

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 22

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

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34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
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JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 143

ROBERTS COMMISSION PROCEEDINGS

[a] NOTE.—The following are brief transcripts of statements made by officers to the Commission during their meetings in the Munitions Building in Washington on December 18 and 19, 1941. The Commission's expressed purpose in consulting these officers before leaving for Honolulu was to get a preliminary outline of the questions involved in the inquiry, and to learn to what extent data on this subject would be available in Hawaii.

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, was invited to make a statement.

General Marshall outlined a number of informative or warning messages sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. These were habitually sent after conferences between the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Sometimes only one message was sent to reach both the military and naval commanders in Hawaii. This was principally to protect the code. The despatches referred to coincided closely with critical developments in the course of negotiations with Japan. General Marshall mentioned such a message shortly before sanctions were imposed on Japan by the United States in July, 1941, and again on October 16, 1941, November 24 and November 27, 1941. The last two messages were warnings in connection with a forecast of the breakdown of [b] negotiations.

General Marshall said that copies of paraphrases of these despatches would be found by the Commission in Hawaii. General Marshall spoke at some length about a message sent by him to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on the morning of December 7. It was not delivered and decoded until after the attack.

Admiral H. R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, was present while General Marshall was making his statement. He concurred in General Marshall's description of the close liaison between these two officers, and commented on the despatches sent to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet on the same or nearby dates as the messages sent by General Marshall. Both General Marshall and Admiral Stark referred to the situation in the eastern Pacific before December 7, and both mentioned the titles of certain key plans and joint plans in effect on and before December 7 and obligatory upon the officers in command in Hawaii in both services.

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner, Director of War Plans Division in the office of Naval Operations, was present with Admiral Stark, and when called upon supplemented Admiral Stark's statement with particulars concerning the joint plans and subsidiary orders and agreements.

Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, was present, and mentioned the Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5, the Joint Coastal Frontier [c] Defense Plan

prepared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant 14th Naval District, and General Gerow said this was in course of revision on December 7. It appeared also that consistent with these plans and joint plans the commanding officers of both services in Hawaii had by agreement drawn joint operating plans of their own. The Commission was assured that copies of these and similar documents would be available to the Commission in Hawaii.

None of the officers who appeared was sworn.

DECEMBER 19, 1941.

General Sherman Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence, made a statement to the Commission. He was not sworn.

General Miles described the function of the intelligence service, which is to inform the high command of the War Department of the existing situation and furnish it with estimates of the situation. He spoke in some detail of the several messages sent July to December, 1941, which were mentioned in the statements of officers yesterday. General Miles also spoke of methods and means of obtaining intelligence of Japanese plans and movements. By direction of the Commission, however, no notation was made of General Miles' statements under this head.

Captain Theodore Wilkinson, U. S. N., Chief of the [d] Office of Naval Intelligence, supplemented the statement of General Miles. Captain Wilkinson was asked to describe the extent of liaison between the Navy Department and the State Department and did so, but by direction this was not noted. Captain Wilkinson was asked about information received in his office from Hawaii. He stated that information received by the Army and the Navy intelligence services were as a matter of course exchanged between them.

Colonel Bratton, U. S. A., and Lieutenant Colonel French, U. S. A., made unsworn statements having to do with the sending and method of sending of the despatch mentioned yesterday by General Marshall as having been sent by him on the morning of December 7 to General Short, to be imparted also to Admiral Kimmel. This was the message which was not received until after the attack. Colonel French's statement went into the details of sending from Washington via San Francisco and covered such information as the War Department has of the circumstances surrounding the receipt and delivery of the message in Hawaii.

Major General Charles D. Herron, retired, was invited to appear. He was not sworn. General Herron preceded General Short in command of the Hawaiian Department. He was interrogated on the subject of maneuvers, training, and joint maneuvers. He stated among other things that the cooperation between Army and Navy was close in Hawaii, and the interchange of information and views was increasingly complete during the time of his command. He also mentioned cooperation with the [e] civil authorities there. He spoke of his special interest in intercepting devices to detect the approach of airplanes and surface craft, and mentioned his reliance upon frequent personal inspections. He was questioned as to his views of the possibility of attack by Japan without warning and of such an attack by air. He said this subject was a matter of constant thought and frequent consultation with the Navy.

Owing to the tentative and preliminary nature of the hearings on December 18 and 19, 1941, the Commission decided that it was unnecessary to have the statements of the above mentioned officers noted stenographically and verbatim. The foregoing condensed statements have been prepared by the Recorder and the Secretary to the Commission from stenographic notes taken by him at the time, showing mainly topics taken up in the several statements.

[f] Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, having examined the transcript of his testimony given before this Commission on December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, and having on January 5, 1942, by letter to the Commission (See transcript page 1470 et seq.) recommended certain revisions of that transcript, the Commission approved each of those recommendations and incorporated each of them in the transcript by interleaving the text of each suggested revision on a page immediately following each page referred to in the said letter. The Commission directed that the transcript thus revised is the transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony on the dates above mentioned. Nevertheless, in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's further request, it directed that his testimony of December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, be copied with each of the revisions incorporated in the copied text to effect a clean copy without interleaved errata. That copy has been made in one volume, in duplicate, pages S-1 to S-226, inclusive, and on January 24, 1942, verified by the Recorder to the Commission as to the correctness of each revision, and it is annexed to each of the two sets of 16 volumes each of the transcript, to be deposited respectively in the secret archives of the Departments of War and Navy, but by direction of the Commission not made a part of said transcript. The said annexed volume accompanies the 16 volumes of the transcripts and is marked "Annex to transcript and not a part thereof: A copy of the transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel given before the Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Territory of Hawaii, and revised by authority of the Commission in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's request."

WALTER BRUCE HOWE
Recorder to the Commission.

[1]

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[2] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

MONDAY, DECEMBER 22, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 10:45 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

There was a brief informal discussion outside the record, following which Lieutenant Colonel William E. Donegan was called into the hearing room.)

STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM E. DONEGAN

The CHAIRMAN. What have you there, Colonel?

Colonel DONEGAN. I have here——

General MCCOY. Let us get the colonel's name, rank, and position.

The CHAIRMAN. Your name?

Colonel DONEGAN. William B. Donegan, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps.

General MCCOY. May I ask, Colonel, before you begin, how long you have been in this position?

Colonel DONEGAN. To give the background, General, I was detailed down here as an infantry officer in April, 1940. From September, 1940, to July, 1941, I was on detached service, infantry, in G-3. In July, 1941, I was placed on general staff as assistant, G-3. On November 5, [3] 1941, I was detailed as G-3 Hawaiian Department.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were about to say, "I have here——"

General MCCOY. May I ask if there is any specific section of G-3 charged with the war plans?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. I would like to stress strongly, to save the time of the Commission, that Major Lawton, General Staff Corps,

is directly in charge of joint Army-Navy activities and is the Army liaison officer with the Navy. He has the background of this study. He is present outside.

General McCoy. Could we have him in with the Colonel? and that would save time.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have him in, sir.

General McCoy. And we can request them both then together.

(At this point Major William S. Lawton entered the hearing room.)

Colonel DONEGAN. Gentlemen, this is Major Lawton.

The CHAIRMAN. Major, glad to see you. What is the full name, Major?

Major LAWTON. William S. Lawton, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Sit down, if you will, sir. We have asked you to come in with the Colonel so that we may ask you indifferently questions; that will save time, enlighten us.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Colonel, what is the first paper you have produced?

Colonel DONEGAN. I hadn't planned any presentation.

The CHAIRMAN. No; I understand that.

Colonel DONEGAN. First, I have the joint coastal frontier defense plan.

General McCoy. That is the one that Major Lawton is in charge of?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. It is signed by General Short and Admiral Block, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. How had we better go through this?

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I personally want to look at those plans.

Colonel DONEGAN. I have the official record I can get.

General McNARNEY. If you have two or three copies we can glance through them.

Admiral REEVES. He can give you a list of what he has.

[4] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Now, what have you there in addition to that document?

Colonel DONEGAN. I brought in field order No. 1, which is the operations order for the Hawaiian Department.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it dated?

Colonel DONEGAN. Dated the 28th of November, 1941. And standing operating procedure of the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 November, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. I have notes, resume of the activities of the major echelons of the Department as of December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. That is only as of the day in question?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. It is a periodic report of G-3 and activities for that day.

General McCoy. Those were all in effect on the day of December 7, were they?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the latest?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the joint plan, Colonel?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you undertake to tell us briefly what the Army's responsibilities were under that joint plan?

Colonel DONEGAN. I would prefer to have Major Lawton do it, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Very well. Let Major Lawton do it.

STATEMENT OF MAJOR WILLIAM S. LAWTON

Major LAWTON. These are very definitely stated in the plan, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you think it unwise to attempt to summarize? Would it be better for us to study the plan ourselves?

Major LAWTON. Well, they are listed here in the plan very briefly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I think I could read them, and right from the plan would be very exact, sir, and brief.

[5] The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Major LAWTON. First, the method of coordination. The commanding general of the Hawaiian Department and the commandant of the 14 Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked. That is the basis of operation of the plan.

As to tasks, the joint task is to hold Oahu and the main outlying naval base and to control and protect shipping in the coastal zone. The Army task is to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land, and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, to support the naval forces; Navy task, to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein and to support the Army forces.

Under the Army there are definite missions assigned. The commanding general, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for the beach and land, seacoast, and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor naval base and naval forces present, and at Honolulu Harbor, City of Honolulu, and the Schofield Barracks, Wheeler Field, Lualualei. Lualualei is the munition depot. The increasing importance of Kanoche area is recognized.

General MCCOY. Of the what?

Major LAWTON. Kanoche. That is the naval air station at Ulupau Peninsula.

The next mission of the Army provides for an anti-aircraft and gas defense, intelligence and warning services, protection of landing field and naval installations on outlying islands consistent with available forces, defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, water, power, and for interior guard and sabotage except within naval establishments, defense against sabotage within the Hawaiian Islands except within naval shore establishments, establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol, and an aerial [6] observation system on outlying islands, and an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, support of naval aircraft forces in major offensive operations at sea conducted within range of Army bombers, provide personnel for and Army communications facilities to harbor patrol posts provided for in paragraph 18.

[7] The next paragraph, briefly: to provide a system of land communications by teletype, telegraph loops, and also radio intercepts;

an intelligence service which in addition to normal function will gather, evaluate, and distribute, both to the Army and the Navy, information of activities of enemy aliens or alien sympathizers within the Hawaiian Islands, counterespionage within the Islands, control of dangerous aliens within the Islands, Army measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communications system, supply of all Army and civil population in the Hawaiian Islands, hospitalization of the same, reception and distribution of personnel and supplies for the Army and of supplies for the civilian population.

Colonel BROWN. Let me suggest, sir, he is just reading; this is all in writing, and he could just get a note of the page read and get it that way.

Admiral REEVES. We do not want to take them.

The CHAIRMAN. We do not want to take these papers.

Colonel BROWN. But you are taking the full data there.

The CHAIRMAN. We would rather not take the papers, and leave it in the hands of the stenographer and copy them; do you not think so?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Major LAWTON. That completes the provisions for the Army.

Admiral REEVES. Those are the tasks of the Army?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think you read one that said warning devices, operation of warning devices on the Islands?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include the operation and responsibility for the use of these detectors that had been set up on the Islands?

Major LAWTON. The radio detectors of the aircraft warning service, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it was the Army's task to operate these detecting stations?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. That is including antiaircraft warning [8] services for the Hawaiian Islands.

Colonel DONEGAN. Probably the Navy.

Major LAWTON. The Navy's responsibility is as follows:

- (a) An inshore patrol;
- (b) An offshore patrol;
- (c) An escort force;
- (d) An attack force;
- (e) To provide and maintain a harbor control post for joint defense of Pearl and Honolulu Harbors;
- (f) Installation and operation of underwater defense for Pearl and Honolulu Harbors;
- (g) Support of Army forces in the Oahu defensive coastal area and installation of submarine mine fields in the defense of Oahu defensive coastal area, as may be deemed necessary and practicable;
- (h) Sweeping channels and mine fields;
- (i) Distant reconnaissance;
- (j) Attacking enemy naval forces;
- (k) Maintenance of interior guard and defense against sabotage within all naval shore establishments;

(l) In conjunction with the Army and local communications service—I will brief some of these here instead of reading them complete, as they are not sufficiently pertinent;

(m) Navy measures to assure effective supervision, control, and censorship over communications systems, in conformity with joint Action Army and Navy 1935;

(n) Operation of a naval intelligence system, including counter-espionage, for the collection, evaluation, and dissemination of hostile information;

(o) Supply and hospitalization of all local naval defense forces; and

(p) Operation or supervision of all water transportation and facilities pertaining thereto.

[9] As pertinent to the discussion, I would like to emphasize in that particular paragraph, paragraph (i), the responsibility for distant reconnaissance, which was made a responsibility of the Navy, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. We have a letter I would like to present to the Commission.

General MCCOY. Before you get off of that I would like to ask, Mr. Justice, a question or two in regard to these plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead, sir.

General MCCOY. Colonel, these joint plans were plans agreed to by the commanding general and the commandant of the district?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What responsibility, if any, did the commander-in-chief U. S. Fleet have in this connection?

Colonel DONEGAN. He was not included in this joint plan.

General MCCOY. In the joint plan.

Colonel DONEGAN. Which is a plan signed by Admiral Block and General Short. Admiral Block is the base defense commander.

General MCCOY. In other words, it was necessary—

Colonel DONEGAN. Did not pertain to the fleet.

General MCCOY. That was on the general idea, I imagine, that the fleet itself had freedom of action?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And that the particular plan here was that the fleet could go and come without being concerned about the safety—

Colonel DONEGAN (interposing). Yes, sir; exactly, sir.

General MCCOY. Of the defense excepting the broader strategy of operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Complete operations.

That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, these plans, joint plans: Were they approved by the Chief of Staff?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

[10] Admiral STANDLEY. And the Chief of Naval Operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir, they were. I have the data.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were approved before being put into effect?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And do you know: are they based on the general or are they based on the basic Army-Navy basic joint plans for national defense?

Colonel DONEGAN. Based on the Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, which is the basic document.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The basic document was presented to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the one that assigns the task.

The CHAIRMAN. Exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is based on that.

The CHAIRMAN. On that.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then it is approved by the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. By the Chief of Staff.

General McNARNEY. Was a copy of Rainbow No. 5 operations order of the Army, of the War Department, available when this plan was drawn?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

Major LAWTON. No, sir. This plan is dated 11 April, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941?

Major LAWTON. 11 April, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. 11 April, 1941?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. I think it was dated March. We got it sometime around July. We can check it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Colonel's statement ought to be taken on that.

Colonel DONEGAN. I can check outside, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just hold that answer open until he checks.

Admiral STANDLEY. On those basic plans dated April, had there been any changes up to December 7 in those plans?

[11] Major LAWTON. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Those were the plans as of that day?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

General MCCOY. There were no changes made after the warning orders came, then?

Major LAWTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume the files produced here, Major, do not include the warning orders from the Chief of Staff's office?

Major LAWTON. Between November 27 and December 7, no, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have those, have you not, your office? They are under your cognizance, are they not?

Major LAWTON. I haven't them, no, sir. I believe the Chief of Staff has them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is the officer that would have cognizance of operations as a result of those orders?

Major LAWTON. That would be G-3, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. G-3. Is that the Chief of Staff?

Major LAWTON. No. Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall have to wait until he comes back. Had you any questions?

General McNARNEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. You have before you and you have produced here a chart defining the sea areas and the coastal areas, and that chart indi-

cates that the coastal area is a belt 20 miles out to sea from the outermost point of any island, roughly drawn 20 miles outside the shore line; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army had functions in connection with the 20-mile belt, as I understand you: first, to use its artillery for the protection of that zone?

Major LAWTON. Around Oahu the area is covered.

The CHAIRMAN. Around Oahu?

[12] Major LAWTON. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area.

The CHAIRMAN. And does that extend more than 20 miles to sea?

Major LAWTON. No, sir. There are a number of various areas that are described. They are quite confusing in description.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we are interested particularly in Oahu.

Major LAWTON. Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have a 20-mile zone or belt outside of Oahu for which the Army has some task, has some responsibility, is that right or not?

Major LAWTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now tell me what is the fact.

Major LAWTON. We have an Oahu defensive coastal area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. Which is described in this document as comprising all water areas within the areas of circles and the connecting tangents drawn with points as centers and respective radii as follows. I think maybe I had better read them into the record:

Keahu Point, 49,000 yards;

Puu Kapolei, 45,000 yards;

Puuiki Station and Kahuku Point, each 23,000 yards.

Those are the limits to which our gunfire can reach on the Island of Oahu. The 49,000-yard and 45,000-yard arcs are those bounded by swing of arc of the 16-inch gun position. The Puuiki Station and the Kahuku arcs are determined by ranges of 8-inch railway guns in the vicinity of those localities.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I interrupt you there a moment, Major? You say that is a defensive sea area.

Major LAWTON. What?

Admiral STANDLEY. I say, you have the defensive sea area. Is that in accordance with the definition of "defensive sea area" as prescribed in the basic plans, and has it the same significance?

Major LAWTON. The defensive sea area. I believe I read this defensive sea area as being this 20-mile limit. The defensive sea area [13] has been recently changed to a limit within three miles of the shores, to come within the sea area controlled by the Government of the United States, I think it is. I believe that is why it was changed. But the defensive sea area is now three miles from the shores of the various points.

Admiral STANDLEY. In our basic plans we have a defensive sea area.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the definition of it.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, is that the same as the sea area that has been prescribed by the Navy Department as the defensive sea area for the Hawaiian Islands?

Major LAWTON. This area that I described was, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is described by the Navy Department?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, recently that has been changed?

Major LAWTON. It has recently been changed.

Admiral STANDLEY. By the Navy Department?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Isn't that the definition of "defensive sea area"?

Major LAWTON. Yes. The Joint Action Army-Navy 1935, that was changed.

Admiral STANDLEY. That means that area in which all shipping must be controlled by the Navy?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Isn't that the only significance that the defensive sea area has?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the fact that you have defensive artillery for shore batteries has nothing to do with it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I intended to bring out.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with respect to the coastal area, [14] did the aircraft of the Army have any task?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir, under this Oahu defensive coastal area, which is the area I am speaking of now within gun range of our batteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Major LAWTON. And one of the items I read under the responsibilities of the Army was: establishment of an inshore patrol of the waters of the Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what do you mean by an inshore patrol?

Major LAWTON. That is the patrol by the Navy of the waters—of the approaches to the harbors.

The CHAIRMAN. So there was a joint task for Army and Navy fliers in that area?

Major LAWTON. Well, Army fliers to do the flying in that area in conjunction with the Navy inshore patrol, which is a surface patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Oh, the naval patrol is a surface patrol?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Army's was an air patrol jointly with it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the farthest to sea the Army fliers were to go except in emergency where they were to aid Navy fliers in an actual fight; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Well, I have a letter here in that regard, sir, that I intend to bring up next, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I think that will explain that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Major LAWTON. This is an agreement between Admiral Block, as commandant of the 14 Naval District, and General [15] Short, as commanding the Hawaiian Department (reading):

Subject: Joint air operations. Dated 20 March, 1941. With respect to distant reconnaissance, paragraph 3: When naval forces are insufficient for long-distance

patrol and search operation and Army aircrafts are made available these aircrafts will be under the tactical control of the Navy commander directing the operation.

In other words, on call the commandant 14 Naval District could request assistance from the Army, in which case, if they did, these airplanes were turned over to the Navy and are operated directly under their command and control. They were completely out of the hands of the commandant of the Hawaiian Department and became part of the Navy's system of long-range or distant reconnaissance. The fact that we might give them planes would in no way interfere with the responsibility laid down in this document.

The CHAIRMAN. How is that?

Major LAWTON. The fact that we might give the Navy or loan the Navy planes would in no way change the responsibilities as laid down in this document.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

General McCoy. Was that in effect on the 7th of November?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Seventh of December.

Major LAWTON. It was in effect. This document was in effect—it is dated the 20th of March, 1941, but between the 27th of November and the 6th of December or prior to the 7th, including the 6th of December, no request was made upon the Army for airplanes for this purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. Is there anything in those appendices resulting from the installation by the Army of the detector [16] service and the method by which that warning should be quickly relayed to the Navy?

Colonel DONEGAN. In the separate command.

Major LAWTON. No, sir. That is generally covered in this document on the interchange of information, but no definite system established in these agreements.

General McCoy. There is nothing there definitely referring in any of the appendices to the new method of detection by this system that was established when?

Major LAWTON. No, sir, not in detail; merely the fact that the Army is responsible for the aircraft warning service.

General McCoy. Yes, but how did they get the result of that service to the Navy?

Major LAWTON. As it has been established, as it has been built up, as material and equipment have become available, we have established an information center to which this information from the aircraft warning service comes. In there there is a representative of the Commandant 14 Naval District, who is an officer from Patrol Wing 2 to give them the information regarding any airplanes, ships, and so forth, that may be picked up on the board, and relay it directly and immediately to the Navy.

General McCoy. That is the responsibility, then, of the naval officer in the information service, is it?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir; he is given the information right there, and it is his responsibility to relay it.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I continue the questions?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what is the status of that order, sir, of the officer's duties? Is he ordered to report to the commanding general or whoever is in charge of the post as liaison officer? What are his orders; do you know?

Major LAWTON. I have never seen his orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would those be found?

[17] Admiral STANDLEY. The commandant.

The CHAIRMAN. The commandant.

Major LAWTON. I would believe at the 14 Naval District, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The orders with respect to your representative in the information post are available, I take it, here?

Major LAWTON. Just in the establishment of the aircraft warning service information center; it is a general order establishing that service, which includes all the elements that go to make it up, sir.

General McCoy. I think that might be furnished us.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I would like to see the order, please.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a note of that, Mr. Recorder, that we want the general order establishing the aircraft warning service of the Army.

Major LAWTON. Well, that is, I think its primary establishment is in our standing operating procedure in this document, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you look and see?

Major LAWTON. There are two documents here. One is Field Order No. 1 and the other the standing operating procedure. Under Field Order No. 1, the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, 53 Coast Artillery Brigade, anti-aircraft, and attached units, including available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery and the aircraft warning service in the anti-aircraft defense of Oahu. Now, that is the basis for the establishment of the aircraft warning service and its responsibility.

General McCoy. Who is responsible for that service in the Army, and to whom does it operate?

Major LAWTON. The interceptor command operates with an air officer in command. The actual operation of the sets is [18] a Signal Corps function, sir, and is supervised by the Department Signal Officer, Colonel Powell.

General McCoy. What is the name of the officer who was in command of it and in charge of it and responsible for it on that day?

Major LAWTON. Colonel Powell is the Department Signal Officer who controls the operation of the aircraft warning service sets. The interceptor command was operated by General Davidson of the Air Force on the day in question.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you had part of another order, you said, that applied.

Colonel DONEGAN. S. O. P.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. Under "Standing Operating Procedure": The interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircrafts, anti-aircraft artillery, including available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service

and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

- (1) arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft;
- (2) the coordination of the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors;
- (3) transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, were the same officers you have named—

Major LAWTON. General Davidson.

The CHAIRMAN. —responsible under that order?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. This is merely an amplification of the Field Order 1, and this part of the document is restricted. That document is secret. This is put out to give it the greatest dissemination to the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the first document from which you read is secret?

[19] Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Second is a general order to go to troops?

Colonel DONEGAN. Well—

Major LAWTON. It is a—

Colonel DONEGAN. Go ahead.

It is restricted so that we can give a greater distribution on Field Order No. 1. We gave those to the major echelon commanders: division commanders, air force commanders, and Coast Artillery commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. Referring now to No. 1?

Colonel DONEGAN. No. 1, yes, sir. This (indicating)—

The CHAIRMAN. Referring now to the general operations?

Colonel DONEGAN. S. O. P., "Standing Operating Procedure," which is a break-down of Field Order No. 1, and a lot of the secret information, particularly concerning ammunition, C. P.'s, and other secret information, is deleted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel DONEGAN. In order that it could get down to the regiments and battalions, lower echelons.

The CHAIRMAN. Four echelons?

Colonel DONEGAN. Lower echelons, lower units.

Admiral REEVES. Major, referring to the Aircraft Warning Service, was it part of their duty to transmit these warnings to all concerned, both Army and Navy? Was that part of the Aircraft Warning Service?

Major LAWTON. No, sir. They got the information at the information center.

The CHAIRMAN. "They" meaning the Navy or other—

Major LAWTON. The Aircraft Warning Service got the information at the information center. These stations are set up at various points around the Island. They are connected by telephone to this center, where there is a large map board. As information comes in it is plotted on the map board. Various tellers sit above this board on a raised platform and can see [20] the information as it comes in plotted on the board. If there are many airplanes moving in a certain direction, or one airplane, unknown or friendly, that information is available to each one of these tellers the minute it is placed on

the board. There is an evaluator or control officer there, who, in case of doubt of a flight, attempts to evaluate the information. Each officer—the naval officer present and the pursuit and bombardment officers present are expected to keep track of all the planes they have in the air and know where they are, so that when a flight appears on the board the controller briefly will ask if anyone claims that flight; and if it is a Navy flight in that area he claims it, and it is immediately marked “Friendly.” If it is an Army flight, why, it is also so claimed. Any flights that are not claimed are put down as “Unknown,” which is practically synonymous with “Enemy” if enemy forces are known to be capable of being in the vicinity.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think Admiral Reeves wanted to know in a little more detail what your arrangement was whereby the naval commander got that information.

Major LAWTON. That was transmitted by this naval——

The CHAIRMAN. Teller?

Major LAWTON. Naval representative from Patrol Wing 2, who had a direct line to Patrol Wing 2. From there it was relayed to the harbor control post.

Admiral REEVES. All I wanted to know, specifically, was not who did this duty but whose responsibility it was. An Aircraft Warning Service is of no value if the information is not transmitted to those who are interested.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Was that part of the responsibility of the Aircraft Warning Service?

General McCoy. Isn't that covered in your order there that you just read?

[21] Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir, if you read the Order No. 1. I think it covers that point, and I wanted to clear it up.

Major LAWTON. I think I know that. “The interceptor command will”—in the third item, transmission of——

Admiral REEVES. That is the item.

Major LAWTON. Let me see how it is worded—“will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies”?

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the answer.

[22] Admiral REEVES. Yes. All I wanted to know is whose responsibility it is to transmit the aircraft warning to the proper people, both Army and Navy. Is that a part of the aircraft warning service?

You see what I want to know?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major LAWTON. I hesitate to say, sir, definitely. This order here is purely an Army order. This is not a joint order here. It says he is responsible for transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies. That is an Army order.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, an Army order, but the Army had the duty and responsibility of this aircraft warning service, did it not?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And did that duty include the transmission of the warning? The warning is not a warning unless it is transmitted to somebody.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did this aircraft warning service include the transmission of the warning to Army and Navy people concerned?

Major LAWTON. I would sooner have General Davidson, the Interceptor Commander, answer that question, sir, but I would like to say that I believe that the way that responsibility was set up was for the Army to get the information, tell immediately or see immediately that his naval officer present in the information center got it. It was then his responsibility to telephone that to the Navy, to the Pat. Wing 2, which in turn transmitted it to the Harbor Patrol Board.

Admiral REEVES. Such an arrangement would be an information rather than a warning service, would it not? The Army would collect the information, but if they didn't transmit that it would not be a warning.

Major LAWTON. That is right.

[23] General McNARNEY. It would be a warning once it was turned over to the proper naval officer.

Admiral REEVES. Well, what I am trying to clear up is whose responsibility it is to transmit this warning for the Army.

Major LAWTON. I think it is the Army's responsibility to give it to the naval officer in the Naval Information Center. It is then his responsibility to transmit it farther than that. It is given to the Navy, to that officer in the Information Center. What he does with it thereafter is purely his naval function.

Admiral REEVES. Well, he then becomes a part of Army's aircraft warning service, doesn't he?

Major LAWTON. He is a liaison officer, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. He is a member of the aircraft Army warning service?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. He is a liaison officer at the information center representing Pat. Wing 2. He is there to watch the board, as I understand it. He is not there under control of General Davidson.

Major LAWTON. No, he is not under control of the Army officer, if that is what the Admiral means.

The CHAIRMAN. As I get your statement, Major, it is that whatever the order may spell out itself, the officers in command worked out a system whereby those who were interested, whether Army or Navy, sat at this board.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And obtained the information, and it was their responsibility to transmit it either to the Army or to the Navy, as the case might be.

Major LAWTON. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever the order might spell, that was [24] the practice that was in vogue at the time?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a common service?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And those individuals, whether Army or Navy, were really carrying out the duty of this aircraft warning service, because that is a part of the duty?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. I think that is correct, sir.

Admiral REEVES. This naval officer, then, was serving in the Army aircraft warning service by transmitting the warnings?

Major LAWTON. He was serving within it, yes, sir, but not under the command of the Interceptor Commander at all, sir. He is merely in there to get that information.

General MCCOY. You speak of the Information Center. Whom was that under?

Major LAWTON. That comes under the Interceptor Commander, sir. That is the aircraft warning service Interceptor Commander. The aircraft warning service is under the Interceptor Commander, as stated in those orders.

Colonel DONEGAN. That is General Davidson.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. That office and all those serving in that office were under this Army officer who had control of this warning office?

The CHAIRMAN. So I take it.

Major LAWTON. Except, Admiral, that General Davidson did not direct this naval officer to do anything particularly with this information. He had it and could send it to any naval agencies that he saw fit to send it to.

General MCCOY. In other words, he was a liaison officer, instead of being there to report to the commander, General Davidson?

[25] Major LAWTON. Yes, sir. He was not under General Davidson's command at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if he did not appear on a given morning it was not a matter of discipline for General Davidson to handle?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was a Navy function?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To see that he was there; is that right?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And then this system of aircraft warning, so far as the Army was concerned, stopped dead in this office and never reached the Navy unless the Navy did something about it?

Major LAWTON. Under the normal setup, yes, sir. However, if the naval officer was not there during drills and an officer was available, he would relay such information as he could, but the Army did not feel the responsibility for warning that naval function, sir.

Admiral REEVES. For warning the Navy?

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And the aircraft warning service, for which the Army was responsible, did not feel responsible for notifying or warning the Navy of any aircraft?

Colonel DONEGAN. Are you qualified to state that at all? It is General Davidson's function.

Major LAWTON. The operation actually within the intelligence or the interceptor command actual operation as it was carried out, I would prefer that General Davidson answered those questions.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Major LAWTON. I can say how it functioned, but what responsibilities were prescribed within there I cannot say, sir.

[26] Admiral REEVES. You do not feel qualified to interpret this order?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That is not part of it?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We supervise the operation of the interceptor command and the Information Center as an echelon of the Hawaiian air force and under the Department, and General Davidson has been designated as the Interceptor Commander.

General McCoy. I would like to ask that note be made to have the order produced that sent the naval officer, by name, to the Information Center. That would be a Navy order. Because we can question General Davidson, and he may say, "Well, he was sent to me by the Navy." I think it would be well to have the order which sent the naval officer to the information service.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be added to your requests, Mr. Recorder.

General McCoy. Yes, by name; and a copy of the instructions that he had, whether he was to report to General Davidson as a liaison officer or what responsibility General Davidson had for him.

Colonel DONEGAN. May I make a statement off the record for the information of the Commission?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. I think that ought to be a matter of record.

Colonel DONEGAN. What I was trying to get away from, General, is, the operations are within General Davidson's interceptor command. I don't know what orders he put out, but I thought the Commission had the picture that a Navy officer was supposed to be there that morning. To my knowledge I don't believe it was expected that a Navy officer be there [27] at the time of the attack on December 7. Do you agree to that?

Major LAWTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. We are a little ahead of what we are trying to get now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think we are.

General McNARNEY. Yes, finally.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we have got enough on the record now so that we shall not forget to go into this matter, but perhaps we ought to get those in command to tell us about the situation.

General McCoy. Yes.

General McNARNEY. If I might make a suggestion, I would suggest the Commission study the Joint Basic Plan, the Field Order No. 1, and the Standing Operating Procedure, and the military members determine whether or not in their opinion they are tactically and strategically sound, clear, and concise and in sufficient detail so that if carried out they would have provided a reasonable defense for Oahu. I think we should determine that before we ask a lot of questions. In other words, at the present moment, unless I know what the standing orders and procedure were, I cannot really ask an intelligent question. I can get a lot of details and a mass of data, but I cannot apply them. I would like to study these documents before we go ahead.

[28] The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, is there anything else that these gentlemen need bring us for study at the moment, or have you got what you need, General?

General McNARNEY. Well, this will do for the time being, and of course as we get further along we should go into the standing orders of the Air Force particularly. We are not particularly concerned with the ground troops because they did not come into the picture, but we are very much concerned with the operations of the Air Force, and I would like to have the detailed orders issued by General Martin, by General Davidson, and by the bomber command also.

The CHAIRMAN. Now have we called for this note before?

General McNARNEY. No, sir, we have not called for the detailed Air Force orders yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it time to call for them now so as to have them ready when we get to them?

General McNARNEY. Well, we should first study this. I do not want to take on too much at one time.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Just keep it in mind, what you need secondarily.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, can these gentlemen leave these here for study for the time being?

General McNARNEY. I see no reason why they should not. If you happen to have some more copies around here it might be well to furnish them.

Colonel DONEGAN. You can get the official copies at the adjutant general's office.

The CHAIRMAN. That would give one copy all around.

Major LAWTON. May I make a statement in connection with the question of Admiral Reeves, which I am not quite sure of the purpose of his question, but I would like to state that in the Aircraft Warning Service and the interceptor command we have had joint drills twice a month for some little while, and [29] the naval representative was there, and the Army commander with his staff, and we actually went through all the motions, including the sending out of airplanes to intercept—to locate and bomb sleds which were towed by carriers, and bombers, in accordance with joint agreement, acting under control of Pat. Wing 2, and our pursuit ships were sent out by the interceptor command to intercept the attacking planes coming in. The system actually worked, and the information relayed, and has been operated through drills, relayed by the naval liaison officer to the proper naval agency. As to details of those, I think General Davidson can give much more than I can, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, while you were out it was asked whether the warnings of November 24 and 27 were received by the Army.

Colonel DONEGAN. Referring to radios from the War Department?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. Generally they were.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom would they go when received?

Colonel DONEGAN. They came in here to the signal officer. In sequence they were decoded, sent by officer messenger to our department adjutant general, who personally takes secret messages of that type up to the chief of staff, and the chief of staff presented them immediately to the department commander. It is a standard routine.

The CHAIRMAN. Standard procedure?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How long does that routine generally take?

Colonel DONEGAN. With the exception, sir, the message of—

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how did those messages come to you? By radio from Washington?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir; in code.

The CHAIRMAN. In code?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

[30] The CHAIRMAN. Over the Army's radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir. All messages came over the Army radio except the message of December 6-7 which came over R. C. A.

The CHAIRMAN. We know that. Well, now, perhaps following General McNarney's suggestion we can excuse these gentlemen now and discuss these orders. Is that satisfactory to the Commissioners?

Admiral STANDLEY. Ask him one more question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Admiral STANDLEY. Does he know why that message of December 7 came over R. C. A.?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why that message came over R. C. A.?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We were on the receiving end.

The CHAIRMAN. I know you were.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know the reason why that did not come by radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. No, sir. We have never had a break in our communications.

Admiral STANDLEY. In your radio?

Colonel DONEGAN. It has been functioning continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, Colonel, who is the signal officer who was responsible for the operation of your receiving station on the morning of December 7?

Colonel DONEGAN. Colonel Powell is the Department signal officer who is responsible for all signal activities.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now shall we excuse these gentlemen and keep these papers for the time being?

Major LAWTON. I would like to call the attention of the Commission to Annex No. 7 in this plan, which provides for joint security measures, protection of fleet and Pearl Harbor base.

[31] The CHAIRMAN. Annex 7?

Major. LAWTON. Yes, sir. This provision was not actually in effect that morning, but it was a provision—an agreement that was made to take care of such an event.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not in effect that morning?

Major LAWTON. It was not in effect, no, sir.

Admiral REEVES. When was it made?

Major LAWTON. It was made the 28th of March, 1941, and signed the 2d of April, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why it was not in effect that morning?

Major LAWTON. Because there was no indication whatsoever here that there was an outside threat.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you said that the alert that was in effect was Alert No. 1?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not an alert, if I understood you correctly, against airplane raid?

Colonel DONEGAN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But was against sabotage only?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, of course, what state of alert you were in depended upon the orders issued by the commander here?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir; also depended upon the information that the commander had.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Colonel DONEGAN. We had no information of any kind that there was a threat from without, and our radios from the War Department on October 16, which I think the Commission has seen,—

The CHAIRMAN. We have seen them.

Colonel DONEGAN. —27, and 28, all referred to sabotage and not to take any action to arouse.

The CHAIRMAN. We are familiar with those, October 16, [32] 27, and 28.

General MCCOY. Well, the Army furnished the Navy warning of November 27 where it said, "This is a war warning"?

Colonel DONEGAN. Not to my knowledge, sir. I didn't see it. If the Department commander did, I didn't see it. The general mentioned the date November 27, on November 28 the commander sent a radio to the adjutant general stating that this Department was on alert for sabotage and in liaison with the Navy, but there was nothing in—the radio you refer to I have no knowledge of.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we will excuse you gentlemen for the time being. I hardly need say to you that on your honor as officers I request that nothing that takes place here be disclosed outside.

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do not discuss it with anyone.

Major LAWTON. Yes, sir.

Colonel DONEGAN. Do you want the other witnesses to remain outside?

The CHAIRMAN. Who are they, and for what purpose are they?

Colonel DONEGAN. G-2 was here; he is gone.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will send for them if we need them. They are easily available, I take it?

Colonel DONEGAN. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon Colonel Donegan and Major Lawton left the hearing room.)

[33]

VII, par. 6

Upon establishment of aircraft warning service, provision will be made for their transmission of information of the location of distant hostile and unfriendly aircraft. Special wire or radio circuits will be made available for the use of the naval liaison officers so that they may make their own evaluation of available information and transmit them to their respective organizations. The information relating to the presence or movement of hostile aircraft offshore from Oahu, which is secured through naval channels will be transmitted without delay to the aircraft warning service information center.

VII, par. 7.

The several joint communications systems listed in paragraphs 3 and 4 (these are the wire and radio systems on the Island) after establishment will be manned and operated. No. 2 alerts, joint exercises which involve these communications systems and such other facilities as may be agreed upon by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, and the naval base defense officer.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will be under the necessity of explaining in its report in some way how the injunctions of the Army and Navy defense plan, the local Hawaiian defense plan, made pursuant to the over-all plan of the two departments and other subsidiary plans, which were obligated on both commanders, are to be summarized and stated so as to indicate the propriety of the commanders' following the injunctions in these various plans.

The Army and Navy probably will not consent to our quoting the plans in extenso or naming them so as to identify them.

After the Recorder has submitted to the Commission a form and the Commission has agreed upon the form, the consent of the War and Navy Departments to the use of the form will have to be obtained before it can be embodied in our report.

(There is attached summary dated 22 December, 1941, signed by Kendall J. Felder, Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.)

[33a]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 22 December 1941.

1. SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION AS OF 7:30 A. M., 7 DECEMBER 1941:

A. *Naval Operations*: No knowledge of Japanese naval vessels in waters farther East than the China sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27th and December 7th, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. *Air Operations*: No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. *Local Situation*: Instructions from the War Department announced that the international situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

(1) *Diplomatic Activities*: On Saturday, December 6th, it was learned through local investigative agencies that papers at the Japanese consulate were being destroyed by burning.

(2) *Concentration & Movements of Local Aliens*: None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

(3) *Sabotage*: Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the Territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 P. M., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

[33b] D. *Precautions Taken*: Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 Office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

Conclusion:

A. *Capabilities*:

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

Kendall J. Felder,
KENDALL J. FIELDER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

[34] The Commission examined the joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier, short title HCF 41, dated 11 April, 1941. This document establishes the responsibility for the preparation of plans and orders as a basis for their protection, the method of coordination between the Army and Navy, delimits the areas of responsibility and assigns tasks and forces.

The Commission also examined Field Order No. 1 (tentative) Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 28 November, 1941. This document states the mission of the Army forces, distribution of troops and missions of the 24 Infantry Division and 25 Infantry Division, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian air force, Department preserve, Company A First Chemical, and the 11 Tank Company.

The Commission also examined the Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 5 November, 1941. This document covers tactical principles, security, liaison, issuance of orders, movement, anti-aircraft defense, and alarm systems. It defines the different categories of alerts under which the defense will be conducted, the various categories of readiness for aircraft, intelligence operating procedures, essential elements of enemy information, measures to obtain and handle information, the method of supply, evacuation, and traffic control.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this time until tomorrow morning at nine o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 4:15 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 23, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

[34-A] The Commission considered the following extracts from a brief estimate of the situation contained in Section II of the Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940, dated 1st December, 1940.

3. The Enemy.

a. *Probable Enemy.* Any war in the Pacific involving the United States, in so far as can now be foreseen, will be with Orange, which is rated as a first class world power.

b. *Orange Nation.* The capability of the Orange Nation for waging warfare is as outlined in Current War Department Combat, Economic and Political Estimates and amplified in the War Department Digest of Information.

c. *Orange Population in Hawaiian Islands.* A tabulation as of June 30, 1938, shows the Orange population of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS and the ISLAND OF OAHU.

(1) Hawaiian Islands.

	Aliens	Citizens	Total	Dual Citizens	Orange % of Total Population (411,485)
Male.....	19,845	62,605	82,450	(39,441)	
Female.....	17,111	53,978	71,089	(34,006)	
Total.....	36,956	116,583	153,539	(73,447)	*37.31

(2) Island of Oahu.

	Aliens	Citizens	Total	Dual Citizens	Orange % of Total Population (227,140)
Male.....	9,922	31,302	41,224	(19,720)	
Female.....	8,555	26,990	35,545	(17,003)	*33.8

*Percentages of other groups by racial extractions: Filipino, 12.83; Chinese 6.9; Hawaiian and Part Hawaiian 15.1; [34-B] Portuguese 7.4; Porto-Rican 1.8; Korean 1.6; Other Caucasian 16.5 (of which almost half are Army and Navy personnel and their dependents).

d. Forms of hostile attacks. The basis of the forms of attack listed below is the War Department assignment of Category "D" to this Department.

(1) Possibly enemy attacks against the OAHU area in the order of probability are:

- (a) Submarine—torpedo and mine.
- (b) Sabotage.
- (c) Disguised merchant ship attack by blocking channels, by mines, or by air or surface craft.
- (d) Air raids, carrier based.
- (e) Surface ship raids.
- (f) Major combined attack in the absence of the U. S. Fleet.
- (2) *Sabotage and Internal Dissension.*
 - (a) It is believed that the Orange population in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, in event of war, will divide itself as follows:
 - (1) Loyal to the United States. This group will certainly include some American citizens of Japanese origin.
 - (2) Passive until developments indicate definitely the probable victor, when it will join that side. This group will probably include a fair proportion of the aliens and many citizens.
 - (b) Sabotage may include one or more of the following acts:
 - [34-C] (1) Destruction of electric light plants, works, and water supply reservoirs.
 - (2) Destruction of food supplies.
 - (3) Destruction of means of transportation, roads and railroads.
 - (4) Arousing inhabitants to insurrection.

5. a. Basis for Planning.

(1) Missions and Conditions.

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions: The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D (see par. 1 b).

The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange (see par. 1 a).

(b) Possible and Probable War Situations are:

- (1) That sea lanes from continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.
- (2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships' fire and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.
- (3) That the sea lanes from continental United States will be closed and that there may be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make [34-D] no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the "cut-off from the Mainland situation".
- (4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

b. Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

c. Scheme of defense, command organization, and missions assigned to major echelons upon initial deployment:

(1) The defense of Oahu combines an air, naval, antiaircraft, seacoast and beach and land defense, together with the supervision and utilization of civilian activities and utilities and, under martial law, their control. To effectively accomplish this defense, particularly when its elements must be controlled simultaneously, the Department Commander decentralizes his command function by assignment of definite missions of responsibility to major echelon commanders, as follows:

(a) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division.

The beach and land defense of Oahu. (For details, see paragraph 6).

The beach and land defense is based upon the principle of the "position in readiness", which permits concentration of forces in critical areas and assures flexibility to meet external and [34-E] internal attacks.

(b) To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: The antiaircraft and seacoast defense of Oahu and in addition furnishing the necessary support to the beach and land defense and the naval forces. (See paragraph 6).

(c) *To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force:* In carrying out the air defense, he may conduct independent operations or may operate in conjunction with, supported by, or in support of naval air forces, or temporarily under the direction of the Naval Air Force Commander as provided in Chapter II, Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and will cooperate with all forces in direct defense of Oahu.

d. *Assignment of reinforcements received in this Department:* Reinforcements as received will be assigned to commanders to assist them in the missions assigned in paragraph c. above. Reinforcements will be trained in organizations.

e. *Defense of Islands other than Oahu:* Forces available preclude a determined defense of Islands other than OAHU. Units of the Hawaii National Guard, stationed on those Islands will prevent civil disturbances, protect landing fields used by our troops and resist landing attacks. The Hawaiian Air Force will resist use of airports on outlying fields by an enemy.

f. *Supplies for the defense.* See paragraph 11, below.

[35]

C O N T E N T S

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[36] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 23, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission will come to order. Call General Short.

(Thereupon General Walter C. Short entered the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, General?

You do swear by Almighty God, the Searcher of all hearts, that the evidence you are about to give before this Commission shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, and so you shall answer at the last great day?

General SHORT. I do.

[37] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, sir?

General SHORT. Walter C. Short.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

General SHORT. Major General, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Briefly, what had been your service record in the Army, General?

General SHORT. I was commissioned from civilian life as second lieutenant in March, 1902, and as rank from February 2, 1901. I have been in service continuously since that time.

During that period I have had service in the Philippines, Alaska, Mexico, Germany, Puerto Rico, Hawaii. I had approximately 11 months with the Pershing Expedition in Mexico. I went overseas and was gone altogether a little over two years.

The CHAIRMAN. When were you appointed to the post of commander in the Hawaiian Islands, General?

General SHORT. On February 7. I arrived here February 5, but General Herron left on the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. 1941?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you ask for this command?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any influence that was brought to bear or occasioned to obtain the command for you?

General SHORT. I specifically, after the Chief of Staff told me that he was going to designate me, I asked him if there was nothing better than a routine peace-time assignment, then not to do so on account of the health of my wife's father, but he considered it important and ordered me here.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been in continuous command of this department since February 7, 1941?

General SHORT. I have, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the period of the emergency, General, how many times were there warnings which caused alerts to be ordered here? Give us your [38] best memory.

General SHORT. We had some practice alerts without any warning. I am inclined to believe that there was one alert that I cannot give you the date of, but about the date, after the freezing of the assets in the banks. I had a warning that caused me to go on alert against sabotage because I realized that the people were much more restless than they had been any time before.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that No. 1 alert ordered?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. No. 1 was the only alert that has been ordered?

General SHORT. Except in connection with maneuvers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

General SHORT. Except in connection with maneuvers.

In May I had a No. 3 alert and we carried right straight on for 12 days with construction of fortifications and maneuvers.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to remember whether the Navy communicated to you a telegram of October 16, 1941, relating to the status of the negotiations with Japan?

General SHORT. Yes, they did, but from the time I put on alert No. 1, after the banks were closed, I do know I kept a close guard on straight through all over utilities, but I did not think that it was necessary to do anything more at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You refer in your report, which we have had the opportunity to read, to the communication of November 27.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That, I believe, was from the Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. That was direct from the Chief of Staff, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you at that time also obtain from the Navy, or was there sent to you from the Navy, a copy of a telegraphic com-

munication by the Secretary of the Navy to the, I think, Commander in Chief of the Fleet here?

General SHORT. I don't remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was in conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block on the 27th for two or three hours. I was in conference with him on December 1—Admiral Kimmel [39] on December 1 and with both of them on December 3; so in all probability I did see the one to which you refer. I am not sure whether it was sent to me officially.

The CHAIRMAN. We made a call upon your staff to produce any copy that the Navy may have furnished to you.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That call was made only yesterday afternoon and has not yet been answered, so it does not appear yet whether you officially were apprised.

General SHORT. I unquestionably knew anything of serious import because I was in repeated contact with them at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. There was also a telegraphic communication from the Chief of Naval Operations, I think, to the Commander in Chief of the naval force here about November 24 which had to do with the same subject, the tenuous character of the negotiations. Do you remember that?

General SHORT. I don't remember that specifically.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the same answer applies to that, also.

General SHORT. Very frequently if Admiral Kimmel had something I should see he would send someone from the staff over and then let me read his copy but not give me a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you ordered No. 1 alert on November 27?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I have examined you just in a preliminary way thus far. The Commission has thought perhaps that you cared to make a running statement of the situation.

General SHORT. I would like that very much.

[40] I have drawn up a very complete statement in writing, and there are certain points that I would like to emphasize, and if it not taking too much time of the Commission I would like very much to orally go through a number of things.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have every bit of time necessary to give you an opportunity to state everything you have on your mind about this matter.

General SHORT. Yes. I think I can emphasize, make some points much plainer, by talking to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, without questioning you further—I have developed merely preliminary to bring us up to date—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you in your own way and at our own leisure to make a very full statement of whatever occurs to you as important to this investigation. Before you do that, I presume that this folder you have handed us is a folder of supporting documents in connection with your statement?

General SHORT. It is a complete statement and supporting documents, both.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a statement here?

General SHORT. The first 50 pages is a statement, and the others are supporting documents.

The CHAIRMAN. This (indicating) is the statement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And under your oath as a witness you state that this statement is as if you had given the testimony here under oath?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and I have signed the statement, and every exhibit has been true copied, I think, by an officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. Now you may proceed.

General SHORT. I would first of all like to read the message that I received from the Navy of October 16, because of the last paragraph:

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote:

[41] "Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precaution including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."

I wish to call attention to that last paragraph:

"* * * take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan."

Now I would like also to read the one I received from the Chief of Staff, radiogram, on the 27th, because it is the same tenor:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop. If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop. Report measures taken stop. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks [42] assigned the rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

I want to call attention to that last clause, to limit it, the dissemination of this, and I think that I limited it to the Chief of Staff and G-2. I think I am correct. But you have the same thing in here "not to alarm civil population or disclose intent." I want to call particularly attention to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it disturb your statement if one or another of us interrupted you?

General SHORT. Not in the least.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask at that point—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —whether you did report the measures taken to your superior?

General SHORT. I did. I will come to that a little later.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. I reported very specifically exactly what I had done.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. When I got this wire I talked the matter over with my Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your Chief of Staff?

General SHORT. Colonel Walter C. Phillips. I did not call in my G-3.

The CHAIRMAN. Is G-3 operations?

General SHORT. Operations, yes, sir.

I did not call in my operations officer as Colonel Phillips had been operations officer up to a very short time before, just a few days, and I thought he and I knew enough about the situation that we did not need to get advice of G-3. G-2 did see the message.

Now, I want to explain—and at that time, then, immediately Alert No. 1 was ordered into effect. I will explain just very briefly, not go into what Alert No. 1 meant—

[43] The CHAIRMAN. I think from the S. O. P. here we know about that.

General SHORT. You think you know, and that you don't even need a general presentation?

The CHAIRMAN. Do we need it, gentlemen?

General McCoy. I do not think so. We discussed that very carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. We discussed it very carefully yesterday. We have been over the orders.

General SHORT. I was going to point out that 2 included defense against air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. And 3, defense against an all-out attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Right.

General SHORT. The first was sabotage, uprisings, and subversive action.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

General SHORT. Now, in addition to ordering Alert No. 1, I ordered the Aircraft Warning Service to work daily two hours before dawn and until one hour after dawn. Now, this was a new service that we had. At that time we had just gotten in the machines and set up. I thought this was fine training for them. I was trying to get training and was doing it for training more than any idea that it would be real. But that was the time of day when they should get the training, as it is the most dangerous time of day. So they were ordered to work from four; they worked from four o'clock to seven. They construed six o'clock as dawn, which was about right, and worked from four to seven daily.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had any of those mobile units been available, how long before December 7?

General SHORT. I think about November first.

The CHAIRMAN. And some of the mobile units, then, if I understand your testimony, had been in operation three hours each morning?

General SHORT. All—

The CHAIRMAN. Since about November first?

General SHORT. No, no. They had been in operation all day long, but they hadn't been in operation from four o'clock in the morning. On [44] November 27 I started them operating at from four to seven.

The CHAIRMAN. From four to seven.

General SHORT. They had been working with them, getting them set up and trying to learn something about them for probably three or four weeks before that time. Our fixed stations were not yet installed, as we had to build roads to the top of two or three mountains, one of them 10,000 feet high, in order to get them up there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, when I interrupted, you said you had issued orders to have those stations—

General SHORT. We issued the order by telephone, and there were three reasons why I decided to issue the order for Alert No. 1 rather than for Alert No. 2 or 3. In the first place, with the population we have here there was a very strong possibility of sabotage. Individual sabotage was the thing that I feared more than anything else. I didn't fear uprisings; I didn't think that they would dare take a chance on that.

In the second place, I had no information to indicate an attack, so it did not appear essential to prepare against a real attack. The sabotage was a direct possibility.

In the third place, if I ordered Alert 2 or 3, I interfered very seriously with the training. No. 2 would have interfered seriously, particularly with the air and anti-aircraft training; 3 would interfere seriously with all training. It was impossible to do any orderly training with them on.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your troops really in need of training?

General SHORT. We have thousands of new men. Some of them had not completed the 13 weeks' training when we got them over. We have a complete regiment of anti-aircraft that is all draft. We have a regiment of engineers that is very largely draft. Some of them had six or seven weeks when they came over. And we have men that have come and gone through the reception center, draftees from the Territory that had gone in the two Hawaiian National Guard regiments here. So that there was a decided necessity for real training. I will cover that with regard to the air corps a little more.

Now, in the carrying out of anti-sabotage measures it can be done [45] very much better and with less men if the planes and the command are not dispersed too widely. With the Alert No. 1 where we were carrying it out for sabotage the planes were kept in the vicinity of the landing mat or the apron in groups, so they could be guarded very closely. If we had gone to Alert No. 2, then some bombers would have been sent to outlying islands where our garrisons are extremely small, or put in the air, and you cannot keep them in the air indefinitely. The pursuit planes would have been distributed in their bunker all around the perimeter of Wheeler Field and around the perimeter of Bellows Field, and it would take maybe hundreds of men to protect them reasonably well from sabotage.

Now, this was especially true because we had not constructed manproof fencing with floodlights around these fields. I put in for money on the 15th day of May for putting manproof fences and floodlights around all of the critical installations. That part of the money was

approved, some on July 11, and on August 12 we got approval for some more. I had asked for \$240,000. We got about \$200,000. The orders were placed on the mainland for the material because it simply was not available in Honolulu. The defense work has cleaned out practically all essential material here. Up to the time of the attack a small amount of this wire, not all the parts, had been received by constructing quartermaster for the Chemical Warfare, and some ordnance staples. The District Engineer, who does the work for the airfields, had not received any material for fencing on the airfields.

You understand, this is a question of priority. We were not given the top priority. The Navy in certain construction work had the top priority and could get their things through at once. We had to take our turn to get the material. Then we had to take our turn to get it on the boats, and in spite of repeated following up it had not arrived at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do I understand, then, that Hickam Field was open to the road and the adjoining land?

General SHORT. The back part of Hickam Field was fenced, but there was no fencing off, which we wanted very much to do, of the hangar line from all of the living part of the field, which made the guarding extremely difficult.

[46] And another thing, at Hickam Field it was impossible to completely disperse the planes there on account of the nature of the soil. That is all filled ground, and with those heavy planes that when they are loaded weigh up to 50,000 pounds you didn't dare get them off there. I had asked in February for money to put in runways and bunkers. It could only be done with heavy material. My engineers with their equipment could not do that. I had asked for money for that, and it had been going back and forth ever since that time. I had gone ahead without any money at Wheeler Field and built the bunkers with my aviation engineering troops. I could not do that on account of the nature of the conditions. You can't dig ground there; you run into water. You have to bring in the earth and build it up.

Now, to take up the question of having no information to indicate an attack, as I say, I was in constant communications with the 14th Naval District. I had nothing in the way of alarming news. In our coastal frontier defense plan we coordinate the work of the Army and Navy by mutual cooperation. In paragraph 18 (i) of that plan—you will find it exactly in there, anyway—it provides definitely that the Navy is responsible for distant reconnaissance. That has been in effect for some time. Then on March 21 we had a board with the idea of making this cooperation closer, and Admiral Bloch and I signed an agreement that went into effect at once, providing that if the Navy did not have enough long range patrol planes to make reconnaissance they could call on the Army, and that when they did call on the Army the planes acted under the tactical control of the Navy. In other words, the Navy gave them their mission, gave them their full instructions, told them where they would probably find American boats, so that they would not by any chance fire upon them or bomb them, and exactly what they wanted them to look for. The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to

a certain sector, say maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

[47] The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there a moment?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On or about December 7 had the Navy called on you for any additional detail of reconnaissance planes?

General SHORT. They had not. From November 27 they had at no time called on me for additional reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. Under that agreement?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I will bring that out.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Perhaps I am jumping ahead of you.

General SHORT. From March 21 on we had repeatedly carried out exercises along that line. We had a minimum of one exercise a week, and sometimes exercises more frequently than that, but we were working constantly to perfect that coordination. This has no direct bearing, but to show what we were trying to do, that some agreement provided that when we were using fighters over the Island of Oahu then they turned their fighters over to my command. We were trying to get coordinated whole in that.

The CHAIRMAN. We are quite familiar with that agreement.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We studied it yesterday.

General SHORT. Now, to go into the question of the interference with training if I ordered Alert No. 2 or 3, this was particularly true with reference to the training of the air corps and particularly important. As you know, this B-17, the Flying Fortress, is a plane that has not been distributed to the Army generally very long. We have had some for a few months, and training a complete combat team for that plane, including bombers, takes a very considerable time. We have been required to send nine out of twenty-one bombers to the Philippines with the trained crews. Then we had been told that we were going to have to carry on a large ferrying operation of planes to the Philippines. We had previous to November 27 sent 18 trained combat teams for these ships to the mainland ferry. We had 17 more ready to send. We had also been told that we would get 12 additional planes to make up very soon, so we were trying to train those.

Now, we have to train those crews only six B-17's. We had twelve here [48] but in order to keep the planes going, that were ready, through to the Philippines, we didn't dare let them go on without part replaced. Well, they kept our minimum of spares down to where we could use only six planes. In other words, to train all these extra crews we had only six planes that we could use. So if we put those six planes in a state of readiness and dispersed them and kept them warmed up most of the day, it completely stopped the training and we definitely would not be able to carry out the ferrying mission that we had been ordered to carry out to the Philippines. We were constantly mindful of the fact that we might have to give up our route bases of Midway and Wake and were working just as rapidly as possible to develop an alternate route down by either Palmyra or Christmas and Canton and Suva and Townsville, Australia. We had all of those fields well under construction and were pushing everything

to the limit, and we felt like we had to push the training of our combat teams in exactly the same way. So that had a decided influence on deciding to not order an alert that put the air out where they could not train.

This is the reply that I sent in answer to that radiogram of November 27:

Re your radiogram number four seven two twenty seventh report Department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with Navy.

Now, that should have given the War Department very exact information of just what I was doing, of the nature of the alert. I did not say "Alert No. 1." I didn't want anybody to have to run and look up and find out what it was. I said, "Alert against sabotage."

I got a reply back from the Adjutant General the next day:

[49] 28th. Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department Paren see paragraph 3 Mid SC30-45 end paren stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

They thought that the question of sabotage, subversive activities, and espionage were so important when they sent me this that they sent a copy right on to the individual air stations to impress them all the more. You will notice here that there was the question that nothing was said about anything but sabotage, subversive activities, and espionage.

I received three message up to that date, October 16, November 27, and November 28. They emphasized right straight thought that we must not disclose our stand and that we must not alarm the population and that we must take measures to protect against sabotage, against espionage, and against subversive action. Nowhere did they indicate in any way the necessity for protecting against attack. They also did indicate definitely that we must avoid publicity and avoid alarming the public. If I ordered a complete alert against attack, it would have alarmed at least the Japanese population.

You will also notice they made no objection whatever to my wire where I stated I was alerted for sabotage. If they had any idea that that was not a correct order, they had all the opportunity from November 27 to December 7 to come back and say, "We do not consider the action taken by you as sufficient and that you should instead take action to defend yourself against air attack."

[50] In other words, I took it as a tacit agreement with the course I had taken and that there was no objection raised, and I cannot see how I could draw any other conclusion.

Now, to show that I was carrying out exactly their instructions in regard to sabotage, on November 29 I sent another wire. I said:

Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Paragraph 3 Mid SC30-45—

That applies entirely to the delineation between the actions of the FBI, ONI, and G-2 respectively of the military forces, and of the FBI carrying out the work with respect to the civilian population. The three worked very close together.

(Continuing:)

Military establishments including personnel and equipment stop. As regards protection telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19 1941 requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection et cetera stop. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20th confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now afforded vital civilian installations stop. In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and the city and county of Honolulu on June 30th 1941 enacted an ordinance which county of Honolulu comma [51] whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop. Relations with FBI and all other federal and territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

I want to explain my reason for some time at least—say the last year and a half or two years when during perhaps tests or certain alarming conditions that they have been placing sentinels over essential utilities without any legal authority. I felt that if these sentinels who are protecting transformer stations or waterworks should fire upon someone that I had no legal protection whatever, and that was my reason for calling upon the Governor to make this request. That placed the military command in a much better situation.

Also I had no authority to close roads, and for that reason I asked the City and County Council to give me that authority and assured them that I would only use that when necessary. So I thought that I was in a much better legal status than they had been theretofore.

I will now take up what happened from November 27 to December 6. Alert No. 1 remained in effect. Troops went on with their routine training. The Aircraft Warning Service worked, as part of the interceptor command, was working every morning until 4 and 7 and was working each station on its own from 7 to 11 and was making necessary reports and so forth from 1 to 4 o'clock in the afternoon.

I might explain what we mean by the interceptor command. We have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of what we call the interceptor commander.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read that part back to me?

The REPORTER (reading):

We have for the purpose of combat, we place pursuit airplanes, anti-aircraft artillery, Aircraft Warning Service, under the command of what we call the interceptor commander.

General McCoy. Who was that commander?

General SHORT. General Davidson.

[52] General McCoy. Of the Air Service?

General SHORT. Yes. The purpose of this is that it is necessary in air combat, anti-aircraft defense, that they are supposed to stop in a split second. It may be that otherwise you may be firing upon your own airplanes because they are following the enemy so closely in the fight.

During this work from 4 to 7 there was always the interceptor control officer working with the Aircraft Warning Service and getting their work coordinated.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Davidson also authorized to coordinate anti-aircraft fire of the district under that command?

General SHORT. Yes. As a matter of fact, I think it was an excellent idea having the Navy here, and if you gentlemen have an opportunity to visit that interceptor command, I think it would be good to do so. They will be moving their underground station in just a few days, and you will see how it works, carrying all marine anti-aircraft ashore because under the anti-aircraft command, he controls the whole of the anti-aircraft fire here.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean in the Navy Yard?

General SHORT. Yes. We have many of our people in the Navy Yard now. If a ship is in the harbor, we do not get our coordination to a point where he would order the ship to fire.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is intended to be the case?

General SHORT. Yes. It may be extremely difficult to develop it, but that would have to go on through the Navy Yard, all the way through in one extra step.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is provided in the plan? Is that what you mean?

General SHORT. We do not say in the plan that we would control the fire on the ship, but unquestionably that would be the next step in the coordination.

General McCoy. The reason was to get a quick warning to the ship?

General SHORT. Yes, because otherwise they would be firing on their own ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you read that last statement of the general?

[53] (The reporter read the last statement of General Short.)

The CHAIRMAN. You mean because otherwise they would be firing on their own planes?

General SHORT. Yes. We say ship sometimes for a plane. I probably should not do it in this case.

General McCoy. That coordination was not in effect on November 27?

General SHORT. No. For the guns manned by the Marines inshore it was in effect.

I was also working quite repeatedly with the Chief of Air Service because the Marines ashore were changing constantly. They would bring an outfit in here from Midway and then send the force out, and the result would be that they did not fit in as a team, not quite so closely, but the purpose was the same. The performance was not quite so perfect.

To go ahead with what took place, as I said, on the 27th of November I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Block, which lasted two or three hours, with reference to the reinforcement

of the naval commands of Midway and Wake by Army pursuit planes. General Martin, commander of the Air Force, with his chief of staff, Colonel Mollison, were with me. We talked over every phase of the subject. They had already ordered the Marine planes out and felt at that time that it was better, better to let that move continue and to delay any taking over or reinforcement by the Army. Admiral Kimmel sent in a recommendation to that effect, and I was in full accord with it as long as I was able to do so.

On December 1 I had a conference which lasted for some time. We had another wire with reference to the possibility of the Army relieving the garrison completely at Midway and Wake; so we had a long conference that morning. On the morning of the 2d he came to my quarters and I went over an eight-page letter that he had written to the Chief of Naval Operations explaining his stand in this matter. We had a conference on the morning of the 3d, as I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the purport of this letter?

General SHORT. In regard to the relieving of this situation. I did not want it effective at that time. I did that because of these air fields that were in the process of construction. Then they had a lot of [54] civilians at Wake and also at Midway. The question of supplies was difficult because it was a complicated situation. I put in a recommendation that the relief should not take place now and to hold up until the construction was completed, and if it took place anyway that they should send in the same five garrisons that they had so as not to deplete the water supply.

The CHAIRMAN. The proposed operation was to send other troops there and to bring back those who were there?

General SHORT. The idea was to make the Marines definitely available for any fleet and land exercises that they wanted or were going to operate so as to take bases in the mandated islands. It was to let the Marines act as an expeditionary force.

The CHAIRMAN. By substituting the Army?

General SHORT. Yes. They told us they would send replacements, and we had instructions that the Army should take the defense of Canton Island also. That was to take over the defense of Canton Island.

On December 4 one of my staff officers, Major Fleming, had a conference with the Fleet Marine Officer, Colonel Pfeiffer, relating to the use of Marine five-inch guns at Canton Island.

I am bringing out these conferences to show that I was in constant touch with the Navy, and to show the character of the conferences because if they had information of Japanese carriers in that part of the water and were worried about a possible attack I would certainly have become aware of it when we were talking about the possibility of sending an expeditionary force to the relief of the Marines. We would not have talked about transporting them out there without clearing out the carriers first.

So, while I do not remember exactly asking a specific question as to the location of the Japanese carriers, I had a very decided impression that at that time there was nothing in the situation that the location of the Japanese carriers was worrying us at that time. In fact, the question came up very definitely by a question of Admiral

Kimmel's. During this conference on the 27th with General Martin, his chief of Staff, Colonel Mollison, the question was asked, and I would like to read it since his [55] statement is more definite than my recollection:

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defense of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral KIMMEL. "McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?"

Captain McMORRIS. "I should say none, Admiral."

At that time there was no exception taken to that statement by either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Block, and apparently the Navy felt that they had definite information of the location of carriers and major ships of the Japanese and that there was no question in their minds of the possibility or probability of a surprise attack upon Oahu.

At this time they had at no time requested the Army planes to assist in distant reconnaissance. The whole combination convinced me that the Navy had definitely enough information as to the location of the Japanese carriers and that they did not think it was necessary to make distant reconnaissance or that they be sent planes for making such reconnaissance because they did not call on me.

I want to point out also that the Hawaiian Department has no information service for locating Japanese or other foreign ships. We are dependent wholly on the information that we get from the 14th Naval District or from the War Department in Washington which gets its information through the Navy Department. The Navy does have an intelligence service for obtaining this information, and we are dependent on them for that kind of information.

General McCoy. Was there any definite arrangement on that between the Army and the Navy?

General SHORT. Possibly in Washington. I do not know. I have no agents outside the Hawaiian Islands. There is no possibility or way for me to know except through the District here or through the War Department because I maintain no agents anywhere in the world.

[56] General McCoy. I am clear about these frequent conferences which are followed by signed agreements, but was there any agreement that they would furnish you this information?

General SHORT. They made themselves definitely responsible for distant reconnaissance and for locations. We were in constant touch with G-2 and ONI. There was a complete exchange of information. If we picked up any information we gave it to them and they gave it to us. If I picked up information through channels coming from Japan we would put this information that we felt was first-hand immediately at the Navy's disposal and I gave it to them as quickly as possible. We frequently had no way to verify that information, but we gave the information, and I am sure that they were just as liberal with us.

If probably certain groups of Japanese ships were seen near the Philippine Islands or the mandated islands they would not have repeated it to us, not thinking it affected us like it did the Navy, but it unquestionably would have gone into Washington and would have been reported by Washington to the Philippine Army.

The CHAIRMAN. The only thing that the joint agreement between you seems to cover is distant reconnaissance?

General SHORT. Yes. That was very definitely placed upon the Army even to the point of controlling the plans, which is the only logical way because otherwise if two people are made responsible they may be making reconnaissance in the same sector and another sector may be forgotten.

On December 5 a B-24, which is a new type of bomber plane, came into Hickam Field from the mainland on its way to the Philippine Islands, and it was to carry en route, I believe, a photographic machine over the mandated islands.

General McCoy. What date was that?

General SHORT. December 5. It is in there. When this plane came in it was not sufficiently armed for combat but had only one .30-caliber gun and only two .50-caliber guns in the tail. It had no ammunition. It could not even have fired if it wanted to. In spite of coming in that condition, the War Department sent that ship in that condition, and the telegram that followed—from that they realized it was coming in [57] without proper armament from this wire which they sent:

Reference to B-dash 24 airplanes for special photo mission stop. It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group stop. Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously stop. Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma air fields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop. Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned stop. Photograph and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop. Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop. Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation stop. The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop. If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash 24 proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop. Advise pilots best time of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop. Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop.

This next sentence is the sentence that is important from my point of view.

Insure that both B dash 24 airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.

Now, the fact is that they sent them to Honolulu without being properly equipped. In other words they considered that the hazard of carrying the extra weight between the mainland and Honolulu was greater than the possibility of a Japanese attack. They apparently did not consider it likely to be attacked in that they sent the plane out in that way.

I sent the message back when I got this message on the same day. I told them that the planes had arrived without guns and without ammunition. I told them that I was going to hold them until they got the proper [58] equipment and asked for a delay for the proper equipment and that it was not safe to proceed, a safe procedure for them to carry out.

Incidentally, I said with respect to our operations to the Philippines that in ferrying our planes, that when our planes left here they had instructions to fly over the mandate islands at 20,000 feet and leave Wake at night and be prepared to defend themselves.

I had given instructions two months before I had this because I did not think it safe to send a man out where he would be murdered without having a chance to fight.

In spite of the fact that I wired the War Department on the 5th about this plane coming in in that manner, they continued to send planes from the mainland without being properly armed and equipped.

On the morning of November 7—

The CHAIRMAN. December 7.

General SHORT. December 7.

The plane left from Hamilton Field, and I am going to give Eastern Standard Time, because that would be the hour the War Department would have knowledge of it. There were two scout planes left the mainland, one at 12:30 December 7 Eastern Standard Time, and one at 1:30 December 7 Eastern Standard Time. These planes were B-17's, 12 of them.

General McCoy. These are four-engined bombers?

General SHORT. Yes, big planes, B-17's. They had no ammunition. The guns were cosmolined so they could not have been fired. The guns were not bore sighted. In other words, if they fired they could not count on making their hits. The crews were skeleton crews. In these skeleton crews they had a pilot, a copilot, an engineer, navigator, and radio operator, but these crews would not be enough to man the guns even if the guns had been in shape to be fired and even if they had ammunition, which they did not have. I am bringing this out to indicate that in the mind of the War Department that they were not thinking in terms of an attack on Honolulu even as late as 1:30 on the morning of December 7. They still considered that the hazard of carrying the additional weight in ammunition was greater than the hazard of the possibility of a Japanese attack.

[59] General McNARNEY. In the last sentence of your statement you say:

Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

General SHORT. That is correct. I will go ahead with that. I had nothing from the War Department since November 27 as I had nothing except what was in the daily newspapers. The reports in the papers and the statement of the President did not give any indication that there was going to be any sudden stoppage like that, and if the War Department had any such communication it did not indicate it to me.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider the cable of November 27 a warning?

General SHORT. Yes, it was a warning, but the fact that the negotiations had been resumed and Mr. Kurusu had gone on there that there was a serious attempt being made to get together. I considered that the War Department if they were aware that there was some crisis in our relations, would have let me know.

We had the warning of the 27th in the way of avoiding publicity and alarm, but nothing from the War Department that there was any

warning of any sudden split-second stop. I think if they had some information they would have given it to me and let it go out. What happened later in the morning indicates they would have given it to me.

I did not state that these 12 ships that they sent from the mainland without ammunition arrived right in the midst of the first attack. It was not a theoretical thing at all. The first planes that landed at Hickam Field—the first plane was destroyed by the attack of a Japanese plane just as it hit and landed. Four out of those 12 planes were destroyed before getting to the ground without any possibility of replying to the Japanese attack. It was not a theoretical thing because it happened to them as they arrived and it was a very vital thing.

Apparently later that morning the War Department got some alarming information. I have no way of knowing how they got the information. However, they filed at 12:18, Eastern Standard Time, December 7, which is 6:45 our time here, Honolulu—they filed a message with the R. C. A. to ask me and General Martin—that message had to be encoded before it was filed. [60] I think the estimate of an hour would be an extremely short time for the encoding of the message and filing it with R. C. A. Our experience would indicate a great deal more time for that. We cut that down as a minimum.

Here is what the message said, and this to my mind is the most important thing I received from the War Department:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1 p. m. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

In view of what happened it is perfectly apparent that they destroyed their code machines in order to put into use a new code that they knew nobody had broken or could get their information.

That message, as I say, was filed at 6:48 in Washington. It was received here by the R. C. A. at 7:33. I do not know what caused the R. C. A. to delay delivering the message immediately because it would have to be delivered by a messenger, but I suspect that at the time the messenger was getting under way, the attack, which was at 7:55, had started, and the messenger did not care to be roaming around during an attack, and it was brought to the Signal Office at 11:45. It was decoded and delivered to the Adjutant General of the Department at 2:58 in the afternoon. You can see the time it took to decode it, so I do not think I am very much wrong when I say that it must have taken at least one hour to decode it; so that if we assume that they started to encode it that they had the information as early as 5:45 Honolulu Time. If they had telephoned me urgent, telephoned the corps in the clear, I could have had the information at 6 o'clock in the morning without any question at all because we talk repeatedly and when we get the call through I receive these things in around 15 minutes.

On that point also we have one of these *speech scramblers*, and there is one in the office of the Chief of Staff. While they are not considered as safe as code, they are reasonably safe.

If they had felt this was a probability of an attack on Honolulu, they could have put the call through, and if they felt there was a

possibility of an attack certainly then they had *every great duty to* get that information [61] to me as rapidly as possible, and if that call was put through to me and got to me as early as 2 o'clock, or I should say 6 o'clock, which was two hours in which to arrange everything and make absolutely ready for a Japanese attack.

As I say, that reached me seven hours after the attack. During the attack that morning I had gone to our defense command post and told Colonel Phillips to call the Chief of Staff and get the information as soon as it was decoded. He asked if we had received a message, but we had not received it even then.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me at what hour Phillips telephoned?

General SHORT. I left this office sometime around 8:35 or 8:40 and Colonel Phillips put in the call and I went to the command post. I don't know how long it took to get the call through but my feeling is sometime around, it must have been around 9 o'clock. Anyway it was before 2:58 in the afternoon. That was all that was said at that time. Apparently the War Department became aware a little later of the significance of the message and of our not getting it until seven hours after the attack.

On December 9 they sent a message.

[62] Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time described message transmitted by Signal Corps staff and by what staff officer received.

I sent the following reply to that:

Re your five four nine radio five two nine—

That is their radio.

delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop. Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh. This time approximate but within five minutes.

It might have been eleven-forty or eleven-fifty, but it is within five minutes of being correct.

Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hawaiian Department two fifty eight afternoon.

Now, even at this late date it appears to me that when the War Department sent this message they still had the feeling *that extreme secrecy in not letting the Japanese know that they had broken their code*, or how they had gotten this information, was more important than the speed of transmission of this message to me, because otherwise they wouldn't send it by code, which anybody knows takes hours longer; that they were trying to maintain secrecy, and in attempting to maintain secrecy they did not get the message to me until seven hours after the attack. I think it an extremely important point to consider.

The CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt you there?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a War Department radio communication system?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you made any inquiry as to whether that was in [63] working order on the day in question.

General SHORT. Oh, it was in working order all the time. They may have thought ours was loaded up and that the RCA would be faster. I don't know why they sent it RCA. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you and had the Navy Department, the Army staff in Washington, knowledge of a radio communications system installed by the F. B. I.?

General SHORT. I don't know whether the War Department had or not, but they definitely knew that I have that secret phone and with connections to the secret phone right in the Chief of Staff's office, the fastest thing that could possibly come through.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that the F. B. I. had its own direct line of radio communication?

General SHORT. I knew that they had communication, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With Washington?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. We at times got messages, but most of our messages were over the Army net. I don't know why they could have used it.

The CHAIRMAN. You had at times gotten messages over the RCA hook-up, hadn't you?

General SHORT. Oh, yes, probably because our net was badly loaded up. So I didn't think anything of it. I haven't been in Washington since the emergency, and I don't know whether the RCA has an office right alongside of radio in the Munition Building. I imagine they have, and that they probably would send it whichever one was least loaded at the time. I don't know. That would just be an inference.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you ever received any communication from Washington or had you ever sent any communication to Washington over the F. B. I. net?

General SHORT. I don't think so. I have talked with Mr. Shivers, the head of the F. B. I., a number of times, [64] and when he told me that he would—talked over with him the proposition of his communicating with his Department something that I felt was better for him to take up, instead of my taking up officially through the War Department. We had very frequent conferences. My G-2 was very close to him, and I will say that the F. B. I. had always worked a hundred percent in every way. There never was any difference of opinion, and anything he had we had.

There were two—I may be taking up a good deal of your time.

The CHAIRMAN. I want you to be very full in your statement, General.

General SHORT. I would like to paint the whole picture, and I can make it a little plainer orally. There were two instances—

General MCCOY. We might take a five minute recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, suppose we take a five minute recess.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a long stretch.

General SHORT. It does not bother me; it is just up to you gentlemen.

General MCCOY. We will stretch ourselves.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess, at the conclusion of which the hearing was resumed as follows:)

The CHAIRMAN. We are ready to resume, General. Perhaps the General wants to know what the last question and answer are, Mr. Reporter.

General SHORT. I think I am perfectly straight.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead.

General SHORT. I think I am perfectly straight. Thank you.

There were two incidents that occurred Sunday morning, [65] the 7th, that might have had a very great result if they had been interpreted differently at the time. About seven-fifteen a submarine entered Pearl Harbor, got inside the net, apparently followed a ship in. It was attacked immediately by naval ships and was sunk. They did not apparently draw the conclusion that this was the forerunner of an air attack or a general attack, and I was not notified until after the attack had taken place. In fact, the information came out to me in a discussion between Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel and Secretary Knox and myself. If they had drawn the conclusion that it might be the forerunner of an air attack or a general attack, unquestionably I would have been notified at once. There would not have been time to get the planes in the air, all of them, probably, because they were not warmed up, but there would have been time to disperse them in the bunkers, because they could be taxied without being fully ready to go in the air, and it probably would have saved a considerable number of planes. I think it would not have prevented the attack at Pearl Harbor. We couldn't have met the enemy out at sea somewhere and stopped them.

The other incident was in connection with our Aircraft Warning Service. They had worked from four to seven that morning and closed the interceptor command station at seven o'clock. There was one of the stations, the Opana Station, on the high ground south of Kahuku Point,—

General McCoy. Let us get that fixed, will you?

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. There is a map.

(A map was produced.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is that last point?

General SHORT. Kahuku Point. That is up to the—

The CHAIRMAN. Spell it, please.

General SHORT. K-a-h-u-k-u. Kahuku Point is up there (indicating). This Opana Station is along on the right here, [66] somewhere along in here (indicating). It isn't marked on the map, up to the north. That station, just on its own—they worked normally for training from seven to eleven every day, and apparently they just thought they wouldn't knock off just because it was Sunday, and the station went ahead and worked; and at seven-twenty the noncommissioned officer in charge of the detector station picked up a considerable flight of planes at 132 miles distance and three degrees east of north. Apparently there was enough movement of his detector that it rather excited him, and he called in the Aircraft Warning Information Center, got the operator, and the operator got Lieutenant Tyler, who was the control officer for the interceptor command. He had not left. While the station was closed he was still there. The operator told him to investigate—

The CHAIRMAN. Was he an Army officer?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. He was an air officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Air officer.

General SHORT. From the pursuit outfit, because they exercised the control of the fighting planes at Wheeler Field. He talked with the operator, and then the operator called the Opana and talked with

the Opana Station. The operator was rather impressed by the Opana Station because they seemed a little excited about it, and he asked Lieutenant Tyler if he should order the rest of the men back immediately to the interceptor station. Lieutenant Tyler in his affidavit, which you will have in your records, stated that he thought it was one of three things:

That there were naval ships making flights from carriers. And, incidentally, there were two carriers out that morning, one going up towards Midway and the other down towards Johnston Island, with task forces. It was not unusual to pick up a group of planes some distance out that were operating [67] off of carriers.

The other thing, he thought that it might be a flight of planes out of Hickam. We started flying normally around four o'clock in the morning, and it was not unusual for the station to pick them up.

The third thing that he assumed it might be was a flight of bombers from the mainland. He had noticed during his tour that morning Hawaiian music on the air all the time from four o'clock on through, and ordinarily they don't broadcast music at that time of the morning on KMG. He knew from experience that when a flight of planes was coming in from the mainland they played the Hawaiian music, and it was understood that that acted as a beam to lead them in. And he was right in that assumption that it did mean a flight coming in from the mainland, and the flight, as I say, arrived within five minutes of the opening of the attack, arrived right in the midst of the attack; so that it was pretty hard to say that he was illogical in his conclusions. He had no information that definitely should frighten him. He figured there were three things that might be. He didn't figure that it might be a Japanese attack, so he did not alert the Hawaiian air force. If he had called the Hawaiian air force right then and alerted them there would have been time to disperse the planes just the same as there would after the seven-fifteen attack, but not to get them in the air. It was just one of those errors in judgment that it would be pretty hard to blame the Lieutenant for, because he had three perfectly logical things to give him that; and, as he says in his affidavit, he had seen the board look like that before when the carriers were out training, and that he didn't get excited about it, didn't think much about it, and that might have made a very great change if he had taken different action.

General McCox. That was not passed on to you or your [68] immediate staff?

General SHORT. Not until afterwards. I mean he stayed right at the control station then, and the minute the first bomb was dropped he realized what was going on, and he gave—he alerted Wheeler Field then, but there were so many things that I was looking after that morning that I didn't discover that incident, I don't think, until the next day. It wasn't of any importance after the thing had happened, anyway, then, and I don't believe it came to my attention until the following day.

General McCox. Would it naturally come to you, or would it come to someone else?

General SHORT. Well, if he had been sure that it was enemy planes it would have gone first of all to Wheeler Field, and then it would have come right to our station. It should have been to me in the course of a minute or two if they had taken it—

General McCoy. Seriously.

General SHORT. Seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. To get it clear in my own mind, this operator at the Opana Station got this information from the sea. He called the—

General SHORT. Immediately the operator.

The CHAIRMAN. He called the interceptor command station?

General SHORT. Yes; and the operator was on duty there. He was always kept on duty there, and Lieutenant Tyler—

The CHAIRMAN. And Lieutenant Tyler happened to linger there at the closure of the station?

General SHORT. After. He was there.

The CHAIRMAN. If the thing had been hooked up for emergency there would have been a Navy liaison officer there at the board?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. About thirty people would have [69] been there.

The CHAIRMAN. And it just happened that Tyler, of those thirty people, lingered on after the station had closed?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Of course we didn't have as big a setup on that training side as we would now when you are with a battle condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Because it would be conducted virtually for the training of these new mobile stations. We had the interceptor command and anti-aircraft tied in to just get everybody working together, but they were not in full force like they would be under battle conditions.

General McCoy. Could you state whether there was a naval officer there that morning?

General SHORT. There was not, for some reason, a naval officer there during the period four to seven. There had been on previous days, and as a matter of fact the Navy had felt that it would be a good idea to have a little more of that, and they had arranged—the interceptor command and the Navy and the whole group had worked out, on just a volunteer basis, of continuing that training every day until four o'clock in the afternoon, but decided that on Sunday they would only work until seven, but the Navy had been instrumental in even extending that period, and it had been agreed that they would work right through until four o'clock. I had not ordered that, but that was just something they were doing on their own.

The CHAIRMAN. And under working conditions when the interceptor command station was open there would be a lieutenant from your command?

General SHORT. Well, of course under battle conditions General Davidson would be right there himself, and the anti- [70] aircraft commander, and there would be a total group of about thirty officers there.

The CHAIRMAN. Including the naval officer?

General SHORT. Including the naval officer. I think three naval officers is the normal quota that they have there.

The CHAIRMAN. That they have in that office?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All under the general command of General Davidson?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, would he have any command over the naval officers?

General SHORT. Only that they would be responsible for getting the information to the Navy. That was their only function, would be to get the information to the Navy in the minimum of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Of time.

General McCoy. In other words, the information service would have—

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

General McCoy. It went there, did it?

General SHORT. It would have any—

General McCoy. Did it go to the information service center?

General SHORT. It goes into the information service in the interceptor command, and it goes right from there to the two air fields—three air fields, and then it goes on what we call the G-2 net and is distributed to the Navy and to our staff.

General McCoy. But it didn't this morning?

General SHORT. No, it wasn't—as a matter of fact, what they would have done right then and what they did do just a little while later, would have called the—we had one general [71] staff officer immediately on duty answering telephone call, staying all night in the office to answer them. It would have gone right to him if he had gotten it immediately and then transmitted it. You see, we were not set up with our battle command post at that time, so it would have come in right here to the general staff officer immediately on duty, and it would have taken a minute or two longer to get to me.

General McCoy. It is not clear to me yet how far along that went. You speak of the fact that Lieutenant Tyler evaluated it to whom?

General SHORT. To himself. He was the officer of the interceptor command that was in charge of the interceptor station during this practice, don't you see?

General McCoy. Yes. But you said he called up somebody?

General SHORT. No, he did not. He had not done it until after the attack came. Then he immediately called Wheeler Field, alerted Wheeler Field, which was the thing that would have been very valuable if he had done it to start with.

Admiral STANDLEY. He called the Opana Station?

General SHORT. Oh, he called Opana Station and talked with Opana Station to verify what they had, don't you see? So he would have that understanding. He talked it over with them.

General McCoy. Where was he?

General SHORT. He was right over here in this interceptor command post that I said I would have you to see.

General McCoy. In the information center?

General SHORT. Well, they have a combination, and the aircraft information center is part of the interceptor command. The pursuit, the interceptor commander commands the pursuit planes, the Aircraft Warning Service, and the anti-aircraft battery. They are all tied in in one place.

General McCoy. And that you call the information center [72] interceptor information center?

General SHORT. We call it the interceptor command, and the information center pertains to what the signal people bring in. You see, they have these mobile stations, and of course when we are operating in battle conditions all of the searchlight posts and all of the O. P.'s of the Coast Artillery—everything of that kind comes in, so that—

General McCoy. Where is that center?

General SHORT. It is just over here about 300 yards in the signal depot.

General McCoy. In this post?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. In the next probably four or five days—we have built—it will be moved into its underground station. It is almost completed. We have been working for some months on an underground station that would stand any kind of bombing, and it will be moved in there. Right now it is very vulnerable.

General McCoy. That naval officer was a liaison officer? He wasn't sent over to be under the command?

General SHORT. Well, it worked out that he is really strictly, you might say, under the command, because it isn't just the same as an ordinary liaison officer is at a headquarters and when something of importance turns up he takes it to his headquarters or goes and gets something that they wanted, but that man takes a phone, a headset there, and he sits right there and sits where he can watch the board, so he can report in split seconds to the Navy Information Center, so for all intents and purposes you might say he is more nearly a part of the command than a liaison officer.

General McCoy. Do you happen to know what Navy orders were given to those officers when they reported there?

General SHORT. I do not. General Davidson could probably give you that much more definitely, the exact mission.

[73] General McCoy. All right.

General SHORT. And I think that you will have a clear picture, if you will go take a look at the interceptor command with its full force.

General McCoy. Yes. Is it in actual operation today?

General SHORT. Oh, yes; 24 hours of the day.

General McCoy. Yes. And we could go there any time?

General SHORT. You could go there any time. There is normally a little more to see at night, but I don't imagine there is now because we are not flying at night except for business. I think it would be highly beneficial if you would take a look. You would see exactly how they work, and I think when they move to their new station underground that there is going to be room there for the Navy to set up a corresponding information service on their surface ships, and it would be highly beneficial, because sometimes when we send out on distant patrol there has been a little discrepancy in the information that they had about our own ships. On that board, with use of the aircraft warning service, you see just exactly what is going on all the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did I understand you to say that there was no naval officer present from four to seven that morning?

General SHORT. There was not.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Davidson there from four to seven that morning?

General SHORT. I don't think General Davidson was there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know what crew was there?

General SHORT. Lieutenant Tyler was the officer that was officially detailed.

Admiral STANDLEY. He was there afterwards?

General SHORT. Well, he was there during the period four [74] to seven; he was in charge.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't know—

General SHORT. He was in charge, I am sure, was the officer in charge.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General SHORT. See?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Now, General Davidson can tell us that, then.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. And I think that you will find in Lieutenant Tyler's affidavit here he states definitely that he was in charge. There wasn't any reason why General Davidson should have been there personally just at that time, because it was not a battle condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, as a general proposition, General Short, the defense of the Island is a coordinated defense, a coordination of the Navy and the Army facilities?

General SHORT. It was.

Admiral STANDLEY. The facilities here?

General SHORT. It was.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. I mean up to December 7.

General SHORT. 17th; yes, it was.

Admiral STANDLEY. And it was by cooperation that those various stations were operated?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that was by agreement of the general and the commandant of the district?

General SHORT. The commandant of the district was supposed to be the channels of communication, and when things were drawn up formally and signed Admiral Bloch and I signed them,—

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

General SHORT. But Admiral Kimmel was in on the thing [75] just as much as Admiral Bloch.

Admiral STANDLEY. But when an agreement was signed, for instance, that the warning station should be under the Army, wasn't it understood that the Navy's cooperation there in the way of officers, and so forth—

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would be in charge of that officer? That is, if it were a Navy responsibility?

General SHORT. I would say there would be no question about it at all. I don't know that that detail ever came up. I don't remember it ever being discussed. Now, we have discussed, something like—oh—probably a month ago, the desirability of getting what you might say would amount to common command posts right alongside of each other, and I had taken Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch over

our whole system of underground command posts. My command post was up in the Aliamanu Crater.

General McCoy. Where is that?

General SHORT. That is where the ammunition—it's about a mile and a half out to the west towards Pearl Harbor. We had considered—

General McCoy. That's where the reserve ammunition is?

General SHORT. That is where the reserve ammunition is, in the same general crater. There is room enough—I had men up there and showed Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch that there was room enough for them to develop the tunnel—rooms right across our tunnel so they could have their command post there, and there was room enough where we were putting in this interceptor command that by a little more excavation they could have their air command right there to work with them; and we felt that the bomber command post, which is just to the south of the crater, right very close to Pearl Harbor and Hickam was an appropriate place for them to put their command of what they call the Pat. Wing 2. That's their patrol planes. That he [76] should have been—because they worked in very close touch with our bombers. We felt that that would have been a very excellent place for them to construct their underground command post right alongside, because our bombers come under command of Pat. Wing 2 when they go out on distant reconnaissance. And that had been under consideration. We had our command posts either fully built or well along, so we didn't figure we could change our plan very well, but that they could go right in and develop right alongside of us. And it would be highly desirable; it would make things work much faster in a fight.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask this, General Short: In all of these developments here in recent years hasn't it been the policy to thoroughly consider the functions of any station, like your warning signal station, and decide between you and the proper naval officials where that responsibility and command should lie, and place it there? Isn't that correct?

General SHORT. I think that there has been closer cooperation in the last eight or ten months here than there ever has before. There have been times in the last twenty years where the cooperation was not very close. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I have been very frank with each other. We have talked things over, and we have usually been able to agree fully on important things. And as I say, on this question of the command post, before, up to recently, I don't believe that the Navy had considered that it was necessary; and I can see from the point of view of the fleet commander he had expected when the fight came on that he wouldn't be down here in the harbor; that he would be on the high seas fighting. So Admiral Bloch's 14th District was the one that would have been most interested in joining up with us on command posts.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your experience, when it was finally settled as to where the post should be, and so forth, it would be perfectly definite, with a definite responsibility?

[77] General SHORT. Well, the way we had divided the responsibility, when the fighting was on land it would be my responsibility; when the fighting was on sea it would be his.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was a fairly definite understanding, however, between you and Admiral Bloch? That is what I mean.

General SHORT. Oh, yes. And it was laid out pretty much in the plan drawn up: if we fought at land I would control; if we fought at sea I would turn my bombers over to him and they would control it.

General McNARNEY. General, in view of the fact that our radio detectors cannot distinguish between friend and foe, was there any normal routine operating procedure by which the Navy and our bombardment units and our pursuit units kept the information center informed as to the location of friendly flights?

General SHORT. The commander of the interceptor station was the same man who commands the pursuit aviation. He would know about his pursuit. He was in instant touch, just a direct line—just pick up a phone—with the bomber outfit, and he could verify, and they would—no matter how much information, every time we picked up a group of planes we verified, because we didn't want to be firing on our own planes. We verified instantly where there was a group of planes, and we verified with the Navy.

General McNARNEY. The verification was after the fact, though.

General SHORT. We didn't have—just in ordinary times that were considered peace around here, when those detector stations were working, that verification was not carried out. What they were trying to do then was to become expert in picking up planes, because the man out on that station is never going to know whether it is friend or foe. All he can [78] do is report it into the information center. It is immediately verified whether there are friendly planes at that place, and that should not take but just a minute to get the verification. And even if you had your plot ahead of time I still feel that you could verify, because it is always possible for a mistake to have been made, and you wouldn't want to fire on your own planes. So if you picked up planes a hundred miles out or fifty miles out, before you would send someone out after them you would get a verification.

General McNARNEY. There was no attempt to verify on the morning of December 7, as I understand.

General SHORT. No. As a matter of fact, if he had he would have gotten a verification, very definitely, that planes were coming in from San Francisco, and they arrived within five minutes after. They undoubtedly would have told him yes, there were planes coming in, and Lieutenant Tyler thought he knew they were coming in on account of this broadcasting of Hawaiian music at that time of the morning, which was only done to serve as a beam, so he probably—and also Admiral Halsey had an airplane carrier up to the north, and Admiral Brown's task force down towards Johnston Island had out a carrier force, so of course verification with the task forces would have required more time, because they would have to send out to the fleet and see if the fleet was participating in any kind of operations; I mean in any routine training. I mean when the task forces went out I don't think the people at fleet headquarters would know just when Admiral Halsey was going to send some of his planes into the air as a matter of practice. I think that would be correct. Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves probably could tell definitely about that: that I don't think he would be limited, when he started out here, to just sending planes at a certain time; I think he could send them any time he wanted to.

[79] Is that correct, Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. Right.

General SHORT. No, that was not verified. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler did not consider the possibility at all of it being enemy ships.

General MCCOY. In the first place, as far as he knew there was no enemy.

General SHORT. No, there was no enemy as far as he knew, definitely no enemy.

I will take up now what happened at the time of the attack. The first attack at Hickam and Pearl Harbor hit about 7:55. I heard the first bombs, and my first idea was that the Navy was having some battle practice, either that they hadn't told me about or that I had forgotten that they had told me about: that the report might have come in, just routine, and that I hadn't remembered the battle practice. When some more dropped I went out on the back porch to take a look what was going on, and about that time the chief of staff came running over to my quarters about three minutes after eight, said he had just received a message from Wheeler or Hickam, or both—I have forgotten which—that it was the real thing.

I immediately told him to put into effect Alert No. 3. That's all the order we needed. And by 8:10 that had been given. It showed immediately the value of having definite plans. They were all worked out right down to the company, where everybody knew exactly what his job was, because there was no confusion; we didn't have to issue a long-winded order; we didn't have to take any time except just to phone to the four major units and put into effect Alert No. 3.

Now, when I did that I just knew there was an attack; I didn't know how serious the attack might develop. If they would take a chance like that, they might even take a chance on a landing of troops, and so I sent everybody to his battle position. If they had been in alert for an air attack the two [80] divisions, the 24th and 25th, would have gotten on their battle positions. They still would have had to have been sent. We would have had to say, "Put Alert No. 3 into effect." I thought it was important to get completely prepared as long as there was attack of any kind, and that went out.

At the time that the attack started, all of the antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews right at their battery positions. They all had small arms ammunition, .30 caliber and .50 caliber and pistol ammunition, in their immediate possession. All but four of the batteries had their ammunition for the three-inch guns immediately accessible. For instance, down at De Russy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not right alongside of the guns. There were four batteries that had to go further for their ammunition. There were four batteries of the 64th infantry; they were Batteries B, C, D, and F. The first one of those batteries started drawing its ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater, where we had our ammunition in caves, at 8:15, to show how promptly that they got into action. And by 10:15 they had all drawn what we call a day of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. So there was no lost motion. There wasn't any confusion as to what should be done. They moved out, and they had about a thousand yards to go, and by 8:15 they were actually drawing the ammunition, the first battery to arrive.

General McCoy. And the batteries you say all had the ammunition at the—

General SHORT. Immediately accessible. They were not right alongside the gun. I say they had to step into the casemate and probably carry the ammunition 75 yards. Down at Fort Kamehameha they probably didn't have to carry it that [81] far, and they were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was closer to the position.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 would ammunition have been present at all times?

General SHORT. Under Alert No. 2 the ammunition would have been right alongside of the guns, but if we had put our anti-aircraft guns all out and started carrying ammunition, like, say, at Fort De Russy, which is right in the city where everybody could see it, and putting live ammunition out alongside of the gun, we knew we would not have been carrying out the War Department's intentions to not alarm the population. We could turn out for maneuvers under ordinary times and nobody would be alarmed at all; but under the strain they had, when you got to the point of putting live ammunition right at the gun, that they could see—the small arms ammunition in the boxes; they couldn't tell. But the live ammunition for the three-inch guns would have been very apparent if we had had it there ready for immediate use, and unquestionably would have caused a certain amount of publicity that would have alarmed the people to a certain extent.

The first firing by automatic weapons, guns of the anti-aircraft, was at 8:05, a battery at Camp Malekole out at the west end of the Island. Apparently a plane came over there and they brought it down.

In the south group—that is the group protecting Pearl Harbor and Fort Kamehameha—all of the automatic weapons were in action by about 8:20. The first of the three-inch guns to fire down there was at 8:30, and all of the three-inch guns were in action by 10 o'clock. Whether some of them were not in action earlier because they didn't have a target I don't know. Naturally they wouldn't fire if they didn't have a target.

The east group, which would include Fort Ruger, De Russy, out in there, apparently had no guns or was slower in getting [82] the three-inch into action.

Now, in the statement that you gentlemen have there is a detailed report there in one of the annexes from every battery, showing just when it was alerted, ready for action, and when it actually did its first firing. The detail is very definitely there.

The Hawaiian air force when the attack hit—

General McCoy. Before you leave that may I put in the record, then, that there was no anti-aircraft fire in action against the first attack?

General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes, the first attack lasted, took—practically the whole of the south group got in action during that first attack. The attack lasted—it hit at 7:55, and it lasted apparently—there were stray planes around there up to 8:30 or a little bit—maybe even later than 8:30. The second attack took place at 9 o'clock. We brought down several planes in that first attack. As early as 8:05 we brought down a plane at Malekole, and the 98th Anti-Aircraft Coast Artillery up at Schofield brought down a plane I think at 8:15.

General McCox. But we might say that the attack was delivered first?

General SHORT. First, yes. As a matter of fact, nobody would have fired if they had seen it, because they didn't expect—the only officer of any rank who observed the planes before they actually dropped a bomb, Colonel Potts, commanding the 98th Field Artillery, just happened to be out near his organization and saw this group of planes as they came over Wheeler before they started their dive, and he thought it was some—they looked very much like the Marine fighters in appearance, and he thought it was a bunch of Navy or Marine dive bombers just doing a little practice, until he saw a bomb meet a ship, and then of course a second later an [83] explosion, and his outfit—he alerted it at once, and it got a plane very early there. But, as I say, he watched those for a minute or two in the sky thinking they were friendly planes. They were too far up to see any insignia on them, and in general profile, why, they are very much like the fighters of the Navy and Marines, not like the Army planes. He knew they were not Army planes.

The other planes, however, the ones that attacked Pearl Harbor, from all descriptions, especially the torpedo planes, came in so low that nobody could have seen them at any distance. As I understand, they came in at about 200 feet, so that they were practically upon the ships there before they were observed. They were very close to them.

General McCox. Coming from what direction?

General SHORT. Coming from Diamond—along Diamond Head. Apparently, from the plotting of the detectors, they came in from the north towards Kahuku, and then Kahuku lost them. I mean Opana Station lost them, probably when they got the Koolau Mountains between the planes and the station. They couldn't detect them, and they apparently skirted the east side of the Island, came around Diamond Head and headed right for Hickam and Pearl Harbor. That is just estimate, but that is the way it looked, considering the fact that they lost them, and they must have been low from the time they started along the east side of the Island because if they had been up in the air at all the detectors would have picked them up. So they were probably flying at a very low altitude so as not to be picked up.

[84] Is that all you want?

To go on to the Hawaiian Air Force, then, the pursuit planes were on three fields that morning. They were at Wheeler Field and at Bellows Field and an emergency field that we use for never more than a squadron, at Haleiwa up on the north side of the Island. We had no buildings there; we just had a landing mat, and we kept them up there in camp for certain training, and we had a squadron there.

General McCox. That is just north of Wheeler Field, is it?

General SHORT. It is right—yes, practically straight north, about 7 miles north of—I can show you.

Admiral REEVES. Can you point that out there?

General SHORT. I can show you. Wheeler Field is right here south of Schofield. Bellows Field is about in here (indicating on map). About in here. The Haleiwa Beach is right—the field is about here (indicating). You can see there are three different points on the Island. Now, on each one of those fields those planes were not dis-

persed; they were grouped because the protection for sabotage was more complete. We had bunkers enough at Wheeler that we had constructed with our engineer troops starting along about May or June, as I remember, in the middle of May, that we could have put approximately 120 of our pursuit planes in those bunkers if we had felt as though the condition made it essential.

The bombers at Hickam were all just off of the mat or on the landing aprons. The ones that were not in commission for flying, like the six B-17's that we had had to take parts out of, were probably in the hangars where the work would be difficult. I think that those were all in the hangars. The heavy planes, as I said earlier, couldn't be scattered very far up on the runways because of the nature of the ground, and we had not built bunkers there because we had been trying for nine months to get money from the War Department—and you will find all the papers, all the documents in here on that subject [85] (indicating)—and we had not succeeded in doing it.

The result was that out of the six B-17's that were really in operation I think two of those were put out of commission, and some of the others that were damaged were planes that were not in commission anyway, and then of course some of them that came in from the mainland were put out of commission. We had heavy losses there with the old B-18's also. For some reason, we had 10 A-20's and they were not touched. Why they were not touched it is just almost impossible to say, but they were at the north—off the north end of the runway and not as plain as the others, and they were not touched at all.

Immediately that the first attack was over, the aviation engineer troops stationed at Hickam and Wheeler started clearing the runways so that they could get the planes in the air, and by 8:50 all of the pursuit that was serviceable were in the air. Some at Haleiwa, when attacked—some of those planes were in the air earlier, and one lieutenant up there brought down four planes; another brought down two planes. By 11:40 all of the bombers that were still serviceable were in the air under Navy command. They were turned over immediately to the Navy according to the plan, and they were in the air and sent out on distant reconnaissance at 11:40 in the morning, all that were still available.

Now, I have got a tabulation; there is a detailed tabulation in the study there, in my statement, that shows just what the condition of the planes was immediately before the attack, what damage was done, and then the planes that we had in commission on December 20. In other words, we had been able to put a great many back into commission.

[86] We thought when we first looked at our Hawaiian Air Depot that things were completely wrecked, but we found that we were able to salvage approximately 80% of the machines, and the new machines that had been constructed had not been damaged and that those in the machine shop should be put in different places because we cannot afford to take another chance of having them damaged.

As far back as February, or two weeks after I came in, I tried to get money from the War Department to put the maintenance underground, and it was something like \$3,800,000, and the War Department said that it cost too much money. Now they have already started on

that. We got practically what amounts to a blank check after the attack, and the work has actually started.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you said you salvaged 8%?

General SHORT. 80% of the repair machines.

The CHAIRMAN. 80%?

General SHORT. 80%, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood you.

General SHORT. 80%. That is important because without that we would not be able to put our machines back in commission, to get our planes like that without that. Immediately before the attack we had 80 pursuit planes in commission. We had a lot of old planes. I do not know for certain how many, but we had six reconnaissance in commission and seven out of commission; 39 bombers actually in commission and 33 out. Many of these were seven years old, and there were always considerable pursuits getting out of commission.

During the raid there was some degree of damage. Eighty-eight pursuits were damaged and six reconnaissance and thirty-four bombers.

On December 20, to show how the maintenance had succeeded in getting into the work, we had 61 pursuits in commission and 22, just small ones that could be used by their squadron. [87] I believe 83 that could fly probably within 24 hours where they had only 80 in commission before that time; in other words, the maintenance has been keener since the attack. They have been working 24 hours a day, and with respect to the Hawaiian Air Depot, machine shop, we have the reconnaissance planes, six in flight condition, commissioned, and two that could be repaired; 50 bombers in commission and 13 that could be put in commission, but we received 29 in the meantime, large bombers from the mainland. I don't know whether that 29 included four that were destroyed or not. I could not say definitely on that, but it shows that our repair work got under way very fast, but of the eight we got, we were pretty well set up for repair work.

Of the planes the Army brought down we made a very careful and detailed study, and there is in the book there a statement of every plane that any battery or any individual brought down and the statement as to whether it was verified. It shows 38 planes brought down, but Colonel Fielder said that to be conservative 9 planes we should not have which we claimed. The Army brought down 29.

General McCoy. Is that what the Army brought down?

General SHORT. The Army brought down 29 or possibly 38. I do not know what the Navy did. You can get the facts from them as to what the Navy brought down. We have reason to believe that they possibly lost a complete squadron on account of the message the Navy picked up from a squadron commander sent in to his carrier saying that he was lost and he was out of gas: so there is a possibility that there was a complete squadron lost in addition to what was brought down.

To take up what happened to the ground forces, the 24th Division, which is in battle position in the north area (indicating on map), north of Schofield, it started fighting at 8:10. It was assembling and it was attacked and returned the [88] fire of the enemy machine guns. It was attacking also with machine guns and it returned the fire with automatic rifles. The division had no antiaircraft battery as such but were using fire on the enemy planes as early as 8:11.

They move to battle position about 8:30, and at 5 o'clock in the afternoon all troops in this group were in battle position and had one day fire. During the night a second unit of fire was issued. They make it a practice to have two days of fire at a battle position. We think that is as much as we should distribute here.

The 25th Division also started moving to its battle position at 8:30, and by 4 in the afternoon was on its battle position with one day of fire.

General MCCOY. Where was this battle position?

General SHORT. The 25th, all through the southern sector out through the beaches and getting some behind, in the rear of the beaches and the reserves over back there and just this side of Schofield. If it had not been for the anti-aircraft it would have taken them more time for these divisions to move out. It is a question of the roads and how many people you could put on the road, and when we moved them out during the air attack we do not permit them to move closer than 200 yards between trucks because you take too much of a chance of having big losses during an air attack. That is what causes a great deal of time in moving out, not having them bunched. We insisted they not bunch.

General MCCOY. Are they kept in battle position now?

General SHORT. Yes. Not only that, but they are perfecting their field fortifications. We started in last May. We had maneuvers on May 12, and for one week I had the troops digging in battle position. For years they have gone along saying, "There is where we would dig," but I got the authority from the War Department to get some money to put in machine gun replacements, positions for 75's, and got them actually [89] digging in. We did not clear the fields where they would destroy the cane fields because that is a small job, but in places dug right out the coral, which is quite a long job and takes pressure and engineering equipment.

The first week we dug and then moved into the 24th of May and then dug from the 24th of May until the 30th of June. After the 1st of July the War Department would not let me spend the training money. Up to the 30th of June I could have used the training money, but I went back after that to get as little as \$125,000 for making that construction, field fortifications, and was constantly turned down; so we did not accomplish much in perfecting the field fortifications from the 1st of July until this happened.

On the 8th the engineers were distributing—we just went ahead and bought the materials and they were distributing the revetting material. The troops were working constantly over the field fortifications from the time they took up these positions on December 7.

I may say, this: that the fire data for machine guns and artillery had been very carefully calculated and even before we started digging digging at all. That applies for both machine guns and artillery, and they were check for fire data. All guns were checked on the 8th and 9th and corrections made, so they should have been able to use their fire and know they are going to hit what they are firing at.

Right after this attack the value of our organization with the civilians for defense became very apparent. They had organized 20 civilian emergency aid station groups. They got into action very rapidly and helped evacuate the casualties from Hickam Field.

We had 16 surgical groups organized of the leading surgeons in town, all completely set up with instruments and so forth by 9 o'clock, and they started reporting at Tripler Hospital, and by 9:30 they had all routine operations going on.

[90] General McCox. Are they under the Reserve or under the Red Cross?

General SHORT. We have an M-Day Bill which was put through here that gives the Governor the power to do this ahead of time, and we had a great deal of trouble pushing it through, and I finally went down and made a talk to the Senate and we got that bill pushed through some two or three months ago. They gave certain money to the Governor to go ahead and do these things and it authorized him to do different kinds of things, and if he wanted to he could declare an emergency.

He never declared an emergency but he organized committees and things of that nature, and the medical society was extremely active here, and our medical work is highly organized, and the Red Cross also.

I had many conferences with him, and a man came from Washington and he convinced him that we should have \$200,000 worth of medicine and a regular course of supplies, and many of them had come in or we had them on hand.

These people got into action very quickly. We had the evacuation business worked out, and the evacuation of Hickam Field and Wheeler Field began at 12 o'clock by these civilian evacuation outfits. They were moved mostly to school buildings, and we set up cots and so forth.

As a matter of fact, some women and children came here because we were constructing two underground places, one for the interceptor command that was not in use, and one for the cold storage plant that is still being used in case of an air raid alarm because they just stopped work temporarily. The civilian agencies under the direction of G-1 carried out these functions. Some of them moved in their own vehicles, and they were operating several busses which were sent to move them out quite rapidly.

That showed the value of having civilian units interested in that thing. Their interest is much keener now than it was [91] before, but they have been going ahead in the work.

The FBI and G-2 started immediately rounding up all the elements we had on the list. We had the list all prepared of all aliens that we considered dangerous, consular agents, and shinto priests particularly, and they rounded up 370 Japanese, 98 Germans, and 14 Italians.

We made plans ahead of time for the use of the Immigration Station and of the Quarantine Station. They started at the Immigration Station and as they got crowded moved to the Quarantine Station on Sand Island and used the Immigration Station as a reception center and then moved them across.

As far as I know, most of these people are still there. They had hearings and they will be released if they are able to prove absolutely that they are not dangerous and should be released. I do not know what the number is out there.

Very soon Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill into effect. He talked to me at that time and told me he would put that into effect, and then on the next day he said we would declare and put martial law in just as soon as I felt it was necessary. I thought the thing over a while, and while they could do a great deal under the M-Day Bill—he could do practically everything except that he could not use the funds as freely as I could under martial law, and we decided the next morning that it would be better to declare martial law, and he declared martial law and asked me to take over the responsibilities for carrying it out.

To show how the work went on, the District Engineer had the work organized to repair the broken water main at Hickman Field, which was serious because we used this aqua system to flow the gasoline on water on all airfields, so without the air pressure we had to use hand pumps, and that means that effects a great deal of difference as well as the fire hazard that existed at that time. They made most of the repairs at night and they got to it quickly.

[92] As soon as martial law was declared I had the District Engineer take over all civilian supplies and equipment on the Island. He also took charge of the contracts and told them to drop all work that was not defense work and got them organized, and our first effort was on the air fields.

We had only one field that really was satisfactory for the largest bombers, and that was Hickam Field. We had only 2,750-foot runway at Bellows Field, and within four days we had 5,000 feet, to show how rapidly the District Engineer did his work.

On Wheeler Field they had less than is necessary for heavy bombers. He started right in building bunkers at Hickam Field and doing that by contract with heavy equipment. He started a new air field at Kahuku Point.

General McCoy. Where is that?

General Short. That is up in the northern part of the Island [indicating on map]. We had to go back and forth to the War Department and the Navy Department, and the Navy had some bombing range, so we were delayed getting the money, getting the thing started.

We improved, however, putting bunkers in, and we tried one three miles south of Kipapa, and I think that is the choice place on the Island for an air field, but the War Department overruled it. That has since been started so as to have sufficient air fields here with runways of not less than 6,000 feet so that they really can employ a large number of planes. We never had the planes that we should have nor what the program called for.

Our program if carried out would have given us 184 B-17's by June 30 next and 360 pursuit planes. Whether it would have been carried out on time I do not know, but these fields have to be acquired anyway. There was also a field at Maui, but it was only about 3,500 feet long, and we agreed that field should be used by the Navy for carrier planes because they used that position at Lahaina Road. After [93] this attack I had a conference with Admiral Block and Admiral Kimmel and they agreed to put a squadron of B-17's there.

That field has been under way and definitely will be completed and have about 5,000 feet rather than 1,000. So we will be able to develop that field for the outlying islands.

We had also one at Barking Sands on Kauai, but that is not paved, only rough, and cannot be used by the large bombers. All that work is being put under way as rapidly as possible, and as of the end of the month we will have plenty of fields because of the fact that many we can use now. After turning us down on many things for months we have practically a blank check now.

We were building air fields that in the appropriation bill that was up they had something like \$20,000,000, so we expect that at the end of December we would have the money anyhow. So we started immediately without waiting for anything, and everything is going along as rapidly as possible.

I took the following action as soon as martial law was declared: The courts were closed. Later on we opened up the courts for civilian things, equity cases, and things of that kind, but not the criminal court. The officials were all asked to continue in their official positions, and all did so. An advisory committee was appointed, headed by the Governor.

The sale of liquor, including wine and beer, was stopped. That was about all the action that taken at the time.

Now, I would like to give, just to show that I have not been asleep since I have been here commanding, that I have been working seriously, and just to give you a little indication of some of the things that I have done and that I have attempted to do. Frequently I could not carry them on because I could not get the money for them, but at least it shows the way I have been trying to conduct my command.

I took command on the 7th of February. On the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff, which you will find in [94] there, and we made a survey of the things that I thought were most important. I told him what we had been doing and gave the estimates and took up the question of the coordination with the Navy, which was not as complete as it should have been, but I think we made great strides during that time. I believe the Navy will tell you that coordination is much closer than we had it before.

With respect to the question of distribution and protection of aircraft, I asked for funds for bunkers at these air fields and runways and so forth. I asked for improvements for the anti-aircraft defense. I was considerably interested in improving the weapons and getting enough personnel. We were having to have our personnel perform dual missions of heavy battery and coast defense battery and perform anti-aircraft mission, and the thing got to a point where they needed to fire on enemy ships, and then make up their minds which was more important in the mission of fighting.

I was trying to get personnel. The Navy was very much interested in anti-aircraft defense and air. Their keen interest was in those two things.

I took up the question of improving the harbor defense guns. They had no splinterproof at any of the guns. In modern guns they are protected against air and we had gotten some money on that.

The searchlights in many cases needed modernizing, and we put in a project on that.

We needed arrangements for moving our supplies and reserves more quickly. We did not get much for motor trails during the period, as a total for the last year, and we did not have the motor trails and

roads that would enable us to get to our positions as quickly as possible.

In Manuaha Road, which is a critical point, it would take to move from our reserve position two hours and 26 minutes. After we built the motor trail there we could move the same [95] reserves in 26 minutes. Without the money, we could not carry out this work.

I took up the question of bombproofing of the vital installations like the command post, and we practically completed our job in Aliamanu Crater; our interceptor command control operated in a week, and our bombproofing is 30% complete. The command post for the 24th Division is just started. I took these things upon February 29.

I particularly recommended getting the Hawaiian Air Depot underground because I foresaw it was the biggest building in sight except the barracks and was sure to be an object of attack, and apparently it was the first thing hit on Hickam Field, and according to eyewitnesses, the first plane that hit it just plowed straight into it. It was a suicide proposition, and whether it was that or not I don't know, but the eyewitness said that and perhaps he knew exactly what he was heading for.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say the air depots, do you mean the hangars?

General SHORT. No. The Hawaiian Air Depot controls all supplies and all heavy maintenance, parts of material and all mechanical work. There are certain types of mechanical work which are done at Schofield, and some of the heavy work is done at the post, but when they come to the more serious operations they have to go down to the Hawaiian Air Depot, where they have excellent mechanics, and the heavy work is done there.

I think that if they lost that we would be in a very bad way, or if they lost the machines we would be in a very bad way.

I wanted to put it in the gulch where we would get a runway of 4,000 feet, and get the maintenance underground, because maintenance was a most serious thing. You could disperse your planes, but this question of dispersing the [96] maintenance in four places because it is too dangerous to leave them all in one place.

General MCCOY. Were any of these skilled mechanics casualties?

General SHORT. I do not know, frankly. I doubt if there were many, because it was Sunday morning. If it was Monday morning or any other morning they would have been considerably, but I do not think it would be many. We did not have any great push of work, and I do not think they were working Sunday morning. Some of them may have been killed on returning back if they went down there and started to help, but they probably were not in the first attack, because I do not think they were in operation except for the watchmen.

General MCCOY. Are they civilians?

General SHORT. Almost all civilians, and men with a great deal of experience.

I took up later the question of antisabotage, the question of supplies, vital installations, ammunition, depots, gasoline storage of all kinds and that I largely got.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that not all taken care of?

General SHORT. No, because while we actually had the money since August, getting priorities is an entirely different thing. I had writ-

ten to the War Department and had gone to the Governor to try to get a priorities office established here. I think it was approved in principle before December but not actually established so far as an office here was concerned; so we had no use out of it.

I had no luck in getting authority to bombproof the gasoline storage. The War Department wanted to disperse that rather than bombproof it, and it probably would be splinterproof. We did not receive the money for that, although there was correspondence on it since February.

General McCoy. Did you lose any?

General SHORT. No, we lost none.

[97] General McCoy. It is all underground now?

General SHORT. It is not exactly underground.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the gasoline is underground?

General SHORT. No. It will be six to nine months before it is completed. Maybe they can make it by April, but on Red Hill Bridge they have been working 24 hours a day for months. It is all above.

The CHAIRMAN. It is still in the big tanks, sticking up?

General SHORT. Those are largely oil. Do not misunderstand me, Mr. Justice. We have some gasoline underground, under the air fields, but it is not bombproof. It is more than splinterproof; it is halfway in between. We did not lose any of that, but there were some 4,000,000 gallons. Aviation gasoline was in the hands of various oil companies, which is all above ground where it can be hit.

The only underground gasoline we have is the aqua system in the field, and we have put in some 50,000-gallon tanks that are safe. If we get our reserve gas bombproof both for motors and for aviation, it would be good, because it would be bad to lose the gasoline here. We have carried on some experiments recently with alcohol. There are two breweries in town and they worked it so we could use alcohol up to 80%.

I took inventory on the 8th of the gasoline in town and started rationing it right away. We found we had four months supply of gasoline on the island for the normal rate of use.

I have made during the last few months a considerable number of requests for an increase in planes, and there have been definite indications of planes. If the program that had been set up was carried out, it would give us an increase in planes by June 30—which depends on the manufacturer—but the War Department was very favorable to it.

I thought when I got here that while the Navy had developed the new facility at Kaneohe Bay, where they put in a channel to bring the cruisers in, that the war plans still [98] provided that the Army would not assume the responsibility for defense.

I wrote the War Department that I would assume the responsibility and asked that the war plans be changed.

I talked with Admiral Block and he agreed. I asked for a garrison. They cut the garrison to half of what I asked for, but when we suggested getting 2,300 men in the garrison about the 1st of September, they told me I had to start the theatre operating type of barracks out there.

I got most of them constructed out there. Then I got word that the troops would not be sent until sometime in January.

General McCoy. Just where is that?

General Short. That is this position (indicating on map). The Navy position is here; the Army post is in here (indicating). You will find 8-inch guns there; not what we should have. When these troops come in they will increase the number of guns there, and I think eventually they will be sending some new 8-inch guns. That is important because with that channel the enemy can now run his ships in, whereas before he could not do anything.

The War Department plan has never provided any defense for the outlying islands. When I got here I started to construct these emergency landing fields, as I felt we had to have some defense. So I sent one regiment without asking any authority. I sent a battalion to Hawaii, a battalion to Kauai, a battalion less a company to Maui, and a company to Molokai.

I sent 75 guns to each which could be used on the beach or moved around, and a considerable number of guns, machine guns.

I felt that was the thing to do that I could consider it without having any authority for it and not waiting to get some increases. The War Department has indicated since I told [99] them that we should have the proper garrisons there. They indicated since December 7 that they will furnish the troops there. It has not been a matter of any importance so far, but it is just a picture of the things I was trying to do to maintain the defenses here and to show that I was really working at it. I made recommendations that I have submitted since February and which have been authorized since December 7, and they have gone further in a number of cases.

Soon after I got here I looked into the question of civilian defense, and one thing of particular importance at this island is that is not growing the food to feed itself; probably not over 15 or 20% is grown here. It seems that the main proposition is to grow cane and pineapples.

I decided I would start a program of getting the food situation in better shape and a number of other things. I had expected to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on April 6, so I decided I would wait until then and lay the program before the people at that time, because I thought that probably every businessman in the Island of Oahu would be present at that meeting.

I took up four different items at this time for the production and the supply of food.

For years they had been working on a question simply of what would be done if the production of food decreased in an emergency. The Department of Agriculture was carrying on some experiments, and the University of Hawaii also at that time. We got a committee working on this particular work. This committee was largely representative of the sugar-plantation people and the pineapple-plantation people and the large plantation people, representatives from the University and the Department of Agriculture.

We got a report on the number of these sugar plantations and allotted so many acres to each different plantation so that they would have some truck gardening. We divided up this ground so that one plantation would grow 300 acres of [100] potatoes or maybe 5 of tomatoes and another would grow something else.

We made up a list of seed required for that and placed these orders in the mainland with proper seed companies subject to telegraphic order.

We made up a list of the tools that each plantation would need to switch from heavy agriculture like cane to truck gardening.

From the 10th or the 11th, three or four days after the attack, I had a meeting of all of the big companies, and they act as factors for all the plantations, and I had a meeting of them and with the Governor's Food Control Committee and certain other leaders interested in this thing.

We had an inventory taken of food beginning on the 8th. We tried to get an inventory for the last two or three months because we had attempted to get out of Congress \$3,400,000 for food storage and \$2,500,000 for the supply of vital necessities for human consumption and \$900,000 for feed, largely for cattle and poultry, and they did not even grow the feed for that. It was held up by that body and apparently there was no chance to get any action on it without taking inventory because someone in Congress said:

For nine months they have been getting their supplies through, so there is no use worrying about it.

When we got this inventory, it was a disappointment even to me. I figured on 50 or 60 days of supplies in the hands of the retailers and wholesalers, and it turned out that we had only 37 days. I had only one day of rice and 18 days of flour. We did not want to start rationing the people. The big companies were perfectly capable of handling the distribution when they could get the shipping to take it in.

I had this meeting and I told them the plan which I had prepared and asked the War Department to guarantee 20,000 pounds a month to supply the current needs of food and as an [101] opening for that suggested \$3,400,000. That is all that was asked at that time, and I asked these people to get in touch with them and try to get that money for that purpose.

These people agreed that they would start on the production. This was the 10th or the 11th. I had the District Engineer order a supply of seed and tools because we had tried to have each plantation do the work. These orders were placed at any rate. The engineering office was tied up, but he bought them. So the War Department indicated that should be done and have it straightened out.

At this time I emphasized the organization of doctors and nurses and Red Cross, and that was extremely well carried out and in good shape.

I advocated the organization of an auxiliary police force and fire department. There was an actual organization effected of these men of an actual police force and they turned out several times for training a day or so, and they took hold very well when things happened.

I also organized at that time plans for the evacuation of women and children, not only of the Army post but along the docks, and practically the whole of that line is a proper military objective. The gasoline and oil is right down there in plain sight. If they put the docks out of commission it would be a very serious thing because practically everything the island is using is brought in from there. So it meant 40,000 people had to be moved out, and if they started bombing these it would be a very serious situation. We made at this time plans for the complete evacuation and had detailed plans for shelters, and we asked the

War Department and the Governor also to ask through the Civilian Defense organization that Mayor La Guardia is the head of—the Office of Defense, I think it is—for \$2,800,000. We received that since December 7. We got it since December 7. These are some of the items that were taken up at that time.

[102] On the question of the M-Day Bill, I do not know whether you are familiar with the form of that or not, but I believe this is the only place that it is in effect, and I do not think there is any other place where the state has passed an M-Day Bill giving the Governor the authority to protect the organization and to get so many things done during an emergency. We have it here. We got that bill through.

The Governor made little use of it until later, and I should say he would have made it if he had know what was going to take place, but it was of considerable advantage and I would say practically that I do not think it would have gone through at all except for being pushed by the Army. I went down there and talked to them.

We got a Home Guard Bill for the purpose of helping out in place of the National Guard group that went out in the service. These can man the guard groups, guard the utilities, and release the Army soldiers for combat work. That was put through at the last meeting and it went into effect since December 7; the Governor had not seen fit to call them out because they made an appropriation of only \$50,000,000. Now they have 1,200 men in that fort actually employed in guarding the utilities. [103] You may not think it has a very direct bearing, but I feel that I would like to have you know that the civil community does not think that I have let them down.

The CHAIRMAN. Does not what?

Admiral STANDLEY. What?

General SHORT. Does not think that I have let them down. Here is a letter that was brought out to me yesterday, a copy of a letter that has been to the President and has been signed by almost every leader of importance in town. I would like to read this letter to you if you don't mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT (reading):

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; [104] and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

The gentlemen signing this:

Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu, [105] C. R. Hemenway, President, Hawaiian Trust Company, A. L. Dean, Vice-President, Alexander & Baldwin Company, Walter F. Dillingham, President of Oahu Railway & Land Co., F. D. Lowrey, President, Lowers & Cook, H. H. Warner, Assistant Food Administrator, J. B. Poindexter, Governor of Hawaii, S. B. Kemp, Chief Justice, Supreme Court, T. G. S. Walker, Director of Civilian Defense of Oahu, John E. Russell, President of T. H. Davies & Company, George S. Waterhouse, Executive Vice-President, Bishop National Bank, Cyril F. Damon, Executive Vice-President of Bishop Trust Company, Briant H. Wells, Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association, H. A. Walker, President, American Factors, Limited, S. M. Lowrey, Treasurer, American Factors, P. E. Spalding, President of C. Brewer & Company, Frank E. Midkiff, Trustee of the Bishop Estate, Edouard R. L. Doty, Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, James Winne, Manager Merchandise Department, Alexander & Baldwin.

Those represent most of the financial interests of the Islands, and that is a more definite statement than it would be almost any other place I know, on account of the way that business is conducted here, and I believe that that should indicate to you that the leaders in this community don't feel that I have been laying down on the job.

Here is a letter here from the Director of Civilian Defense that I would like to read to you:

Please allow me to express my sincere regret that [106] our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated.

It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute's notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense.

I would appreciate it if the Commission would see fit to call before it some of the senior officers of my command who know what I have done. They have had the responsible positions enough to know what I have been doing. General Martin you will have before you anyway. I would like to suggest that you call General Burgin, commanding the—

The CHAIRMAN. What is the name?

General SHORT. General Burgin, commanding the Coast Artillery. H. T. Burgin. General Maxwell Murray, commanding the 25th Division.

General D. R. Wilson, commanding the 24th Division.

And Colonel E. M. Wilson, commanding the post of Fort Schofield. That is our one big post.

All of these officers have had enough to do with my [107] planning and carrying it out that they can give you a correct picture of what my work has been like.

I would also like, if you feel that you could do it, to call the Governor, and he has indicated that he is perfectly willing to be called in spite of the fact that he has been sick. Possibly Mr. T. G. S. Walker, the Director of Civilian Defense; Mr. Frank Locey, who is the Commissioner of Agriculture and the head of the Governor's Food Control Committee. He knows more about my work than most people. And some of the prominent business leaders. In Honolulu you can almost say that the heads of the five big companies and Mr. Walter Dillingham, those six men, practically control the business of the Island. Any of them will know the work I have done.

Gentlemen, that is about everything that I have to present, and I appreciate very much your consideration.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you some questions you would like to ask?

General McNARNEY. I have a number of questions I would like to ask.

General, the cable of October 16 directed that (1) to take due precaution; (2) to prepare deployments. That of November 27 stated that hostile action is possible, and to undertake reconnaissance. Do you feel that ordering Alert No. 1 was carrying out these directives?

General SHORT. My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. The Navy have assumed full responsibility for the distant reconnaissance.

General McNARNEY. Was the inshore reconnaissance undertaken?

General SHORT. The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes all around the Islands just constantly. [108] And if we had had them in the air 24 hours of the day, that inshore would not have accomplished anything, because the attack started from much further out.

General McNARNEY. As I remember, you stated in your statement that you assumed that the Navy was sending out the proper reconnaissance covering the proper areas. Did you know that they were?

General SHORT. I knew it was their full responsibility, that if they could not do it they would call on me for bombers to assist them. That was in the definite agreement. I didn't think that I had a right to call on them for a daily report of what they were doing. They had task forces out all the time. I don't know just where they went, and I don't know just what they did when they went out. That was a naval problem.

General McNARNEY. Didn't you feel it was part of your responsibility for the security of your command that you should have that information available?

General SHORT. I didn't feel that they had certain information in regards to the location of Japanese boats. I felt sure that if they had anything to indicate any Japanese carriers or anything within a thousand miles or probably closer than the Mandate Islands, which are 2,100 miles, they would have told me, and I did not feel that it

was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance. I think he would have resented it very much. I knew definitely that there were no land bases of the Japanese closer than about 2,100 miles, and that from all information available there were not bombers that can go 2,100 miles and bomb and return.

General McNARNEY. At any time during the operation of the Information Center up here was anything shown on the board as to the location of the Navy patrols?

[109] General SHORT. Oh, you couldn't go over there any time of the day—you couldn't go to any one of the stations at any time and watch for 15 minutes and not see planes. There were always planes in the air here. The only time that there wouldn't be planes in the air would probably be about between 11 o'clock and 4. They didn't do much flying between 11 o'clock at night and 4 in the morning. But you couldn't tell whether they were Navy planes or Army planes, or both. Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes, and the stations would pick up every one of them. All you had to do was watch any station, just drop in one of them any time and they would see a plane that's 35 miles out or 50 miles out, or whatever it was, and you would watch the course that they were taking. They could pick them up almost any time except between 11 and 4.

General McNARNEY. I think in your statement you said that you thought Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would interfere with training. Don't you believe that the actual occupation of battle positions is better training than the normal routine of peacetime training?

General SHORT. Not in this particular case with the air corps. The air corps had a very specific mission assigned to them of preparing so many combat teams to ferry planes to the Philippines. You can't afford to start half-trained men taking planes all the way from San Francisco to the Philippine Islands. They have got to be trained.

General McNARNEY. Would not the best training be actual reconnaissance out over the water?

General SHORT. No, because you have to do this, and you know, General, enough about the training of workmen, when you are going to make a B-17 pilot you have got to step him up; you can't just jump him right from his training ship [110] to a B-17. Ordinarily they have been putting them on the B-18's for a certain period and then putting them on the A-20's and then putting them as a copilot on the B-17.

Now, that is just the pilot business, and you have got your bombers, which is a very slow proposition, and we had a total of six ships to do all this training, and you couldn't—if you sent this out, if I played fair with the Navy, if I agreed with them that I would turn my bombers over to them any time that they asked for them for reconnaissance, I had no business rushing out there on my own on distant reconnaissance. I would just be covering probably the same sector they covered, using up my planes when they needed them, and they wouldn't be available; and if I put them down there and kept them warmed up 24 hours of the day, scattered them out and kept them warmed up ready to go in the air 24 hours a day, I couldn't use them for training these pilots for ferrying missions, and the situation didn't look to me like it justified that. And you know that you can only work so many hours a day on the thing.

General McNARNEY. Now, on your anti-sabotage measures were there insufficient men available to protect the planes if they were dispersed?

General SHORT. No, if we wanted to put our whole command on that kind of business, but it didn't look like it was necessary. I did not believe—from the wires of the War Department, they said nothing whatever about an attack by air; and when I told them what I was doing on the 28th day of November they never came back and said, "Well, this sabotage business you are doing all right, but you need to carry it a step further and protect against attack." If they had said that I would have gone ahead immediately, but they apparently accepted my decision as to what to do, and they were there where they should know more about the inter- [111] national situation than I did.

There was one thing I didn't cover, gentlemen; I would like to. It has been brought out a good deal by the questions of the General. I would like to read my conclusions to you.

1. The radiogram from the War Department of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the "Joint [112] Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

[113] 3. Action of the War Department on December 5th, and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the

mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code books been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese [114] attack than I did would certainly have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

General McNARNEY. I have a few questions on this operating procedure, and maybe you could clear up a few things for me on that.

General SHORT. All right, sir. I would be glad to.

General McNARNEY. First, on the covering letter distributing this it states: General and special staff sections and commanders of major echelons also will submit their standing operating procedures.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I suppose that they are slightly in more detail?

General SHORT. A great deal more in detail. What happened when the division got this—and this had been in the course of preparation for two or three months; we had put out tentative ones, and we had made changes suggested through lower echelons, and they had worked along the same line. When we got ours in final shape and it went out, then the division commander of the 24th and 25th divisions, commander of the harbor defense troops and of the Hawaiian Air Force drew up theirs and submitted them. Their subdivision units, taking for instance in the division of regiment, drew up a plan of standing operating procedure [115] that would conform to the others. So right down to the company everybody knew what he was going to do. Before we could put this into effect it had always been necessary to get out a long order to do things, because they had been making a point of maintaining a lot of things secret that I felt should not be kept secret. If you maintained it a secret you could not expect the company commander or the noncommissioned officer down in the company to know what to do when the thing arose. Our idea was to draw the thing up so as a matter of training it would get clear down to the private in the organization, so if you said Alert No. 1 he would know what his part was. And it really worked, because we had no confusion, and I think it is the only sound way to do it.

General McNARNEY. I ask the Recorder, when we call the other heads of departments and the commanding officers, generals, of the

major units, that they be asked to bring their copies of their standing operating procedure with them. Some of these might sound like repetition, but I still would like to ask them again.

General SHORT. I think you will find this: not with the divisions because they are pretty definitely set; I think you will find if you ask the air force that they would say they would change or that they would prescribe more in detail some of the things that were prescribed before. I mean we have developed since December 7 certain routine of putting so many pursuit in the air an hour before daylight. Every time a bomber squadron is ordered off the ground we get the pursuit over to the air field before it goes. Those details may not be in their standing operating procedure. I say if they would rewrite them today they would be more detailed, but that is a question they are bound to learn and put in more detail.

[115] General McNARNEY. Paragraph 6 of the standing operating procedure says:

Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces.

You felt that Alert No. 1 took care of that particular paragraph under the existing situation?

General SHORT. Under the existing situation I felt definitely it did. I didn't think there was any possibility of a ground attack. Of course there would always be the possibility of an air attack, but from the information I had I thought it was highly improbable.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 7 states:

During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:

Those are the 24th Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Hawaiian Air Force, the 86th Observation Squadron, and each department reserve unit. Were those liaison officers actually present?

General SHORT. I am quite sure they were actually present from both sides in the 25th Division. The 25th Division command post had been changed so it was right in the tunnel with us, and there was no occasion for their having a liaison officer. I could step down there or they could step up to my headquarters in walking a hundred feet.

General McNARNEY. Were they on duty 24 hours a day?

General SHORT. Someone is always there, and that is particularly true—has been—during this period with the air and the anti-aircraft harbor defense. Now, the Hawaiian Air Force, they would be in—they changed the command post until they are just like being from here to there (indicating), so it has not been necessary for them to have a liaison officer because we were in immediate touch with them.

General McNARNEY. Did Alert No. 1 provide for any exchange of liaison officers to be made?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 10 covers anti-aircraft defense. Subparagraph d. states the responsibilities of unit commanders for the maintenance of air guards to give timely warning, adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation, and the reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and matériel when in bivouac.

General SHORT. Now, what alert are you reading under?

General McNARNEY. This is the general paragraph on anti-aircraft defense.

General SHORT. Yes. Well, that is depending on the type of alert.

General McNARNEY. And my question is, Does paragraph 10 apply to Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. It would not apply to Alert No. 1 because the troops are not out on their positions.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 11 states that an adequate alarm system will be established in connection with protecting of important installations. Was that alarm system ever completed?

General SHORT. We have an alarm system. We have 1400 klaxons. They are not as loud as they should be. They are the type that we used in France as gas warnings. At all these installations there are telephones, so that they can give an alarm system that way. On account particularly of the civil population we should have—and money has been requested for that—we have been trying to get them on our own for some time—some large sirens that could be heard all [118] over the city. We haven't sufficient of them. I have given the City 300 of the small klaxons, but they don't work very well. They do pretty well in posts and out in the open, and they don't do very well in the city.

General McNARNEY. Under paragraph 15, which covers Alert No. 2, it is really not pertinent to what we are talking about, but I would like to ask one or two questions:

Subparagraph d.(6) states:

Place 240-millimeter howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

General SHORT. Well, I will tell you why that is. Those are manned by the Field Artillery, and it is done that way because there is not enough personnel. Those are extra guns above organizational equipment, and we figure on sending those out, when Alert No. 2 goes, before the rest—before the division ever moves to its position, because when the division starts moving to its position there are not men available to take out the 240's. So on Alert No. 2 they go out and go into position and just leave enough men there to guard them. That is the thing that takes time; and, as I say, we had not the men to man those that we probably have now because we got in a lot of men day before yesterday, but that was a provision for manning equipment over and above organizational equipment, doing the best we could to get the heavy guns in position before the third alert was necessary. Incidentally, General, we manned about on the average two or three times the fire equipment here that is provided for as standard equipment.

General McNARNEY. Yes, I know about that.

General SHORT. For instance, in the rifle companies that have as many as 24 heavy machine guns issued to them we are manning a tremendous fire power.

General McNARNEY. Subparagraph e. says:

Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that [119] railway batteries will remain at Fort Kamehameha or where emplaced.

General SHORT. We have changed that as a matter of safety because at Kamehameha—it is so close to Hickam Field—they were all on tracks there ready to be dispatched wherever there was a threat. We had actually sent all of them away from there on account of the fact

that they are too close to Hickam Field. We put one at Browns Mill on the West Coast; we put two up on the north coast because we haven't the harbor defense guns up there to protect it that we have on the south. We put one out at Kaneohe Bay. We just took it off the railroad tracks and moved it out there on trucks and put it just on rails, so that we provided some long range fire power there, because it was the only way to do it, so that now there is not a one of those batteries at Fort Kam. Three all are ready and can be moved anywhere by rail. Incidentally, we have probably by this time completed a track going up through the middle of the Island. There was a stretch there of about four miles that was not joined up, and we couldn't move except by the track around the perimeter of the Island. We got money some little time ago, and I think that has been completed in the last four or five days so that we can move our railroad guns now either by the regular railroad around the perimeter of the Island or by coming down through the center where we connected up.

General McNARNEY. Now, as I understand, Alert No. 1 does not require either the occupation of battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service, its releasing the—

General SHORT. It does not, but in this particular case I did require it because those people needed training.

General McNARNEY. Yes, but what I wanted to ask you, to restate the additional—

General SHORT. The requirement was made—it was using [120] this instance where we turned out an Alert No. 1 to train this new organization, was the real purpose of it. It is not part of Alert No. 1.

General McNARNEY. That is, you went beyond Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. We went beyond Alert No. 1, to the extent of ordering the Aircraft Warning Service to work two hours before dawn and one hour after dawn, the most dangerous part of the day, I think you will agree, as far as any air attack is concerned. If I had made it up to about eight or nine o'clock it would have been immensely better.

General McNARNEY. Paragraph 14g. states, District Commanders, assisted by air corps troops, will defend the air fields.

General SHORT. That is on the outlying islands. We have a district commander of the Island of Kauai, and we have two air fields there, one at Barking Sands and one at Burns Field at Port Allen. There is a company of infantry at each air field and then two companies that are held as a reserve. There is an air detachment of probably 60 men at each place, and the district commander, since he is the air officer—that is, at any one of the fields there is no air officer there permanently; the district commander is responsible for the defense.

General McCoy. Were any of those district troops in action?

General SHORT. No, sir. There was no attack at all except shelling of one of the towns in Maui by submarine three or four days later. We have a setup of a district commander at Maui and one at the large island of Hawaii also.

General McNARNEY. That does not apply to the mainland or to Oahu, then? Oahu?

General SHORT. No, there is not any district command. The department command has the responsibility here, but those [121] people are separated. The Island of Hawaii is 200 miles away.

General McNARNEY. I mean on the Island of Oahu the protection of the air fields is the air corps function?

General SHORT. The immediate protection of the air field is the function of the air field commander, supervised by the Hawaiian Air Force.

Now, we have asked eventually to put a battalion of infantry at each one of those air field, but there were plenty of men, especially at Hickam Field, corresponding to number of planes. They had between five and six thousand men there, and when you consider the total number of planes they had to operate, it gave them two or three thousand left over that could have been used for immediate defense. They actually had two battalions of five hundred men each trained with machine guns and rifles for the immediate defense. They had been required to train those. We had sent infantry officers down there to give them that training, for defense against parachute troops and landing by gliders, air transports, or anything of that kind. I figured, in the last analysis, that when the time came that they were trying to land it would mean that we would not have many airplanes to be operating and that the air troops ought to be able to fight for their own protection, in the last analysis, and ought to have enough men trained as infantry to take guns and fight, and that training had been given to them. And in the last maneuvers, in the last exercise, we assumed that the planes had been put out of commission, and we even took 500 of those men and put them down to take over a section of the beach, so that—at least figured to make a final counter attack, just to carry out the idea that any man, when his weapons were gone, could still fight as an individual; if his planes had been knocked out by the enemy, that he didn't sit down with his arms folded and say to somebody, "Come protect me."

[122] **General McNARNEY.** Did they ever actually set up any espionage or counterespionage organization here?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. We have got a very elaborate—it has been in effect for years.

General McNARNEY. Under the Army?

General SHORT. Yes, and works very closely with the F. B. I. and also with O. N. I., and practically everything that F. B. I. knows, my G-2 knows. I don't think they hold out at all. And the same way, if we have anything we give it to them. Their offices are as close as from here to the window (indicating) to each other downtown, our contact office and Mr. Shivers' office, and they are in constant touch.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

General SHORT. May I—I just received a letter from the Governor of Hawaii here, if I may impose on you long enough.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you may.

General SHORT. I have not read it myself, and I would like to read it to you:

Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would [123] play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of

these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

Now that is what we call the M-day Bill.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent.

Incidentally, that was not included in the inventory taken on the 8th and 9th.

Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, [124] since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers [125] in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases

of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. [126] I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.

Now, if it is satisfactory, I would like to have a copy of this made and placed in your folders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think you may.

General SHORT. I will get those copies made, and if you can spare your folders for a few minutes some time I will furnish the copies.

The CHAIRMAN. Make them, if you please, and one of your aides can bring them over.

General SHORT. An hour after I leave here it will be ready to be put in here.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably you had better let the stenographer have it for incorporation in his minutes, and then he will return it to any officer you will designate.

General SHORT. Well, I have a copy of it here. That is not a true copy (indicating), but I will have the ones that go in your book made a true copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves, have you any questions?

Admiral REEVES. I have only one or two questions.

You gave, General, three reasons why you ordered Alert No. 1—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. —instead of Alert No. 2. One of those [127] reasons was that Alert No. 2 would interfere with certain training.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Specifically, with the training on B-17's?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, more than anything else.

Admiral REEVES. More than anything else.

General SHORT. It would have interfered with the training of thousands of new men also.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Would the sending aloft during the dawn period, when you had the interceptor system in operation, of your pursuit planes, have interfered seriously with training?

General SHORT. I doubt, Admiral, if there was ever a day when there wasn't a very considerable amount of pursuit in the air every morning, I mean habitually.

General McCoy. At that time, you mean?

General SHORT. Yes, habitually there were planes in the air from four o'clock on. There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about eleven o'clock at night until four o'clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn't step out of your house and look in the air without seeing planes. They were just constantly—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, they were the planes of your inshore patrol?

General SHORT. Well, they were planes that were in training, but they would see just as much as—yes, they would have only been in

shore patrol; they wouldn't have gone over 15 miles; they wouldn't have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't have seen constantly.

General McCox. Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning.

General SHORT. That Sunday morning they were not up, most unusual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to—

[128] General McCox. How do you explain that?

General SHORT. I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson just why; but if they had been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition.

Admiral REEVES. I was not referring so much, General, to training measures. Alert No. 1 did not require your planes to be in the air?

General SHORT. No, sir. Alert No. 1 did not cover preparation against an air attack at all. It's sabotage, uprisings, and subversive measures.

Admiral REEVES. Had our pursuit planes been in the air, ordered there as a security measure during the dawn daylight period, they would have been an added security, would they not?

General SHORT. They probably would have been back on their fields about seven o'clock. I mean, you can't just keep them in the air constantly. We had decided that some two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn was the dangerous time, and just as we were working our interceptor station the chances are that if we had had a dawn patrol out it would have returned before eight o'clock. There is no question, if we had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected this attack at eight o'clock, why, we probably would have—we might have been able to stop it to a very considerable extent, at any rate. Some of them would have gotten through. We think they had approximately 160 to 180 planes in the attack.

Admiral REEVES. But had that contingent of armed pursuit planes been aloft, opposition to a surprise raid would have been possible?

[129] General SHORT. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Now, in addition to that, and in addition to the conditions prescribed by alert No. 1, had you had the anti-aircraft batteries manned during the morning period, that would have added security, wouldn't it?

General SHORT. Well, it would have added security, the anti-aircraft batteries. They were in action as soon as ten minutes after the—some of them as early as ten minutes after the attack.

Admiral REEVES. For planes—

General SHORT. It would have been an added value.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. No argument about it at all.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. If we had known—

Admiral REEVES. If you, instead of limiting your dawn daylight alert to two hours after dawn, had placed the limit a little later on, it would also—

General SHORT. It would have been an added factor.

Admiral REEVES. It would have been an added factor.

General SHORT. Of course, you have got to take this into consideration: just like Colonel Potts looking right at this group, with a con-

dition of peace, he had no idea, looking right at the squadron, that it was not friendly planes until he saw the first bomb drop. I mean the condition was such. Now, if we had had that wire that was turned over to R. C. A. at 6:48, then we would have been expecting attack. That was the thing that would have made the difference. But without that wire, if we had had nothing else and if we had had troops in the air, they still probably wouldn't have thought they were enemy planes.

Admiral REEVES. Of course you would adopt security measures at other times than a time when you were expecting an attack, wouldn't you?

[130] General SHORT. Oh, if you were at war, yes. If you were at war you would carry—you would carry——

Admiral REEVES. Or in case of possibility of war?

General SHORT. It is determined absolutely by your estimate. My estimate of the situation here was that the only thing that could seriously be expected was sabotage. I was fully prepared against sabotage, and there has been no sabotage from November 27 to this date. Now, there have been people who have been stationed here in years past who have felt that serious things would happen. We have had complete control of that. That was my estimate. My estimate was that the War Department would let me know of a crisis and that the Navy would let me know of the presence of any carriers in Hawaiian waters, and without that there couldn't be an air attack.

Admiral REEVES. In reference to this distant reconnaissance, a carrier operating at high speed, say 30 knots, might have been several hundred miles, perhaps 500 miles away, the night before?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. No question about that.

Admiral REEVES. So that distant reconnaissance covering the circumference of a circle 500 miles——

General SHORT. Wouldn't do any good.

The CHAIRMAN. If what?

General SHORT. We had planes.

Admiral REEVES. (Continuing)——did not guarantee that you would be notified of the approach of that carrier?

General SHORT. Not if it stopped at 500 miles, no. Our plan and the plans we had sent in to the War Department called for reconnaissance out to a thousand and fifty miles, based on very accurate study as to how close they could come, making the most of the use of darkness, don't you see, to get in, and we figured that the distant reconnaissance should go to a thousand and fifty miles. That was as far as our B-17's [131] could carry it; and that that was the—and there is a very long study in the War Department that we put in on that. But as I understand it the Navy is not limited to reconnaissance for their information of hostile ships, and we had a definite line of Mandate Islands, that that was the closest land base that the Japanese could have, and that was 2,100 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient we shall adjourn until 2 o'clock. I do not want to interrupt you, Admiral. You may go on.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we adjourn, then, to 2 o'clock, and you will return then at 2 o'clock?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Now may I collect these (indicating) and put in that letter then?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. We will leave them right here at the desk so you can have an officer collect them.

General SHORT. I will have them collected, and I will get that communication in.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[132]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves, any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No, I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you referred to several conferences you had with the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commander of the 14th District in the period from November 27 to December 7.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any estimate of the situation discussed between you at those conferences?

General SHORT. We discussed the estimate in this way, particularly in reference to the relief. If a relief was sent to any of these islands, there are no harbors at Wake or Johnston or, I do not think any, at Palmyra, where large transports could pull up and begin discharging troops, and we discussed the danger that would exist during the period when the troops were discharging because it would take some hours to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that you were discussing a possible danger?

General SHORT. A possible danger.

The CHAIRMAN. Due to Japanese hostilities?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Within a period of a few days these transports would be going across?

General SHORT. I don't know when they would be going across. We recommended that it be put off till the completion of these fields, which would mean 2 or 3 months, but it was always a possible danger.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not referring so much to that as I am referring to these telegrams with respect to the strategy indicating that the War Department and the Navy Department [133] were progressing before the outbreak of hostilities?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the severance of diplomatic relations. Did you discuss that situation with your naval colleagues?

General SHORT. I did not go into detail. Admiral Kimmel at one time—I don't remember his words—but he expressed the idea that he was handicapped by having to absolutely maintain a defensive attitude. May I say if I speak perfectly frank—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. May I say that the Navy, and I think Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves will bear me out, that the Navy are more careful about their secret information than any other department of the Government. They are possibly more careful than the War Department. I would hesitate lots of times to ask for specific information because I knew the point of view they took about secrecy

and that they would not tell their staff officers as must as I told mine.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is not exactly what I am getting at. After all, I am only a layman, but reading the communications of the War and Navy Departments sent to you from the period of October 16 to November 27 I should have expected when I looked at them that there was a possibility of imminent danger of hostile attack from Japan, a surprise attack.

Did you get that impression, or was there any discussion between you and your Navy colleagues as to that?

General SHORT. The most positive expression we got over this period was that by—when Admiral Kimmel asked his War Plans Operations Officer what he considered was the possibility of a surprise attack on Oahu, and he said, "None."

If Admiral Kimmel did not agree with that conclusion he made no expression of it to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. If I get the right impression from your testimony, it is this: that while the force knew that Oahu [134] was subject to a surprise attack, none of you envisaged it within a period of days or weeks; is that right?

General SHORT. I had the feeling, and I know it was on my part and Admiral Kimmel's that as long as he had as much of his exercises of the fleet here in Hawaiian waters, that they would not try to take a chance with a carrier attack. If the fleet had been ordered away from the Hawaiian waters I would have been extremely apprehensive.

I knew that they had a force out constantly, carriers with perhaps 90 planes, scouring the seas, but I did not believe it was possible for them to actually carry through an attack without the Navy getting something and becoming suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless I am misinformed, the general understanding in both the Army and Navy has been for many years that a surprise airplane attack might be the method of Japanese attack on Oahu?

General SHORT. I definitely would have expected it if the fleet had not been here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, wouldn't the fleet in Pearl Harbor be a very fine target for such an attack?

General SHORT. That is true. There were two task forces out at that time with airplane carriers. I believe that is the first time since I came here in February when all the ships have been in the harbor. I did not know until the next day that they were in. They come in and they go out constantly on exercises. I cannot say this is correct, but I think they probably had more battleships here then than at any time since I have been here.

The CHAIRMAN. You say in your report to the War Department that because of the seriousness of the situation depicted in the Chief of Staff's telegram of November 27 that you ordered Alert No. 1?

General SHORT. Yes.

[135] The CHAIRMAN. What did you mean in your statement about "the seriousness of the situation"?

General SHORT. I figured that we were always in very great danger here from sabotage. Take for instance when they closed down the banks. I thought then that there was a very great possibility that there may be something of that kind, and I put an Alert No. 1 in. I felt that any change in the situation for the worse at all might cause

the Japanese agents—as there were some here—to attempt to carry out sabotage operations that would hurt us.

The CHAIRMAN. From the time you came into the command of this Department, sir, did you have any information of subversive activities of any kind on this island, furnished through your own intelligence, the Naval Intelligence, or the FBI?

General SHORT. We knew, and we had a list of probably something over 500 people. We had something over 300 we knew and also the consular agents.

I do not believe since I came here that there has been any act of sabotage of any importance at all, but the FBI and my intelligence outfit knew of a lot of these people and knew they probably would watch the opportunity to carry out something.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the military opinion as to the most dangerous time for an airplane raid on Oahu?

General SHORT. About dawn or maybe two hours before dawn, because we figure that they will do more damage if they can hit in the dark or just at dawn and get back to their ships. If they attacked entirely at night they might get back to their ships and not be able to land on them. Then they could not land without turning on their lights. I do not think any of them like to land on the ships at night, and we figured they would never attack so early that they would get back to their ships when it would not be daylight, but that they would always attack about dawn.

[136] The CHAIRMAN. Under the conditions prevailing since you came here, which dawn was the most dangerous dawn from the point of view of attack? Which day of the week?

General SHORT. Definitely figuring the day of the week, you would probably say they would figure Sunday would be the day that there would be more people off and that the command would be less on Sunday than any other time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition with respect to leaves over that week-end?

General SHORT. No different from the other.

The CHAIRMAN. No different from any other week-end?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But different than week-days, though?

General SHORT. Our distance is so short that any man can get back to his post in an hour and can get back to their posts from town within 30 minutes. So with respect to the amount of time involved, the only reason is that Saturday night was the only night they could stay out, because on week-days we worked them hard. They would not have any way of going out because that was the difference between Sunday morning and other mornings.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the percentage of effectives on station on that Sunday morning?

General SHORT. I imagine that would run about——

The CHAIRMAN. Eighty percent?

General SHORT. Eighty percent or maybe more, because I would say probably 90% of them—they will not get home until 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, so they are very much discouraged from staying in town.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the anti-aircraft crews on that Sunday morning? Were they skeleton crews?

General SHORT. Yes, skeleton crews at every gun.

General McCoy. You mean available for manning?

General SHORT. No, on account of sabotage we had covered [137] every gun, covered every installation with the men right at the weapon, because we were taking no chance of sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. When you had your discussions, sir, from November 27 to December 7 with the Navy commanders, were you informed of what scouting forces they had out?

General SHORT. No, sir. I usually knew that they had task forces out. We usually talk about it.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no discussion about increasing the patrol?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any call upon you for additional planes?

General SHORT. No. There was no time when we refused planes to them. They understood perfectly well they would be made available if necessary, if we had them.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information as to a message from the Island, either by the FBI or your own intelligence department, to some Japanese person in Japan?

General SHORT. The evening before they listened in to a telephone conversation in Japanese between a local man here and somebody in Japan. This was about 6:30 Saturday night, and it was a very good attempt so that we were not even able, even today reading it, there is nothing that you can tie to except a conversation about general conditions here among the Japanese people. The only thing that would arouse your suspicions now is about asking how many ships there were in Pearl Harbor. The reply from the man at this end was that ships were in and out all the time and there were some, but not so many in recently as there had been back in September or January last year, that the number was cut down. In other words, indicating that there was some withdrawals of ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you staying that night, Saturday night?

[138] General SHORT. I went up to Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on duty?

General SHORT. No, I went to a dinner and left there sometime after 10 o'clock. I was right here.

The CHAIRMAN. You slept here in your headquarters?

General SHORT. Not in my headquarters but in my home.

The CHAIRMAN. You said something about knowing that there was a Navy carrier working to the north?

General SHORT. Yes. Admiral Halsey had a task force in the direction of Midway. I did not have official notice, but from talks I knew definitely that they had a carrier and a task force to the south because I sent an officer. I asked permission to send one of my officers with that task force because they were carrying out fleet land exercises that I wanted information on. I did not have an officer with the forth to the north.

The CHAIRMAN. General, there was a third attack at 11 o'clock on the morning of December 7, was there not?

General SHORT. It depends. I think there was. It depends on the exact location. Some say the attacks were at 8, 9, and 10, and another

will say there is a definite attack at 11. I think it depends on the exact location. I would say at that time a definite attack was at 11:30.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it effective?

General SHORT. They all caused losses. The big losses were the torpedo-plane attack on the first attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Did greater losses occur in the 11 o'clock attack than the earlier ones?

General SHORT. They were greater than in the 8 o'clock attack. In the last two attacks we caused the most losses. We brought down two of their planes. I don't know if we brought down any more than that in the first attack.

In the records you have the planes destroyed and that will also show the exact time on every plane.

[139] The CHAIRMAN. There were some statements in the newspapers—whether responsible or not—that some of the general officers in charge of defense of the Island due to drinking were not in proper condition. What do you have to say about that?

General SHORT. I am sure it is absolutely wrong. In the first place General Martin, who is head of the Air Force, never takes a drink. I have never seen him take a drink. I don't think he has taken a drink in years, because he has some sort of stomach ulcers.

I have seen General Burgin take a cocktail. I take a cocktail myself. General Davidson, who handles the pursuits, never takes a drink. So when that question is raised, there are two of the three that I know never take a drink.

I think General Rudolph takes a drink before dinner, but I have never seen any general officer in this command who has ever shown up in the District at any time having been drinking too much.

The CHAIRMAN. Since you have been here, do you know of any general officer under your command who has ever been unfit for duty due to excessive drinking?

General SHORT. No, and I am sure that the condition has never existed. I know them all individually, and I am sure that it never has existed.

General MCCOY. I know them all and I can concur in that statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that statement should be in the record.

General, Colonel Fielder furnished you, I suppose, under date of the 22d of December, 1941, a summary of the situation as of 7:30 a. m. December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. That would go to General Emmons, who has relieved me in command.

The CHAIRMAN. That was made up after the fact?

[140] General SHORT. Yes. We put out a daily summary of intelligence about being in combat.

General MCCOY. May I ask the General to look at that and see if he agrees with that estimate of the situation?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I would like to have him do that. I would be very glad if you would do so, General, and look over it carefully and slowly.

(The Chairman handed a report to General Short.)

The CHAIRMAN. At our request, a telephone conversation referred to in General Short's testimony has been furnish for the information of this Commission.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, you have looked over this estimate of conditions prepared by Colonel Fielder?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say that expresses your view of the situation?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. There is only one thing I did not know until the next day. I did not know the FBI had discovered some papers were burned at the Japanese Consulate. I did not know that until the next day.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether the FBI reported that to some of your subordinates on the 5th or 6th?

General SHORT. They may have reported it on the 6th, because the officers were right alongside of each other. I knew it the next day. I talked with Mr. Shivers.

I knew there were some burned papers that they had actually arrested or interfered with the burning of papers and had gotten a complete file.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the FBI rescued some papers from the fire?

General SHORT. That was the next day. They got almost a complete file.

[141] The CHAIRMAN. They did?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither your intelligence nor any other intelligence unit in touch with you knew anything about a secret code of blinker signals here?

General SHORT. No, sir. It was common practice with the fishermen in fishing offshore to have lights so that they can judge their return, and that has been largely true in Hawaiian waters from Japanese fishermen and that serves as a beacon light for them. Some of these may have been fakes and some of their signals bona fide to get the fishermen in.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that after the airplane attack these Japanese fishing boats started to talk on the radio so that they blurred out your signals so that you were not able to judge what was going on. Is that true?

General SHORT. I think that is rather an exaggeration. I think you can ask Colonel Fielder about it, because I do not know all about the details. I was quite busy after the attack.

General McCoy. Is this Colonel Fielder a G-2?

General SHORT. Yes. He can answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, since December 7 the principle here regarding the command has been changed?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is now under the principle of unity of command?

General SHORT. Yes, under the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is that officer?

General SHORT. Admiral Pye until Admiral Nimitz gets here.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is under the command of the United States fleet?

General SHORT. Yes.

[142] Admiral STANDLEY. Not the commandant of the District?
General SHORT. No. The commandant of the District is junior to the Army commander, and that is the way it is for tactical purposes. The Navy has taken over the military governorship.

Admiral STANDLEY. In that change in command or the principle of command, has there been any change in the organization or authority or responsibility for defense of the island?

General SHORT. That has happened since I was relieved from command.

Admiral STANDLEY. You would not know of that?

General SHORT. No, I would not. I know since the order was received that General Emmons had a long conference with Admiral Pye, but I do not know the details of any understanding of theirs. I doubt that it has affected the principle very much except that now in place of getting coordination, Admiral Pye would be able to order it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke in one case here of getting certain messages or a message from Admiral Kimmel?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then in other cases you got messages or an interchange of messages with Admiral Block?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why is that?

General SHORT. Our prescribed channel for anything formal is Admiral Block, but if there is a formal agreement, they print it and Admiral Block would ordinarily sign that agreement. Very frequently I get word from the War Department to confer with the Commander in Chief of the fleet and Admiral Block practically always sat in on those conferences, too.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then would it be possible for Admiral Kimmel to get a message from the Chief of Naval Operations, relaying certain warnings and so forth, and you not receive that message?

[143] General SHORT. Yes, it would be possible without that message specifically telling him to furnish to me, he would only give it to me as a matter of information.

Very frequently if he got any information that he thought was of importance and he knew it was not being furnished to me, he would send a staff officer to me to show it to me or else give me a paraphrased copy. Sometimes he did one and sometimes the other. It was voluntary on his part.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any sort of embarrassment or misunderstanding or anything untoward because of the fact that there were two officers down there to deal with?

General SHORT. No. We had very friendly relations. Most of the time we all three sat in on a discussion.

Admiral STANDLEY. You don't remember having seen or heard of a message that started out, "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. No, sir, I didn't see it.

Admiral STANDLEY. That message never got to you?

General SHORT. No.

General MCCOY. Didn't it instruct the admiral to inform him?

General SHORT. May I ask the date of that message?

The CHAIRMAN. November 27.

General SHORT. It may have been the same. It may have been the same as my message of the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No. It started out, "This is a war warning."

General SHORT. I don't remember seeing it. I think I would remember seeing that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I asked you whether you thought you had been apprised of that message but you said you did not recall, that you had been in conference with the Navy officers and supposed you had seen it.

General SHORT. Oh, I was in conference for two or three hours. If they got that later in the day——

[144] The CHAIRMAN. You were in conference with them again later than this?

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They may or may not have shown it to you, but that is the best you can say on that?

General SHORT. I do not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Have I asked your staff whether there is any report of the Navy having messaged it to you?

General SHORT. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We have not received any reply?

Mr. HOWE. There was some difficulty in the files.

General SHORT. I did get a message from the Chief of Staff on the same day.

General McCoy. Did you show it to the admiral?

General SHORT. I think I did. We had the same procedure that anything that is important, I send a copy right over by the staff officer, and especially if the Chief of Staff said to give this information to the Navy, then I would send it over just as promptly as possible.

General McCoy. I remember Admiral Stark read that to us and he said it instructed Admiral Kimmel to show it to the Army man.

General SHORT. I may have seen it. It may not have had any information that wasn't in mine of the 27th, in which case I would remember it.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't remember that statement? You say you don't remember the wording, "This is a war warning"?

General SHORT. That is correct. I don't remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, you made statements in regard to anti-aircraft. That is now installed here?

General SHORT. Yes. It is about six weeks since that work started.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is it entirely completed?

[145] General SHORT. No, sir. We were authorized to begin three fixed and six mobile stations. We started building these fixed stations. We had to build a road to the mount of Haleakelá, 10,000 feet high, and they are putting in a station there now. That is the highest mountain we are putting one on.

We started putting one, which is almost completed, on the Island of Kauai. The Navy has one force to the northwest.

They started putting one on Kahala that is almost completed. That is a steep grade. You have to use a cable. We have been four months trying to get a priority on a cable. So, of the fixed stations, none of them were in operation.

Later on, probably a month ago, we were authorized to build three additional fixed stations that have been started. Our mobile stations are working and six fixed stations are working.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long has it been since you first requested this detector material?

General SHORT. I would say it is probably back about March 6 that we knew about the attachment, because I made a serious effort to have some of these things operating by July 1. The parts did not arrive.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the reason for the delay in obtaining this material?

General SHORT. Of course, it is a new thing and it had to be manufactured. These electrical things take time. Apparently they could not get it out fast enough. That is the demand of electrical things in every way, not just aircraft warning.

Admiral STANDLEY. You referred to the possibility or the fact that certain alerts would interfere with your training? Is it also a fact that certain material which you have furnished to outlying stations has also been at the possible expense of your defense?

General SHORT. Yes, that is true. We had a total of [146] 21 B-17's. We sent nine of those to the Philippines and I have ready six more with parts to go. That order was cut down to six planes in operation. Then the War Department asked me if we could let them have 48 75-millimeter guns, and I think it was somewhere around 120 30-caliber machine guns. I wired back that we could spare the machine guns. We had to take the beach guns to spare the 75's, but I thought the Philippines were in a more difficult way and possibly needed them worse, and I told them they would be ready, and I put them in the boat and sent them to the Philippines in the next 24 or 48 hours.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, in the coordination plan, the general plan, you had time to deplete some of your own defenses?

General SHORT. Yes, but I thought if I informed the War Department about the 75's they might not have ordered them sent.

General MCCOY. May I ask a question about the ammunition? Did you send at any time in the recent past aerial bombs or reserves of ammunition to the Philippines?

General SHORT. I know we haven't sent aerial bombs. I don't believe we sent off the ammunition with the 75's. If they told us to I would have sent it, because we had enough ammunition that we could have done it without depleting our supplies.

Admiral STANDLEY. You referred to the request for funds and your delays in obtaining money or materials, delays in building projects. Could you tell us what steps have been taken in the way of training and operations which would bring out and emphasize the needs of this command both for the Army and the Navy in order to secure the material for its protection and function as a secure base?

General SHORT. I think the Navy agreed with me in the building of the air and the anti-aircraft which were the first [147] things that we needed, and if the fleet left and took most of it for distant reconnaissance there would not be anything else to do about it. So we made a comprehensive study and had asked to have possibly 184 B-17's so that we could make a 360-degree patrol for a thousand miles.

Admiral STANDLEY. What I am trying to bring out is whether the Army and the Navy engaged in joint problems, in joint evaluations for the purpose of bringing out the needs for defense?

General SHORT. The Navy participated in May from the 12th to the 24th. We had maneuvers, and the Navy participated in the air

phase of those maneuvers and had fleet exercises. There were fleet exercises about the last week in March and the first week in April to get our two air forces working in coordination. We haven't had any exercises in land operations. With respect to the land forces getting land operations against this Island, the ground force would not get the same exercises, the same as against the Island of Kauai, because that represented the characteristics that he thought he might run into out in the Mandate Islands. I think that was the main purpose he took his task force there, and this was the reason they were away from 8 o'clock Sunday morning before this attack started. The reason I sent the officer along was to observe these land operations.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your knowledge or from the facts that you have, do you know how far back, how many years back the Navy and the Army have been building up on joint operations here, joint exercises or how long the joint exercises have been between the fleet and the Army?

General SHORT. I think it must be back to 1934, but I think we had more detailed exercises in recent months than ever before and in many exercises was just working as a team.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you here when the fleet came here in 1925?

[148] General SHORT. I was never stationed here until last February.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke about going before the Senate here. How many members of that Senate are Japanese?

General SHORT. There is one or two. I think no more than two.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does the House have any greater number?

General SHORT. The House may have as many as four or five. I don't know exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do not put this in the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

General McCoy. Does it show in your statement the description of the attacks as to the results and as to the effects and as to the time and the losses on both sides?

General SHORT. I have given the detailed studies there of the planes before the attack, the ones damaged, and the ones back in commission on December 20. I showed what damage we inflicted on the enemy in the way of planes. I do not believe I put in there the losses in men. I think I can probably give that to you from memory.

The dead up to December 20 was nine officers and 223 enlisted men; the wounded, 16 officers and 435 enlisted men. Some of those were slight wounds and some of them were serious.

General McCoy. Can you state where those occurred?

General SHORT. They occurred very largely at Hickam Field. There were 38 killed at Wheeler Field.

In Hickam Field most of the losses occurred there—there is a large barracks that houses 3,500 men, and they bombed that barracks, and practically anybody who was on the top floor in that barracks was killed or seriously wounded. The people on the first floor weren't injured at all. It is a three-story building. Most of the losses were taken right in that one barracks.

[149] General McCoy. Were there any losses in attempting to get the planes into the air?

General SHORT. Yes. There were some planes pulled right out of the fire. That started at Wheeler Field, where they succeeded in pulling the planes out of the fire.

General MCCOY. Have you made any investigation of these separate incidents at Hickam Field and at Wheeler Field and at other installations?

General SHORT. As to just exactly the details?

General MCCOY. As to what happened?

General SHORT. We have gotten in detailed reports, and I have gone over them and tried to arrive at what happened. Of course, there are always discrepancies. You get a difference of opinion as to just what happened.

I have gone over them and I have culled from the statements of the anti-aircraft and made a chart showing exactly when the battery started firing and what it thought it brought down.

I have a statement in there showing when the pursuit planes were put in the air, which was 8:50, and some of them earlier, and the bombers took off at 11:40 under naval control. I don't know if these bombers were actually in the air earlier than that or not.

General MCCOY. The commanding officers in each one of these places have made reports?

General SHORT. Yes.

General MCCOY. Did you make any investigation as to the conduct of the senior officers in these installations?

General SHORT. All the reports I have about the conduct indicate that everybody at the time was excellent in conduct. I know I talked with Colonel Fielder, who is commanding that post there, and he told me he was machine-gunned getting across the road from his quarters to the hangar while the first attack [150] was going on. He was not hit, but the Japanese planes came down the line and turned around and came back and had apparently figured the officers would be trying to get across the road to the hangar line, but I am not sure whether there were four officers, or whether they were killed in getting across the road by the planes.

General MCCOY. Do you know if all the commanding officers were present in the garrison?

General SHORT. Yes, I know they were all present.

Admiral STANDLEY. If I may, before we leave this there were some headlines in the papers before we left the States, charges and so forth, and among them I will start out with the newspaper account given out by the Secretary of the Navy on his return. He stated that, as I remember, the Army and Navy were not on the alert. Is that in his statement? Did he say the Army and the Navy, or the military and the naval forces? I think he said the Army and the Navy, but of that I am not certain.

General SHORT. I think he said the service. The first report I saw said "service", and then another report said "the Army and the Navy."

General MCCOY. What do you think that was based on?

Admiral STANDLEY. The one I saw said the Army and the Navy.

General MCCOY. What do you think that was based on, General?

General SHORT. I talked with Mr. Knox for probably an hour and a half or two hours. I gave him very largely but not in as great detail what I have told you gentlemen here this morning.

General McCoy. You did not present anything to him in writing?

General SHORT. None whatever, no. It was over at Admiral Kimmel's quarters.

[151] General McCoy. Were the admiral and you together at the time?

General SHORT. Yes. Secretary Knox, Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Block, and Captain Smith, and I think Captain McMorris was there part of the time.

General McCoy. Do you know whether he made any other investigation?

General SHORT. He came over to my command post the following morning and wanted to get a picture of how we organized the fighting, and I had a conference arranged and I had all of our detailed moves, showing the whole location and the sea-coast fire and the location of the lines and the location of our observation posts and detailed maps showing the location of the air fields and everything of that kind, and of our communications.

Then I had a series of staff officers for three minutes, and of each of them he asked questions.

The conference was arranged by Colonel Phillips taking about three minutes to describe to him the general plan of defense of the Island. That was outlined by Colonel Powell next, the Signal Officer of the Department, explaining in detail our signal system with maps so that he could get a picture of what kind of communications we had. That was followed by Major Lawton describing the coast and artillery defenses and the location of the guns and the sea-coast fire and the range of the different guns, and things of that kind.

Then General Martin took up the question of the air work, the aircraft work, and the Secretary asked him many questions, and in place of what was to be three minutes for discussion, it probably went into ten minutes.

Following General Martin, the 24th Division operations, or the infantry, was described by General Brush presenting the ground defenses of the 24th Division. Then the operations officer of the 25th Division presented—no, it was the officer [152] of the 24th presenting the ground defenses and General Brush presented the 25th ground defenses.

We tried to give him a complete picture of just how we were organized to fight and how we carried it out.

When he told me what he wanted I asked him and he said that was all he wanted. Then Colonel Phillips was finished presenting that and he asked questions for about 15 minutes, largely of the air, about what was done at that time, and then he went through my command post, and I took him through.

So far as I know, that was the only investigation he made of what happened in the Army forces. I am quite sure that was all he saw.

General McCoy. So far as you know, did your subordinates all carry out their missions and duties?

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCoy. To your satisfaction?

General SHORT. I think without exception. I think there may have been some feeling in the War Department that maybe the air had been

a little asleep or something. General Arnold, the Chief of Staff of the air called me. He talked with Colonel Phillips. I was out at the time. He asked Colonel Phillips whether he was satisfied with General Martin's action, and he said he had somebody he could replace him with.

Colonel Phillips told him he thought I was, but he left word and told me to radio. I radioed as soon as I got in that I was completely satisfied with Martin's conduct.

General McCox. Have you been conscious, as a responsible commander, of the way these Axis attacks have been carried out?

General SHORT. What is that?

General McCox. Have you been conscious, as a responsible commander, of the way the Axis powers have successfully launched each attack without a declaration of war, a surprise attack, particularly in the air and against air fields?

General SHORT. Yes. I have realized that particularly. [153] As I say, if the fleets had not been present in Hawaiian waters I would have expected such a thing, but I did not think it was possible with the fleet here.

General McCox. Do you remember the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War and the attack on the Russian fleet?

General SHORT. Yes, I remember that perfectly.

General McCox. In other words, having that in mind, and what has happened during this war and things of that nature, these surprise attacks in each case, why did it happen that there remained in your mind the threat only of attempted sabotage?

General SHORT. Because I felt that if the Navy which had enough resources in the way of intelligence agencies and so forth, and if the Navy with enough ships out on task forces with forces out week after week covering several hundred miles, and I felt that if they did not succeed in intercepting a carrier they would at least know if they were within hundreds of miles of Hawaii. We all recognized the facilities which they had in the way of ships and planes.

General McCox. It is an old habit of responsible soldiers to consider the worst that might happen. Not what you think is going to happen but the worst that might happen from the enemy.

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCox. Did you think of that?

General SHORT. Yes; frankly I had thought of that. I took into consideration all my wires from the War Department where they were interested in not alarming the public and not causing publicity and actions about sabotage and subversive movements, and I had sent my order to them and they knew exactly what I was doing, and they did not raise any objection and they did not say I was not doing the right thing, and I thought they knew more about what was going on in a diplomatic way than I did.

General McCox. I am conscious as an old soldier of the [154] great irritation in reading in the papers at home suspicions of the reasons for the Army and the Navy not being on guard; not being ready to have any suspicions, but having in mind the fact that for 25 years this particular command has just been training and preparing for this very thing.

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCox. There have been various things said to the effect, in one of them, that on Saturday night everybody was out on parties and that there was unusually heavy drinking in Hawaii. Now, without making any direct charges, just those general statements, and I am satisfied that no such things did occur because you would not know what every officer in your command or your soldiers were doing, but are you satisfied that whatever they did had nothing to do with what happened the next morning?

General SHORT. I am absolutely positive. My men are not the men who would get involved in getting drunk. My two air men never take a drink. General Martin and General Davidson have not had a drink in years. I do not know whether they ever have, but I know in years they have not had.

I am sure nothing anybody did the night before had anything to do with what took place the next morning.

General McCox. Have you looked into the fact that this surprise attack occurred on Sunday morning and what happened in the past on Sunday morning as to the subordinate officers and men being on duty?

General SHORT. Well, I know the division, the 24th Division, was already turning out within 15 minutes, in time to reply to anti-aircraft guns or machine-gun fire from the air. The whole division had moved out by 8:30, and the same thing with the 25th Division. These troops were going out when the Alert No. 3 was ordered.

General McCox. Do your records indicate how many men were present?

General SHORT. No, sir.

[155] General McCox. May we have that looked into, Mr. Recorder? I would like to know how many men were present for duty and how many were absent.

Is it possible to get that from your records?

General SHORT. The records would not show whether they were present right at the formation, but I think that they would know when the men fell in how many men there were. If a company had only three or four men missing apparently they would not have taken the time for a full roll call at all.

[155A] General McCox. I doubt very much if they had roll calls in most cases.

General SHORT. I don't imagine. That is, they would know generally whether they had 95% or whether they had a much smaller number.

General McCox. Were you conscious that these Axis movements almost without exception took place on Sunday?

General SHORT. I don't remember that I had noted that particular thing.

General McCox. At any time, as far as you remember, had you thought of the fact that Sunday was the most dangerous day?

General SHORT. I had not given that particular thought. Here that would probably affect us less than almost any place because, I say, the men get to their posts in thirty minutes to an hour, and practically nobody ever stays in town.

General McCox. Did you issue any instructions in view of the alert as to the number of men or proportion of men that should be permitted to leave their commands?

General SHORT. Ordinarily a minimum of 50% is kept in the post at all times on alerts.

General McCoy. But did you issue any special order as the result of the alert?

General SHORT. No. It has been my practice that on any kind of alert 50% of the command must be immediately available to turn out, and in certain organizations there must be a hundred percent, complete.

General McCoy. Did you issue any special instruction on that score?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. As a result of the imminence of hostilities?

General SHORT. Not on that particular point, because we had—the reserves were maintained at certain definite places, [156] full battalions.

General McCoy. Did I understand you to say that it was not customary for the Admiral to notify you when his fleet was leaving or entering the harbor?

General SHORT. No, sir, I did not get notice.

General McCoy. You never did?

General SHORT. No, sir, not personally. Now, of course, my harbor control post knew every time a ship went in or out, but whether—any kind of a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. And where would that information be deposited as a matter of record?

General SHORT. The harbor control post down at Fort Kamehameha; it was a combination post that the Army and the Navy operate there, and no—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, that didn't come to your headquarters?

General SHORT. No, it didn't come to my headquarters. I could have had it come to my headquarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General SHORT. But I did not have it come to my headquarters. No boat can come in or go out without signalling that post and getting authority, and that was operated in combination, Army and Navy. The chief thing was that, so that our harbor defense guns would know any minute whether—we could tell them whether to fire on a ship or not.

General McCoy. Do you know or have you been informed since of when the battle ship divisions came into Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. I am of the opinion that they came in the Saturday afternoon, but I am just relying on memory without ever having any official report, so it would be better not to say.

General McCoy. Did the Admiral at that time ask you for any special protection or to be on guard to protect his ships?

[157] General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. Nor Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. So that there were no special precautions taken?

General SHORT. None.

General McCoy. When the fleet was in or out of the harbor? No change?

General SHORT. No. Just regularly they were always sending out a couple of task forces and would be bringing another one back in and they handled that themselves except for this harbor control post

General McCoy. I have no further questions for the present.

The CHAIRMAN. I have another question or two, General. Would it be true to say that this attack was a complete surprise to both Army and Navy?

General SHORT. I think so, definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. And would it be true to say that its initial success was due to a lack of a state of readiness against an air attack of this kind by both branches of the service?

General SHORT. Partly. I will say this: that if we had been absolutely on the alert for this kind of an attack, I believe that those low flying planes that came in at 200 feet would probably have gotten in regardless. It's pretty hard—your gunfire is very ineffective against planes as low as 200 feet, and the chances are they would have gotten in. We would have probably gotten a lot of the others.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your chief intelligence officer?

General SHORT. Colonel Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell?

General SHORT. He is what we call the contact officer. He stays—he has charge of our counterespionage group and works [158] intimately with F. B. I. He has his office downtown right adjoining F. B. I. and works intimately with them, and he has a group of counterintelligence police working under him.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any report through your Intelligence on December 3rd with respect to a radio message to Japan giving a pretty definite outline of the form and nature of this attack?

General SHORT. I don't remember anything of that kind at all. Are you sure that it was not deciphered after the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. No, I am not.

General SHORT. No, I know I didn't—I haven't seen all of those, but in this file of the consul, the Japanese consul, that the F. B. I. got when they went there to—when they went to arrest them there they got this file, and they sent the file down to Naval Intelligence to be broken, and I understand that they did get very definite information as to the nature of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed on December 3rd, 1941, that the Japanese consulate was burning its papers and records?

General SHORT. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you personally were never informed of the occurrence of that?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of that occurrence, whenever it took place, until after the attack?

General SHORT. That is correct. Are you sure of the date, Mr. Justice?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have the 6th.

General SHORT. I think it was December 6th that they show rather than the 3rd, and I didn't know—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not sure of the date.

General SHORT. I didn't know until the next day; I did not [159] until the next day when I checked with Mr. Shivers, the head of the F. B. I., that there had been any burning of papers before.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know when your staff was informed of that fact?

General SHORT. I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. That is all I have.

Admiral REEVES. General, you said that had you been fully alert, and had this attack not been a surprise, that you think the low flying planes might have been successful?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Because your guns wouldn't be effective against them?

General SHORT. They are not as effective.

Admiral REEVES. Do you mean that you relied entirely on anti-aircraft gunfire for security, or do you rely also on pursuit and fighter planes?

General SHORT. If you knew exactly the minute that that attack was going to take place, you would have your pursuit in the air to meet it, and you would try to meet it many miles out; but if you had a squadron on the ground ready to go into the air there would be quite a possibility that those first low planes would have gotten in before you could have gotten to them. Without you had been tipped off that an attack was going to take place at a certain hour and certain minute you would never have—you couldn't possibly keep all your pursuit in the air constantly for that kind of a proposition.

Admiral REEVES. If you had been fully alert your radio detector service would have given warning of the approach?

General SHORT. Radio detector service covers—

Admiral REEVES. And your fighter planes might have been in the air?

General SHORT. They gave us 35 minutes warning. If a [160] state of war had existed and we had had a squadron always ready to take off, we undoubtedly would have gotten that squadron in the air. We could not keep all of our planes in such a state of readiness that we could get them all in the air in 35 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on account of the size of your field relative to your planes?

General SHORT. Well, no. I mean you couldn't do that day in and day out; you would wear out your troops and your planes, and you wouldn't have anybody when the crucial time came.

General McCox. You spoke, however, of the air being full of planes every morning starting at four o'clock in the morning. Apparently there were none up on this morning, of all others?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

General McCox. Sunday morning. Have you looked into the reason for that?

General SHORT. I have not looked into the reason for that because the details of the—I mean the exact time that the field sent up a certain group of pilots for training was a detail that they ran, and I have not looked into it.

General McCox. General Davidson would know about that?

General SHORT. General Davidson and General Rudolph would both know the reasons why.

General McCox. What is General Rudolph's command?

General SHORT. Rudolph commands the bombers, the bomber wing.

General McCox. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes?

General SHORT. General Davidson commands the pursuit planes.

General McCox. Are there any of the air attack planes here, air attack squadrons?

[161] General SHORT. Air what?

General MCCOY. Or do they have any of those nowadays?

General McNARNEY. The A-20's have taken their place nowadays.

General SHORT. The attack.

General McNARNEY. The two-engined light bombers, A-20 attack.

General SHORT. Yes.

General MCCOY. They don't have that low flying formation that you used to have?

General McNARNEY. No; that has been somewhat passe since they have built the two-engined light bomber which they call the attack, but they do do some low flying.

General MCCOY. Would such planes be able to handle such an attack as these low flying torpedo planes made?

General McNARNEY. They could, yes, but would probably use the A-20A fighter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any A-20's?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. We had ten. I think there were nine in commission and one out on that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Did I understand you to say that the bulk of the morning flying was practice flying?

General SHORT. Yes, just ordinarily, just regular and regular training flying.

The CHAIRMAN. Training flying?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, the bulk of all the flying. The only time that we did straight reconnaissance flying was when we were carrying out a problem with the Navy or sent out for long distance reconnaissance for the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any warning system on Hickam Field? And, if so, how was the alarm to be set off?

General SHORT. The details of that, I believe it would be safer if you ask—

[162] The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General SHORT. Because I might be wrong in the thing.

General MCCOY. Were the pursuit planes armed and supplied with ammunition at all?

General SHORT. They were not.

General MCCOY. If they went up at all they had—

General SHORT. They had to arm their—yes, they did; they had to arm their planes.

General MCCOY. In other words, up to that moment the planes were not on a war footing?

General SHORT. They were not, no sir.

General McNARNEY. Have you reached any conclusion as to why the Japs picked approximately eight o'clock to make their attack?

General SHORT. No. The only way you could arrive at it would be the fact that they made up their minds—that they knew we would figure that it had to be made sometime around the vicinity of daylight to get the benefit of the darkness hour running their carriers in, that we might be expecting them more about dawn, and that they would delay it an hour as a bigger surprise. That is the only conclusion I could draw, that they figured they would get more surprise out of it at eight o'clock then they would at dawn, and maybe—that's just guesswork.

General McNARNEY. That would be my conclusion; more surprise.

General SHORT. Yes. They expected us to be more careful at the most dangerous hour, which we were.

Admiral REEVES. Could it have been possible that they were aware of your standing order to secure at seven o'clock each morning?

General SHORT. It could be possible.

Admiral REEVES. That was true, was it, that that was a standing order?

[163] General SHORT. Oh, yes, that was it, because that was just a routine training proposition. It would have been probably fairly easy for them to obtain that order; we have fully 1500 Japanese serving here as enlisted men.

Admiral REEVES. You say this was a routine training operation. You didn't man those radio detector stations, then, as a matter of security?

General SHORT. Both, but the basic thing was that I knew that they needed this training worse than any other part of the command. They were new, so I took—I thought I would make them take it more seriously: I put them in this alert specifically to give them—not so much that I thought that they were going to be used to the real thing but to get the battle training at the hours when it was most needed and most difficult.

General McCoy. In other words, there were no troops in your command ready for war at that moment?

General SHORT. No, sir. They were ready for uprisings. They were—we were definitely organized to meet any uprising or any act of sabotage or anything of that kind. A battalion of troops was the biggest unit that was ready to fight right then.

General McCoy. Were the bombers in the same state of unpreparedness as the fighting planes?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Without—

General McCoy. And as I remember you said all these planes that were ferried back and forth in recent months enroute to the Philippines arrived here without arms or ammunition?

General SHORT. Well, what I was talking about, the ones that came in then, I said that in the planes that we sent on I saw that they were in an instant state of readiness before they were let out. Now, that did not apply to bombs; that [164] applied only to machine gun ammunition to defend themselves. They could not have made part of the flight with bombs. They could make it with machine gun ammunition, and if they had a full weight of bombs they couldn't make the flight from Wake to Port Moresby, and what we were doing was not arming for offensive action; we were arming for the personal protection of the personnel. I think most of the previous planes coming in had had their machine guns, but that we had equipped them with ammunition here, and I had no orders from the War Department; I took that responsibility myself.

General McCoy. What became of those two photograph planes that were on the mission to the—

General SHORT. Only one of them ever got here. I don't know what held it up on the mainland. And the one that got here was parked in a hangar and was destroyed. We didn't send it on because it was not equipped so it could protect itself, and we didn't have the adapter, so we could not put in the guns.

General McNARNEY. Did you discuss with the Navy the category of alert required to meet the situation as it was known to you on November 27?

General SHORT. They knew. They knew, I am sure, that we were not in—not alerted to resist an air attack, that we were alerted thoroughly for sabotage.

General McNARNEY. You didn't actually coordinate with the Navy as to whether they considered Alert No. 1 sufficient?

General SHORT. I didn't go down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether they considered it sufficient. I am sure from all of our talk that everybody understood just what was being done.

The CHAIRMAN. This Alert No. 1 or Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 is referred to in this joint defense plan. Was it intended that the same alert would be ordered by the Navy as by the Army in each case?

General SHORT. I hadn't—yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am very much in difficulty because of my [165] lack of knowledge of military procedure.

General SHORT. Well, I would say that the same situation that would cause me to go on the alert against an air attack should cause the Navy to get all their ships out of the harbor because they could not defend themselves when they are huddled in the harbor. If they were going on an alert against air attack I think they would move out all their major ships. If they were going on alert against submarine they would probably prefer to have them inside.

Admiral Standley can answer that much better than I can. Would that be correct?

Admiral REEVES. During war, General,—

General SHORT. Beg pardon?

Admiral REEVES. During war, actual war, are you not on the alert always against an air attack?

General SHORT. You would during war, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Well, now, at the present time we are at war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. By your testimony just now, do you expect the Navy to remain at sea throughout the duration of the war, because of that threat?

General SHORT. I would expect them to come into the harbor only a part of the time. I wouldn't expect them, if they had a dozen battleships here, ever to put them all in the harbor at the same time; and, when they put them in, that they would have their task forces of airplane carriers, cruisers, and destroyers where they could be reasonably sure of detecting any enemy carriers far enough out to protect their battleships. I don't believe that the Navy would start a battleship from here to San Francisco tomorrow by itself, because it couldn't protect itself.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney, have you another question?

[166] General McNARNEY. No, sir, I have no more.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, I have nothing more.

The CHAIRMAN. General? Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I would like to pursue this just a little bit further.

Your answer to that last question, General Short, brings up the whole question of what is the purpose of a naval base.

General SHORT. The purpose of a naval base, as I see it, is to provide facilities to which the Navy can go for servicing the ships and for repairing them and for supplying them.

Admiral STANDLEY. What of recreation for your crew and rest for your crew?

General SHORT. Of course that does enter in. That would be secondary in case of a real fight.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then would you expect the Navy to provide their own security in that case, or whose responsibility is that?

General SHORT. It would be everybody's responsibility.

Admiral STANDLEY. The what? Whose?

General SHORT. If they are in a state of war—if there had been a state of war and I knew that the Navy was bringing in all those battleships, I would have doubled my alertness with regard to my air protection, definitely, but I would have expected them to have every anti-aircraft gun on their ships absolutely alert and to have all possible marine anti-aircraft under my command for the same purpose.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but what I am trying to get at is, Is it your concept—suppose this war lasts a year—is it your concept of this base that the Navy is to go out and stay out?

General SHORT. I think—

Admiral STANDLEY. Or could it—is the base to be used as a place of rest, a haven where the Navy can go in and be [167] protected? What is your belief?

General SHORT. I don't believe, under modern conditions of aviation, that there is any restricted area where it will ever be safe for the Navy to go in and huddle.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but that is afterthought. Now, what has been the concept of this base from the beginning of time?

General SHORT. The concept of the base, before the air accounted for as much in the fighting game, was that they could come in here, they could put out their submarine nets, and they would be relatively safe. I think the Navy has been perfectly conscious in the last two or three years that this was too restricted an area for the fleet; that a bay like Manila Bay, extending from Cavite to Manila Bay probably 60 miles long would be an immensely safer place to put a fleet in view of an air attack, because you could disperse them and you wouldn't have such an enormous target. All you had to do was to drive by down here when the fleet was all in; you can see that they just couldn't be missed if they had a serious air attack. There were too many—there was too little water for the number of ships.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand your testimony, General, at all, to imply that it wasn't your obligation to protect that harbor in every way you could.

General SHORT. No, not in the least. I am implying that it would be practically impossible to protect the ships in such a restricted area against a serious attack, no matter how much you tried; that they would be so close together that they would be bound to suffer losses, and I don't believe the Navy at war would ever take a chance on putting the entire fleet in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you say that no matter how apparently impregnable the defense against air attack was made,

[168] if you had been on the complete alert and had had every machine and every fighting airship and every anti-aircraft gun that you could specify, you could not guarantee the Navy that you could keep one or more planes from getting in there and making a hit on a battleship?

General SHORT. Definitely not; the area was too restricted.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have your ideas materially changed since the 7th of December?

General SHORT. Not on that point. That has been apparent and I believe that you will find that Admiral Kimmel would have had the same idea, that the area was too restricted in case of war to have the fleet in there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, your basic plans state specifically that that is the responsibility of the forces here, to protect that base.

General SHORT. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Now, if you had those ideas have you discussed them with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along those lines? Have you ever discussed with them the situation, or rather, whether or not they should bring their fleet in, or how many? Has that ever been discussed?

General SHORT. I don't think that I have discussed that particular point as to how many ships they would bring in.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more, gentlemen?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, General, we may have a postscript.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We may think of something else we may want to ask you about.

General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So I have no doubt you will be available if we need you.

[169] General SHORT. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will excuse you for the time being, sir.

General McCoy. And I think we might say that if as a result of this testimony and our questions he wishes to present anything he may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, further; if anything supplementary occurs to you that you think we ought to have, please feel free to furnish it.

General SHORT. Thank you very much. And if I may I would like to say to Admiral Standley that I am not trying to set up any idea of naval tactics; that I am just talking from the point of view of the defense that I could afford Pearl Harbor or that anybody else could have afforded it if the area were too restricted for the number of ships; that far be it from me to try to present a tactical doctrine for the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. I am not looking at it, General, otherwise; I am just trying to get a basic understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will appreciate, General, in view of the situation and nature of this inquiry, that nothing that has gone on in this room should be disclosed by you or discussed by you with anyone.

General SHORT. Yes. I was not offering it as a criticism of the present situation. It is simply that the condition had changed over a period of years. When Pearl Harbor was first built it was adequate.

The CHAIRMAN. You got my caution about not discussing?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Let us call General Davidson.

[170] **TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HOWARD C. DAVIDSON, UNITED STATES ARMY AIR CORPS**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name, General?

General DAVIDSON. Howard C. Davidson.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

General DAVIDSON. Brigadier General, Air Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your official function on December 7th and theretofore in the Department of Hawaii?

General DAVIDSON. Commanding General, Fourteenth Pursuit Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. As part of your duties you had the interceptor service, the airplane interceptor command. Tell me what your tasks were as such.

General DAVIDSON. I had the pursuit wing, sir, but the interceptor hasn't really been formed—the interceptor command hadn't really been formed up to that time. I don't think it has been formed still.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, the pursuit wing—

General DAVIDSON. The pursuit wing, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. — was your particular care.

General DAVIDSON. My particular care.

The CHAIRMAN. And in that connection what materiel did you have under your command?

General DAVIDSON. I had two groups, one of four tactical squadrons and one of three tactical squadrons that were able to operate. Two other squadrons we had just been ordered to activate, but they had no airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a trained force to man all the squadrons you have mentioned?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. Not the two that have been activated.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General DAVIDSON. They had—

[171] The CHAIRMAN. But the others?

General DAVIDSON. The other seven, yes, sir. Now, they were not very well trained, sir. They had a force, though. We were in process of training them at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your routine, so far as the squadrons under your command went, on and before December 7?

General DAVIDSON. We were occupied principally in attempting to train the new pilots that had been assigned to us. We received the pilots with 200 hours flying, none of which had been in pursuit aircraft and none of which had ever fired a machine gun, and we were occupied principally in attempting to train those pilots.

The CHAIRMAN. At what hours in the day were training flights being made?

General DAVIDSON. We trained until about four p. m., sir, each day, and then on alternate weeks the field was assigned to one of the groups for night flying. We didn't try to fly both groups at night. We were

operating both groups off Wheeler Field, and it was a little congested there for night flying.

The CHAIRMAN. None of your operations were off Hickam Field?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. They are now, but they were not at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when would the training flights begin in the morning?

General DAVIDSON. They would begin at about seven-thirty, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, planes, to your knowledge, were flying in the coastal patrol from four a. m. to seven a. m. or eight a. m.? Any?

General DAVIDSON. Why, the plot shows there were planes flying, but I couldn't say, sir, whether they were coastal patrol planes or not.

[172] The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have had information that in the early morning planes were flying all around the coastal area. Were those the planes under your command?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not?

General DAVIDSON. Not under my command, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anyone else who had command of flying equipment besides yourself on the Island?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. General Rudolph and—

The CHAIRMAN. His were bombers, were they not?

General DAVIDSON. His were bombers, and Admiral Bellinger had patrol planes, and there were some marine planes at Ewa, but—

The CHAIRMAN. At what?

General DAVIDSON. E-w-a. "Ever" they call it. But whether they were flying or not I could not say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, on a week day morning none of your command would be flying between four and eight in the morning?

General DAVIDSON. Well, about seven-thirty on a week day. This 7th was Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. I know it was.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am trying to draw the distinction between Sunday and week days.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There were none flying at any time Sunday morning, were there?

General DAVIDSON. None on Sundays of ours, as far as I know, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. That was because the men were resting on Sundays?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

[173] The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney, have you any questions?

General DAVIDSON. May I amend that sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General DAVIDSON. One plane had gone to Molokai, a bomber, and it came back just in the midst of this raid. It might have been flying at that time.

General McNARNEY. Have you a standing operating procedure?

General DAVIDSON. We have. I just sent for some copies. The nearest approach to it is a paper here [indicating]. We were trying to explain the duties of the interceptor command. We called it "Tentative

Manual of Interceptor Command Organization Procedure, and Operation for Air Defense." But it is a rather elementary effort to explain to the pursuit units exactly what the duties of the interceptor command were.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I am only a layman and don't know your military procedure, and therefore I am a little at large on this question. Let me clear it if I can. Am I to understand that the force under you and the small bomber force of General Rudolph were the only forces available to repel the airplane raid on Pearl Harbor? If not, will you tell me what the total available force for that purpose was on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. As I say, there were 34 marine planes, I think mostly dive bombers, over there, and I imagine they could have been considered a part of the force that was available.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, under the coordination plan, in the case of an air raid would those marine planes be available to you or to General Martin? Who would take command of them?

General DAVIDSON. If they were fighters they were available to me, but if—

The CHAIRMAN. If they were dive bombers?

General DAVIDSON. Dive bombers, they probably would be—come to me also. That is, in our joint maneuvers they have [174] often assigned me some dive bombers, which we didn't use as dive bombers: we used them to attempt to track the enemy back to the carrier in which he came, but the joint agreement says that bombers will be assigned to Patrol Wing 2 and the fighters to the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing for operation.

The CHAIRMAN. Who had command of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing?

General DAVIDSON. I had the command of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. You did. Now, I have your two groups of pursuit planes in mind; I have General Rudolph's small force of bombers.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And perhaps six—in mind. I have the 34 planes of whatever character the Marines had who would come under your command to repel an attack. Now, what else had you?

General DAVIDSON. Nothing else, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing more?

General DAVIDSON. Nothing more, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if a state of war had been declared, would plans have been made to coordinate a repulsive action against a possible raid?

General DAVIDSON. The plans were already in operation, sir. We had—

The CHAIRMAN. What alert would that be?

General DAVIDSON. That would be Alert No. 3, probably, sir. We were on Alert No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MCCOY. What were your duties under that alert?

General DAVIDSON. Simply guarding against sabotage, and we had direct orders, in a telegram from Hawaiian Air Force, not to dis-

perse the airplanes; that the airplanes would be kept [175] concentrated so they would be easier to guard against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Who issued that order?

General DAVIDSON. General Martin, sir. One was signed "H. A. F.," which means Hawaiian Air Force, and the other was signed "Martin." There were two telegrams.

The CHAIRMAN. General Martin was your superior?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. He is the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. What other units did he have under his command? He had Rudolph's command under him?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And yours?

General DAVIDSON. And mine,—

The CHAIRMAN. And anything else?

General DAVIDSON. —except, in hostilities the operational control of his bombers would go to Pat. Wing 2.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. You are familiar with the Standing Operating Procedure of the Department, aren't you?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. And the covering letter on the distribution of the Standing Operating Procedure, as dated the 5th of November, requires each subordinate headquarters to furnish their standing operating procedure. Have you ever drawn one up?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. We got a notification from the Hawaiian Air Force that they would—when they put this alert on on November 27 they gave us a notice that they would draw up their standing operating procedure, but until that time they simply defined to us the various types of alert.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 what dispositions would you have made?

General DAVIDSON. We would put the airplanes in the [176] bunkers, and we keep half the people there generally ready to fly.

General McNARNEY. What state of readiness would you have? What percentage of—what state of readiness?

General DAVIDSON. Could I look at the paper, or do you want me to—

General McNARNEY. Surely; look at the paper if you wish.

General DAVIDSON. I have it right here (indicating). The state of readiness is prescribed in the order, and it is called operational degree of readiness: 1 is four minutes; 2, thirty minutes; 3 is one hour; 4 is two hours; 5 is four hours; and then, the Alert No. 2: Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Have you ever directed or have you ever actually issued any order as to what your state of readiness would be? You say, "as directed by this headquarters."

General DAVIDSON. This is from the Hawaiian Air Force.

General McNARNEY. Yes. Oh, that is directed by the Hawaiian Air Force?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. The state of readiness of your command?

General DAVIDSON. They designate the state of readiness.

General McNARNEY. In other words, you received orders from higher authority as to the proportion of your command which should be in state No. 1; is that correct?

General DAVIDSON. May I just show you the telegram?

General McNARNEY. You might read it.

General DAVIDSON. The telegram says—this was sent on November 27:

Air force 27 OB Priority

HAF Four two C period place Alert number one in effect immediately stop anti-sabotage only stop this [177] is an actual repeat actual alert not a drill.

Signed AGHAF 340P.

Then that was followed by the next telegram. It says:

Under alert number one aircraft will not be dispersed stop all units continue training under condition easy five.

That means E-5.

General McNARNEY. Four hours?

General DAVIDSON. Easy five is just normal training condition, go right back to normal training on the easy five.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information of the reasons why Alert No. 1 was put into effect?

General DAVIDSON. As a matter of fact I wasn't here when No. 1 was put into effect. I went to the United States on October 15 to study the interceptor command setup and didn't return until November the third, so I never gave it a thought as to why it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean December 3rd.

General DAVIDSON. December 3rd, yes, sir. I came back about December 3rd, and when I came back we were in Alert No. 1 easy five condition, which was an anti-sabotage alert, and the only effect that had had on us was to double our guard, practically.

General McCoy. And to concentrate your planes?

General DAVIDSON. We concentrated—we kept them parked in that same place, General, all the time, anyway; we just did not disperse them. It was a concrete mat on which we had rings to tie them down at night.

[178] General McNARNEY. You then had no actual knowledge of the existing condition known to the higher command here, as to the actual existing situation against Japan?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I had just come back on the 3d. I spent—I got back on the 3d; I spent the 4th and the 5th either writing up—finishing the reports or talking to the staff of the Hawaiian Air Force, telling them of the setup in the United States on both the interceptor command and the maintenance command, which was very difficult to understand. It was contemplated putting in both those commands here.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you refer to by the interceptor command, which you say had not been established?

General DAVIDSON. The interceptor command is a combination of the pursuit units plus the air warning, aircraft warning regiment of signal corps troops principally and operational control of the anti-aircraft artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, a portion of the equipment for the aircraft warning system had been received?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under your command, was it not?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose?

General DAVIDSON. That was under the signal corps. They were installing these units.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who was responsible for the training of the men in the use of these units?

General DAVIDSON. We had built, through the help of the signal corps, a small information center with material that we could find on hand here. You probably will visit it; it's on the top of a little concrete warehouse of the signal corps. But up until that time the signal corps had handled the construction of it. The troops that were being trained in it are all signal corps troops and were still under the signal [179] corps, but—

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose command was Lieutenant Tyler?

General DAVIDSON. He was under my command and had been sent there as duty officer for that day for that training.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what were his duties?

General DAVIDSON. We were trying principally to train the operating crews of the Radar stations—we call them Derax stations; the Navy calls them Radar—and the plotters around the board at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I still don't quite understand what Lieutenant Tyler's duties were on that morning of December 7.

General DAVIDSON. He was the duty officer in the place there, to see that that training went on, and he was being trained himself, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, he is not a signal corps officer, is he?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. He is an air corps officer. Around this board you have a controller, and on his right is a pursuit officer, and he was really acting as a pursuit officer for that day but was actually just being trained himself.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack occurred?

General DAVIDSON. I was in my quarters at Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it your order that the stations should be shut down at 7 o'clock on the morning of December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. That was the department had issued such orders as that. They operate the station from 4 to 7.

General McCoy. Are you in command of that station now?

General DAVIDSON. Now I am, sir. The order was just published a few days ago that the 14th Pursuit Wing Headquarters of my headquarters company would be constituted the headquarters in headquarters company of the interceptor command, [180] and the 14th Pursuit Wing would be designated.

General McCoy. So that now you have command of the whole layout of the detector system?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the anti-aircraft service, as you call it?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And your own groups?

General DAVIDSON. Our own wing, yes, sir.

General McCoy. But that was not the case on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. The Aircraft Warning Service is still in process of being activated. We have recommended that the signal company that's operating now be used as a cadre to form this aircraft warning regiment which will operate the Aircraft Warning Service.

General McCoy. Does that include also the present setup for aerial alarm?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, and the operating of the stations on the outlying islands, too, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The permanent station?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At the time of the first attack on the morning of December 7 how many men of your command were present for duty?

General DAVIDSON. I couldn't tell you that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any data available on the subject?

General DAVIDSON. I suppose we could get that, sir. We could get—I don't know just what it would be. It would be the morning report.

General McNARNEY. The morning report.

The CHAIRMAN. When would the data for the morning report be gathered?

[181] General DAVIDSON. It comes in in the morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I mean when would the data be gathered for the report? Before 7 o'clock?

General DAVIDSON. I think so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you see if those data can be obtained, and give the Commission a memorandum of the number of men present and the number of absentees on that morning from your command?

Can you state, General, whether there were less planes in the air early Sunday morning, December 7, than usual?

General DAVIDSON. Well, we generally don't have any planes in the air on Sundays.

The CHAIRMAN. So that there would be less in the air than on a week-day?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any warning signal at Hickam Field that can be sounded as an alarm to the men?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We have what we call the alert signal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is it? A siren?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. It's a gong that's beaten on. We tried the siren, and it's not very effective, and every time they have a fire you didn't know whether you were being alerted or whether it was a fire signal.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there the same system at Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. I thought you asked Wheeler Field, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I asked Hickam. I asked first for Hickam Field.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, I think Hickam uses the siren.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether those were sounded on the morning of the attack, and if so, when?

General DAVIDSON. I had an officer call up and order the alert sounded, but— [182]

The CHAIRMAN. When?

General DAVIDSON. About 8:05, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after you had by the use of your own senses observed the attack?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. I heard the first bombs dropping, and about 8:05 we sounded the alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home on the Island? Near either of the fields?

General Davidson. It's on Wheeler Field, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On Wheeler Field?

General Davidson. On Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. The bombs were being dropped at Hickam Field at that time, were they not?

General DAVIDSON. They were dropped at Wheeler Field, too, about that same time.

The CHAIRMAN. Both at the same time?

General DAVIDSON. They seemed to have attacked both fields almost simultaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any report that one of your officers or soldiers saw the approach of this fleet some time before it reached any of the fields and gave an alarm?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard of no such thing?

General DAVIDSON. I do not believe it, either.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe such a thing occurred?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. The fleet looked very similar to Navy airplanes. They were painted a gray like the Navy, and their silhouettes are quite similar, and I do not believe that it would have caused anyone to give an alarm.

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler didn't report to you that there were planes approaching?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. Lieutenant Tyler had a [183] chance to become a hero, but it would have been an accident if he had, because the board simply shows a little series of arrows pointing down as they come across the sea space, and there were many other arrows there, and if he had divined that that was a Japanese attack in peacetime it would have been almost a fifth sense.

I have that sheet if you want to see it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is attached to General Short's report to the Secretary of War.

General DAVIDSON. Oh.

The CHAIRMAN. And that we have seen it.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We are having that same difficulty right now, sir, trying to determine friendly airplanes from foes. The system in England, where this was evolved, is what they call an I. F. F.—“Identification Friend or Foe”—setup on friendly airplanes; and by directing a radio beam on that the plane will tell you if it's a friend; and if it does not tell you it's a friend, it's a foe. But we have no such system, and we are in great difficulty now, still, trying to identify friend from foe, because they send out these patrols six and eight hundred miles to sea, and then they turn around and come back, and you have to divine each one or attempt to divine which are the friends and which might be foes. We are doing that through making them report when they are 100 miles offshore their exact position. Then if

that coincides with the arrows we assume that it's a friend. But if by chance they have shot down—maybe they have shot down a friend right there at that spot when he reports, and they would come in and we would plot them in as friends.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose you can coordinate the thing to some slight extent also by keeping very accurate track from the Navy of where their task forces are?

General DAVIDSON. They are doing that now, but they [184] are very chary, as these two admirals can vouch for, of reporting the position at sea, afraid it will give away the ship from which they have taken off.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General DAVIDSON. But we have gotten them to have the airplane report its position, thinking that that will not divulge the position of a warship out there.

General McNARNEY. Does not the radio detector give the indication as to the number of airplanes in a flight?

General DAVIDSON. It gives a big echo for a big plane, and it gives a big echo for a big flight, but the best we have gotten so far is to tell whether it's more than three. Now, with our present equipment, if it's more than three and there is any doubt about it we send a pursuit patrol out there to meet it head-on, but a big ship like the B-17 gives a big echo, and often we get that reported as two or three and go out and it's a—

General McNARNEY. Well, a flight of nine or twenty-seven, as contrasted to one of three, shows up on the detector, does it not?

General DAVIDSON. Well, it did on this Opana detector, which is the best one we had, but ordinarily the operators have not been able to tell us anything beyond the fact that they believed it's more than three airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, this system was not nearly in as perfect order on December 7 as it is now?

General DAVIDSON. No; no, sir. And we were doing operational training, you might say, on that system at that time.

General McNARNEY. In order to get the record straight 15 i. of the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department states that the Department Signal Officer will (1) insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the interceptor command; (2) insure that joint army-navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment. This is under alert No. 2. I [185] understand, then, that under alert No. 1 the Aircraft Warning Service had not been turned over to you?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You had no control over it?

General DAVIDSON. Except we were attempting to teach these people how to operate it. We had our own Signal Corps Officers there and Signal Corps men; and the G-3 of the 14th Pursuit Wing, in conjunction with a Commander Taylor who had been loaned to us by the Navy, were attempting to teach these soldiers how to operate this board.

General McNARNEY. Well, in effect they had operational control, but you were exercising your control only for the purposes of training?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. That is about the situation.

General McNARNEY. You were not exercising operational control for the purpose of security?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, because the board was not manned 24 hours a day, which it would have to be for the purpose of security.

General McNARNEY. As you knew the situation at that time did you feel that there was any necessity for operating the RDF for the purpose of security?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I never thought there was any necessity for it.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, it operated week-days and Sundays as a training proposition?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, as training, and Sundays it shut down at 7.

The CHAIRMAN. And other days at what time?

General DAVIDSON. The schedule, I think at other days it shut down on Department orders at 7, but our people had them come back and operate, I think, until 11, and then in the afternoon they used that for maintenance to get the equipment in shape to operate the next day.

[186] The CHAIRMAN. The reason, I presume, that the orders were to shut down at 7 on Sunday was, again, that Sunday was partially a day of rest here?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Now, the Navy man that you stated was assisting you was there for training purposes, to assist you in training or for training of himself?

General DAVIDSON. He was assisting to get the board in operation. He had been stationed in England and was quite familiar with the board, had been sent out here by the Navy for some purpose, and we had without any orders simply borrowed his services.

General McNARNEY. He was not there, then, for the purpose of affording information of anti-aircraft to the Navy?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, he was not there operating as the Navy liaison particularly.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, I understand that under your routine procedure there was a Navy liaison officer at the board?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, there is. There is now, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was there anterior to December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I don't think so.

The CHAIRMAN. You think not?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, it would not be extraordinary if there was no Navy officer there on Sunday morning, December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. We were running the board more to train the operators. I think that's what the order called for, to train the Radar station operators.

The CHAIRMAN. So that do I understand that Lieutenant Tyler did call the Navy?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

[187] The CHAIRMAN. He didn't call them at all?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He made the best approximation he could of the situation and decided that there was no necessity?

General DAVIDSON. Decided that we had a flight coming over from the mainland that could have been wandering up there, and the

Navy—well, even after December 7 they put off airplanes from carriers that came in exactly that same way, without notifying us.

General McNARNEY. Well, I take it, inasmuch as you personally had not been warned that there was a serious situation confronting the United States with respect to Japan, that similarly your subordinate officers had no idea that the situation was at all serious, and this lieutenant could not be expected to be on the lookout for enemy aircraft?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. I would say that if he had been on the lookout it would have been prescience beyond the ordinary person's capacity, knowing as little as he did about the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

General McNARNEY. Well,—

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

General McNARNEY. What did you think the situation was with respect to sabotage when you received the order for alert No. 1?

General DAVIDSON. We were very much afraid of sabotage. Every time we dispersed our airplanes—and we dispersed them on several other alerts before—we spent a lot of our time guarding them out there on those dispersed positions, expended a lot of energy in the guards; and around the airplanes here, even without an alert, we had very heavy guards. And then when the alert for anti-sabotage came we doubled the guards there and also guarded many vital places on the post, like [188] water system and transformer station.

General McNARNEY. What were the facilities on the field for protection, such as barbwire fences or manproof fences, searchlights, and so forth?

General DAVIDSON. We had been promised manproof fences, but they never had materialized. We had no barbed wire.

General McNARNEY. How much of the field was open to ingress from the outside?

General DAVIDSON. There is a public road going through the center of the field.

The CHAIRMAN. What field?

General DAVIDSON. Wheeler Field. And all the rest of the field was open to ingress. There was a public road running along the edge of the field on two sides. On the third side is a gully that leads into the pineapple fields.

General McNARNEY. Do you know the size of the guard that you maintained under condition of alert No. 1?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. We had about a hundred and fifty men in addition to the men that the groups—the tactical groups—had down there.

General McNARNEY. If your airplanes had been dispersed under an anti-sabotage alert, how many additional men would be required?

General DAVIDSON. It would have taken about two and a half times that many.

General McNARNEY. What was your total strength available for guard without seriously interfering with the operation of your aircraft?

General DAVIDSON. We had trained with rifles 500 men just for that purpose, for anti-sabotage work, and I think we have been maintaining 511 there at Wheeler for the big part of the time since that raid, to guard this—

General McNARNEY. Well, what effect would it have on [189] your operations if you had used these 500 men?

General DAVIDSON. Well, it is seriously affecting our operations now, and we still are using many of those 500 men.

General McNARNEY. In what way is it affecting it? Planes out of commission?

General DAVIDSON. Well, the planes are not out of commission now, because we have been reduced in—but it's affecting us in that the men that are in the squadrons are having to stay on duty longer than they would if they had their full quota.

The CHAIRMAN. You have taken men from the flying squadrons for guard work?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir. As many as 34 men in—a squadron just reported this morning they had 34 men of their squadron up at Wheeler Field doing guard duty.

General McCoy. In other words, you are still more afraid of sabotage than you are of the enemy?

General DAVIDSON. We are still afraid of sabotage, yes, sir, and the field is difficult to guard, and it seems very difficult to get other troops to guard it.

General McCoy. Well, what difference has war made to you in your handling your command? Are you still handling it on the same line that you did before December 7?

General DAVIDSON. I don't understand that, sir. We have got all the airplanes alerted in the morning from 5:30 until 8. Then one squadron stays on alert which is ready to take off in four minutes, and the others are in a state of readiness. Then at I think its 4 o'clock they all come back on alert. So it's quite different. They are all operating on dispersed positions.

General McCoy. Are they all armed and equipped with ammunition, and so forth?

General DAVIDSON. All armed and equipped, yes, sir.

General McCoy. That was not the case before December 7?

[190] General DAVIDSON. We did not have the guns loaded. That was our biggest difficulty the day of the attack, was to try to get the guns loaded, especially since one of the hangars where we had a lot of our ammunition stored was afire, and the ammunition was afire too.

General McNARNEY. Did you have loaded belts available?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, sir, the belts were available, but the boxes were burnt up.

General McNARNEY. I notice in General Short's testimony that he said that on December 7 the pursuit planes in commission were 80, pursuit planes out of commission 69. Will you please explain this rather large percentage of planes out of commission?

General DAVIDSON. The percentage I do not believe is large compared to other places. I inquired about that when I was back on the mainland, and about 60% of these new planes is about the average for in commission. Our great difficulty was in getting spare parts for these new planes, the P-40's especially.

General McCoy. Have you received any additions to your force in the way of trained fighting pilots since the outbreak of war?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir.

General McCoy. They are still these amateur pilots?

General DAVIDSON. We are training these pilots—we were training these pilots on December 8, sir; still training them. We have men that haven't fired yet, and we are trying to get them trained. We have stopped that now because we just haven't got the facilities, but will start it again just as soon as we get new planes, which are coming in now. They are in the depot now.

General McCoy. Do I understand that there are no trained fighters over here at all?

General DAVIDSON. Oh, no, sir. We have trained fighters, [191] but we have got a number that have not been trained. They come over here, General, with 200 hours. We get them in a batch like 50. We got 58 with 200 hours.

[192] General McCoy. Right from school?

General DAVIDSON. Right from school, and they have never even been in a pursuit plane.

General McCoy. How many trained fighting pilots do you have?

General DAVIDSON. We have 150 now, but of these I would say at least 50 are this new batch which have just finished.

General McCoy. Are these men who did so well some of the newcomers?

General DAVIDSON. One of them was one of the newcomers. He did very well. He got four.

The CHAIRMAN. What was his training before?

General DAVIDSON. He had just finished the ground gunnery course. He got in the plane and got four, but he had just finished the ground gunnery course.

General McCoy. How many planes did you get in the air in these attacks on the Sunday?

General DAVIDSON. We got about 17 actually in the air, and I think three more were shot down as they took off from Bellows Field.

General McCoy. Where were the others of the 150 trained pilots? Why didn't they get in the air? Was it because of the construction of the planes?

General DAVIDSON. Our first job was to get the good ones out from the burned ones. The planes were all parked like on this table here (indicating). Some were set afire and some were not, and we had tried to get them apart, to get the planes that would roll out of the burned mass and the burned hangars. We had great difficulty rolling them because they shot the tires off many of them. Even of the ships which were not afire, they might be next to a ship that was afire, but it would not roll from the fire because the tire of one of the wheels had been shot off.

General McCoy. That was the first attack?

[193] General DAVIDSON. We did not have very much of a second attack, sir. Our second attack was more or less shooting off the additional ammunition that they had left from some other attack as they came by Wheeler Field on their way out.

General McCoy. There were just two attacks on Wheeler Field?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes flown from Hickam Field at all?

General DAVIDSON. There were bombers, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing but bombers?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I do not think any of them got off at all.

The CHAIRMAN. There were no other planes but bombers there?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, nothing but bombers.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one question. Lieutenant Tyler, who was in the Aircraft Warning Station that morning, first observed from the Radar—

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, the Radar is miles away from here.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is at the Opana Station?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. He received that.

General DAVIDSON. He just received the telephone call.

Admiral STANDLEY. He saw nothing himself?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, he didn't see anything.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your board at the center was not working?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, there were not any plotters there. The plotters had all gone home, and they telephoned it from Opana Station, and the man with the telephone on his [194] head, he plots the position they give him, but they had all gone home.

General McNARNEY. It might be interesting for the Commission if you would explain the operations of the detector system from the observation station right on through.

General DAVIDSON. The Radar station is a high-frequency radio. It sends out a beam similar to a beam of light. It cannot go over a hill or over the horizon. It strikes a solid object and reflects back let us say a little figure on the screen. The screen is a glass screen and there is a tube there, and the man has a mask on his face and he looks into it at this light or flash like a flash from a spark plug, and you see it on a ground glass. When it hits that object, that echoes it a little. If it is a big echo, it echoes it quite a lot, and if it is a land echo it echoes a little different reading, and if it is an echo of a ship at sea, it echoes a slightly different reading.

It is sometimes difficult to tell a ship at sea from an airplane, but they generally tell them because the ship at sea does not move, and the airplane does, and they can see the movement in this screen.

He then brings this echo into the movement of his screen and gets the range reading, and he reads through the azimuth and sends that to his plotter, who plots that on the chart, and sends it in to our plotter upon this map of Oahu and the vicinity, and it is sent in by X and Y coordinated.

He calls off the square in that position, say squares 3 and 4, and plots them, and that is how anybody in the information center knows about it, and that is all anybody in the information center sees or knows about that plot.

The plotting is done there with the board, and the controller stays in front watching this map, and he has on his right a pursuit officer and on his left his general radio officer and switches the radio from one place to another so [195] he can get the radio to control the ships and the airplanes in the air.

There are other personnel around the board, anti-aircraft and Navy, air raid precautions officer and Federal Communications officer, and several others.

They all simply look at the board and they generally take the necessary action without having any orders issued. It is simply a fast method of command, trying to do away with orders as much as possible.

When the action is to be taken by the pursuits, the controller tells the pursuit officer next to him how many airplanes he wants in the air, and he picks off the exact squadron and he orders them off right from that board. Then they have a radio transmitter there, and he communicates with the squadrons in the air, and they draw a point at a certain altitude and they have that circle so that we will know where they are. In the system they generally turn that flight or squadron over to the interceptor, who handles the intercepting itself and handles the intercept from the control center because our station is so narrowed down.

General McCox. Would you be at headquarters?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, although on the mainland, take for instance the one at Mitchel Field, the headquarters of the interceptor command is Mitchel Field. The control centers are at Boston, New York, and at Philadelphia. Isn't that right?

And each one of these is in control of a group commander who takes all necessary steps to intercept the hostile planes coming into his area, his group area. He defends that area against hostile attack without any further orders from the interceptor commander. The interceptor commander has a general board showing the situation in all areas of his command, and if one needs reinforcing or help, he orders it, but the actual defense of the area is entrusted to the group [196] commander who has charge there.

I think that covers it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. What date was the interceptor command activated?

General DAVIDSON. I would have to look at the order, but I would say about the 17th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves.

Admiral REEVES. Your evidence has been extremely clear and specific, and it is of great value to the Commission. I have only one or two questions that I would like to ask you merely in order to clarify this information. I call your pursuit planes fighters.

General DAVIDSON. Yes, we call them fighters.

Admiral REEVES. Are these fighters more effective if you have them all concentrated on one field, or are they more effective if they are dispersed to various fields?

General DAVIDSON. They are more effective if dispersed to the fields, and we are making every effort we can to get them dispersed.

Admiral REEVES. It adds to the risk of sabotage but adds more to the effectiveness of your operations?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. I understand that the torpedo planes came in from the East flying at a low altitude?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. If you had warning of their approach and had gotten your fighting planes in the air in an attack on these torpedo

planes flying at low altitude, would you have expected your attack against those planes to have been effective?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, they were quite slow.

[197] Admiral REEVES. That is, if you had warning of their approach and had your planes been in position you would have them in the air and your attack on those torpedo planes would have been effective and might have been perfected, among other things?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I am sure it would have been perfected. I think they could have shot down most of them because they were quite slow.

Admiral REEVES. Before they reached their objectives?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Your interceptor system would not likely pick up such low-flying planes?

General DAVIDSON. If the plane is low it is difficult because it gets down below the horizon and only the very high stations will pick them up.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the interceptor did not get them at all when they got behind that big eastern ridge of the Island?

General DAVIDSON. I do not know, sir. As soon as they get behind anything which will give a reflection, they go off our screen. With this type of radio, it cannot hit anything without bouncing back.

The CHAIRMAN. If somebody put his hand up, that would indicate it?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, even a bird will do it.

General McCoy. You spoke of the British having a much better system. Why haven't we got that?

General DAVIDSON. I don't know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

You understand, General, that anything that has been said in this room is not to be disclosed or discussed with anyone else?

[198] General DAVIDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will now have General Rudolph.

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL JACOB H. RUDOLPH

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name, General?

General RUDOLPH. Jacob H. Rudolph.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General RUDOLPH. Brigadier general.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment in the Hawaiian Department?

General RUDOLPH. Commanding the 18th Bombardment Wing.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that position here, sir?

General RUDOLPH. Since November, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you, sir, on the morning of December 7 last?

General RUDOLPH. At Hickam Field during the entire attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Are your quarters as officer near the field?

General RUDOLPH. I don't know what you mean by "near the field".

The CHAIRMAN. I mean, where is your home?

General RUDOLPH. Right on Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Right there?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So you were in your quarters, in your living quarters, when this attack took place?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no warning of it?

General RUDOLPH. Not the slightest.

[199] The CHAIRMAN. What did your command consist of that day?

General RUDOLPH. I had two groups of five and eleven bombers; 12 B-17 airplanes; 30 B-18's; 12 A-20's.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what order was the field being maintained that morning with respect to alert 1, 2, and 3?

General RUDOLPH. It was under alert No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. And had been since November 27?

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What guard were you maintaining at your planes that day?

General RUDOLPH. I had the planes guarded well at night, and then I changed the heavy guard that was on at night and lessened the guard during the daytime because we were carrying on actual flight operations and were getting ready to actually do training in squadrons.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been training from Hickam Field, taking off from Hickam Field daily?

General RUDOLPH. Every day.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you training pilots and crews for heavy bombers?

General RUDOLPH. We were training ferry crews to get them prepared to go to the mainland and bring the heavy bombardment planes this way.

The CHAIRMAN. There were planes from your command in this training work in the air practically every morning?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, and every night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were out at night, too?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, at least four to five nights a week.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these planes armed for action, those being used in the training?

[200] General RUDOLPH. We were having a limited amount of gunnery in both the B-18 type and the B-17 type.

The CHAIRMAN. That meant arms and ammunition?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of your planes in the air at 7:55 on that Sunday morning?

General RUDOLPH. I would not be positive. I know they got ready to go in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of your planes get in the air and get into action in any of the attacks that morning?

General RUDOLPH. Not until after the attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no orders with respect to preparedness for airplane raids except the one order for alert 1?

General RUDOLPH. It depends. It did not include airplane raids; it included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we

could have much better protection against sabotage. If with a raid we would have them dispersed.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. If alert No. 2 had been in effect, would that seriously have interfered with your training?

General RUDOLPH. Well, in alert 2 one cannot do a great deal of training. That is, I would have to stand by and start dispersing them and not go ahead with my normal training. In No. 1 I would go ahead with normal training.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information of the international situation with respect to United States and Japanese relations? I mean official information?

General RUDOLPH. Not the slightest.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no general order or anything of that kind issued that there might be suspected an attack in the immediate future?

General RUDOLPH. None whatever; none whatever. If we had the slightest inkling we would have gone into a dispersed position, but we were doing that in accordance with alert 1, [201] which to us means getting them into a close area and guarding them very carefully against internal sabotage, not raids.

General McCoy. Has there been any sabotage in your planes at any time?

General RUDOLPH. We found several positive indications of sabotage within our own group. We found the gaps in the spark plugs hammered together. That is, in the back of the spark plugs were little points that connect it to the electrode and have a 10,000th clearance, and they had hammered them against the electrode. That was somebody from our own organization.

General McCoy. Have you discovered him?

General RUDOLPH. Not yet, no, sir.

We found the oil block in the oil tank cut to a point where it almost dropped off. We had several other unmistakable evidences of internal sabotage.

General McCoy. Was that recently?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, within the last two or three months.

General McCoy. Do you employ any Japanese in your shops or maintenance?

General RUDOLPH. None whatsoever. Mine are all enlisted men.

General McCoy. During these whole negotiations, you were not conscious of imminent hostilities?

General RUDOLPH. We certainly were not.

The CHAIRMAN. As an instructing officer in the strategy of war, would you have expected one form of attack by Japan to be an attempt at a raid on Pearl Harbor?

General RUDOLPH. I have conceived the possibility of that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would want to guard against it in the event of a state of war between the two countries?

General RUDOLPH. Yes, sir, rightly so.

[202] The CHAIRMAN. If you were given a warning in the words, "This is a war warning," would you be ready?

General RUDOLPH. Yes. We certainly would never have had them on the apron that Sunday morning. We would have scattered them as well as we could over Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. They would have been ready to get in the air?

General RUDOLPH. We would have been ready even though it was a Sunday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that a Sunday morning at dawn is about the most likely time for such a raid?

General RUDOLPH. Truly so.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral REEVES. No questions.

General McNARNEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General Rudolph, of course you understand that the nature of the Commission's procedure is such that it is highly important that you do not discuss anything that has been answered here or said here nor discuss it with others. I will ask you to observe that.

General RUDOLPH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Now let us have Major Allen.

(Thereupon Major Brooke E. Allen was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

[203] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR BROOKE E. ALLEN

The CHAIRMAN. State your name, Major.

Major ALLEN. Brooke E. Allen.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank is what?

Major ALLEN. Major, Air Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your quarters, as such, Major, on the Island?

Major ALLEN. At Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in those quarters on the morning of December 7?

Major ALLEN. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you start from the beginning without questioning and tell us what you saw and what was done?

Major ALLEN. At the time of the attack I was asleep, and I heard planes diving and an explosion. As I looked out my bedroom window I could see a number of planes in a column in a dive, and as I looked they released bombs apparently in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor.

I rushed out and put on a robe and rushed outside to get a better look at them, and realized we were being attacked by Japanese planes.

I went in and immediately put on my uniform and rushed down to my hangar, and at the time I was in command of a squadron. My first idea was to save as many planes as possible. I managed to get into one of the B-17's that were assigned to my squadron.

At that time the attack was being conducted on Hickam Field on the hangar line. I got inside one of the planes. The guns were in the plane. We put the guns in readiness to fire. My first idea was to take off. I was unable to start one engine. I started with only three of the engines.

I got the crew, the best I could gather. I taxied across the field, about which time the attack apparently subsided. I observed ammunition bomb trucks being pulled out of the [204] ammuni-

tion storage area loaded with bombs. The thought occurred to me to try to load the bombs so I could attack any enemy ships in the vicinity. We were in the process of loading bombs when the second attack occurred, during which time they bombed the hangar line. Then the bombers, apparently having bombed Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field, were strafing the vicinity in which we were loading the bombs. In the meantime the crews from my squadron were trying to disperse the Army planes in the squadron.

During this strafing attack we were getting some distance away from the airplane, and as a result of the attack that airplane was so badly damaged that I was unable to fly it. One engine was completely shot up and one wheel was shot from under it.

So we turned our attention then to another B-17 airplane in the squadron and started in loading it with bombs to put it in readiness for a mission.

By that time the attack had apparently ceased, and I reported immediately to the wing commander for instruction. We were told to get a pursuit escort and arrange for protection of our take-off, and got off the ground sometime after 11 o'clock—about 11:30—with instructions to attack two enemy carriers reported about 35 miles south of Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Barbers Point?

Major ALLEN. Right in here (indicating on map).

Major Saunders took a B-17 and I took one. We had some pursuit escort at the time.

We proceeded south of Barbers Point and saw no enemy activity there at all. We began a search to the southwest and northwest, there being no information available.

After some two or three hours Major Saunders had to turn back on account of engine trouble. I remained in the air until approximately 7 o'clock that evening and I saw no enemy activity at all.

[205] I stayed in the quadrant to the northwest and southwest (indicating on map).

The CHAIRMAN. No pursuit was attempted to the north by anyone, so far as you know?

Major ALLEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You two were probably the only ones that were fit or could be escorted?

Major ALLEN. So far as I know we were the only two fit to fly at the time. There was another plane fit to fly which had some trouble on the take-off and could not get off. He jammed his propeller on the take-off and was unable to get off.

The CHAIRMAN. You were innocent of any thought of an airplane raid when you went to bed on Saturday night, I suppose?

Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard no discussion even informally of a possible attack by Japanese planes?

Major ALLEN. No, sir, there was no indication of such.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, the general sentiment among the Army men was that there was no thought of a possible attack at all?

Major ALLEN. I would say particularly so in the Air Corps because the fact that most of our striking force was taken from here, and we were more or less in the status of ferry training, ferrying

B-17's to the Philippines. We had been conducting training in the squadron toward that end for some time.

General McCoy. If this attack had not occurred in a few days, this would have gone off?

Major ALLEN. I would have gone, ferrying planes to the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say your training was not at all on a war footing?

[206] Major ALLEN. No, sir. Our training had been conducted almost entirely toward ferrying planes to the Philippines. Our combat training had been more or less halted, and the other training had been given priority. At the time of the attack there were some of our combat crews back on the mainland waiting to ferry the planes back.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General?

General McNARNEY. Did you see any planes come in from the mainland approaching north?

Major ALLEN. I did, sir.

General McNARY. What did you observe?

Major ALLEN. Well, when I arrived on the hangar line one of the first things I saw was a B-17E flying over the hangar line very low. I had never seen a B-17E before and I was a little confused about it. As a matter of fact, I had no knowledge of the flight from the mainland. It was a secret flight, of course. When I first saw these four-engine bombers flying over I was confused because I knew they did not belong to the Hawaiian Air Force. My first thought was, "Where did the Japs get four-engine bombers?" In a few minutes I realized that was one of ours and that this was undoubtedly some flight from the mainland, and then I knew the ships were coming over from the mainland.

I observed a number of others flying around, and one in the process of landing, with a Japanese right on his tail firing at him. When he was ready to land a pursuit plane pulled away, and the truck pulled this way, and he had to cut around, and there was a burst from the anti-aircraft which went off right opposite him, but he managed to circle around and land successfully.

General McNARNEY. Was that the only case you observed of our own anti-aircraft firing at our own planes?

Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was no reason to believe that [207] our own anti-aircraft would not be able to identify that as an American plane?

Major ALLEN. No, sir. I can see why they would be confused, because they had no knowledge of that type of plane coming in, and they were not familiar with that type of plane in the Hawaiian Air Force because we had no planes of that type. Our planes were smaller and these planes were the B-17E type, which is different from the D.

General McNARNEY. How many men in your squadron were detailed to guard your airplanes? Or were the guards furnished by other units?

Major ALLEN. We furnished the guard for our own airplanes, and that was handled by a guard group. The regular troop organized a group for each guard and ran its own guard, a sergeant for the guard and a corporal for each relief. I don't remember the exact number,

but it was from five to six men who were detailed daily as members of the guard group to guard the airplanes from that group.

General McNARNEY. How many men would have been required if the airplanes would have been dispersed?

Major ALLEN. No more than that number except possibly one additional man. At the time of the attack there were two B-17D's and four B-18's. When we disperse the airplanes we always, instead of the normal guard, we keep one member of the ground crew armed and at the airplanes during all hours.

General McNARNEY. Well, would the furnishing of these additional six men have interfered in any manner with your training?

Major ALLEN. It is bound to. Any men you lose is bound to affect your training.

General McNARNEY. Would it have seriously affected your training?

Major ALLEN. Not seriously, no, sir, but it would be a matter which would depend on the number of men you are required to furnish.

[208] General McCoy. In wartime you are called on for a great number of men, including the guard. With respect to the case now, have they been replaced as guards by ground troops?

Major ALLEN. I cannot answer that. I have not been on tactical duty for the last week or so. I understand that the ground crew has been increased by some troops.

General McCoy. Where did you get your escort planes that day?

Major ALLEN. From Hickam Field. They were P-40's. I remember seeing four of them. They were merely to protect our take-off and stayed with us only a short time after the take-off.

General McCoy. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke about one of the planes being interfered with by a truck?

Major ALLEN. I don't think I did, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mentioned something like that.

Major ALLEN. Yes, one of the planes from the mainland when it was landing. The bombs are delivered to the planes by what is called a bomb trailer, a four-wheel trailer with a truck pulling it. The very first I remember seeing getting the bombs loaded at the airplane, they were scurrying all over the field, and the bomb storage area is at about in the vicinity where the planes are dispersed, and they were getting on the runway, trying to get the bombs to the airplanes to fly, those which were in commission.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Major. I need hardly say to you that you should not discuss anything that has been said here.

[209] Major ALLEN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 24, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

[201]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[211] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Well, are we ready to proceed, gentlemen?

Admiral REEVES. We are ready to start.

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we call Colonel Phillips? He is General Short's chief of staff.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips.

[212] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
GENERAL STAFF

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name, please?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Walter C. Phillips.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Colonel, general staff.

The CHAIRMAN. And your position in the Department of Hawaii has been what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have been the chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Since General Short came here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. I became chief of staff on the 6th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. What position did you hold before that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was G-3, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. G-3. G-3 is Information, is it not? Intelligence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-3 is Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Operations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. G-2 is Intelligence?

Colonel PHILLIPS. G-2 is Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, I show you a telegram received by the Navy on 28th November and sent by Naval Operations on 27th November. Did the Navy furnish you a copy of that telegram?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, although I do not remember exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, "Inform District and Army Authorities."

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, although I do not remember exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice that in the telegram the instruction is, "Inform District and Army authorities."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "District" evidently referring to Naval District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Referring to Naval District. Fourteenth [213] Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. This telegram, I suppose, was dispatched to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, under your routine, if information had been furnished pursuant to that direction, where would that information have been lodged in your organization?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That information, secret nature, comes directly from the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet ordinarily by an officer directly to the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And would it go to General Short in person or to you as his chief of staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. If the general is present I usually direct that directly to him; otherwise it would come to me and go directly to him when he—

The CHAIRMAN. Is available?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Is available, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In such a case, Colonel Phillips, would any record whatever be made in your department of the receipt of such information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have made a call, or the Commission has made a call, for your records anent this telegram, and that call has not yet been answered. Have you had anything to do with searching for the information?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I knew nothing at all about the call having been made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was made through Major Allen, who is the officer assigned to us.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I heard from him that there was some difficulty about identifying the message and determining in what file it was.

[214] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard nothing about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you take it upon yourself, please, to determine what if any records?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That was what date, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. The date of receipt here by the Navy is November 28, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Subsequent—

The CHAIRMAN. The date of the message is October 27.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. November 27.

The CHAIRMAN. 27. That was the date it was dispatched.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Go ahead.

General McCoy. Colonel Phillips, I remember the two also. That is, General Short received a like message in different language on the 27th or 28th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. From the War Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From the War Department.

General McCoy. What was the routine in connection with that message? In other words, did it come personally to General Short?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Or did it come to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It came directly to me through our General. The adjutant general brings that directly to me by an officer messenger, and General Short was here in the office at the time. I delivered it personally to him.

General McCoy. Yes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As it happened, there was an officer [215] present. The adjutant general was present talking with General Short at the time.

General McCoy. Did you furnish a copy at that time to the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I will have to look in my records about that, sir. I am not sure that we directed. We ordinarily do.

General McCoy. Would you make a note to see whether you furnished them with a copy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I will look for that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you want to ask anything about the text, there it is (indicating).

In reply to the message that General McCoy has just asked you about, that of November 27 from the War Department, the reply, copy of which was furnished us by General Short yesterday, is to the effect that he had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir. I ordered that at once, at the direction of the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge was there any discussion of that part of the message which indicated that hostilities might break out at any moment?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I recall, sir, we—that was read and reread a number of times, and the gist of the thing seemed to be that sabotage—sabotage, subversive uprisings; and as a result we acted accordingly. No, hostilities and attack from without, any such thing, wasn't visualized by us at that time. We had our alert No. 1, as we call it, for sabotage and suppression of subversive uprisings within. We didn't visualize anything from without at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose the Army command here was cognizant of the fact that a Japanese air raid might be one element of any hostile outbreak, any hostile action?

[216] Colonel PHILLIPS. Possibility, yes, sir, but not particularly connected with sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course not.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then I gather that the thing that impressed the responsible officers here, and was discussed on the receipt of that telegram, was sabotage, and that only?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That is it exactly.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you the night of December 6, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The night of December 6 I was in my quarters by about 11:30. Mrs. Phillips and I were invited to a dance, and we left rather early and were back in the quarters here at Shafter. I live at Shafter here.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was the first knowledge you had of an attack on the morning of Sunday, December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was dressing, partially dressed, and the explosion, firing, is the first that I heard, evidently from bombs. I immediately went through my own mind: This is Sunday. What can this be? We planned nothing. Oftentimes the Navy was out on a problem, or we were doing a little firing with our coastal defense, or something of that kind, from time to time, but I was thoroughly familiar with everything of that kind that went on, and could see no justification for anything of the kind. And a member of my staff, G-1, called me and says, "This is attack. Attack."

I says, "It must be, because we have nothing planned today." With that, I shouted to my family and ran over to the Department commander's quarters just next door and told him what I believed to be the facts, that we were being attacked, and recommended that the troops move out under alert No. 3 at once. He approved it. I came to headquarters here and initiated that move without delay. I ran all the way to Headquarters, and in the meantime collected my G-4 [217] and my G-1 on the way up, and we issued those orders by phone.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they promptly carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, so far as I have been able to ascertain.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have attempted. I did at the time, because I put my G-3 right out immediately. That's his function, to go out and see how the troops are operating, and they moved out. I think the

25th Division moved out in better form than ever before in their history.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the G-3 alert was carried out—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. —as it was intended it should be?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely. That is, the alert 3; not the G-3 alert, sir. The alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, it is the practice for the men in service to have a great many parties on Saturday nights here on the Island, isn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not think more than ordinary.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there a lot of large parties at which drinking was going on on the island and at which officers were present on the night of December 6?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not that you know of?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the affair that you attended a reasonably sober affair?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite, yes, sir.

[218] The CHAIRMAN. Have you any knowledge of any officer who was disabled to have gone on duty if there had come a call at midnight Saturday night?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None whatsoever.

The CHAIRMAN. You have none?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the dance that you attended?

Colonel PHILLIPS. At Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Given by some officers there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; at the Officers' Club on the post.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been the practice, I presume, to grant week-end leaves or Saturday evening leaves to a great many of the men in the service here, both officers and enlisted men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not during the period of alert, sir. We were under alert No. 1, and we were granting passes to but very few. We considered ourselves on duty all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You think, then, and I presume you can't have specifically accurate knowledge, that there were comparatively few officers and men on leave that Saturday night and over the Sunday?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I should say comparatively few, yes, sir. Yes, sir. To give you my actions before I left here—I did this nightly in order that I—this is particularly since November 27th. I would inform message center. We had an officer of the day, a staff officer of the day, on duty here all the time, and I would tell him whenever I left the post. He knew exactly where I could be found 24 hours out of the 24. I checked in at our message center, our signal office, to see what messages had come in and what the situation was as far as could be determined from messages we had received. When I came back from the party that night I did the same thing, went to the staff officer of the day, which was located in [219] the adjutant gen-

eral's building, checked through his messages and found nothing except routine nature.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 1 being in effect, is it your belief that all officers in responsible command were in touch with the message center in the same way that you were?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Department commander was, and myself. We didn't believe it was necessary for others. If there had been anything of importance they would have been informed at once.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any questions?

General McNARNEY. Colonel, did I understand you to say that Alert No. 1 was ordered immediately after the receipt of the message of November 27?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 27th, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. That was ordered prior to the receipt of the message on November 28 relative to sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, I am speaking of the receipt of the message here. I am not—I thought it was on the 27th. Now, the sabotage message was the one that we ordered the Alert No. 1 on, sir.

General McNARNEY. You did nothing, then, on the message of November 27? You did nothing on the receipt of that message?

The CHAIRMAN. Here they are, Colonel (indicating documents).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Could I refresh my memory?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Here is the November 27th one. Admiral, you have a reply to this message in your folder.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Here it is here.

The CHAIRMAN. My folder must have it.

Admiral STANDLEY. It refers to the 27th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. This is the message that we alerted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. And when was that received?

[220] Colonel PHILLIPS. This was 11—6 the 27th here.

The CHAIRMAN. This goes out under what?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 11—6 p. m. the 27th. This is—

The CHAIRMAN. The 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. This was 1:16 p. m. the 27th, and this went out at 5:40 p. m. the 27th (indicating). That was all on the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that the long message from the War Department was received at 1 o'clock, at 1:16 on the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 1:16, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And at 5:40 p. m. on the 27th you sent your reply?

Colonel PHILLIPS. 27th; that's right.

The CHAIRMAN. That you had alerted against sabotage?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right. Yes, that's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have you got that clear?

General McNARNEY. Yes. In other words, Alert No. 1—

General McCoy. Mine, I notice, is dated at Washington the 28th. That must be a different message.

Admiral REEVES. It must be a different message.

The CHAIRMAN. It must be a different dispatch. It is in Exhibit b.

General McCoy. Here it is.

Admiral STANDLEY. 5:40, 27 November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Here it is. Now go ahead.

General McNARNEY. In other words, Alert No. 1 was ordered prior to the receipt of the War Department message of November 28, which was concerned primarily with sabotage?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you find the 28th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I haven't that, sir.

[221] The CHAIRMAN. Where do you find the one of the 28th? Under Exhibit 1?

Admiral STANDLEY. Signed "Adams," right next.

General McNARNEY. "G."

The CHAIRMAN. "G." There is the new one (indicating).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, that's right.

General McNARNEY. Going back to the message of November 27,——

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, that is under b.: 27th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. (Continuing.) ——I fail to find in that message anything relating to sabotage specifically, but I do find certain terms:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action probable at any moment.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I also find:

Policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I also find a direction to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you feel that the Alert No. 1 carried out the directive contained in the message of the 27th?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt so at the time, sir. We felt that we were alerting the entire command and our immediate threat was right here.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether the gist of the directive of the 27th was communicated to any senior staff officers or senior commanders of the Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't tell you that. There was a [222] question of the minimum essential officers being informed in regard to this. At the last sentence it says, "Limit discussion of this highly secret information to the minimum essential officers," and that was done.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell the Commission who were the officers that was communicated to?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I informed the G-3. I don't know whom the Department commander informed. I believe I also informed the G-2.

General McNARNEY. Are you the senior member of the Local Joint Planning Committee, senior Army member?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By order, yes, sir; I have never functioned as such.

General McNARNEY. Since when have you held this position?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Since I became chief of staff.

General McNARNEY. There have been no meetings of the Local Joint Planning Committee since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. What is your idea of the function of the Local Joint Planning Committee?

Colonel PHILLIPS. My idea is, of course, controlled more or less to conform to what we have as a joint plan, and I should say that whenever changes are necessary, why, that joint committee should meet and modify the joint plan that we have.

General McNARNEY. You did not consider that the situation as known to you on November 27 and 28 required any revision of the existing plans or any examination into the propriety of making a new plan?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We were all familiar with the plan thoroughly, sir, and a change was not deemed necessary at that time.

[223] General McNARNEY. What is the normal routine method by which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commander of the 14th Naval District maintained close liaison and contact with reference to the existing situation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. By personal conferences at one or the other headquarters.

General McNARNEY. Did you, as Chief of Staff of the Department, confer with any Navy officers during the period November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not. I was occupied with the duties of my office here at headquarters practically the entire period.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you a few questions, Colonel.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This party at the club at the barracks that you attended, this dance—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was General Short there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I can't say, sir. It was a large party.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was this a club party, or were there other—Was this a private party, and were there other parties at the club? Was this a private party?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was the ordinary evening club dance, and this was a private party, not a club entertainment.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there probably were many other parties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Many other parties, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Many other parties?

[224] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And those parties consisted of—what were the personnel at those parties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Officers and their wives, generally speaking; some civilians.

Admiral STANDLEY. Both.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Invited guests.

Admiral STANDLEY. Largely officers of the post?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is liquor sold in the club?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the Schofield Barracks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is liquor there at Schofield?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, just like ordinary clubs throughout the Army.

Admiral STANDLEY. Suppose there was obviously a drunkenness among the officers there: what would be your responsibility in the matter, as Chief of Staff if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Well, sir, I of course did not have the situation to face. I would have, of course, taken disciplinary action, perhaps put the officer concerned under arrest, send him to his quarters, or report him to his commanding officer. There was no indication of such thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. You feel, and felt then, that you had a responsibility in case there was a drunken orgy at the club that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Most assuredly. Most assuredly.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, your responsibility as to the conduct and the morale of this post would involve a responsibility which required you to take action of some kind if that occurred?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

[225] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was any such action taken?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no occasion for such action, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one other question: You would be cognizant of the disciplinary measures taken at this post since you have been here; is that true?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What has been the record of punishment for drunkenness at this post among the officers?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There has been very little drunkenness among the officers here, sir. We have had—I can't say offhand, but perhaps two or three trials since the first of March when I arrived, but those are—I am not positive about that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The records will indicate it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes, the records will.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum for us of all such instances of charges of drunkenness?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just a moment. When I used the expression "post" I meant this Department.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I understood that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Command.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General McCoy. Have you ever had occasion, Colonel Phillips, to report to your commander any such individual derelictions or cases of drunkenness?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not at this Department, sir; never.

General McCoy. Did you see any evidence of drunkenness that night at the dance at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not.

General McCoy. Never even occurred to you?

[226] Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Was it a dinner dance?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. The usual post dinner dance at the club?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The usual, the ordinary post dinner dance, and Major and Mrs. Dupree—he is adjutant of Schofield Barracks—had quite a large party of, I should say, 40 people, officers and their wives chiefly.

General McCoy. Had it ever occurred, in consideration of what might follow on an alert, that it would be proper to lay down that there should be no social activities during an alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That has never been considered, no, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, after you were warned on the 27th that war was imminent and hostile action might occur, unpredictable, from any direction, you still carried on the usual social amenities and activities?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There were not so many present, of course, because many officers were involved in duty. We are very closely packed here; we can get to our stations in a very few minutes. Ordinarily there is no distance involved, any place in the Island, and there had been no restrictions in social functions.

The CHAIRMAN. If an Alert 3 had been ordered, there would have been?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Quite different. Quite different.

The CHAIRMAN. Everybody in effect would have been on post?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Absolutely, just as it has been since Alert 3 has been in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert 3 has remained in effect since December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. May I ask another question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

[227] General McCoy. In your consideration with your commander on receipt of this warning of November 27 did you discuss these first phrases that General McNarney called to your attention: "Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General McCoy. "This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, that is the body and the gist of the whole dispatch.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. But on that you simply ordered Alert No. 1, with regard to sabotage, which is local—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly.

General McCoy. —and hasn't anything to do with hostile action as stated there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We—

General McCoy. Did you discuss those statements and those warnings with the commanding general?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What was the—

Colonel PHILLIPS (interposing). The thing that might jeopardize our defense the most was an organized internal uprising right in our midst here, with the large Japanese [228] population led by aliens. With the Pacific Fleets here responsible for distant reconnaissance under our plan we felt, while a possibility of attack from the outside—while it was possible, it was rather remote, and the thing that would jeopardize our defense plan the most would be an organized uprising right in our midst, to sabotage our seacoast defense, sabotage our planes, and generally disrupt our plan of defense on the Island.

General McCoy. Excepting what actually did happen?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And you didn't envisage that happening at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not with distant reconnaissance provided by the Navy.

General McCoy. Were you informed that such distant reconnaissance was being carried out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know that we were in so many words. We assumed that we were carrying our part of the plan, and I don't know that there was even any thought of anything else.

General McNARNEY. Was there any discussion of it?

General McCoy. But I can't quite get yet why you thought that, with these statements that I have just read, which are the burden of the whole dispatch.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. I was controlled in my action, sir, by the directive of the Department Commander.

General McCoy. Were you informed by the Naval District of the arrival of the battleships in the harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I was not, sir. I can't say whether the Department Commander was or not. I was not, sir. I never knew whether the ships were in or out.

General McCoy. Wouldn't that affect any plan for defense that you might have, whatever?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, it should have affected that, [229] sir, but as Chief of Staff I never knew.

General McCoy. Did it ever occur to you that that was one of your main functions here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. To help protect the fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. But you automatically thought that that followed from your—

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. That was a matter the Department Commander was attending to personally, sir.

General McCoy. Were not you usually with him at these conferences with the Commander of the Fleet?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I was not.

General McCoy. Were you with him when he had any conferences with the Navy during that period of November 27 to December 7?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who was with him on those conferences? Are you informed as to that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe his aide, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is his aide?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Captain Truman.

General McCoy. Captain who?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Truman.

General McCoy. At any time during the period of the alert from the 27th of November to December 7 did you have any conference with your vis-a-vis in the Navy or with any officer in the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I did not.

General McCoy. Did anybody of your staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. None of my staff, no, sir.

General McCoy. And neither the Operations nor the G-2, as far as you know?

[230] Colonel PHILLIPS. As far as I know, no, sir. The Department Commander was handling all that himself.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. If your Department, Colonel, was informed of the nature and tasks of the scouting forces of the Navy, that information came to the Department Commander himself, in your belief?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I have some questions.

On receipt of this cable of November 27 you discussed the matter with the commanding general, did you not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Was there any discussion as to the type of alert which should be put in? That is, did you consider No. 2 and No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Or just No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We considered exactly what we should put in, whether 1, 2, or 3.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the objection to putting in 2 or 3, if any?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no particular objection, sir. It was considered that 1 was what we desired and required.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have one; I am not quite ready yet.

General McCoy. I have one: Colonel Phillips, under Alert No. 1, the very first line, the very first sentence, 14, page 3, it states, "This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the Islands, with no threat from without."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, here was a warning telegram that did mention hostile action and unpredictable action from without, from the War Department.

[231] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. So that that line is absolutely inconsistent, then, with the instructions from the War Department, is it not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It says, "with no threat from without," sir.

General MCCOY. So that Alert No. 1 is not consistent, I take it, with these instructions from the War Department. Had that inconsistency in the very first paragraph of Alert No. 1 occurred to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It had not, sir. At the time I saw no inconsistency, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, in this Standing Operating Procedure under the duties for the interceptor command—that is paragraph 15 j. (2).

Colonel PHILLIPS. Page 7.

Admiral STANDLEY. On page 7. The first paragraph of j. says that the interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, including available naval and Maritime Corps anti-aircraft artillery.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that would involve, would it not, the artillery or the anti-aircraft artillery on board ships in the harbor; and then to follow up I will help you, will follow up 2: it says—

coordination of anti-aircraft fire with naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu harbors.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that automatically, then, your plan takes care of the ships that are in the harbor; wouldn't it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had planned that. That feature of this had never been settled in any joint agreement at all at that time, sir.

[232] Admiral STANDLEY. But it was on operating procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was at the time, yes, sir.

General MCCOY. I understand, however, the interceptor command was not constituted until the 17th; is that correct?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why was it that that had not been activated prior to December 7, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We did not have the Radars. They are still not installed. Making every effort that we can to get them in, sir, and that was the basis of the interceptor command, we felt: Aircraft Warning Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, when was this operating procedure adopted?

Colonel PHILLIPS. This was signed on the 5th of November, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And it was therefore—what was written about the interceptor command? Was it prospective?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Exactly the same as the Home Guard; there is a reference here to the Home Guard, which had not been in existence, was not at that time. It has just been organized.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any other parts of this procedure that were not operative at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe not, sir.

General MCCOY. Was there a provision made in this Alert No. 1 for aerial warnings, for warning against hostile aircraft? Any system, in other words, in effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not understand that question, General.

General McCoy. Well, I notice since the attack you have issued an instruction establishing an aerial warning service with sirens in the tower downtown, and so forth.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That was not in effect on December—

[233] Colonel PHILLIPS. That was not in effect at this time, sir.

General McCoy. Nor any other system—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of air raid warning, no, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Coloney, you just stated that the Radars were not installed. Do you refer to the permanent stations?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The permanent installations, yes, sir. We had temporary mobile stations. We had six mobile and six permanent provided.

Admiral REEVES. Were the mobile stations installed?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The mobile stations were in position, yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. On page 1 of Alert No. 1—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Or no. On page 1 of the Standard Operating Procedure I notice under the term "security," under (6) : "Security."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. "Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces."

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What measures for security did you envisage as being normally taken under that provision?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is set forth in that Field Manual 100-5, sir, which gives the—makes the unit commander responsible for his security. General statement as to that.

General McCoy. Did it provide for having ammunition at the guns and the guns in readiness and a skeleton crew at the guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. In case the guns were out, yes, sir, I should say so; that would provide—that is a normal battery function, I should say.

[234] General McCoy. When they were in the field, you say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. When they were in the field, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know whether on December 7 antiaircraft guns were ready for action with ammunition present at the guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were moving in under Alert—these were mobile units, sir. They were moving in under Alert 3 just as soon as they got their orders.

General McCoy. But they were not prepared under Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, they were not in position under Alert No. 1. That is not required, sir.

General McCoy. Is there any provision under the standing orders as to where ammunition and bombs for the air fleet should be kept? I will make that a little explanatory by telling you that a statement has been made that at Hickam Field the ammunition was in the hangar.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes.

General McCoy. Which were immediately set on fire.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That's what leads me to ask this question.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, was there any inspection and report to you as to the security of ammunition and its availability against immediate surprise attack?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No report made, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, when the message of November 27 was received I understand you had three mobile Radar units?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion, in view of the possible outbreak of hostilities, of the necessity for working those Radar units 24 hours a day?

[235] Colonel PHILLIPS. No discussion of that so far as I know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, in spite of the availability of those units your Department depended simply upon the scouting forces of the Navy and such intelligence information as the Navy might otherwise obtain to warn you of any hostile attacks?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I would say so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the system of training on the Radar units went on as before?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We had no trained operators. We were exerting every effort we could to train these men. They were all rank amateurs; nobody was a professional on the Radar. We were devoting—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was it because of that deficiency that you didn't give orders for the Radar equipment to be worked full-time, or was it because that expedient didn't occur to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir; there was no discussion of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that any inquiry I might make now as to why the senior officers of the Department did not give instructions for the use of the Radar equipment continuously would be simply speculation on your part as to why somebody didn't think of it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Radar and its operation was under the interceptor commander and also the Department signal officer at that time. He was training these people, and that was his function.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But inquiry could be made of one or both those men?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As to whether it was not possible to keep [236] the equipment working continuously?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. That's true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as I understand your answer, that expedient occurred to nobody and was discussed by nobody in the superior command?

Colonel PHILLIPS. So far as I know, sir, that was not discussed. It's possible that the Department Commander took consideration of that. I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, isn't it a fact that those things were not discussed because no one in the superior command had the slightest notion that there would be any raid within any reasonable number of days? You all felt secure against a raid?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We felt secure against a raid, particularly with the Fleet here, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, Colonel, had you, in fact, a right to rely on the Navy's scouting unless you knew what the extent and the nature of that scouting was? For example, if you had been told that the Navy had available but a single task force for that purpose would it not be obvious to you that but a single task force couldn't cover the four points of the compass of this Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Certainly it would, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't know how many forces they had out?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As I said a while ago, sir, I never knew what the Navy had.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

General McCoy. I noticed in General Short's report to the War Department and also in his statement to us that he mentions and gives full particulars of the operation of the [237] Radar on the morning of the 7th.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Including the volunteer action of one of the operators that did find a large force of planes approaching the Island. It is carried forward in these statements up to the point where Lieutenant Tyler—is it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Lieutenant Tyler evaluated the information.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. When did you discover that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As to the evaluation of the—

General McCoy. As to the whole story that is stated here.

Colonel PHILLIPS. The whole story? Perhaps on the 8th or 9th.

General McCoy. There was no report made to you at the time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no report at the time. I reported it to the Department Commander as soon as I—

General McCoy. How did you discover it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was reported by the signal officer, Department signal officer, Colonel Powell.

General McCoy. What was the nature of his report to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Informal report, sir.

General McCoy. What did he say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He told me of the circumstances and that they were retained—they were running from 4 to 7 normally, and that after 7 these planes had appeared on the graph of the Radar, and that Tyler had considered they were either planes being ferried from the mainland as we had been getting them in from time to time—of course that was very secret. Sometimes they knew, and he had known of them arriving; or they were planes from the Navy carriers.

General McCoy. Did you inform anybody in your command—[238] that is, the ground command—of the arrival of those planes that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of the arrival of the B-17's?

General McCoy. Yes, from the mainland.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Whom?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Hawaiian Air Force.

General McCoy. Were they mistaken on their arrival for hostile planes by any member or any detachment or any anti-aircraft organization, as far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. As far as I know, no, they were not.

General McCoy. You do not know whether they were fired on by our own guns?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not know about that, sir.

General McCoy. Has any report—

Colonel PHILLIPS. There have been no reports to that effect.

General McCoy. Have you made inquiry since December 7 as to what went on in these various posts and fields on that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, through my staff, through my G-3, G-2.

General McCoy. Have there any reports been called for from the commanding officers of the different fields and posts as to what happened on that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe so, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, General Short's report to the War Department, a copy of which has been furnished us, was made up without finding out what happened in his subordinate—

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. He visited personally every post; he was out on reconnaissance the entire period personally making that report.

General McCoy. You think he knows, then, what happened [239] on each field and post at that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. He was inspecting continuously.

General McCoy. Since that time?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, during that—during the 7th and following, subsequent thereto.

General McCoy. I understand that he established immediately what you call your advanced—

Colonel PHILLIPS. Command post.

General McCoy. Command post, in the crater?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you remember about what time that was established?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Very shortly; I should say around 9, perhaps 9 o'clock, 9:30, it was being opened.

General McCoy. It was functioning, then, during most of the succeeding raids?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is, I take it there were three raids, were there?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There were three to my knowledge. I remained here, sir.

General McCoy. That is, you remained in this building?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I remained in this building, my office just in there (indicating). We had our scrambled phone to Washington in this little booth right here, and I was directed to remain here and did not go to the forward command post until Tuesday following the attack.

General McCoy. Who was in charge of it during the Sunday morning after it was established?

Colonel PHILLIPS. General Short was there himself, G-3 was there, and the bulk of G-2; the headquarters commandant, Major Henderson, was there establishing the post, and he of course is—

[240] General McCoy. That was the normal arrangement for it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That was the normal arrangement, yes, sir. Normally the Chief of Staff, of course, would have been there; but due to our telephone arrangement with Washington and the necessity that the Department Commander felt for getting information to Washington and from Washington I remained near this phone and did all the talking with the War Department.

General McCoy. How many times did you talk with them that day? Do you remember?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Two or three, sir.

General McCoy. Did you take a transcript of your conversation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir. Most of them were in the—first call I put in at the direction of the Department Commander, General Marshall.

General McCoy. The Chief of Staff, you mean?

Colonel PHILLIPS. To the Chief of Staff, yes, sir.

General McCoy. You talked to him personally?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How many times that morning?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We only called once, as I recall.

General McCoy. Did he call you back at any time that day?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I believe he did, sir. There is a record of that. There is a record of the number of calls.

General McCoy. Yes. Could you sit down and think it over and dictate the nature of your conversation to General Marshall?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. I think it would be well.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum to do it and come back later when we have got through these other matters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was there any other time between November [241] 27 and December 7 that the Department Commander or you talked with the Chief of Staff or anybody else in the War Department about the measures taken for security here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, sir, and I do not believe that the Department Commander did.

General McCoy. Was it customary in time of crises to use the telephone with the office of the Chief of Staff in Washington?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It was used very very seldom, sir.

General McCoy. Why was that the case? That is, I mean it is the quickest means of communication.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, why was it not used in time of emergency more frequently, say?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I could not say as to that, sir.

General McCoy. Did you possibly feel that it was not as safe as a code message by radio?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. With this phone it's a highly secret arrangement. It's a scrambled phone, and we feel its use is ex-

tremely—that is limited; we shouldn't use it but on a highly important—or for highly important calls. That is the impression that the Department Commander gave me. It is the most secret, we think. I don't know.

General McCoy. And it is certainly the quickest?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No question about that, sir.

General McCoy. You talk in the open, and it scrambles itself?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right. You raise a little plug on the phone itself. There are definite instructions as to how to place the call. The operator says, "Go ahead," and you pull out this little plug, and that scrambles your conversation.

General McCoy. Both ways?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Both ways. He pulls out the plug on his phone. [242]

Admiral STANDLEY. That is understood beforehand?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Oh, yes, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you any such arrangement with the Navy here on the Island?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you have a direct line between commanders-in-chief and the commander here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. We have in the forward C. P.

General McCoy. But not here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not here, no, sir?

General McCoy. It would go here through the city central, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Well, no. We have cables here direct to Pearl Harbor but no direct connection. The forward C. P., we have a phone directly—onto the Department Commander's desk directly from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General McCoy. How would you get the Commander in Chief normally here at headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Call Pearl Harbor, sir.

General McCoy. That would go into a military central, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir, right here, sir.

General McCoy. It would not go downtown to the civilian central?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I do not believe so. I believe that is correct, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, there is a military central here and a naval central down at the—

Colonel PHILLIPS. A naval central down there.

General McCoy. At Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

[243] General McCoy. How long does it take physically to get from here to Pearl Harbor in case of emergency?

Colonel PHILLIPS. From 15 to 20 minutes, sir.

General MARSHALL. Were there any liaison officers exchanged as a result of Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to Alert No. 1, we had a naval officer on duty at this headquarters in G-3 office, and we had also an Army officer on duty in the operations section of Admiral Bloch's staff.

General McCoy. That was prior to Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What happened after Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was no change in that made.

General MCCOY. So that there was a naval officer?

Colonel PHILLIPS. There was a naval officer here, and we had an Army officer there.

General MCCOY. Was that the case on Sunday?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Who was that naval officer? Do you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Burr.

General MCCOY. Is he here now at this headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. That is normal for him to be here?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. Well, he is in the forward command post.

General MCCOY. But he is here now—oh, he is in the forward command post now?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. And who is the Army officer on duty over there at the District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Lieutenant Colonel Dingman.

General MCCOY. What are their respective duties?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not believe they have ever been [244] given prescribed duties. They are liaison officers.

General MCCOY. Embraced under the term "liaison officer"?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, liaison officers.

General MCCOY. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, you took over the duties of Chief of Staff on the 6th of November?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This Standing Operating Procedure is dated 5 November.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. '41.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And it says that—

This replaces, supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July, 1941.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know what brought about the issuing of this draft of the standing order, of the Standing Operating Procedure?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Of this one (indicating), sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. The one dated November 5.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir. It was a result of—this tentative procedure was published, and all major echelon commanders were directed to submit suggested changes, and these changes were considered by the Department Commander, G-3 Section, gone over very thoroughly, and various conferences were held with the major unit commanders. Those changes were all embodied in this volume which was issued the 5th of November (indicating).

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those conferences attended or taken part in by the Commandant of the 14th District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were not, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. They involved a number of commitments or requirements for naval action or cooperation?

[245] Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those various phases approved by the Commandant of the District?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They had not been taken up with the Navy so far as I know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, that ties in with your statement to General McNarney that there had not been a meeting of the Joint Planning Committee since you had become Chief of Staff?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Did you furnish the Navy with a copy of this Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I cannot say about that, sir. I did not myself.

General McCoy. Will you make a note and make sure of that, please?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did the Navy have a corresponding plan, so far as you know?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you say whether anything of that nature was furnished to you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if it was, where would it be located in this Department?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It would be—if anything of this nature was furnished, it would come through me, and I do not believe that such a thing exists.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge were the naval commanders advised that you had put Alert No. 1 into operation?

Colonel PHILLIPS. They were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how were they to know what Alert No. 1 comprised? Would it mean anything to them for you to tell [246] them that Alert No. 1 had been put into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Not as such, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words,—

Colonel PHILLIPS. I am not positive of that, sir. I am not positive about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that what was communicated to the Navy by General Short would be known by General Short and his aide, rather than by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing came to your knowledge with respect to the state of preparedness that the Navy was in in view of these warnings?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you have any conference or conversation with the Naval officer in the G-3 about it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The G-3 had in the course of normal operations the naval—naval liaison officer is in with all G-3 conferences.

General McCoy. It would be one of his functions as liaison officer—

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

General McCoy. —to have a copy of Alert No. 1, would it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And he would probably furnish it to his own headquarters?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, if the Navy had put in operation an operation order which involved cooperative measures or joint action, would you expect the Army liaison officer to inform the commanding general of it? Would that be part of his responsibility?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That would be the normal thing, yes, sir, I would think.

Admiral STANDLEY. But wouldn't the normal thing be to [247] have this commanding general and the Commandant of the District discuss such a procedure as that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to putting it into effect?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Prior to its adoption, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether General Short had such a discussion or not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I do not.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further?

General McNARNEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You will get the matters that we asked you for, Colonel, will you, as expeditiously as you can reasonably?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And, Colonel, on account of the nature of this inquiry it is enjoined upon witnesses that they shall not discuss anything that has gone on in this room or discuss it with anyone else.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I will ask you to observe that caution.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, gentlemen, I am not sure whom we have here. (There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Call in General Wilson.

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, COMMANDING 24TH INFANTRY DIVISION

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name, General?

General WILSON. Durward S. Wilson.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General WILSON. Brigadier General, commanding the 24th Division.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine him?

[248] General McCoy. Is your division constituted on a war footing now?

General WILSON. Do you mean as to strength, sir, or activities?

General McCoy. Yes, as to organization of the division on a war footing.

General WILSON. I don't believe I follow you, General. As far as its activity is concerned, it is. It's considerably under strength, if you have reference to that.

General McCoy. Well, I had reference both as to organization and strength.

General WILSON. As to organization, it is organized along the lines of a triangular division, with a considerable number of shortages. In other words, the personnel is not more than two-thirds strength, officers for duty approximately 50. Certain installation—units such as the Quartermaster Battalion, Medical Battalion are both way under strength. For instance, the infantry regiments have a strength of enlisted personnel of around 2,000, whereas they are supposed to have around 3,200, and about 40-odd officers for duty. The artillery also is way under strength; we understand replacements are on the way.

General McCoy. When was this division formed?

General WILSON. October 1 this year, sir.

General McCoy. Were all the personnel brought here from the States since then?

General WILSON. Oh, no, sir. The Hawaiian Division that existed here was split into two triangular divisions. I might also state that one of the three regiments belonging to the 24th Division is not under my command; it is the 299 Infantry, which is scattered throughout the outlying islands, defending them.

[249] General McCoy. Under district commanders?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You have no responsibility for them at present?

General WILSON. No, sir, none whatever. In fact, they were detached some time ago before the organization of the two triangular divisions.

General McNARNEY. General, were you ever informed of a War Department cable dated November 27 which outlined the situation between the United States and Japan and gave certain directives?

General WILSON. On I think it was the 27th I was informed by an officer who had come from Department Headquarters; I was given a message something to this effect—it wasn't even written: that negotiations with Japan seemed to be off, that the United States would sit tight, await action by Japan. That was the intent of the message which I received.

General McNARNEY. Who delivered this message?

General WILSON. It was delivered by Colonel Haynes, who is G-2 of the 25th Division. He got it from Department. The Department directed that he deliver it to me. He delivered it to me after dark.

General McNARNEY. When did you receive the orders to go on Alert No. 1?

General WILSON. Alert No. 1, I think it was that same day, the 27th. I am quite positive of that, because after I got this message from Colonel Haynes we of course put it into effect. We have a Standing Operating Procedure, so that we can tell them to carry it out. But as soon as I got that message, which was after dark, I assembled the regimental commanders from my chief of staff, only very few, because I was told to keep it secret, had a little discussion with them and directed [250] that every installation which we were guarding, vital installations, be inspected that night.

General McNARNEY. What did Alert No. 1 involve to your command?

General WILSON. Alert No. 1 involved proper measures against sabotage, under the supposition that there was no threat from the outside, and the measures that we put into effect were as follows: A number of vital installations were protected by standing guards. These

had been carefully selected in advance. Standing guards were put upon them, and in addition we had patrols cover the principal roads throughout the north sector. In addition we had a battalion of infantry alerted and ready to move on very short notice.

General McNARNEY. Were there any observational units on the beach?

General WILSON. No, not—no. This Alert No. 1, as I stated, was based upon no outside threat. It was against sabotage.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information on the 27th that the War Department had sent a message which stated in effect: Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment?

General WILSON. Not in that manner. I have stated to you the import of the message which I received on the 27th.

General McNARNEY. There was no indication in that message that hostile action might be expected?

General WILSON. No. No, because the following day the newspaper, as I remember it—because it impressed me that we were bound to great secrecy, and the newspapers stated practically the same thing, and that is that negotiations looked like they were practically finished and that our country would wait and allow Japan to take the initiative.

General McNARNEY. Did the fact that negotiations were [251] practically finished lead you to believe that there was a possibility of action against the Island of Oahu?

General WILSON. No. I had no feeling whatsoever that there would be any action that we wouldn't get wind of. Now, as to what action would be taken—no, I didn't expect—personally didn't expect any attack on the Philippines, because I figured—

The CHAIRMAN. On Hawaii.

General WILSON. I mean on Hawaii, because I figured that with the patrol system and the strength that we have here Japan would make her effort in another direction.

General McNARNEY. You mention a patrol system. What do you know about the patrol system in effect?

General WILSON. I know nothing about it. That I could testify to only by hearsay, about a Navy patrol, inshore and offshore patrol. I know nothing. All that is kept very secret, and I know nothing about it, except just what you hear.

General McNARNEY. Can you give the Commission a brief narrative of your actions after the attack started?

General WILSON. As soon as the—I was at my quarters at the time the attack started.

General McNARNEY. Where are your quarters?

General WILSON. They are in the 21st Infantry Area at Schofield Barracks, about five minutes from my command post by car. Sunday is my day for taking it easy, and I was in bed when the first bomb sounded, landed. I arose and dressed, went out in front, and while I could hardly believe it I saw that they were Jap planes. I immediately jumped into my personal car and drove as quickly as I could to my command post. There I found my chief of staff had preceded me; he lived nearer. He had gotten there, and he had already issued orders to supplement Alert No. 1: in other words, to direct the troops

to get their machine guns into anti-aircraft [252] position just as quickly as possible, some of our units having already anticipated us and got them there; in addition, to send patrols throughout our whole sector for observation of the beach, and to increase the standing guards. That action was all taken by the time I got there. About—I can't give you the exact time, but I would say it was approximately 8:50—as far as we could determine this attack came about 8:05, and within a few minutes after that my chief of staff had issued these instructions to the troops. About 8:50 we got word from Department that Alert No. 3 would go into effect at once. That was an all-out defense where our troops moved and get into their defense position, and that was immediately initiated.

General McCoy. Did it work satisfactorily to you?

General WILSON. Yes, sir, it worked very satisfactorily.

General McCoy. Could you say, just off the bat, what proportion of your command, first as to officers and next as to men, took part in that initial movement? That is, was there any particular proportion of your command, both officers and men, absent on pass?

General WILSON. General, I am not aware of the—I haven't the details on the proportion, but I would say that the bulk of our command was in the quadrangles preparing to move very shortly after the alert sounded.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by the bulk of your command?

General WILSON. Well, I would say at least 80%.

General McCoy. Did you make any check on that at any time?

General WILSON. The regimental commanders of course checked. I haven't the figures myself, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they lodged?

General WILSON. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Where are they lodged, if anywhere, the [253] figures?

General WILSON. Within the regiment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they furnished to the adjutant general?

General WILSON. I am not certain, sir. The figures may have been collected by my own adjutant general. That is a point that has escaped me, because—I might state in that connection that we are not able to immediately jump into our transportation and move out into our position, and by the time the troops were ready to move the troops were all there. There are many preparations that have to be made. We have a great many sector weapons. For instance, we have organizations that have as many as—rifle companies that have as many as 24 machine guns, and ammunition had to be loaded. Up until that time were were allowed to have 1,000 rounds of machine-gun ammunition loaded in belts. That's four belts, but of course we had to load a lot more. So I don't think the exact number that initially turned out when this alert sounded has any particular bearing, because they were there by the time we did move out.

The CHAIRMAN. Your apprehension is that there were not many passes and not many men on leave on Sunday morning?

General WILSON. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think less than 10% of your command?

General WILSON. I said I would estimate 80% were present, so it would run about 20%.

The CHAIRMAN. Twenty percent?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And under Alert No. 1 that was not an abnormal number of leaves?

General WILSON. Well, no, sir, I wouldn't think so, because, as I stated, we had a battalion alerted and kept ready for a quick movement; and, as I stated, this alert is all based on sabotage, no threat from the outside. Therefore, [254] we put no particular restraint on the men, granting of passes for the men, so long as we had the troops that we needed to meet the sabotage threat.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir?

General WILSON. I was at Schofield.

The CHAIRMAN. At a party?

General WILSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What sort of party?

General WILSON. This was a dinner dance and a cabaret—so-called cabaret one of the very talented young ladies had worked up, some singing and dancing and song, and it was a combination dinner dance with some dancing by these people.

General McCoy. By post ladies?

General WILSON. Yes, sir. Oh, yes. It was called Ann Etzler's cabaret. It is a feature that they put on annually.

The CHAIRMAN. What time did it break up?

General WILSON. I think I left about 11 o'clock, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see drinking there?

General WILSON. No more than normal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is normal?

General WILSON. Well, over here cocktails are served before dinner. I saw no drinking in the evening.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see anybody who was apparently under the influence of liquor there?

General WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If anybody in your command who was there was under the influence of liquor, what would have been your duty in the premises?

General WILSON. To take the proper action, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that be?

General WILSON. Investigate the case, sir, and, if necessary, put the officer under arrest and, if circumstances justified, try him by general court martial.

The CHAIRMAN. There was nothing approaching that sort of [255] thing, was there?

General WILSON. No, sir. In fact, I might state that I think the liquor angle at the point with which I have been stationed, Schofield, is excellent. People take a drink when they want it, and maybe before dinners people will have a drink or two, but you don't see people who are intoxicated, in other words.

[256] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to court-martial any of your officers or men for drunkenness?

General WILSON. No, General.

The CHAIRMAN. On this night you saw nobody the worse for liquor?

General WILSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was no reason why if they went home they would not be fit for active duty the following morning?

General WILSON. Absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to the passes of men on liberty, do you have a check to your company commander or anybody else by a check of the men going out and coming in?

General WILSON. The men who go on a pass check out except in certain particular cases. We have what we call good conduct passes where the men are allowed out for a certain length of time without checking in.

Admiral STANDLEY. How is he to get past the entrance?

General WILSON. Each man has his pass.

Admiral STANDLEY. He has his pass?

General WILSON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If he does not go out on a good conduct pass, he is checked out on the pass?

General WILSON. That is right.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he is checked when he comes in?

General WILSON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you could give an absolute record of the state of your command at practically any time of the night?

General WILSON. You could give an approximate number. That is, of the men having good conduct passes, there is no check made at the gate. The check is made within the organization, within each company. I could not possibly check each [257] company, but we could probably approximate this.

Admiral STANDLEY. What percentage of the men have good conduct passes in the regiment? How many men?

General WILSON. I could not tell you the proportion of them because that is worked out within the lower units based on certain regulations that were set down as to what constitutes good conduct, and they will vary with the various organizations.

Admiral STANDLEY. Could you recall whether or not at some period it may have involved your whole company?

General WILSON. Oh, no, no, sir. It never would be that.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is limited?

General WILSON. Yes. At this particular time it would be a limited liberty because of the fact that we are on alert No. 1 and were using a great many of our men for patrol duty and standing guard duty at the vital installations and so on, so that the number on pass would be less than in normal peace time.

General McCoy. Was there any anti-aircraft action against the enemy on the part of your command?

General WILSON. On that morning?

General McCoy. Yes.

General WILSON. Yes, sir. Before I left my quarters. In fact, by the time I got out of my house there were machine guns mounted and in operation, 19 and 21. The men themselves had gotten these machine guns out and had gotten to work. As soon as my chief of staff got out of headquarters he directed them.

General McCoy. Did they have any effect, so far as you know?

General WILSON. Well, I don't know, General, whether we succeeded in getting any of them or not.

General McCoy. But they were in action?

[258] General WILSON. Yes, in action.

General McCoy. Who is your chief of staff? I would like to know his name.

General WILSON. That is Colonel Spraggins.

General McCoy. I would like to see a man like that who takes the initiative instead of waiting.

General WILSON. Well, he is a very fine officer, gentlemen, and you will probably run across him at some time. He is a nephew of Colonel Eckles.

General McNARNEY. Do you have the written standing order of procedure?

General WILSON. Yes, the standing operating procedure.

General McNARNEY. Did you bring a copy of it?

General WILSON. Yes, I have six copies here that were called for.

General McNARNEY. Would you leave those with the Commission?

General WILSON. Yes.

There is one statement that I would like to make if I may.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General WILSON. I have been very much impressed myself since General Short arrived in this department at the initiative and the activity that he has exerted over this command.

I came over here a year ago. I came here in September last year. Before that time nothing had been done in the way of fortifications. There was much discussion about it. I know I remarked that it seems there was a lot of talk but no work.

General Short initiated fortifications work and initiated some very live maneuvers and got them alerted. As division commander I am very sure that he succeeded in getting many machine gun emplacements constructed prior to December 7 [259] without the money for them, and the department commander tried to get them and had very little money to do it with. It was done mainly by salvaged material here.

I simply wanted to make that voluntary statement that I feel that in the short time that General Short has been here that we have been more on the alert, that there has been more initiative, more aggressiveness, and all the fortifications that were never initiated prior to his coming here were started in May and continued up until December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, with respect to our function here we think it is necessary that the witnesses called here shall not disclose what goes on in the room nor discuss their testimony with anyone else, and I will ask you to observe that.

General WILSON. Yes, sir, I realize that. It stays with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Call General Murray.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL MAXWELL MURRAY,
UNITED STATES ARMY, 25TH DIVISION**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

General MURRAY. I have six copies of the Standing Operating Procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, General?

General MURRAY. Maxwell Murray.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General MURRAY. Major General, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. In command of the 25th Division?

General MURRAY. In command of the 25th Division.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine?

General McCoy. Give us some idea of the present condition of your organization with regard to the type of division and the [260] strength.

General MURRAY. The division is now organized as a modified triangular infantry division. The strength is approximately 8,000 men. I do not have the exact figures this morning. It was 7,940 as of the last check I made yesterday or the day before.

General McCoy. What should it be under the tables of organization?

General MURRAY. It should be under the tables of organization, General—I am not certain. I think it is probably 12,000 men. We are short in headquarters communications, the signal corps units, military police units, and are quite low in the infantry strength. Our authorized strength is 7,000 as against 3,000. I have one National Guard regiment of two battalions, which is a strength of approximately 900 men as opposed to a full war strength.

General McCoy. Is the division equipped and armed for war service?

General MURRAY. Yes, but not with standard equipment. We have just reorganized as of October 1st from a half division with artillery units and we had a great number of artillery units, of the British 75 model 1917, left over from the 1917 emergency, and the howitzer equipment is 1917, 155 millimeter, and 75 millimeter tank guns, and we had improvised sets for those 75's and I have that organized so that I am using them for adapting the anti-tank guns, so they would be effective.

General McCoy. Will you state what happened on the morning of December 7?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir. I got up early, which is unusual for me on Sunday morning. I planned to take a horseback ride and I went to the window to see whether it was possible to ride.

I heard a dive bomber coming over my quarters, so I looked [261] out so that I could report him for coming so low into an occupied area. The plane went over my place about 75 yards, and I could not identify him. I thought he was going to land at Wheeler Field. I ran to the front door and turned to take my watch so that I could report the time he landed. As I was watching him, I saw him drop his first bomb very clearly. My first thought was that there was some crazy

aviator dropping a practice bomb on the dump there. Just then a bomb exploded. So I went into my quarters and told my wife and told her to get under cover and then I called next door to my aide and then took my wife and daughter to cover. This was about eight o'clock. I am not certain as to the exact time. I took them to cover about eight o'clock, and this was about 7:53 when the attack began.

I took them to the barracks and then began to get the information from department headquarters and then decided to order all artillery of the 25th Division moving out, and at 8:20 starting to draw ammunition. The artillery did not draw any ammunition under Alert 1, but the artillery was all set to move and they were drawing ammunition and they were loaded before the roads were clear for them to move fast.

General McCoy. Were you at the command post at this time?

General MURRAY. I went direct to my division office, which is a frame building, and the machine gun strafing was heavy. So I moved my staff there and stayed in there directly across the street. That was the only protection we had from overhead fire. As a matter of fact, one bomb landed in my front yard and struck the house of my chief of staff, but it did not actually strike my house.

General McCoy. Did you take any action as division commander for the purpose of getting the artillery set in place?

General MURRAY. I sent word up to the infantry post by telephone to get the machine guns on the roofs, but the machine [262] guns were on the roofs and they were firing within ten minutes. They had gotten started before we could get the telephone through.

General McCoy. Did they have any effect?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I don't think so. We had no anti-aircraft weapons then in the division, no seacoast anti-aircraft. We had 30 caliber machine guns, and that is supposed to provide for an emergency, anti-aircraft fire, but it is not a very effective seacoast mount there until it is sandbagged up.

General McCoy. When did Alert No. 3 start?

General MURRAY. It was approximately nine o'clock, General. I have it in the records. Would you like to have the exact time?

General McCoy. No. I just want to follow through what your actions were.

General MURRAY. It was approximately nine o'clock. The machine guns were in action on the roofs, and the artillery was at the other end of the post.

They were getting some strafing, and they were probably firing with the B. A. R.'s, shooting operations for close defense, anti-aircraft fire.

General McCoy. Was the artillery all motorized?

General MURRAY. Yes, all truck-drawn.

General McCoy. What did you do after you got Alert No. 3?

General MURRAY. I transmitted it to the organizations which were loading. I had already given them the verbal order that No. 2 was in effect. That meant they should start loading, getting ammunition.

Several days before the alert I violated the usual regulations regarding ammunition by moving all infantry ammunition except high explosives into the company barracks, the barrack rooms, and that meant that most of them had as much as 30 rounds [263] of ammunition in the belts; so they were ready for immediate action.

Ordinarily we do not keep loaded ammunition in the barracks, but I had a full unit of fire for each rifle, and most of them going into operation except for the high explosives.

General McCoy. Why did you do that?

General MURRAY. Because of the situation at Schofield. I think you know the situation at Schofield. We have a very congested magazine area there that was built for peacetime, but when a whole post starts to draw ammunition at once, it would be just like a slaughter with the Japanese bombs dropping into that area while they were all drawing ammunition. It would be just hopeless.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not expect Japanese bombs when you gave that order?

General MURRAY. No, sir, I did not. I was just looking after the alert. I thought there might be a surprise raid.

The CHAIRMAN. By plane?

General MURRAY. By boat. I never dreamed that there was a possibility of carriers. The answer was just to draw and try to move forward and to be able to move without delay, without two or three hours delay that would be occasioned by drawing for 20,000 men going through two gates, one gate going in and one gate coming out and there would be that congestion there and the exposed position of the troops. It took approximately six hours to draw the ammunition from the magazines due to the congestion in the area.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 1 did not call for that?

General MURRAY. No, except for what we call emergency ammunition of 20 rounds per rifle, but we had the ammunition at hand except the artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. When would you be ready under that alert?

General MURRAY. I was ready inside of an hour. As a [264] matter of fact, Alert No. 1 required us to get one battalion ready, ready to suppress sabotage, ready to move in an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you get Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. November 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. What communication did you get with respect to the Japanese situation at or about the time you got Alert No. 1?

General MURRAY. I am sorry. I haven't got my teletype message here. I just took it when it came off. There was some telephone call, and we advised them we were under attack, and we got some other stuttering messages.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I do not mean that. When was Alert No. 1 issued?

General MURRAY. November 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any communication with respect to the Japanese situation?

General MURRAY. There was no expression of imminent action then. The negotiations were apparently progressing, and everybody was following it carefully, and the only concern we had was a possible attempt at sabotage of our communications systems or possibly some of the Hawaiian projects or the vital installations such as water. We had a very heavy guard on our electrical plants, substations, and communications.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any communication on the 27th from headquarters here as to what the probabilities then were?

General MURRAY. Not that I recall, sir. If I may refresh my recollection (referring to a paper). Unless I am very much mistaken the only thing on November 27th was a telephone communication that Alert No. 1 had been ordered. Alert No. 1 immediately put in the standing operating procedure and simply required: "This is not a drill," and I took the first message over the phone at my office. However, there was nothing to indicate a change from the steps described in the standing operating [265] procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no message by any staff officer to you stating that any communication had been received from the War Department indicating an imminent state of hostilities?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know about that at all?

General MURRAY. I don't recall it. There was a liaison officer at department headquarters and we knew we were—I might say I talked with General Short several times personally between November 27 and December 7. As a matter of fact, our last conference was in this office on December 6, in which I brought out a number of shortages that were reported particularly in the personnel, officers, and the fact that the staff of one battalion consisted of the major commanding the battalion and no other officer.

General McCoy. In this conference with General Short, did he speak to you about any messages he had received from the War Department?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir, a number of them.

General McCoy. What was the nature of them?

General MURRAY. The nature was in general that he had not been able to get funds that he had requested to build the defenses, installations, and field fortifications, and we needed the material very much.

General McCoy. Did he give any indication as to the international situation as outlined by the War Department?

General MURRAY. No, sir, except in general. No, in our discussion he brought out the fact that he had been able to take the necessary action on our plans to prevent sabotage, but I recall no other threat that was mentioned at any time.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir?

[266] General MURRAY. I was in my quarters the whole evening—no, sir, I was at a dinner at the club on Saturday evening until about ten-thirty and then went home.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a party?

General MURRAY. A small dinner.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a party at the post?

General MURRAY. Yes, but I was at a small dinner. They had a small cabaret show that started about seven o'clock in the evening with some dancing, two or three dancers, and then there was general dancing.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe any drinking there that night, General?

General MURRAY. Nothing unusual. As a matter of fact, there was some drinking. I had a cocktail or two before dinner. I had nothing at dinner. I saw no signs of it. In fact, I haven't seen for months any evidence of excessive drinking in the club.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a large percentage of your command on leave Saturday night and Sunday morning?

General MURRAY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was not?

General MURRAY. No, sir. I do not, as division commander, keep a record of the men who are actually authorized to be absent at amusements, but the amusements of the post of Schofield are on the post at Schofield. Of course lately Honolulu has been very crowded and it is very expensive, and the junior officers get their amusement on the post with amateur theatricals and card games, and such, and three dances a week. They have a dance on Wednesday in which the music stops at ten o'clock.

[267] General Short had curtailed all late parties shortly after taking command of the department. The last hop was allowed to go until twelve o'clock, and the bar closed at the same hour.

Admiral STANDLEY. How about the moving pictures?

General MURRAY. The last moving picture gets out about ten-thirty. The movies have been running three shows and they start about five o'clock or five-fifteen and the last show was from eight-fifteen to ten-fifteen, which the officers attend.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many movie houses do you have?

General MURRAY. Three permanent and three temporary ones, of which one was a cantonment type building, and one was open-air surrounded by canvas, like the ones you see at the roadside in the States, open, with no covering at all; and one in a tent, rather small, at the replacement center for the new draftees who had been coming in about a week before the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you permit civilians from outside in the vicinity of Schofield to come into the movies?

General MURRAY. Yes, there are quite a number of them, many of the civilian employees of the post, and many in the adjacent town, and there are also a few Americans who live over in Wahiawa, and they come over to the post movies when there is a movie there that they think worth while driving two or three miles for.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is it the practice of your men generally to attend your movies in the post or to go into Honolulu?

General MURRAY. Generally in the post, sir. I would say 95 out of 100.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, because of the nature of our investigation it is desired that the questions asked here and the testimony given is such that anything that happens in the [268] room shall not be discussed in any manner, nor disclosed nor discussed by you with anyone else.

General MURRAY. I understand that thoroughly.

The CHAIRMAN. And you will observe that admonition?

General MURRAY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call General Burgin.

**TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN,
COAST ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name, sir?

General BURGIN. Henry T. Burgin.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

General BURGIN. Major General.

The CHAIRMAN. And your command here?

General BURGIN. I command the Coast Artillery commands which consist of two parts, the seacoast artillery on the one hand and the anti-aircraft artillery on the other hand.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine?

General MCCOY. Is your command on a war footing?

General BURGIN. It is on a war footing, yes, sir.

General MCCOY. As to strength?

General BURGIN. It is below strength considerably, in the nature of about 900 men at the present time, short in the whole command. That condition has gotten rapidly worse since the policy of sending men back after one year's service and the men who are 28 years old.

When I came over in August we were above strength by a couple of hundred men, but now we are below strength by approximately 900.

General MCCOY. Have you sent any replacements to the Philippines?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I have not; not from here.

General MCCOY. You are not short in the noncommissioned [269] officers?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General MCCOY. You have not been depleted?

General BURGIN. Not in that line, no, sir. We have recently sent some detachments to the outlying islands in the Hawaiian group.

General MCCOY. Do you have a close liaison with the Navy?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, with the Naval District Commander, Admiral Block. I have no communication with the fleet as the fleet, but my dealings are with the Fourteenth Naval District, Admiral Block. We have a close cooperation there.

General MCCOY. When Alert No. 1 was ordered on the 27th of November, what happened so far as your command was concerned?

General BURGIN. My harbor defense troops were right at their guns, their operations, and slept, bedded down and ate there.

My anti-aircraft troops stayed in their home positions and went on guarding that property and guarding against sabotage, acts of sabotage, internal disorders, but not with the idea of an outside attack.

General MCCOY. At that time were you informed either by the Department Commander or by any member of his staff as to the nature of the orders or directives on that subject from the War Department which caused the alert?

General BURGIN. I put Alert No. 1 in effect immediately, and after assuring myself that it was going smoothly, I came up here. I talked to the Department Commander on other subjects and that, and I saw the Chief of Staff. He handed me out of the safe this, and said, "Do you want to see this put into effect?" and I said I did.

[270] He showed me a radio to the effect that diplomatic relations had broken down completely. It was more or less of that nature. I talked very little.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the telegram (handing telegram to General Burgin) ?

General BURGIN. It probably is, sir. Yes, sir, that is it. I saw that telegram. That was shown to me as an explanation why Alert No. 1 was put into effect.

General McCoy. Did it occur to you that Alert No. 1 was the consistent order to follow that telegram ?

General BURGIN. It seemed to me. It seemed to be perfectly proper at the time, although I talked with Colonel Phillips, and he said, "We are going on Alert No. 1 now."

I expected it to follow immediately with Alert No. 2, which is where we take ammunition. We waited for Alert No. 2 or 3 to go into effect and it did not take place.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any further talk with Colonel Phillips or with the Department Commander between November 27 and December 6 ?

General BURGIN. I did not, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not here at headquarters during that period, were you ?

General BURGIN. No, sir. To my best recollection, no, sir, not on that subject; certainly not on the subject of the alert or the war.

General McCoy. Were you surprised completely by the attack ?

General BURGIN. I was, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Why ?

General BURGIN. In the discussion with the Navy people and with General Short himself the question came up several times, the question of a carrier getting close enough to this shore to land or to attack, and the assurance was always that it could not be done. We had the Navy scattered, scouting out [271] with the naval patrols and it was felt they would certainly detect any such movements before they could get near enough to land a plane.

General McCoy. Do you remember any particular naval officer making that statement ?

General BURGIN. Yes, talking to Admiral Bloch, I am quite sure he did. General Short is the man who expressed himself forcibly along that line also, my Department Commander.

General McCoy. Did he tell you what he based it on ?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. He did not state it was as a result of any conference with the Admiral ?

General BURGIN. No, sir, not in particular, sir, but it is my impression he got it from talks with the Navy people.

General McCoy. Did you accompany General Short on any conferences with Admiral Kimmel ?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. Your liaison was entirely with Admiral Bloch ?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Was that frequent ?

General BURGIN. Rather infrequent, sir. I had a representative in his office there and have had for two or three months, called the Harbor Control Post. There are three officers there on continuous duty.

General McCoy. Do they have any additional officers in your headquarters ?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I didn't have until after December 7th to now.

The CHAIRMAN. There were three officers in the command post?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. An officer of your command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

[272] The CHAIRMAN. An officer of the Navy?

General BURGIN. No. It is a Navy control post, sir, called the Harbor Control Post, operating at Pearl Harbor. It is purely a Navy post.

My representative goes over there as liaison officer, and for example there might be a ship, an enemy ship coming in, and the Navy control tells me whether I should open fire on the ship or delay firing and let the Navy take care of it.

General McCoy. That comes to you from your representative?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you have a wire?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Where is that?

General BURGIN. Fort De Russy.

General McCoy. In a bombproof place?

General BURGIN. Semi-bombproof. It is a 14-inch battery magazine.

General McCoy. You control from your command post all coast artillery functions?

General BURGIN. That is correct. I control absolutely the sea-coast defense against surface ships. As soon as the anti-aircraft goes into operation, actual fire, that goes over to the interceptor command. I train it and put it into position, but in order not to shoot our own planes, it goes to the interceptor command.

General McCoy. Did it go over to the interceptor command on the 7th?

General BURGIN. Yes. It has been going over within the last two or three months. They have been working on it quite extensively.

General McCoy. Was it functioning on the 7th?

General BURGIN. It was functioning, sir, for two or three months.

[273] General McCoy. That is with regard to anti-aircraft?

General BURGIN. It has been functioning, sir. I have turned my aircraft over to the intercept command.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was that interceptor commander?

General BURGIN. General Davidson, of the Air Corps.

General McCoy. Have you had any conferences with the District Naval Commander since November 27, since this alert went into effect?

General BURGIN. No, sir. I had no direct conference, only through my harbor control post.

General McCoy. Were you informed as Coast Artillery Commander of the arrival of the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. In the days immediately preceding the 7th of December, no, sir.

General McCoy. Wasn't it one of your functions to protect the fleet when it is in Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. I don't think so, sir. That is a broad question. The mission is to protect Pearl Harbor from this Island. Of course we do what we can to protect the fleet against both surface ships and

from the air, but so far as protecting the fleet in Pearl Harbor from the air by anti-aircraft fire alone, I do not think it is possible to do it. We could derange and break up and perhaps make the attack less severe than it would ordinarily be.

General McCox. But wouldn't it be useful for you to know when the fleet comes into the harbor?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, it certainly would. My positions with the anti-aircraft are the same whether the fleet is in the harbor or the fleet is not in the harbor, but there was the condition of readiness for Alert No. 1 and there were the fixed anti-aircraft guns along the coast. They were in position ready to shoot.

General McCox. Did they shoot?

[274] General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCox. Did they have any effect?

General BURGIN. We claimed eight planes, all told, with the small arms fire and the anti-aircraft fire.

General McCox. These anti-aircraft guns were operating under the interceptor command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, they were, although they were shooting at everything in the air that morning. With respect to the interceptor command, I don't think they had much control because of the conditions of the attack, but they just shot at them.

General McCox. Where were you at the time this happened, this attack?

General BURGIN. At 8:05 when the first shock came, I was asleep in my quarters about a hundred yards from the command post.

General McCox. What did you observe on the morning of the attack?

General BURGIN. I felt the shock of the torpedoes first. I got up and I could see the anti-aircraft fire from the fleet guns. I knew what it was. I came back into my office, which is only a short distance from my house. I got a message from the Department saying that Alert No. 3 was in. I immediately sent that out to my post units. They were out in their positions within ten minutes. They got into position, some of them in a very short time—fifteen or twenty minutes—and others had to go to the other side of the Island and did not get into position until the afternoon.

A great many of the anti-aircraft batteries did get into position and did considerable firing, both the 3-inch guns and the machine guns.

General McCox. Do you know whether any low flying torpedo [275] planes were brought down?

General BURGIN. Not to my knowledge, sir, I don't. It was reported that two were, but I have no official information on that, sir.

General McCox. So far as you know, none of your guns brought them down?

General BURGIN. My guns?

General McCox. None of your guns?

General BURGIN. I am quite sure none of my guns brought them down. If they were brought down, they were Navy guns.

General McCox. Were they too low-flying for your guns?

General BURGIN. Not with my machine guns or automatic weapons, but too low-flying for the 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, yes.

General McCox. Were your coast defense guns there, the anti-aircraft guns firing at those torpedo planes?

General BURGIN. Not at the torpedo planes, no, sir.

General McCoy. They came in too low and too fast?

General BURGIN. Too fast and too low and before anybody knew they were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Under Alert No. 1, as I understand it, most of your guns were ready to go into position but they were not in position?

General BURGIN. That is absolutely correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that mean with ammunition?

General BURGIN. Ammunition? It is different for different batteries. We have been working for months getting the ammunition near the positions where the guns would be firing. That was worked up in nearly every instance. There were some half dozen batteries whose ammunition was still out in the main magazine in the crater, and of course, they had to go there to get the ammunition.

[276] Even with the guns with the ammunition nearby, the ammunition was boxed, and it takes some time to get the actual ammunition there and shooting, but that had been done in some cases inside of fifteen minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

General BURGIN. I was at Fort Ruger, down in my command.

The CHAIRMAN. Not out at the party?

General BURGIN. Yes, we had a little dance out at Fort Ruger. It broke up at ten o'clock and I went home.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any drinking there?

General BURGIN. A little, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see anyone under the influence of liquor?

General BURGIN. Absolutely no one, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are clear about that?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, absolutely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The men you saw there could have left and gone to their stations and been adequate at that moment?

General BURGIN. Everyone of them, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you had any disciplinary trouble or such in recent months?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I have not. I have been in command since August 7th only.

I have been very careful about that particular thing. I have not seen a single drunken officer in the whole time, either in my command or anyone else's command.

General McCoy. Have you had much trouble from drinking among the enlisted men?

General BURGIN. Not anything unusual, no sir. There were a few old-time drunks that you can't get away from, but as a general rule the men are far better than the men we had years ago. They drank their beer and seem to enjoy it, and let it go at that.

[277] General McCoy. Have you had occasion to try any officer since you have been here for drunkenness?

General BURGIN. No, sir, not even any suspicion of charges.

General McCoy. You have been satisfied with the morale and discipline of your command?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir; no question about that, sir.

General McCoy. There would be more trouble with your command, I take it, than with any other command in the Army on the Island on that line, if there was trouble? That is so from the nature of their stations; you are closer to Honolulu, in other words.

General BURGIN. Well, sir, that depends. I don't think so, sir. The men from Schofield and other places get down to Honolulu almost as often as my men do.

General McCoy. Well, as a matter of fact, Fort De Russy is right in town?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In Honolulu?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you seen signs of any disorder or drunkenness among the soldiers around you?

General BURGIN. A little bit. There are a few honky tonks just over the fence where we had some brawls within the last two or three months where two enlisted men were severely injured. One was stabbed in the neck, and the other in the arm, but there is so little of it.

General McCoy. Is there any of it?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Did any of these brawls occur on the night of December 6 or the morning of December 7?

General BURGIN. No, sir. They were at least six weeks or two months prior to that.

General McCoy. What proportion of your command would you estimate was ready for immediate duty on the morning of [278] December 7th?

General BURGIN. I have not found anyone who was not ready.

General McCoy. Your estimate is that your whole command was ready?

General BURGIN. Yes, my whole command was ready.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the men on leave, officers or men?

General BURGIN. They were on leave, but they were back the next morning and probably were home asleep.

The CHAIRMAN. You think everybody bunked there that night who was supposed to be there?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir. There may be some instances of officers visiting, but they hurried in there and came to their post.

General McCoy. Were there any officers reported absent at the time of the surprise attack?

General BURGIN. No, sir, except one who was killed trying to get back to his place; a bomb hit him.

The CHAIRMAN. You said something before that after you got Alert No. 1 you were staying around waiting for Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 to come through, and apparently surprised that you did not get it. Am I right in that understanding?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, that is the thing in back of my mind all the time. I kept expecting to hear this next alert, to get my action ready and to get in position. I had nothing to base that on but just my feeling in the matter.

General McCoy. Was that caused by the dispatch shown to you from the War Department?

General BURGIN. No, that is the only dispatch I saw (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. That says, "Hostile action possible at any moment."

General BURGIN. Yes.

[279] The CHAIRMAN. That did not influence your judgment?

General BURGIN. It certainly did, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I think he stated Colonel Phillips mentioned something.

General BURGIN. Yes, if hostile action started, but I don't think it occurred to our men that hostile action would occur here in Hawaii. We expected—at least in my mind—that at some distant place some distant ship would be sunk, and that would be the overt act which the President wished to be done. It never occurred to anybody's mind that the attack would be right here in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that before war was declared there might be a hostile raid?

General BURGIN. Yes, but we were ready with Alert No. 1 and in a few minutes we could get to our battle positions with everything ready. We thought we had plenty of time to do that and we didn't.

General McNARNEY. Would you know the naval patrols that were out? Would you know the routine naval patrols out scouting? Would you know that?

General BURGIN. No, not completely. We don't know that now. We know there are twelve destroyers out there, but we don't know where they are. We cannot know that. We know they are friendly ships, but it is pretty hard to tell whether you are a friend or an enemy out there, the ships look so very much alike.

General McNARNEY. The Navy does not indicate to you what patrols are out?

General BURGIN. No, except what type of destroyer they are. When they come in to Pearl Harbor they let us know.

General McNARNEY. Do you furnish that information to anyone else?

General BURGIN. Only to G-3.

[280] The CHAIRMAN. You do furnish it to G-3?

General BURGIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you communicate or furnish the information? As soon as you got it?

General BURGIN. As soon as we got it, yes, sir. We did not communicate the information about the offshore patrol, which is a running matter. For example, if the fleet is sending a carrier back here for supplies, or something of that kind, we hear nothing but that they will enter Pearl Harbor at a certain hour or that it expects to clear Pearl Harbor at a certain hour.

General McNARNEY. Was that true on December 6?

General BURGIN. No.

General McNARNEY. What proportion of your guns were not in position then, or I might say, what proportion of your guns are mobile guns?

General BURGIN. The great majority of them are mobile; I would say 80% of them. I can get the figure.

General McCoy. That is anti-aircraft?

General BURGIN. Yes, anti-aircraft only. Is that what you mean, General?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General BURGIN. There are 60 mobile and 26 fixed. Since the 7th we added 12 guns of the Marine Corps that are mobile; so at the moment there are 72 mobile 3-inch and 26 fixed 3-inch.

General McNARNEY. What proportion of the 37 millimeters have been furnished?

General BURGIN. 20 guns out of 140.

General McNARNEY. How about the .50 calibers?

General BURGIN. I have not got the figures exactly on the .50 calibers, but we have got about 40% of what we are supposed to have.

General McNARNEY. You are using the .30 calibers for substitute weapons?

[281] General BURGIN. Yes, wherever we can with improvised tripods, wherever we can use them.

Admiral REEVES. Do you have ammunition for your machine guns?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, ammunition for the machine guns, yes, but we had no ammunition for the 37's until about two days before December 7, and then 9,600 rounds arrived, so each gun has about 500 rounds only.

Admiral REEVES. Do you expect to get any Bofors or Oerlikon guns.

General BURGIN. I have no information on that, sir, except a personal letter from my Chief of Staff in Washington, in which he said that the Bofors was a very fine gun and that they were trying to get some for everybody. That is all I have on that.

Admiral REEVES. None have been assigned to you?

General BURGIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. General, you stated you had three officers in the harbor patrol station. That was under the control of the Navy?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long prior to December 7th was this man detailed there? I mean your detail.

General BURGIN. There was one man, one officer, Major Dingham, and one enlisted man, prior to December 7th. On December 7th it was increased so that we keep one man there all the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was his detail changed after December 7th or were his duties exactly the same after December 7th as before?

General BURGIN. They were added to considerably after December 7th and we were beginning to function continuously and getting the information from the Navy, but up to that time it [282] was still the practice, and then it was a continuous operation. For example, we did not get notice of the ships coming in and out of the harbor of Honolulu. Now we do. Now we know what is coming in.

Admiral STANDLEY. Into the harbor of Honolulu?

General BURGIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not get Honolulu before?

General BURGIN. No, we did not get Honolulu at all.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. We did not get Pearl Harbor ordinarily; I only got it when we were practicing.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that man supposed to do? He was there all the time?

General BURGIN. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not all the time?

General BURGIN. Not all the time, no, sir. The functions were in the daytime.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were there every day?

General BURGIN. Yes, every day.

Admiral STANDLEY. Their purpose was to keep you informed as to what was happening every day?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So it was the duty of that officer to keep you informed about the ships going in and out? Is that a fact?

General BURGIN. That is what he was there for, yes, sir, when we functioned on a war basis, but up to the time Alert No. 3 went into effect, we were not functioning on a war basis.

Admiral STANDLEY. But he was kept there daily all the time?

General BURGIN. The harbor patrol post was working all the time, but the Army representative was not functioning all the time, continuously. He was just setting up the skeleton and [283] framework when it came to a stage where it got working.

Admiral STANDLEY. But he got the information just the same every day when the ships came in and out?

General BURGIN. He should have, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. He should have had that information?

General BURGIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was his business to get that information?

General BURGIN. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you remember whether you were informed of the entry of battleships to Pearl Harbor?

General BURGIN. No, sir, I was not. We did not expect to.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

General BURGIN. We were not functioning on that basis. The Navy never gave us any information before December 7th except when we were practicing.

General McCoy. In other words, it was purely a training matter?

General BURGIN. Yes, sir, purely a training matter up to the morning of the 7th of December.

The Navy was quite secret and they gave us practically nothing in that way except when we were practicing, training.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General, the nature of our inquiry is such that we must ask you not to disclose or discuss anything that has taken place in this room or discuss your testimony with anyone.

General BURGIN. I shall not.

General McNARNEY. Will you leave copies of your Standing Operating Procedure?

General BURGIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Colonel Phillips.

[284] FURTHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, GENERAL STAFF

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have the information that we desired, Colonel?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes. One question was, was the Navy furnished a copy of the Standing Operating Procedure?

According to our records, on or about November 5th, the Navy received ten copies of the Standing Operating Procedure.

In a telephone conversation with Commander Momsen—and I believe he is operations officer for Admiral Block now—he states that he has nine copies in his safe now.

General McNARNEY. Does that include Alert No. 1?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Our Standing Operating Procedure, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Alert?

Colonel PHILLIPS. Yes, complete copies of them.

In regard to the record of Army officers tried for drunkenness in the Hawaiian Department, I am only going to March 1st, the date of my arrival here. There have been no trials of officers for drunkenness in the Department since March 1, 1941. Charges were preferred against Second Lieutenant Seacat, 8th Field Artillery Battalion, on October 3rd. Upon investigation, the investigating officer recommended a reprimand, which was given.

Memo. relative to the telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff, Washington, about 9 a. m. on December 7, to the best of my recollection:

General Marshall, this is Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department stating that General Short, who is now on reconnaissance, has directed me to call you and give you the situation. We are now being attacked by Japanese planes. Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Pearl Harbor are being attacked.

[285] General Marshall asked, "Did you get my message?"

Reply: "What message?"

General Marshall: "A radio I sent you last night."

Reply: "It has not been received."

General Marshall: "Continue with the description."

They were not his exact words, but he used words to that effect.

Some hangars and planes have been destroyed. Our casualties have not been heavy. All troops in the Department are now moving to their field positions.

General Marshall: "Keep me informed."

There is no record in the Chief of Staff office files. We keep a record of incoming messages and outgoing, and their disposition. There is no record of a message on the 27th or the 28th being delivered to the Navy. G-3 believes that the message—both messages were taken by the Department Commander to the Navy. I have a faint recollection—

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have a faint recollection that this was the case, although there was no record and there would not be a record made of that in our files.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any record of a communication to the commander of the fleet of November 27th which includes the words "inform Army" or words to that effect, which was received by you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no record on that subject at all?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that cover everything we asked you?

Colonel PHILLIPS. That covers everything you asked me, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Just a moment. I want to ask you one question.

[286] The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Another question occurred to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. You say there is no record of a message having been sent to the Navy?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, not in my office, so far as we can find.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your reply to that message states, "liaison with Navy."

Colonel PHILLIPS. That meant that the Department Commander had gone to the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Phillips, did you show this message of the 27th from General Marshall to any of the Department Commanders, to your recollection?

Colonel PHILLIPS. I did not, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir. It is possible the Department Commander did, but I don't know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he see it?

Colonel PHILLIPS. The Commander saw it, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you show this message of General Marshall's to anyone, this message which states that negotiations with Japan were about to be terminated, and so forth?

Colonel PHILLIPS. To the Department Commander?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Division Commander. Did you show it to any Division Commander?

General McCoy. To the Division Commander of the Coast Artillery?

Colonel PHILLIPS. No, sir, I did not, personally; no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One of them has a recollection that he saw it here at headquarters.

Colonel PHILLIPS. Through the Department Commander then, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No, he stated you showed him a message. [278] I believe that is in General Burgin's statement.

Colonel PHILLIPS. I have no recollection of that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was something to the effect of, "Would you like to see a message about putting Alert No. 1 in effect?" and he said, "Yes," and you showed it to him, got it from the safe and showed it to him. Do you remember that?

Colonel PHILLIPS. It is possible, but I do not recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

It has been suggested that we have a recess now.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

The CHAIRMAN. Shall we have Colonel Fielder now?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel FIELDER. Kendall J. Fielder.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel FIELDER. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. And your command here?

Colonel FIELDER. G-2, General Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. You are chief?

Colonel FIELDER. Chief, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Since when?

Colonel FIELDER. July 22nd.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, information, Colonel, did your department or your G-2 have with respect to hostile action by the Japanese fleet or by carriers?

Colonel FIELDER. None.

The CHAIRMAN. You did have cognizance of certain intercepted messages, did you not, on the days of December 5th, 6th, and thereabouts?

Colonel FIELDER. Military messages?

[288] The CHAIRMAN. No, from a Japanese on the Island here.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I had knowledge of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you advised between what parties that telephone conversation took place?

Colonel FIELDER. The party in Tokyo was unknown; it was Dr. Mori here in Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is Dr. Mori?

Colonel FIELDER. He is a civilian, but I know, sir, that I did not know him. I had never heard of him prior to this, although I understand the F. B. I. did have him on their suspect list.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you furnished a transcript or a translation of that message?

Colonel FIELDER. About 7 p. m. Saturday, December 6.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you take it up with anyone?

Colonel FIELDER. I took it up with General Short at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us the conversation, will you please?

Colonel FIELDER. My contact officer brought it to my division. We then went to General Short's headquarters and read it over and discussed it. We tried to figure the significance of it but we were unable to attach any military significance to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you obtain any radio intercepts in the day prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any in which you were unable to break the code and forwarded them to Washington for decoding?

Colonel FIELDER. Not to my knowledge. That could have happened without my knowledge.

[289] The CHAIRMAN. How?

Colonel FIELDER. Because our signal officer or possibly one of the other investigative agencies, such as the F. B. I. or the O. N. I. or my own contact officer might have done so, but not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not necessarily come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, it would not.

General McCoy. Why wouldn't it have come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. If it was one of the other agencies it would not have necessarily come to me. It would do me no good unless it was a decoded translation. If it was decoded shortly after, it would come to me thereafter.

General McCoy. But wouldn't it have to go to some agency to be decoded and forwarded?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. That agency would be either the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Office of Naval Intelligence or my own office. We all have translators.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you since the attack become cognizant of the fact that a code was intercepted which would be used to signal the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you become cognizant of that?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember the date, sir. It was right after the attack, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you become cognizant of the fact that there had been such a code?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That code, as your information now is, contained signal code words for directing the attack on Pearl Harbor, did it not?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And who got hold of that code?

Colonel FIELDER. That code was gotten by the Federal [290] Bureau of Investigation after the attack by a search of the Japanese Consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any attempt by the military authorities to get a translation of the intercepted code done at Washington? Let me ask you this: Is it a fact that the War Department in Washington intercepted three code words and advised you of the three code words they intercepted, and this before December 6th?

Colonel FIELDER. Not to my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't there be any knowledge of that?

Colonel FIELDER. There might be knowledge at this headquarters here through the signal officer. It should come to me.

The CHAIRMAN. It should come to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I should know about it before it happened, but I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported to me that about ten days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Colonel FIELDER. I have no knowledge of that whatever.

The CHAIRMAN. You know nothing about it?

Colonel FIELDER. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no communication from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, it never came to my attention.

[291] The CHAIRMAN. After the Japanese Consul had burned his papers, the code message here was discovered?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, the code book was.

The CHAIRMAN. Which contained all sorts of information as to signal lights, blinker lights, and so on, which would be used to advise the Japanese fleet?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew nothing of that before the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What, if any, interceptor device were you using on the Island then?

Colonel FIELDER. We had none.

The CHAIRMAN. You had none?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. This is hearsay, but I have been told that such a service was requested by the signal officer over a year ago, but it was turned down.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the Federal Bureau of Investigation pass on to you anything they discovered about subversive activities or anything of that kind?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. We worked in close relationship.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been entire harmony there?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not able to furnish you anything of significance of a possible attack prior to December 7th?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct. I had talks with Inspector Shivers since that time, and he told me that he knew that the entire espionage ring centered around the Japanese Consulate, but diplomatic immunity prevented his investigation, and that anything he did might start the overt act which would create war.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, he could not search the Consulate any more than you could?

Colonel FIELDER. That is correct.

[292] The CHAIRMAN. I understand that this message in Japanese was tapped over the telephone? Is that your understanding?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. That was a trans-Pacific telephone, which he had authority to do. He could intercept a cable message, but nothing at the Consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a commercial message?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, a commercial message.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the outbreak of hostilities have you had any access to the records of the commercial radio here?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, that is supervised by the Navy. The Navy has censorship over the commercial radio.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there is no reason why we cannot subpoena any of the messages that were put on or that came in. I mean the local office of the radio company.

Colonel FIELDER. That is right. I see no reason why.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that short of a declaration of war, you could not demand copies of those messages?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I could not.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no advice from the Navy at any time of ships moving in the Pacific that would indicate anything with respect to Honolulu?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. All I could say was that they had bases in the Mandate Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. That the Japanese did?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to subversive activities, as I understand it, there was very little evidence that any of the bureaus or services could work on?

Colonel FIELDER. I had my own Intelligence, and most of our agents were engaged primarily in that. We had reason to believe that subversive acts would be committed, and most of our efforts were directed along those lines.

The CHAIRMAN. There has not been any word on the Island [293] of secret meetings or Bund meetings, Japanese Bund meetings, if I may call them that, or anything of that sort?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, there has not. The few meetings that were held are attended by one of our agents.

The CHAIRMAN. What sabotage have you known of prior to the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. None, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General Rudolph said there had been some sabotage in the airplanes.

Colonel FIELDER. I had them investigating as to whether they were actions of sabotage, and none have been proven.

The CHAIRMAN. He thought some spark plugs showed that the points had been hammered back down to the contacts possibly by someone in the plane, in the airplane service.

Colonel FIELDER. That is entirely possible, but our investigation revealed that the irregularities probably were spite on the part of local soldiers. That is the only thing that came to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean spite against a superior?

Colonel FIELDER. Perhaps. The personnel concerned have been disposed of. They are no longer here, but there were two or three instances in one particular organization which indicated that perhaps—

The CHAIRMAN. That they were disgruntled?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, when did it come to your knowledge that the Japanese Consul was beginning to burn his papers?

Colonel FIELDER. I think on the 6th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Colonel FIELDER. No, it must have been before that time. It came to my attention on the 6th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that it was on the 3rd or the 5th.

[294] Colonel FIELDER. That is entirely possible. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported it to my agent, and I in turn reported it at a staff meeting on the morning of Saturday, December 6.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you attach any significance to the fact that the Consul was burning his papers at the time?

Colonel FIELDER. It was suspicious, but we burn secret papers every day in the world, and we have a can out there that does nothing but burn secret papers. I discussed that on that day with the F. B. I.

The CHAIRMAN. You are familiar with the fact that when a consul or diplomatic representative is about to make his getaway that the first sign is the burning of the consulate papers?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, we were quite suspicious of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Wasn't the Department Commander convinced by that fact that war was imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, apparently not. We know war was imminent, sir.

[295] The CHAIRMAN. Imminent?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't think it was going to reach Hawaii, did you?

Colonel FIELDER. Not in that form, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the form of an airplane raid?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. We suspected organized——

The CHAIRMAN. Sabotage?

Colonel FIELDER. Sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. And you thought there was such organized sabotage, perhaps, in spite of the fact that you had never been able to uncover a sign of it?

Colonel FIELDER. We did. Just the mere fact of approximately 160,000 people of Japanese extraction would lead us to believe that a certain number of them would be loyal to the Japanese Empire.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many Japanese are there in the whole Islands?

Colonel FIELDER. 160,000, approximately.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the whole Island?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. That's all of them. Those are people of Japanese extraction. There are approximately 35,000 aliens. The rest are dual citizens.

Admiral REEVES. How many are there on the Island of Oahu?

Colonel FIELDER. I beg pardon, sir?

Admiral REEVES. How many are there on the Island of Oahu?

Colonel FIELDER. Of Japanese extraction? I don't have those figures in my head, sir. I can get them very easily. I think it is in the neighborhood, though, of 80,000.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your command make any investigation along the coast in the two months before the attack for [296] blinker signals, light signals, offshore signaling?

Colonel FIELDER. We did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel FIELDER. For the reason that that is very prevalent over here between the fishermen and the shores. They use a lighting system to direct the fishing fleet into the various channels, and they home on these signals. They have been doing that commercially for years.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there a lot of small entrances around the Island, other than the big entrance?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There are?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where the fishermen come in?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, there are many of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the attack had you any record of the number and location of small radio sets on fishing boats here?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They were very common, too?

Colonel FIELDER. They were very common, and literally hundreds—I won't say hundreds but dozens of residents were authorized amateur—so-called "ham"—operators.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. Many of these, of course, were Oriental.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Are there any further questions?

General McNARNEY. How often did the commanding general hold staff meetings?

Colonel FIELDER. Once a week.

General McNARNEY. Was that normally on Saturday morning?

Colonel FIELDER. Saturday morning only.

General McNARNEY. Was the War Department message of November 27 discussed at any staff meeting?

[297] Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it was. It was either discussed—I believe that message was passed around to the staff officers. They were called in, a few at a time, and permitted to read the message. That's what took place in my own case. I was called in and read the message, and I received a similar one from G-2 section of the War Department the same day.

General McNARNEY. Now, you state you received a similar one. What do you mean, "a similar one"? The same message?

Colonel FIELDER. Mine was much shorter than that, but the gist of it was that war was imminent and to be—that we might expect sabotage.

General McNARNEY. That was dated November 28, was it not?

Colonel FIELDER. 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. It is dated the 27th in this from the War Department. Receipt is dated here the 28th, I don't know why.

General McNARNEY. You received that on the 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. 27th was the date of the War Department message. Now, we would normally receive most of our messages in the morning of the day following the date of their transmission, because the transmission is usually done at night.

General McNARNEY. This message was not discussed in the full staff meeting, then?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember whether it was or not. It was brought to my attention, and I can't remember whether it was—I know right away they ordered an alert, No. 1 alert, but whether or not it was discussed in detail at a meeting I don't know.

General McNARNEY. Did the Department Commander call for any suggestions, advise, or opinions from his staff?

Colonel FIELDER. He did from me. He called me in and asked me what we should do, and I told him that I recommended the No. 1 alert remain in effect indefinitely and that I utilize all of my agencies for additional investigations, snooping around the various communities, intensify their [298] activities, in other words.

General McNARNEY. What were your relations with O. N. I. previous to November 27?

Colonel FIELDER. We have a meeting—the relations are very close; we meet once each week, the O. N. I., the F. B. I., and my office, but we have the closest of relations. I have a teletype machine, for instance, in my private office. It is connected only with F. B. I. and O. N. I. and the Navy Yard and the Provost Marshal. The relations have been quite cordial and close.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean messages can come both ways on that or go both ways on it?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Between your agencies?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. It's a complete loop.

General McNARNEY. Had there been any significant messages between November 27 and the date of the attack?

Colonel FIELDER. From whom?

General McNARNEY. On the teletype.

Colonel FIELDER. No; nothing relating to a possible attack. Most of the messages are in the nature of suspected individuals who are possibly Nazi-inclined or Communistic in their tendencies or disloyal or something like that.

General McNARNEY. In your meetings with O. N. I. did you ever discuss the location, disposition, possibility of attack by Japanese forces?

Colonel FIELDER. No, never discussed it. We probably discussed attacks in general—the probability of attack, perhaps, and the possibility of it—in a more or less informal discussion, but we never discussed it with viewpoint of apprehension, you might say.

General McNARNEY. With any thought that it would actually happen to you?

[299] Colonel FIELDER. That's right. Any discussion that we had was more or less informal discussion.

General McNARNEY. Academic.

Colonel FIELDER. Academic, exactly.

General McNARNEY. Did the Navy furnish you any information as to what they picked up over their radio intercepts?

Colonel FIELDER. No, not in relation to this. I get a lot of news broadcasts from them and propaganda and things like that, but they have given me nothing directly related to this attack.

General McNARNEY. Did they give you nothing relative to the movement of Japanese vessels?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, you mean now?

General McNARNEY. Now and prior to the time—

Colonel FIELDER. They didn't prior, no.

General McNARNEY. They do now?

Colonel FIELDER. They do now.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, the nature of our investigation is such that we feel it necessary to warn those who come here that they should not disclose the testimony or anything that occurs while they are in the room or discuss it with any other officer or person.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. I shall observe that.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask you to do that?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, said.

General McCoy. May I ask one thing more? The question occurred to me to check upon where General Wilson, commanding the Division—

Colonel FIELDER. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. General Wilson—commanding the 24th Division, is that?

[300] Colonel FIELDER. Yes.

General McCoy. —stated that either you or some officer from Headquarters gave him the gist of this War Department message.

Colonel FIELDER. You speak of the one of the 27th?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. It probably was the Chief of Staff. I did not. I hadn't talked to him at all about that.

General McCoy. My remembrance was that he said an officer at G-2 or "G-2" came out and gave him the gist of that message upon which the alert No. 1 was based. General Burgin also said he saw it.

Colonel FIELDER. That could very easily—I have over 50 officers in my section, and the Chief of Staff might have grabbed someone as a messenger. That is quite possible, but it wasn't to my knowledge, sir. I didn't do it personally.

General McCoy. And you didn't do it through any of the commanders?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. That's a command function rather than intelligence.

General McNARNEY. Just a minute. I have one more question. Is this the message you referred to as having been received by you from G-2 (indicating)?

Colonel FIELDER. No, that is not it. Shall I get a copy of it? Would you like it?

General McCoy. There is a copy here.

Colonel FIELDER. I believe it is. I turned it over—no, sir, that still isn't it. This one had about five lines, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get it?

Colonel FIELDER. I think it is on the way here now. I know it has been assembled. It has been taken from my section. I can—if you will give me about five minutes, sir, [301] I will look it up.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be in this dossier?

Colonel FIELDER. No, I don't think it would.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it?

Colonel FIELDER. That looks like it right there. That looks like it might be a copy of it. No, sir, that isn't it.

General McCoy. It came to you from Miles, did it?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it came from General Miles, only about four lines. It said war was imminent and to be—that we could expect sabotage. That was the gist of it, four lines.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you get it let Major Allen know that you have it, and you can bring it right in, if you will.

Colonel FIELDER. Very well. I know it's on the way to this Commission, sir, because they got it out of my office early this morning to be presented to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we haven't seen it yet. At least I think not. Will you trace it up?

Colonel FIELDER. I will trace it up, sir.

Major ALLEN. Colonel Craig, the Provost Marshal.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL MELVIN L. CRAIG, PROVOST MARSHAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Colonel CRAIG. Melvin L. Craig.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel CRAIG. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. And your commission here in this Department, or your office, the office you hold?

General MCCOY. Assignment.

Colonel CRAIG. Provost Marshal.

The CHAIRMAN. Assignment?

Colonel CRAIG. Department Provost Marshal.

[302] The CHAIRMAN. Since when?

Colonel CRAIG. Since July—it was a year last July, almost two years now.

The CHAIRMAN. In your official capacity you are supposed to know the conditions within this District with respect to law and order by troops and officers?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say as to the condition on the night of December 6, 1941?

Colonel CRAIG. The condition as to law and order on the island of December 6, 1941, was very good.

The CHAIRMAN. Any reports of misconduct or drunkenness by enlisted personnel?

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing unusual.

The CHAIRMAN. What is unusual?

Colonel CRAIG. Well,—

The CHAIRMAN. Or, rather, what is usual on a Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. Saturday night we usually have 70, 80 arrests, drunkenness.

The CHAIRMAN. For drunkenness?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you perhaps had 70 or 80 that night?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is of enlisted personnel?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What was done with those 70 or 80 on Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. The most of them were returned to their stations. That is, those from Schofield were returned to Schofield; those from Fort Kamehameha were returned to Kam. The other ones were detained, those that were beyond—seemed what we might call passed out—detain those at Fort Shafter [303] guardhouse overnight.

General MCCOY. How many of those? Do you remember?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I should say offhand approximately 25, roughly.

General McNARNEY. I think we might have the exact figure.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to have the exact figures.

Colonel CRAIG. I can get the exact figures for you.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to furnish them to us.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Arrests and detentions and returns for that night.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything with respect to officers that night?

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing to my recollection, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any records that would show?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I have the records.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you consult them?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And certify the fact to us?

Colonel CRAIG. That is the night of the 6th?

The CHAIRMAN. That is right, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. It might be well to have the comparison of the night of the 6th with two or three other Saturday nights.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that for us?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Pick them out over the the two or three previous months at random, some Saturday nights, and see what the record shows.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you say that that was a small proportion of a command of this size?

[304] Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, it is. I think it is remarkably small for the number of men we have here.

General McCoy. How would it compare, possibly, with civilians of like number?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I would say it would be comparatively—well, I couldn't answer that question; I would have to check the records of the civil police.

General McCoy. Yes. Would you be able, for instance, to check the civilian records?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, if they were available.

General McCoy. On a Saturday night?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fine. Would you make it your business to get in touch with the Chief of Police and get comparable records for the City of Honolulu?

Colonel CRAIG. We are in very close contact with the Chief of Police all the time, and our relations have been very—hundred percent.

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with that get us, as nearly as you can, the male population of the City of Honolulu and the number of arrests for drunkenness by the police of Honolulu on three or four Saturday nights.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That would not be a difficult thing to get?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. They have that information right available.

General McCoy. I think we might state to the Provost Marshal the reason we are asking these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General McCoy. So that he could possibly even give us a better picture than what we asked for. For instance, there have been telegrams received by all the members of this [305] Commission, before it left the United States, from certain organizations asking us to investigate what they stated were reports of great revelry and drunkenness on the night of December 6 amongst the officers and soldiers of this command.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Well, I can get that record in figures for you.

General McCoy. So that we would like to get a sort of picture, comparative picture,—

Colonel CRAIG. I see.

General McCoy. —that would show just what did occur on that night.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. Very well, sir.

General McCoy. And comparable notes over a period of, say, some month or two.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Does that cover it from your point of view, Mr. Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel, where were you on the night of December 6?

Colonel CRAIG. I think I was home, from my recollection; I just hadn't thought about it, but I think that I was home that night. I don't think I went out anywhere.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is it?

Colonel CRAIG. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is your home?

Colonel CRAIG. Right here on Fort Shafter.

General McCoy. In other words, you weren't called out during the night?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Due to any unusual happenings?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Mobs or brawls or anything like that?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, nothing unusual.

General McCoy. Where were you on the morning of the [306] attack?

Colonel CRAIG. Right at my quarters, No. 8 on the Department Headquarters, Fort Shafter here.

General McCoy. What did you do?

Colonel CRAIG. I got up about 7 o'clock, had breakfast, dressed. I usually ride Sunday morning, a little exercise, and I dressed for riding and had gone up to my bedroom again—it was about 8:15 I guess—went out to look for the morning paper before this, and we hadn't received it yet, and I didn't think anything unusual about that.

I was up in my room, and I saw Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff, who lives two doors below me, walking up the street in front of the house. He was dressed in uniform. At that time I had heard shell-fire over here, landing over here in the Damon estate, and could hear airplanes in the air, and at that time Colonel Phillips took up the double-time. He came up towards Headquarters here.

So I immediately went downstairs and came up to Headquarters here, and Colonel Phillips informed me that Alert No. 3 was in effect. When I first heard this firing the thought occurred to me that it was artillery firing falling short. I didn't know whether the Coast Artillery were having target practice or not, but that's what I thought it was at first. I really didn't know it was an attack until I came up to Headquarters, and that was about 8:25, I would say. I immediately went down to my office and alerted my commands.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you apprised of the contents of the War Department's telegram of November 27 as a result of which Alert No. 1 had been put into effect?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And how were you apprised of the contents of that message? Was it shown to you?

Colonel CRAIG. It was read to us right here at the staff [307] conference.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the staff conference at which it was read? On the day it was received?

Colonel CRAIG. On the day it was received, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The staff was assembled to hear it, were they?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion as to what was the appropriate measure to take in the light of that message? What I mean is—

Colonel CRAIG. Nothing more than Alert No. 1 was in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was that put in effect as a result of the staff conference or before the staff conference, if you know?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, that was put into effect as the result of the staff conference, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I ask you, Was there any discussion as to what would be the appropriate orders in the light of that telegram, in the light of that message? Did you talk it over?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. We didn't. I didn't stay; I just got the telegram and went back and put my Alert Order No. 1 in effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. That was the only—it didn't last very long.

General MCCOY. Who held the staff conference?

Colonel CRAIG. I think it was Colonel Phillips, the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. And if I get your testimony correctly, Colonel, what he did was to acquaint the staff with the message and say that Alert No. 1 was to be consequently ordered [308] into effect?

Colonel CRAIG. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I would like to ask: In the number of arrests during the day here or the evening are some of them sent back to barracks?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Without any record?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. We keep a record of them, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If you pick them up, take charge of them, there is always a record?

Colonel CRAIG. That's right, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is a naval patrol—

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, shore patrol.

Admiral STANDLEY. —in connection with it?

Colonel CRAIG. They were right next door to my office downtown.

Admiral STANDLEY. And any records they have would be the same as you have? If you pick up a sailor man and turn him over to the patrol you would make a record of it?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, we don't pick up the sailor men. That is done by the shore patrol.

Admiral STANDLEY. Done by the patrol?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir. They handle all theirs, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So they will have in all probability a similar record as to their forces—

Colonel CRAIG. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. That you have with respect to your forces?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. When you get up your records will you let us have one on pay night, records as to the arrests on payday night?

[309] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. Well, you know, we have a dispersed payday over here now, just the last couple of months. That is: Hickam, the Air Corps paid in one night, and the Coast Defense another time. It's spread out over a period of time. That is, it just happens the last two months an order—the arrests were getting pretty large, and of course we had more troops, too, but they dispersed the paydays over a period of time, but I can give you the reports on the number—on who was paid and what troops confined that night. You see, we don't have just one payday any more like we used to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, sir, what you could do would be to go back to a period three or four months ago when you did have a pay night, and get that.

Colonel CRAIG. Oh, yes, sir, I can get that very easily; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Approximate number.

General McCoy. Were you conscious on Saturday night of any unusually large number of sailors being in town?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I did; I noticed that there were quite a few sailors in town.

General McCoy. In other words, you knew the fleet was in the harbor, did you?

Colonel CRAIG. Well, I noticed that there were an awful lot of sailors in the streets. I didn't know, of course—that's all that I observed. I didn't know that the fleet was in, but it seemed to me there were a lot of sailors in town on the evening of the 6th. I was down there about 6, between 6 and 7 o'clock, I think it was, and I remember seeing a lot of sailors in the street.

General McCoy. But even so, there was nothing that caused you to stay downtown that night due to anything unusual?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir, not to the best of my recollection. I think that I was at home that evening; I could check [310] it up with my wife.

General McCoy. In other words, it wasn't so outstanding that you remembered anything about it particularly?

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir.

General McCoy. Have you heard any comment in town here among civilians, any charges that the Army or the Navy ran riot that night, a lot of them.

Colonel CRAIG. No, sir. This is the first I have heard of it. I haven't heard anything like that.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investigation we feel it is necessary to caution witnesses not to reveal questions and answers or anything that took place in the room.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And not to discuss it with anyone.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you to follow that injunction.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And when you are ready with your information, if you will let Major Allen know we will try to call your office.

Colonel CRAIG. Very well.

Mr. HOWE. Colonel Fielder has that message, G-2 of the Army. There are no other witnesses.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the adjutant? Has he got his figures?

Mr. HOWE. I imagine. The adjutant general is called to stand by for 2 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, he is?

Mr. HOWE. In case General Martin does not come.

[311] **FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER, GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY**

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Fielder, what is the message that was given you?

Colonel FIELDER. This is from General Miles, War Department Message 473, secret, dated 27 November:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop. Hostilities may ensue stop. Subversive activities may be expected stop. Inform commanding general and chief of staff only.

General McNARNEY. What was the time of receipt?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't have that recorded on here. It got to me on that same day. I showed it to the Chief of Staff and the general on that same day.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you show that to them before Alert No. 1 was ordered?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember in relation to that whether it had. I don't remember which message was received first, this one or the one to the Commanding General.

General MCCOY. Well, I think it is important for us to have that, and certainly your signal office would have some record of that as to the exact time of receipt. Would you look into that, please?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just certify it to us if you can get it.

Colonel FIELDER. I might clarify one point, sir, that General McCoy asked about my having been reported as talking to General Wilson. I was sent out by General Short to inspect the—to see that the provisions under Alert No. 1 had been put into operation, but that was some time—that was several days after the 27th.

[312] General MCCOY. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. That is the only time that I could have possibly talked to him.

The CHAIRMAN. I think he mentioned an officer of another name; I don't think he mentioned you.

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I did not talk to him.

The CHAIRMAN. He made some allusion, but I think it was not your name, sir.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Do you remember a staff conference on the morning of November 27 or 28 where this message may have been read and

the other message that came through to the Department Commander on the same date was read to the assembled staff?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't remember in detail, no, sir. I know that it was shown to me, because I'm right in the next room (indicating).

General McCoy. But you don't remember any staff conference where the whole staff was there?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I don't remember that.

General McCoy. And where these messages were read?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. I believe that is all.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Colonel FIELDER. I now have the hour of the decoding of General Miles' message to me of November 27, and the decoding hour is 4 p. m.

General McCoy. Were those messages together discussed or taken to the Department Commander, as far as you know?

Colonel FIELDER. I discussed mine with the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff only, as directed; it was not discussed at staff meeting. When the message came in—the first message came in—I was immediately called in, because I am in the next room, and—

[313] General McCoy. That is the message from the War Department, Marshall?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. I read that before the 4 p. m. conference. There was a staff conference of the four heads at 4 p. m. on the 27th, but I in the meantime had already been given the information, and I had started action so far as my agencies were concerned. The training section, G-3, was told at this conference at 4 that the Department Commander had decided to put Alert No. 1 into effect, and to get busy and see that it was carried out.

General McCoy. And both these telegrams were available at that time?

Colonel FIELDER. They were available at that time, yes, sir, but the conference did not see this one; they don't know yet that this one was received, except the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

(Thereupon, at 12:50 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[314]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL,
ASSISTANT TO DEPARTMENTAL G-2, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Colonel BICKNELL. George W. Bicknell.

The CHAIRMAN. Rank?

Colonel BICKNELL. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Your assignment here, sir?

Colonel BICKNELL. I am the assistant to the Departmental G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we have had news of one intercepted telephone communication shortly before December 7 which I believe was turned over to you by the F. B. I.

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you take it?

Colonel BICKNELL. I brought it directly to the Department Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And what discussion was had about it, if any?

Colonel BICKNELL. I stated that the message looks somewhat suspicious to me in part. At present, up until that time, having just received it only an hour—less than an hour before that, I had not been able to make any evaluation of it, but there were certain portions of that that did appear to be suspicious.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you and the Department Commander able to make anything out of it that would put you on any alert as to any hostile action?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

[315] The CHAIRMAN. Had you gotten from the Navy Intelligence or F. B. I.—and I understand you all worked in conjunction—

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. —any message that would arouse suspicion of any hostile action?

Colonel BICKNELL. Nothing of the kind, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing of the kind?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were unable to know what was being sent from the Consulate?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true.

The CHAIRMAN. And were you able to get anything from the commercial radio?

Colonel BICKNELL. We were not authorized to do that.

General McCoy. Did you make an attempt, that is?

Colonel BICKNELL. I did not make the attempt, no, sir. I believe there were some attempts made by the other services, but we did not.

The CHAIRMAN. You felt that you were forbidden in peace time to do it?

Colonel BICKNELL. That's right. It is illegal to do that in peace time.

The CHAIRMAN. Sir?

Colonel BICKNELL. It was considered illegal to do that in peace time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You knew nothing of any code or blinker signals, or what have you, of the same character until after the 7th; is that right?

Colonel BICKNELL. That is correct, after the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. You then obtained some information about that?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From the consulate?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[316] The CHAIRMAN. When did you get information that the Consulate was burning its papers?

Colonel BICKNELL. I received that information at 5 o'clock Friday afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be the 4th?

Colonel BICKNELL. The 4th, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise your Department—
Admiral REEVES. 5th.

General McCoy. 5th.

Colonel BICKNELL. 5th, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you advise your Department Commander of the matter?

Colonel BICKNELL. I advised them. That is, I gave all that information to the congregated staff heads at the staff conference at 9 o'clock Saturday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine o'clock Saturday?

Colonel BICKNELL. Saturday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Saturday morning. Did you impart to the conference the significance of that?

Colonel BICKNELL. I did. I said that was a most interesting fact.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance?

Colonel BICKNELL. That they were burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the significance, in your judgment?

Colonel BICKNELL. The inference of it, in my judgment, is that that is one of the signs that something is going to happen somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you are at the very brink of war—

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —when a consul—

Colonel BICKNELL. —starts burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. —gets ready to flee, aren't you?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

[317] The CHAIRMAN. So that you explained that that meant that some hostilities were probably going to break out immediately?

Colonel BICKNELL. I didn't make that explanation at the staff conference.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel BICKNELL. But I said that it was very significant, in view of the present situation, that the consul was burning the papers.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubt that there were communications back and forward to Japan from the consular office here, have you?

Colonel BICKNELL. I feel certain that the entire espionage system headed up at the consular office.

The CHAIRMAN. There seemed to be no way that you could break through that?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. I would like to know what the reaction at the staff conference was to your statement that this burning of papers you thought was significant.

Colonel BICKNELL. There was no comment that I know of.

Admiral REEVES. No comment on it whatever?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. Of course, I might explain that under the delineation agreement that was published a year ago in June the F. B. I. and the Navy jointly were in charge of Japanese espionage.

The CHAIRMAN. They were?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, amongst the civil community, and the Army was only charged with espionage within the military establishment.

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't know that.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. That is the joint agreement of—
(The witness examined papers.)

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you need not refer to them; your word [318] is quite sufficient.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir. I think it was in July of 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, legal or illegal, if there were attempts to break the communication system between here and Japan it was an F. B. I. or a Navy job?

Colonel BICKNELL. Or a Navy job, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel BICKNELL. We work in very close connection with them, but it was their responsibility only.

The CHAIRMAN. But they gave you nothing?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir, that's true; they gave us nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Except that the F. B. I. gave you some things after the fact that were too late to use?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, what do you know about an interception of a message having certain code signal words that were to be used to signify—to signal the attack on these islands?

Colonel BICKNELL. That message was turned over to the F. B. I. encoded in a file of papers which were removed from the consulate after the police established a guard at the consulate. The story as related by them is that they smelled papers burning when they went in the consulate on the morning of the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Colonel BICKNELL. They saw smoke coming from behind a door. They asked the consul if there was a fire, and he said, "No; there is just something in there." They opened the door, which was a double door, and found a wash tub on the floor in which they were burning these documents. The room was full of smoke, and there was just one brown—this bellows type envelope that was full of papers that had not been destroyed. They [319] removed that—I don't think the consul knew that they got it—and brought it down to the F. B. I., and we turned it over immediately to the Navy Intelligence, inasmuch as Commander Rochefort has the key to some of their codes. Within I think it was less than 24 hours Commander Rochefort had broken one of the messages in this file in the consulate, which gave the system by which various lights, star boats, and other systems—

The CHAIRMAN. That is the so-called Kita, K-i-t-a, code?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about; I refer to the fact that some ten days before December 7 it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishments in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands.

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any such story?

Colonel BICKNELL. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Never heard of it?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions. Are there any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. I would like to ask if in close cooperation with the Navy and F. B. I.—if from Commander Rochefort or the Navy you learned anything about the collection of Japanese ships in the mandated islands.

[320] Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir. I knew nothing. We had no information from Navy, at all.

Admiral REEVES. No information about that movement of any ships?

Colonel BICKNELL. We knew nothing of any of the fleet or where they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel—go ahead.

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Complete.

Admiral REEVES. No; I was going to say that I had nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, in view of the nature of our investigation we shall enjoin upon you that you shall not disclose what has been asked you or what you have testified here or discuss this testimony—

Colonel BICKNELL. Certainly. Very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —with any other person.

Colonel BICKNELL. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

General Martin.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK L. MARTIN, AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Thereupon the witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

General MARTIN. Frederick L. Martin.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

General MARTIN. Major General, Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment here?

General MARTIN. My assignment has been as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force from November 2 until December 17 when I was relieved.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to make any statement about the occurrences off your own bat, General, or would you prefer [321] that you be questioned about the situation?

General MARTIN. Well, I might state what little I know about what happened and what we tried to do to fight back. I was coming down to my breakfast on Sunday morning, December 7, just before 8 o'clock, when I heard a very violent explosion in the vicinity of the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard. I ran to the door just in time to see the second airplane making the dive release its bomb and pull up. I saw the red circle—

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your quarters, sir?

General MARTIN. They are on the channel that leads into Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. So that you had a view of the harbor?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. This was about—this bombing was occurring probably less than a mile from my position. I saw the red circle on the wing tip of this airplane as it pulled out, and I knew it was Japanese. I rushed back to the telephone, called General Davidson, who was in charge of the intercept command, to tell him to get his pursuit ships in the air just as fast as he could, and he said they were being attacked at the same time and that they were struggling to get their ships in position so they could get them off.

I then tried to call General Rudolph, who was in command of the bomber command, and I could not get him at his telephone. So I got in my private car and drove to my headquarters as quickly as possible, so as to get communications with everyone. I found my staff assembling very rapidly, and we communicated with those that we could. We tried to get such information as we could from the intercept command to give us an indication of the location of these carriers, because our ambition at the time was to try to get the carriers if we possibly could. I called Admiral Bellinger on the field phone which I have in my office, which connects the two of us. As you know, the Navy is responsible for the search, and they also have turned over to them our bombardment in case of [322] attack. I talked to him, and the bombardment was so heavy at the time we could hardly hear each other, and he said he had no information whatever to give me any light as to which direction to go to find the carriers. I called him back later; he still had no information. The information we got at the time from the intercept command led us to believe that there was a carrier not far distant from the southernmost point of Barbers Point, which is out in this direction [indicating], and they indicated it might be 25 or 40 miles from there; that there was considerable air activity in that direction.

Of the airplanes we had, which were not very many, of bombardment airplanes we had in commission, loaded as quickly as possible, four A-20's, which are a light type of light bombardment airplane. As soon as they were loaded we gave them a mission. After finding that they had no mission from the Navy and they had no instructions from the Navy, I myself gave them a mission of trying to find the carrier that was south of Barbers Point. They took off at 11:27, four of them. They did not succeed in finding anything in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. When did the bombardment by the Japanese cease, as nearly as you know?

General MARTIN. I have no information from anyone as to just when it ceased. Everyone seems to know when it began, but no one seems to know exactly when it ceased. There were three distinct attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, three waves.

General MARTIN. Three waves. One started at about 8 o'clock and lasted for about 30 minutes, and there was another one at 9 o'clock or just after, and the third one was probably in the neighborhood of 9:45 to 10 o'clock. No one seems to know the exact time of the third.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when you got this pursuit squadron off at 11:20 or thereabouts, the bombardment had ceased by [323] the Japanese?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is what I want to know.

General MARTIN. Some of the pursuit got off before the bombardment had ceased, and I saw their first attack was made on some ships—that is, within my view.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. —was made on some ships that were attacking the Ewa Marine Station; that is south here a short distance.

The CHAIRMAN. Then they went off to the south southwest in pursuit?

General MARTIN. Our information was to the effect that they left south or west of south.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Had any of the Japanese attacking planes in your observation gone off in that same direction?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir; that's what I was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. That is why you suspected a carrier?

General MARTIN. Yes, that's what I was saying.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. And one of our pursuit pilots had shot down two of the Japanese planes leaving in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

General MARTIN. We had that information. After we dispatched this, the first four A-20's, we were given a map that had been recovered from a pilot that had been shot down on the edge of Fort Kamehameha, which is right on the edge of the military reservation of Hickam Field. This map had approximately ten courses laid out on it to a point northwest of the Island of Oahu, which indicated that they either had left carriers there or expected to return to carriers in that direction.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[324] General MARTIN. And as we got other ships in commission we dispatched them a little after 12 o'clock, as I remember, in the northerly direction, but they didn't succeed in finding anything. As to what position they launched the ships from the carriers, we do not know, but from the time of the attack we suspect they were in the neighborhood of 200 miles from here, and it is pretty likely that they steamed back from that position before they recovered their airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Away from the Island?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. So it was possible for them to be approximately 300 miles from here at that time. Now, there is nothing positive about that.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

General MARTIN. The control officer in the intercept command did not give us any information that there were carriers in that direction, although, as you probably have received testimony, we were receiving all sorts of spurious messages with reference to the positions of the carriers. They were in every position around here, but they never mentioned the northerly position, which now would lead us to believe that they probably were in that position rather than south or east.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you acquainted with the condition of the radio air after these attacks, or have you since learned of the condition of the radio air? I understand it was full of—

General MARTIN. Well, to this extent: that we have had considerable interference, and they have tried to monitor the position to

locate the position of the instruments that are causing the interference.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have heard that the sea was full of Japanese ships that all started talking on small radio sets and jammed the air.

[325] General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With contradictory talk and signals.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the fact, is it?

General MARTIN. We have learned that since, and we were getting this information that we knew in all probability was spurious, but we couldn't differentiate one from the other.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate a perfectly complete espionage system operating before the attack, here in the Islands, wouldn't it?

General MARTIN. Justice Roberts, they had complete information of everything. It is impossible for one to believe that such a well-coordinated attack could have been made. They knew the exact position of everything. In their attack upon our installations they picked out those things of greatest importance to our future effort. They started in on our engineering establishments and our depots and our ships that were in the line, the armed forces—

The CHAIRMAN. Ships that were in the line, you say?

General MARTIN. Ships that were on the line.

The CHAIRMAN. On the line.

General MARTIN. Unfortunately, as you probably know, we were in Alert No. 1, which means prevention against sabotage, and that means pulling in your equipment so you can protect it from things that are moving on the ground, and that was the most unfortunate thing of all. After we got our ships dispersed, which was between the first and second attacks, we only lost one bombardment airplane, and that was of an obsolete type.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the third wave didn't get home at all, so to speak?

General MARTIN. Well, the success of the third wave was small as compared to that of the others, and the third wave [326] was largely horizontal bombing; there was very little bombing, but there was a good deal of strafing that preceded each bombardment attack, and this strafing was very effective. They had mounted in the wings of their ships 7.7 millimeter weapons and something that corresponds to our 20 millimeter weapons, and some of the ammunition in these belts was armor piercing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was what? Armor piercing?

General MARTIN. Armor piercing. Others were incendiary, and most of them were tracer, so the destruction of the ships was largely from this strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. You gathered that they even knew the location of ships in the harbor and picked their ship?

General MARTIN. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Picked individual ships as their individual targets?

General MARTIN. In my mind there is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you apprised of the contents of the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, the day that Alert No. 1 was put into operation?

General MARTIN. Well, I am apprised of one message. I did not receive the last message until after all this was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I understand that.

General MARTIN. I am apprised of one message in which he said to take such measures as necessary to prevent subversive effort—words to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there was more in it than that, wasn't there, General?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, there was more in it than that. They said that—

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the whole message?

General MARTIN. I read it, and then it was put in the secret files of the Department.

[327] The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Can you say if that is the message, General (indicating)?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, that is the message. He mentions that—you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary. These measures should be carried out so as not to repeat not to alarm civilian population or disclose intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that shown you, General Martin? Here?

General MARTIN. As I remember, I was called to General Short's office right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Were the staff present?

General MARTIN. My staff?

The CHAIRMAN. No, no. General Short's staff.

General MARTIN. Not that I remember.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean you were called in alone?

General MARTIN. I believe my chief of staff was with me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. And probably General Short's chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. I do not remember exactly as to who was present when I went in, but there were not many.

The CHAIRMAN. And you do not remember at what hour of the day that was? This message, to refresh your memory, was received at 1:16 p. m.

General MARTIN. Well, it was one afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. It was in the afternoon?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And was it the afternoon on which the Alert No. 1 was ordered?

General MARTIN. It was ordered immediately after that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Immediately after?

[328] General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss the significance of that message with the Department Commander?

General MARTIN. Nothing more than he said that we were going into Alert No. 1 right away and that we would prevent—take all necessary precautions against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. It was felt at the time that sabotage was the thing to guard against an attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

General MARTIN. I cannot say. Probably geographical location and the fact that we had no information to the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, between the time that Alert No. 1 was put into effect, which happens to have been November 27, and December 7, did you hear—were you apprised of any other information or any other fears or any other intention to put the command into a more alert position?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I have a message from my own chief, General Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force, which I have brought along with me here I might read.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.

General MARTIN. This was dated November 28 and addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force:

That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department (see paragraph 3 MID SR 30-45). The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once stop. It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following: protection of your [329] personnel against subversive propaganda, protection of all activities against espionage, and protection against sabotage of your equipment, property and establishments stop. This does not repeat this does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures stop. Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security stop.

It is also desired that on or before December 5 this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions stop.

Signed

ARNOLD,
ADAM, *Adjutant General.*

The CHAIRMAN. What is your reply, sir?

General MARTIN. The answer to that was given as follows:

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.:

Following report in compliance with instructions contained in AGWAR 4A4-28: instructions contained in subsequent radiogram issued to all establishments and units under control of Hawaiian Air Force on 29 November stop. Entire subject of protection recently received, and continues to receive, detailed and comprehensive attention as result of these reports prepared by special investigator during June and July 41 stop.

Additional steps initiated specifically to comply with subject radiograms substantially as follows: assembly of intelligence officers of the major subdivisions of Hawaiian Air Force 29 November stop. Personal inspection of stations and activities by Air Force Commander one and two December. Increase in size of guard where desirable stop. Instructions issued to expedite overhauling of pass system, civilian and military, now in progress stop. This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention [330] of sabotage activities stop.

Secrecy discipline being given all emphasis practicable through official and quasi-official agencies stop. Work has actually been begun on essential protective fencing and floodlighting projects stop.

With reference to counter propaganda, the problem is educational rather than regulatory and at present is being dealt with through the medium of squadron talks stop. Need is felt for a War Department publication (possibly in form of

development and extension of forewords suggested, FM21-100) suitably arranged and worded for use of relatively inexperienced personnel, dealing with status of soldier as citizen, ideals and doctrines influencing founders of American government, structure of government, place of military establishment in the structure, national objectives, both domestic and international, together with discussion of those forms of government inimical to democratic form stop.

Signed

MARTIN N.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further communication from your chief after that and before the attack?

General MARTIN. Not that I remember of.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be in your file if you had one?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been in Alert No. 3 would your situation have been bettered to meet this attack?

General MARTIN. Very materially, because our intercept command would have been in operation, and as we were so hard pressed for training our problem here has been impressed on us as one of training. We have a lot of new men and a lot of new equipment, and the intercept command is one that requires specially trained men for the manning table, and we endeavored to train these men as quickly as we could, because the equipment [331] had been set up but recently. And we were working all day long through the week, but on Sunday they were only working from 4 to 7 o'clock. Now, had that been in operation by more skilled operators we would have had sufficient warning so that we could have intercepted before they reached the bomb release line. We did not have enough equipment here, airplanes, to have prevented attack of that intensity, but we could have reduced the effects of the attack very materially.

The CHAIRMAN. Your considered judgment is that even if you had had warning of the attack sufficient to get your ships into action still you had not enough equipment to have entirely prevented damage in Pearl Harbor?

General MARTIN. No, sir, we could not. I make that statement for this reason: that we had but a hundred and one of the P-40 type, which is the later type of pursuit airplane, and, as I remember, 39 of the P-36 type, which is an obsolescent type of pursuit airplane that does not have the requisite fire power. That is not sufficient. In our estimation we should have two fully-equipped groups of pursuit aviation or approximately 200 pursuit airplanes to ward off such attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean 200 fit to take the air?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On notice.

General MARTIN. And I have so recommended. In addition to that, we have had a great deal of trouble with reference to getting the requisite amount of spare parts.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. Of course our program at first, as you know, was one of all-out production.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MARTIN. And then we had to pick up the spare parts later.

[332] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. And while we are getting some spare parts under control now, it hasn't been, and about half of this number of airplanes

we had were out of commission for one reason or another. So we had on the morning of this attack approximately, as I remember, 64 of the P-40 type and—let me refer to my notes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

General MARTIN. I think it was 24 of the other type. (The witness referred to notes.) Twenty of the P-36 type. That would make it about 84, which was less than half of that which would be necessary. Now, of that number we lost about—a large part of our equipment in this attack by being on the ground. But had we been alerted and ready we would have had approximately 80 airplanes ready to meet them.

The CHAIRMAN. General, do you use intoxicating liquor?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not for many years.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on December 6, the evening or night of December 6?

General MARTIN. That was a Friday evening?

The CHAIRMAN. No; it was a Saturday evening.

General MARTIN. Saturday? Oh, yes, Saturday evening. I think I attended a dinner party at the club, at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Schofield Barracks?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

General MARTIN. No, I was not at Schofield Barracks. I was at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Hickam Field. You saw other officers there?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was their condition?

General MARTIN. As to sobriety it was nothing to criticize. They were having a drink now and then.

[333] The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. But no one showed the effects of it.

The CHAIRMAN. When you left could the rest of them have left and taken battle stations with full efficiency? Was there anyone there who wasn't fit to go out and take his command?

General MARTIN. So far as I know there was none, Judge. You will have to qualify that because it's a question that even medical officers would discuss as to the effects of one drink on a man.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, exactly; I understand.

General MARTIN. And a great deal depends on the individual.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARTIN. But I would consider any of them could have taken their positions and put up a good fight, without any question in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. That is what I wanted to know. I think I have no other questions. General McNarney, have you any?

General McNARNEY. Have you the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Air Force?

General MARTIN. That Standing Operating Procedure came out for the Department on the 5th of November, and there were certain changes that had to be made on it. Our staff were working on it, and it had not been published at this time. For the Alert No. 1 we published—(The witness examined documents.) I don't know whether I brought it with me or not. Yes: for Alert No. 1 we published this paper right here (indicating).

General McNARNEY. The Commission has copies of those.

The CHAIRMAN. We have copies of that.

General McNARNEY. We have a copy of that.

The CHAIRMAN. We have a copy all right.

[334] General MARTIN. The purpose of withholding the finished preparation of that report was that we had General Davidson and Major Meehan back on the mainland at a maneuver, and we wanted the value of their experience there to guide us in the preparation of this report.

General McNARNEY. When you were informed by the Commanding General of the Department that Alert No. 1 would go into effect, did you have any reaction or apprehensions that this type of alert was not sufficient to meet the situation as then known to you?

General MARTIN. I must say that I did not.

General McNARNEY. If Alert No. 2 or No. 3 had been put into effect, would it have seriously disrupted your training program?

General MARTIN. Yes, it would, very materially.

General McNARNEY. If under Alert No. 1 it had been the practice to distribute your airplanes in their bunkers and disperse them, would that have seriously disrupted training?

General MARTIN. Not seriously disrupted training; it would have increased the guard very materially, and the Air Force is furnishing the guard, so you would have to take them out of the tactical units in order to increase the guard.

General McNARNEY. Would it have affected maintenance?

General MARTIN. It would, yes.

General McNARNEY. To any considerable extent?

General MARTIN. Our estimate—because we have done that—our estimate is that it is about 25%. We have practiced all these alerts from time to time, had drills on them, and everyone knows how to perform the duties in connection with a specific alert. The men—the airplanes have been dispersed a number of times on Alert No. 2, in simulated Alert No. 2.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 2 what is the state of readiness of your interceptor command?

[335] General MARTIN. The interceptor command is in operation continuously while the alert is on.

General McNARNEY. What is the state of readiness of the actual forces? That is, you probably have one squadron ready to go in four or five minutes?

General MARTIN. Oh, you mean the pursuit forces?

General McNARNEY. Yes, the pursuit forces.

General MARTIN. We have a state of readiness in addition to the alert, you know.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General MARTIN. The state of readiness indicates whether they are all ready, one-fourth ready, one-eighth ready, or whether they are—of course, with a No. 2 you couldn't have the last, which is that training goes on as usual and you have four hours to get to your post.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what the standard procedure is under Alert No. 2? For instance, at dawn how many squadrons would you have ready to go?

General MARTIN. Well, under Alert No. 2 you have to specify the state of readiness, and the state of readiness indicates the number of airplanes that are are ready to go.

General McNARNEY. Well, in your practices under Alert No. 2 would your state of readiness be prescribed?

General MARTIN. Well, we have different ones. Sometimes we have all of them ready, and sometimes we have only a fourth of them ready, and sometimes we would just have one squadron in each group ready.

General McNARNEY. In other words, it depends on the situation existing at the moment?

General MARTIN. It depends upon what we prescribed at the time; there was no set rule for it.

General McNARNEY. You prescribed in accordance with your idea as to the existing situation?

General MARTIN. That is right.

[336] General McNARNEY. You previously mentioned the fact that a large number of airplanes were out of commission. That was true not only in the pursuit but also in the bombers and reconnaissance. Was that primarily due to a lack of spare parts?

General MARTIN. Well, we had a particularly vicious condition in reference to the B-17 bombers that had just come to our attention, and that is in the assembling of these leakproof tanks. The grommets fastening the tanks in position had not been properly placed, and the gasoline had gotten into the ingredient between the two layers of this composition which was supposed to swell up when the gasoline came in contact with it, and it had expanded down into the tank until the capacity of the tank had been very much reduced, and we did not find this until we began to get a red color to the gasoline, and we upon investigation found that about half of the tanks that we removed were so damaged, and reported to the Chief of the Air Corps this condition. We found it at the time when we received instructions to send all of our remaining B-17's to the Philippines, and we asked that we be permitted to delay their departure till the last of the ships in transit, which was granted, and this was for the purpose of getting them in commission, as well as for extending the training, because the few that had a part of the tankage could be used for training missions here. And then we were also changing the engines on those ships so as to insure that the engines on the airplanes, these 12, would have the proper interval between overhaul and inspection to permit their making that transit. So had the transfer been completed we would have had no B-17's at all.

General McNARNEY. Was the Aircraft Warning Service under your control on November 27?

General MARTIN. The what?

General McNARNEY. The Aircraft Warning Service.

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Radar?

[337] General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. When was it placed under your control?

General MARTIN. It has never been placed under our control. It operates—cooperates with the intercept command, which is wrong of course.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it is a component part of the interceptor command?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. I intended to speak to General Short about having it transferred, now that it was in operation, to the control of the Air Force and the intercept command. That is where it belongs.

General McNARNEY. Has it been placed under your command or was it placed under your command after the attack?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not to my knowledge. I knew nothing about that, if it has.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it was after your relief. I think we were told that it was done on December 17.

General MARTIN. I have been in the hospital since last Sunday a week ago, and if it has been done it has been done since probably General Emmons came.

General McNARNEY. Who prescribed the hours of operation for the—

General MARTIN. That was arranged by the intercept command and the chief signal officer or the signal officer having charge of the air warning service company.

The CHAIRMAN. General Davidson is subordinate to you, is he not?

General MARTIN. He is the intercept command. He is the pursuit commander and the intercept commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And in both capacities he is under you?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, if the interceptor command had been organized and integrated it would have been under you; it [338] didn't need to be transferred to you, did it?

General MARTIN. That is perfectly correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, we have had some information, General, that it wasn't activated until December 17, ten days after the attack.

General MARTIN. Oh, it has—as soon as the first stations were in a position so they could operate and we could get personnel trained for that operation, they have been conducting drill in order that they could train additional personnel as rapidly as possible so as to man all the stations, and we finally had six mobile stations but none of the fixed stations. There are supposed to be six fixed stations, which have not been in position and are not in position yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Had there been any emergency requiring continuous operation of one or more of the mobile stations, had you a force at your command then that could have kept those stations operating and reporting to the control room?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir. They were not well trained men, but they were men sufficiently skilled that they could get information to us that would be of value, that we could investigate to find out the facts.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, with your knowledge of the setup, General, if you had been given Alert No. 3 would those mobile stations have been running 24 hours a day?

General MARTIN. They probably would not have run 24 hours a day, but enough of them would have been in operation at any time out of the 24 hours that we could have gotten information. The reason I say that is that if you ran them 24 hours, as we had in the first—

The CHAIRMAN. You play them out?

General MARTIN. We found out that the machinery wears [339] out. So to prolong the life of the machinery we kept enough in operation at all times so that we could get a semblance of information. If we saw something of importance, then we would put the others in.

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me for interrupting you.

General McNARNEY. Would you have had authority on December 6 to order 24-hour operation?

General MARTIN. Would I have had the authority?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General MARTIN. I am sure if I had requested it I could have obtained it.

General McNARNEY. You yourself did not have authority to order operations?

General MARTIN. It was in complete operation, but it hadn't been turned over to the Air Force as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who had it?

General MARTIN. He is talking about the Air Warning Service; aren't you?

General McNARNEY. About the Air Warning Service.

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who had it if you didn't?

General MARTIN. It was under the signal officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

General McCoy. He is not an operating man.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any information on December 6 of the naval patrols that were actually operating?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did the Navy as a matter of course furnish you this information, or if you desired it would you have to go after it?

General MARTIN. They never have furnished us any information as to what they learned from their reconnaissance and [340] search. Had they found something of interest to us, they probably would have done so.

General McNARNEY. After the attack what was the situation?

General MARTIN. After the attack they had very little with which they could work. I, as I told you, had talked to Admiral Bellinger, which is my contact with the Navy, twice during the morning while we were being attacked; and, learning that some of the bombardment planes that were in a state of readiness, could go on a mission, and loaded, had not been assigned a mission, I assigned them myself. There was a mission assigned in the afternoon of that day by Admiral Bellinger, late in the afternoon. I was in the bombardment command post when this message came in: they wanted to search for a carrier which was reported to be about 65 miles north of here, and this was late, so late that it was hardly possible for them to get this information or to see anything before it became too dark, but they went out.

The CHAIRMAN. Who went out?

General MARTIN. The six B-17's, in answer to this request.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

General MARTIN. They did not find anything in that position. I will get the exact time of this in just a minute (examining papers).

Three B-17's went out at fifteen-twenty to eighteen-twenty-five, three hours and five minutes. The bearing was between 165 and 195 degrees. That's from three-twenty to six-twenty-five.

Admiral REEVES. Well, that is not north.

General MCCOY. What is the bearing?

Admiral REEVES. What is the bearing? That bearing is not north, is it?

General MARTIN. 165 to 195. You see the spread in the search [indicating].

[341] Admiral REEVES. Are you referring to compass bearings?

General MARTIN. Sir?

Admiral REEVES. That would be to the southward if you are referring to compass bearings.

General MARTIN. This is an azimuth.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. Wait a minute. You are right. It is not north.

Admiral REEVES. No.

General MARTIN. This is in a southerly direction, south and south-easterly.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. That is the information I had here on this chart that I held. I was sitting there in the office, and they said that they had information that there was a ship 65 miles north of here.

Let me see if I can find anything more on that subject.

[342] General MARTIN. It says 165 to 195. They flew in sight contact with each other on a course between 165 to 170 and about a distance of 70 miles. No enemy contact was made.

This mission was ordered by the Navy.

Admiral REEVES. No flight was sent to the north?

General MARTIN. No, sir. Evidently this is wrong.

The CHAIRMAN. After the 7th, General, were you advised by the Navy what task force they had out scouting and where it was?

General MARTIN. No, sir. We had to seek for that information as we had to know where their ships were, and it was quite difficult to know the position of friendly ships. That has since been arranged, but it was no true at the time or immediately afterward, to identify a signal that would mean whether you could identify the friendly ships, which has since been arranged. You had to go down close to see whether they were friendly or enemy, which is fatal to us.

The CHAIRMAN. It takes too long?

General MARTIN. No, if you get too close you lose your ship from anti-aircraft fire.

Admiral REEVES. The records on the morning of December 7 show that the enemy force proceeded in a northerly direction at 10:27 and 10:29.

General MARTIN. I have spoken to the control officer since then and they said that was the position in which the entry was made that morning which they overlooked and that there was such an entry on the board, but there was no indication of that course being an important one at that time.

Admiral REEVES. That information was not brought to your attention in the morning?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not until they analyzed the history of the control chart.

Admiral REEVES. You said, General, had Alert 2 been in effect it would have seriously interfered with your training. [343] Did you refer to the training that was in progress for ferry service or combat?

General MARTIN. No, sir. I have reference to both, because we had both problems of training here. We were required to train crews to ferry these ships to the Philippines, and we had our problem to get the combat crews trained also, and we had not reached our quota. I am speaking of the bombardiers primarily.

Alert No. 2 requires a certain proportion of the men to always be available for carrying out the mission. As to whether you are in a state of readiness, the proportion of your command which is placed in a state of readiness will affect the training. If it is a serious threat you will have all your men in that state. If no threat is imminent, you may take, say, one squadron of each group.

Admiral REEVES. In Alert No. 2 you would have been obliged to do a certain amount of flying?

General MARTIN. Alert No. 2 means searching as well as flying.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General MARTIN. We would have tried to continue with that particular phase of the matter.

Admiral REEVES. You would have fighter planes in the air?

General MARTIN. No, sir. You do not have the fighter planes in the air because they have such a limited amount of fuel. You can't afford to try it in getting them off in the air on a mission like that because you take the chance of having them out of the fight when the fight comes on.

Admiral REEVES. I do not follow you. I would think that you would have your fighters in the air ready to fight. I do not mean if their gas is exhausted, but you would certainly send fighters up in certain periods of the day.

General MARTIN. It would depend on when the fight came in. [344] If they went on and exhausted their fuel and the fight came on, they would be of no value to you.

Admiral REEVES. But in a state of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, would you keep your fighting planes on the field with the gas tanks full?

General MARTIN. It depends on the situation. Generally speaking you would keep them on the field and make ready to get them off on information issued from the interceptor commander as to the direction of the attack in order that you could intercept that attack before it got to bombing the field.

Admiral REEVES. If you had fighters in the air, they could intercept them quicker than if they were on the ground?

General MARTIN. Yes, that is true.

Admiral REEVES. Therefore, it would seem that the fighters would be in the air on Alert No. 3 or Alert No. 2 at the critical periods protecting against a surprise attack?

General MARTIN. We think it is tactically unsound to do that; our teaching is contrary to that.

Admiral REEVES. You could intercept the attack sooner, don't you think so?

General MARTIN. Yes, if you expedite by contact with the enemy and have enough fuel to carry through to the end, it is very desirable.

Admiral REEVES. So you think in Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3 your training would have been interfered with in aviation?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. If they were engaging in war maneuvers, reconnaissance, fighter tactics, wouldn't all that be useful training?

General MARTIN. I do not get that question.

Admiral REEVES. In Alert No. 2, that does not prevent your carrying out reconnaissance, does it?

[345] General MARTIN. No, sir. In fact, Alert No. 2 means to carry out reconnaissance.

Admiral REEVES. That would be useful training, wouldn't it?

General MARTIN. Yes. The point is, you can't get training for the bombardier. You get training for the pilot and the copilot, but you are getting no training for the bombardier, and the gunners get very little training, and your mission fails if they do not destroy their target.

Admiral REEVES. It is not quite clear to me to what extent a war condition interferes with war training, because war training is a part of war operation. In a condition of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, your planes would have guns and ammunition?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Don't you think, General, that on this Sunday morning, December 7th, if you had been in a condition of Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, that you would have been better off?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You would have been?

General MARTIN. Yes, we would have been much better off.

Admiral REEVES. Even at the sacrifice, in your opinion, of a certain amount of training?

General MARTIN. Yes. If the attack was so imminent as that, you would have to sacrifice everything in order to meet the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Alert No. 3 implies that an attack is imminent?

General MARTIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to sacrifice some training and stay ready?

[346] General MARTIN. Had we gone into Alert No. 2, our information was sufficiently adequate to indicate that we could expect the danger of attack for a certain period and we could carry on a certain amount of training in order to bring additional crews up to combat efficiency.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General MCCOY. Did you consider this an order from Washington to yourself as chief of the air service, for you to take local disposition here when you were under another commander yourself that you give instructions under Alert No. 1?

General MARTIN. No, it was not in accordance with the Department, but it was in full accord with the instructions already issued, practically all instructions here which were already put in force, and there was no discord.

General McCoy. Had you received your orders from the head of the air service in Washington direct?

General MARTIN. I don't remember receiving other orders.

General McCoy. Didn't this surprise you to get an order from the War Department?

General MARTIN. My reaction was I thought they were very much concerned with respect to subversive activities and they wanted to be sure we had the information here and would take steps to counteract it. That was my information.

General McCoy. Did you report that order to General Short?

General MARTIN. Yes, he knows about it.

General McNARNEY. That is the same one General Short received on November 28th which states, "This message is to be sent direct to all air fields."

General MARTIN. I might explain that this message was [347] addressed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, decoded, and he saw the message before I did.

General McNARNEY. The message was sent to the Department Commander?

General McCoy. It was.

I would like to go back to this other dispatch on the 27th. Do you have it there? Is that 472?

The CHAIRMAN. 472.

General MARTIN. 472 on the 27th?

The CHAIRMAN. That is under B?

General McCoy. Yes. Do you have it?

General MARTIN. Yes, I have 472 in front of me.

General McCoy. Tell me again when this was communicated to you in person by General Short.

General MARTIN. He called me to his office in the afternoon before Alert No. 1 went into effect.

General McCoy. In reading that telegram you will notice down about two-thirds of it that it indicated the imminence of hostilities with Japan?

General MARTIN. Yes. It says that if hostilities cannot be avoided that the United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. Is that what you have reference to?

General McCoy. Yes. It says:

This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense prior to hostile Japanese action.

Don't you think that Alert No. 1 did that, did that plainly after what happened, and didn't you think so at the time?

General MARTIN. I have to admit that I did not.

General McCoy. You mentioned an inspector last July. Who was that?

General MARTIN. That was Colonel Burwell, who made an [348] inspection of all our air force activities to determine the possibility of sabotage, and we had taken steps after receiving his report to prevent those things that he thought might happen.

General McCoy. What did he think might happen?

General MARTIN. He was very much concerned about the protection of the B-17's, as he thought they could be sabotaged by men getting near enough to them to interfere with the airplanes or the wires or the

instruments or the controls, and he was concerned about the possibility of incendiary activity and so forth.

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendation about the disposition of the planes themselves?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. What were they?

General MARTIN. In order to protect them against sabotage he recommended that they be brought into close formation or in a small, as small an area as possible, so that they could be more easily guarded. He said this thing of having them in an exposed position was not the best possible protection for them as a man can come up in the night and throw an incendiary bomb into a plane.

General McCoy. That is, having them dispersed in the bunkers?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. He did not call attention to the danger of having them together, as has been shown throughout this war in attacks on airplanes?

General MARTIN. No. That is absolutely the wrong position for airplanes to be in if they are going to be attacked from the air.

General McCoy. I take it, then, that at the time you received this imminent hostilities report, it did not occur to [349] you at that time that it was possible that such an attack as was made could be made?

General MARTIN. No, sir. I will say that we discussed this thing not only among ourselves but with the Navy, and it was the accepted consensus of opinion in the Department and various other departments about the danger of losing any task force of that nature, but on account of the Pacific fleet being in this position, that the opportunity of such an attack was practically nil.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you and the Navy really agreed on that proposition before this war telegram came?

General MARTIN. Yes, not afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General MARTIN. We discussed the possibility of such a surprise attack, and that was the consensus of opinion among everyone that we talked to, which would be anybody who would be taken into our confidence.

General McCoy. After these instructions about Alert No. 1, you were only concerned with sabotage and the protection of your planes on the ground against subversive activities?

General MARTIN. Yes. That was our opinion, to be correct, the thing to do under this condition. We thought the explosion would come from within rather than without as soon as hostilities were declared between the two countries; so on account of living here with these people and knowing the condition with respect to sabotage, we were very alive to that particular situation but not sufficiently sensitive to the other.

General McCoy. Do you know anyone who took the other position?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I do not. Some of the Navy claim that they have now, but they never expressed it in my presence.

[350] The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McCoy. With respect to the Burwell report you mentioned did it envisage at all an attack such as happened here?

General MARTIN. His report was based entirely, General, on sabotage, the possibility of sabotage and the method of preventing it. It increased the guard and watchfulness of communications and passes for individuals and things of that nature. It was all based on that.

General McCoy. Did he make any recommendations about the possibility of an attack that might catch you in this exposed position?

General MARTIN. No, sir, he did not.

General McNARNEY. I have seen that Burwell report. I read it at the hotel before I left Washington. It was particularly concerned with sabotage, and I looked at it and saw what guard measures he had recommended, and I could find no place where he recommended anything except anti-sabotage, and I knew that was in effect, so I was not particularly interested in it.

General McCoy. The reason I brought that up was because I heard of this report and it seems to have a pertinent bearing on the state of mind of General Martin.

General MARTIN. I hate to say it, but we have been thinking of sabotage and not of an attack from the surface.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

General McCoy. I have no other question except one, and this may have been brought out, but in drawing up the air side of Alert No. 1, you were consulted on that?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. And you made no objection to it as a passive defense?

[351] General MARTIN. That is right.

If I say at the end here, it might be interesting to the Board to know that we have submitted here from my headquarters on the 20th of August a plan for the employment of long range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu which requires only 180 long range bombers, and as the allocation of airplanes which I received indicated, they were sending us 180, I think it would accomplish this object, and in my opinion—and my opinion is getting of less value—but this report or this plan, if carried into execution, can give security to this place for approximately half the cost of one battleship so that nothing can get in on the surface; maybe some submarines, but nothing on the surface. If I can, I would like to leave it with you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we would be very glad to have it.

That will be marked as Martin Exhibit No. 1.

General McCoy. I would like to have the Burwell report.

General MARTIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And when it is received it will be marked as Martin Exhibit No. 2.

General MARTIN. You gentlemen are aware of a joint agreement between the Army and the Navy with respect to the air forces?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we are.

I neglected to ask you, considering the state of alert in which you were under orders, what was the performance of your troops when the attack came?

General MARTIN. Justice Roberts, I have never been so proud of men in my life.

The CHAIRMAN. From all I have heard I think that you may well feel that way, General Martin. Your force was practically complete and ready to go on station?

[352] General MARTIN. They were at their stations by the time I got there, so far as I could ascertain. I do not know how they got there so quick. Upon arriving at my office we were then being attacked, and so far as I know, practically every man was on duty.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine. This will be off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. Of course I need hardly say that our inquiry is confidential and we will ask you not to disclose anything that has happened in this room or to discuss it with the men outside.

General MARTIN. I understand that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Call Colonel Powell.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARROLL A. POWELL,
SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. Carroll A. Powell.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel POWELL. Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been here?

Colonel POWELL. I have been on the Island since July 3, 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. In the same capacity?

Colonel POWELL. I was Department Signal Officer for about a month, and then I was relieved by Colonel Van Duzen. He came in August, and the following year, 1940, he left in October, and I was again appointed Department Signal Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been such since 1940?

[353] Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Had the interceptor command been organized in accordance with the Standing Operating Procedure on December 7, 1941?

Colonel POWELL. It had not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose responsible direction were the detector instruments on that day?

Colonel POWELL. They were under my direction, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was planned when you had your system operating satisfactorily that it should be turned over to the interceptor command?

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in a period of training at the time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your period of training was not affected, I take it, by the installation of Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the training had been between the hours of four and seven at the various mobile stations prior to December 7?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. It was just during the daytime or morning, and my previous answer was incorrect. I did not quite understand your question.

At the beginning of Alert No. 1 I was on the mainland at that time.
The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I was with General Davidson. We were going around the country visiting the various interceptor commands there, getting information on how we were going to improve our operations here, and when this Alert No. 1 was put into effect, Colonel Murphy—he was the acting department [354] signal officer in my place—and he told me G-3 gave the order to operate the stations two hours before daylight and one hour after daylight.

When I got back—I got back the 3rd of December—and I saw Colonel Murphy on the 4th, and he reviewed the whole situation for me.

I asked him about that particular point, these orders, and he told me he had received them from G-3, and I said they appeared to me to be satisfactory for the situation on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, was the training sufficiently advanced so that you could get the stations running smoothly, or some of them, every day?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had sufficient personnel trained then to do it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, we had. We were using some of the men 18 hours a day, which is not conducive to good work, but the stations were in position on training and location, and in most stations we are dependent on the men plotting.

The CHAIRMAN. They are the permanent stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You had one at Opana?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was your other mobile station for training?

Colonel POWELL. I can tell you on the map. We had one here at the peak (indicating on map). Then we had one over here at Waianae.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about the center, along the western shore?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That was covering the sector from here (indicating) up through here and down to here, because these mountains will obstruct it.

[355] Then we had one at Fort Shafter, in the back here, and that would only cover the sector down through here.

Then we had one at Koko Head. That was covering this sector here. We felt that should give us the most protection here through this area (indicating).

Then we had one over here about Kaaawa.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was approximately in the center of the east coast?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, that covers down to here, right here. Then we had this Opana station, and then we had one at Kawaiaea. That was over here and down through here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. You were training at all these stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. While it may have been difficult in view of your training to get every one of these stations running 24 hours a day, you could have had such stations going 24 hours a day?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, but there are not enough here to give you clear protection all the way down, because you have to shut down your machines for mechanical difficulties and repair them, and the generating plants which have been running quite successfully, but

they don't stand a 24-hours operation very long. They are only emergency sets, and we did not put the permanent power in from the Hawaiian Electrical Company for the reason we believed they were just temporary training stations, but thereafter we made progress with them, and we are putting them in now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the temporary stations?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we are putting power in these temporary stations.

The CHAIRMAN. You are?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, until we get the permanent stations in. Opana will be a permanent station also.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a member of the staff of this department?

[356] Colonel POWELL. Yes, I am department signal officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you apprised of the contents of a War Department message of November 27, 1941, that came in the same time Alert No. 1 was ordered?

Colonel POWELL. I was not here, sir, at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. I forgot. You were on the mainland?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If anyone would be apprised from your branch of the service, it would be Colonel Murphy?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing was said to you about the reason for the alert?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. All I know was what I read in the papers on the mainland on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the evening of December 6?

Colonel POWELL. I think I was at my home.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were at your home on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They called me up.

The CHAIRMAN. The first information you had was when they called you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your living quarters?

Colonel POWELL. Down in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. In the city?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General MCCOY. With respect to that message from the War Department—

General McNARNEY. Before we leave that, did you have any system of ground observers in the aircraft warning system?

Colonel POWELL. No, we do not think there is any need for ground observers here. That was borne out in the air [357] observations on the mainland at the interceptor command exercises in Seattle. The observers can't see any more or can't see as much as our detectors can. The distances are so short that before the observers can get anything, the planes are away.

General McNARNEY. If you had observers on the outlying islands, wouldn't that have afforded some protection?

Colonel POWELL. That would have meant a radio phone call here to give us that information because there are no cables between the various islands, and the only way is by radio phone.

General McNARNEY. It would have been comparatively simple to equip them with radio phones, would it not?

Colonel POWELL. Well, your answer would be the answer to that, but as I say, we were in a state of training, not worrying about detectors on the other islands.

General McNARNEY. Maybe I can make it clear this way: What system of aircraft warning service did you have prior to the time you received your mobile detector sets?

Colonel POWELL. We had none. There was no system before for covering anything.

General McNARNEY. Was there any system planned?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is another subject that I would like to ask you about.

Admiral STANDLEY. If I may?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to your schedule, you say the schedule of four to seven went into effect on Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Colonel POWELL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was ordered as a part of Alert No. 1?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

[358] Admiral STANDLEY. You would have a schedule from four to seven?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to that, did you have any regular schedule for the period of training?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, it is quite difficult to get the people trained and we would have to take the individual sets and put the men out and train them, and that report came to our information station, but we probably started in the morning, probably about nine o'clock, and worked until eleven one day, and probably in the afternoon, or we would have arrangements with the air corps to send out a fleet, and if they came in we could go out and practice. It was just a practice condition. It was practice.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were here on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. On that morning, that Sunday morning, had there been any special orders changing the routine as a skeleton organization after seven o'clock, or was there any change in that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, no change.

The CHAIRMAN. The standing order of four to seven was in effect?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, four to seven was in effect.

General MCCOY. This pick-up which occurred was just a routine training thing?

Colonel POWELL. It was just a routine training thing.

General MCCOY. As I remember, the station had closed down and one of them stayed down there operating on his own?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. All the men are all keen about this thing. It is to me an interesting thing, and the men are all keen and anxious to learn all about these sets, especially the operators of them. It is almost fantastic the way these things [359] operate, and the

men are all anxious to learn about them. This particular one wanted to work longer to get more training, because we were to put control sets on the other islands, and he wanted, I suppose, to become one of the operators on the other islands. That he did not say but that is what they were working for, to be able to operate those sets on the other islands.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to ask you about your radio communications with the War Department. Was it the practice of the War Department to go on the air at any particular time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have general schedules with them and we are on the air all the time and they are on the air all the time. They can shift to us any time and call us.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you make any inquiry to discover whether there was an attempt to call you on the morning of December 7th?

Colonel POWELL. There was no record in our department.

The CHAIRMAN. In the office?

Colonel POWELL. There is no record.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no record of an attempt to get you?

Colonel POWELL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any peculiar weather or atmospheric conditions on that morning that you know of which would have prevented the War Department getting through to you?

Colonel POWELL. I can't answer that question, but I will find out.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I wish you would find out whether there was any difficulty in getting to you or anything preventing you from receiving on that morning, and if so, what the difficulty was.

[360] Colonel POWELL. This is on December 7th?

The CHAIRMAN. This was the morning of December 7th from, let us say, five to eight.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As chief signal officer, do you know whether the War Department in Washington has used the RCA commercial circuit?

Colonel POWELL. Occasionally they use it to cable.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the occasion for their using the commercial cable? If they could not get through to you?

Colonel POWELL. As a general rule. We relay from 'Frisco. The RCA may have had access through a certain frequency which we did not have, and they gave it to them and sent through 'Frisco.

The CHAIRMAN. You do this only in case your own Army radio is not working properly?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, that is my understanding.

General McCoy. Or it might be loaded?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, it might be loaded in Washington sending to other places and our not being loaded.

General McCoy. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a limit to the load?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I might have all the load I can handle because I relay all traffic from Manila, and I have my own men to take care of that situation, to report and read the message and then retransmit to Manila. I handle that traffic and refile that traffic to Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. That gives me a thought. Would there be a record here of your having handled a message for Manila that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the same sense and in the same verbiage as the message they got here through RCA?

[361] Colonel POWELL. Yes. However, that would be in code.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind whether it is in code. You would forward it in the same code?

Colonel POWELL. We can decode it.

The CHAIRMAN. You would forward it in the same code?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have a record here showing you re-forwarded a message that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Please get it for me.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a telephone communication direct with the chief of staff in this building?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and it is in the Aliamanu Crater.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether the War Department was familiar with the fact that the Federal Bureau of Investigation had a direct radio line from Honolulu to the F. B. I. headquarters in Washington? Did you know of that fact?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not.

You say a direct telephone line?

The CHAIRMAN. No, a radio.

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps neither did the War Department know it.

Colonel POWELL. I would probably have known about it. I should have known about it, because they could probably have relieved some of our load.

The CHAIRMAN. The fact is, there is a communication line to the central F. B. I. office from Mr. Shivers' office here, and you did not use it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not know it existed, because I am in charge of the messages and the only other people I ever used are the Navy.

[362] The CHAIRMAN. The Navy had a radio communication to Washington?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They communicated direct to Washington.

General MCCOY. I would like to follow that dispatch that arrived here but was not delivered until the afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. The dispatch of the 7th which was delivered to the Department Commander on the afternoon of the 7th.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that go through your office?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For what purpose?

Colonel POWELL. For delivery and decoding.

The CHAIRMAN. When it was brought over, it was sent from Washington at what time?

Colonel POWELL. I would have to get the message on that. It would be after midnight.

General MCCOY. I thought he could describe the message.

Colonel POWELL. No, I have not got that here. The messages are in our secret files.

General McCoy. Do you know what message we are talking about?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I am in charge of messages and I investigated that because the chief of staff asked me to see what it was. Do you want our copy of the message?

The CHAIRMAN. That will be contained in the code room in Washington as to the date of delivery?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, that only gives us the date and hour that it was delivered to the RCA in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have it.

Colonel POWELL. It would merely show the time it was received by the RCA in Honolulu.

General McCoy. Can you tell us what happened after it got to the RCA office in Honolulu?

[363] Colonel POWELL. I investigated that and the message shows it was received here at 7:33 a. m. in Honolulu. It was delivered by a messenger. He brought it out here along with a lot of personal messages. We handle all messages from RCA, and we put them out on our own delivery system for delivery to the various outlying posts. That is a service we give to the officers because otherwise these personal messages would not be delivered until the next day.

He brought this message out and left it here, and on that particular message he did not get a receipt for it; so therefore there is no record of the actual time of delivery that we can show except what the young man says.

He says he found it there about 11:55 laying with a bunch of messages that had been delivered to the office by this messenger who had left RCA some time that morning.

He got by the boy because he was rushing a message for the Commanding General which he delivered, and as he came back the messenger was there, and he was kidding him for having this red circle on his arm, and he said he had better take that off or somebody might take him for a Japanese. That is how he knows that boy did deliver that message.

General McCoy. Do you know what time it was received downtown?

Colonel POWELL. Seven thirty-three in the morning.

General McCoy. Do you know approximately from this reliance on your man's memory of this incident about what time it was delivered here?

Colonel POWELL. About eleven-thirty.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the messenger been interrogated about it?

Colonel POWELL. I only investigated the men here.

The CHAIRMAN. Your own men?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. There was considerable excitement around at the time, so I didn't get down to the code room [364] until two o'clock. It was decoded and delivered at three o'clock to the Adjutant General.

The CHAIRMAN. We had better see it.

Colonel POWELL. Do you want a photostatic copy?

General McCoy. I do not know whether it is necessary to see it, because they will have a full account in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very important message.

General McCoy. Yes, I think it is a very important message. I think we had better have it.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you bring a copy of it?

Colonel POWELL. This message had taken us an hour to go through the code machine and had to be played back to make sure it is accurate, so it was about a half hour that we spent in decoding it.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, would it take longer to encode it than to decode it?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It should be about the same time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. If you lost an hour in coding it, you would say that the scrambled phone would have been much better?

Colonel POWELL. Absolutely, yes. I think that is what caused them to inquire. I don't know what time the message came in, but they inquired of me where the message was, and that is how I found out where it had gotten lost.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such, Colonel; that we feel it necessary that you should not refer to your testimony here.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or anything that occurred in this room, and do not discuss your testimony here with any person.

[365] Colonel POWELL. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT H. DUNLOP, ADJUTANT GENERAL DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name, Colonel?

Colonel DUNLOP. Robert H. Dunlop.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Colonel DUNLOP. Colonel, Adjutant General Department. I am Adjutant General.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have been for how long?

Colonel DUNLOP. Since the first of last June.

The CHAIRMAN. As such, sir, do you have any records for us which indicate the absences or the complement of forces which were on hand on the morning of December 7, 1941? Let me make myself clear. We thought perhaps you could give us some approximation of whether there were a vast number of leaves in the force when the attack occurred on Pearl Harbor, or whether the forces were practically intact when the attack took place.

Colonel DUNLOP. They were practically intact. The only men who were absent were, I would say, very few, due to the proximity of the center of population in the Island of Oahu. For instance, most officers, or especially the men, might go to Honolulu, but in a little after twelve o'clock there is no place for them to stay with the exception of possibly—well, I would say 50 out of my department spending the night on the island of Oahu, and they go to a place like Pawaa, a cabaret, but they don't stay there.

In order that I might get the information I have prepared a radio this morning and sent it out to the echelons, the stations, and so on, to get a reply at ten o'clock tomorrow morning, sir. It states:

[366] Estimated percentage of strength your command who were present for duty at zero eight hundred comma seven December forty one will be radioed or otherwise submitted this headquarters not later than ten hundred comma twenty five December nineteen forty one period for the purpose of this report personnel absent on pass will not repeat not be considered present for duty.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the records at the various commands will be adequate to supply that information?

Colonel DUNLOP. I am not sure about that, sir, because there are so many, and a great many of the well behaved soldiers have their good conduct cards, and they go out, and there could be a number that might not be there the next morning. Now, whether the first sergeant is going to know about it the next morning at eight o'clock or not is problematical, but I do not expect to get actual figures. I did not ask for any figures, but just a percentage.

The CHAIRMAN. You think those percentages can be given and that they will be approximately correct?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes. There won't be any great absenteeism because they would be home the night before.

The CHAIRMAN. Do most civilian amusements in Honolulu close down at midnight?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes. The sale of liquor stops at twelve o'clock and there may be a few places, the Swanky Franks, and such, that run after, but the soldiers begin to go home, and the sailors too. They go home in great numbers after that.

Of course there was a payday in there. We have staggered pay-days, but they had some paid, but I could hold up my hand and really say that I do not believe there were any great absentees at eight o'clock the next morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir?

[367] Colonel DUNLOP. I was here in the post. Yes, I went to the movies at Fort Armstrong. I came back and got a message for the chief of staff and gave it to him before I went to bed.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any disorder in town that night, Saturday?

Colonel DUNLOP. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any signs of drunkenness or carousing?

Colonel DUNLOP. No, sir, I didn't notice anybody out here at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there some soldiers on the street?

Colonel DUNLOP. As usual, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This was Saturday night?

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your observation with respect to sobriety or the contrary among the officers and men in this Department?

Colonel DUNLOP. I have not noticed any excessive drinking among the soldiers, any more than any place in the service, or during my service. I very seldom see a drunken officer. As I stated before, the only time that I ever saw a drunken officer was the occasion of the annual alumni dinner at West Point, and this was about three o'clock in the morning, and maybe I didn't have any business being at the club at that time. Officers do not get drunk any more, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am glad to hear that.

Colonel DUNLOP. I mean, as a general thing.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Any further questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Colonel, we desire that no communication of what goes on in this room shall be made, and your testimony shall not be discussed with anyone.

[368] **Colonel DUNLOP.** It shall not be mentioned, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** If you care to, you can send the summary that you get in answer to your radio to Mr. Howe, our Recorder, who will incorporate it in the record. He will give you his address at the hotel.

Colonel DUNLOP. Yes, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Call Lieutenant Tyler.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KERMIT A. TYLER, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The **CHAIRMAN.** Will you state your full name, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant TYLER. Kermit A. Tyler.

The **CHAIRMAN.** And your rank?

Lieutenant TYLER. First Lieutenant, sir.

The **CHAIRMAN.** What was your assignment prior to December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was assigned to the Eighteenth Pursuit Squadron.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Were you at any special duty on or about December 7, 1941?

Lieutenant TYLER. My special detail was pursuit officer at the interception control board, Fort Shafter.

• The **CHAIRMAN.** That is right here on this reservation?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Tell us all that happened that Sunday morning.

Lieutenant TYLER. On Sunday morning I reported, in compliance with my instructions, to the interception control board, at four o'clock in the morning. There was no activity observed on the board, as near as I remember, until, I suppose, 6:10 or thereabouts. At that time a number of plots or indications, some arrows, appeared on the board to show that there was aircraft flying around the islands. I noted that there [369] was one in the vicinity south of Kauai and there was also one south of Molokai shortly after seven o'clock in the morning at a distance of—I think it was—130 miles north of Oahu. A couple of plots appeared on the board.

This activity gradually increased in the general direction of the Island. I think it was just about seven o'clock.

All the plotters that put these arrows on the board folded up their equipment—they have headsets to receive their information—and folded up their equipment and went out to breakfast. All the rest did as they were doing.

At that time, just prior to this folding up, I noted that there was a man on the drafting board and was completing this thing. I did

not know what he was doing. I asked him what his job was, as to what he was doing, and he told me he makes a historical record of the plots that appear on the board. In other words, if they were practicing something, generally to find out what it was so that we can trace it back.

I don't remember that these two plots north of the Island were on the main board. They were some distance out, but I know they were on the drafting board, because I saw they were side by each.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this the plot (handing a document to Lieutenant Tyler)?

Lieutenant TYLER. This does not look to me like the one, but it may have been.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, at any rate, it was a plot something like that?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the idea of the plot?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you looked at it you saw what?

Lieutenant TYLER. I saw those two little plots. It was right after that that the operator, or all the fellows and [370] this draftsman also left.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do anything about the plots?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I had previously only once seen the board in operation, and it looked to me like the usual thing. I had seen just the same setup on the board, saw these plots all over the place, and I had no reason to suspect, so far as I am concerned, that there was anything irregular going on.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought these might be friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir. That is my thought. I did not know they were anything else. I thought that is what they could be, or possibly some friendly craft.

About seven-twenty the operator from Opana contacted the station.

The CHAIRMAN. You were still in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, I was detailed from four to eight a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Why would you stay there after the headset operators had left?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, I was detailed to be there those hours, so I just stayed.

The CHAIRMAN. And you stayed?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes. About seven-twenty, I believe, the operator of the Opana radio direction finding station told me that he had followed these plots and that there was a large number of aircraft, he thought.

Well, perhaps I should have done something. I don't know, but it seemed to me that there was still nothing irregular, that they probably might be friendly craft. So I thought about it for a moment and said, "Well, don't worry about it," and went back awaiting the hour and time until the next relief.

At about between ten and five minutes of eight I heard some noise outside and went out to see what was going on, and saw what I thought to be Navy bombers in bombing practice over [371] at Pearl Harbor. Thereafter I heard a few bursts of antiaircraft fire.

About a little after eight Sergeant Starry from Wheeler Field called me and said, "There is an attack at Wheeler Field," and I told

the operator to remain on duty, so I immediately told him to recall the plotters and receivers of this information.

They came back and it was at about that time that Major Tindal, one of the controllers, came in and took charge of the situation.

From then on I just assisted him in communications and whatever I could do. I still did not know very much about the setup because of my first experience.

The CHAIRMAN. You attempted to trace back the Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. They were plotted, I believe, on this historical record. I did not oversee it, because there was quite a bit going on and it was lots doing.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the impression that they did trace the planes going to the north after the attack?

Lieutenant TYLER. The stations were all operating. The plotters were there; so I thought the operators certainly got them.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, was the information that these stations received, which was coordinated at the control room, to your knowledge transmitted by telephone to the air force so as to direct the air force to get the pursuit planes in the air after the air bombardment? The stations were kept running in tracing these Japanese planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir, as soon as the call was made.

The CHAIRMAN. No one from the control room would have sent to the particular officer of the air force whatever information you got?

[372] Lieutenant TYLER. I did not personally call anyone.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they send any command there?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was the only officer there, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, until Major Tindal got there.

The CHAIRMAN. When did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. Eight-fifteen or eight-twenty.

The CHAIRMAN. Then when you started to trace the receding planes, didn't Major Tindal call up the air force base, to your knowledge, and direct them, tell them in which direction they had gone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I don't know that. Major Bergquist and Major Tindal were really in charge, as they had training on the mainland and were working with the installation.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were more or less an observer after that?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is correct, yes.

General McCoy. Was there any other officer there at that time?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir. I was the only officer there until the Major came or it may have been a signal corps officer before that, but I don't know. He didn't have anything to do.

General McCoy. Didn't you transmit this information of the plotted planes to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Why not?

Lieutenant TYLER. The historical record was there, and I felt if they had anything left to fight with, it would be there to use. As a matter of fact, it didn't occur to me to do anything about it at the time, sir. I was so confused with the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you perhaps misunderstood General McCoy's question. As I understand your testimony, it was that [373] before you knew of the actual attack you thought that this was a normal movement of friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore you did not communicate with anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. That is right. I communicated with no one.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you would have if you had thought these were enemy planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you know of the coming in of the friendly planes from the mainland?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir, I did not. However, I suspected they were coming because as a matter of fact on coming to work from two-thirty to four I heard the station so I thought these were B-17's coming in, and that confused me still more.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought they were friendly planes?

Lieutenant TYLER. I thought they were off course and that they were maybe working out some problem, and it confused me.

The CHAIRMAN. And on this particular morning the Navy may have had a task force in that neighborhood?

Lieutenant TYLER. The movement of the Navy was usually secret, more so than we are, sir. I do not know what they are doing.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there is a closer liaison between the Army and the Navy than there was before December 7th with respect to the direction and location of Navy scouting forces?

Lieutenant TYLER. I do not know that, sir. That is under bombardment. I am in pursuit, so I do not know that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not under your province?

[374] Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McCoy. You are attached to the detector service?

Lieutenant TYLER. I worked for two days after the raid and then I went to the subordinate unit at Wheeler Field and worked there up until another week, and I was on flight patrol with my pursuit squadron for four days after that. I am now back down here. I have been here for three days working in the control unit.

The CHAIRMAN. You are in the control room?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. Was there a controller on duty that Sunday morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Major Tindal was one of the controllers.

General McNARNEY. What time did he get there?

Lieutenant TYLER. He got there at eight-twenty.

General McNARNEY. I mean prior to that time, before 7 a. m.?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was no controller there then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were you acting both as controller and as pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. Well, sir, I did not know what my duties were. I just was told to be there and told to maintain that work.

General McNARNEY. That is your experience as controller or pursuit officer, or did you have any experience?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had once previously seen this being made around the Island. We walked through the installation and had the situation explained to us.

General McNARNEY. You had no experience as controller or pursuit officer?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed once before as pursuit officer.

[375] General McNARNEY. You really had no conception of what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I had very little, sir.

General McNARNEY. This was purely a practice run, to your knowledge?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. There was actually no one stationed in readiness that morning, the 7th, Sunday?

Lieutenant TYLER. No.

General McNARNEY. There was nothing in readiness?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you report afterward any of these plots to anyone?

Lieutenant TYLER. I reported, sir, I believe, to Major Tindal. This may be all wrong, but I know someone asked, "Why didn't we plot this thing?" and I remember reporting in the confusion to, I think it was, Major Tindal or Major Bergquist, and I think General Short also saw me, but I can't think what it was, and I told someone, and I think he gave it to him.

Admiral REEVES. Who detailed you to this duty?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed by order of the Fourteenth Pursuit Wing operations officer, who is Major Bergquist.

Admiral REEVES. He did not tell you what you were to do there or what your duties were?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was instructed to become acquainted with the situation, and the previous Wednesday I had reported there for duty, and there was an operator there, and I called and he said, "We are getting this in Saturday and we have to have someone there," and I was looking around finding out what I could do.

Admiral REEVES. How long have you been in the air service in the Army?

[376] Lieutenant TYLER. Four years and two months, sir.

Admiral REEVES. No other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. You say you were detailed from four to eight that morning?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. If nothing had happened in the ordinary course of events, would you have stayed for relief at eight o'clock?

Lieutenant TYLER. I believe there was another relief detailed, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you don't know?

Lieutenant TYLER. The thing seemed to be that it was shifted because I was previously detailed Saturday afternoon, and then it was shifted to Sunday, and I don't know whether we had any detail scheduled or not, so far as there was relief.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about on Wednesday?

Lieutenant TYLER. I was detailed on Wednesday from twelve thirty to sixteen hundred—four o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you relieved then?

Lieutenant TYLER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The station closed?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. In other words, this was just a drill?

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes.

General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, our inquiry is such that we will ask you not to discuss the testimony that has been given here by you or anything said while you have been in the room. Do not discuss it with anyone.

Lieutenant TYLER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will take a recess for a few minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

[377] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name?

Major BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist.

The CHAIRMAN. Your rank?

Major BERGQUIST. Major, Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your assignment here?

Major BERGQUIST. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.

General McNARNEY. What particular position in the Interceptor Command?

Major BERGQUIST. I am the operations officer of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As such have you to do with the Warning Service?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your particular assignment now?

Major BERGQUIST. My assignment includes the operations of the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, a part of which is the operational control of the Aircraft Warning Service.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When was that interceptor service set up as outlined in the Operating Procedure? What date? We have been told December 17; is that about right?

Major BERGQUIST. That is the date that the Hawaiian Interceptor Command, as that name, was ordered, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, what was being done with the devices for warning on and before December 7, 1941?

Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a regular service to the Department?

Major BERGQUIST. We were setting up the information center, sir, and I was working at that most of the time to get that functioning.

The CHAIRMAN. And how much were you operating your [378] detecting devices each day?

Major BERGQUIST. We were operating them from 4 in the morning a week prior to this, sir. We were operating them from 4 in the morning until 11 in the morning. Four to seven was as ordered by, I believe, a verbal order from the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department, and from 7 to 11 we were operating them for the purpose of calibrating the instruments and training our pursuit pilots in interception.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was what period?

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Admiral STANDLEY. What period was that?

The CHAIRMAN. That was from 7 to 11.

Admiral STANDLEY. Seven to eleven?

Major BERGQUIST. Seven—

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but what period? What period of days?

The CHAIRMAN. A week.

Major BERGQUIST. That schedule was approximately taking in a week before and previous to that.

The CHAIRMAN. A week before the 7th?

Major BERGQUIST. Sir, previous to that we were operating them during the period 7 to 12, I believe it was, sir, and also two or three hours in the afternoons.

Admiral STANDLEY. In addition from 4 to 7?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In other words, were attempting to get the sets calibrated and get all our personnel trained.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you know why the order was during this week prior to December 7 that you should operate from 4 to 7 a. m. each day?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not, sir. The Hawaiian Interceptor Command was not set up. Therefore, the Aircraft Warning Service was operating directly under the Department signal officer, and we had no control whatsoever over it, but we were [379] as a matter of cooperation and coordination operating, and the period 4 to 7 was ordered for the detector stations but for nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. And you operated, therefore, on the morning of Sunday, December 7, from 4 to 7?

Major BERGQUIST. The detector stations were operating at that time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of training, or what?

Major BERGQUIST. On Sunday morning, sir, I would say as a matter of compliance with the order. On the weekday mornings, other mornings, they were, in addition to compliance with that, operating as a matter of training, and I also had assigned watch officers during those periods in order to train them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was Lieutenant Tyler one of the men you assigned as a watch officer?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. That was done just on the part of the wing on my own hook, so to speak. We were not required to do that, but—

The CHAIRMAN. You were not?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would have operated the service?

Major BERGQUIST. As far as I can see, sir, they would have just operated with the Aircraft Warning Service personnel. They would have had no Air Corps officers there, but I took it upon myself to have these watch officers assigned as long as those stations were required to operate, so that I could train my officers in the system.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore Tyler was sent up and other officers were sent up to get familiar with the things?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that about the size of it?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. I had a roster of officers. I published a roster of officers.

[380] The CHAIRMAN. Who were to go up there in turn?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And various times. You would not expect Tyler to know very much about the whole thing, would you?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I just hadn't had time to get around to all officers that were on this roster. I was trying to teach as many as I could, to acquaint them with the system.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, I take it that Tyler had no duty, so to speak, there, of communication or warning or anything of that kind, had he? Or what was his function?

Major BERGQUIST. My instructions, sir, were verbal to these officers: that they were to go down there during the times I specified, acquaint themselves with the whole setup as far as they possibly could, and if anything went wrong they were to notify me.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what do you mean by "anything went wrong"?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, in an emergency they should have notified me.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if Tyler had been conscious that what was being recorded in front of his eyes was a flight of enemy airplanes he should have called you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was it likely that Tyler would identify this flight as enemy planes?

Major BERGQUIST. I don't believe so, sir, due to the fact that we had not had the Navy liaison position manned so that we could know the movements of the naval air forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. And so it was logical for him to assume that there probably was a friendly carrier up in that area operating their planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, had there been a Navy liaison officer [381] there, on the earlier days prior to Sunday, December 7?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. We were trying to get that arranged, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That hadn't been set up?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So it was not unnatural that there was no Navy officer there that morning?

Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that right?

Major BERGQUIST. That's right, sir. We had a meeting on the 24th of November of coast officers and representatives from the Navy in order to try to get an interceptor command—or interceptor information center, rather—operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. And ironically we said—I have the notes on that meeting—and we said that we had hoped to get everything operating within a period of two weeks, and I think that was just about two weeks to the day that we had the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And therefore you hadn't notified the Navy that things were running so now that there would be a regular routine whereby a Navy officer could be there as liaison officer? I say, you hadn't sent them that notice yet? Or had you?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. Commander Taylor who was loaned to the Army by verbal arrangement to help with this setup, had contacted the Commander-in-Chief's staff, I would say, approximately on the 24th, thereabouts, sir, and had asked for liaison officers to be assigned.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. But they had not been assigned, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, it was contemplated that when your staff had been properly trained and you had your liaison arranged and established with the Navy this communication center would be run under regular orders and that the information would be released to the Army and Navy as received?

[382] Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. On the 24th of November we wanted to expand every effort to get it operating on a 24-hour-a-day basis.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't run these little mobile stations that much a day, could you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, we can. They are operated by an auxiliary power unit.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Major BERGQUIST. And we had also made arrangements and asked the signal officer at that time to bend every effort to get us commercial power put in at these positions, which he said he was going to do, but in the meantime they could be operated by these engines.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. They would wear out pretty fast if you ran them?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, the main difficulty was the gasoline engines that ran the generators.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

Major BERGQUIST. They were subject to failure on occasions, but they could be operated.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there had been an emergency whereby it became critical to sweep the seas with these detectors around Oahu you think you could have arranged, subject to breakdowns, to run a 24-hour detector?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had enough personnel to work it out, did you?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know why you were instructed to run a regular tour of three hours daylight or dawn, do you?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, you see, when you say why I was, I mean I wasn't in the organization that was ordered to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Which organization was ordered to do it?

[383] Signal corps?

Major BERGQUIST. It was the Aircraft Warning Service company which operated directly under the Department signal officer, and we were just cooperating with them on the basic principles.

The CHAIRMAN. Until the time would come for you to take it over as part of the Interceptor Command?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. If you had been operating on a wartime basis how many pursuit officers would be present in the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. There would be a controller and a pursuit officer, both of which would be flying officers of the Air Corps.

General McNARNEY. Had you a trained controller?

Major BERGQUIST. I considered myself trained as a controller, sir, and also Commander Tyler or Major Tindal; any one of the three of us could have taken over controller, as we did after the attack.

General McNARNEY. None of the three were present that Sunday morning prior to the attack?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, not prior to the attack.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any trained pursuit officers?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You were training Tyler as a pursuit officer?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. May I retract that? One officer who I know could have been considered a trained pursuit officer was at Wheeler Field.

General McNARNEY. If you had been in condition Alert No. 2, how many squadrons would you have had in the first [384] degree of readiness at the hour of the attack?

Major BERGQUIST. That being the dawn period, sir, we would have had all available squadrons on the alert. When I say "on the alert," I mean that all the planes are in the dispersed position, the pilots are in a tent or dugout near their planes, with their flying equipment on ready at a moment's notice to jump in their planes and get off. In other words, it would take them from the time they were ordered off from one to three minutes before they would be in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean your engines would be warmed up?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, and there would be a man sitting in the cockpit. As soon as the signal came he would start the engine. In the meantime the pilot would slip his parachute on and jump in the plane.

General McNARNEY. During your maneuvers here what was the rendezvous of the pursuit that took off on the dawn period?

Major BERGQUIST. We have initial points around the Island which we have had for—I think I made them up about approximately two years ago now, initial points. In other words, this Island being rather roughly a square shape, each corner of the Island plus one point in the middle—I can enumerate them for you, sir, or show you them on a map.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a map right behind you.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. Kahuku Point is Affirm or Point A. That is phonetic. Ulupau Head is Point Baker. Koko Head is Point Cast. Hickam Field is Point Dog. Barbers Point is Point Easy. Waianae parenthesis City—Waianae City—is Point Fox. Kaena Point is Point George. Haleiwa is Point Hypo. Wheeler Field is Point William.

In other words, the system that we have been operating on for the past two years is that if we get a warning of an enemy coming from any direction, if I knew the general direction it is coming from the system was to immediately dispatch pursuit to the initial point nearest

to the approach of the [385] enemy, and then while they were getting there and gaining their altitude, then from the information I had I would try to figure out their course for collision, interception. That was prior to the operation of the Radar. Our system now is, with the Radar plot we also will plot our own pursuit, and we can direct them right from the board by giving them course changes following their plot.

General McNARNEY. You still get them off to initial point, though?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. During your practices how was the radio communication between you and the patrol in the air?

Major BERGQUIST. Fair, sir. Not good.

General McNARNEY. Not good?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. That has been one of the worst things over here, is the radio communications.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the matter with it?

Major BERGQUIST. The transmitters in the airplanes are too weak, and the transmitters we have had on the ground are too weak, but we now have, I believe, a satisfactory system right now, because we have some stronger transmitters.

General McNARNEY. If the information center had been in operation the controller would give the order for take-off, or the pursuit officer?

Major BERGQUIST. The controller would tell the pursuit officer to order so many squadrons off and tell them where to send them.

General McNARNEY. And the controller determines the number of pursuit that takes off?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. The controller, being the more experienced officer,—

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. —determines that, and the pursuit [386] officer is really just a method of transmitting information?

Major BERGQUIST. More or less, yes, sir. He helps the controller.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Major BERGQUIST. He is really the assistant controller, but normally he just operates to direct—to carry out the orders of the controller.

General McNARNEY. The controller has the mike in his hands; he can talk direct into the air then?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You speak of arriving on the morning of the 7th at the center. At what time did you arrive there?

Major BERGQUIST. I did not arrive there, sir, until approximately 10 o'clock, 10:15. The first thing I did was to try to get an organization at Wheeler Field of what we had left, to get the squadrons organized into—I mean even if we had to disband one squadron and take the airplanes we had left and organize them into an air unit. Actually control is centered at Wheeler. That is, this is merely a relay point, because we had most of our squadrons at Wheeler. Get them—be sure that that was operating. I directed the signal officer to check all our lines, and as soon as I had finished that then I immediately started out for the information center at Shafter.

General McCoy. Did Lieutenant Tyler bring to your attention this peculiar plotting that would have indicated the approach of the enemy planes?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I had no inkling that he even saw a plot.

General McCoy. When did you discover that?

Major BERGQUIST. The next day, sir.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the fact that it was important to follow these planes out to their aircraft [387] carrier?

Major BERGQUIST. I should have been, sir. I was not that morning.

General McCoy. So that nothing was done toward following them out?

Major BERGQUIST. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing was done, no directions were given from the control room, the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir. I believe that Major——

The CHAIRMAN. The operator?

Major BERGQUIST. Major Tindal was there operating.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you mean you don't know what he did, or you do know?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not know what he did up to the time I got there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. After you got there what was done?

Major BERGQUIST. It is not clear in my mind exactly. I cannot give the sequence of what I did. The only thing I can say is that I immediately went to work and tried to get everything functioning properly. I went from one position to the other in an attempt to make it function.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose your crews for your stations had all disbanded and gone?

Major BERGQUIST. They were called back, sir, at the time of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And went back to their stations at the mobile units?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. In fact, they have those base camps near there, their stations.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

General McCoy. What were they called back for?

Major BERGQUIST. Well, as soon as we knew that we had been attacked, from then on we were on 24-hour-a-day operation. [388] Immediately ordered that.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they were starting tracing, were they, from their stations?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were those tracings coming into the information center?

Major BERGQUIST. I believe they were, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think Tindal was acting as controller?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And somebody was relaying information as to where these planes were going, or were they able to find them, or what was it?

Major BERGQUIST. I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't. You didn't stay there?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir, I did after I got there, but all the pilots of those planes were going out, as far as I know, had disappeared by

the time I got there. You see, that was two hours—a little over two hours after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Where had they disappeared to?

Major BERGQUIST. I mean, evidently the planes had gone so far out that we couldn't pick them up even.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Major BERGQUIST. But it is not clear in my mind, sir, exactly what I did when I got there or what I saw.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether the control room was all in service in advising air service as to where these planes were disappearing to? You can't say that?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whatever happened in that respect happened before you got there?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Normally would the bombardment have an [389] officer in the control room to relay information to the bombardment?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir. We had a bomber liaison officer there.

General McNARNEY. Was there one there on the morning of the 7th?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. At any time?

Major BERGQUIST. No, sir, I don't believe we got one there until either that afternoon or the next day; probably that afternoon.

General McCoy. Is the center functioning now?

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How would it be if we stroll over with you, Major, and see it?

Major BERGQUIST. We would like very much to have you come, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess we just have about time to do it before we have to leave to beat the darkness. If there are no other questions from the major we will do that.

General McCoy. We might do that on the way home.

The CHAIRMAN. On the way, yes.

Let me just say to you, Major, that under our regimen here we desire that the witnesses say nothing about the questioning here.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or discuss what goes on in this room with anyone.

Major BERGQUIST. Right, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Major Tindal is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps we shall bring him in, and we will be with you in a minute.

Major BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

[390] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR LORRY NORRIS TINDAL,
AIR CORPS UNITED STATES ARMY**

The CHAIRMAN. What is the full name?

Major TINDAL. Lorry Norris Tindal.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

Major TINDAL. Major in Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your assignment is now to the Interceptor Command?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. I am assigned to Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. What were your duties on the morning of December 7?

Major TINDAL. My duties on the morning of December 7 were my normal duties as S-2 and assistant S-3 of the 18th Bomb Wing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What had your duty to do with the information service?

Major TINDAL. I was sent to New York to go to their school early in the year, and later on I was transferred to Hickam Field, so that on December 7 I had no connection with the Interceptor Command.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you appear at the information center at any time that morning?

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Under what circumstances?

Major TINDAL. Well, I knew they would probably not be fully manned, and I thought that I was the nearest one and could get there sooner, so I went there.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, when you got there what condition of affairs did you find?

Major TINDAL. The condition of affairs was a little muddled up and everybody was in somewhat of an uproar because of the suddenness of attack, but the R. D. F. stations were working, and the boys were manning the board.

[391] The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to trace the course of the retreating Japanese planes?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. The retreat of the planes seemed to me from the directions of the board to go to the southwest, and the plots would have appeared to go about 30 to 50 miles—somewhere there about that distance—to the southwest, and mill in a circle, and we would lose them. There were two distinct circles in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. You traced nothing away to the northward?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. If there was anything going away to the northwest it was probably a thin plot that I didn't see.

The CHAIRMAN. You were acting for the time being as controller, were you?

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir, and practically everything else, too.

The CHAIRMAN. You had assisted in setting up this information center before you went back to Hickam Field, did you?

Major TINDAL. Partly, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Are there any questions?

General McNARNEY. Did you communicate the probability of what you might believe to be planes going out or landing on carriers to anyone?

Major TINDAL. I communicated this to the Air Force, sir.

General McNARNEY. The Air Force.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir; those I could get hold of immediately, I knew that, because I knew theirs was in operation. Their office was manned. I am not sure; I don't remember whether I communicated that to the Navy or not. I may have. I was running around from one station to another there, from one position to another, and I am not sure how many other places I sent it to, but I know I did send it to Air Force.

Admiral REEVES. Did your plot show any indication of a surface ship to the southwest?

Major TINDAL. No, sir. It just showed the plots. Are [392] you familiar with those plotting boards, sir?

Admiral REEVES. No, I am not.

Major TINDAL. Well, they put down a series of little arrows.

Admiral REEVES. Yes?

Major TINDAL. And the arrows proceeded to the southwest between 30 and 50 miles away and then formed a circle, indicating many airplanes, and there were two distinct circles about 10 miles apart.

Admiral REEVES. Well, I understand your instrument will indicate a small flight or a large flight.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Or that it will indicate perhaps a surface ship.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir. That's quite correct, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Provided the altitude is sufficient.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Well, was your instrument in such a position that it would have shown the presence of a separate ship 40 or 50 miles away to the southwest?

Major TINDAL. That's quite a long range to pick up a surface vessel from these ground—from these R. D. F. stations.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Of course your instrument is at a high altitude?

Major TINDAL. Well, even so, even if the instrument is high, there is too much shadow from the water itself.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. Your waves. Your waves pass too close to the surface.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir. I did, though—in those circles I did have we could have picked up a surface vessel on account of many plots of airplanes in the immediate vicinity.

Admiral REEVES. Well, now, the testimony you have given would indicate these planes disappeared by landing on a carrier?

[393] Major TINDAL. That's what it indicated to me, through looking at the board, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Major. Please observe secrecy as to what has been said in here and what has been done in here.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't communicate it to anyone.

Major TINDAL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Will we have time to step in? We might ask the major if he would go down with us; we might like to take a look at that center.

Major TINDAL. Very well, sir.

General McNARNEY. We would like to go to the information center right now.

Major TINDAL. Very Well. Fine. Will you have enough transportation?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Major TINDAL. I have my car out there.

(Thereupon, at 4:55 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until Friday, December 26, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

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[395] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 26, 1941

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii.

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Adviser to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CARROLL A. POWELL,
SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. Now, since you have been here before, Colonel, have you investigated the atmospheric and radio conditions on the Island of Oahu on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. I did not investigate the atmospheric conditions but just took our log that we worked with from Washington and the trouble we had that morning.

At 1:40 a. m. we were contacted with Washington. Our frequency here was 8160. Washington's was 8860. We had been [396] contacting them previously and we were clearing corrections. We had been clearing corrections, errors, and we had a readability of four, which is very poor.

At 2:40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections of the previous errors and had a readability of four. The frequency was the same.

At 3:40 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections. The readability was the same. It was very difficult to get anything through that morning.

At 4:20 a. m. we were still clearing our corrections, but we decided we would go on another frequency. It was getting so bad that our signals were not clearing.

General McNARNEY. What time was this?

Colonel POWELL. Four-twenty a. m.

General MCCOY. Hawaiian time?

Colonel POWELL. Hawaiian time.

This has been a terrifically bad reading of signals due to atmospheric conditions all the way through. Our signal set was very poor. That was S-1 to S-2.

We shifted at 4:20 a. m. to 12240 frequency.

The CHAIRMAN. 12240?

Colonel POWELL. Twelve comma two-forty cycles. Washington was still on 8860.

At 5 a. m. we were unable to hear Washington on that frequency, and we shifted to 12090 and tried to listen to Washington. We were unable to get him at 6 a. m. or 7 a. m.

Then we shifted at 7:20 to the listening station 12075, hoping we might break through. There was a lot of interference developed about that time.

General MCCOY. What kind of interference?

Colonel POWELL. Static. I think it might have been—the operators, the men could not tell me whether it was other radios or not, but there is a possibility. This comes in on a siphon recorder, and it shows up on this little tape. Our [397] indications are both static and possibly something else.

We shifted to WAR at 7:30 to 1600, and we heard them then. We heard them on this. We had interference from our WVY, which is the San Francisco station. We were unable to keep them on or to get any signals or messages through. Then at 9:05 he told us to get him and he would relay through San Francisco. That is what we did at that time.

General MCCOY. That is very interesting.

The CHAIRMAN. That is very interesting, and it confirms what French said.

Colonel POWELL. The other question was—

The CHAIRMAN. Before you get to that, there was another thing. We want to know whether there was any message received between 5 and 8 a. m. on December 7 which you relayed to Manila?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, there was not, because we did not get anything.

The CHAIRMAN. You are to produce General Marshall's message that arrived on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir (handing a document to the Chairman). That was dispatched at 12:18 p. m., which is 6:48 our time here.

The CHAIRMAN. That was dispatched from Washington at 6:48 your time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The date there shows it was received at 7:33 your time?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, downtown.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no evidence here of when it went in and out of San Francisco?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. It was relayed at San Francisco by R. C. A. to this station. They do not work Washington direct. They read the tape, and as the operator read the tape, this is the time showing it was coming in. I think that is what it meant. There was some considerable delay in getting it out to [398] us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we understand that. I believe that covers everything that we asked Colonel Powell to bring us.

Colonel POWELL. You asked me to find out whether a message had been sent to Manila.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. There was a message, and this is a message or a copy of the message which they sent to Manila asking whether they had ever received such a message, and this is the message that was sent to them.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you know that?

Colonel POWELL. This came back.

The CHAIRMAN. If the message to Manila did not go through your station, relayed through, how do you know that Manila got this?

Colonel POWELL. This is after the thing was all over. This was during that day or during that afternoon in which we had contact with Washington, and they asked if the message going to Manila—asked whether they had received this R. C. A. message. Then it went to the decryptographer and then it was delivered to me, and this answer came back. I think they figured out here the Honolulu time so you can get the comparison of it.

The CHAIRMAN. But you say this transmittal of the Washington message for Manila which, I understand, did not go through your station—

Colonel POWELL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. And it arrived in Manila, according to subsequent records, at what time?

Colonel POWELL. Eight-twelve a. m. Honolulu time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, the R. C. A. message to you, sir, got here at 7:33 a. m.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the R. C. A. message in the same tenor [399] got to Manila in the same comparative time at what time?

Colonel POWELL. Eight-twelve on the same day.

The CHAIRMAN. What would that indicate to you, Colonel, that the R. C. A. message was put through to you by R. C. A. before they picked up Manila?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because Manila got it at what time? How much later?

Colonel POWELL. Forty-five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Later than you did?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That may be due to atmospheric conditions again. They have a more powerful transmitter than I had. Their transmitter at Manila is 25 kilowatts; ours is only 10 kilowatts.

If I had a transmitter as high as theirs I could have maintained traffic to Washington very easily then because I could have busted through those atmospheric conditions, but I could not do it with only a 10-kilowatt station.

General McCoy. You would consider that weakness in your transmitter a military weakness in a fortress of this type?

Colonel POWELL. I do, sir, yes, sir, very definitely, sir. I do not recall what the Navy transmitter is, but it is much more powerful than mine.

General McCoy. You do not know whether the Navy had trouble that morning?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Their log will show it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, their log will show it. That is the Lualualei Station. That is heavier than mine.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know of any reason why the Army strength should be less than the Navy strength?

The CHAIRMAN. You mean as to a transmitter?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[400] Colonel POWELL. It is just a matter of lack of funds.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is your opinion?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you ever asked for a heavier or for more transmitters?

Colonel POWELL. I have asked for additional transmitters. I got it but I didn't get a chance to say what size it would be and I have installed that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you familiar with the Navy uses for radio at this station?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know whether the Navy uses their station for broadcasting air reports and time signals in this whole ocean?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know that?

Colonel POWELL. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Army does not do that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, we do not do that. That is all the function of the Navy.

General McCoy. Do you have a personal conference from time to time with your parallel communications officer in the Navy?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you keep in close personal touch?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. He is a very fine officer, Commander Graham.

The interference from other stations, the Japanese station would not show up on our recorder as an individual station, but it is very possible and it could happen.

[401] They have a 25-kilowatt transmitter beamed on this Island here, and they could shift over entirely into any frequency they want and get a beam and get to jamming up anything.

I was listening to it last night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and it comes in very powerful. It is beamed right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that located?

Colonel POWELL. Tokyo.

The CHAIRMAN. In Tokyo?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is a 25-kilowatt transmitter. It sends its beam on us and puts in signals at 52 decibels, and the Navy station puts out from 10 to 15.

The CHAIRMAN. You could easily pick it up?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. I am trying to rent a station to counteract that same thing.

The CHAIRMAN. To jam it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General MCCOY. When was this powerful Japanese station put in? Do you know?

Colonel POWELL. That I don't know, sir, but it has been picked up over here for some time, and I have been here two years and a half, and it has been coming over that time. We have been noticing them and they have been putting out this propaganda. Now the propaganda is in English. They have a Britisher or a Japanese youngster who has studied in England, because he has a very decided British accent.

There might have been interference at that time. They could swing into any frequency they wanted to to jam anything they wanted to.

General MCCOY. In other words, they can jam you but you cannot jam them?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, they have a more powerful station than I have.

[402] Admiral STANDLEY. Are you responsible for the communications that you have on the Island?

Colonel POWELL. The only communications?

Admiral STANDLEY. And outlying posts?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have a signal post at Kahuku Point?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, we do not as yet. That has just been made an Army post.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any station on the north coast around Kahuku Point? You have a station at Opana?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have a direction finder station at Opana.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any of the responsibility as to the guard?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any watch on them?

Colonel POWELL. There are men guarding them.

Admiral STANDLEY. They would not be under you?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, they are not under me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are your men under cover in this station? Do they have a regular post under cover in the buildings?

Colonel POWELL. They did not at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they out in the open?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, because we only considered this as a training station until the others were completed.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you positive there were guards at that station on the morning of December 7?

Colonel POWELL. I don't know. The Army commander was responsible for the guards.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is Colonel Fielder?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, that is the commanding general in that division, in that area.

Admiral STANDLEY. Of the Infantry?

[403] Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be Murray or Wilson?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did I understand you to say you had no communications with the other islands in this group?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, we have radio communication with the other islands. We have our own system and by Mutual Telephone Company radio system. That is by voice. They have it on the principal islands, but not on Lanai; but they have a radio phone service to Kauai, Maui, Molokai, and Hawaii, and it goes through the interisland system.

General McCoy. I thought you said there was none?

Colonel POWELL. I said there was no cable station. There is no submarine cable station. That is not practical because it is so very expensive to lay it and the waters are very deep, and the cable would have to be swinging around and it would be worn out.

General McCoy. From the viewpoint of security, you think the present setup of wireless telephone and radio is sufficient?

Colonel POWELL. I think it is, yes sir, because if they wanted to they could cut the cable just as quickly as they jam up the radio.

General McCoy. Do you know whether any of those communications systems were working on that Sunday?

Colonel POWELL. That I do not know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By that question do you mean the ones in operating order or whether they were actually sending and receiving?

General McCoy. Well, I had in mind whether they had been put out for some reason.

Colonel POWELL. I could find that out.

General McCoy. Atmospheric conditions or jamming or from some local Japanese effort.

[404] Colonel POWELL. I can say I don't believe they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Were what?

Colonel POWELL. Were operating. They were operating. I think they were operating because I would have heard of it because I am in close contact with the Mutual Telephone Company and I think they would have expressed to me statements as to the conditions taking place at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you find out and let us know within the next hour whether the telephone system on the Island was working and whether your radio system was working that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. They go on a different frequency. Theirs is a very high frequency, and for that reason it is better. They are very high in the air, practically line of sight.

General McCoy. Did we ask you when you were on the stand before as to whether you were conscious of any concerted effort to jam you at any time during Sunday, any jamming from fishing boats or such?

Colonel POWELL. Nothing was reported to me. I got the logs on that situation and I have gone over the logs, and according to the report of the operators and the logs, there was no attempt to do that that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Does your last answer mean that you do not think this 25-kilowatt station in Tokyo was attempting to jam the Army radio line from Washington that morning?

Colonel POWELL. I saw no evidence of it. As I say, it could be possible, but the tape does not show there was any effort. A concerted attempt at jamming would show up in a regular beat.

The CHAIRMAN. The tape does not indicate that?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, no regular beat.

General MCCOY. In other words, you would assume that had the attack not occurred that normally that interference would [405] be atmospheric?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, that is what I thought about it, because we have been having that same experience right along. This is a bad time of the year to transmit with our transmitter to Washington. We might be a complete day without communication to Washington due to atmospheric conditions, the time of the moon and so on, that sometimes no one was able to transmit to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. The same thing does not necessarily apply to their ability to transmit to you because their station is more powerful?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But as it was, your reception was very bad that morning?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General MCCOY. Didn't you have some questions you wanted to ask concerning this scrambled telephone?

The CHAIRMAN. When was your scrambled telephone instrument installed here?

Colonel POWELL. It was about a year ago. It is a very secret thing. Very few people know about it.

The CHAIRMAN. We are keeping everything secret, but we have got to know the facts.

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Because it was so very secret, was there any understanding here that it should be used only in emergency cases, or was it generally used?

Colonel POWELL. It was only for the use of the commanding general and the chief of staff. Nobody else used it or had the key to it except the commanding general and the chief of staff.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate that it was an emergency service?

[406] Colonel POWELL. Yes, a confidential service.

The CHAIRMAN. A confidential service.

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It is fairly confidential, but it is not secret by any means.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Colonel POWELL. Just because of the mechanics of the thing. Our transmission to San Francisco is all scrambled by the Mutual Telephone Company.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Mutual Telephone Company here?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, and the R. C. A. at San Francisco. For scrambling done here, a radio or an ordinary receiver could not pick up that message.

The CHAIRMAN. If I had an ordinary receiver I would hear a series of queer words which did not mean anything?

Colonel POWELL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Mutual office here has to advise San Francisco which dial they are using in order to unscramble it?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then San Francisco has got to set its dial at a certain point?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that San Francisco will hear it clearly?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They have the same system from San Francisco into Washington?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if anybody was going to listen in on another set, he would have to know which dial they are going to use to get it?

Colonel POWELL. He would not know the type of instrument?

The CHAIRMAN. The type of instrument?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

[407] This scrambler here has an addition to the scrambler, put in by the Mutual Telephone Company so that the message is double scrambled. A very interesting thing happened. We installed the outfit about a year ago, and the telephone circuit from Tokyo uses the same scrambler as this Mutual does from here to San Francisco.

So when we put this on the circuit, Tokyo called up right quick and wanted to know what we had done to the circuit between Honolulu and San Francisco because they said they could not understand it and wanted to know what was being done to it; so we have been watching that telephone circuit and reading it all the time—everything that goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that telephone circuit a radio circuit?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not run on a cable?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. The only cable is the cable company.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought this was a wire?

Colonel POWELL. It is simply a radio.

General McCoy. So they could listen in?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. And you put in a second scrambler to cover that?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is what they called up for and wanted to know what we had done to the circuit.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know if they ever found out or not?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. We just told them something had happened, or Mutual told them something had happened to the circuit, and that is all.

I have been assured by the board in Washington that, so far as this particular circuit ever getting out of the United States, that does not mean it makes it private because they can [408] undoubtedly find out that, I suppose, or shift it or make it themselves; so it is not a secret means of transmission. It is what you might call a private means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. But rather dangerous to use?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McCoy. What caused it to be put in? Was it put in on your recommendation?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, it was a system put in under orders of the Secretary of War, I understand, in that he wanted to talk to all commanding generals in the area in the United States, and then he had one put in over here in Puerto Rico—no, in Panama, so he could have a private means of communication so everybody would not be able to listen in on his conversation.

General McCoy. Do you know whether there are any Japanese in the telephone central office here?

Colonel POWELL. There are no alien Japanese in the telephone central, and the Department Commander has placed me in kind of charge of the telephone company, and they have cooperated very well and have removed all aliens from the telephone circuits going to the mainland, and have eliminated them from all very important key jobs. They had no aliens, but only people of Japanese ancestry, which they have taken out.

General McCoy. Has it occurred to you that it might be an additional safeguard for the telephone company to cut out all telephones to aliens or Japanese on this island at this time, during the war?

Colonel POWELL. We did discuss that, but we didn't think it was of any advantage because of the fact that the Navy censors all trans-Pacific calls, and I have a crew of 30 people censoring all interisland calls; so nothing can get on the air or the radio that we do not want on the air.

General McCoy. But they could communicate using the Mutual system?

[409] Colonel POWELL. They could do that, because this is an automatic exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. There is no operator?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. On your trip to the mainland to inspect the Radar system, were there any permanent stations on your trip, or were they all mobile?

Colonel POWELL. The ones I saw were mobile. I just heard of one that was a permanently installed station. I think it was in Maine, but I did not get a chance to see it.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what particular priority you were on for the permanent station order?

Colonel POWELL. Well, we had authority to build these stations, and the plans were drawn up by the District Engineer, and he is to proceed to build them, but it was just a question at that time if there was any urgency. That is, we wanted to get them done as promptly as possible, but we did have difficulty getting the cable for Mount Kahala, and a few other things for the other stations here that were not ready; but as to priority we had sets here to install in this station, and they have been here for approximately three months, and the stations haven't been finished due to the lack of our ability to get the materials to finish them.

General McCoy. Do you have that material now?

Colonel POWELL. The last of it is here, the power plants.

General McCoy. Do you know when they will be here?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. They were being bought by the District Engineer, so I did not check that part of it. We had a conference yesterday on that particular thing, but we are starting.

General McCoy. Did the conference bring out the probability [410] of the permanent installations being completed?

Colonel POWELL. The station at Maui will be up in about two weeks. The equipment has been there and the building.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the power plant there?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. The signal corps power plant is there, but I am going to divert one of these to give our power to operate the radio sets and other things like that temporarily, but the buildings are just being completed, and that coming back from Maui has given me a few items that the District Engineer is clearing up with the engineer there and has directed them to be completed promptly. At Haleakala the shelter building was not completed and the water supply was not complete, and it is very cold up there, which you would not imagine. They had a barrel of ice there and they had no heat, and they were putting in commercial power to augment our power.

Kauai is in about the same condition. They expect to get them going in about two weeks.

General McCoy. What alternative action has been taken for security purposes pending the completion of these stations?

Colonel POWELL. We have concentrated at this island all our portable Radar sets. By that means we hope we will have our security sufficient in this particular island. Now, that is about the best answer I can give you.

General McCoy. What could be done to supplement that for additional security during this dangerous period?

Colonel POWELL. We would have to have more portable Radar sets. I was talking to General Emmons several times, and he wanted me to let him know in particular how many more we would have to have, and that is the reason for the conference yesterday, determining how many more we would have to have until these permanent stations are fixed because it would take us two weeks to get the portable stations here, if there are any available on the mainland.

I believe in the meantime we may be able to get these fixed [411] stations completed so that we would not need these mobile stations and operate them.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any system of observers on the outlying islands who could radio in any information of enemy planes observed by them?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose it would be possible to put observers on the outlying islands and let them radio messages in of planes coming in?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. The question there is with respect to transmission. I have taken over practically all amateur radio sets in the Island, and I have to change them from their frequency to meet our frequency, and that is being done now, and they will be installed on these islands.

The CHAIRMAN. So they can warn you?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Couldn't these observers talk over the inter-island telephone system?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, they could. My answer was that we did not think the situation here was so serious that we should try to get them from the other islands because we felt that these Radar sets would give us sufficient protection in an emergency, and we could put them in different positions.

General McNARNEY. Have you looked into the plans around 1935 to see what system there was of aircraft warning then completed prior to the development of the Radar systems?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, I did not. I have not looked into it.

The CHAIRMAN. When you came here, sir, was there any warning system established on the outlying islands?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Over the telephone or radio?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, because at that time they were [412] concentrating all their defense here on the Island of Oahu, and we had no military people, no organization of any kind on the other islands. There were no military organizations for defense on the other islands.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no thought of putting out scouts or outposts on these islands for your help and assistance?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir. This is the system that has been developed since then. It has only been the responsibility of the signal corps since the development of the Radar.

General McCoy. Do you have in effect local aerial warning sets?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir, by which we are now warning the people.

General McCoy. Yes.

Colonel POWELL. By means of broadcasting stations downtown and by means of other things, whistles that we can get set up and get in word of an air raid, which is an air-raid warning system, and we thought of putting stations all over the Island and installing these sirens just as soon as we get them.

There was a telegram came here the day before yesterday advising that the signal corps was getting them at San Francisco, or anticipating getting them for delivery at the earliest possible time.

General McCoy. There was no such thing provided for prior to the attack?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir, only we had discussed that with the defense counsel. I went down there and we were developing a plan to do that, the Governor's committee, and had assumed control of it, and felt at that time the responsibility was to take care of the field; that is, the air fields and the Army posts; and the civilians, that they should take care of their own.

General McCoy. Did you have on the air fields any warning service prior to the attack?

[413] Colonel POWELL. We had made tests at Wheeler Field of various sirens to determine what siren was the best to install, and we recommended to the War Department that we be given authority to buy certain sirens, and they came back and said they were developing sirens and that as soon as they were available they would send them to us.

General McCoy. But they were not on the air field at the time of the attack?

Colonel POWELL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Was there any other warning service on these fields, that you know of, under your control?

Colonel POWELL. None on the fields under my control, no, sir.

General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McNARNEY. What was the approximate date on which it was decided to install this Radar system on the Island?

Colonel POWELL. I will have to get my records out. I would say about a year and a half ago.

The War Department sent out a directive to the Commanding General to direct him to state our requirements for these Radar systems, and this board was appointed and travelled all over the Islands to determine on the locations for the various sets.

That report went into Washington and it was approved, and then they got that appropriation from Congress and we started to build them.

Then recently, about four months ago, they said, "We think you should have four more stations." So we studied it and located these four more stations on the Islands, and they have been in the process of doing that.

[414] General McNARNEY. Are these positions based on the experience of the board?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. That is all the information there was. Nobody from this Department had gone to England to study the situation. We just had to take what was reported by the observers and base our positions on their report, which sometimes is quite difficult to understand.

General McNARNEY. Do you know how long the Army and Navy have been experimenting with this sort of thing?

Colonel POWELL. I can't answer that question except by guesswork.

General McNARNEY. What would you guess?

Colonel POWELL. I would say about four years.

General McNARNEY. In other words, the decision to put these in was based upon the successes of the instruments in this war?

Colonel POWELL. In England, yes, sir.

General McCoy. As I remember, they were carrying on experiments for at least four or five years back?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. At Monmouth?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It was so secret that nobody got in there. I used to try to get in there because I am an electrical engineer and was interested, but it was so secret nobody could get in there. I just heard they were doing something like that.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Chief of Staff told me about it at least three years ago.

Colonel POWELL. As I understand the situation, the British have had a well-developed situation, but they did not let us know anything

about it, so we had to start in right from scratch and work it up by our own help and not with the help of the British.

General McCoy. This is an American system, not British?

Colonel POWELL. Yes. It is different, as I understand it, [415] from what the British system is.

General McCoy. Would it be possible to get the British to give us the results of their successes?

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get us that information, Colonel?

Colonel POWELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army has produced the Burwell report, which the Recorder has marked Martin Exhibit 2, and which will be a part of our record.

Call Lieutenant Taylor.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT KENNETH M. TAYLOR, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Kenneth M. Taylor.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a lieutenant in the Army?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what assignment?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Pilot, 47th Squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you examine, General?

General McCoy. Is that Hickam Field or Wheeler Field?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Wheeler Field, sir.

General McCoy. Pursuit squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. We would like to have a narrative from you first. Give whatever information you know and simply tell us what happened to you during the morning of the attack until your own activities were over that day. Just give us a running narrative without any attempt to give us more than just what [416] happened, what you saw and what you did.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Well, sir, on the morning of the 7th I was at Wheeler Field at the Officers' Club when the bombing began. Lieutenant Welsh and I got in my car and drove to Haleiwa. We had been in the field there for the past week or thereabouts, as one squadron is at all times recently.

When we got out there mostly new men were there. I saw the new men, and so Lieutenant Welsh and I took two planes that they were servicing and got ready to go up. We had called them or somebody had called them; so they were practically ready when we arrived.

There were some other officers there getting ready to take off, but I think they followed us in about 30 minutes; I am not sure, but Lieutenant Welsh and myself started patrolling the Island. There wasn't any .50 caliber ammunition, so we landed at the field. That was be-

tween the first bombing and the second bombing. I got .50 caliber ammunition in my plane and Lieutenant Welsh got some in his.

From there on things got kind of jumbled, because we took off, and as we took off they were coming over the field.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the second attack?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes. We landed three times, it seems like. It is kind of jumbled in my mind which time we did go back, but I would say this time they were going very low over Pearl Harbor, and the men left, and I took my plane around and took off right into them so they could not run me down too easily. I made a nice turn out into them and got in the string of six or eight planes. I don't know how many there were. I was in them. I was on one's tail as we went over Waialua, firing at the one next to me, and there was one following firing at me, and I pulled out. I don't know what happened to the other plane. Lieutenant Welsh, I think, shot the other man down. Then we patrolled some more over Ewa. At that time there was a whole string of planes looking like a [417] traffic pattern. We went down and got in the traffic pattern and shot down several planes there. I know for certain I had shot down two planes or perhaps more; I don't know.

At that time Lieutenant Welsh and I got separated. He came back to Wheeler Field, but I believe I landed about three times. I just landed and got ammunition and went back. I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you getting breakfast at the time of the attack?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, I was still in bed when the first bomb hit. I thought a Navy man had probably gone off the main route, so I didn't get up until the second one and then went out just as they were machine-gunning the club at that time, and they were machine-gunning all around while we were driving for the post.

The CHAIRMAN. What sort of plane were you up in that morning?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. A P-40B, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the crew in that plane?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Just myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Just one man?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you examine, General?

General McNARNEY. You say your squadron was stationed at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How many planes were in that squadron, if you remember?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I think we had four P-40's and two or three P-36's, and B-12's—six. I don't know whether I should mention them, because they are obsolete.

General McNARNEY. How many of those were in commission?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. That morning we used four altogether [418] at different times. They were landed out there and we had got together and sent more up.

General McNARNEY. Where were the enlisted personnel in your squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Well, they were there at the field.

General McNARNEY. They were stationed at the field?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And the officers were there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It being Saturday night, some of them were sleeping or in there.

General McNARNEY. Normally, when you are stationed at Haleiwa, you sleep there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I would say normally, yes.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Major Austin.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. He was on Molokai.

The CHAIRMAN. He had been sent there on some special mission?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, he was deer hunting over the week-end.

The CHAIRMAN. He was on leave?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Who was in charge of the squadron?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Lieutenant Rogers.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. He was there when I got there at the field. He was at the field at the time and later took up a plane.

General McNARNEY. You say you and Lieutenant Welsh went and took off.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Were you directed to go up by anybody [419] or did you just go on your own initiative?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You were not directed by anyone?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, we were not directed by anybody. He was the assistant operations officer, so we just went off.

General McNARNEY. In other words, no squadron commander gave you any orders? You just took off on your own initiative?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir, there was nobody there who could give us orders with the exception of Lieutenant Rogers, so we went ahead and took off. I imagine the orders would be the same.

General McNARNEY. You say you had no .50 caliber ammunition?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Is .50 caliber ammunition usually carried at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It should have been. We did not have any gunnery there, but for normal gunnery that would be done with .30 caliber.

General McNARNEY. Was your plane already loaded with .30 caliber ammunition, or were they putting it in?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. They were loading it at the time. They were doing it when we got there.

General McNARNEY. The men were loading when you got there?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, the men were loading when we got at the field.

General McNARNEY. No one gave you any instructions as to what particular part of the Island you were to patrol?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. We called the patrol at the interceptor center and they gave us Easy to patrol. That is Barbers Point. We went to Easy, but there were not any planes there.

[420] We then came back and got .50 caliber ammunition. Our communications were very poor. You know how it is trying to get communications on a ship. One minute you can and the next minute you can't. So from then on we took it entirely on our own. From now we were on our own at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, had you had any training firing .50 caliber ammunition before?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I had fired it once or twice before.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in training here?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I have been over here since about—I graduated April 25 from the flight squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. This was your 200 hours?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes. There was a month's difference. I arrived here in June and I started flying probably June 10 or 11.

General McNARNEY. How much time did you get while you were here?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I got more time than the rest of them. I think I got 430 hours up to that time.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether your squadron had any operating plan, standing operating procedure and method of take-off and initial point and so forth?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. The only plan I know of we got to take orders, but it has changed constantly since then. We have changed our tactics considerably as to the formation of flight and the method of take-off and the method of landing. Then I had these M I reports. From them we got a general idea of what we were to do in the beginning, but they never appeared that we used them as our plan. We never had any set plan, I would say; I don't know, I am not positive.

General McNARNEY. If you got the signal to take off, where would you go?

[421] Lieutenant TAYLOR. I would turn in my control and they would tell me where to go when I contacted them.

General McNARNEY. Isn't there a normal initiative point of rendezvous?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know all the initial points on the Island?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Call them off.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. It starts with A. That is Kahuku. The next is Ulupau, Baker; then Koko Head, which is Cast; Dog is Pearl Harbor; Easy is Barbers Point; Fox is—

Admiral STANDLEY. Lualualei?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Lualualei. The next is Kaena Point. That is George. Next is Hypo. Haleiwa, where we are stationed. Then William, which is Wheeler Field. Robert is the interception center.

General McNARNEY. Do you think everybody in your squadron was thoroughly familiar with these points?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. No, sir. I would not say they were all familiar with them. Most of them carried maps with them. I know the order came out that we were to know them.

General McNARNEY. Could you travel out to any point in the Island which was given to you, say Easy? Are you familiar enough with the Island to be able to go to Easy?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. You mean if it was heavily overcast and I could not see where I was?

General McNARNEY. No. If you knew your location, could you actually take your course which would take you within two or three miles of Easy?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do I understand that you have received a commendation from the Department since the attack?

[422] Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In what form?

Lieutenant TAYLOR. I understand I am to receive the D. S. C. All I know is just what I read in the newspapers.

General McCoy. I congratulate you.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions of the lieutenant?

General McCoy. That seems to be all.

The CHAIRMAN. Our inquiry is of such nature that we ask all witnesses who come here to not discuss their testimony with anyone on the outside or to refer to it in any conversation with anyone as to what went on in this room.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask you to observe that.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir. We have been glad to have you, Lieutenant.

Lieutenant TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Lieutenant Welsh.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE S. WELSH, AIR CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you have a seat, Lieutenant, and give the reporter your full name?

Lieutenant WELSH. George S. Welsh.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank is lieutenant?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the 7th of December?

Lieutenant WELSH. I was assistant operations officer, 47th Pursuit Squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, will you examine Lieutenant Welsh?

[423] General McCoy. General McNarney.

General McNARNEY. Where were you stationed on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Haleiwa.

General McNARNEY. Where were you personally?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Wheeler Field, Officers' Club.

General McNARNEY. Normally, would the pilots and enlisted men of the squadron stationed at Haleiwa remain there overnight?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were any of your personnel on the alert or in a state of readiness on December 7?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell the Commission what you did personally from the time you heard the first bomb drop?

Lieutenant WELSH. When I heard them I stayed in the club and then watched for about five or ten minutes. I imagine, and then we got in Lieutenant Taylor's car and drove to Haleiwa.

General McNARNEY. What was the condition of the field when you arrived there and what happened?

Lieutenant WELSH. They had been alerted, apparently, from Wheeler Field, because they were loading the airplanes, and we received orders from control to take off and proceed to Easy, which was Barbers Point, at 8,000 feet.

General McNARNEY. How did you get the order from the control? By telephone?

Lieutenant WELSH. When we got the order, yes. We got over to Easy and didn't see any planes. We didn't get a radio, so we went around by Wheeler and saw a B-17 and saw Japanese strung out strafing Ewa. I came back to Wheeler Field and the Japs were attacking and came back to Wheeler Field, so we came back to the field and then took off again.

[424] General McNARNEY. When you first landed at the field, what was happening at that time?

Lieutenant WELSH. They were dispersing the airplanes. I got ammunition and gasoline and we took off again.

General McNARNEY. Was there any difficulty in getting the ammunition or gasoline?

Lieutenant WELSH. We had to argue with some of the ground crew. They wanted us to disperse the airplanes and we wanted to fight.

Finally I got the ammunition, and just as they were loading some 50 caliber, the Japs came back again. We took off directly into them and shot down some. I shot down one right on Lieutenant Taylor's tail.

I went back to Ewa and found some more over Barbers Point and engaged them there. Then I came back to Wheeler. I landed there and then I went up and found none around five miles Barbers Point. I continued around for 45 minutes. I didn't have a regular patrol. Then there was no more action.

General McNARNEY. How many planes in your squadron did you get in the air?

Lieutenant WELSH. While the Japs were still over the Island?

General McNARNEY. I mean the morning of the attack or during the course of the attack.

Lieutenant WELSH. I would say four, or maybe six, airplanes. I am sure it was four.

General McNARNEY. Did they go off singly or in formation?

Lieutenant WELSH. Lieutenant Taylor and I took off in formation. Lieutenant Brown, Webster, and Rogers took off. We were in formation and broke away and just disorganized, getting any airplane we could.

General McNARNEY. Are you familiar with all the initial points about the Island? [425]

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Would you say you were familiar enough with the Island and sufficiently familiar with the topography to be able to fly direct to an initial point?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Could you say that for the rest of the pilots of the squadron?

Lieutenant WELSH. I can now, sir, but I could not then. It has been very well impressed upon us now, but before that I don't think very many of them knew them.

General McNARNEY. How long have these initial points been established here?

Lieutenant WELSH. Well, I arrived in February last year, and they were established then.

The CHAIRMAN. February, 1941, you mean?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This year you mean?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

Lieutenant WELSH. Major Austin.

General McNARNEY. Where was he at the time?

Lieutenant WELSH. He was on the Island of Molokai.

General McNARNEY. Who was acting squadron commander?

Lieutenant WELSH. Lieutenant Rogers is acting squadron commander.

General McNARNEY. Where was he?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Wheeler Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Had he been in the Officers' Club there?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, he was in his own quarters.

General McNARNEY. Do you know when he arrived at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant WELSH. He arrived there about the same time I did. I saw him getting out of his car.

[426] General McNARNEY. Did he take off?

Lieutenant WELSH. He took off, too, about a half hour later, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, Saturday night?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Honolulu, Hickam Field, and Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have a party?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on leave?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many planes do you think you got?

Lieutenant WELSH. I only saw four hit, sir.

General McCoy. You were given credit for bringing down four planes, were you not?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir. I was given credit for five, but I did not see the other one.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McCoy. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were assigned to special detail at Haleiwa?

Lieutenant WELSH. I had a regular duty, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have a tour of duty at Haleiwa with officers assigned to the tour of duty, daytime?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, our whole squadron was moved to Haleiwa for 15 days approximately for training in the field.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your planes were parked there?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What sort of guard was over your planes at that time?

Lieutenant WELSH. I imagine a regular field guard. I am not positive about it, but at least one man for every plane, armed with pistol and rifle.

[427] Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any officers assigned to duty with that detail so that there was some officer there every day?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, we had an officer there and four or five others, pilots, but they were new pilots and apparently they had never flown P-40's, and we didn't take them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, did you at any time stand a tour of duty?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. During your tour of duty, what was your responsibility as to these planes?

Lieutenant WELSH. To guard the planes from sabotage. We were on alert for sabotage then. We did not have any instructions against aerial attack; it was all ground defense, and I was to inspect the guard twice during each relief.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many guards did you have stationed?

Lieutenant WELSH. At Haleiwa?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Lieutenant WELSH. Twenty-three, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they armed?

Lieutenant WELSH. Yes, with a pistol, and some with pistol and rifle.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any machine guns?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did they have ammunition?

Lieutenant WELSH. They had .30 caliber ammunition but no .50 caliber.

General McCoy. Was there any installation of antiaircraft guns ready for action then?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir, there were none ready. There were pits dug, but no guns in them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any instructions issued to those guards as to what to do in case of an enemy airplane coming over?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

[428] Admiral STANDLEY. There was no indication that sabotage might take the nature of an attack from above?

Lieutenant WELSH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We will ask you not to discuss the testimony that you have given here or anything that has happened in this room?

General McCoy. I congratulate you on your D. S. C., Lieutenant.

Lieutenant WELSH. Thank you, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Colonel Powell is back with some information you wanted.

**FURTHER TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CARROLL A.
POWELL, SIGNAL CORPS, U. S. ARMY**

Colonel POWELL. I have checked with the general manager of the telephone company and he told me that there was no unusual amount of traffic that they carried on Sunday morning, that it was just the same amount, and the technical staff report there were no unusual disturbances on their frequency.

The CHAIRMAN. That would indicate there was no jamming?

Colonel POWELL. Yes, sir.

Their frequency is 35 to 40 megacycles.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel.

Major ALLEN. The next is Sergeant Hall, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

**TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT MOBLEY L. HALL,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have a seat, Sergeant, and give your name to the reporter.

Sergeant HALL. Mobley L Hall.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you assigned on the morning of [429] December 7, sir?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, I was in my quarters in the new defense housing project. When the first bomb dropped I knew something was wrong, and I knew my duty was to report to my place of duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was your place of duty?

Sergeant HALL. At the hangar.

General McNARNEY. What squadron did you belong to, or what job did you hold in the squadron?

Sergeant HALL. Crew chief, headquarters squadron, 18th Pursuit.

General McNARNEY. Go ahead with your narrative, Sergeant.

Sergeant HALL. I got in my car and went down to the hangar to see what was happening, and it was as I arrived there the bombing was going on, and as soon as that was over I saw the planes. We had only three planes.

General McNARNEY. How many planes did you have in the squadron?

Sergeant HALL. Three.

General McNARNEY. What was your regular assignment there?

Sergeant HALL. Three planes was the only ones: two AT-6's and one OA-9.

General McNARNEY. None of those were combat planes?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir. Two of them was on the line, the OA-9 and the AT-6. Mine was in the hangar, which was burned.

I saw one still in a whole piece which was parked by the OA-9. As soon as the bombing was over I had instructions and all I did was pull it off the ramp, and the oil lines were shot off. I thought it was on fire and switched it off at the end of the ramp. As I got it over they came back, and then I left. There was nothing then I could do because I thought the airplane was burning, and then we all went to work [430] on the fire and tried to get the hose to put the fire out.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your quarters?

Sergeant HALL. 724.

General McNARNEY. That was in the barracks?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir. That is in the new defense housing at Kemoo Farms.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you patrolling near the house?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I had just gotten up.

General McNARNEY. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Sergeant HALL. I was home.

General McNARNEY. Are you married?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How quickly, according to your observation, did the men respond when these bombs were heard?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, as best I could say, everybody was there. They seemed to be there and doing everything as rapidly as possible.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there practically a full complement of the airplane force on the field promptly? Was it that practically everyone who was assigned there was working there that morning?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, that is hard to say; I would not say.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I realize you did not stay there to count them.

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many leaves that Saturday night?

Sergeant HALL. As usual.

The CHAIRMAN. More than usual?

Sergeant HALL. Sir, I could not say; not that I know of. As soon as my work was over, I would always go home.

General McNARNEY. Who is your squadron commander?

[431] Sergeant HALL. Lieutenant Armstrong.

General McNARNEY. Did you see him on the morning of the 7th?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did he give you any instructions as to what to do?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, he didn't come down to the squadron till after the attack. He came down the line with his flying clothes on, but somehow he tackled some kind of job before he got to the squadron.

General McNARNEY. Do you know anything about a guard on the field the night before?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I do not.

General McNARNEY. You do not know anything about that?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McNARNEY. Were there any machine guns or automatic weapons placed around the field for anti-aircraft protection?

Sergeant HALL. I don't know about that, sir. I understood we were on the alert. I thought we were.

General McNARNEY. What kind of alert did you think you were on?

Sergeant HALL. When the first alert just went on it was four minutes and then E5—four hours, and all I knew was to stick close by.

General McNARNEY. When were you informed of the alert? Do you know the date?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be more than a week before the attack?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I suspect that it was November 27?

Sergeant HALL. That is just about when it was.

General McNARNEY. How soon did it take to go on Easy?

[432] Sergeant HALL. I know I was on guard in the hangar with our whole crew, 24 of our members, and I was trying to bring some of them out.

General McNARNEY. Which ships were in commission on the morning of December 7?

Sergeant HALL. My own ship, which had just been put in commission. I had just put a new engine in, and that was why it was in the hangar.

General McCoy. Did it burn up?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. It did?

Sergeant HALL. Completely.

General McNARNEY. What type ship was this you taxied out?

Sergeant HALL. AT-6.

General McNARNEY. Did it burn up?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You saved that one?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't you say the oil lines were shot off?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With machine-gun bullets, I suppose?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you got there and the Japanese were strafing your field with machine guns, did they get some of your fellows?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your quarters bombed or strafed?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the barracks that was hit by the bomb at Wheeler Field?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Were your barracks bombed and burned?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, it was bombed, but not burned. It was burned slightly, but all that fire we exterminated. I [433] believe my barracks was the only barracks that was severely bombed, and they had some strafing.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been in the service, Sergeant?

Sergeant HALL. Three years and seven months, sir.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been over here?

Sergeant HALL. I came over here in September, 1938. I have been here ever since.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Sergeant, you spoke of your own plane being in the hangar?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any effort or plan for defense against sabotage of that plane in the hangar?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The other two planes were out on the line?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any plans for protecting those planes against sabotage?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, we had guards for patrolling that area.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have anything to do with the guards?

Sergeant HALL. Well, our guard is run, it seems to me, changed ever so often and they work in shifts.

General McCoy. Was there any infantry guard in the post, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, not around the airplanes, because our Air Corps men patrolled the airplanes.

General McCoy. Did they come to you? You took your turn at guard duty, I suppose?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

[434] General McCoy. What were your instructions in the event of danger from aloft or by plane?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, my instructions were naturally—all we had was on sabotage, and that was to investigate, and if anybody was fooling around, give them a chance to halt three times, as usual, and then, why, shoot. Those instructions we always gave the sentries.

General McCoy. Was there any sabotage, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, so far as I know.

General McCoy. No attempt at it?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McCoy. Was there any firing against the Japanese on Wheeler Field, so far as you know?

Sergeant HALL. Well, my ammunition wasn't sufficient to fire at the airplanes.

General McCoy. Did they get any machine guns in action?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, Sergeant Bayon got the first machine gun set up. It was a .50 caliber, and he is credited with shooting an airplane down that went into Wahiawa, went down.

The CHAIRMAN. Were machine guns actually placed around the field?

Sergeant HALL. They had to go to the supply room to get them out.

The CHAIRMAN. To get the guns and the supplies?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not expecting that type of attack on the field?

Sergeant HALL. No.

General McCoy. Were you very much surprised when it happened?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, I certainly was, although I looked for it, but I did not believe it was real.

[435] The CHAIRMAN. Had there been any talk among the troops or your crowd, your fellows, of a possible Japanese air raid here?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No one was expecting an air raid attack?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Were you conscious almost immediately that they were Japanese planes, or did you think it maybe was some friendly plane that was carrying out a maneuver or something of that sort? What was your reaction to it? What was your impression?

Sergeant HALL. Well, sir, my impression was when I heard the first bomb drop, I knew something was wrong. I did not know what it was, but I knew I was supposed to report to my place of duty.

General McCoy. Were you able to see that they were Japanese planes?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir. I looked at them for a while and I recognized the rising sun on the airplane.

The CHAIRMAN. Before you got to your place of duty?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On the first attack, were they flying low?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, very low.

The CHAIRMAN. And strafing?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, and bombing.

The CHAIRMAN. And bombing?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. From a very low altitude?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you went toward Wheeler Field, how many planes did it seem to you were attacking the field? I know you did not count them.

Sergeant HALL. They had to be anywhere from 12 to 15.

[436] The CHAIRMAN. It must have been that many?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How many were brought down at Wheeler Field, if you know?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir, I don't know.

General McNARNEY. Did you see any Japanese planes brought down?

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir, this one. I didn't see it fall but I saw it later after I got a chance to go over there.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what attack that occurred in?

Sergeant HALL. The first attack, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They got the machine guns up and hit one in the first attack?

Sergeant HALL. Yes.

General McCoy. How many attacks were there?

Sergeant HALL. There were actually two that I know of. After the first attack they didn't go very far but they came back and started strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, did you get an impression as to what direction they came from into Wheeler Field?

Sergeant HALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not ascertain that?

Sergeant HALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such that we think it necessary to ask the witnesses not to discuss with anyone their testimony or what has been said while they have been in the room. I will ask you to observe that.

Sergeant HALL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Sergeant, have you been commended for your action?

[437] Sergeant HALL. Only by the squadron commander, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FRANK W. EBEEY, COAST ARTILLERY,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Captain?

Captain EBEEY. Frank W. Ebey, Captain, 55th Coast Artillery.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the morning of December 7?

Captain EBEEY. I was commanding Battery B, 55th Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Fort Kamehameha?

Captain EBEEY. Right at Hickam Field.

General MCCOY. Would you show it on the map?

Captain EBEEY. Yes. It is right here (indicating on the map).

Admiral STANDLEY. Is the fort across the channel?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, Fort Weaver.

The CHAIRMAN. Are your officers' quarters right there at the battery?

Captain EBEEY. About two and a half blocks from my battery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when you first learned of the attack?

Captain EBEEY. I was sitting on my lanai reading a book, when I first heard this commotion. I thought it was a Navy plane, but we were on an anti-sabotage alert, so I got my gun and went up to the battery. I did not think we were being attacked. I just stayed there, and the first indication was a plane dove at me, letting go machine guns at me, and I saw dive bombers coming down on Pearl Harbor, and I knew what it was.

[438] The CHAIRMAN. It was a surprise to you?

Captain EBEEY. Yes, I was sort of stunned.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your equipment at your post?

Captain EBEEY. My equipment was four 155 millimeter guns, truck drawn, and we had some .30 caliber machine guns with anti-aircraft mounts.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your machine guns in place?

Captain EBEEY. No, sir. The machine guns are not anti-aircraft machine guns; they are used for ground defense, but my supply sergeant was there with a few rounds of machine-gun ammunition, and I got the battery and the men from Fort Kam, and the machine guns were coming at us, and I ordered the machine guns set up in the rear of my place. We set them up in the tennis court. I sent two thirds down to load the guns and one third down to get ammunition. We loaded up the guns with the ammunition and started firing.

We established these machine gun positions there and started firing at 8:13. I looked at my watch.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were the machine guns before you set them up in your tennis court?

Captain EBEEY. They were right in my supply room, sir, ready to go to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you use your big guns for anti-aircraft action?

Captain EBEEY. No, sir, they are designed for no purpose except coast defense or against land attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what was done?

Captain EBEX. We went to battle position.

General McCoy. Did you have any target in the harbor or any harbor mount?

Captain EBEX. No, sir, our battle position is this point (indicating on map), Barbers Point. We had to cross the harbor. We had this position here (indicating) by barge, and then by road, but we did manage to bring down two planes in [439] the second attack with machine guns, two fighter planes that came over our barracks, and we knocked them down.

General McCoy. Which must have been a great satisfaction to you?

Captain EBEX. It was a great satisfaction, sir.

General McCoy. You saw no submarines or other hostile water craft?

Captain EBEX. I saw no submarines or any water craft. We were too busy trying to get what was in the air.

We got the barge loaded between the second and last attack. As we went out of the channel two fighters dove on us and machine-gunned us. The machine guns were firing back, but they didn't hit any of our men. It seemed like they were unloading a truckload of high-explosive ammunition.

As they passed over us, some cruiser there let go with all the equipment, and these two planes seemed to dissolve in the air. They must have cut them to—

The CHAIRMAN. Cut them to pieces?

Captain EBEX. Yes, and I have some scraps of the stuff left.

The CHAIRMAN. You had machine guns in your barge?

Captain EBEX. Yes, and we fought back. I personally handled the machine gun on the barge and we fought back.

I might say that Quartermaster Mr. Jack Barros made six trips under fire across Pearl Harbor, and he certainly did his job well.

That is all we did, sir. We went out to Barbers Point to battle position, and we went out and got our guns into position and were ready to fire at 3 o'clock. We were completely ready to fire.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Coast Artillery?

Captain EBEX. The Coast Artillery, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you get any instructions from high authority?

[440] Captain EBEX. Yes, my battalion commander.

General McCoy. Who is he?

Captain EBEX. Colonel McCarthy. He was at the battery a minute before I was and he said, "Get your guns ready and rolling," and I said, "They are all made ready now."

The CHAIRMAN. Was your full complement of men practically on hand?

Captain EBEX. They were all on hand, sir. Of course, it was the day before pay day, and we were on an anti-sabotage alert, and not many of them could leave anyhow.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many off on leave Saturday night?

Captain EBEX. No. The ones that could did, but it was the day before pay day, and many of them were financially unable to go.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on Saturday night?

Captain EBey. Well, I am a sort of bachelor. My wife and daughter are in the States, and I was reading a book called "John Brown's Body."

General McCoy. That is a very good book, sir.

Captain EBey. Yes. I was reading about the surprise at Shiloh Church when the attack occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Captain, had you received any instructions in any way which would lead you to believe that there had been any warning in regard to an attack?

Captain EBey. We were on the anti-sabotage alert, sir, and with the international situation it might occur some day, and we were holding the infantry reserve in case of any uprising.

We had gone so many times to our war position that it just seemed like drill even when they were firing at us. None of the men got excited.

[441] Admiral STANDLEY. There was nothing in the way of an expression that would indicate that there was apprehension among those in the War Department or in headquarters of an attack other than sabotage?

Captain EBey. No, sir, I had no idea by any expression of any attack being imminent.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

General McCoy. Did you have liaison with the Navy at all? Any information from the Navy previous to this attack?

Captain EBey. Well, sir, I may say that the Navy impressed me with the efficiency of their barrage and they really saved the lives of many of this group when this cruiser shot those planes up, but I believe the battery commander would know about the liaison with the Navy.

General McNARNEY. How did you get this barge across?

Captain EBey. It is pushed. They had this harbor boat, and we just pushed it across.

General McNARNEY. Who manned it?

Captain EBey. It is manned by a crew of two sailors and chief engineers and master and several employees of the Quartermaster Corps.

General McNARNEY. They were there available at the time.

Captain EBey. Yes, everybody was on the job.

General McNARNEY. Where do they live?

Captain EBey. They live right almost at Fort Kamehameha dock.

General McCoy. Who was in command of it then?

Captain EBey. Colonel E. B. Walker.

General McCoy. Have you been commended for your action on that day?

Captain EBey. No, sir, it was just—I did not do anything more than the rest of the battery did. They were all just [442] calm. We were being shot at and we could not do much else than fire back.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, we think it necessary in view of the nature of our inquiry to ask the witnesses not to discuss their testimony or

what occurs in this room with anyone, and we will ask you to observe that.

Captain EBEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WILLIAM J. MCCARTHY, COAST
ARTILLERY, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The witness was sworn in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Please sit down, Colonel, and give your name to the reporter.

Colonel MCCARTHY. William J. McCarthy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment on the morning of December 7, Colonel?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Commanding officer. First Battalion, 55th Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha, Territory of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your first information that you had been attacked?

Colonel MCCARTHY. About 7:45 Sunday morning I heard several planes. They don't bother me any.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard the planes before you heard the shooting?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, for this reason, that my quarters are such that the planes flying in and out of Hickam Field always fly over my quarters.

It wasn't until I heard the bombing and explosion and the tat-tat-tat of machine guns that I knew what it was. That was at 7:45.

[443] My first reaction was that this is a funny time for the Air Corps to start trouble. I got out just in time to see a single-seater Japanese plane flying over my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any trouble in identifying it?

Colonel MCCARTHY. No. There was the insignia the red ball, and his two machine guns were both going. I knew I was safe because he had just passed me and headed for Hickam Field.

That immediately excited my curiosity, and I went to the telephone and called to see what it was all about. The telephone operator could not give me any information, so I immediately got in my car and alerted my other batteries and told them to get rolling, that is, Battery A and C.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the captain who was just in here under your command?

Colonel MCCARTHY. Yes, he is under my command. He commanded Battery B.

I told him to get rolling and get to war position.

At that time there was a lot of machine-gun bullets all around the place, and I reached the battery which is at the lower end of Oahu Point, and a Japanese plane had just struck a tree and caromed off the first tree and struck into a wall at my right at the ordnance machine gun shed. That plane was on the ground. The pilot was dead, having left the pilot stuffed in the tree, but the plane was on the ground, and the engine went around the ordnance shop. [444] In caroming off he struck several men who were in the road. One man was completely decapitated. Another man apparently had been

hit by the prop, because his legs and arms and head were off, lying right on the grass. The pilot was dead, as I say, in the plane.

By that time headquarters battery, A battery and B battery, were firing with machine guns, auto rifles, and rifles at the planes going over.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were the machine guns before the action began?

Colonel McCARTHY. They were in the battery areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel McCARTHY. Pulled out of the storeroom, and everybody started firing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your command intact that morning?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there many leaves over that—

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. They were intact. There were no leaves other than the usual granted. There were at least 50% of all commands present, and probably more than that, because nobody had any money, and they all stayed in the post.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Colonel, when did you receive the orders to go on Alert No. 1?

Colonel McCARTHY. Alert No. 1? About the 21st or 22nd of November. We were on Alert No. 1 and 2 up to the time of the attack.

General McNARNEY. When were you ordered on Alert No. 2?

Colonel McCARTHY. About the 30th, and that was taken off about the 3rd or 4th.

The CHAIRMAN. There was a period in there that you were on 2, was there?

[445] Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What does Alert No. 1 entail in your command?

Colonel McCARTHY. Alert No. 1 entails anti-sabotage guard, guard of installations, consists primarily of merely guards armed with rifles to protect vital installations.

General McNARNEY. While you were on Alert No. 2, what additional measures did you take?

Colonel McCARTHY. The additional measures involved in Alert No. 2, sir, were to increase the guards. We had doubled guards on every place.

General McNARNEY. You set up no machine guns?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Or anti-aircraft work?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir; just guards, anti-sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you expecting any attack in the nature of a Japanese air raid, Colonel?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Heard no suggestion of any such thing?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Over this period?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where are your battle positions?

Colonel McCARTHY. My battle positions, sir, are located on the south shore. My command post is at station B, commonly called the Ewa group.

General McCoy. Will you show us on the map, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, gladly.

(The witness went to a map.) Barbers Point lighthouse (indicating). My command post is right behind on a hill called Puu Palailia. That is my command post. I have two [446] guns at Awanui Gulch. I have four guns immediately to the left of Barbers Point lighthouse on the beach. I have four guns, battery C, at Fort Weaver, mounted on Panama mounts, and I have four guns at Fort Kamehameha mounted on the beach just to the left of Battery Selfridge, all mounted on Panama mounts with the exception of the ones at Barbers Point, which are dug in, the ordinary field positions. All these guns are on the beach.

General McNARNEY. And how many automatic or infantry weapons do you have in your command for close-in defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. For close-in defense, for the defense of the materiel I am armed with .30 caliber rifle, machine guns .30 caliber, and automatic rifles, Browning automatics, B.A.R.

General McNARNEY. Are any of those set up for anti-aircraft defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. They are all around the guns.

General McNARNEY. When did any of your weapons get into action on that morning? Do you know?

Colonel McCARTHY. The first somewhere between eight o'clock and eight-ten, but that was right in the battery areas at Fort Kamehameha.

General McCoy. Did any of your guns go into action at all against the Japanese?

Colonel McCARTHY. The 155's, no, sir; none of my guns have been in action yet, sir.

General McCoy. Did you see any targets at all on the sea or at the entrance of the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Submarines?

Colonel McCARTHY. Submarines were out there, but we were told not to fire on them. When I say "not to fire on them," we were told to hold our fire until we were directed to fire, [447] although we have an order that if we cannot positively identify a submarine we will fire on it, in our own judgment. All American submarines now are to be convoyed or escorted by a destroyer, so that if we see a submarine that is unescorted it is presumably an enemy and we will fire on it.

General McNARNEY. Those are the orders in effect at the moment?

Colonel McCARTHY. At the moment, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were they in effect on December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. How did you get your firing—or would you have gotten your firing orders, on December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. From the harbor. Harbor defense.

General McNARNEY. From the harbor defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. At Fort Kamehameha.

General McNARNEY. Good communications?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. They are perfect.

General McNARNEY. How soon did you get your command post manned?

Colonel McCARTHY. The command post, sir, was manned all the time.

General McNARNEY. That is your battle position command post?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. That was manned ever since the day of the original alert.

General McCoy. Did you get any orders from higher authority that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Acted entirely on your own initiative?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. As soon as I saw what was happening I told the batteries to roll, to get out to their positions. I might interpose this: Battery A of course was in position right there at Kam, Battery C guns were in position at [448] Weaver, and the only battery that had to be emplaced was B battery at Barbers Point. C and B battery started across the channel on the barge going about eight-thirty. They couldn't get across at that time due to the fact that the Navy destroyers were just pouring out of there just as fast as they could go, with all guns blazing, all their anti-aircraft, and naturally we couldn't block the channel to them. As soon as we got clear on the second attack we cleared across, and B battery was strafed going across with their guns.

General McNARNEY. Did you receive an Alert No. 3 status from the higher command on that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, although I was in Alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. After you got started you were?

Colonel McCARTHY. I just went out there with ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Now, you stated that you were on alert No. 2 for a few days during this period. Would there be any records in your headquarters showing when you received the Alert No. 2 and when you went off of it, or was that entirely a verbal order?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, there would not be, because those were verbal instructions from the post commander.

General McCoy. In the nature of drill?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, they were not in the nature of drill. The commanding officers of the various battalions were called in and told that Alert No. 2 was on, to double the guards, and three or four days before the attack it was eased off.

General McCoy. Have you a mimeographed sheet showing what Alert No. 2 is?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. It is contained in S. O. P., Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department, which all organizations or battalions at least—

General McNARNEY. Who is the officer that called you in [449] and gave you the order for Alert No. 2?

Colonel McCARTHY. If I recollect correctly, it was Colonel Walker.

General McCoy. He is your regimental commander?

Colonel McCARTHY. He is the post commander, yes, sir.

General McCoy. He is also regimental commander?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did that apply to the whole coast defense system, do you know, or simply to your post?

Colonel McCARTHY. I wouldn't know, sir. I know it applies—it applied to our post, because anything that would affect the whole system would come from the Hawaiian coast artillery command.

General McCoy. And you are quite sure that you never got an order for Alert No. 3?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, not on the 7th I didn't, except: the only order that we received that might be interpreted as an Alert No. 3 was the message of three o'clock in the afternoon, or in the afternoon—just what time I don't recall—that all officers would report to their battle stations and remain there. That was a message from harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor.

General McNARNEY. Do you keep any war dairy in your organization?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you keep it prior to December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Have you one for December 7?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask some.

Under Alert No. 2, Colonel, that you went into on about [450] the 30th, what is your liaison there with the Navy?

Colonel McCARTHY. Our liaison with the Navy, sir, operates through Pearl Harbor, through a naval liaison officer called the harbor control post, the navy yard. I personally have no direct connection with it. That is, if I want to find out anything I call harbor defenses, and they get the harbor control post of the navy yard and get rulings on any questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there any Army liaison at harbor control post?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. That's Captain Eby that was in here, is the liaison officer in the harbor control post now.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was he before?

Colonel McCARTHY. Not before the night of the 7th, but there was one, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who?

Colonel McCARTHY. Colonel Dingman.

General McCoy. Do you get a report as to the ships that come in and out?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, we get that direct from harbor defenses. In other words, a friendly ship coming out, they notify us that one DD or one BB or aircraft carrier is leaving port or will ply—

General McCoy. Did you get any such notices on the day of the 7th?

Colonel McCARTHY. I would have to consult the record, sir. There were so many things came in there, I wouldn't remember. We undoubtedly did, though, late in the afternoon or in the afternoon or night.

General McCoy. Are you conscious of any particular responsibility on your part when the fleet is in the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, very much so. It is my duty to protect and keep that channel clear against all landing [451] forces and to see that the Navy has safe conduct through there.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any particularly added responsibility when the fleet was in the harbor?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir. I must prevent any foreign vessel, warcraft, from entering that harbor.

General McCoy. Is the torpedo net there under your control or defense?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir. That is entirely under the control of the Navy, sir.

General McCoy. You have no guns that would help protect that?

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir, I have: A battery at Fort Kamehameha could shoot right down that channel, and I could have the guns at Fort Weaver turn around and shoot at it.

General McCoy. Did you learn from the Navy at any time on the 7th of the presence of any submarine?

Colonel McCARTHY. I presume it came from the Navy. My own headquarters notified me that there were enemy submarines off Barbers Point, and I was alerted on Alert 3, condition of readiness 2, ready to go in action immediately, not later than five minutes.

General McCoy. Did you see any submarines that day?

Colonel McCARTHY. Our own, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you see any enemy submarines?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, this liaison between, or on this post, harbor—

Colonel McCARTHY. Harbor control post.

Admiral STANDLEY. Harbor control post. That liaison. That has existed for how long? Do you know?

Colonel McCARTHY. Well, I have been here, sir, twenty-seven or -eight months, and to my knowledge that has been in existence all the time.

[452] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you direct communications with the navy yard?

Colonel McCARTHY. Sir?

General McCoy. Have you direct communications to the navy yard or direct wire, or what?

Colonel McCARTHY. No, sir, I have no direct communication with the navy yard. All our communications are addressed to the harbor defenses of Pearl Harbor, and there is an officer there who contacts the navy control post.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we will ask you not to discuss what has gone on in the room while you were here, with anyone.

Colonel McCARTHY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Major ALLEN. Private Shortt, Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Private, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE CREED SHORTT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give the reporter your full name, will you?

Private SHORTT. Creed Shortt.

The CHAIRMAN. What command are you in, Shortt?

Private SHORTT. Fort Kam Coast Artillery. Rather, ambulance. Fort Kam ambulance driver.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was your immediate commander on the day of December 7?

Private SHORTT. Sir? Major Gill was in charge of the dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the attack came on?

Private SHORTT. Well, sir, I was at the motor pool down there washing the ambulance when the attack first began, and I [453] hit—went to the dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. A little bit louder. I don't hear you.

Private SHORTT. Sir, I was down there at the motor pool washing the ambulance, sir. I had the left fender, just got it waxed, and when the attack began I pulled out and went to the dispensary. That was my first move.

The CHAIRMAN. What hour, as nearly as you know, was that?

Private SHORTT. Sir, by the clock down there it was eight o'clock, about eight o'clock when it happened.

General McCoy. Where was this, Private?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General McCoy. Where was this?

Private SHORTT. Fort Kam dispensary.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you notice the size of the flight that went over there? Have you any notion of the number of planes that came in on the first attack?

Private SHORTT. No, sir, I didn't. I just looked up and saw that there red rising sun on it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Were they flying high or low?

Private SHORTT. Sir, they was flying low.

The CHAIRMAN. What character of planes?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Single seaters, any of them?

Private SHORTT. Sir, they was kind of single-seated, flying pretty low.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNARNEY?

General McNARNEY. You said you went to the dispensary?

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What did you do there?

Private SHORTT. Sir, went there, went out—went down and picked up some men where the plane crashed.

General McNARNEY. How many officers or men were in the dispensary at the time?

[454] Private SHORTT. Sir, there was Major Gill and Captain Ketchman and Captain Smith and Captain Garry.

General McNARNEY. Did they organize a litter service or an ambulance service, or how did you get these men?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General McNARNEY. I say, how did you get these, how did you pick these wounded men up? Did you have a litter service or ambulance service?

Private SHORTT. Litter. I just went out and it took—I went out and picked them up by myself, sir. I went out to get them.

General McNARNEY. Did nobody help you?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. We got down and there were some fellows, and I got them to give me a hand.

General McNARNEY. Who directed you to pick them up?

Private SHORTT. Sir?

General McNARNEY. Did anybody direct you to go out and pick them up?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. They just said there was a plane crashed, and I went on out to pick them up.

General McNARNEY. How many wounded were brought into the dispensary that day?

Private SHORTT. Sir, there was nine wounded.

General McNARNEY. They were all coast artillery men?

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any Japanese wounded?

Private SHORTT. No, sir. The Japanese, he was killed.

General McNARNEY. What did you do with him?

Private SHORTT. Sir, I didn't pick the Japanese up. I just took care of the wounded.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General McNARNEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't discuss your testimony here with anyone, Shortt, outside of the room. [455]

Private SHORTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are much obliged to you.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Saltzman, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT STEPHEN G. SALTZMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give the reporter your full name, will you, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Stephen G. Saltzman.

The CHAIRMAN. Of what unit are you a member?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. 98th Coast Artillery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And where is the headquarters of that command?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. The upper post, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. And where are your quarters, your personal quarters?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. My personal quarters are at the upper post, the regimental area.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment? What is your specific command?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I am regimental communications officer.

General McCoy. Regimental?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us in your own way when you first learned of the attack, and go on from there and tell us what you observed and what you did, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I will try to, sir, to the best of my knowledge. I was lying in bed about quarter of eight Sunday morning, the 7th of December, and I heard the fleet that attacked Wheeler Field come over my quarters, and I have been interested in the air corps for some time. I knew [456] immediately that they were not American planes; they didn't sound like American planes. And I threw a towel around myself and went outside and saw that they were Japanese planes, ran down to the switchboard to call the commanding officer, and his line was busy, so I told the operator to get in touch with him and tell him that we were under attack. Just about that time they opened up over Wheeler Field. I ran back, and there were officers standing around in the quadrangle, in the officers' quarters, and I shouted to them that it was an attack, and threw on a pair of coveralls and pistol and runs down and turned some of the men out in the regimental area where the barracks are, and saw that they were drawing ammunition. We already had small arms ammunition in our storerooms due to the alert which we had had for a week, and I drew some pistol ball and went up to the motor park, and there were drivers up there, and our regiment—the alert plan on which each man has a job, and I sent the drivers off to their appointed stations and—

Yes, sir? I thought you were going to ask a question (addressing General McCoy).

And at approximately eight-fifteen the guns had started to move out of the motor park. One point of interest I think you might be interested in is the fact that the whole flight that came down came over Kolehole Pass and directly over our gun park, and we had 24 guns and 6 directors and height finders sitting there in the gun park, and one group—one small bomb would have done a great deal of damage.

General McCoy. Did or would have done?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Would have done.

The CHAIRMAN. Would have done.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I don't see how anybody going over as low as they were could have missed seeing them. I believe that they were interested in only their ultimate purpose, which was [457] to lay low the air force.

About that time I took off for my regimental communications shop. My men were there loading up the truck. I had been battalion communications officer, and that detail had already left for their field positions. The alert, as far as I could determine, was sounded at eight-twenty. I went through Wheeler Field, drove a ton and a half truck of the regimental communications detail out of the gun park at 8:25, and it was under attack at that time. I dropped guards at my terminal cans to guard the wires, and went over to command post which is approximately 300 yards due west—east of Wheeler Field.

While we established communications I heard what sounded like two planes pulling out of a dive over Kam Highway, and I grabbed a rifle from one of the men standing there and a couple of clips of

ammunition—it was a Browning automatic rifle—and ran outside, dropped to my knees, and Staff Sergeant Klatt was behind me, and we got on our knees to study the planes and make positive there were no friendly pursuits in the air. Nobody was firing at it. Just then he opened up with his four machine guns, and I think I was too mad to be scared. He wasn't more than a hundred feet off the ground. We opened up at him, and fortunately for us there were high tension lines behind us, and he had to pull out of his dive or I am afraid I wouldn't be sitting here. He crashed about—after we emptied our clips he crashed the other side of the building. Two pilots in it. We ran over there, and it was a Pratt-Whitney engine in the machine, and it worried me. I thought I had made a mistake, and after the Air Corps Intelligence got over there they determined that it was Japanese.

The rest of the morning was spent in preparing the command post, and the regiment itself seemed to move into the field with very little delay and confusion, and never in the whole time, the whole action we had, did I notice any chaotic con- [458] ditions. The men—it was—well, it was gratifying to see the way the men went to their jobs under attack the whole time.

The CHAIRMAN. What state of readiness or unreadiness would your command be in to meet an attack of this kind under the alert that was then in effect?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had been alerted. I believe, the Sunday before in a No. 1 Alert, which under the Standing Operating Procedure in the Department is an anti-sabotage alert, in which the guard was doubled—I believe our guard was tripled, and live ammunition was issued to it in place of the guard ammunition. All the batteries, all the organizations, drew a day's fire for each man and kept it in their storerooms. Then men were not issued the ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Personally?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. That is our state of readiness; our guns were all in the gun park, in the moving, traveling position.

General McNARNEY. What equipment did you have in your regiment?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I beg pardon, sir.

General McNARNEY. What equipment did you have in your regiment?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had two battalions of 3-inch guns. In a second battalion we used all M-4 equipment, which is 1940 or later, and, the first battalion is armed with the 1923 gun and the T-83 directors, which is older equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your regiment a mobile regiment of artillery?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, our regiment is a semi-mobile regiment. However, we have I believe almost enough motor transportation to make it completely mobile.

General McNARNEY. How about automatic weapons? What did you have?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had no automatic weapons [459] other than .30 caliber Brownings with infantry adapter mount for A. A. fire.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no machine guns?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, we had these .30 caliber machine—

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, but you had no anti-aircraft guns?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir. There were infantry machines with an anti-aircraft adapter for high elevation.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Were they in position?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, they were not.

General McCoy. Where were they?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I believe they were in the battery storeroom, sir. I believe that some of the guns had been kept out on the entrances to the regimental area in nests, I think just maybe two or three with ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Where are your normal gun positions?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Our regiment is—our first battalion of our regiment is assigned to the defense of Wheeler Field. The second battalion is McOppen out at Bellows Field.

General McNARNEY. I presume that you have been in position many times?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, we have.

General McNARNEY. Your replacements all prepared, and everything?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, our emplacements were in very good shape, but they were not in what I consider a shape to stay in the field for a campaign. The field fortifications for the guns themselves and the ammunition pits were all dug and ready to go, and they stand today almost exactly as they were then. However, we had to dig into the ground for barracks for the men, you see.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean to keep them on position?

[460] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What happened to the battalion whose station was Bellows?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Well, sir, they got under way very fast. They, as far as I can ascertain, were in position down there about two hours after the first alarm.

General McCoy. They were in your same park, however, at the time of the attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, that's correct.

General McCoy. Had to go how many miles?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Well, sir, if they had gone over the Pali Road it would be, I should judge, 40 miles, but if they had gone around Koko Head it would have been closer to 60.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we have heard something here about an Alert No. 1 ordered on November 27. Does that correspond with your recollection?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was that order changed at any time between November 27 and December 7, the date of the attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I have heard rumors that it was, but we never had notification of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard rumors that for a few days an Alert No. 2 was in effect?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, I am not familiar with that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what are the rumors of change that you have heard?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I was told that Saturday night before the attack, December 6, that the alert had been called off completely, no alert, and that the units hadn't been advised of that, because——

The CHAIRMAN. So that they still assumed that it was in effect?

[461] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. I think the rumors are probably wrong, but we want to get all the light we can on this situation.

General McNARNEY. Sitting around barracks or sitting around talking with your contemporaries did you ever discuss an air raid, the possibility of an air raid?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, knowing that the signal corps—the air warning service has outposts all over the Island and on other islands and that they are manned almost continually and that the Navy patrols these waters, I never felt that we would be completely surprised the way we did. I don't think anybody thought that we would be surprised.

The CHAIRMAN. You know the situation was tense, didn't you, as between Japan and the United States?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir, I did.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Did it ever come into your mind that Japan might take off in these hostilities by air-raiding the Island of Oahu?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, in my wildest dreams I couldn't fathom it. I couldn't see how, completely surrounded as she was by what would turn into hostile forces, she could dare to do a thing like that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think your state of mind was not unusual amongst the military commands on this Island?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, among the junior officers I believe it was the same as I felt.

General McNARNEY. How long have you been in the service?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. One year January 2nd, sir.

General McNARNEY. Are you a reserve officer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where did you come in from, what school?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. University of Delaware.

[462] The CHAIRMAN. Where is your home?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Wilmington.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any training before you came in as a coast artillery officer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. No, sir, I hadn't.

General McNARNEY. What did you study at school?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Economics, sir.

General McCoy. What was your remark there?

General McNARNEY. No previous training.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I had four years of R. O. T. C.

General McCoy. At the University of Delaware?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, where were you on the night of December 6?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. The night of December 6 I was in the 98th Officers' Club playing cards.

The CHAIRMAN. We have heard rumors that a lot of the forces on this Island was off at parties on Saturday night and that there was a

good deal of drunkenness. What do you know or what have you heard on that subject?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, I can only speak for the officers of the 98th. I remember that night most of the junior officers were gathered in the club there, and we were sitting around and we were drinking, and I don't remember—recall any instances of drunkenness. I didn't move out of the area at all that night; I can't say.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to the time you left the club, Lieutenant, was there any officer there who wouldn't have been fit on account of drinking to respond when an alert was given?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I don't believe so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There was drinking there?

[463] Lieutenant SALTZMAN. There was drinking, yes, sir. It was mostly beer.

The CHAIRMAN. Mostly beer?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What you would call normal drinking?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I would, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your command practically intact as respects presence at their quarters on the morning of this attack?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Sir, a report was required three or four days ago concerning the number of men present for duty, and as I recall it it was 95% present for duty.

General McCoy. Both officers and men?

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions, gentlemen?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we have found it necessary to enjoin upon witnesses here in this inquiry that they do not discuss it, speak to others about it at all, about what went on this room.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall ask you to observe that.

Lieutenant SALTZMAN. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Next witness.

Major ALLEN. Sergeant Klatt, Schofield Barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT LOWELL VINCENT KLATT, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Sergeant?

[464] Sergeant KLATT. Lowell Vincent Klatt.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your command, Sergeant?

Sergeant KLATT. I am in charge of wire communications for the 98th first battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the same outfit to which the lieutenant who was just here belongs?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir. He is regimental officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are your headquarters?

Sergeant KLATT. Our headquarters are at Schofield Barracks, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at Schofield Barracks Saturday night, December 6?

Sergeant KLATT. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not on leave?

Sergeant KLATT. No, I wasn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of the 7th when this attack broke?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, when it first started, sir, I was in the mess hall having my breakfast.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you hear first? What first attracted your attention?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, the first that attracted my attention was the squadron of planes coming in over Kolekole Pass and right over our mess hall.

The CHAIRMAN. You could hear them?

Sergeant KLATT. You could hear them when they went over low, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they high or low?

Sergeant KLATT. I would say they were quite low.

The CHAIRMAN. Without my asking you, then what happened? What did you do?

Sergeant KLATT. When we first heard them go over, why, we paid very little attention to them, figuring it was some of [465] either Wheeler Field or Hickam Field planes that were out on maneuver or something like that. And shortly thereafter, why, we heard these concussions down around Wheeler Field, and also machine gun fire, and at that, why, we all ran out and stood out around the yard watching to see what happened. At first we didn't know just what to expect, and as we saw smoke and flame coming up from Wheeler Field and as these planes would tear over the barracks, why, we would see them cut loose with their machine guns, and numerous places there was splinters flying and things like that. And at that, why, I figured it was something important, so I told my detail to get their packs, get the trucks down, and be ready to take off. And while I was doing that Lieutenant Saltzman gave the word that we were on the alert, to go to our battalion command post and set up communications. Well, I had my truck down in short order and loaded it, got my men aboard, and we took off 20 minutes—20 minutes, 25 minutes after eight and started for our battalion command post.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?

Sergeant KLATT. That is on the other side of Wahiawa, in a C. C. camp.

The CHAIRMAN. How far?

Sergeant KLATT. I would say offhand about three and a half miles. And as we started for there, why, we passed Hickam Field, and we could see that it was all in flames, and we could see these planes diving down and concussions of bombs, and so forth, and so it looked very real to us, of course, and we got over there, and we were setting up communications, and shortly thereafter Lieutenant Saltzman came in, and he told us it was the real thing, boys. That's just the way he said it. And as we were setting up our switchboards, telephones, and so forth, connecting our wires, why, we heard two planes pull out of a

[466] dive over Wheeler Field, and they came right over Kam Highway so that they headed directly into us to strafe us. Lieutenant Saltzman wasn't armed with a rifle or anything like that, and he grabbed a B.A.R. from one of the boys that were there, and using him as a cue, why, I also grabbed one, and we got down on our knees and started firing at these planes as they came towards us, and right directly behind us was a high tension line, and as they pulled out and peeled off to the right and the second one peeled off to the left, and just as he peeled off to swing away from us, why, we cut loose with the Browning automatics, and within a second or two seconds at the most we heard this crash and a blast. And as there were no planes in our immediate vicinity at the moment, why, we ran around the corner of the building. We hadn't seen it crash or anything like that; it had passed around the corner of the building from us. We ran around the corner, and we could see this plane in flames, and we ran over there, and the gasoline and everything had spread so far, and everything was—

The CHAIRMAN. Burning?

Sergeant KLATT. Burning, and the heat was terrific. We couldn't get very close to it. And after a while, after it had burned itself out practically, why, we got in there and we investigated as much as we could—just looking, naturally, curious, why, we had the wing sections and saw the motor was an American make motor and American prop, and Lieutenant Saltzman told me that the parachute itself was an American parachute. And, well, that's about all there was to it, and we went back and finished setting up our communications, getting the command post in order.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you stayed at the command post what? The balance of the day?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, I have been there ever since, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Been there ever since?

[467] Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did both planes crash or just one?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir; only the second one, the one that swung to the left. We didn't get a chance to fire at the first one to amount to anything because he pulled away from us pretty fast, but the other one pulled—swung right around broadside to us.

General McCoy. Was there more than one pilot?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, there was a pilot and observer, or another one right in behind him anyway. It was a two-passenger plane.

General McCoy. Both burned, were they?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, both burned very badly.

General McCoy. Both killed in the crash?

Sergeant KLATT. I believe they were, sir. At least, when we got there they were making no effort to get out; they were just all crashed down in the cockpit, from what we could see of them.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. Sergeant, what were your duties under Alert No. 1?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, our duties under Alert No. 1, as we had always done before, was to go over and set up the battalion command post and remain in constant attendance, and in case of any wire com-

munication going out it was our job to go out and fix it, splice lines for any breaks or shortages or anything like that.

General McNARNEY. You were not in position under an Alert No. 1, were you?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir, we weren't

The CHAIRMAN. Under 1 you were to keep wire communications in contact to the command post, were you?

Sergeant KLATT. That's right, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did you mount any guard any place?

[468] Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, there was guards—as soon as Lieutenant Saltzman was there, why, he mounted a guard around the C. C. post there, the command post.

General McNARNEY. That was after the fact, though, wasn't it?

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir, that was after it had started.

General McNARNEY. What were your normal routine duties before the attack, from November 27, on, during the period of alert?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, we had gone out and we had checked all our lines, our line for our battery into the command post. We weren't—we didn't have our switchboard in or telephones or anything like that. They were left back in the barracks supply room, and it was my job to see that they were all right. We had had no orders to move out in the field and maintain the post.

General McNARNEY. What percentage of your detail was required to remain on the post?

Sergeant KLATT. Well, I have seven men in my detail, a corporal and six privates, besides myself, and I always had at least four of the men there and myself, or a corporal and four men were always there.

General McNARNEY. How many men of your detail got to the command post that morning?

Sergeant KLATT. They were all present, sir.

General MCCOY. Did you have any casualties?

Sergeant KLATT. No, sir, there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you, Sergeant, not to disclose any questions or any of the testimony you have given in the room or discuss the matter with any of your fellows.

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Sergeant KLATT. Yes, sir.

[469] Major ALLEN. Colonel Howard, at Fort Armstrong.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL JACK W. HOWARD, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Colonel HOWARD. Jack W. Howard, Lieutenant Colonel, Q. M. S., Supply Officer, Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Fort Armstrong, Colonel?

Colonel HOWARD. Well, that's located down on the waterfront, on Ala Moana and Richards Street.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the city?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in the city, on the front?

Colonel HOWARD. Right in the city, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us when you first knew of the attack, where you were, and what happened as you observed it?

Colonel HOWARD. I was getting ready to play golf at the Waialae Golf Club when I heard over the radio a call for everybody to report to their stations, which I did.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would you report then? At your quarters?

Colonel HOWARD. At Fort Armstrong, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At Fort Armstrong?

Colonel HOWARD. At the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. What time did you get there? Do you know?

Colonel HOWARD. I would judge it was about 8:45.

The CHAIRMAN. The first attack was in progress or nearly over at that time?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

[470] The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe where the attackers in the first attack went after they—

Colonel HOWARD. I did not, sir. As a matter of fact, I was on my desk, and I wasn't out looking.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6, sir, and Sunday morning?

Colonel HOWARD. I was at the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. On the night of December 6?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, no, no. I was at home.

The CHAIRMAN. At home?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And were your quarters in the city?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir. I live out at Kahala about four miles from the depot.

The CHAIRMAN. So you know nothing about conditions in the city the night before?

Colonel HOWARD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. What do you store in your depot?

Colonel HOWARD. All supplies for the Hawaiian Department.

General McNARNEY. All nature of supplies?

Colonel HOWARD. Quartermaster supplies.

General McNARNEY. The General Quartermaster?

Colonel HOWARD. Class 1, class 2, class 3, and 4 supplies.

General McNARNEY. Were any calls made on you on the morning of December 7 when you got there?

Colonel HOWARD. Plenty.

General McNARNEY. What types of supplies were most needed?

Colonel HOWARD. Principally equipment and arrangements for food, bedding also, all classes of clothing and equipage and all classes of subsistence.

General McNARNEY. How large a place do you have in the depot?

[471] Colonel HOWARD. I have about 100 to 125 people under me.

General McNARNEY. Enlisted or civilian.

Colonel HOWARD. Some enlisted and mostly civilian.

General McNARNEY. How about the civilians? Did they turn up?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir. Most of them came in right away. Some few women did not show up.

General McNARNEY. Did you have standard orders as to what personnel—

Colonel HOWARD. They were to all report in. My key personnel report in; that was the standing order: the key personnel report in immediately, and then they call their own branches to come in if necessary.

General McNARNEY. On or about November 27 Alert No. 1 was ordered in effect?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Under Alert No. 1 what precautions were taken to guard the depot?

Colonel HOWARD. Other than the usual guard, none.

General McNARNEY. What does the guard consist of?

Colonel HOWARD. It consists of a post that runs across—runs up and down the Ala Moana and a post that runs up and down the Halekauwila Street, and, oh, those posts are not over a block and a half long, one of our city blocks here. Then, there is a roving patrol that visits those two guards, I think about every hour.

General McNARNEY. Was the depot easily distinguishable as a target?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, it is, very.

General McNARNEY. Were there any arrangements made for anti-aircraft protection of the depot under any type of alert?

Colonel HOWARD. Outside of the use of our own troops, which was set up as the original program, we were to take over [472] the defense of our own depot and Fort Armstrong.

General McNARNEY. What arms did you have for this purpose?

Colonel HOWARD. We had automatic rifles and rifles.

General McNARNEY. And no machine guns?

Colonel HOWARD. Not at that time.

General McNARNEY. Have you now?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. How many?

Colonel HOWARD. That I would hesitate to say. Being in command, I am not handling the troops directly. I wouldn't say.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what type of machine guns they are?

Colonel HOWARD. Browning.

General McNARNEY. Browning .30 caliber?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Adapted for anti-aircraft fire?

Colonel HOWARD. I think they are now. I think they have got their adapters on. I am not certain as to that. If they haven't the adapters on I am sure that Colonel Sothern who has command of one of those detachments as to the actual guard, has rigged up some mechanical attachments which will act as an anti-aircraft mount.

General McNARNEY. Did your issuing of supplies proceed smoothly on the day of the attack?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir, very, outside of the usual confusion in a situation like that.

General McNARNEY. Was there any jamming up of motor transportation in the vicinity of the depot?

Colonel HOWARD. No more than usual.

General McNARNEY. Is there a traffic control there?

Colonel HOWARD. Oh, yes; we got our traffic control to working right away.

[473] General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we shall ask you not to discuss with anyone outside your testimony here or anything that has happened in the room. Thank you, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, will you point out where Kahala is and where you live?

Colonel HOWARD. Kahala is right out in this area right out here [indicating].

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that right near Waialae golf course?

Colonel HOWARD. Yes, sir; just a very short ways.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Cooper, Hickham Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Cooper, will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT HOWARD FREDERICK COOPER, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Lieutenant COOPER. Howard Frederick Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your assignment on and before December 7, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant COOPER. I am commanding officer of the headquarters squadron, 17th air base group. My duties are on the ground; I have nothing to do with the air.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 at about 7:45?

Lieutenant COOPER. At about 7:45 I was sleeping.

The CHAIRMAN. In barracks?

Lieutenant COOPER. At my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. In your quarters. Your quarters are how near to Hickam Field?

Lieutenant COOPER. My quarters are right at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Right on it. What was the first thing that [474] attracted your attention, sir?

Lieutenant COOPER. The first thing that attracted my attention was the loud explosions along Pearl Harbor, after which I woke up and looked out, and I saw smoke coming out of Pearl Harbor. I figured it was very strange to have the Army—the Navy practicing on Sunday morning right in the harbor. And about that time I heard loud bursts on Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and tell us what happened, what you did.

Lieutenant COOPER. Naturally, I got out, put some clothes on, and ran out to the rear of Hickam Field. Dive bombers were tearing the place to pieces, blasting everything, coming down so close that I figured it was dangerous to run out, so I went out the front, and by that

time some of the other officers were up. And I noticed the high-altitude bombers coming over about over the officers' club, which is about 300 or 400 yards away, and there were two formations of five planes in each, I would estimate at about 12,000, 15,000 feet, traveling very slowly, proceeding to Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Proceeding to Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant COOPER. To Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. From what direction were they coming?

Lieutenant COOPER. From the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. From the ocean?

General McCoy. From the south?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. From the south?

Lieutenant COOPER. From the south, yes, sir. When they were over Pearl Harbor they dropped their bombs, and the formation was perfect, so perfect, and the timing on the dropping of the bombs was so perfect, that I could follow them down in V formation right to the ground, right to the impact.

General McNARNEY. What did they hit?

[475] Lieutenant COOPER. They hit Pearl Harbor, something in Pearl Harbor; I couldn't see because of the buildings in close front. These two waves I noticed turn around, one wave turn around one way and another wave turn around another way. Well, I forgot about those planes for a while, got my steel helmet and my gas mask and went down to the hangar line. First I went down in my car, and I turned around and left the car home because the place was bombed, and I got down there and got in contact with my first sergeant, and he said that all our men were out of the barracks. I told him to keep the men separated. Of course the damage seemed pretty considerable at the time. I walked up to the parade ground. There were some machine guns out there, but they were all out of commission, lacking any water cans, and men were busy trying to put them to working order.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on the parade ground?

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They had not been in position before the attack, these—

Lieutenant COOPER. No, sir, not in position; they were just being brought out.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did they go to get them?

Lieutenant COOPER. They got them anywhere they could find them, and all the men showed remarkable courage bringing all of these weapons out, trying to put them together. And about this time, while I was down at one of the guns, I could imagine that the high-altitude bombers were close overhead because of the anti-aircraft fire just blasting the skies, and it was all black, and before I knew it they had probably dropped their second bomb load from high altitude, and that's what sprayed the large barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck the large barracks?

Lieutenant COOPER. That struck the large barracks and [476] splattered on the ball diamond and the parade ground.

The CHAIRMAN. How many attacks would you say there were, how many separate attacks that morning?

Lieutenant COOPER. I would say that the whole thing was one attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You would?

Lieutenant COOPER. It was split up in dive bombers and high-altitude bombers. While the high-altitude bombers were attacking Pearl Harbor the dive bombers were damaging Hickam Field, and when the high-altitude bombers came over Hickam Field the dive bombers were attacking Pearl Harbor, and they worked in that system. It was very methodical.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, was there not a respite around nine o'clock? We have rather gotten the impression that there was a first fierce attack about eight o'clock and another fierce attack about nine and another about eleven. Was it your observation that there seemed to be planes over you during that whole period from eight to eleven?

Lieutenant COOPER. Well, when those high-altitude bombers were bombing Pearl Harbor the dive bombers were attacking Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. And vice versa?

Lieutenant COOPER. And vice versa.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Lieutenant COOPER. And while the high-altitude bombers were going out to the ocean again to get a bearing on Hickam Field I was—the men—in fact, a lot of the men were watching the dive bombers attacking Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Lieutenant COOPER. And of course the high-altitude bombers were on a mission to bomb Hickam Field this time, and they would come over and bomb Hickam Field, and of course they would have to go out again to come back on another mission, [477] and the dive bombers came right after them. It was a methodical system whereby they wouldn't bomb any of their own planes.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Which squadron did you say you belong to?

Lieutenant COOPER. Headquarters squadron, 17 air base group.

General McNARNEY. What are the duties of the headquarters squadron?

Lieutenant COOPER. Purely administrative. All the men are dispersed, scattered throughout the field and working in offices, libraries, and base maintenance when we have extra men.

General McNARNEY. Do you furnish any guard?

Lieutenant COOPER. We furnished—at the time that the thing happened we had about four men on guard.

General McNARNEY. What type of alert were you on on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant COOPER. We were on status A-3 and Alert No. 3, whereby only the ground defense was alerted.

General McNARNEY. Status A-3. Is that a local directive for Hickam Field?

Lieutenant COOPER. That is the directive for Hawaiian Department, Alert 3.

The CHAIRMAN. When was Alert 3 ordered?

Lieutenant COOPER. It was ordered two weeks before the attack or thereabouts.

General McNARNEY. Under that status of alert how many men of your squadron do you permit to be absent at any one time?

Lieutenant COOPER. Fifty percent of men and officers.

General McNARNEY. How many do you estimate were present [478] that morning, on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant COOPER. I believe close to all of the men were there. Very few men have any place to stay in town anyway, so they all reported back to the field.

General McNARNEY. Where did your men go, the most of them? Did they go to their duty stations, to their typewriters, or did they stay out on the field?

Lieutenant COOPER. Most of the men in my squadron had drawn rifles and ammunition and were out along Hangar Avenue.

General McNARNEY. What is your record of service, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant COOPER. I was ordered to active duty on the 7th November, 1940. I am now serving my second tour.

General McNARNEY. Where did you come from?

Lieutenant COOPER. Honolulu, sir.

General McNARNEY. Honolulu. Are you a native?

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. A native of there. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary, Lieutenant, to ask that you do not discuss your testimony here, or anything that happened in this room, with anyone else.

Lieutenant COOPER. Yes, sir. I will do that.

Major ALLEN. The Provost Marshal is here, sir. Would you like to hear him at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we shall be glad to see him.

FURTHER TESTIMONY OF MELVIN L. CRAIG, LIEUTENANT COLONEL, FIELD ARTILLERY, U. S. ARMY

The CHAIRMAN. Have you the information we requested?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, I believe that I have.

On the night of December 6, between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. the total number of soldiers arrested was 43, and 38 of these men were arrested for being drunk and 4 for being A. W. O. L. [479] Out of these 43, 42 were returned to their organizations and one man was confined.

The civil police record for that night: they had a total of 90 arrests: drunkenness 39, gambling 39, threatening 2, theft 1, auto theft 1, drunk-driving 1, other misdemeanors 3, assault and battery 3. A total of 90.

Comparing that with previous Saturday nights at payday, the night of July 31 from 6 p. m. to 6 a. m. we had 80 arrests. That is soldiers. Out of these, the number that were returned to their organizations was 48.

On the night of August 30 between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m. we had 87 arrests. That is the military. Number of men returned to their organizations was 30. 28 were turned in for safekeeping that night.

In the night of October 1, total number of arrests was 87. Number of men returned to their organizations was 40, and 47 confined.

On September 2 we had 21 arrests, 20 men confined and 1 returned to his organization.

September 30, 79 arrests, 35 returned to their organizations and 44 confined.

Then in November they started to distribute the paydays, and on November 3 Schofield Barracks was paid. Number of arrests was 67. Number of men returned to their organizations was 49. Number of men confined was 18.

And November 7: number of arrests 70, number of men returned to their organizations 10, number of men confined 60.

Then on December 3—that was the payday before—the total number of arrests that night was 114. 98 of these men were returned to their organizations; 16 were confined. But as far as the records show there was a relatively small number on the night of the 6th.

The civil police on November 15 arrested 74. That's [480] civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. Not soldiers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel CRAIG. November 22, 63; November 29, 68.

General McCoy. So in every case there were more civilians arrested than soldiers?

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir, it works out about that way. The population of the City of Honolulu and police district #1—that includes just the City of Honolulu and around this area here—that is, men over 21 years of age—is 61,800.

That is as far as I went back; I thought that that was the information the Commission desired.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is exactly what we want, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, was there anything else that we asked the colonel to get us? I think not.

Mr. Howe. I have nothing else, no, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. There were no officers on the night of the 6th.

The CHAIRMAN. No officers detained?

Colonel CRAIG. No officers. And, as I stated before, I checked on my activities that night, and I was home at eight o'clock, and I was home all evening until Sunday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Colonel CRAIG. Yes.

Mr. Howe. I have a report from Colonel Dunlop of the Adjutant General's Department on the consolidated report on the radio question you sent out as to men on hand, in percentages of men on hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. Howe. And also one from General Davidson referring to Wheeler Field.

[481] The CHAIRMAN. I think we shall just ask the stenographer to copy this report of Robert H. Dunlop into the record.

(The report referred to is as follows:)

26 DECEMBER 1941.

Memorandum to: Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps.

In response to a radiogram of this Headquarters sent to all major echelons, post and district commanders, the following tabulation shows the percentage of strength present at 8 a. m., 7 December 1941:

24th Inf. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.	90.0%
25th Int. Div., Schofield Barracks, T. H.	85.6
Hawaiian C. A. C.	
Hq & Hq Btry, HCAC	86.0
Hq Btry & Intelligence Btry, 53d CA	88.0
Harbor Def. of P. H. (includes the following 97th CA, Ft. Kam., T. H.)	97.0
Harbor Defenses of Honolulu	91.0
64th C. A., Ft. Shafter, T. H.	89.5
98th C. A. (includes 97th CA, at Scho Bks)	94.0
251st C. A. (Camp Malakole)	67.0
Hawaiian Air Force, T. H.	
Hq & Hq Squadron, HAF	100.0
19th Transport Squadron	90.0
428th Signal Maintenance Co.	96.0
Tow Target Detachment	91.0
5th Chemical Co. Service	100.0
7th AC Sq Communications (based on total strength including men on DS)	53.0
7th AC Sq Weather	90.0
407th Signal Co. Avn	97.3
18th Bomb Wing, Hickam Field, T. H.	94.0
14th Pursuit Wing, Wheeler Field, T. H.	
Officers	95.0
Enlisted men	84.0
[482] , Schofield Barracks, T. H. (Non-Divisional Units less reception center)	93.49
Trainees at Reception Center	27.0
Hickam Field, T. H.	84.0
Wheeler Field, T. H. (non-tactical units)	
Officers	97.0
Enlisted men	81.0
Fort Armstrong, T. H.	81.0
Percentage of Strength present at 8:00 a. m., 7 December 1941:	
Bellows Field, T. H.	
Officers	51.0
Enlisted men	85.0
Kilauea Military Camp, Hilo, Hawaii	
Permanent Det.	80.0
Visiting Det.	70.0
Hawaii Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Hily, Hawaii	95.0
Maui Dist., Nat. Guard Armory, Wailuku, Maui	59.7
Tripler Gen. Hospital, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	
Officers	20.0
Nurses	99.0
Det. Med. Dept.	97.0
Det. QMC	100.0
DHST, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	95.0
Hawaiian Ord. Depot, Ft. Shafter, T. H.	
Officers	42.0
Enlisted men	95.0
Kauai District, Lihue, Maui	Not received.

ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

[483] The CHAIRMAN. The interceptor command report reads thus:

(The report referred to was read into the record by the Chairman, and is as follows:)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND
23 December 1941

Honorable OWEN J. ROBERTS,
*Associate Justice of The United States,
Chairman Investigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H.*

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: As requested by your Committee, the following figures on the strength of Wheeler Field as of midnight 6-7 December 1941, are submitted:

Present: 228 Officers. 2547 Enlisted Men.

Absent: 1 Officer. 406 Enlisted Men.

Of the 406 men absent:

373 were on Detached Service (Schools, etc.)

5 were sick

21 were on furlough

2 absent without official leave

5 absent in confinement

—
406 Total.

H. C. DAVIDSON,
*Brigadier General, Air Corps,
Commanding.*

The CHAIRMAN. That seems to be a reasonable report, doesn't it?
General McNARNEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Copy that, Mr. Reporter, if you will.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant James K. Thomas, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Lieutenant?

[484] TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT JAMES K.
THOMAS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name to the stenographer.

Lieutenant THOMAS. James K. Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your assignment here on December 7, 1941, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was post signal and post signal property officer at Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Hickam Field?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack broke?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was at my quarters when the first attack broke.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us what you observed and what you did and saw done after that?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Well, I believe it was one of the very first bombs awoke me, and I saw that there had been a hit of some sort in Pearl Harbor area; I couldn't tell just what, from my quarters. I proceeded out into the front of the house. I noted some planes which I believe were dive bomber type carrying the Japanese insignia, which

were coming low over my quarters at that time, coming from the direction of Pearl Harbor toward our H. A. D. area. That awoke me to what was going on, and I went back and dressed immediately and went to my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Which were?

Lieutenant THOMAS. The headquarters building at Hickam Field, automatic telephone exchange.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in charge of that communications post, were you?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I suppose your duties at the post did [485] not permit of your observing very much outside? You were pretty busy?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Well, I was in and out quite a bit, sir. We immediately went to work laying field wire to set up an advance command post.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Lieutenant THOMAS. In the officers' quarters area, at Colonel Farthing's quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. Were your men under fire when they were doing that?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I was at my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of your command reported promptly?

Lieutenant THOMAS. I would say that every man was there within 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Full complement?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir. I had—no, sir, I will retract that. There were two men on post who rang in about an hour later, as rapidly as they could get there from Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You say you were setting up an advance command post. Was that in accordance with Standing Operating Procedure or was it an order given that morning?

Lieutenant THOMAS. We had established no definite location of an advance command post, but it was in our operating procedure that such would be set up immediately, and the location would depend on the situation.

[486] General McNARNEY. Who picked the location?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Colonel Farthing.

General MCCOY. Who was the colonel?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Colonel Farthing.

General MCCOY. Was he post commander?

Lieutenant THOMAS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to discuss or disclose anything that went on in the room while you were here. Thank you, sir.

Lieutenant THOMAS. Thank you.

Major ALLEN. Sergeant Ullrich, Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, will you be sworn, sir?

**TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT RALPH TRAUGER ULLRICH,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your full name?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Ralph Trauger Ullrich.

The CHAIRMAN. What command are you in, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Base engineering, sir, at Hickam Field, 22d Matériel.

The CHAIRMAN. And where are your quarters?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Quartered in the barracks, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on duty on the morning of December 7?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the attack broke?

Sergeant ULLRICH. At Hanger 15, sir, the base engineering shops.

The CHAIRMAN. You had already gone out to the shops before the attack broke, had you?

[487] Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir; I had.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first thing you heard or saw?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, as near as I can give it to you, sir, we had orders to report into the shop at 7:30 in the morning, between 7:30 and 8, so I got up there about 7:30, and practically everyone else was there. We heard some airplanes overhead and heard some explosions over near the Navy sector. We all walked outside, and I heard someone make the remark that "If that's fooling I'll believe anything."

General MCCOY. That what?

The CHAIRMAN. "If that's fooling I will believe anything."

Sergeant ULLRICH. And just about that time we seen a formation of airplanes coming from the south side of the field, from over Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they high or low, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I would judge about 200 feet, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Probably a little higher. Just then there was an explosion occurred near us, and we all scattered. Some of us went through the hangar, and there was a number of explosions in there. When the dust and everything settled, what of us were on our feet yet, we run outside, and then they began machine-gunning us.

The CHAIRMAN. These were dive bombers and machine-gun strafers, were they?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir. So after that was over I went back in the hangar, helped to pick up the wounded. We got them out, I went down to the barracks, and sometime later it started all over again.

The CHAIRMAN. There seemed to be a second attack?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir, there was.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Hickman Field bombed from a high [488] altitude, as well as this low-flying stuff?

Sergeant ULLRICH. I couldn't say, sir, as to the high altitude.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know. Your contingent was all on hand that morning, were they?

Sergeant ULLRICH. The greater percentage, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Was it normal routine to work on Sunday morning in the base engineering shop, Sergeant?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, it wasn't. We had a B-24, and they were doing some work on it, that we had worked on late Saturday evening, and then they expected some more airplanes in in the morning, and we had orders that the entire crew would come out and report for duty.

General McNARNEY. Did your outfit furnish any guard?

Sergeant ULLRICH. They had some on ground training that I know of, but I don't know how many, or so forth.

General McNARNEY. What guard was on the shops?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, there was no guard at all around the shop, sir, that I know of.

General McNARNEY. Do you keep the shops locked at night?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir, they are locked, and then they have the necessary guard, but they were not from my organization.

General McNARNEY. Anybody sleeping in the hangar?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir. And then they did have guards up there while the B-24 was parked. We were doing some work on it. What organization had them I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you observe any of these 4-engine bombers come in that morning on a flight from the continent?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. From the mainland?

Sergeant ULLRICH. No, sir, I didn't.

[489] The CHAIRMAN. You didn't see them.

General McNARNEY. How many ships did you have in the shop? Have you any idea?

Sergeant ULLRICH. There weren't any at all in our shop, sir. Ours is all machine shop, engine setup, sheet metal, and so forth.

General McNARNEY. How much damage was done to your equipment?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Well, not near as much as I thought at first, sir. I lost a few grinders, drill presses; that's about all. Practically all my welding equipment was ruined because it was down there in that far corner where the first large bomb hit.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any fire in your hangar?

Sergeant ULLRICH. Just a small one, sir, of no importance. About the only fire I seen was an arc welder burned up, and a few points.

General McNARNEY. How many men were disabled in your hangar when the hit came?

Sergeant ULLRICH. They figured about 60-odd, sir. That is the organization. In my department there was around 50-some-odd men. I had 20-some-odd casualties, and they weren't all there at the time.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you not to disclose the questions or anything that happened in the room, Sergeant.

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Sergeant ULLRICH. Yes, sir.

Major ALLEN. Private McBriarty, Bellows Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

[490] **TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RAYMOND F. MCBRIARTY,
UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your name to the reporter, please.

Private MCBRIARTY. Private first-class Raymond F. McBriarty.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your branch of the service, McBriarty?

Private MCBRIARTY. Air Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are you stationed?

Private MCBRIARTY. I am stationed at Bellows Field, sir, in the 86th observation squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. What are your duties there?

Private MCBRIARTY. I am aerial gunner and armorer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the air on December 7?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, after the attack we got in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. How long after the attack?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, I'd say about five minutes after the field was strafed.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Private MCBRIARTY. About five minutes after the attack, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you inquire, General?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Was there any other outfit stationed at Bellows Field besides the observation squadron?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir. The 44th pursuit was stationed there.

General McNARNEY. What airplanes are you equipped with, your squadron?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, our squadron is equipped with the O-47 B.

[491] General McNARNEY. How many?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, we had at the time, I believe there was, six in commission.

General McNARNEY. What time was the attack made on Bellows Field?

Private MCBRIARTY. Sir, at 8:30 one ship came over from the sea and fired on the shore. I don't believe it inflicted any casualties, and I don't know where the bursts landed. I heard them myself, and from there proceeded to go to church, and later I seen a B-17-B-17 D I believe—was landing down wind on the runway, and at about nine o'clock whistles blew around the camp, and everybody proceeded to their stations, the sections where they worked. I ran from church down to the section, and that was the time the large attack started, sir. There was no bombs dropped. It was just a strafing of the field.

General McNARNEY. You didn't realize then, when the first attack was made by this single plane, that there had been a heavy attack on the Island?

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir. I seen the plane, and the bullets sounded just like blanks, like—like blanks that the U. S. Army uses, and the ship looked like the AT-6 trainer the Army has.

General McNARNEY. And your commanding officer didn't realize that an attack was in progress?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, I couldn't say whether he did or not.

General McNARNEY. Well, you say you went to church. Was that voluntary?

Private McBRIARTY. That was on my own, sir.

General McNARNEY. That was voluntary? Nobody told you that—

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir. I had seen that one plane, and somebody in the barracks asked me what it was, and I told [492] him it was a plane with two red balls, so I just proceeded to go to church, and of course thinking about it, and then when I seen this B-17 landing down wind, that should have—more should have dawned upon me. It didn't.

General McNARNEY. Well, you received no instructions from any of your—

Private McBRIARTY (Interposing). —superior officers, no.

General McNARNEY. —noncommissioned officers or officers that anything unusual was happening?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. And you say a signal was sounded?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where were you then?

Private McBRIARTY. I was in the church at the time, sir.

General McNARNEY. And where did you go then?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, then I ran down to the line and proceeded into the armament shack and grabbed my gun, and another fellow followed me out with ammunition, and I got into the Major's ship, Major Stewart's ship, and mounted my gun and put my ammunition in my own gun and loaded it and went around and was proceeding to put ammunition in the fixed guns when the attack started; and when the first wave of planes came over I hit the dust. After it passed over I crawled in the cockpit, and I expended 450 rounds on them. I believe it was 450; I couldn't exactly say up to the dot, but I know it was over 400, in 100-round ammunition cans.

General McNARNEY. It was on the ground?

Private McBriarty. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. And did you notice any results?

Private McBRIARTY. Well, sir, one plane—one plane was coming down, just came right down the runway, didn't seem to have any objective at all, just fired on the ramp. Well, I know I hit that, but I could see that it sort of—it was so darned close, I could see holes going in the fuselage behind [493] the pilot, but I doubt whether I got him.

Then there was another one that dived straight on me. I fired right into its motor, and after he came out of his dive he pulled awful hard on the stick, not as any regular pilot would do, and I might say he was an awful poor pilot, because the way he was following in on his gunnery line, why, he tried to fire—to follow me straight in, and to correct his fire, why, he gave it too much rudder from one side and then too much rudder on the other side, and he completely missed his target.

General McNARNEY. You think he was an inexperienced pilot?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir; I would say most of them were, from the way they banked their ships. They skid all around. They really were rugged with the controls, really pretty rugged with them.

General McNARNEY. Rough?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. When did you take off?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, I said—I'd say we took off about five minutes after the attack, and when we got up in the air the Major's plane was acting sort of rough. We were going to—I believe we were going to proceed to go out to sea, to try to follow them, but I don't think the Major took the chance with the ship; it was pretty rocky. I don't know whether the ship was hit or not, but it had plenty of chance to be hit.

General McNARNEY. And you came back in and landed?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir, we came—proceeded back to land.

General McNARNEY. Did any other ships of your squadron take off?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir, no ships of our squadron took off, but one P-40 from the 44 Pursuit took off, and that went down, as I understand. I don't know whether any more took off or not, sir.

General McNARNEY. Was there any great amount of damage done [494] to the airplanes there?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, from the 86th squadron there was only—there was an O-49 completely ruined, shot through the dashboard and the controls; the wings were all ripped up, and there was one hole in an elevator in an O-47.

General McNARNEY. That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask one question: Have you knowledge of anyone observing planes that morning flying over or by your post, by Bellows Field, approaching the Island?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir; I haven't heard of anybody at all that has seen anything of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your contingent all present and accounted for that morning when you were needed?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, most of our men were. We were pretty well johnny-on-the-spot.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Private McBRIARTY. We were pretty well eye-on-the-spot that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Commanding officers all there and taking charge?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. About what time was it when you came out of church when this attack occurred?

Private McBRIARTY. Sir, I would say it was about nine o'clock, almost on the minute.

Admiral REEVES. You had heard nothing before that except this one plane that you told us about?

Private McBRIARTY. Yes, sir, just this one plane. Sir, what drew our attention to it was the B-17, which is unusual, it is such a small field, and then, besides, coming down wind, why, we thought there was something fishy.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did it make a good landing?

Private McBRIARTY. No, sir. It was with the wind, and it [495] landed about midrunway and went off the end of the ramp. There is a big knoll there, and the plane was a complete washout.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the pilot killed?

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir. He had three men wounded. They had been attacked on the way over here, and there was no ammunition in the plane, and evidently they couldn't fire back. I imagine—I couldn't say exactly the true facts of the case, so I would rather it was taken away from me.

General MCCOY. Was that the only plane of that type that landed there that morning?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir, it was the only B-17.

The CHAIRMAN. Is the B-17 one of our planes?

Private MCBRIARTY. Yes, sir.

General MCNARNEY. That is the big 4-engine flying fortress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Private MCBRIARTY. B-17 D I believe, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that wasn't one of those that was coming in from San Francisco. It wasn't armed?

Private MCBRIARTY. No. It had guns and everything else, sir, but it lacked the ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Private MCBRIARTY. I know we took the guns out of it and placed them up for ground defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss the testimony or what has been asked you here, with anyone else.

Private MCBRIARTY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Major ALLEN. Captain West, Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN MELBOURNE H. WEST, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, please?

Captain WEST. Melbourne H. West.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your branch of the service, Captain?

Captain WEST. I am in the Coast Artillery Corps, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you stationed on the day of December 7, 1941?

Captain WEST. I was stationed at Camp Malakole, at Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. At Barbers Point?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your headquarters were not at Barbers Point, were they?

Captain WEST. I described Camp Malakole as being at Barbers Point. I was at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Captain WEST. Our headquarters is there.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first you knew of the attack on December 7?

Captain WEST. Only by my own observation.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want.

Captain WEST. At eight o'clock in the morning I was having breakfast at the officers' mess, and I was officer of the day, and heard what sounded like gunfire, which sometimes is not unusual, and it continued to get louder, and I went outside and observed in the sky all the smoke coming from Pearl Harbor, in that direction, and the shrapnel in the air, so I knew it wasn't gunfiring, and shortly after eight o'clock I heard machine gunfire from—it sounded like from the air, and it was from the air over Camp Malakole, strafing of enemy planes over that camp.

[497] The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any machine gun defense there?

Captain WEST. We had ground machine guns, sir. We were protecting our own equipment against sabotage at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were under Alert No. 1 at that time?

Captain WEST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And did you get your machine guns into action, Captain?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir; not only those machine guns but other machine guns which were for anti-aircraft protection, that would be moved out later on, but they were put into action during—oh—the third or fourth strafing attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You got them out of storage as fast as you could and set them up, did you?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your contingent up to full strength that morning?

Captain WEST. No, sir. There were some men on pass. Some men were on pass. The guard battery was there a hundred percent, and we had a standby battery there, and I can't—I don't know how many were on pass, but very few, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain WEST. Small percentage.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. What equipment have you in your batteries, Captain?

Captain WEST. Have I in my battery, or—

General McNARNEY. Yes. In your battery what equipment do you have?

Captain WEST. I was commanding officer of the searchlight batteries.

General McNARNEY. Oh, the searchlight batteries.

Captain WEST. Yes, sir. We have all of our equipment there, of course: the 3-inch guns of the other batteries and [498] the .30- and .50-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns.

General McNARNEY. Was any of the equipment in place ready to fire?

Captain WEST. No, sir. It was in the storage area.

General McNARNEY. How long did it take you to get into position?

Captain WEST. I was at camp, and I can't state the time that the machine guns were in position at Pearl Harbor, but they got down there ready to fire within one or two hours after that time. The

3-inch guns moved out of there—it takes considerable time to place those ready to fire; it was some time in the afternoon before the 3-inch guns were ready in their war positions.

General McNARNEY. What were their war positions; will you tell us?

Captain WEST. Their war positions were down on the Ewa plain. There were three gun batteries, two in a southerly direction from Ewa and one near West Loch.

General McNARNEY. Will you point those places out on the map?

Captain WEST. One gun battery was down here southeast of Ewa (indicating), another here (indicating), and another up near West Loch.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what time you received the orders for you to take up your battle position?

Captain WEST. I don't know, sir. As officer of the day I gave the call to arms at 8:10. I tried to get through to the 53 brigade and also the commanding officer, and I couldn't do that, so on my own I gave that call to arms.

On the time that we received the order to go into Alert No. 3, I cannot give that to you exactly. It was between 8 and 9, all I can say.

[499] General McNARNEY. Well, this call to arms, position—is that the order to move out, or just alert?

Captain WEST. That alerted everybody; that is, to get every man into their—to get their equipment together, personal equipment together, and stand by for further orders.

The CHAIRMAN. You got the Alert No. 3 around eight, between eight and nine, did you?

Captain WEST. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. From headquarters?

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been in Alert No. 1 for how long, Captain?

Captain WEST. Since the 27th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Had there been any interval of Alert No. 1 or 3 in between there, between the 27th of November and December?

Captain WEST. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It had all been Alert No. 1?

Captain WEST. Alert No. 1. We were taking all precautions against sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Anything more?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall ask you not to discuss the testimony that you have given or anything that has occurred in the room while you were here, Captain.

Captain WEST. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Major ALLEN. Do you want to hear some others, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Major ALLEN. Lieutenant Lyman, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

[500] **TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIS THEODORE LYMAN, UNITED STATES ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, please?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Willis Theodore Lyman.

The CHAIRMAN. And to what command are you attached?

Lieutenant LYMAN. First Lieutenant, 251st Coast Artillery, Anti-Aircraft Battery E.

The CHAIRMAN. And where in that capacity was your personal station on the morning of December 7?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Sir, at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. The same station as the captain, the previous witness?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first warning you had of an attack?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Sir, at eight o'clock my captain and myself were just getting up preparatory to going to church; they were going to dedicate our chapel. And the phone call came asking for Lieutenant Lytton of our command, asking for him. His wife was phoning and stating that there was a lot of noise, and she said a lot of big black things dropping around the place up there at Wahiawa, which is near Schofield Barracks. We could hear the sound of explosions at that hour—that was about two or three minutes to eight o'clock, sir—and I could hear it over the phone, and I assured her that I thought it was just a practice bombing on the north side of the Island by the air corps. And then she hung up, and I stepped out to the porch of the officers' barracks, looked toward Pearl Harbor, and saw the bursts of high explosive in the air, and I knew that was not right.

At the same time I could observe three planes circling low [501] and left, following the hills from Fort Berrette toward camp. I rushed back to my room, grabbed my glasses, took a look, and the captain was right with me. We saw the red insignia, and I told the captain and Captain Byars, the battalion executive, that those were Japanese planes, and Captain Byars said, "Alert the battalion," and Captain McIntire and I both hit the phone at the same time to alert the battery. That was approximately three minutes after eight, sir. We then completed dressing and ran over to the battery and went to work.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any anti-aircraft guns in place?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We did not at that time, sir. We are a machine gun battalion. We are in the machine gun battalion and are the machine gun battery of the automatic weapons battalion, and we had our .30 calibers out. I got two of them out on the line, and we got a chance to fire.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you get them out from?

Lieutenant LYMAN. From our ordnance room, sir, which is—well, it is kind of hard to describe from here.

The CHAIRMAN. Never mind. It is some distance from where you set up your guns?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We set up about fifty yards immediately toward the sea from the barracks.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Lieutenant LYMAN. And fired from there.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had been in Alert No. 2 or Alert No. 3, where would those guns have been?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Under Alert No. 2 we would probably have been in the field, sir, because we go into the field on Alert No. 3.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. When did you get Alert No. 3 from headquarters?

Lieutenant LYMAN. So far as I know, sir, we never received that, but we received orders to move at about ten o'clock, and [502] I called the first platoon out and went to Pearl Harbor after we had fired on these planes at Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your fire effective?

Lieutenant LYMAN. We got one plane definitely, sir—I believe they are going to give us credit for it—and the other plane is a question mark. I noted in the journal that I wasn't sure about the other one, but it seemed to have some trouble getting away.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. At what altitude were the planes that you fired at?

Lieutenant LYMAN. The first plane that we fired at, sir, was approximately a hundred yards. The second plane was 75 feet at the lowest point, and at that point we, as far as I know about it, on one fire only had two guns going, sir, two .30 caliber on the old umbrella mounting, model 1918 mount, and it was almost pointblank fire both ways. One of our boys, Fairbanks, was struck in front of me by one tracer stream, and the other tracer stream from the plane was about as far away from me as between this gentleman here and myself (indicating), and he's recovered and is back with us.

That plane dipped to about 75 feet, and at that point when it fired—we fired at it—we could see—I saw one tracer ricochet off of the plane near the junction of the wing and the fuselage there by the cockpit, and it ricocheted off the plane, and the plane made a climbing turn to the left and wheeled on out and kept dipping down like this and struck the water some distance out.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you think of the way they handled their planes?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Their flying, sir, was skillful. They took their time. They apparently knew exactly where they were going. I didn't think much of their bombing. They fired on [503] our little group of three trucks on the way in to Pearl Harbor, so we stopped and piled out and shot at them with our rifles, and rode in, and while we were emplacing the 50's on the roof of the shop supply building in Pearl Harbor—that's building 150 where I put one section, put the first section I took out with me—they attacked us twice there, and that was at about eleven o'clock. I think my journal shows that about 11:12 we received the first one, and then the second one was about three or four minutes later. Things happened pretty rapidly; you didn't have time to keep track all the time.

They knew where they were going. And their speeds, approximately, I judge from our target practice work, didn't exceed more

than about 200 miles; the last group—we shot at that last group at Malakole—was approximately 200.

General McNARNEY. What type were they? Single seaters, or what?

Lieutenant LYMAN. Two types. The first group that we saw come over, and the first warning we had that they were actually going to strafe the camp, they cleared their guns, and they were a type that is like a pursuit, except the trailing edge of the wing might have been, instead of being tapered, straight like our P-40's. Their planes were plainly a hybrid, no definite type such as ours; a rounded nose like a P-36, and the back end of those wings looked like those old Douglas 0-19's we saw in the maneuvers in '40, although not quite so much cut in. And then the ones that we shot at were apparently a two-place ship. And could only fire straight forward. Their guns fire from the leading edge of the wing. We picked up some of the slugs. I have one slug with a steel jacket and—steel core, and the base of the shell said 7.7, would be about 25.

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

(There was no response.)

[504] The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, we shall ask you not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

Lieutenant LYMAN. Yes, sir. I understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Major ALLEN. There is one more witness, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT JUNE D. DICKENS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give you full name to the reporter, will you, please?

Sergeant DICKENS. June D. Dickens.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant, what was your tour of duty on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was sergeant of the guard, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was sergeant of the guard at Camp Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. At Malakole?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is coast defense?

Sergeant DICKENS. No, sir. That is anti-aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-aircraft. Same unit as the lieutenant who has just been here, Lieutenant Lyman?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir; we are all in the same regiment, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All in the same regiment. Where were you when the thing broke?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was on the guardhouse porch there, sir. I had just got up, and I went out there to make up my guard book, and just as the corporal went down to get breakfast, why, I turned around and says, "So long. Take it easy," and [505] I stepped out there, and about that quick, why, the crack of machine gunfire

cut loose. It was two Japanese dive bombers. I am quite sure as to what they were because I took a good look at them.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were they coming? Over Malakole?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. They were going directly down California Street in Malakole.

The CHAIRMAN. They were?

Sergeant DICKENS. They were going directly over the center of Battery B's barracks, and I looked up, and that is when the machine gunfire cut loose. They seemed to have picked out the ammunition dump as their target.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you were not in a position to fire at those?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir, but I wheeled out as many machine guns as I could.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your machine guns?

Sergeant DICKENS. I had one sabotage truck on the beach, and I had one other sabotage truck at the guardhouse, and I am pretty sure there were six planes. As the first two went over they fired at them from the beach there. They saw what was happening and didn't hesitate.

The CHAIRMAN. That truck was manned at the time?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. It always had been manned.

The CHAIRMAN. It had been manned?

Sergeant DICKENS. We man all our trucks 24 hours.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under Alert No. 1?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-sabotage?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was enough of a crew there to go right to work, was there?

Sergeant DICKENS. There certainly was, sir.

[506] The CHAIRMAN. And they did get additional machine guns?

Sergeant DICKENS. I warned the second battalion—they are the machine gun outfit—that we were being attacked, and to wheel out as many guns as they could, and the marine outfit up at the beach, I think they may have been at Malakole; now they camp at Nanakuli. They came and manned their five .50-calibers on the beach up there—they were having target practice a week before—and returned as much fire as they could. We had two B. A. R. men on the fire tower there, which brought down one plane. It was quite remarkable.

The CHAIRMAN. Two of your men?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir, two men on guard up there. It was a guard order that we had two B. A. R. men there. And as the plane swooped down to do its best to wipe out the Marine Corps, the B. A. R. men let go with automatic, short bursts, and it banked right down and went into the ocean.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those all the planes, those six or so, that went directly over you?

Sergeant DICKENS. There were six.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all?

Sergeant DICKENS. There was one bomber that come in from the west. It was a heavy bomber. I couldn't quite make out what it was. The motors on it were pointed; it had four motors on it.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess it was one of our own.

The WITNESS. It might have been.

The CHAIRMAN. One that was coming in from San Francisco and didn't know.

General McNARNEY. Did you fire on that, Sergeant?

Sergeant DICKENS. No, sir, I didn't. If you don't know what the plane is you don't want to shoot at it; it might be your own.

The CHAIRMAN. It was.

[507] Where were you the night of December 6, Sergeant?

Sergeant DICKENS. December 6 I was at the guardhouse. It was a funny thing about that. That afternoon, Saturday, we observed a Japanese fishing boat off the coast of Malakole there. Well, they naturally called me down there to see what it was. I knew what a Japanese boat looked like if I saw it. The boat was within 50 yards of the shoreline, and there were two men trying to swim in to shore. So I unlimbered my 45 and walked down to the beach and told them if they come any closer I would shoot to kill. They started treading water and headed back to their boat and went back, and that's how I mounted a machine gun truck up there, my two B. A. R. men and machine gun loaded, and told them if they ever came back again I would start opening fire, because they are not supposed to come near. The boat came back three or four times, but it didn't come into machine gun range. It's in the guard order at Malakole that I wrote it in.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[508] General McNARNEY. You thought that boat was getting its feet warm trying to sabotage your equipment?

Sergeant DICKENS. We are suspicious of the Japanese or Chinese around here and if they start fooling around the camp we don't take any talk from them.

General McNARNEY. Did you report that incident to anyone?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, the officer of the day was with me, and he went back to investigate.

The CHAIRMAN. You say it was entered in your journal?

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, before I left the guardhouse on that day, I made notes about the attack and how many planes there were and the description of the planes, and I left it there for the next sergeant to write it in.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you were on duty until what time Saturday night?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was on duty all night.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on duty all night?

Sergeant DICKENS. All night, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you started to get breakfast after your tour of duty?

Sergeant DICKENS. I didn't get breakfast until the next day then.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the service?

Sergeant DICKENS. I have been on active service more than a year.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you called in from?

Sergeant DICKENS. I was called in from the National Guard.

The CHAIRMAN. What group?

Sergeant DICKENS. The California group.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Just do not disclose nor discuss with anyone anything that was said in this room.

Sergeant DICKENS. Yes, sir. I have a short memory.

[509] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

We will adjourn at this time until 2:15.

(Thereupon, at 1:30 o'clock p. m., the hearing was recessed 2:15 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The hearing reconvened at 2:15 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES J. UTTERBACK

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name, please?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Charles J. Utterback.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your profession?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am head foreman for the District Engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7?

Mr. UTTERBACK. At Hickam Field.

The CHAIRMAN. At what hour?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I went to work at 6:30 in the morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is your position here under the Army or a civilian position?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am a civilian, sir, working for the District Engineer.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell us what your first warning or first knowledge of the attack was and tell us what you observed?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I was walking toward Mat A, which is the mat at Hickam Field, air side, and I heard a large explosion, first thought—the first thing that I thought was the dynamite up, because we were loading the dynamite.

[510] I glanced toward Pearl Harbor and I saw this black smoke rising.

About the time I looked up I heard another explosion, and saw a lot of planes flying toward us, and about this time the main remark was that they were Japanese planes, and they were over us.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those planes flying high or low?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Very low, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What firing did they do? Were they dropping bombs?

Mr. UTTERBACK. The first planes that came over dropped bombs and they flew right over the—the first one I saw dropped a bomb was at the repair hangar. It hit that kitchen, just this side of the hangar, dropped the first bomb there.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they seem to be going fast or not?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, they were not very fast, just slow speed, flying very low and not very fast at all—very slow-flying.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what else you saw.

Mr. UTTERBACK. When this happened, why I saw the Japanese planes. We could see the markings on them because they had the red insignia on the bottom of the wings.

I being a War Veteran then suggested that the men with me should take cover; so we ran back to the side of the road and went in the ditch along the Fort Kamehameha highway, which was 75 feet from there.

We went in this ditch and waited for a while. They were flying around in circles. They seemed to fly out to sea, and then came back again.

I saw my men seemed to be dumbfounded, and I told them to get under cover. I told these men to take cover. Then I telephoned the exchange to see what message there was. I [511] wanted to get to the foreman, and the telephone operator was there, and he wasn't there. At that time some Army officers appeared on the scene. I went back to my men, and they were under the trees; so I asked the Army officer there in charge if he would get these men under cover.

He told me to take them over to the old mortar casemate, and we found it was locked, but we got them under shelter for a while; so I told them to take cover back to the mortar battery.

I stayed there. That was when the second attack come over, and they were starting to strafe the ground. We laid along the casement there. So then we went back to the mortar battery. We were in there and we stayed in there probably an hour or so. Some of our men helped to get the lights running, and I sent mechanics to the gun battery to get the engines running.

The colonel had asked for volunteers, and I sent a bunch of men to dig trenches. They had no toilet facilities there, and there were no water facilities. We sent men out for water.

At this time my direct superior got in touch with me and told me to go and clear the streets and shut the water off. This was about the third phase of it.

They were very high at this time and dropping heavy bombs at the last attack.

I was near the parade ground at Hickam Field trying to shut off the main when the last attack came over, and they seemed to be dropping a heavy load on the ball diamond. One hit the railroad track, and the rest of them didn't hit anything. I don't think any bombs hit any building in the last attack. The only one that did damage was the one that hit the railroad track.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you observe any of our own [512] airplanes getting into the air?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I could not say, sir. There were some planes trying to land. They were trying to land, and it was while I had the detail out trying to get some water—I imagine 9 o'clock—that I noticed a couple of our small fighting planes flying very low after the Japanese planes, chasing them across, because I had hollered at the gunner from Fort Kamehameha to quit firing because it was one of our own planes. That was during the second phase, but the anti-aircraft seemed to be in action. It didn't take them long.

The CHAIRMAN. Probably they drove the last planes very high and spoiled their aim?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes. The anti-aircraft in less than 10 minutes were putting up a barrage from the Pearl Harbor side, were putting up quite a barrage.

General McCoy. Was that on Hickam Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. This anti-aircraft fire?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, it seemed to come from Pearl Harbor. There was no anti-aircraft fire on Hickam Field, to my knowledge. There was from behind Fort Kamehameha, but not at that time.

General McCoy. What was your general impression of the conduct of the officers and the soldiers of the service under this shock, surprise, and so forth?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I can say the younger officers—I even remarked to someone later there how cool they were. There was some excitement. There are always some excited men, but I think they were very cool and conducted themselves in a very sober manner.

General McCoy. And the soldiers also?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, because it was only 45 minutes until they were storing ammunition in the casemate and bringing up [513] surplus ammunition.

General McCoy. Was there anything exceptional that you noticed? Was there anything that struck you at the time as being an exceptionally bad act or anything of that sort?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No. The only thing I noticed that I thought was exceptional was how quick some of the officers got to their posts on Fort Kam, and I know several of the officers, and it seemed they got to their posts very rapidly because the old battery was manned—it seemed like it wasn't more than 20 minutes until they were ready at that old mortar battery.

General McCoy. Were there any anti-aircraft guns there?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir; but the coast defense were being manned very rapidly. I also noticed men in the hangars that came out fast trying to get the planes out, but they were strafed away.

General McCoy. Did you see the bomb that hit the barracks?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, because the large hangar hides the barracks from where I was at that time, but I did see Hangar 13 hit, and I also saw the kitchen go up in flames. but I saw the direct hit on the repair hangar. They were right over that, and it seemed like they were just almost on it. They hit it several times but the first bomber hitting the repair hangar was very low. He was just right over it.

General McCoy. Did you see any Japanese planes knocked down?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir. I only saw one. I don't know whether he was knocked down or shot down. That was the only one sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Where do you live?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I live at 1419 Konia Street.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where is that?

Mr. UTTERBACK. That is on the Heights, Kamehameha Heights.

[514] Admiral STANDLEY. Kamehameha Heights?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

Admiral STANLEY. That is back from Fort Kamehameha?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, that is the heights over here (indicating), right behind here. That is my house where I live over there.

The CHAIRMAN. That is toward Diamond Head?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir. That is right behind here. There is the school over there.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are your contacts in daily life? Recreation and so forth aside from those at Hickam Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. You mean those I contact with?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, your friends and so forth.

Mr. UTTERBACK. I have the men I work with, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. They are all civilians?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, all civilians.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you ever associate with the military to any extent except in your work?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, except in my work.

Admiral STANDLEY. What, if any, comments or general impressions among the civilians and among your associates have been expressed in regard to the whole action on the 7th?

Mr. UTTERBACK. You mean the remarks that were said, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, the general understanding, the general comment on the whole situation.

Mr. UTTERBACK. The only thing I heard that morning, sir, was, "They caught them asleep, by God." That is all you would hear: "They caught them asleep, by God." I think I heard that comment 50 times that day.

General McCoy. How long have you been working here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I have been on Hickam Field ever since it started, since 1936.

General McCoy. What would you say about the normal habits of the officers and the men at Hickam Field?

[515] Mr. UTTERBACK. Well, I have nothing but the highest respect for them, sir. I have been around the Army and in it practically all my life and I have seen nothing disorderly about any officer there.

General McCoy. Have you noticed any unusual drinking or drunkenness among the Army personnel since you have been here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir, no more than any other place.

General McCoy. In other words, what would your general comment be about the Service men there?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Well, this is a small island and from the viewpoint of the Service men it has been very outstanding, sir, the soldiers and sailors here, because with so little recreation here they have to let some steam loose, and it has been outstanding from what I have seen.

General McCoy. Who is the engineering officer with whom you contact?

Mr. UTTERBACK. I am with the civil service. I am working directly under Colonel Wyman.

General McCoy. That is Rivers and Harbors?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of gossip in the newspapers about the Army men here having a pretty good time, and a great deal of drinking and so forth, and about a great deal of slackness. What is the opinion around among the civilians in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor? You realize we have got to get at the facts.

Mr. UTTERBACK. As I said before, there is probably a good deal of drinking, but with the large amount of men here, and as I say, there is no recreation for them, and I know myself, and probably some of you gentlemen do too, that back in 1916, 1917, and 1918 we had no recrea-

tion, and that was about the only thing you had to do, to get tanked up. That is just natural. I do not think it exists any more than among the civilians.

[516] The CHAIRMAN. No more in the Army than among the civilians?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't there some place for them to go in town? For instance, isn't there an Army and Navy YMCA?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, but it is small for the amount of men.

General McCoy. Does the USO have a house in Honolulu?

Mr. UTTERBACK. No. They were raising funds for it, but there hasn't been any money for it unless it was started since the 7th. I know up to that time I don't think there has been any money for it.

The Navy had a recreation place out here but that was the only thing outside of their beach.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the Richardson Athletic Field?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you been in any of the hospitals here?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, I have been in Tripler.

General McCoy. Does that impress you as being a good hospital?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes. I was in there three years ago when I fell and broke my arm and my shoulder on federal duty, and I was treated very nicely, being a civilian. I was treated exceptionally well and had a good doctor.

General McCoy. Do they have a Red Cross unit in that hospital?

Mr. UTTERBACK. Yes, sir, there is a Red Cross unit there.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Please observe silence about what has gone on in this room and do not discuss what has been said by you or anyone else.

Mr. UTTERBACK. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[517] General McCoy. Thank you.

TESTIMONY OF EDWIN ST. J. GRIFFITH, UNITED STATES ENGINEERS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Edwin St. J. Griffith.

The CHAIRMAN. And what is your official position?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I am chief inspector and associate engineer, United States Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a military or civilian unit?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Civilian unit, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I was at the base yard. We were taking inventory.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is that base yard?

Mr. GRIFFITH. That is between Hickam and Fort Kamehameha.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first thing you observed? Tell us your observations around the fort and what happened, as nearly as you can.

Mr. GRIFFITH. We had just gotten started taking the inventory, or just about to get started, and we heard some shots, machine-gun

shots. I went out of the building we were in and looked out and saw a plane coming in a westerly direction about 100 feet or possibly more above us, which swooped down and machine gunned the place while it was in flight, and then swung around.

At first we thought that was our own maneuvers, military maneuvers, and many others seemed to think the same thing.

Just after it occurred I looked toward Hickam Field and saw another plane drop a bomb in the vicinity of the AC repair hangar, the one that was badly damaged, and then I knew it was Japanese planes.

The official that was in charge of the inventory asked me [518] if I would call Mr. Sisson, who is our boss, and ask him what he wanted us to do, or whether he wanted us to continue in this inventory.

I could not get Mr. Sisson, so I called Major Robinson, and then finally I called Colonel Wyman. He said, "Use your own judgment."

Then we went from there over to the section that was wooded near Fort Kamehameha, I should say, about half past eight, and the raid started at 8 o'clock sharp.

We stayed there under the trees for some time, possibly another half hour. Then the second raid started, and they put us in the magazine shelter in Fort Kamehameha proper.

We stayed there until it seemed to be quiet, about noon, and we came out and went back and stayed around in the base yard where our supplies are, and stayed there that afternoon and that night.

About half past 10 or 11 o'clock there was evidently another raid. We saw the tracer bullets, and I heard some shooting, but we could not see anything, but we knew it was another raid.

The CHAIRMAN. That was in the evening?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes, in the evening. We waited all that night and the next day. There wasn't anything of any particular moment then.

The CHAIRMAN. Could you see when they put the United States planes in the air?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I didn't see any planes at the time that the first raid was on. I did see later on planes coming back, which we thought were some of our patrol planes coming in. I can't say just exactly what time that was.

The CHAIRMAN. That was after the raid was over?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes, after the raid was over.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you living in Honolulu?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I live at the housing, the Hickam housing. [519] That is right adjoining the field.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right adjoining the field?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been your observations of the conduct of the officers and the private personnel of the Army here? Has their conduct been outstanding or poor? Was there a lot of drinking?

Mr. GRIFFITH. That is a hard question to answer.

The CHAIRMAN. I realize that, but we have a hard matter to decide here and we have to have the facts.

Mr. GRIFFITH. I believe there is quite a little of that goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you Saturday night, sir? Were you out?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Saturday night?

The CHAIRMAN. December 7.

Mr. GRIFFITH. I was home. I was home—no, I was not; I was out. I went to a show in town with my boy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any disorder of an unusual character in town that night?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I didn't notice any.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there were many soldiers and sailors in town that night?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I saw many, but I didn't notice anything disorderly.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Mr. GRIFFITH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been among your acquaintances and friends, as you talk over the situation, any comment on the drinking by the troops and officers here?

Mr. GRIFFITH. Not to any great extent.

The CHAIRMAN. It has not been a matter of comment?

Mr. GRIFFITH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

[520] General McCoy. Have you served with the Army in any other station?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I have been at Hamilton Field.

General McCoy. Is there any comparison that you could think of as to the conduct of the soldiers and sailors here and those you noticed on the mainland?

Mr. GRIFFITH. My only comment is I have noticed that the men we come in contact with on the mainland were not quite so interested in taking over the construction work as it was being done. They did not delve into it so minutely as they do here at Hickam Field. That is my only comment.

It was rather irksome here at Hickam Field. Some things we felt should have been left to us. That is my only comment.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the conduct of the officers and men at Hamilton Field and here as to whether there was drinking and their conduct generally?

Mr. GRIFFITH. I don't believe I have noticed any.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We are asking you, Mr. Griffith, not to communicate anything to anyone that has happened in this room or to discuss your testimony with anyone.

Mr. GRIFFITH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming.

TESTIMONY OF ALBERT L. BRECKMAN, UNITED STATES ENGINEERS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name, please.

Mr. BRECKMAN. Albert L. Brenckman.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a resident of Honolulu?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir. I live in Hickam Housing, right next to the field.

[521] The CHAIRMAN. What is your position?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I am assistant associate engineer, Area No. 2, United States Army Engineers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a civilian employee?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, I am a civilian employee and an ex-Army man.

The CHAIRMAN. In what branch of the Service were you?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I enlisted in the 9th Ambulance Corps in 1917, and enlisted here, and I was transferred subsequently to the Hawaiian Infantry for discharge in 1919.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you at your living quarters at Hickam Field on the morning of December 7?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir. Mr. Griffith, Mr. Utterback, and the hangar force were at what we call Fort Kamehameha Base Yard preparing to take inventory because we were to take over the Base Yard for our own operations, and I was at that point when the first attack occurred.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you first see up there, sir?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I looked up, and I heard quite heavy aviation noises coming from overhead, and I looked up and saw these green planes with torpedoes under them, flying very low and circling out toward Pearl Harbor. I then followed them with my eye, and all of a sudden there was a large explosion, so I jumped in the nearest ditch and stayed there during the first strafing.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did the first attack last?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Well, it seemed like hours, but I think it was 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a second attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. We were largely disorganized. We had no place to go, so we gathered by the old trench battery in Fort Kamehameha, and while we were there trying to find a safe place—which we did find for the women—the second attack occurred. The machine-gun bullets were shooting around, and [522] we went to one of the magazines, and so far as I could see they just about repeated the same tactics, and then they came the other side over toward the hangars, but it was too hard for us to see anything definite. We were back against the wall. I would say that was about 9:30 or thereabouts.

The CHAIRMAN. And then there was a third attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. I stayed there approximately for three days and three nights. On that night about 10:30 or 11 another attack occurred, and all we could see were tracer bullets.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether that was a sortie or some maneuvering by our own planes?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know whether it was a Japanese raid?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No. Then about 4:20 the next morning there was another raid, cannonading over Pearl Harbor. I don't know what that was, but I saw nothing after the first two.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been here in Honolulu?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I came over in March as associate engineer and have been at Hickman Field since the 12th of November.

General McCoy. What has been your observation as to the habits of the officers and men in this department, particularly with respect to drinking?

Mr. BRECKMAN. I haven't associated with any of them, so I would not know about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no observation of that?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been around on Saturday nights?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, I have. I could not very well afford to go to any of the night spots, and I don't believe I have ever seen an officer under the influence of liquor at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir. I have seen several enlisted [523] men, but having had a lot of experience in sabotage and arson investigating, I am not too sure whether some of them were under the influence of liquor. I think they were just waiting for somebody to approach them and ask them a question, so I am not too sure about that.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard no gossip or talk about that?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No.

General McCoy. You, as an old soldier, know that there is a certain amount of drinking always among younger men in the Army?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, definitely.

General McCoy. From your experience and what you have seen since you have been here, has it occurred to you that it might be worse now than it used to be?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Well, yes, sir, in this respect: that prohibition occurred in July. That was in July, 1917. From then on there was very little drinking unless it was bay rum or something like that, but at that time I was only 16 and I did not go in for night life, and I never associated any downtown outside of a few reserves living in the boarding house, rooming house, until my wife got there, and we never felt much like staying out. So I never had a chance to associate with any of the personnel except some of the Navy men who lived in our boarding house. I am trying to say that the civilians seem to be more addicted to it than the Service people. We had more drinking parties and brawls around our neighborhood among the civilians than the Service people did.

That is my observation, although having been in the Service I know that a Service man does like a drink too.

General McCoy. Were you close enough to see how the officers and men reacted under this shock of surprise?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. We were in pretty close contact [524] with them during the second attack and between the two attacks. We got in with my employees in the mortar magazine over at Fort Kamehameha, and the younger officers there seemed to be quite busy, and the colonel in charge—I don't know his name—but he was all right. He just had everything under control. He was getting everything set, and he seemed to be handling it very well, so far as I could see. The conduct there was reassuring to many of the employees who were a little bit jittery. As a matter of fact, inside 20 minutes they had already broken the men up into groups, laboring crew and so on, and got them ready. I don't know how long it was, but I am sure it started clicking right off the bat.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. When you saw these planes in the first instance, could you get any idea of the direction from which they came?

Mr. BRECKMAN. They seemed to be coming in from the ocean.

Admiral STANDLEY. From Barbers Point?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, over the other way.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is toward Koko Head?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, toward Waikiki. They seemed to go in this way and then come back and swing in the back and drop the bombs. As I say, I didn't expose myself very much after the first one or two drops.

Admiral REEVES. You said the first planes you saw were torpedo planes?

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes. I saw these enormous torpedoes. They seemed to be almost the length of the plane at the time.

Admiral REEVES. Do you have any idea how many of those planes there were?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, but there seemed to be no end of them. They seemed to be zipping in there no more than two or three hundred feet flying over us.

Admiral REEVES. How many would you say you saw?

[525] Mr. BRECKMAN. I saw at least six. They went down as soon as they got over the oil tanks in Pearl Harbor, and then they machine-gunned some on the way back. One soldier took some shots on the second attack, but they did not have any effect. The officer told him he was wasting ammunition.

General MCCOY. Did you see torpedo planes in the second attack?

Mr. BRECKMAN. No, sir, I don't remember seeing them. After that we were not allowed to go out and expose ourselves but went under this canopy.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything more, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. We will ask you, Mr. Brenckman, not to refer to your testimony or to talk to anyone or to refer to anything that has occurred in this room.

Mr. BRECKMAN. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon Mr. Brenckman left the hearing room.)

The CHAIRMAN. There is ordered to be placed in the record a communication from Major General Maxwell Murray to Major General Frank McCoy under date of December 25, 1941, correcting, in certain respects, General Murray's testimony given before the Commission.

(The communication above referred to is as follows:)

SECRET

DECEMBER 25, 1941.

Major General FRANK MCCOY,

c/o A. D. C. to Chairman,

Military Investigating Committee, Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCCOY: After leaving the committee room yesterday morning and reconsidering the questions which were made to me concerning the message received immediately after Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, I remembered that I had directed that a copy of an important message received [526] be filed in my G-2 safe.

As I stated to the committee I sent a liaison officer to the Headquarters Hawaiian Department as soon as the Alert No. 1 was announced on November 27. About an hour later he reported to me giving information substantially as I gave it to the committee. However, when I remembered that I had directed this liaison officer to make a copy of the message and file it in the safe at my headquarters for future reference, I decided to send for it and furnish this copy to

you. At the time this liaison officer gave me the message he told me that he had been allowed to read the message received from the War Department but was not permitted to make a copy of it. He was instructed to read it and repeat it to me in person, and he carried out his orders to the letter. The copy of the message as filed in my safe follows:

(Quote) "Negotiations have come to a standstill at this time. No diplomatic breaking of relations. We will let them make the first overt act. You will take such precautions as you deem necessary to carry out Rainbow plan.

Do not excite the civilian population. This will be held to minimum people. Above message is signed MARSHALL." (End quote)

I repeat that the above message was written from memory (by my liaison officer) approximately three-quarters of an hour after my liaison officer had read it at the Department Headquarters. I received it in my headquarters at Schofield Barracks. I do not recall any other conversation or message from the Department which indicated an emergency more acute than that pictured in the message quoted above.

The above may be of interest to the committee as an indication of exactly what information was given the Division Commanders after the initial Alert No. 1 was ordered.

[527] I also recalled after leaving the committee room that I was in error in stating that I had received the announcement of the Alert by telephone directly from the Department Headquarters, and that I had been in my Division Headquarters at the time the Alert was called. Upon checking this statement after my return to my headquarters yesterday I recalled I had left my headquarters temporarily, for dental treatment at the Post Hospital and while there received the telephonic message directly from my Chief of Staff. The Alert was being announced to the troops when the message reached me. I do not consider this statement as having any major bearing on the information of your committee but I do not wish to allow a misstatement of my whereabouts, even though unintentional, to be recorded.

I am sorry that I have not had the pleasure of seeing a little of you during your stay and trust that before you leave I will have the opportunity to see you again.

With kindest regards, I am
Very truly yours,

(Signed) MAXWELL MURRAY,
Major General,
U. S. Army.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn the hearing until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock, at Pearl Harbor. The Commission will now go on a visit of inspection to the barracks, posts, and if possible, Pearl Harbor.

(Thereupon, at 3:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken to tomorrow, Saturday, December 27, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m., at Pearl Harbor.)

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Testimony of—

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Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, United States Navy-----	529 ¹

[528a] **NOTE.**—On January 6, 1942, Admiral Kimmel recommended to the Commission a revision of the transcript of his testimony before the Commission given December 27 and 28 in certain specified instances, each of which was set forth in a letter signed by him and dated January 5 and submitted to the Commission January 6. (That letter is quoted in full in the transcript for January 6.) Thereupon the Commission directed that the transcript of Admiral Kimmel's testimony be revised with each of the specified corrections except that one recommended for page 622, line 2 of the transcript, which correction was made by Admiral Kimmel in testimony given before the Commission on January 6 and so appears in the transcript for that day. Each revision now appears in the transcript on a page or pages marked "Corrected" immediately following the page of the transcript where the subject matter of such revision appears and is marked "See following page."

¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[529] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding, pursuant to adjournment on yesterday.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Robert, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Good morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL,
UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Would it be possible for me to have Admiral Theobald with me to assist me?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, sir. Let him come and sit [530]
there beside you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have a statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to hear that in the first instance, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You might sit with me here (addressing Admiral Theobald).

(Admiral Kimmel read from a statement.)

(See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you have, gentlemen, a report of the action of 7 December which I signed on 21 December.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we do not have it yet, Admiral. I have not seen it.

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your report to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have a copy of it. We have not a copy of it as yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was informed that you had been given a copy of it.

General McCoy. We asked for a copy but have not received it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir; we have not received it, Mr. Recorder?

Mr. Howe. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought you had it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. We have not had it. General Short's report was in Washington before we left, and we obtained a copy of it, and also here we got a copy of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this report was made up on the 21st—I signed it on the 21st of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we haven't had it yet.

[530 *Corrected A*] The following statement was read by Admiral Kimmel as noted on page 530.

In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received from Patrol Wing 2 and the task forces which were operating at sea. The staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full information, and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be assembled.

It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose as a result of the attack, rather than to concentrate on the preparation of reports of what had occurred.

The reports are still coming in from individual ships, and I understand the staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling these reports, which will be submitted in due course, and from them a much more effective reconstruction of events can be made.

[531] Admiral KIMMEL. And that was forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief, and I am sure that I was informed that you had a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some slip about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Forwarded to Washington from here, was it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Here is a report; it is a very short one.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. It gives a narrative of events which we have reconstructed from all sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, that would be helpful to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, we haven't got it.

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't got it.

Admiral KIMMEL. You haven't seen that?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. My remembrance, Mr. Recorder, was that we asked on our arrival here for any reports that the admiral had made to the Navy Department.

Mr. Howe. Yes.

General McCoy. But we have not received them yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the report had not been made when you arrived?

The CHAIRMAN. When we got here, no.

Admiral KIMMEL. And we got it up very hurriedly, the best we had, and I thought you had the report.

Admiral THEOBALD. I have sent for additional copies.

Mr. Howe. Will you look that up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps I had better read the report.

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps you had. I think that would be a good preliminary.

(Admiral Kimmel read from a report.)

(See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all the report proper, but in addition to that we have four enclosures. One is a partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese air raid on

[531 *Corrected A*] On page 531 Admiral Kimmel read:

Report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/(02088). The subject: "Report of the Action of 7 December 1941." Copy of this report appended marked Kimmel exhibit number —.

[532] Pearl Harbor of 7 December, second is the damage to ships, and the third is a supplementary partial report of damage to ships, and the last one is disposition of all known forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

Now, this narrative of events occurring during the Japanese raid on 7 December has been reconstructed from dispatches received and from the reports received from individual ships, and this narrative does not represent the information that I had at the time. This is reconstructed afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say that the first word I had personally of any untoward incident was about 7:30. I was telephoned at my quarters that an attack had been made on a submarine near Pearl Harbor. We have had many reports of submarines in this area. I was not at all certain that this was a real attack. I had issued orders about the 27th of November that all submarine sound contacts were to be considered hostile and they were to bomb them, and that was a distinct change from the policy we had been following before that time. We had prohibited ships from bombing hostile submarines except in the defensive sea area, which was about three miles from the shore line. That procedure was approved by the Navy Department. I reported last February that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb, to depth-charge any submerged submarine that we didn't know about, and I was told that the former policy was the one

that should be followed. The Navy Department never changed that. I changed it on my own responsibility and informed the Navy Department of all I had done, and that was the reason that these ships promptly made the attack on the submarine when it was discovered in the operating area. However, as I say, there were a great many false contacts, and I was not convinced at that time that there was an actual attack. You will see that that is pertinent as this investigation goes on.

[533] At 6:18—Shall I read this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will, sir. Yes, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is quite long.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it will orient us, I think, in the whole situation. Don't you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it will assist, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Aid Raid on December 7, 1941.")
(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

0745 Avocet. Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosion and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, that means that at 7:45 your information station or your headquarters received that message from the steam Avocet; is that it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What does the "Avocet" mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Avocet is a mine sweeper converted for use of the aircraft, as an aircraft tender.

The CHAIRMAN. Ship moored?

Admiral KIMMEL. Ship moored at Berth 1A, Naval Air Station Dock, Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. And at 7:45 there was a bomb explosion on her?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Admiral KIMMEL. She heard a bomb explosion, and she heard the planes and sighted them attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. And she reported that at 7:45?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. No, sir. This report is taken from the report made by the Avocet.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. After the fact.

[533 Corrected A] (On page 533 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

[534] Admiral KIMMEL. After the fact, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have reconstructed it now?

Admiral KIMMEL. We are reconstructing here.

The CHAIRMAN. In order of time?

Admiral KIMMEL. In order of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what we are trying to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it.

Admiral KIMMEL. These reports were not prepared by me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I get it now.

Admiral KIMMEL. At this time they had no time to make reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading) :

The Tucker was nested alongside the Whitney. 5-inch gun No. 3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 caliber machine guns fired at attacking planes during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.

This is the Tucker's claim, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is what the Tucker claims.

Admiral STANDLEY. She is a destroyer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, she is a destroyer.

(Admiral Kimmel read further.)

(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL. The Tracy is a destroyer, by the way.

* * * * *

Now, I might interject here that, while these times are the best they can get, they were taken under stress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you have got to evaluate that, but this is the best that we have.

[534 *Corrected A*] (On page 534 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

* * * * *

[535] (Referring to item "0755, Raleigh," report p. 11:)

He has covered a considerable period there, and he did not do all that at 7:55.

* * * * *

I might say that the Ramapo was loaded with five motor torpedo boats which were being sent out to the Asiatic station, and they were later on taken off.

* * * * *

(Referring to item "0759, Jarvis," report p. 18:)

The CHAIRMAN. What are BB's, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. And where is Merry Point? Off to the eastward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.
 (Admiral Kimmel read further.)
 (See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. Since you started, Admiral, your aides have handed us a copy of this chronological statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think that what you have read is sufficient to indicate the onset of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the balance of it is all here, and as I understand it each ship reports what it was doing at a given hour or a given minute.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I do not believe it would pay us to put the admiral to the burden of reading all that, when we have it here for ourselves if it becomes material. I leave that to the members of the Commission, though. How do you feel about it?

Admiral STANDLEY. It seems to me we could dispense with that and go to the task force report. He has another report there of damage, which is a summation of this, and I think we

[535 *Corrected A*] (On page 535 Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941.")

Add the following:

This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel Exhibit Number —.

[536] can dispense with that and go to the task forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that seem a good idea? We shall have all this before us to read, anyway.

Admiral REEVES. If there is any special portion of the narrative that he would like to call attention to, we might have that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral, if beyond what you have read there is any special portion of this narrative that you think it important to call to our attention, we should be glad to hear it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no special portion of the narrative which I haven't—I have covered that in a separate way, and I would suggest that we take up the question now—

The CHAIRMAN. I think this chronological statement is very important for reference.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But it really does not give us as good a synopsis as perhaps you can give us yourself.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I was coming to. I have now—

Admiral STANDLEY. He has a prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you have a synopsized statement of your own, Admiral, which you are going to give us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you have them or not, but at your convenience we would like to have five copies of this report.

Admiral KIMMEL. The whole thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Entire?

Admiral THEOBALD. Five of the entire report.

Admiral KIMMEL. Including everything?

The CHAIRMAN. The narrative.

[537] Admiral THEOBALD. Damage and everything?

Admiral KIMMEL. The narrative? I mean the report with all the enclosures?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, exactly. Then we can use it at leisure, you see.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have one copy, here, Admiral, now.

Admiral THEOBALD. You want four more, then?

The CHAIRMAN. We want four more.

Mr. HOWE. Five more.

The CHAIRMAN. Five more, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I call your attention to one part of this, sir. I would suggest you take that up next. I have a copy of it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Admiral: Have you a prior running statement covering your communications with the Department in Washington, and so forth, leading up to the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but I was trying to give you a picture of what had occurred, first.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I quite understand that.

Admiral KIMMEL. And the efforts just to—

The CHAIRMAN. To repel the attack.

Now, you were coming to the disposition of the attack forces on that morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces.")

(See following page.)

* * * * *

Admiral KIMMEL. Incidentally, I might add at this point that in accordance with the security measures we had in effect it provided that patwing 2 should start this search immediately without any orders from me, and he had already started to do

[537 *Corrected A*] On page 537 Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces on December 7."

Add the following:

This report was enclosure (D) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. B. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088) and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number —.

[538] what he could before he got this order.

(Admiral Kimmel read further.)

(See following pages.)

[538 *Corrected A*] In presenting this statement to the Board, I must emphasize that the picture presented is that of events and actions before the attack had must be considered in that light. It is a common tendency, empha-

sized in this case by the magnitude and effects of the later developments, to judge events in the past by the actualities of the future, thus discounting the assumptions upon which the past actions were based. I cannot overemphasize the point that this entire situation can only be reviewed fairly and intelligently, by divorcing from our minds, to the extent that this is possible, the facts as we now know them, and to concentrate upon the situation as it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief before the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. In stating this, I would like it understood that I am not attempting to avoid any responsibility which is legitimately mine. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and that Fleet was seriously damaged, with a resultant effect which far transcends the fate or fortune of any individual. However, in justice to myself, to the Navy as a whole, and for the future welfare of our Country, it is vital that events be dispassionately reviewed in their proper perspective. The statements which follow are based upon this premise, and will present as complete a picture as possible of our efforts to get the Pacific Fleet ready for war, to insure its security at its base, and to evaluate and meet by appropriate action, each situation as it was presented at the time.

Underlying all my actions were these basic considerations:—

First. Constantly changing regular personnel, both officers and enlisted, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits [538 *Corrected B*] and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. This necessitated, if maximum results were to be achieved, confinement of our operations to areas close to Pearl Harbor where target and training services were available.

Second. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short range anti-aircraft guns, radar equipment, lookout equipment, additional personnel accommodations, splinter protection and many other incidental alterations.

Third. Maintenance of reasonable security of Fleet units, both at sea and at an exposed base, poorly equipped for its own defense, was vital. Even aside from its defense, the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, presented a difficult problem which had to be met.

Fourth. Under approved War Plans, it was essential to initiate, promptly, offensive action in the Mid-Pacific and beyond, in order to contribute to the defense of the position of the Associated Powers in the Far East and Malaya by relieving the pressure in that theater, which by all agencies, was conceived to be the locale of initial enemy operations. The Navy Department's plan that an early initial offensive be undertaken in that area had a vital influence on my thought and actions in each new situation.

In order to clarify the situation existing in the Hawaiian Area at the time of the surprise attack on December 7, it should be stated that:—

(a) Pearl Harbor is a Fleet base for upkeep, repair and recreation.

(b) The defense of Pearl Harbor rests with the Army, in accordance with Joint Army and Navy action. (Chapter 1, Paragraph 5 (a) (2)).

[538 *Corrected C*] (c) The Navy had definite plans and was ready.

(d) We had an extensive training program to maintain the efficiency of all Fleet units.

My conception of a Fleet base is a haven for refit, supply, and for rest and recreation of personnel after arduous duties and strenuous operations at sea. I knew, as responsible officers have long known, that Pearl Harbor, with its single channel and its congested moorings and industrial facilities is vulnerable as a base for heavy ships, particularly vulnerable to surprise air attack. Air attack at dawn can be guarded against only by a 360 degree search before dark to a radius of 800 miles, and this would require eighty-four planes daily, and three times that number to maintain continued daily flights. We have never had more than one third the latter number of naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area. We must depend upon pre-daylight search, radar warnings, and a base defense so effective that a raid can be repelled with certainty. We have not an adequate base defense today.

Before assuming command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, I made a survey of the defenses of Pearl Harbor and of security measures in effect in the Fleet. I had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that hostilities in the Atlantic might begin at any time and that a war on two fronts was possible.

I was astounded at the existing weakness of the Pearl Harbor defenses, and, collaborated with my predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:—

(a) The critical inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns available to defend Pearl Harbor, necessitating during war the constant manning of ships' anti-aircraft guns [538 Corrected D] while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District—subchasers and patrol boats.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

We recommended that measures to correct these deficiencies take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. Some remedial progress was made. The War Department provided fighting planes.

My next step, 15 February, was to organize security measures for ships at sea, to guard against surprise attack, submarine or air. The order promulgating these security measures was revised from time to time and reissued in latest form as Confidential Letter No. 2CL (Revised) dated 14 October 1941. Measures prescribed in this order were rehearsed frequently and regularly by forces both at sea and in port. In Pearl Harbor ships were so moored that arcs of fire were allocated by berths, and assurance was made that dispersal of ships permitted best possible anti-aircraft fire in all directions.

All during the period of my command of the Pacific Fleet I had to balance the requirements of training, material upkeep and military alterations of the Fleet against the security measures to be kept in effect. The availability of ships and planes for active war operations was one of my constant concerns. Obviously the maximum security could not be obtained unless we very drastically sacrificed the necessary training to bring and maintain the ships of the Fleet to a satisfactory [538 Corrected E] battle condition. Constant personnel changes, both of officers and men, made this training mandatory. This applied to all types of ships and aircraft. My files are filled with the efforts we made and the steps we took to overcome difficulties. Our training program was thorough and I believe produced rapid and effective results. In accomplishing this training we had to accept continually throughout the past ten months a somewhat reduced security against a surprise attack. Had we not accepted this risk, Fleet training would have ceased. Immediately upon taking command I took steps to coordinate as well as my powers permitted, the efforts of the Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Islands.

The Fleet was divided into three Task Forces and the schedule of operations required at least one Task Force at sea at all times, available to strike in the event of a surprise. Often two Task Forces were at sea at the same time but never three. Training operations were intensive, but it is necessary always to provide time in port for overhaul of machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for action against the enemy.

We worked out a comprehensive plan to utilize all the forces in Hawaii to the maximum in the event of a surprise attack. Frequent drills were held, deficiencies corrected in so far as possible, and every effort made to perfect the organization by trial and error. Day by day, over several months I had considered when we should establish the maximum security measures and I realized at all times that this would be a difficult decision to make. The despatches and other information we received were carefully evaluated and I kept my principal subordinate Admirals and the Commanding General informed of the situation as it developed. The action I took was [538 Corrected F] dictated by my own best judgment after such consultations and I think these subordinates were in substantial agreement with the action that I took from time to time.

War was threatened many times during the past year and I had to consider at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the Fleet of long periods of watch standing in port during peacetime and the result that the demands might not destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to promote. The security measures in effect in the ships of the Fleet while at sea were of the highest order. We considered a massed submarine attack on the ships at sea in the operating areas as a probability and effective measures were taken to combat this menace. We considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility, but one to be guarded against, and training and plans were made for this contingency to the limit of forces available. Just when to place in effect to a maximum these measures was our problem. From the actions of the Navy Department I believe they shared the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote

possibility. Our correspondence bears this out. At the time the attack took place conversations were still being conducted in Washington. For an attack to be launched on this place the forces had to leave Japan at least two weeks prior to the conclusion of the conversations. Our radio and other intelligence gave no indication of such a move.

From 1 February to the date of the raid, both by official and personal correspondence, I continuously demanded of the Navy Department ammunition, modern planes, more destroyers, patrol craft for the Fourteenth Naval District, sea train vessels for transporting aircraft from the Coast, radar for all ships, IFF for planes, sound detection devices for small craft. My replies [538 *Corrected G*] from the Department almost invariably were to the effect that the major effort would be in the Atlantic. This statement may be verified from the files of the Commander-in-Chief. Many of the most powerful and modern units of the Pacific Fleet were transferred to the Atlantic. Flight deck merchant vessels under conversion and small craft such as subchasers were diverted to the United Kingdom. I asked for more men, and was told that the Atlantic Fleet needs were even more pressing than those in the Pacific, the Atlantic Fleet was under complement also. Although shooting orders had been issued in the Atlantic and in the South East Pacific East of Longitude 100° W., as late as 23 September 1941 I was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations not to bomb suspected hostile submarines except in the restricted area close to Pearl Harbor channel, and was informed that in the event of hostilities with Japan there was no intention to further reduce the Pacific Fleet except for the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month "after Japan and the United States are at war."

Failure to obtain men and materials demanded for the Pacific Fleet is not a defense against having been taken by surprise. I submit, however, that repeated rebuffs of my recommendations and constant insistence of the Navy Department that the major emphasis was to be placed upon operations in the Atlantic strongly contributed to my estimate that an air attack of the nature and force of that delivered on 7 December was not to be expected. Without warning from Washington, I had no reason to consider December 7th as different from other times of diplomatic tension with Japan. Throughout my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief I have kept my Task Force and Type Commanders informed of the existing situation as presented to me by the Department. I [538 *Corrected H*] believe all of these officers held views similar to mine. It must be evident today to anyone who studied my correspondence with that agency, that the Navy Department up to December 7th did not believe that Japan would make an air attack on Pearl Harbor nor that hostilities were unduly imminent. My frame of mind was necessarily influenced by the action of the Department and the letters and despatches which I received therefrom.

If the President, the State Department, and the Navy Department at any time during the Washington negotiations with the Japanese emissaries gathered a more alarming viewpoint regarding possible Japanese military action against this Fleet, I was never so informed. The absence of such a warning from Washington could not fail to affect most decisively every estimate of the situation which I made up to the time of the attack.

The Commander-in-Chief received but one war warning, dated 27 November. It read as follows:—

"OpNav to Cincpac and Cincaf. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. This is a war warning. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out defense tasks only assigned in WPL 46. Similar warning being sent by War Department. Guam and Samoe directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

There was a warning sent to Commander Naval Coastal Frontier info CinCPac on 29 November.

This despatch indicated confinement of original attack to Philippines, N. E. I., and Singapore. On 30 [538 *Corrected I*] November the Chief of Naval Operations sent following despatch to Cincaf:—

"OpNav to Cincaf, info Cinpac. It is indicated that Japan is about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expeditions. In order to ascertain the

destination of this expedition and for security, Cincaf is directed to cover by air the range from Manila to Camranh Bay for three days. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur."

The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special warning was sent by the Department of Cincaf on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

We did expect a surprise submarine attack upon our ships at sea. There have been several such suspected attacks in the past, but no real evidence that they were genuine. We have for ten months been fully prepared for submarine attack. On 28 November, without reference to the Department, I ordered all ships to depth bomb suspected submarine contacts in all of the Oahu operating areas and confined submerged operations of our own submarines to certain limited areas. This readiness to meet the submarine menace is evidenced by the fact that when a submarine was discovered near the entrance to Pearl Harbor early on 7 December, it was promptly attacked by the nearest destroyer. When during the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor a destroyer making emergency sortie sighted a submarine in the channel ahead, the destroyer passed over the submarine and destroyed it by prompt depth charge action.

In the light of what has happened it is easy to state [538 Corrected J] that we should have placed in effect all security measures and should have utilized our patrol squadrons to the maximum of their capabilities. At the time of the attack we had one squadron of patrol planes based on Midway and five and one-half squadrons based on Oahu. Of these one squadron had just returned from seven weeks extensive operations based on Midway and four and one-half squadrons had recently been delivered by air from the factory at San Diego. While operable these four and one-half squadrons required considerable work to make them effective. Difficulties were being experienced with this new type and the absence of spares made it highly desirable to economize on their operations in order to have them available in an emergency. The Army was having difficulties with their four-engine bombers and it had been reported within the week that they had only six in operating condition. A flight of Army bombers arrived during the raid, but they had come from the mainland without ammunition. About a month before the raid we had sent two squadrons of patrol planes to the Coast to be replaced. I accepted with reluctance this reduction of our patrol planes but took the risk in order to have the new patrol planes available before delays incident to expected bad winter weather. I cite this as one of the many decisions that had to be made.

At the time of the attack the anti-aircraft batteries of ships in harbor were partially manned and they opened fire promptly on the first attacking planes. Two torpedo planes of the first wave were shot down before they launched their torpedoes and a third plane immediately after launching torpedoes. Only the short range weapons could be used against the low flying enemy planes in the harbor crowded with our ships and this Fleet is woefully deficient in short range anti-aircraft weapons. The use [538 Corrected K] of 5" guns on the low flying first attackers would have wrought great havoc on our ships and on the shops and residences of the Navy Yard and nearby settlements. Furthermore, the fuse settings cannot be set low enough to cause the shells to burst in front of these planes when they came into view over the trees and houses almost right on our ships. In spite of that I think they used them.

The Japanese espionage and intelligence service in the Islands was and is excellent. We know now that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu cabled, over our cable, the daily movements of our ships during the days immediately preceding the attack. Charts taken from enemy planes and a submarine prove that the Japanese knew the berth numbers and names of every ship in the harbor. This intelligence service placed us under a terrific handicap, a handicap that has existed during all the time the Fleet has been based on Pearl Harbor. That Japan was maintaining an effective intelligence service in the Hawaiian Area difficult to apprehend with the peacetime methods has been well known to us throughout our stay in these waters.

On the other hand, the intelligence service available to me was ineffective and inaccurate. I had never been able to obtain from my Government a definite statement of the action it would take in certain eventualities. Correspondence in the Commander-in-Chief's files can be introduced in evidence to confirm this.

Letters and despatches received from the Chief of Naval Operations in the days immediately preceding hostilities indicated a Japanese movement to the Southward. My radio intelligence was misleading as was that promulgated by the Navy Department. On December 1, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin stating that there were [538 *Corrected L*] strong indications pointing to an early attack on Thailand and that "The major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." We have evidence now that four or more carriers took part in the attack at Oahu.

The heaviest damage suffered by the Fleet was that delivered by torpedo attack. The Navy Department was convinced that aerial torpedoes would be ineffective in Pearl Harbor and we had discounted that menace. The anti-torpedo baffle had been considered, both by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. In his letter of 15 February 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations had stated:—"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet is desired." The depth of water in and around available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed 45 feet.

We knew the international situation was serious, but it had been serious for much more than the 10 months I served in command of this Fleet. Messages which I received from the Navy Department and our radio intelligence gave no indication that anyone considered an air attack on Oahu more than a remote possibility.

I went over each day all despatches and intelligence reports received. My staff were untiring in their efforts. On the Saturday preceding the attack we carefully evaluated the situation. It was appreciated that the situation was growing increasingly critical. Although I did not expect the United States to become involved immediately, a written memorandum, by my direction, was kept available as to the course of action to be taken if hostilities should come. The last revision was made on December 6.

It was felt that the most serious hazard would [538 *Corrected M*] be from submarine attacks and that the most important considerations were to minimize the danger from them and to start offensive action by movement against the Marshalls at the earliest possible moment. This movement involved the advancement of patrol planes to Wake and Johnston and an increase of the number at Midway.

A careful evaluation of the factors involved, the information from the Navy Department, and the concept of the war by the Department as indicated by the Departmental War Plans led very strongly to the conclusion that utilization of patrol planes for searching the Hawaiian Area for a possible but improbable enemy was of much less value than being prepared to immediately advance those planes to our distant island bases. To aid in their protection and to cover effectively the advancement of mobile surface units for offensive operations in the Marshall Area and to support these operations when commenced.

My operating plans, based on the Department's concepts of the war—in which I was in general accord—and its orders had been approved by the Department. I was prepared to commence war operations, and felt keenly that vigorous offensive action should be initiated as promptly as possible after hostilities commenced.

By our operating plans no more than two squadrons of patrol planes were to be retained in Oahu.

The purpose of such planes was primarily to cover the sea lanes toward the Coast and toward the South Seas against enemy auxiliary cruisers, submarines, etc., that might raid our communication lines. It was thoroughly realized that they were far too few in numbers to maintain any effective search around Oahu against enemy carriers. All other patrol planes were to be used in connection with offensive operations.

[538 *Corrected N*] The Department with much more complete information than we had clearly indicated that they discounted the probability of an attack on Oahu. The attitude of our government was evidenced by acceptance of our war plan; by priority given to Europe and the Atlantic Fleet in assignment of aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons and other security installations; by transfer of the greater part of long range bombers from Oahu to the Philippines and by the proposal (which incidentally I did not accept) to transfer fifty pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway and Wake.

Subsequent developments show that all of Washington as well as the Fleet were somewhat prepared for a treacherous initiation of war, if Japan should decide on such a course, but we were all in error as to the date, the direction and the character of that treacherous attack.

I have constantly given serious consideration to the question of the availability of patrol planes when hostilities broke out. As I have previously stated we had 69 patrol planes on Oahu on December 7. Of these 61 planes were in flying condition. Had I started the continuous patrols on November 27, the day the war warning was received, it is probable that this number would have been somewhat less by December 7. Fifty-four of these planes were of the PBY-5 type which had recently arrived from the mainland. There was a practical absence of spare parts for these new planes. Some material difficulties were being experienced and all of these new planes were due to be fitted with armor and leakproof gas tanks, before being entirely suitable for war service.

Maintaining continuous search using all planes in flying condition beginning on 27 November and continuing indefinitely had to be balanced against the probability [538 Corrected O] of attack on Oahu and the desirability of having all our patrol planes in operating condition when war came.

Excluding the PBY-5 type an effective search could not be made with what remained. I therefore determined that our best course was to bend every effort towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations than to expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches. To insure against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles on a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require 252 planes. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. One hundred patrol planes would be required for this dawn patrol. This would be required for assured security against an attack because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter daily many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Needless to say, had I known of the imminence of an attack on Oahu on or about 7 December, I would have utilized all planes to the limit of their capability accepting the necessary risks of such operations with the new patrol squadrons.

I believe the Fleet was in as an effective state of readiness as it was humanly possible to place it under conditions that existed during the past ten months. I am sure that my files and the testimony of responsible officers in the Fleet will bear out the statement that I left no stone unturned and spared no effort to have this Fleet ready to fight.

[539] I can at the present time present certain exhibits which we have here to show the steps taken in the fleet to obtain the state of readiness which, I think, may be germane to the investigation. Shall I go ahead with them, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 10, paragraphs 7 and 9. Even before I assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, I had collaborated with my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in preparing a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the inherent weakness of the fleet's base in Hawaiian waters. This letter went forward to the Department over the signature of Admiral Richardson. As it is very important, I shall read the entire letter:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., January 25, 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOC.

References:

(a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-GTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor enroute to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for [540] Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

- (a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.
- (b) War with Japan is imminent.
- (c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.
- (d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
- (e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered [541] sidered German or Italian.
- (f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.
- (g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

- (a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.
- (b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.
- (c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.
- [542] (d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:

- (a) Provide escort for important ships.
- (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.
- (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.
- (d) Despatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.
- (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.
- (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:

- (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.
- (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.

(c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.

[543] (6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.

(9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and [544] material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

(a) The critical inadequacy of A. A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A. A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and [545] material aid to Great Britain.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements re-patched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not be referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W. P. L. 44 (advance copy) be embarrassing the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Exhibit 11. In view of the fact that by far the most important damage received by vessels of the Fleet in the attack of December 7, 1941, was inflicted by torpedo action, I desire to read into the record at this time a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, the subject of which was: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor", dated February 15, 1941. (See following page.)

I will read this letter in part:

FEBRUARY 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you read that again?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. He did not get that. Read it again.

[545 *Corrected A*] The letter referred to on page 545 was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and all the quoted matter on pages 546-547 was a part of the same letter.

[546] Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

That is about all there is to it. That is the crux of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

General McCoy. Was that since the British attack on Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. Was that prior to the attack on the Italian ship in Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not find it out.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think it is.

General McCoy. What is the date of that letter?

[547] Admiral KIMMEL. February 15th.

The CHAIRMAN. February 15, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 15, 1941.

I think this was, yes, sir.

(Reading:)

As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 90 feet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Continuing reading:)

The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire.

I have Exhibit 12 here, which is a chart of Pearl Harbor showing that 45 feet is the maximum depth in the harbor. That is something that you can verify.

The CHAIRMAN. We have it here on the board.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think everybody knows it anyhow.

I might say that the torpedo business was a complete surprise to me. Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would have been enormously less.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, had there been any communications from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department later than February 15 modifying the content of that letter about the depth of water?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir. I will [548] search for it and make certain.

Admiral STANDLEY. Before I left Washington I saw a copy of a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance under date of July in which they referred to this letter stating that they found they could fire torpedoes at a lesser depth. I wish you would see if you have any such information from any source.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I asked them to do that for me.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take a recess now for about five minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject, but it did not greatly modify this letter.

Admiral STANDLEY. I did not see the original letter, but I saw the second letter.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Because I particularly asked about it, but I am not sure it modified that letter to any extent.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a result of these facts, under date of March 12, 1941, I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations a letter accepting the fact that torpedo baffles not be installed in Pearl Harbor until a light efficient torpedo net could be developed and supplied to the area. It is an unfortunate fact that by December 7, 1941, the light efficient net had not been made available to Pearl Harbor for the protection of the vessels moored therein, and the endorsement on the investigation made (See following page.)

by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District:

In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

[548 Corrected A] On page 548, line 7 from bottom:

Delete the word "investigation" and insert the word "recommendation."

[549] That was on the basis of that.

In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir.

(See following page.)

Under date of 20 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Department on the subject: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks."

Paragraph 3 of that letter read as follows:

In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the use of baffles for Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

That is the essence of the letter.

From the day I assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, February 1, 1941, the security of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters was a matter of earnest concern to me. I immediately initiated a study of this subject and under date of February 15, 1941, I issued an order to the Fleet entitled "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

Admiral THEOBALD. I do not think you need to read "G", as it is in the next one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I put that in to show that we started on this immediately.

Exhibit 16. After eight months' experience as Commander-in-Chief, I decided on certain revisions and elaborations of my original order on this subject, and under date of October 14, 1941, I issued another order on the subject of security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas. This order covered the subjects of Continuous Patrols, Intermittent Patrols, Sortie and Entry, Security in Operating Areas, Security of Ships at Sea, and Defense Against Air Attack. Further subjects covered were: "Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in

[549 Corrected A]

REVISION

On page 549, line 2, delete "In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir." and insert, "I have some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir."

On page 549, line 14 from bottom:

This order was submitted as exhibit 15 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel exhibit number —. [550] Operating Area." That I was not unmindful of the possibility of a surprise attack upon the Fleet is evidenced by paragraph 2 (b) of both my security orders. In both these orders this paragraph 2 (b) read as follows:

That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3) A combination of these two.

I think it may be well for me to read this security order in toto. I will read the whole thing:

From Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference: (a) to (h).

Enclosure:

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

General MCCOY. What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is dated October 14 and this supersedes the order covering the same ground issued on February 15, 1941. We is-

sued an order and after eight months we gathered together the evidence that was in the original order and made a revision.

The CHAIRMAN. That security order will be placed in the record.

(See following page.)

(Admiral Kimmel read from the security order paragraph (G) on page 4 of the order and paragraph (3) found on page 6 of the order.)

Admiral KIMMEL. There are various other provisions which I had, covering the actions to be taken by the various commanders at the time of the air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless the Commission desires otherwise, I suggest that Admiral Kimmel's report of December 21, 1941, be marked "Kimmel No. 1" and attached to each of the copies of

[550 Corrected A] On page 550, line 10 from bottom:

This order was submitted as exhibit 16 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel exhibit number —. [551] the notes of this day so that it will be in the same copy as the Admiral's testimony.

It is also suggested that this order of October 14, 1941, be attached to each page of the notes of this day as "Kimmel No. 2," so that we will have it in the same testimony and under the same cover.

Is that all right, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

(The order of October 14, 1941, Kimmel No. 2, is as follows:)

(See following page.)

[551 Corrected A] Here include printed copy of Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) dated October 14, 1941.

Five printed copies to be supplied by Admiral Kimmel. Number printed copy page 551 Corrected A.

[551b] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

A2-11/FFI/

A4-3/QL/(0271)

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., February 15, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) U. S. Fleet Conf. Letter No. 8CL-40.
- (b) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (c) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 9L-40.
- (d) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (e) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (f) Section 4, Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

1. Reference (a) is hereby cancelled and superseded by this letter.
2. The security of the Fleet operating and based in the Hawaiian Area may reasonably be based on two assumptions:

(A) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

- (1) sabotage from small craft on ships based in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) to block the Entrance Channel to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel,
- (3) lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(B) That a declaration of war might be preceded by;

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor.
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part or in their entirety as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Maintain continuous patrols:*

- (1) Channel Entrance plus a ready duty destroyer moored near coal dock.

[551c] (2) Boom.

(3) Harbor.

(B) *Intermittent patrols:*

- (1) *Patrol Wing TWO* shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces and in early morning on subsequent days.

(2) *An off-shore destroyer patrol* of three destroyers beginning twelve hours prior to the sortie and/or entry of heavy ships to search that part of the circle of a radius of ten miles from the entrance buoys not patrolled by the Channel Entrance Patrol. This patrol shall be furnished by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force, on request of Task Force Commander.

(3) *An air patrol* shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship to search that part of the circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is South of latitude 21°—20' N. This air patrol shall be furnished: for sortie, from ship or carrier-based aircraft by the Senior Officer Present Afloat of unit remaining in the Harbor on the request of the Sortie Task Force Commander; for entry, by the Task Force Commander entering; when a sortie and entry occur in succession, by the Task Force Commander entering.

- (4) *Daily sweep.* Sweep for magnetic and anchored mines.

(C) *Operating areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (e).

(2) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and patrol aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

- (a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available in the priority:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

[551d] (c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wing TWO and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(D) *Sortie and Entrance:*

- (1) Comply with instructions in U.S.F. 10.

(2) Patrols outlined in (B) (2) and (B) (3) above, shall be established and commanded by the Sortie Commander except when forces are entering only, in which case they shall be established and commanded by the officer commanding the Task Force entering. When forces sortie and enter consecutively the command of the patrols will be turned over to the entry Task Force Commander on completion of the sortie by the Sortie Task Force Commander. These patrols shall continue until released by the Task Force Commander of the sortie in case of sortie only, or by the Task Force Commander entering in case of entry or successive sortie and entry.

(3) Degaussing coils, if calibrated, shall be energized in water of less than sixty fathoms. Unless the Entrance Channel has been swept for magnetic mines, Commander Base Force shall furnish a tug, minesweeper, or small ship without protection to precede the first heavy ship in which the degaussing gear is inoperative. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(E) *Conditions of ships at sea:*

(1) Ships, except submarines, shall not anchor in unprotected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului may be considered

as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(2) Task Force, or Task Group Commanders, if directed by the former, shall maintain inner air patrol for disposition or formations, when in assigned operating areas.

(3) Maintain inner anti-submarine screens insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(4) Maintain condition of readiness **THREE** on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[551e] (5) Maintain material condition **XRAY**, or equivalent in all ships.

(6) Steam darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(7) Restrict use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(8) Maintain horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(9) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(10) Submarine operations, except (9) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarines squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian Area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they will maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(11) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes all operations of submarines other than those covered in subparagraphs (9) and (10) above, shall be on the surface.

(12) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(13) Commanders of surface task forces, when they have been designated, shall be furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. Commanders of surface task forces shall ensure that all air patrols are properly notified thereof.

(F) Condition of ships in port

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (b), (c) and (d).

(G) Defense against air attack

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

[551f] (2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) As a basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire, berths in the harbor are assigned to air defense sectors as follows:

Sector I—Berths F2-F8, K2, C1 to C5. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 045° to 190° true from assigned berths).

Sector II—Berths F1, F9, B1-3, Dry Docks, DG Calibrating Buoys, T1-4, WL-2-3, D2-7, X22, X23. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 190° to 270° true from assigned berths).

Sector III—Berths D1, D9, F10-13, X2, X15, X18. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 270° to 000° true from assigned berths).

Sector IV—Berths X3, X4, X5, X6 to X14, X17, C6. (Sector defined by approximate bearings 000° to 045° true from assigned berths).

Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships moored at that sector's berths. But ships at other sector berths may be used to augment fire outside their sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that

they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and will be responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he will:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

[551g] (d) Co-ordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notify all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

(7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed: Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships will not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure will be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(2) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(3) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(4) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea advised.

[551h] (b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit.

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require.

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines of action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks, or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

[551i] (c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit will execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

(a) *Ship Attacked.* Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing details and

addressed to all ships present in Hawaiian waters. To insure rapid delivery this despatch should be transmitted by the attacked ship to the Task Force Commander, to all ships present in Pearl Harbor on the harbor circuit in effect, and to Radio Honolulu (NPM) on 355 kcs. for Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, and relay on schedule. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

Ships other than one attacked.

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except all aircraft will be placed in Condition ONE, armed. Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available). Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except that one-half available aircraft (armed) will be used for own inner air patrol. The second half will be sent to scene of attack, armed, to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined defensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

[551 f] (f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship is attacked, tugs in operating areas slip tows and join her at best speed, prepared to tow. Report in code positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wing TWD.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ships(s) for repair.

(l) *SOPA, Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at sea.* Co-ordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines awaiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

H. E. KIMMEL.

DISTRIBUTION:

(List II, Case 1):

O; X; AA1; AAA1; EN1; EN3;
NA12; ND11AC; ND11-12-13-14.

P. C. CROSLY,
Flag Secretary.

[552] Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 18. The close cooperation required between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian Area has always been thoroughly recognized by both services. Coordination of effort between the two services throughout my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was obtained by cooperative effort between the Commanding General and myself. The weakness of this command setup was finally recognized by the authorities in Washington and this recognition led to the only thoroughly satisfactory type of command in the premises, namely: "Unity of Command." Under date of December 17, 1941, Naval Operations addressed the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. I quote herewith a paraphrase of that despatch: "Commanding General, Hawaiian Department informed by UpNav and Chief of Staff that Army of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier is now under C-in-C in Pacific. Obtain an exact copy of the Chief of Staff's despatch to the Commanding General."

(See following page.)

quired between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian Area has always been thoroughly recognized by both services. Coordination of effort between the two services throughout my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was obtained by cooperative effort between the Commanding General and myself. The weakness of this command setup was finally recognized by the authorities in Washington and this recognition led to the only thoroughly satisfactory type of command in the premises, namely: "Unity of Command." Under date of December 17, 1941, Naval Operations addressed the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. I quote herewith a paraphrase of that despatch: "Commanding General, Hawaiian Department informed by UpNav and Chief of Staff that Army of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier is now under C-in-C in Pacific. Obtain an exact copy of the Chief of Staff's despatch to the Commanding General."

General McCoy. What date is that?

The CHAIRMAN. December 17, 1941.

General McCoy. Did you make any recommendations as to the unity of command before the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I made no recommendations on the subject. I talked about it on various occasions. It was a subject that has long been before the two services. I think it was recognized by everyone that the unity of command is essential to any effective effort.

General McCoy. Had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. While in the Navy Department had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I never served on the joint board.

General McCoy. Did you know that that subject was up before the joint board before?

[552 Corrected A] On page 552, line 1, delete words "exhibit 18."

[552b] UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646
Confidential

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised).

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

To: PACIFIC FLEET.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt:

- (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) Continuous Patrols:

(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) Intermittent Patrols:

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[552c] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty Destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°—20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) *Sortie and Entry:*

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channels buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force will clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2)

(b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[552d] (D) Operating Areas:

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U. S. C. & G. S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrols need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the officer responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) Ships at Sea:

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBc

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to co-operate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness **THREE** on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[552e] (h) Maintenance of material condition **XRAY**, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) *Ships in port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) *Defense against air attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battalions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Office Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[522f] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (3) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above).

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action To Be Taken If Submarine Attacks In Operating Area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[552g] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers*. Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers*. Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines*. Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft*. Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force*. If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings*. Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft*. Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District*. Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S. O. P. A., Pearl Harbor*. Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea*. Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[552h] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSLY,

Flag Secretary.

[552i] (At this point in the original transcript there appears a map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 37, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[552j] CONFIDENTIAL

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1) Inshore patrols.

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minicraft, Battle Force; and Minicraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c) Daily search opn. areas.

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Enclosure (B)

[553] Admiral KIMMEL. I had heard it was before the joint board on many occasions, and I had heard that in time of war they would probably appoint a man who would have absolute command of the forces in any one area, but I knew nothing had been done, and I knew that in time of peace the probability of getting any action was just about nil.

Exhibit 19. Throughout the time that I was acting as Commander-
(See following page.)

in-Chief of the Fleet the cooperation and coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Area were guided by "Joint Action, Army and Navy." This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. The most vital consideration in all efforts of cooperation was the coordination of the actions and operations of the air forces of the Army and the Navy.

I shall read paragraph d(3) on page 14 of "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," which reads as follows:

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

That comes under the heading of, "The specific functions of the Army is coastal frontier defense," and in carrying out these functions the Army will provide and operate or maintain:

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

Then on page 32 of the "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," paragraph z:

[553 Corrected A] On page 553, line 7, delete the words "exhibit 19."

[554] An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants,

public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

Through verbal agreement with the Commanding General, an agreement for joint air action by Army and Navy forces was drawn up under date of 20 March 1941, and signed by the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer in my Security Orders of 15 February 1941 and 14 October 1941.

I might add that before I took over command, I took steps to talk to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to my own air people, and I told them that we must get some method of operating the Army and Navy in conjunction with the other, to get some coordinated effort.

As a result of their efforts and a great many other people, Admiral Bloch and General Short ordered a board to consider this method of coordination and efforts with the Army air force, and under date of the 20th of March they got an agreement, and the agreement is laid down here:

20 MARCH 1941

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the [555] threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the [556] tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

(See following page.)

MAILGRAM

Mailed at:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 120001 April 1941

From: Naval Base Defense Officer

(Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)

Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commanders & Type Commanders
Compatwing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer, Capt. Yard. C. O.'s Dist. Activities & Units
as per distribution list of N. B. D. O. Operation Plan No. 1-41 with annexes
A, B, C, D, & E.

Information:

Cincpac

Comdg., Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with paragraph (X) of naval base defense officer operation plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, Revision of annex baker (Naval base defense air force operation plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of annex baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. N., Commander Naval Base Defense Force (Com-
mandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.)

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

[556 Corrected A] On page 556, line 7, paragraph "4" the following authentication should appear:

Approved 21 March 1941, signed C. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department.

[556b] C-A16-3/A4-3(5) /ND14(0348)

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., April 9, 1941.

(Confidential)

Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan—No. 1-41 dated February 27, 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN No. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

(a) *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two))*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Patrol Squadrons.
- Shore-based VO-VS units.
- Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
- Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
- Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
- Army bombardment squadrons.
- Army reconnaissance squadrons.
- Navy Utility squadrons.

(b) *Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commander)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

- Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
- Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
- One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. Information:

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

Assumptions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Anti-aircraft gun control in the Pearl Harbor area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or fleet units in the operating areas.

3. (a) Search and Attack Group. (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets; (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) Air Combat Group. (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

[556d] 4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing Two).

Approved:

O. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

C-16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)
(Confidential)

MARCH 31, 1941.

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Wing Two, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

[556-e] (b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8" guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be [556-g] used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.

2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.

3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the [556-h] next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The

disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be most would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

IV. Action open to us:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands:

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.

2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

[556i] (c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.

2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.

3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

(d) In event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.

2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.

3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

(4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required.

1. Search Unit.

2. Attack Unit.

3. Air Combat Unit.

[556f] Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing Two))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.

Shore-based VO-VS units.

Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.

Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.

Army bombardment squadrons.

Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Navy Utility squadrons.

[556k] 2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.

Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.

One division of shore-based carrier VS planes.

(Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of surface vessel interception.

2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

[556-l] Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of Readiness:

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of

the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently [556-m] available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: Condition A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. Conditions B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any Condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. Conditions C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal-daily flying from all units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commanders designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two): an officer experienced in [556-n] VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLANGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing Two).

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14 (0348)
(Confidential)

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41.

Conditions of readiness and readiness reports:

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

[556-o] D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of operational readiness:

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

3. Readiness Reports:

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two).

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness [556p] for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force and Commander General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

Now, based on that the air officer commanding Patrol Wing 2, Commander Bellinger, and General Martin, Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, got out an operating plan which was effective on the date that the attack took place.

General McCoy. Admiral, these agreements between Admiral Bloch and General Short, signed by each one of them, were they approved by you as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were approved by me as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, yes, sir. Whether I signed them—I don't recall that I actually signed them, but I knew all about it and I did approve of it.

General McCoy. Admiral Bloch was the responsible officer for the defense of Pearl Harbor on that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch was not responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor; he was responsible for certain elements of the defense.

General McCoy. He was?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was.

General McCoy. He was responsible for the security of the Navy Yard. Doesn't that also include Pearl Harbor? How is that exercised where you were present?

Admiral KIMMEL. As you stated it, sir, you said Admiral Bloch was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor. Of course, Pearl Harbor, (See following page.)

by agreement and by joint action of the Army and the Navy, was the responsibility of the Army, and

[556q Corrected A] On page 556o, line 2 from bottom, before the words "Pearl Harbor" insert the words "the defense of."

[557] Admiral Bloch was responsible for the naval elements that could be made available for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say that in the event of an air raid the responsibility on Admiral Bloch was to turn over whatever was available to the Hawaiian Air Force to be used in connection with its own forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. For destroying planes over Oahu, yes, sir.

General McCoy. The call to be made on you by him for the Army command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Subsequently, that is in the operating plan, but we ran into some difficulty in the practical operation as to making this available. We got that all ironed out by the time of the attack, or long before the attack took place. That is, the different elements were automatically available in case of an air raid. That was, I think, well understood by all elements.

General McCoy. Well, for instance, when an attack was over Oahu, my understanding would be that the Navy forces would go to the Army automatically, and by request vice versa, if you wanted them for patrolling over the seas, and they would go to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is just the point. In the drills with them we found that it took entirely too long to get a communication through. That provision was subsequently taken care of in the operating plans, and those forces that were available became immediately available.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, Admiral Bloch would not wait for a telephone call from General Martin, since he knew what he had available for the Army, for General Martin, and would put his command at the disposal of General Martin?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And vice versa?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That was the way it worked out [558] practically, which followed that we had to hold onto some of his stuff, (See following page.)
you see?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. But in a working agreement they had this right to hold it back, but practically—I am now giving you what I believe to be a fact, and you can determine that more thoroughly from Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Bloch here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard, and this is hearsay—I wish to make that clear—that orders were issued by Admiral Bellinger and how and where he wanted his bombers to go. He immediately asked which bombers would be available, and when he was told he told them where he wanted them to go.

No, there is a discrepancy that never may be definitely located—I don't know—in all the testimony that is given here as to the events of this particular day. You can realize that people were laboring under a terrific stress and surprise which was so great that this thing had occurred, and the damage done, which was quite substantial, and we are bound to run into discrepancies of this kind in the testimony.

I believe that everyone is trying his best to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure of it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask a question there, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Following this policy or this understanding that you said had been arrived at between the two force commanders, that was the procedure that was to be effective in case of an attack or an emergency; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the event or prior to the

[558 *Corrected A*] On page 558, line 1, after the word "practically" delete "comma" and insert "period" and delete remainder of sentence.

[559] emergency where, as you have previously stated, there was a lack of sufficient force of whatever kind or nature to perform the tasks assigned, do you know whether the Commander of Patrol Wing, Admiral Bellinger, had asked the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

I understand it is the Navy function to provide the offshore air patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there were not sufficient patrol planes to accomplish that effectively with the forces at that time. Had Admiral Bellinger made any request on the Army to supplement his forces to take care of that situation? Do you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, he had not, but the only real effective patrol planes that the Army had were big bombers, and these big bombers within a week—it was reported to me that only six of them were in operating condition, and they had some twelve available at that time. We had—and my figures may be slightly in error—but we had approximately twelve of those bombers here, but all but twelve had been flown to Midway, Wake, and then by way of Australia to the Philippines.

We were daily expecting somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty additional long-range bombers to come through here, and they were scheduled to go on to the Philippines. Shortly after that there were to be a hundred, I think. The exact figures escape me, but it was a large number. The Department was much concerned about the situation of Wake Island, and I thought we would be able to get these bombers through from Wake all the way to the Philippines.

We had previously put the guns on Wake, and we sent two submarines out to assist the defense, and we had just sent out these twelve fighting planes at the time that the attack took place. We were attempting to secure Wake as well as we [560] could.

The construction of these bases on the outlying islands has been under the most adverse conditions. We were faced with the necessity of building bases and of protecting them at the same time. We had a limited supply of water and water-making facilities, food, and refrigerator facilities, and the total number of men on each one of the islands could not be exceeded. You could take your choice as to whether they should be military personnel or construction personnel at all times.

When we sent guns and the Marines to Wake, we had to withdraw some of the working force. When the Department wanted to send out a much smaller number of guns than I did, I sent a despatch to the Department in which I suggested more guns be sent, and they

approved of it. About two weeks later they told me they did not want all those guns out there and they wanted to send considerably fewer. I told them it was too late, that the guns were already there, and that I could not very well get them back.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did all these preparations and plans interfere with the requests or with the planes carrying out patrolling between the Army and the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Admiral STANDLEY. My question was concerned with the fact if Admiral Bellinger did not make any requests upon the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. About the request of Admiral Bellinger on the Army for planes to carry on offshore patrol, that could have been made, but so far as I know, it was not made; but I desire to point out in that connection that we had maneuvers shortly before this in which all the ships of the fleet took part, and we wanted the Army to take part in that maneuver. We invited them to, but the Army could not do it because they were engaged in ferrying these planes to the [561] Asiatics and in getting their planes in a ferrying condition here. I realized that the chance of getting any assistance from the Army was very small inasmuch as they had only six of these bombers which could fight this week before. They had their problems too, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, if you had anticipated the emergency which developed, would you have had any hesitancy in asking the Army for its help?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not the slightest.

Admiral STANDLEY. The answer is that the emergency was not anticipated, and therefore the other work took precedence over the condition you did not anticipate?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir, but I would like to point out one thing and that was that we really had more ships out than the operating plans called for, and we made some changes in it from what the operating plan originally called for. We had no striking force to put this patrol out, and we had no striking force to go after them after we found them.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. At this point I would like to read into the record the following figures from the statement of General Short as to the planes in and out of commission on December 7, 1941:

Reconnaissance planes in commission.....	6
Reconnaissance planes out of commission.....	7
Bomber planes in commission.....	39
Bomber planes out of commission.....	33

Admiral REEVES. That agrees with the Admiral's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger had worked out some cooperative plans pursuant to the master plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is so. I will submit that as

[561 Corrected A] On page 561, line 18, delete the words "We had no striking force to put this patrol out, and we had no striking force to go after them after we found them." and insert the words

"We had not sufficient air force to maintain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force left to go after the enemy when we found him."

[562] an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Submit it as "Kimmel 3" and we will include that with your testimony so that we will have it before us.

You could probably furnish us copies.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

(See following page.)

[562 *Corrected A*] The document referred to on page 562 is quoted in this transcript on pages 556-A to 556-O inclusive.

[563] Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 19. This is a fortnightly summary of current national situations, a bulletin issued by the Director of Naval Intelligence under date of 1 December 1941. I will read from "The Japanese Naval Situation" on page 9 of the fortnightly summary of the Office of Naval Intelligence, dated 1 December, 1941:

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction [564] material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

Exhibit 22 contains communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu. The vital importance which Tokyo obviously attached to a knowledge of the ships in Pearl Harbor and the manner in which they guarded against the departure of those ships without immediate warning of that departure appears conclusive evidence to the effect that Japan had no intention of attacking Pearl Harbor in the absence of a large number of our battleships and aircraft carriers. Elaborate arrangements were made to report to Japanese submarines and Japanese vessels at sea the departure of the aircraft carriers and battleships from Pearl Harbor by:

- (1) Broadcast advertisements over KGMB at 0945 daily.
- (2) A system of lights from a house on Lanakai and Kalama during the night and visual day signals at Lanakai from a star boat during daylight.
- (3) Further visual warning of the absence of aircraft carriers and battleships was a bonfire to be shown on the Island of Maui near the Kula Sanatorium.

The codes of the Japanese Consul were seized on 7 December and it was not until 9 December that by using these codes the messages were broken down and the translation available to me. Had the information contained in exhibit 22 been known to me on 6 December I would have ordered all units to sea, because the best dispositions against surprise air attack can be effected with the fleet at sea.

However, the initiative as to the time of attack prior to the declaration of war rested entirely with the Japanese and if the fleet did proceed to sea, it had eventually to return to port for fuel, provisions, minor repairs to machinery, etc. In that event, the Japanese would have awaited the time when a considerable portion of the fleet was again in Pearl Harbor.

[565] The CHAIRMAN. Do you have knowledge of a message from the Consul here seized after the consular office was seized?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was seized when? On the 7th or 8th?

Admiral KIMMEL. The 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information of these secret codes before that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, which I got on the 9th.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't broken down until sometime after?

Admiral KIMMEL. It took a couple of days to break it down, yes. I do not think it is necessary to read these messages.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read them now?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Why the fleet is in Hawaiian waters: All the senior officers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility of surprise attack against the fleet when that fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson. In answer to a letter of his, the Chief of Naval Operations, under date of 27 May 1940 wrote Admiral Richardson as follows:

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph—.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies.

And further in the same letter:

I realize what you say about the advantage of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation, but at this time that is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principal reason for your being in Hawaii. [566]

Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 7th of December. I knew that the Navy Department and the Administration in Washington insisted on keeping the fleet out here. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet here. I thought it was appreciated in the Navy Department as well as by me, but it was one of the things I felt was beyond my power to change. I had the choice of saying I would not stay and to get another commander-in-chief, or to remain. Naturally, I wish I had taken the other course at the present time, but I did not. I did the best I could with what I had and under the conditions existing.

I have here Exhibits 1 to 8 which may be of interest. These are the steps which we took in the Pacific fleet to improve the efficiency of the fleet and to further the training program and to render the fleet as secure as possible.

I will read to you the titles which I think perhaps will give you all that is necessary, and you can go into them more thoroughly if the question arises in your minds as to the efforts that we made to bring this fleet up to a proper fighting efficient order.

The first one is on the question of anti-submarine screens, which was submitted on the 16th day of September, 1941. You can realize that all these represent the latest revisions we made of the orders which had been in effect prior to this time. It speaks of inner, intermediate, and outer anti-submarine screens. It speaks of general maneuvers, patrol stations, and a number of other questions that are germane to the subject, together with a number of diagrams.

Exhibit 2 is the tentative radar doctrine. The last revision was dated September 7, 1941. This is annex E to

[566a]

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/(0828)

U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

S-E-C-R-E-T

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 26 May 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet.

I. Personnel.

(a) *Stability.* A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel.* Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to short duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(c) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.* The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% do not intend to reenlist. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He [566b] does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this sub-paragraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to short duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers, all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale.* The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth of the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers.* It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

[566c] (f) *Uniform.* There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. Aviation.

(a) *Aviation Training.* The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.* The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:—

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR [566d] for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes, and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N.A.S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N.A.S., Pearl Harbor.

(c) *Separate Air Force.* This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exaggerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions: the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air-striking force than other nations. [566e] The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. Material, General.

(a) *Priorities.* The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal

items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range anti-aircraft guns, especially at 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors, (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's, and those *sine qua non* needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range anti-aircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *RADAR equipment*. Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

[566f] IV. Communications.

The need for establishment of confidential call signs is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. Operations.

(a) *Fleet Operations*. With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed *vital* interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to "cover" the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value can not be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear. The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having "broken our backs", so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations

of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

[566g] (b) *Fourteenth Naval District.* The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanding Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resustinance and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine.* The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support.* Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. National Policy.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as [566h] a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy

cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. Information.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet [566i] impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. Public Opinion.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

[561] Pacific fleet operation order No. 31-41.

We had taken vigorous steps to learn how to use the radar. We had a great many exercises in the radar, and we had developed a reasonably good doctrine for its use. We got out on October 28th

instructions for escort commanders and commanding officers of escort vessels.

On 31 October we got out task force organizations and missions. These divided the fleet into three task forces, or rather I should say into a number of task forces, but three principal ones, and it was a revision of the organization previously issued, changing it in some respects and getting it more nearly on a war footing.

It provided for a support force, a covering force, a reconnaissance force, a force to train in landing operations. It divided and established the task force for the Fourteenth Naval District, for the submarines, patrol wings, and a number of other points. It is here in *extenso*.

Exhibit 5 is the aircraft depth bomb alert watch. We had depth bombs in the fleet, and it was necessary to maintain a watch to drop a depth bomb, and I had arrangements for a plane to stand by when the patrol was out and to launch it immediately, to send out a depth bomb into any suspected place.

Battle plan and submarine and patrol planes under bulletin revision U. S. F. 10, which is covering the tactical orders and doctrine in United States fleet, and that was in process of revision at the time of the attack, or rather I should say it had been revised and was in process of printing at the time of the attack. The provisions of that were in effect though.

When I went to Washington in June I presented to the Chief of Naval Operations this survey of conditions in the Pacific fleet, and I took a great many steps hoping to improve the condition of the fleet, and I think we did make some improvements.

(See following page.)

[567 *Corrected A*] The survey referred to in the last paragraph on page 567 was submitted by Admiral Kimmel as his exhibit 9 and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel Exhibit No. —.

[568] Those are the principal things there.

Now, there is another thing, and that is the question of radar information, and I think perhaps you heard something about that, but I think it is wise for me to give you what I think and what I know about it.

The Army in the Hawaiian Area have a radar network on the Island of Oahu. On December 7, 1941, no communication was received from the Army authorities by the Naval authorities informing the latter that the Army radar network had unknown planes recorded on their receivers.

At about 10:45 Tuesday, December 9, 1941, Commander Kitts, Lieutenant Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, two members of my Staff, and Commander Momsen on the Staff of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District were in conference with Army authorities regarding the placing of certain anti-aircraft batteries. At the conclusion of the conference on this subject, Brigadier General Davidson, USA, asked these three naval officers if they would be interested in examining a radar plot of the Japanese planes which was recorded at the Army radar reception center during the forenoon of December 7, 1941. These naval officers did examine this plot and discovered therefrom that the Army radar network had picked up many unknown planes at or about six a. m., December 7, 1941, about 132 miles north of the

Island of Kauai and had tracked these planes to Oahu and back to the northward until they disappeared from the radar receiver about 1059 in the morning. When asked why this information was not transmitted to the Navy, these naval officers were informed that the Army radar network was manned solely for drill on the morning of December 7, 1941, and the officer in charge of the operations thought that the planes which were recorded on the receiver were Navy carrier planes and did not consider it necessary to investigate the subject further. It also developed in conversation that the officer conducting the drill on this Army [569] radar network had departed from the radar reception center at about seven o'clock in the morning and left that center in command of a non-commissioned officer. This was advanced as the probable reason that the information on that Army radar was not transmitted to naval authorities on the morning of 7 December 1941.

The Navy has made no serious effort since that time to investigate this matter. However, even if a non-commissioned officer was directing the radar from seven a. m. until after the attack on Oahu, between the hours of eight and nine a. m. on December 7, 1941, it must be apparent that when the Army alerted at the time of the attack, an experienced officer would take charge of the Army radar reception center. Thus, even if an inexperienced officer or non-commissioned officer on the morning of 7 December 1941 had been the cause of failure to report strange planes to naval authorities prior to eight a. m. required by Joint Action, Army and Navy, it is incomprehensible that immediately following the first attack the officer directing the Army radar reception should have failed to appreciate the importance of the information to the Navy. It should then have been realized that, while this information was too late to prevent surprise, the Navy still had vital interest in the further movements of the Japanese planes as the Navy surface units were proceeding to sea in the hope of intercepting and destroying Japanese forces.

It is an unfortunate fact that as a result of the failure of the Army radar network authorities to inform the Navy that the enemy planes after the attack had retired to the northward, the surface naval operation which ensued took a westerly direction with their aircraft scouting largely to the southwest. The available Navy planes first scouted in a sector between 280° and 300° true. A second plane scout was between 300° and 000° true to 300 miles. This late forenoon failure in [570] communications between the Army and the Navy contributed somewhat in the escape of the Japanese surface vessels without any damage whatever.

I wish to clarify the status of Lieutenant Commander Taylor, USNR. This officer reported to Commander Aircraft, Battle Force to give the fleet the benefit of his experience which included one year in the Royal Navy and one year in the Royal Air Force. He had had considerable experience in radar operations. As a matter of courtesy he delivered a series of lectures to the Army on the subject of radar. The Army was so impressed with Lieutenant Commander Taylor's knowledge of the operational aspects of the radar system that on about November 17, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in behalf of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, requested

the service of Lieutenant Commander Taylor as technical advisor to the Army Air Forces in the Hawaiian area in connection with organization of the Army radar system. Without written orders Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army for this duty. It will thus be seen that his status was entirely one of a technician and in no sense was he a liaison officer.

The Army was responsible for communicating radar information to the Navy both before and after eight a. m. December 7, 1941, and this should have been recognized as a matter of paramount importance. With the Navy fully alerted by five minutes past eight on that day, several channels of communication—telephone circuits, messenger, etc., were open for this purpose. The Navy's lack of this knowledge of the retirement courses of the Japanese destroyed the last possibility that existed on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, that the attacking Japanese forces could be brought to decisive action.

Now, in order to show the condition of readiness of the various ships of the fleet at the time of this attack, we have reports from a large number of them, and it indicates that [571] watertight integrity report was what we call considerably better than XRAY provides for closure of all watertight compartments except those in the living compartments and for opening storerooms and such places as that in order that they may get some stores from the storeroom. However, a higher degree is when they close everything below the second deck, and the highest degree is when everything is closed up tight.

By my order and with the forces at hand we had ready ammunition on deck and in ammunition boxes, I think the 5-inch and for the (See following page.)

3-inch 50's, and for 1.1, and for the .50 caliber machine guns. On the battleships two of the 5-inch guns had ammunition laid out and the crew near the guns, two of which were the .50 caliber guns and they (See following page.)

were completely manned and ready. In all cases—and this is laid down in some detail here and is available for the inspection of the board—there were considerably more than 50% of the officers and well over 99% of the crew on board at the time of the attack. I should (See following page.)

say it would run to 70% of the officers and 99% of the men. All ships (See following page.)

went immediately to general quarters. Fire was opened, and from the inspection of the reports from the various ships it appears that almost all the ships were firing within two minutes of the first alarm. (See following page.)

We had our other operations fully manned and in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm as we (See following page.)

know it is pretty well substantiated that in the first flight of the torpedo planes, that three of the first flight were shot down: two before they launched their torpedoes, and one afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be then a total of how many?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Were there about a dozen in that first flight of torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, somewhere in that neighborhood.

[571 Corrected A] On page 571, line 9, delete the words "I think" and insert the word "for."

On page 571, lines 12 and 13, delete the words "which were" and insert the words "and they."

On page 571, line 16, delete the words "99%" and insert the words "80%."

On page 571, line 18, delete the words "99%" and insert the words "80%."

On page 571, lines 21 and 22, delete the words "it appears that almost all the ships were firing within two minutes of the first alarm" and insert the words "it appears that almost all the ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm."

On page 571, lines 11, 10, and 9 from bottom, delete "We had our other operations fully manned and in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm" and insert the words "We had all guns fully manned, in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm."

[572] The CHAIRMAN. You got a report on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is difficult to say exactly what the number was. I think it is reasonable that it was somewhere between 12 and 20 in the first flight. I think we shot down three of them or maybe more.

All this is, as I say, in considerable detail in the report. I do not think you want to know where every ship was.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I see it is summarized in the appendix to your report to the Navy Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This merely assembles it for each ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. It carries it along.

The CHAIRMAN. And what each ship did?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you developed it in order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but this is a little different from the other. The other is a report of the ship and the action. Some of them didn't even think about reporting this.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some of them didn't even think about reporting this. They knew their guns were manned and shooting and they didn't even mention it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there a summary there?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir, but we can produce the summary, if the Commission would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. These percentages are rough approximations?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but it is laid out in considerable detail here as to organization, training at sea, training in port, security for sortie and entry, security for ships at sea, security for ships in port, duties of task force commander,

[572 Corrected A] On page 572, line 18, delete the words "Some of them didn't even think about reporting this" and insert the words

"Some of them didn't even think about reporting the time they opened fire. This is a special report in answer to a specific questionnaire."

[573] naval base, air combat guard, watertight integrity in port, condition of readiness, what station, and so on.

I might say at this point something which just occurred to me, and that is that the organization prescribed for all the ships in the fleet provided that for the anti-aircraft battery that there should be a complete crew for the anti-aircraft battery in each watch section on board no matter whether we had the same men or not, that they should be

(See following page.)

capable of manning a complete anti-aircraft battery.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that there were skeleton crews and ammunition at the anti-aircraft guns on these battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. That was according to orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think they were. They could not have begun firing as quickly as they did, if that wasn't so.

General MCCOY. Is that all submitted in toto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am perfectly willing to, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very helpful to us if you do.

Admiral KIMMEL. You can ask Admiral Pye if you want to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is really a report to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. The Commission would only be concerned with the matter that is pertinent to the happenings on the morning of the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Some of it is in regard to sea maneuvers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we forget it for the moment, will you find out when the Navy Department ceased permitting families of officers to come to Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. The exact day I cannot give, but it was after the attack was completed. That is correct, isn't it?

I can answer that but I would prefer to get the despatch

[573 *Corrected A*] On page 573, line 7, delete the words "no matter whether we had the same men or not."

On page 573, line 12, after the words "That is correct." insert the words "Except that two .50 caliber guns were completely manned."

[574] that was sent out when they stopped it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I know it was subsequent to the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Families come here in many instances where they have home yards, but the Department will not furnish them transportation unless their home yard is here, but families could come anyway on their own expense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I want to amend that, because I misunderstood at first. The Department permitted families to come here but they didn't furnish them transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. They didn't furnish transportation except to families of officers with permanent stations here or whose home ports were here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to recess now until two o'clock.

(Thereupon at 1 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[575] The CHAIRMAN. Had you concluded your statement, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. There are one or two things, sir, that I would like to add to what I already stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have here a memorandum from the fleet personnel officer.

To the best of my knowledge Unav has never prohibited dependents of personnel attached to vessels whose home port is Pearl from coming out here on Government transportation. (See following page)

Attached dispatch proves that such dependents were still being authorized on 3 December. Subject to Opnav 98 if home port not Pearl Government transportation is not authorized any time in accordance with regulations except possible special cases about which I do not know.

The only thing that stopped dependents from coming out here was the evacuation order which was issued on 15 December:

Evacuation Hawaii directed for dependents Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel on the 15th of December.

And on the 15th of December, also, Opnav sent a message 13 12 11 15 Commander in Chief Pacific Incom 14:

In order to reduce number individuals entering Hawaiian Islands to minimum take appropriate action to permit passage only those definitely required that area in interest of national defense. Maritime Commission, State, War, and Treasury office informed and requested to operate.

Off the record, I was a little confused with that evacuation order and the stopping of dependents coming out here. So, strictly speaking, we have got no order to stop dependents there. We had an order to evacuate.

On 22 October we received the——

Admiral THEOBALD. We will find it later.

[575 *Corrected A*] On page 575, line 7, delete the word "Unav" and insert the word "Bunav".

[576] Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet we received a message from the Chief of Naval Operations telling us to make appropriate dispositions, because he didn't know whether we would be attacked or not. That was the essence of the message. I haven't an exact copy of it here.

Admiral REEVES. What date was that, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is November. This is October.

Admiral THEOBALD. October.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that is the message of October 16.

Admiral KIMMEL. October 16. Was that the day, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a message of October 16, I think, both to the Department Commander and to you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I have——

The CHAIRMAN. One from each department.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have not that here with me, but the essence of the message was to be prepared for anything. And as a result of

the message which we received to make appropriate dispositions, I informed the Department that we were continuing to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway. We dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway. We started two submarines for the patrol of Wake. We dispatched the Castor and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional Marines and stores. The Curtiss arrived at Wake with gasoline, lubricating oil, and bombs. We prepared six patrol planes at Midway for Wake, replacing these six by others from Pearl Harbor. We sent additional Marines to Palmyra. We placed on 12 hours' notice the task force under Admiral Pye, then on the West Coast for a recreation cruise. We prepared six submarines to depart for Japanese waters. We placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. We delayed the sailing of the West Virginia for the West Coast until time when she was actually required at Puget Sound. This [577] is back on the 22nd of October.

We informed CNO that every exercise plan finds us short of destroyers and stated that in order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships made effective we required at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Again asked that the North Carolina and Washington or some other battleships be sent here to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Asked for all long-range submarines that can be sent here. Asked for more cruisers to take care of the Japanese raider activities after the outbreak of war. We asked for another carrier, for sea-train vessels to transport aircraft, and urged to hasten the supply of Radar and made some complaint about the ones that we had received for the Honolulu class being practically of no value, being of the wrong type.

We on 27 November—

Admiral THEOBALD. You have read that already, I think.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 27 November when we received the war warning, we sent one patrol, then at Midway, ordered to Wake and proceeded on 1 December, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route.

Patron at Midway replaced by patrol from Pearl. Left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route Johnston and en route Johnston to Midway. This squadron made daily search of a hundred-mile radius from Midway on three, four, five, and six December. They also made another. They were to

(See following page.)

make the daily search, further orders, and because we only had that
(See following page.)

one patrol squadron there we sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF
(See following page.)

squadron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landed planes at Wake on 3 December. Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights with own planes. Patron at Wake then withdrawn, conducted reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to Midway and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

Lexington proceeded to Midway with VMF squadron, departing Pearl 5 December. Conducted daily reconnaissance flights with
[557 *Corrected A*] On page 577, line 10 from bottom, delete the words "They also made another."

On page 577, line 9 from bottom, after the word "search" insert the word "until."

On page 577, lines 9 and 8 from bottom, delete the words "and because we only had that on patrol squadron there." Change the word "we" to the word "We."

[578] own planes en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke.

Burroughs despatched to Wake with additional supplies, including Radar and forces, but was short of Wake when war broke. Burroughs departed Pearl 29 November. She returned, incidentally, having landed a barge down at Johnston Island, and she got in safely but did not go to Wake.

They conducted daily reconnaissance flights of VP planes based (See following page.)

on Pearl Harbor, to cover fleet operating areas and approaches thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Patrol plane flights based on Pearl Harbor.

Each day, beginning the latter part of November, 30 November, we got up a memorandum to show what the initial steps would be when war would come, and the last one was made up on 5 December, gone over by me on the morning of 6 December, and this was ready when the war broke. These were steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war, and I read:

Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send dispatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The submarine and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous to be designated.

[578 Corrected A] On page 578, line 8, delete the word "They" and insert the word "We."

[579] (d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl.

3. (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort Saratoga from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur.

I merely cite that, not that there is any particular merit in what we had planned to do, but to show you that we were alive to the possibility of war. I must state again that I was by no means convinced that we were going to get into the war at this time and that we would become involved immediately. That was, of course, my mistake.

Now, I have here a number of messages which were received, and I don't think it is necessary to read them all, but they can be inspected to show that from 20 January on we periodically received messages which indicated a grave situation. We did [580] not have any one prefaced by the term "war warning," but they might very well have been.

I have also made some extracts from letters from the Chief of Naval Operations in which this state of tension was emphasized from time to time. I think it is hardly necessary to read all those, unless you want something more definite.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question there.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley wants to ask a question.

Admiral STANDLEY. While you are on the messages you have referred to a message from Naval Operations saying, "This is a war warning."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message? Have you got that there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That message was 27 November.

Admiral STANDLEY. 27th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Wait a minute now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral THEOBALD. That is right. Here. I have got it right here.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. There is the original, I mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. Shall I read that for you, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. No. I have it. I just wanted to ask you: Is that estimate that you read there as brought up to the 6th of December, and the plans of things to do—is that in the light of this war warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, in the light of that war warning and general situation.

Admiral STANDLEY. The last of that message says, "Carry out the task. Inform District and Army authorities."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[581] Admiral STANDLEY. Did you furnish the Army a copy of this message, or do you know?

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help you on that.

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that I sent a copy of the message to be read by the Commanding General and furnished him with a paraphrase of the message.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can amplify: during the recess—

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, suppose I swear you now, and if you answer questions then you will be a witness.

(The oath was administered to Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name?

Admiral THEOBALD. Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald.

General MCCOY. I do not think that counsel ought to be asked questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand that you were here as counsel.

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that you were here to assist the admiral with information.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. So it is understood you are not acting as counsel here?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

General MCCOY. The admiral is not on trial, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. No, this is not a trial of the admiral, in any sense.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help a little in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral THEOBALD. Because during the noon hour Admiral Kimmel sent out to get this message, and we have got his intelligence officer and his ex-intelligence officer and ex-communication officer outside, but I just interviewed them, and we can bring in his intelligence officer who did deliver [582] this message personally to an Army officer but not to the commanding general, and he doesn't know the name of the Army officer, but he is absolutely certain in his own mind that that officer that delivered it, naval officer, is Lieutenant Layton. He is outside now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do we want to break—

General MCCOY. I think we had better finish with the admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. I should think so. We will hold him in reserve for this message.

General MCCOY. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. He did not receive a receipt for it. He said they were not receiving receipts at that time. He delivered the dispatch personally and remembers it of his own knowledge, but did not receive a receipt. That's what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, then, Admiral, with your statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I haven't anything further, sir, I think. Do you know of anything further?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any message from the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. 7 December?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, the day of the attack. If your file is complete there I guess it ought to show it.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think this is just a—I had better go out and ask Curts to bring up the December.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we would like to have any telegraphic messages that the Department sent to Admiral Kimmel between October 14 and December 7. We would like to have the complete file.

Admiral THEOBALD. All right, sir. We have here the November file. We haven't got the October file, or the [583] first seven days.

Admiral KIMMEL. We have the November file here, yes; I was just looking up.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have the November file. Here is the original November file.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 7 December, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Apparently your file there ends with November; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; it runs to the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. That file (indicating)?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Oh, I don't know about this one (indicating), but I have here a transcript of what we considered the messages that might be germane to this investigation, and I find no message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 7 December.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next one earlier than the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. And I find nothing on 6 December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? What next?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What earlier than that? What earlier than the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. On 3d December we have, "OpNav informs"—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "—informs CinC Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

And on 2 December:

"OpNav informs CinC Pacific, Asiatic, and Com-14 and Guam that landing field will not be constructed on [584] Guam because of impracticability of providing effective defense for Guam."

The CHAIRMAN. That was on 2 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I can produce my files, of course, sir, and you can examine them.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite all right for you to do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. If I made a mistake here or if it hasn't been put in I want it found.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, quite right.

General McCoy. May I ask the admiral if he—

Admiral KIMMEL. Now may I interject? Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. May I ask if you received on the 7th or at any time thereafter a dispatch that was sent to General Short by the Chief of Staff of the Army informing him of the danger of outbreak on December 7 and which arrived, as we know, in Honolulu on the morning of the 7th but didn't get to General Short until after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In the dispatch General Short was directed to furnish you a copy.

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short did furnish me a copy of that. I saw it. But the attack had already taken place, and it was of no use to me. I did not keep a copy of it. That was delivered immediately—some 24 hours after the enemy raid had ended. I think that's wrong. It is a little bit earlier than that, but he did not receive it until after the enemy raid had ended. He sent it to me—he immediately sent it to me, and of course I have no interest in it.

General McCoy. You had not received that directly from the Navy Department, that particular dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I had not. Now, I was informed by the Secretary when he was out here that a dispatch had been sent to

the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the purport of which I judged from his conversations was a warning [585] that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed by his Government to deliver his answer exactly at 1 o'clock, I think it was, Washington time, and that indicated that the Japanese were going to make an attack at that time.

That dispatch was never received in my office, sir. We have no record of it, and I am sure that if it had been received I would have seen it. Immediately the Secretary told me that, of course I had a search made in an attempt to discover it. The Secretary asked me if we had intercepted a dispatch. Well, with the number of dispatches that we have to decode we just simply cannot decode everything that goes through the air, and so far as I know the dispatch was never even intercepted.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Navy routine would a copy of that dispatch have gone to you as Commander of the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Under the Navy routine, no, sir, not unless it was addressed to me.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. And generally when a dispatch such as that is sent there is a multiple address; it is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and any other interested parties. We have two degrees. One is that a dispatch is addressed for action and to other people for information. The information dispatches for general guidance and the action dispatches require something to be done about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So, as far as you know, that dispatch would have been sent directly to the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and would not ordinarily have passed through your office at all?

General MCCOY. Asiatic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Asiatic Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Department sent a great many dispatches and sends a great many dispatches direct to the various [586] commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Even in this fleet the Department may send a dispatch to a subordinate of mine on which he should take action, particularly in matters of materiel and personnel that I have no particular interest in. As Commander-in-Chief I could not cope with all those things, not even with the staff that I have.

General MCCOY. Those were really administrative dispatches?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There are numbers of dispatches that are sent.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, as far as you know, this dispatch saying that negotiations would be broken off probably at 1 o'clock Washington time, December 7, never came to you at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have never received that at all.

General MCCOY. He got it from General Short after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, but I am talking about a Navy dispatch. I am not talking about an Army dispatch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, you were talking about the Navy dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, as I understand you, the Secretary said that such a dispatch was sent to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have never seen that dispatch yet, and all I know about it is what the Secretary told [587] me.

General McCoy. Have you endeavored to find out through communications what happened to that dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I made no attempt to find out. It would be very difficult to trace it with the meager information that I've got.

The CHAIRMAN. Communication with the Pacific Fleet might be direct from Washington? It wouldn't be relayed from here, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. It might be relayed through this station and still never broken down here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in the light of that plan that you made on December 6 resulting from information that you had up to that time, and suppose you had received that message from the Department that you referred to, breaking off relations and delivery of the note at 1 o'clock; suppose you had received that at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of December: would you have made any other dispositions than were then in existence?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, that is difficult to answer.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I am just trying to get informally the—

Admiral KIMMEL. It would depend very much on the wording of a dispatch which I have never yet seen. I am unable to answer what I would have done had that dispatch been received. If I had considered that war with Japan was imminent, if I had believed that war with Japan was imminent, I would have taken every step possible, but what my reactions would have been to the dispatch—well, I hesitate to make a statement like that.

Admiral STANDLEY. I am trying to ascertain whether or [588] not the information which you had up to the 6th of December had fixed in your mind the dates which progressively meant decisive action or possible decisive action: dates and hours and times. Had that impression been made in your mind, that various dispatches, and so forth, mentioning dates, had certain significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't believe I understand you.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, I understand from the Department that they had referred in their various messages to certain dates: 27th of December. Oh, one, I think—

The CHAIRMAN. November.

Admiral STANDLEY. November. I think there was one in October, and the 29th of November was another, and then at 1 p. m. on the morning of the 7th of December was another, and the message which you never got. Now, I am trying to find out if these messages created

in your mind a progressive move towards a date on which Japan was going to take decisive action. In other words, the message which said 1 p. m. on December 7 meant 1 p. m.—as far as concerns them over at that side, meant that that had a certain significance, and I want to know if it would have conveyed the same significance to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it probably would, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I think that is the only dispatch that mentioned any date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, they spoke about the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral REEVES. No, in no previous dispatch have they mentioned the date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but Turner has told us that there were certain dates that had made impressions on them; I don't know whether that was a radiogram or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall any specific dates, sir.

Admiral REEVES. There were no dates. The only dispatch [589] which I recall which mentions a date is the one of the 7th of December.

Admiral STANDLEY. That mentioned hours, yes.

Admiral REEVES. That mentioned date and hour.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume, Admiral, you are familiar with what burning the codes and the papers in the consulates means?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but burning the codes in the consulate—after all, the codes are burned from time to time, and in a time of tension like this we receive a great many scary reports. To be sure, they came from a great many sources. But, again, the Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant. I didn't draw the proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusions from what I got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if they had amplified and drawn the conclusions.

General McCoy. Don't you think it was of considerable moment, having followed the one of November 27, which was given as a war warning, "This is a war warning"; then the next dispatch you got—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but—

General McCoy. —stating that the consulates in London and various other places were burning their codes, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And don't you suppose it was sent to you with that in view, that is, in part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. As an additional warning to the dispatch of the war warning?

[590] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. But again, in connection with the war warning, the war warning was sent with some intelligence in it which very definitely indicated that in the mind of the Department the attack was directed towards Kra Peninsula. Now don't mistake me, gentlemen; I am not trying to evade anything. I am merely trying to let you know what influenced me, what was in my mind.

General McCoy. Well, that is what we are trying to find out, because it is pertinent both to our interview with General Short and with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. We are not trying to put you on the spot at all. We are just trying to—

Admiral KIMMEL. No, but I don't want to be misunderstood if I can help it.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you quoted from that order made up on December 5 which you say you saw and approved on December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you turn to that order again?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That was not an order, sir, so much as a memorandum or a reminder.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a memorandum of action to be taken?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it was a reminder of action to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. Now, is there anything in that memorandum that tightens up the defense against a possible air raid on Pearl Harbor? And if there is will you point it out to us?

Admiral REEVES. Let us have the Admiral read the whole memorandum; it isn't very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't he read it, Mr. Stenographer?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you might read it. You need not take it again, Mr. Stenographer. Read it again.

[591] Admiral REEVES. Make a note.

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one moment. I think I can answer you. I think the answer to your question is that in these particular reminders there isn't anything that specifically tightens up on the patrol in Pearl Harbor, but that was in my mind and would have been done automatically.

Admiral REEVES. How long is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Automatically.

Admiral REEVES. I would like to hear it again.

The CHAIRMAN. Without taking it again on the record, will you read it through again?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send despatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below.) (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

Admiral REEVES. That is very definitely air action, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was wrong about that.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, I thought there was definite air action in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that—

Admiral REEVES. Your submarine and VP plans.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

plans will become effective without special reference to them.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations—

Is that all you want, sir?

Admiral REEVES. No. I would like to hear it. It isn't very long.

[692] Admiral KIMMEL. "Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled." That was because there wasn't any commerce.

Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows:

Admiral REEVES. Yes; that is another item.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral REEVES. Another item of air, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Radio and reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance.

Admiral REEVES. Raiding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance plan.

Delay reconnaissance until task forces 2 and 3 are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

Admiral REEVES. What was Task Force 3, again? That contained a carrier, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. So you were sending additional support to the carrier east of Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

Admiral REEVES. Task Force 2 had a carrier in it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake." [593] The LEXINGTON, you remember, was up there.

(Admiral Kimmel read the remainder of the memorandum of steps to be taken in case of war.)

Admiral REEVES. As I have checked it, there are seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was to be put into effect in the case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was the action you took on what date?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December.

Admiral REEVES. That was the direct result of the warning of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You took these war preparation measures on that morning as a result of that warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as the result of that warning and the general situation I wanted to know—I was keeping a running record of what—

Admiral REEVES. Well, would you say that these measures that you have taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind when you took these measures to despatch forces all along?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more than protect yourself against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with [594] the Army commander.

General McCoy. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the attack you had conferences with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the—

General McCoy. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us that he had conferences with you on certain days. Could you have that looked up, the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is probably at the hotel, General.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had several conferences.

General McCoy. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Immediately prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

General McCoy. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked about—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Talking it over together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he couldn't remember it, and his records and his file over [595] there do not show that it was ever furnished him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General Short, to the best of my knowledge and belief, but—

General McCoy. I understood from your records that you had sent him a paraphrase.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, the paraphrase and the original.

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, however.

Admiral REEVES. No, I don't think it did.

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was going to add, General, that I believe that in my own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him.

General McCoy. Well, he was of that impression, but he didn't remember that particular one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I believe that with all my might. I mean I am convinced that I did, and in addition to it I am convinced that I sent him a paraphrase of this message.

General McCoy. You remember the nature of your discussions at those conferences as regards your anticipation of what the Japanese would do in case war was suddenly declared or started without declaration?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that my idea was—I know that my idea was, and I think that I must have expressed it to the General—that I thought the war was getting pretty close. [596] I thought that they were going to go to the Kra Peninsula, and I thought they were going to go into Thailand. I agreed with that, but I believed that we might not get into it for a little while, but we never could tell what was going to happen.

Admiral REEVES. It might help you, Admiral: Do you recall General Short showing you a dispatch of the 27th of November which he received from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, on this same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Could I see it, sir, perhaps?

Admiral REEVES. Yes. (Handing a paper to Admiral Kimmel.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I have seen that before. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch before.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, you apparently had a copy of it from General Short on the 27th of November, and of course if you did you must have discussed this dispatch and also the one which you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Yes, I remember seeing—I have seen that dispatch.

General McCoy. Do you remember General Short at that particular conference asking you if you anticipated any attack by the Japanese from the air here in Hawaii at the outbreak of hostilities either by declaration of war or without declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall that now, but we discussed a great many things. It's quite possible he did ask me such a question.

General McCoy. Was there an officer by the name of McMorris with you at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was he your operations officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is the War Plans Officer, yes, sir.

General McCoy. "War Plans." Well, we can ask—

[597] Admiral STANDLEY. He was supposed to have answered the question.

General MCCOY. Well, the Admiral, he said, turned to McMorris and—

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I recall.

General MCCOY. Do you remember—

Admiral KIMMEL. McMorris is here and available, sir, whenever you want him.

General MCCOY. I mean, do you remember referring, or do you remember that when General Short asked such a question you turned to McMorris and asked his opinion?

Admiral KIMMEL. I very probably did, sir.

General MCCOY. You don't remember it, however?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember that particular incident, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you really any apprehension between November 27 and December 7 that there would be an airplane raid on Hawaii, on Honolulu?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was highly improbable, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that, so far as you know, the opinion of the well-instructed officers in your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. They were all, as you were, surprised at the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir. I might state that as nearly as I can recollect the Saturday preceding the attack I went over this situation in the forenoon, and I think Admiral Pye was in the office. I know I went over it with DeLany and McMorris and Smith. We left the office about 1 o'clock, came here to these quarters, where we have our meals, and I think after lunch we sat there and talked for some time about the possibilities of this and that in connection with the situation, and along two or three o'clock in the afternoon I went to my quarters and remained there until about a quarter [598] of six when I went downtown for dinner at the Halekulani Hotel. I left there about 9:30 and came home, turned in about 10 o'clock, and that was the way I spent the day before the attack.

General MCCOY. What evaluation of the situation did your staff officers give you at that conference? What was the estimate of the situation at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The evaluation that they gave me is pretty well summarized in this memorandum of action to be taken. We discussed taking additional security measures and balanced the probabilities against the additional action to be taken, and made the decisions. I had no advice from any one of them—I think I am fair in stating that—to take any measures other than the ones that we had laid down.

The CHAIRMAN. When, if at all, Admiral, had you alerted the command under you against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had been alerted for two years against sabotage, sir, continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. You took no special means or measures after the message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. At all times, long before I became Commander-in-Chief, we were alerted against sabotage. We had

patrols in the ships, and what I believe to be a very effective organization. I was in the cruisers of the battle force at the time that that was first started; I got a very comprehensive order which remained constantly in effect. I took no measures against sabotage at this particular time because we already had done everything that we could do.

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can say that there had been no proved [599] cases of sabotage. We had had some things go wrong with some turbines and other gear in the ship, and each time such an incident occurred we made a very thorough investigation, and I don't recall a single instance where it was determined that there was sabotage or even that there was a strong probability of sabotage.

Do you recall any?

Admiral THEOBOLD. No; when I was chief of staff of the fleet the nearest we came to it was the ARIZONA incident, the fire in the ARIZONA, but the F. B. I. could never give us enough evidence to make the then Commander-in-Chief want to take any further action. That was Admiral Bloch's regime. So it just dropped. That is the nearest.

General McCoy. Do you remember being furnished with General Short's Alert No. 1 that he put into effect as a result of that dispatch and conference with you of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have in your files his Standing Operating Procedure?

Admiral KIMMEL. I may, sir, but if I did—I may have seen this (indicating a document), but if I did I never went into it very thoroughly, because that was the Army's mission. I thought General Short was a very competent officer, and so far as I remember I haven't seen this. It's possible that I have, but I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. You will notice that in that telegram from the War Department to General Short of November 27 there is reference to precautions against sabotage.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the telegram to him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he inform you what he had done or intended to do with respect to precautions against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know he didn't.

[600] General McNARNEY. I think you are mistaken, Mr. Justice. That was on the 28th, sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it? Maybe I am wrong.

General McCoy. With reference to this Alert No. 1 that was furnished the Navy, according to the Army records, as the New Deal, as it were, as the result of the dispatch of the 27th, in this Alert No. 1 there is provision made on the Army air fields for, instead of the dispersion of the planes which had been in force before, a concentration of the planes, which caused their destruction in the attack. Now, was that order of the Army for protection against sabotage of their airships in any way put into effect in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. As regards land planes of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. They were dispersed on the——

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no knowledge of the concentration of Army planes.

General McCoy. Well, it is provided for in this Alert No. 1, which was furnished the Navy on the day it was put in effect, according to the Army records.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, it may have been furnished the Navy and I would never have seen it, and I doubt if any member of my staff had time to fully read the whole setup there, and I certainly——

General McCoy. Do you know whether the Navy planes were concentrated for protection at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; so far as I know the Navy planes were dispersed. I had invited attention to the necessity for keeping the planes dispersed, and I know that at Kaneohe, in particular, they had attempted to disperse the VP planes to the extent of anchoring them out to get them away, so as they were widely separated, and after the attack I was informed that every single one of those that had been [601] anchored out in our attempt to disperse them had been completely destroyed, while those that were kept on the ramps and dispersed as well as they could there—that while some of them had been damaged, most of them they had been able to repair and to fly; and due to the fact that those that were dispersed—I am speaking now of patrol planes, which are our biggest problem—those that had been anchored out, they couldn't get at them to fight the fire, once it started, and they were destroyed and sunk at their moorings; while those that were on the beach, they had been able to get at them and fight the fires and had saved some of them, at least.

Now, the condition of the planes at Ewa, which is where the Marines had their planes, I know they had provision for dispersing their planes. Exactly what condition they were in on the morning of the attack I don't know. I haven't found it out. But there was no order given by any authority any higher than the commanding officer of the field to protect against sabotage. Issued no such order.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in that memorandum of things to be done I note you referred to something that was to happen, as I recall, on the 7th of December. I think it was the landing of planes at Midway or Wake.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, Midway.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you refer to just that memorandum there for a minute?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I know what you mean: "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned afternoon of 7 December."

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, planned afternoon of 7 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that memorandum, then, was prepared on the 6th of December?

The CHAIRMAN. No, it was prepared on the 5th and visaed [602] by him on the 6th.

Admiral STANDLEY. You approved it on the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Now, what would have happened to that memorandum on, we will say, the morning of the 8th if there hadn't been any untoward incident here? We would have revised it? You would have, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have revised the memorandum.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, that was a day-to-day—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a day-to-day plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Keeping it up to date?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I would have revised it. I did revise it. This is the last one; this is not the first one.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I want to bring out. It had to be done from day to day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You have another one underneath there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have another one underneath here. It is the same thing; a little bit different. Some days the situation (See following page.) wouldn't change any.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you did not discuss with General Short what shape his dispositions were in to meet an air attack here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not. That was the Army's responsibility, and I presumed he would carry out his responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on many occasions. We held these drills. For a long time we held them weekly, and then there was some diffi-

[602 Corrected A] On page 602, line 13 from bottom, delete the words "It is the same thing;" and insert the words "It is the same subject;"

[603] culty about getting all elements to take part in the air-raid drills, so we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to the fullest extent, and that had been in effect for—the air-raid drills started, oh, I should say in March at the latest. [604] They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting with the training and the various operations.

Now, about the possibility of an air raid, we did discuss it from time to time. I freely confess and so state that I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, but by no means a probability.

General McCoy. Do you know yet where the Japanese carriers were at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. From the captured documents and from the planes that we got, all indications point to the fact that they were northward of the island, that they landed their planes some 200 miles (See following page.)

from the island, and that they turned and ran north at as high a speed as they could immediately after launching the planes; and that they launched them around six o'clock in the morning.

I must say that this air raid was a beautifully planned and beautifully executed military maneuver. They knew exactly where every air field in this place was and they knew exactly where every ship in the harbor was supposed to be. They made their attack so that the air fields were attacked shortly before the ships in the harbor, Pearl Harbor, were attacked to insure that they could immobilize the planes on the ground, and they attacked—let us see. There are about nine or ten objectives, I believe, and they must have had a very considerable air force there to do it. I estimate that they must have had in the neighborhood of 250 planes in the attacking group. Now, that is hardly something that I can prove, but I think to carry those 250 planes they had at least four carriers, or probably six. We have documents which reasonably well establish the fact that there were four carriers here; there may have been two more, sir. We have some indications that they were

[604 *Corrected A*] On page 604, line 14, delete the word "landed" and insert the word "launched."

[605] accompanied by two battleships, that these carriers were accompanied by two battleships. I think they were probably back there as a supporting group, some distance away.

Well, that is about all.

General McCoy. Were there any patrols out on the morning of the 7th or the night before, in a northward direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not until after the attack. You mean before the attack?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I thought you meant.

General McCoy. You spoke of things happening automatically. Were your patrols automatic and mechanical? That is, did you have some patrols day after day in the same region?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely, so, sir. We were making patrol flights in that direction, but the patrol flights to Midway and to Wake were not normal patrols. We have a system of patrolling the operating areas daily to ascertain that there were no surface ships or submarines on the surface in the vicinity of the operating areas. That was the only patrol that was a day-by-day affair.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the operating area? Three miles offshore?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The operating areas extend 150 to 200 miles to the south and southward.

The CHAIRMAN. To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And no patrol would normally go to the northward?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from the southward, what would you do?

Admiral KIMMEL. The air raid force on this place would have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from the [606] northward than they would from the southward, but no part could be disregarded.

There are two ways for an expedition to come to this vicinity. One is from the homeland by way of the northern route which would be much

more direct and advantageous, to come in from the northward; and the other would be a much shorter route from the Marshall area where it is about 2,000 miles to the Marshall area as against 3,500 miles to the homeland.

Of course, coming up from the Marshall area that would be some 1,500 miles less, but again, coming from the Marshall area, they would have the difficulties of taking their supplies to the Marshall area and they would have to pass our outlying stations, which are Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and in that area. So, I should say that the probabilities of attacking from the north were probably more than those from the south.

We felt that and our first inclination was to send carriers and other forces that we had at sea to the northward, but we were diverted from that by the, I assume, false reports that we received indicating that they went to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you made the chase?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. That would indicate when you knew the dangerous point was to the north that you didn't expect any air attack from that region?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Because you had no patrols out there. The normal patrols didn't cover the northward point.

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not expect any air attack, and the only justification for the action that I took is that we considered an air attack here improbable at this time, and [607] that the patrols to the northward were not justified with the then state of the planes and the necessity for conserving them, that I thought existed.

General McCoy. I take it from your testimony that you had nowhere nearly enough planes to cover the whole circle around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, not effective, not effective to cover the whole circuit around Oahu. To cover that circuit around Oahu we had to have two or three hundred miles to cover and to insure against a surprise air attack would have taken considerably more than that.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to go about five or eight hundred miles the evening before?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to be sure. We could run a patrol eight
(See following page.)

hundred miles the evening before, and it takes in an awful lot of planes.

Now, there are many different ways to run a patrol, but to do any-
(See following page.)

thing but what might be called a direct patrolling method leaves a great many hollows, blank spaces on your search, and while some of them looked very attractive on paper, when you sit down and analyze them they are by no means 100% effective.

However, if I had considered the probability of an air attack as if an air attack were anywhere near probable, I would have used everything we had, everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Including what ships the Army could have spared you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCCOY. You did not ask the Army to reinforce your patrols at that particular time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a layman on these matters, and your description of where your task forces were working does not

[607 *Corrected A*] on page 607, lines 8, 9, 10, and 11, delete sentence, "To cover that circuit around Oahu we had to have two or three hundred miles to cover and to insure against a surprise air attack would have taken considerably more than that." and insert "To cover that circuit around Oahu continuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a surprise air attack."

On page 607, line 14, delete the words "We could run a patrol" and insert the words "We would have to run a patrol."

On page 607, line 18, delete the words "to do anything but" and insert the words "doing anything other than what."

[608] register very accurately with me. Now, put it into a layman's language.

How many evening patrols were off here the evening of the 4th, 5th, and the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not send any evening patrols.

The CHAIRMAN. None?

Admiral KIMMEL. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, there was no sector of the entire circumference that was searched every evening?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that would be the daily procedure at the several points of the circumference to see if an air raid was in the offing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCCOY. Do you have radar on any of your ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCCOY. Do they work?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar on the ships in port is not effective, due to the presence of large land masses, and the only radar we had to depend on was the Army radar, so far as Oahu was concerned.

General MCCOY. Did you have task forces for radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. None of them picked up anything?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Didn't one of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. One of them was within 400 miles of Midway and then out of range of anything, and they could not have picked up anything.

The other one was a little over 200 miles to the westward of Oahu, and it is highly improbable that they would have picked up anything.

Their planes coming, came into the combat, made contact, [609] and they shot down some of the Japanese planes. This was in the midst of the fight, and my recollection is that about four of the planes from the Enterprise were shot down there during the time they were coming in here after they attacked.

General McCoy. Do any of your airplanes have radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. We do not have any radar on any planes, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not used radar planes for patrolling? Is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, we have endeavored to get radar in the patrol planes, and I hope some day we will have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any morning patrol on the morning of the 5th?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, the only morning patrol was over the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean up to 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would not cover the whole circumference of the island?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would they be? To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were to the southward, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing in the north?

Admiral KIMMEL. Nothing to the north, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had the slightest inkling previously of air raid you could have been working that point to the north as well?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you might have gotten news by six o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is quite possible.

General McCoy. Were you conscious after the war warning [610] of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General McCoy. Of a Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. As you look at it now, the Japanese plans are perfect in that respect also, aren't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Sunday morning was the best morning for them to come in here, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On account of the number of passes and leaves issued on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but so far as the Navy was concerned that had very little effect, very little effect on it, because the ships had ample men on them and used everything that they had.

General McCoy. Were the commanding officers of the ships present.

Admiral KIMMEL. The commanding officers of a great many ships were ashore.

General McCoy. That would be due to it being a week-end? To it being Sunday, would it not? That would be due to it being a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no, sir; not entirely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I might say that two battleship captains were killed on the bridges.

Admiral KIMMEL. They may have been ashore on other days.

General McCoy. There are more absences both of officers and men on Sunday than on any other day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, maybe so, but I don't think appreciably more, certainly not at that time of the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is your opinion of that (referring to Admiral Theobald)?

[611] Admiral THEOBALD. The attack started about 7:50, and most of them start back about twenty to eight in the morning, and I think if they attacked on Monday morning there would not have been probably a great many more officers on board. They would have been on the decks, but maybe not on the bridges.

(See following page.) (See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. When your ships are in harbor, do the officers sleep ashore generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on what is being done to the boat, I suppose?

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on whether the families are here, and there were a great many officers here who had no families, and they slept on board.

The CHAIRMAN. On board?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, a great many of them, and some of them got in this morning and they were in their quarters available immediately, and a great many others were in the same fix.

I have made no survey but I think it is safe to say that 50 to 70% of the commanding officers were on board at the time the attack took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the conditions of such an attack the officers of capital ships would have attempted to get their vessels out of the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. We would have attempted to get them out, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would?

Admiral KIMMEL. As soon as we were able to arrange an adequate submarine patrol we would have gone out from the harbor.

Admiral THEOBALD. In fact, the Nevada actually started.

Admiral KIMMEL. In fact, the order was given and the Nevada was on her way out, and we told her not to go out. We

[611 Corrected A] On page 611 line 5m delete the word "decks" and insert the word "docks".

On page 611, line 5, delete the words "the bridges", and insert the word "board".

[612] delayed it and then it was hit by a torpedo and it beached. (See following page.)

One of them made a circle of the island, of Ford Island, and then by (See following page.)

that time it was fixed up there and she went out. (See following page.)

General McCoy. When did the two United States battleships come into the harbor?

The CHAIRMAN. We heard it said they came in on the 3rd or 4th or 5th. I do not know whether that is so or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. One came in on the 3rd; 5 or 2 and 4 came in some days before that. Wait a minute.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. What caused them to come into the harbor? Anything affecting this war warning or despatches you had from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. They came in in accordance with the operating schedule which we had prepared and we hadn't seen fit to depart from that up to this time.

General McCoy. Is it customary to bring two divisions into Pearl Harbor at the same time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had the fleet divided into three major task forces (referring to a document).

The fleet was divided into three main task forces:

Task force 1 with Admiral Pye in command, which consisted of Batdivs two and four, which was 6 battleships, one of which was in the Navy Yard for repairs, the Colorado, which is still there; Cardiv one less Lexington, 1 CV; Crudiv nine, 5 CL, Desflot one less Desron five, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD, Oglala, Mindiv one, 1 CM, 4 DM.

Their primary mission was to organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient covering force available for supporting operations
[612 Corrected A] On page 612, line 1, add at end of line, "We delayed the sortie of heavy ships due to the report that mines had been dropped in the channel."

On page 612, line 2, delete the word "them" and insert the words "the cruisers."

On page 612, line 3, delete the words "that time it was fixed up there and she went out." and insert the words "that time the mine report was discounted and she went out."

One page 612, lines 8 and 9, delete "1 came in on the 3rd; 5 or 2 and 4 came in some days before that. Wait a minute." and insert the words "Batdiv-1, consisting of three ships, came in on the third; Batdiv-2 and 4, consisting of five ships, came in some days before that."

[613] of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two, (commander aircraft, battle force):

Batdiv one, 3 BB, Cardiv two, 1 CV; Crudiv Five, 4 CA, Desflot two, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD, Mindiv two, 4 DM.

Primary mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three, (commander scouting force):

Cruidivs four, six, 8 CA; Lexington plus Marine Air Group 21, 1 CV; Desron five, 1 DL, 8 DD, Minron two, 13 DMS; Trainron four, 6 AP;

2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Amphibious Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four, (commandant Fourteenth Naval District):

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve the Island Bases.

Primary Mission: To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

[614] Task Force seven, (commander submarines, scouting force):

Subron Four less Subdiv Forty-one, 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD; Subron six, 12 SS, 1 AS; Subron eight, 6 SS, 1 AS, Subron ten, 4 SS, 1 AS.

Primary Missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases.

Now, of the three main task forces operating out of here, it was provided that one of them should be at sea at all times; but sometimes two of them were at sea at the same time.

We provided for tactics for as large a number of ships as there were in these two forces and then pitted one force against the other. At times there were two task forces that were in port, and this was one of the days and there was no reason at this particular time to change it.

Now, according to this agreement there may have been some change (See following page.)

in it, but that was when they were supposed to come in, and they came in 29 November and 12 December. Task force 3 was supposed (See following page.) to come in 26 November.

Admiral THEOBALD. That task force was the one scheduled to be at sea at the time of the attack, I think.

General MCCOY. There was only one task force outside at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I did change that to the extent that we had one task force out. That was Vice Admiral Brown's task force, (See following page.)

and that was the Lexington, 400 miles southeast of Midway, or the Indianapolis with Admiral Brown, but there was another task force out which had gone to Wake Island and

[614 Corrected A] On page 614, 13 lines from bottom, delete the word "agreement" and insert the word "schedule."

On page 614, lines 11 and 10 from bottom, delete the words "and they came in 29 November and 12 December. Task force 3 was supposed to come in 26 November." and insert the words "and they were due to come in, Task Force One on 28 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 December."

On page 614, line 4 from bottom, after the word "had" insert the words "more than."

[615] was on the way back from Wake.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, you had part of one task force out and part of it in?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had your cruisers and aircraft carrier out of one task force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and the battleships in, yes. I think the task force was out at Midway in its entirety.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had any suspicion of an air raid on that Sunday morning your ships would have cleared the harbor before they could have gotten here, and you could have gotten them out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. We would have sent them to sea.

General McCoy. The fact that you had two in here together would indicate that you had no suspicion here of any air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, if I had that information the service then had and they didn't come into port this time and they had been at sea, they could have held off for another chance and tried another time.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. It goes back, I take it, to the fact that the Japanese had perfect information and you had none?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

General McCoy. It occurs to me that at that time or previous to that time and up to now that you were without any information about the Japanese; is that not so?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have less now than we had before.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, perhaps we know more now than we did before.

Well, there is another thing in connection with this raid, and that is the Tatua Maru which was sent out from Yokohama for Los Angeles and Panama to evacuate Americans from Japan and to pick up Japanese in Los Angeles and Panama.

[615 Corrected A] On page 615, line 8, delete the words "was not at Midway" after the words "task force" and insert the words "three was out".

On page 615, lines 16 to 20, inclusive, delete the whole paragraph and insert the words "Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, with the formation service that we now know the Japanese had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our ship had been at sea the Japanese would have held off for another chance and tried another time."

[616] I believe from what I have seen that this Tatua Maru embarked and that she sailed. We have been watching that also.

(See following page.)

(See following page.)

I believe it actually embarked and she sailed, but I don't know where
(See following page.)

it went after it went to sea, but they got out, and I doubt very much
(See following page.)

whether the captain of the *Tatua Maru* knew anything except the fact
that he was going to carry out his mission.

General McCoy. Your information service has failed you then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so, sir.

General McCoy. You knew though that this place was naturally
full of Japanese spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Apparently neither the Army service nor the Navy
service was able to get these spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you attribute that to the fact that it was a poor
service here or to the fact that the Japanese were particularly good?

Admiral KIMMEL. I attribute it more to our laws, our freedom, than
to any other factor.

I have been told that the F. B. I. and the Military Intelligence De-
partment and the O. N. I. had their eyes on a considerable number of
people here in Honolulu and around here who, when war broke, were
promptly seized and they have crippled the Japanese intelligence
service considerably.

I think there were a considerable number. I hesitate to make that
statement as to the number, but you probably know more about it than
I do. It is something that is very easily verified, but I heard the state-
ment made that they had about 2,500 rounded up, I would say. Is that
correct?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are about 400 Japanese out at the
immigration station, if that is what you mean. That is my under-
standing. I do not know that to be a fact.

[616 *Corrected A*] On page 616, line 2, after the word "embark"
insert the words "American passengers."

On page 616, line 2, delete the word "have" and insert the word
"had."

On page 616, line 3, delete the word "it" and insert the words "Ameri-
can passengers."

On page 616, line 4, after the word "sea" change comma to period.

On page 616, line 4, delete the word "but" and insert the word "But."

[617] Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think perhaps the proper agen-
cies would know that. I understood it was in the neighborhood of
2,500, but that I do not know. I had no responsible person to tell me.

General McCoy. Did you have any espionage service or counter-
espionage service with anyone in Japan to inform you as to what
was happening in the Japanese naval bases or rendezvous?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would not know that, sir. That is under the
Office of Naval Intelligence. I hope they have, but I have not any-
thing definite about it.

General McCoy. You spoke of the O. N. I. Did your O. N. I.
have any espionage agent in Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir.

General McCoy. Did they have any representatives in the Mandate
Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't it a very dangerous thing for us to sit here with no one in the Japanese areas and with 120,000 Japanese at our gates here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And it will continue to be dangerous.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I think it is not as dangerous now as it was before, the time before the declaration of war. This is a thing that has been constantly in the minds of a great many naval officers here, a great many of us. Once war is declared and the intelligence service is smashed, we are much safer here than we were before war was declared.

General McCoy. I notice in your operations orders and in your statements that you were under orders to supply certain fortifications or certain detachments and certain defense measures to these outlying posts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you expect these outposts to defend [618] themselves against Japanese attack in time of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. We hoped that they would be able to defend themselves against a small expedition which could be sent there. We knew that Wake was vulnerable. We knew that, that Wake gave a great deal of concern to every one of us, and the steps to be taken at Wake were the subject of considerable correspondence between my office and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Navy Department. We felt that if we could keep Wake reasonably well defended—and I think it was reasonably well defended—it would serve as bait to catch detachments of Japanese, the Japanese fleet coming down there, and we hoped to be able to meet them out there in sufficient force to handle them.

We also wanted to keep the investment. We had quite an investment at Wake, and the Navy Department had ordered it under way and there were extensive improvements established, and there was a flying field which, incidentally, has been used by the Army in ferrying planes to the Far East, and as an observation post.

The wisdom of ever putting anything on Wake is open to very serious question; by "anything" I mean anything more than just enough to handle the commercial planes that could go by there. However, that was something in which the final decision was not with me, and they decided to do these various things at Wake.

Then we had the decision—as I tried to indicate here a little while ago in answer to a question where I got off the track a little bit—that we had to make a decision as to how much defense we were going to put there, if any. Rightly or wrongly, we eventually had there about 350 marines and 6 5-inch guns and 12 3-inch guns and a number of machine guns, and we have four fighting planes there.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Was that expected to hold out against

[618 *Corrected A*] On page 618, line 2 from bottom, delete the words "have four" and insert the words "had twelve."

[619] Japanese attack indefinitely?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did for same time, sir.

General McCoy. Was the Navy to play any part, in its defense?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What happened to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy were to play a part in its defense, but after this affair here the picture changes considerably from what we anticipated.

On the question of profit and loss with respect to Wake, we lost about 350 marines. They sank one cruiser, two destroyers, and a gunboat in one attack. They beached two destroyers up there when they landed, and presumably they were well destroyed before they got away, if they ever did get off. They knocked down and destroyed at least ten bombers which came over them and which attacked them. On the first attack they destroyed eight of the twelve fighting planes that were there with the other four ones that we could replace parts of that could be used.

General McCoy. Didn't you have a task force in the vicinity of Wake at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there was not.

General McCoy. I thought you said there was a task force there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That task force was about 200 miles away.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Wasn't there one to the westward at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Returning to Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. And there was no help sent to Wake from the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is something that was out of my hands.

The CHAIRMAN. How far was this from Wake Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was 200 miles from Pearl Harbor.

[619 Corrected A] On page 619, line 10 from bottom, after the word "away" add the words "from Pearl Harbor."

[620] Admiral REEVES. How far is it from Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. About 1,800 miles.

General McCoy. Wasn't that in your plan to relieve Wake, to attempt to relieve wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the original plan, yes, sir.

General McCoy. I am just leading up to some of the questions that we hope to put to the responsible commander since you have been relieved.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I explain a little bit about this Wake business?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. One of the principal difficulties at Wake was that of loading and unloading ships there. There is no way to get in the lagoon, and we were working against time, hoping to get things so that when we sent a ship out they could run it in and unload it. Depending upon the weather, it took anywhere from two days to two or three weeks to unload a ship there, which made it very difficult to supply. We also had on that island a number of workmen that the Navy wanted us to keep there. I personally thought they were entitled to some protection, some chance for the white alley.

Now, with respect to operations that have taken place since I was relieved as commander-in-chief, I would prefer not to talk about it.

General McCoy. Yes.

The Secretary of the Navy made a public statement on his return to the United States that the Army and the Navy services were not on the alert and that they were completely surprised. Is that a fact, from your point of view?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, before you can answer that question you have to define the term "alert." There are many different degrees of alerts. I feel that the Navy afloat was alert and that they were ready for attack and [621] that they were as alert as it was practicable to be at the time. They opened fire in most cases within two minutes of the alarm, and in some cases considerable less than that, and I considered them to be alert, in a fair condition.

General McCoy. I think his statement was that they were completely surprised.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. How about the statement he made also that they were completely surprised?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were surprised, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you investigate, Admiral, how the submarine got into your channel here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it get in?

Admiral KIMMEL. The submarine that came in the channel is a boat about five feet in diameter and about seventy feet long. It is fitted with a propeller like a torpedo has. It is run by storage batteries and can travel not more than 200 miles when its charge is exhausted. It carries two torpedoes, which torpedoes, we estimate, cannot run more than a thousand yards, but they carried also from 800 to 1,000 pounds of explosives in each one of those torpedoes. These submarines, according to the blue prints which we have captured, taken from the submarine, can make up to 24 knots under water.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any ship come in that morning? for a very short time. Then can put themselves in the wake of a and that it is just like a torpedo. Of course they can make that only ship and come through with the ship when the gates open.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Now, wait a minute. I do not want to make a statement without knowing it. I am not sure whether they did or not, but ships were out that morning, and they began to go out. I think it is probable that this sub- [622] marine went down, dove under the net, and came in that way.

Now, we had never anticipated any such submarine as this, as described on the chart which they discovered on this submarine, as to whether they could have laid down a track to come in and where, when it came in the harbor, but there is some curious item about it—and this I have not checked. I have not had the opportunity to check it, but when they sounded into the net where they came in they found that there was a hole in there through which he could have gone.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. An ordinary submarine would have gone into the net?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, an ordinary submarine would have gone into the net. It would have indicated it was there.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not found any evidence of the gate being open to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not there?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there. The gates are kept closed at all times except when a ship was entering or leaving. That has been definitely established.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what officer was charged with the duty of seeing that that net was closed that morning. I am not assuming anything, but we want that officer.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can get him.

I understand that there were two of these submarines which came in, or am I wrong about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had one come in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the one the Monaghan ran down?

Admiral KIMMEL. The first was. He put a hole through it.

The CHAIRMAN. She rammed it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Rammed it and depth-bombed it. There were some air bubbles there and I did not want to take any chances
[622 Corrected A] On page 622, line 2, change comma to period, after "this."

On page 622, lines 3 to 9 inclusive, delete these seven lines and insert, "We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for this submarine to have passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have made was reported to me but I have not checked it."

[623] so they bombed it again and that finished it.

The other submarine that they got went aground over by Bellows Field on the north side. We got that submarine in time and brought it over here and captured the two men in it.

We all thought that there was another submarine in the harbor at the time, but that was never discovered and I do not think there was another submarine in there. I think that was the only one.

A couple of days later we heard of another submarine in the harbor, and just to be sure, they depth-bombed it, but finally they said there was no submarine there and there hadn't been any. My opinion is that only one submarine got inside. Do you think that is a fact?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if your description of that submarine is correct, would she be launched by a plane, or could it be launched from a ship, in your judgment?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have been launched from a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Then part of the Japanese fleet would have been within a hundred miles of Oahu that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. I think it is possible that those small submarines could have been serviced by other submarines. I think it is also possible that they could come alongside other submarines and get charged.

I think they might well have been launched from around here, 50 or 200 miles, and they could have been serviced there, or they might even have been concealed in this neighborhood for sometime.

We made searches for submarines. It is in this report, as I remember it, that they had sunk a number of small submarines over on the coast of Molokai, and that they were servicing them and charging them over there. That was several months ago. We made reconnaissance with searching planes but

(See following page.)

[623 *Corrected A*] On page 623, line 5 from bottom, delete "it is in this report" and insert the words "there was an intelligence report some time ago, as I remember it."

[624] were never able to discover any of them.

Of course there are dozens of reports of the most fantastic kind that come in during any war period. We have tried not to overlook any of them, but we had to use some sanity in our investigation. I think one of the two-man submarines must have put one torpedo into the Raleigh. I believe that is all the damage that was done by the two-man submarines. That is not positive. It is not positive that that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that at 7:20 a submarine was bombed outside Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is in the report.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that was the area within which you had determined that you would bomb Japanese submarines if you found one?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had determined that we would bomb Japanese submarines found anywhere in the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. Within 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Within two or three hundred miles of this place.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the operation was within sight of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I judge so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not come into the situation of an air raid, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not at that time, and although we had indicated in our order that an air raid might very well be coincidental with submarines, we had so many reports, false reports of submarines in the outlying area, I thought, well, I would wait for verification of the report that an air raid started. Admiral Bloch will also

(See following page.)

develop that and give his reaction, which, I believe, is very much the same as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to what was mentioned before, [624 *Corrected A*] On page 624, line 4 from bottom, insert period after the word "report".

On page 624, line 4 from bottom, delete the words "that an" and insert the words "then the".

[625] do you mean you only knew that the airplane had taken a shot at something?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not what the airplane shot at. It was shot at something, but I knew the destroyer had depth-bombed a submarine.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In the air attack you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. The air attack on the submarine you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sometime later.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood his statement. Apparently the attack was by a destroyer, not from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was from the air, but I did not know that, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was both.

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean it has only been put together, everything that we now know. That is not what we knew at the time. I am giving you everything as nearly as we can find out what happened, but not what I knew was happening at that time.

General McCoy. Did they sink that submarine at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. It was a large submarine, not a small one?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I am not positive of. I think it was a small one. One, I think the Ward submarine, was a small submarine, according to the Ward report.

General McCoy. According to the Ward report did they ram it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, shot at it and depth-charged it. I think we got a considerable number of submarines, sir. The Japanese admitted the loss of five in the radio broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. In this action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, five small ones, they said.

[625 *Corrected A*] On page 625, line 3, delete whole paragraph and insert, "No, sir, I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was reported to me was that a destroyer had depth bombed a submarine."

[626] General McCoy. To get back to the despatches from Washington, the war warning despatches, and others, that came here successively from October 16, and with respect to a war warning, and General Short said he felt sure you must have shown it to him. Were those furnished to your separate commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Were they shown to the separate commanders?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In general I showed to the commanders of task forces, the three vice admirals, everything that I received in the way of war warnings and of the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations and of the board on the situation. I kept them as thoroughly informed (See following page.) as I could.

In regard to this war warning on the 29th of November I am positive (See following page.)

that Admiral Pye had seen it. I think Admiral Brown had seen it, but I am not sure; I would not be positive. Halsey had not because he was at sea at the time it was received.

General McCoy. There was no warning given him by despatch or radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, but he was fully prepared for anything when he left here—he was fully prepared for anything that might happen. All he needed was a declaration of war, and I do not believe they could have got Halsey asleep while he was at sea.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you one question, According to No. 2 CL, 1941, revised, with respect to the defense measures available to be taken against air attacks on Pearl Harbor, it states that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as navel base defense officer, shall exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack; arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced; exercise supervisory control over naval shore base aircraft, arranging through combatwing 2 for cooperation [626 Corrected A] On page 626, line 11, delete the words "and of the board" and insert the words "that bore".

On page 626, line 13, delete "29th" and insert "27th".

[627] of the joint air effort between Army and Navy.

In other words, that provides that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was the officer who coordinated the air defenses and possibly other defenses with the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, in General Short's statement he refers to the joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier, Hawaiian Department, and the Fourteenth Naval District, and directly under this it is signed by Walter C. Short and C. C. Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And paragraph 18 says, "Navy. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for (i) distant reconnaissance."

Now, as I take it, for that purpose the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is under you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. But there is no separate force for the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is not enough of any planes for the defense of Oahu and the use of the fleet in the Pacific. Eventually the plans provided for about 175 planes at that time.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. They were not attached to the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. And it is my recollection that some 80 of them were turned over to the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. As a part of the coastal defense frontier force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. To remain here permanently?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. This is what I mean: 185 is the number called for, for airplanes, patrol planes, in this area,

[627 Corrected A] On page 627, line 10 from bottom, after the figure "175" insert the word "patrol".

[628] and offshore patrol planes, 72. I am speaking from memory only, but I think some 80 of those are set for the use of the Commandant of the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the plans they allowed a force that will remain with the District for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Of a number of planes we had here in the area and with our planes for defense to the westward and the reconnais-

(See following page.)

sance covering the fleet movements to the Marshalls we would have left, as I recall, only two patrol squadrons here. These were plans approved by the Navy Department and the tasks set up.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then there was provision for a force to remain here for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two patrol squadrons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Under the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you have explained that there were not sufficient patrol planes to carry out an effective patrol at any time; is that correct? I mean, an effective patrol against air attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, we find in the Standing Operating Procedure under interceptor command that the interceptor command will coordinate the control and operations of the antiaircraft batteries and will coordinate and control the aircraft warning service.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which included the interceptor command and the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As it developed, which you probably do not know, that radar service was not in operation for service at that time. It was operating as a training service, and while it had certain hours for operation, it was not operating as an

[628 Corrected 4] On page 628, line 7, delete the words "planes for defense" and insert the words "plans for advance."

[629] effective warning service. Did you have knowledge of that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that, sir, until I got news of this radar incident which I had told you about.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether Admiral Bloch knew that was the case?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commanding General did not have advice with regard to distant reconnaissance and of the approach of the large torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he did not have the force to do that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the Commanding General interested in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he was, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You are not sure whether there was a discussion or any knowledge of the lack of effective information on the instrument on that board to carry out that part, or the lack of an effective warning service on his part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Admiral, we have had several problems out here, and we had clearly indicated to the Army as a result of some of these searches that we had conducted, that we could not maintain a continuous patrol around these islands and over several months ago. At one time in the early stages of our training with the Army I was informed that they had the idea we wanted the patrol out all the time. I know that their minds were disabused of any such thing as

that, and I am quite sure the reasons therefor were set forth by us, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and compawing 2, who are the men having to do with the air, and I do not see how they could have failed to know the condition of the state of the affairs at the various exercises, the joint exercises we [630] had with them.

The CHAIRMAN. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that the operations of the radar, Army radar, which was reported to me in the maneuvers, that we had, that they had been able to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in.

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape.

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not what they wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place I knew that my staff had taken a very effective part in urging the District and the Army to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he had come down and told us also [631] and some other people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the perfection of the warning net, to get quicker communication, but I was under the impression, a very strong impression, that the radar was in operating condition and that it was in very good shape.

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth—I have not talked to anybody about this since the action—but my impression was that they had, I think, three permanent stations, and I think some seven or eight portable stations around the island, and their big ones were the ones, according to which, I thought that we could have some dependence on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. Was there an officer on your staff

[631 *Corrected A*] On page 631, line 2 from the bottom, delete "no" and insert "yes."

[632] detailed to the radar warning service room to keep you informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. How did you expect to be informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar warning service was the function of the Army and the naval base defense officer. I had a staff who were active and trying to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I thought that they had developed it and handled it.

If I had it to do again, of course I would check it a good deal more than I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You had the responsibility for the security of your fleet, at least here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the radar warning service would have been of enormous protection to your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had a warning that war might break out at any time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you tell us that you thought the radar service was working; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. From my experience and from what I knew, I thought I knew the radar service was working.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had no liaison officer with that service at the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no liaison officer from my staff with that service.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had loaned Lieutenant Taylor to help them set it up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And to help them in training?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not report to you or to any [633] member of your staff anything whatever, and that was in the first week of December; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't say he reported to any member of my staff; he did not report to me.

The CHAIRMAN. He knew what the conditions were; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think he probably did.

The CHAIRMAN. And as the radar system is now running, there is a naval officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that goes on there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that that was the situation then?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you assume was the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time or prior to the time of the attack, we had very few officers out here who were competent. Our cry was for competent officers, and that cry was continued, and it seemed we didn't have a sufficient number of officers to divert them to these duties.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you had no officer who you felt was available and competent to sit and stay there at the telephone and to phone the information to the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I did not think it was necessary to have an officer there.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that that was the Army's job?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but since the attack we have had some officers on the difficulty of identification of ships, and we put a considerable number with the Army.
(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F.?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F. interceptor on them?

[633 *Corrected A*] On page 633, line 6 from the bottom, delete the word "difficulty" and insert the word "duty".

[634] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, therefore, that the radar detector and the control officer would have to have advice from the Navy as to where your patrol fleets were, or did you assume that such information was being given to the controller on the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. As to where our ships were?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I didn't assume any such thing as that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not know how the Army interceptor service would know whether they were attacking planes or whether they were enemy planes? You did not know how that was worked out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that was Admiral Bloch's responsibility to work that out for the Navy, under you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that he had done his duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had done the best he could, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is his duty. I do not think you could expect an officer to do any better than that.

General McNARNEY. For the purpose of the record I would like to call attention and make reference to the "Tentative Manual of Inter-

ceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defense," 27 October, 1941. Paragraph 7 refers to the personnel supposed to be present in the control room and subparagraph (g) reads:

Navy liaison officer. This officer is on the platform and has contact with the naval headquarters in the region. He will be able to identify all naval [635] aircraft flying in the area so as to distinguish them from the enemy. He is also charged with keeping the controller informed of the naval situation so as to aid him in getting a picture of the situation as a whole.

I would like to refer now to the report of General Short on page 22. It states in paragraph 4:

The Navy liaison officer's position within the information center was not manned when I reached the information center at about 8:30 a. m. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 p. m., when the position was taken over by naval officers. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.,
2nd Lieutenant, Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

I just ask to have that go in to clear this up.

General McCoy. May I ask a question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. To go back to your memorandum of December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. It was your function on December 6 to put into effect on the outbreak of war certain specific things.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. When war broke out, did you put those things into effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

General McCoy. Why not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not on account of the losses sustained.

[636] General McCoy. Was not the fleet complete with regard to all forces except battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but that was a very big outfit that was cut out.

General McCoy. Did you have any information of any kind about enemy battleships being in this vicinity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5th, 6th, or 7th, would you have altered your distant patrols in any way?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if no radar was working on that morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these islands; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I had known that no radar was working it would have been a factor to consider, but what I would have done under those conditions I do not like to state.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it was working?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the short of it. I thought it was in working condition.

Admiral REEVES. Is it a fact that there was no radar working that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, my impression is, gathered from the report which I gave here, and the report of Commander Curts and others that the radar was working on the morning of the attack, and I thought it was in material condition to work, and it has certainly worked since then. The manning of it, I do not know about, but the material condition of the radar was, I thought, in very material condition here, in material condition to work, and I thought it was in material condition to work because they did work it.

[636, *Corrected A*] On page 636, line 3 from the bottom, after the word "very" insert the word "good."

[637] General McCoy. We heard testimony that it was not only in condition to work but that it actually was working.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I did not think there was any question about it.

General McCoy. And that it was not working as a system, but it was brought out that there was no naval officer present but only a soldier who picked up something that morning after the station had closed down at seven o'clock, and that one of the soldiers just happened to pass along and pick it up.

Admiral KIMMEL. However much I should have personally checked into this thing—and God knows now I wish I had—I had a great many other things to do, and whether the Navy liaison officer was present at the radar at the time was something that the officer responsible for the running of the radar should have, it seems to me, looked into.

General McCoy. The warning system wasn't working; it was just a drill and had been exercised through a couple of mobile sets. None of the permanent sets is working yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of the permanent sets is working yet?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that.

General McCoy. There was a soldier there playing with it, but no responsible officer to see this map that you have heard of in time to follow the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, there was no responsible Army or Navy officer who heard about it until the next day. Let us be fair about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to make one point clear. At no time do I wish to accuse any Army officer or anybody connected with the Army of having withheld information which we should have had. I merely cited the incident as it was related to me in order to show what might have happened if they had given us the information which was obtained.

[638] General McCoy. Obtained but not evaluated in time to follow the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I wish to disclaim any idea of putting anybody on the spot. I want now and always to give everyone all the information that I have to tell you in order that you may properly evaluate it.

General McNARNEY. There is some indication in your report that there were indications of enemy action at 6:18, 6:33, and 7 o'clock. If both the Army and the Navy had been on a war footing, would that

information have been communicated to the Army interceptor command?

Admiral KIMMEL. The information which was communicated as available, to certain Navy units at that time, was reported as rapidly as we could, but that information did not reach the responsible command until some time after.

I tried to emphasize the fact that this has only been drawn up from the reports received after the thing was all over, in order to show the sequence of events, as well as we could, and as soon as we could.

It does not show the information that was available. It should not be taken to indicate that the information was available at that particular time nor even that they made reports at that particular time. When a man sees things, before he makes a report he attempts to verify it, but that information was not available. All we had was given to the Army, all we thought was of any interest to the Army, and we gave it to the Army as soon as it was available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will have to adjourn pretty soon if we are to get back before dark.

General McNARNEY. I have just one or two questions and then I will be through.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General McNARNEY. What was the condition of readiness [639] perfected for the naval base defense on the night of December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better get that from Admiral Bloch. He can give you the answer to that.

General McNARNEY. Can he tell me who was the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he can tell you that.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can tell you that. It was Admiral Pye.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get this information about the enemy airplanes at 6:30 or thereabouts? Where did you get that information?

General McNARNEY. Enemy action.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get it? Did anyone know there were any airplanes present at 6:30?

Admiral KIMMEL. I heard they were present.

Admiral REEVES. Why weren't they reported to the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why wasn't it reported to the Army?

Admiral REEVES. Yes, and how did you get the information about enemy airplanes?

Admiral KIMMEL. I got no information, sir, about any airplanes being present at 6:30 in the morning.

General McNARNEY. Enemy action, it is.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only information I had in regard to enemy airplanes was on the morning of the 7th.

(See following page.)

Admiral REEVES. I am told that the question was "enemy action." I suppose if they were not airplanes, they may have been submarines. Then the question is not pertinent to what we are discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better adjourn until Monday morning.

Let me say to both you gentlemen that the nature of our discussion is such that we deem it advisable that you do not discuss with anyone anything that has taken place in this room.

[639, *Corrected A*] On page 639, line 10 from the bottom, after the words "of the 7th" insert the words, "When I received the air raid warning at about 7:50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the Fleet in Pearl Harbor."

[640-(658)] That is necessary because of the secrecy of these things.

Admiral KIMMEL. I appreciate that, and almost everything I have presented here is of a highly secret nature, but I have no hesitancy in presenting it.

The CHAIRMAN. You need have no hesitancy in presenting it because there will be nothing in our report until the Secretaries of War and Navy see that nothing in our report will be in any way detrimental to national defense. We have no such agreement, but we have an agreement between ourselves that we will protect the national defense in this, so you need not have any hesitancy in anything you say.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m. the hearing was adjourned until Monday, December 29, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m. at Pearl Harbor.)

[659]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[660] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on Saturday, December 27, 1941, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED
STATES NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as you probably have heard, Admiral Reeves is not well. He was taken to the Naval Hospital on Saturday evening, and he is under the charge of Commander Brunson. Commander Brunson states that Admiral Reeves cannot be here today and possibly not tomorrow. We have consulted Admiral Reeves and he is entirely willing to have the testimony go on. We have made arrangements that he will be furnished a [661] transcript of the testimony each day so that he can read it and familiarize himself with it if he wishes to call you or any other witness back for further questions. In that case we shall call you or any other witness back for further questions by Admiral Reeves when he gets back if there is anything that appears to him as important to be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We feel that you are entitled to a hearing before the full Commission, and if you feel that it would be fair to you to

wait until Admiral Reeves can be back here, while I should deplore the delay, I would feel that that was your right, and there would be no prejudice or feeling of prejudice against you if you ask us to wait until Admiral Reeves can be here.

If you would like to consider that matter more, we will give you time to do that and to confer with the admiral here until you come to a decision about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I need no time, sir. I am very sorry indeed that Admiral Reeves is ill and I know that you will miss him, and I know that I will, but I have every confidence in the judgment of this Commission, and I think that the arrangements that you have made will be satisfactory to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You quite understand that Admiral Reeves will have the opportunity to examine you further if, upon the inspection of the notes, there is something that he thinks should be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. I expect to be constantly available to the Commission for any such procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for that decision, and with that understanding we will proceed.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I go ahead now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[662] Admiral KIMMEL. During my first day's testimony there appeared to be some question as to whether or not the OpNav despatch of November 27th, the war warning despatch, was delivered by me to the Army.

I have carefully investigated the circumstances of that delivery which I have found were as follows:

I gave the despatch to Lieutenant Commander Layton for personal delivery to General Short. Lieutenant Commander Layton misunderstood his orders and gave the despatch to Lieutenant Burr, Navy liaison officer at General Short's headquarters, and left Lieutenant Burr with the orders to deliver the despatch to General Short. When Lieutenant Burr arrived at Army headquarters, General Short and his Chief of Staff were not present. Lieutenant Burr therefore delivered the despatch to G3. He states that the despatch was delivered to either Lieutenant Colonel Donegan or Major Lawton and that Major Horner was present at the time. He states further that he asked the Army officer to whom he delivered the despatch to make certain that General Short received the despatch and that officer said that he would do so. Lieutenant Burr is very sure that this occurred on November 27th 1941 because there was considerable activity at Army G3 in connection with an order for Alert ONE which the Army issued on that date. Lieutenant Commander Layton is very certain that the despatch which Lieutenant Burr carried to Army headquarters was the war warning despatch because that was the only despatch which he gave to Lieutenant Burr. Lieutenant Burr did not read the despatch but states that he had only been required to carry one despatch from the Fleet headquarters to the Army headquarters.

[663] I might enlarge on that a little. This despatch was received in my office late on the afternoon of November 27. I immediately took steps to have that delivered. This despatch was received in my office late on the afternoon of November 27. I immediately took steps to have that delivered to General Short, and I gave it to this officer with orders to deliver it to General Short personally.

I had also attempted to get hold of Admiral Bloch, but Admiral Bloch had gone to see his wife, who was in the hospital. I got hold of his chief of staff, Captain Earle, and Captain Earle brought to me the dispatch which the Army had just received, their warning. I read that and while I was in there, Layton brought in the paraphrase of the dispatch which he had received, on which was written at the top, "War Warning," and it was something that I thought could not be mistaken. I approved of it and told Layton to deliver it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, to deliver it to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. To deliver it to General Short, yes. As Earle went out of the office he said to Layton, "Give this to Burr. He is going back to Headquarters now, and he will deliver it." And like an idiot, Layton did that. I did not know these details until yesterday when I investigated it.

That is correct, isn't it?

Now, there was another question which came out on Saturday, and that was the torpedo plane baffles. When I started to get up the data for this I told the commanders and my staff that I wanted everything on this subject about aerial torpedoes, and when I presented to you what I did the other day, I thought I had everything. However, Admiral Standley recalled to my mind a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance which was dated in July. I have been unable to locate that letter, but I have located this letter of June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles [664] for protection against torpedo plane attacks. A copy of that was sent to me. I will read that letters:

JUNE 13, 1941.

In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles—

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the date reference?

Admiral KIMMEL. CNO letter, 17 February.

Admiral STANDLEY. 17 February?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, 17 February.

(The letter above referred to is as follows:)

[664a]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.
The Commandant, Third Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.
The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.
The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.
The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.
The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.
 Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op-30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be latered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives [664b] of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it can not be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information, the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to: CinCpac
 CinClant
 CinCaf
 C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon
 C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport
 Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo
 Comdt. NavSta, Samoa
 BuOrd
 Op-12

(Copy)

[665] Admiral KIMMEL. I read this, and when Admiral Standley recalled it I had some recollection of some such communication, but when I read this, knowing of the depth of the water in this harbor, the channel, that it is 40 feet, and that there are very few spots where it is more than 45 feet, and knowing that battleships cannot be maneuvered in less than 40 feet, then I thought that if the Department meant that the heavy ships were always subject to attack, then I do not know why they did not say so, because we cannot maneuver ships in less than 40 feet of water. I still assumed that we had a certain immunity from attack in this harbor. Of course, I was entirely wrong.

General McNARNEY. You did not by any chance recover any of the torpedoes which the Japanese had fired?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we recovered them.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. Was there anything peculiar about them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they had Whitehead fins. I have not had

(See following page.)

time to go into this myself, but I have been informed that these torpedoes were Whitehead torpedoes. That is subject to confirmation. Understand that I do not know completely what I am talking about

on this, but I understand they were Whitehead torpedoes, manufactured in 1931, these aerial torpedoes.

They had fitted a large fin on the side of them, almost like a diving rudder on a submarine, and when the torpedoes hit, they just skim into the water. They do not go down far.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are there two or four of these fins?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two. One on each side.

Admiral THEOBOLD. It is a shallow dive.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very ingenious thing. They were evidently built and fitted that way just for this purpose here.

General McNARNEY. Was there any change in the arming device or length of the run necessary?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I would not know. I think Admiral [665 corrected A] On page 665, line 15, after the word "recovered" insert the words "one of."

On page 665, line 17, delete the word "Whitehead" and substitute the word "wide."

[666] Bloch can give you considerable information on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the name of the torpedo officer who examined it, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch would know that. However, I can find it out for you.

Admiral THEOBOLD. The man doing most of this work was Thales Boyd. He did most of the work on the torpedoes. There was one torpedo by the Raleigh, and I got that and examined it, but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head.

(See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bloch talked to me about the arming device, but I think he was talking about the submarine torpedo which we talked about before.

In our reply to the original letter of February 17 we indicated that we still wanted these light torpedo nets and baffles put out. You recall that.

General McCoy. What are these out here? What are these nets or baffles in the harbor now?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are improvised and principally target rafts with some nets strung under them.

Admiral THEOBOLD. He may be confused about the baffles at the entrance to the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. When we were on the tower on Saturday, Admiral, we saw what appeared to be a lot of floats carrying nets. That was in the upper part of the harbor, just what I would call about west of the part near where the floating dry dock is. We thought they were nets that had been put down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am not familiar with it.

Admiral THEOBOLD. Admiral Bloch would know about that. They have nets, however, in the channel. They have target rafts there. They got these target rafts out after the attack and strung them across.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to touch on the question of [666 Corrected A] On page 666, line 7, delete the words "there was one torpedo by the RALEIGH and I got that and examined it,

but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head."

[667] the Army Radar network. I have looked through the files of the Commander-in-Chief and found two communications regarding that Army installation. I would like to bring this up with respect to the discussions that took place the other day. The first one is a letter from General Short to Admiral Bloch thanking him for certain Radar training which fifteen key enlisted men had received from four vessels of the fleet. This was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch. I will read pertinent sections therefrom. (Reading:)

As you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone to sea on cruises on board the California, Chicago, Chester, and Pensacola. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and experience in the operation of Radar equipment, preparing them for the operation of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated with the fleet personnel.

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equipment shortly after it has been placed in operation.

Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other naval commanders concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both services should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service personnel.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General U. S. Army, Commanding.

[668] That was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch on the 19th of June for such action "as you may care to take."

We had sent some air officers up to inspect the Army Radar, and they did derive some benefit from it.

Under date of August 5 General Short sent me a letter on the subject, "Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department," which I shall read. (Reading:)

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months.

The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans for a similar system of their own, it seems greatly to the interest of both services to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be highly cumulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation greatly enhanced.

Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer between your Headquarters and mine.

Under date of August 16 I sent the letter:

In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E. Curts, [669-670] U. S. Navy, the Communication Officer on my Staff, has been assigned to that duty.

It will be noted in my reply that I appointed Commander Curts of my staff to act as liaison officer between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters. This liaison duty should not be confused with the liaison duty referred to yesterday by one member of the Commission at the time that he read from a publication on the subject of Radar installation.

If it is possible, I should like to examine this publication which was read from on Saturday.

(General McNarney handed a document to Admiral Kimmell.)

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time to examine it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

When this extract was read it took me completely by surprise, and I thank you very much for letting me see this. I had never seen this manual, and when I left the meeting I tried to find out what it was he was reading from.

I would like to point out one or two things about this. I note that it is dated October 27, 1941, and that it is tentative, entitled, "Tentative Manual of Interceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defense."

This, so far as I know, is not over the signature of any ranking officer in the Hawaiian area. I would like to say that no copy of it was ever received at my headquarters, and so far as I have been able to determine, it has not gone to the people there. I do not know whether it was ever received by Admiral Bloch, but you can ask him that question when he comes before you.

[671] I noted on page 2 of section 3, paragraph 6:

Warning: the writer again wishes to warn the reader that the above is merely a "stab-in-the-dark" and that the organization to be prescribed will be the result of a careful study by a board of officers.

The quotation read at the last meeting by a member of the board was subparagraphs (g) and (h) on page 5 of section 4 of this publication. I had no knowledge that the Army had prior to December 7 requested a naval officer for liaison duty at the A. W. S. reception center. But Admiral Bloch is a witness; the Commission can of course ascertain whether the Fourteenth Naval District had a copy of the manual or was asked by the Army for liaison watch officers prior to December 7, 1941.

I would like again to add the following brief comment: Prior to the events of December 7 I knew the following facts:

The Joint Action Army and Navy required the Army to maintain an Air Warning Service.

The Army had a radar network on Oahu.

On or about 19 November, by my authority, Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army to advise them in the operations setup for their radar network.

In General Short's letter of 5 August, he stated: "The Army aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion."

After the attack of December 7 I ascertained the following facts. This, incidentally, I found out after I left here the other day:

That the Army radar network was operating for drill purposes only and plotted Japanese planes 132 miles north of Kauai into Oahu and back to the northward until 1059. I had learned that before.

Since the day of the attack Army radar network has been constantly in use. [672]

That upon the day of the attack six Army radar stations were functioning, as follows: one at Fort Shafter, one on Koko Head, one on Kaawa, one near Opana, one near Puaena Point, and one at Wainae.

In reverting to this subject and in presenting again in more detail to this Commission the foregoing facts, I hope that the position which I have tried to maintain from the beginning, namely, that I have no desire whatever to evade the responsibilities which were mine at the time of the events of December 7, 1941, will be fully appreciated by the Commission. However, in fairness to all concerned and as an aid to the future war-making capabilities of our country I feel it incumbent upon me to assure that all factors which in any way contributed to the happenings of December 7 be clearly presented to this Commission. It is with this thought in mind that I have felt called upon to revert to the subject of the Army radar.

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at the last session that I was convinced there were at least three fixed stations, and by that I meant three stations with communications to the central plotting room and to the central place, by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought there were more. I find that there were six, and I underestimated. Now I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was manned was the search type and that they are—what do you call them? Two seventy, wasn't it? Leave that out.

(See following page.)

Admiral THEOBALD. I don't know.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a search-type radar. And at the places where they are building permanent setups, they propose to put the same type radars that they had mounted in these

[672 *Corrected A*] On page 672, line 5 from the bottom, delete the words "leave that out."

[673] stations to which I referred. I think they are going to make some slight changes in the antennae.

Admiral THEOBALD. They said that they had taken one out of our damaged ship that would give them altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I know.

Admiral THEOBALD. This is only search, and they have only one that gives altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. We turned one over to them from one of our damaged ships. I know that. It was done at my order.

A member of my staff recalled to me after this session the other day that I had told him that General Short had informed me that he thought he could give us a 200-mile coverage with the radar installations at some time, I don't know exactly when, prior to this; but that was firmly in my mind.

Now, I didn't want to bring up this radar business at all. It is an Army responsibility, and I was trying to keep as clear of anything which appeared to be shoving off on the Army as I possibly could, but when we got into it I felt in justice to myself and to the Navy, which is of much more importance than I, that I should say what I believe to be the truth about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question, I think, while we are on this: Admiral, does that pamphlet say anything about or refer to a Standing Operating Procedure in the title page? Does it say why that was in there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't—(turning pages of a document).

Admiral STANDLEY. No. The title page. Does the title page refer to any previous correspondence?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't see it, sir (handing document to Admiral Standley). It may. I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, have you ever seen that pamphlet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you ever seen that pamphlet (indicating pamphlet, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 [674] November, 1941, "Subject: Standing Operating Procedure: To: Distribution 'B', 'L', and 'G' less 1, 2, 3 and 5," signed by Colonel Dunlop)?

(Admiral Kimmel examined the pamphlet referred to.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think he said he had no recollection of ever having seen it.

Admiral STANDLEY. No; that is another one.

Admiral KIMMEL. In answer to your question, sir, I have seen this since the 7th of December, since these proceedings started, and to the best of my recollection I never—I didn't see this before. It is quite possible, and that I can ascertain, that it was furnished to my headquarters; and if you ask me if I read all of it I can tell you I have not. I did not read all parts of it. I have not yet read it all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, for the benefit of the Commission, will you state what your status as to authority and responsibility was in relation to the Commandant of the Fourteenth District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Fourteenth District is a part of the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet could give directions and orders to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with dealing with the Army in practically all matters of detail connected with the liaison betwixt the Army and the Navy. There were of course certain things that I dealt directly with General Short on, such as these war warnings and things like that, and there were discussions that we had, but in practically—oh, in practically all cases the Commanding General dealt through the Commandant of the District in coordinating the—dealt directly with the Commandant of the District in coordinating, and anything that required my action came through the Commandant of the District to me. The Commanding General had an entirely [675] independent and separate command. Both offensive and defensive arrangements were by the principle of mutual cooperation in accordance with the Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and the Commanding General was in no sense subject to my orders nor to the orders of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the event of the absence of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, did the Commandant of the District succeed at any time to direct command of the forces here, or did that devolve upon the senior officer present afloat?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Commandant of the District assumed command in his regular order of seniority.

Admiral STANDLEY. Of seniority.

Admiral KIMMEL. I conceive him at all times to be a part of the fleet, and in my dealings with the Commandant I tried to consider him just as one of the subdivisions of the fleet. Now, manifestly the senior officer present afloat has certain responsibilities, and those were not changed by the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were not changed by the letter, did you say?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those were not—I didn't mean anything I said to change that. I didn't write any letter, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you mean this, Admiral: that even though the Commandant of the Fourteenth District by virtue of seniority was in command here, even under those conditions the senior officer present afloat had certain responsibilities as to the ships afloat here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I might say that Admiral Bloch so far as I recall during this period of time—well, he may have been for a few days, but in a vast majority of times, almost always, there was at least one task force commander in port, who was a vice admiral and therefore senior to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

[676] Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Who is a rear admiral, yes, sir.

Does that answer?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you misconceived some of the questions that I put near the close of the last session. What I was trying to do was not to fix any responsibility on you or anybody else in the premises, but what I was trying to do was to find the net situation with respect to information as between Army and Navy as to warning devices in operation at the date of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I understood that, and I have absolutely no complaint to make to you or anybody else about the way I have been treated.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, sir.

Now, to summarize it, without going into the question of whose fault it was, whether it was the fault of lack of equipment, lack of personnel, defective exchange of information, or whatnot, the fact was that on the morning of December 7 you knew that there was not any distant patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that there was a radar information service operating?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. More or less complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I thought so.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was the state of your information and belief on that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask, before we leave this subject of the radar, a question premised on the fact that the radar on the fleet in harbor was not working due to the surrounding [677] mountains; it wasn't expected to work while they were in harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, in addition to the drill that was going on that morning by the Army there were task forces at sea supplied with radar on the individual ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did that apply to all ships at sea, all fighting ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, all ships are not equipped with radar. The Chicago—

Admiral THEOBALD. The Lexington.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Enterprise. Lexington wasn't in this area. The Chicago, the Enterprise, and I think the Indianapolis are equipped with radar and—now wait a minute. The Indianapolis wasn't there. I'm wrong. I'm wrong. No, I'm wrong. Cut that out, please. I got two task forces mixed up in my mind. The Enterprise was equipped with radar, and she was about 200-odd miles to the westward, and I am sure her radar was working at the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. The question I was wanting to ask again, or ask in addition: Was there post facto information furnished you such as we and you got as to the Army radar report or chart showing enemy ships operating? Was there also anything developed on any of the ships' radar afterwards that showed that they had any contact with enemy ships of any kind?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not that I have heard, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. They were all too far away.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were all too far away.

Admiral THEOBALD. Any one of them. The Enterprise.

Admiral KIMMEL. Enterprise was 200 miles to the westward, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they had no contact with any surface ship or—

[678] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, none was ever reported to me, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Too far away, sir. The Lexington and Indianapolis had them, but they were miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they were way down.

Admiral STANDLEY. What would be the radii of any such instruments on any of these surface ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. The surface ships, it depends on the height of the radar installation on the ship and the size of the ship that they are searching for: the two principal factors.

Admiral STANDLEY. About what would be the normal distance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am trying to tell you that, sir. Take the Enterprise, and against a battleship, and she could probably be reasonably certain of getting it at 40 to 50 thousand yards, which is 20 to 25 miles. Now, then, against a plane which is well up in the air that could run up to as high as 200 miles. Now, the higher you put the radar installation the more it increases your range for surface ships as well as for aircraft, and—well, does that answer the question, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, in the case of a destroyer, I might add, the radar installation in the Enterprise should be good for, oh, somewhere between 20 and 35 thousand yards, something of that kind.

Is that correct?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes. The thing about it is that the radar projects the beam and it's rectilinear just like light: as soon as you hit the curvature of the earth the things below that, below the horizon —

The CHAIRMAN. — you don't get.

Admiral THEOBALD. That beam goes over, just like over a hill, and it's no good.

Admiral STANDLEY. Taking height out, is there any limit [679] in power or effect?

Admiral THEOBALD. You had better get experts, sir. I think we have gotten reception on planes well over 100 or 150 miles, and this Army radar followed some planes out, it must have been, over 200 miles before they lost them on that morning, but I am not an expert on that, but I think it's around—I think 200 miles is —

Admiral STANDLEY. — the limit of power.

Admiral THEOBALD. Again, a plane is a simple problem. With a good radar instrument you could get a plane that far.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know how high this Opana installation was, but I suppose it was as high as the highest masts on some of your ships, and they apparently picked up planes 132 miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on the height of your planes again, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, again, how high they were.

Admiral THEOBALD. Our planes are now coming to a technique of flying very low when they go out now until they have to go up to see something. I mean our planes are following a principle of getting down close to the water until they get close to something to search for. They have been doing that for some time now, and that is what the Japs did too.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Evidently they flew low along the easterly side of the Island in coming down here.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of reports, Admiral, which caused you to send out patrols to the west and southwest.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any of those reports based on radar information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, so far as I remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. What type of reports were they which [680] caused the patrols to the south and southwest rather than to the north? That is, after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were false reports, as we found out, and of contacts, and were direction-finder reports.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some belief, is there not, that those were stalls by Japanese boats?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fishing boats and whatnot?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been told that there was a great deal of radio talking and a great deal of confusion in the signaling after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did as much as they could to confuse everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you must hand it to them, leaving aside the unspeakable treachery of it, that once they were launched on it they did a fine job.

Off the record :

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you maintain an operations board here which shows or pictures the location of surface vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. You do not happen to take a photograph of it, do you, day-by-day, so we could see the picture on December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have records, I think, which can be——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, on that very line Admiral Standley has just made the suggestion that it would be helpful to us if you could have prepared a large chart, probably on a small scale, which would show us the location of all your forces on the 6th.

[681] Admiral KIMMEL. I think that that——

The CHAIRMAN. Between the 6th and the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the very thing you had in mind, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think if you will call Captain De Lany before you he is prepared to do that now.

Admiral THEOBALD. Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris.

Admiral STANDLEY. We would like a large-scale chart.

Admiral THEOBALD. They have the large plotting sheets they kept there on a table longer than this (indicating), and they have it there all the time, which is right in the war plan section at headquarters.

Admiral STANDLEY. It shows the whole ocean?

Admiral THEOBALD. It shows the whole ocean.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might give a brief description of the scheme that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We kept the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District informed of the movement of all combatant ships, and in his office there was prepared each day a location sheet for the combatant ships as well as for all the merchant ships which we knew anything about, and a copy of that was furnished to my office, an overlay, and they could put it right on the chart, and we had all the merchant ships, and of course we knew where our own ships were, and they had their own ships and they had added on our ships. Now, that was done each day.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, you had a permanent chart.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you made a location sheet which
[682] you can lay right on top of that permanent chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Transparent paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Transparent paper, which would locate your vessels on the sea area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And those are permanent records?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they could produce the big chart and then produce the location sheets of, say, the 5th, 6th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be Captain DeLany or Captain McMorris?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris would be the ones to present that, and I think that there should be no difficulty about it.

General McCoy. May I ask if such a sheet, such a chart, was kept as to the Japanese fleet and where it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. That included this, sir. That was included.

General McCoy. On the same chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily on the same chart, but there was an overlay for that purpose. There was so much on some of these charts that—

The CHAIRMAN. So much on some of these overlays, you mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, so much on some of these overlays that they sometimes split them up and had one at—my recollection now is, we had one for the Japanese and one for our own ships.

Admiral THEOBALD. I would like to say something about that if I may. It is recognized that the Intelligence is not good, but we did have a Radio Intelligence Service that [683] Lieutenant Commander Layton can tell you about, with a main-intercept unit in Washington, one in Cavite, and one here, who did trace by doing nothing but intercepting Japanese traffic and assaying it. They got all the checks. He, I assume, can tell you that; I don't want to. But they went right along, and that's all they actually have as to where the Japanese are. That's the main detections. There is no spy system in Japan; I don't think you can develop it. Layton, on that, will tell you a lot, I mean, and what they have in the way of plots.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room, an operations room, in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would there be any reason why the Commission itself could not go there and look at that plot room?

Admiral THEOBALD. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there anything more secret about that than we get right here?

Admiral KIMMEL. There isn't anything more secret about it, sir, except that they are carrying on work there right now and it is a very busy place.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, we wouldn't want to interfere, I mean, but we could go there and see it in operation.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think we could see exactly what they are doing there, to give us a picture that we could not get otherwise.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you have to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief on that, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. The Fourteenth Naval District was [684] doing the same thing, too, as far out as they—they have a large plot in their war plans section.

Admiral STANDLEY. A separate plot, too?

Admiral THEOBALD. Oh, yes, sir, over at Fourteenth Naval District headquarters of the Navy Yard. This plot room that Admiral Kimmel is talking about is right down here in Command-in-Chief's headquarters about two block from here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to call—

Admiral THEOBALD. To call up and find out?

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to arrange that at 12 o'clock we may be taken—only the members of the Commission; I think no one else ought to go—to those two plot rooms and look over the plotting?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, sir. I will get that right under way.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will make that available to us we will adjourn at 12 o'clock and go down and look at that.

General MCCOY. Were any of those information sheets or relays—overlays—of the Navy furnished to the Army? Do you know? Or the substance of the information?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better ask Admiral Bloch that, sir.

General McNARNEY. This is not particularly germane to the subject, but just for my own information I would like to ask the Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. In laying out your battle fleet formation, what is the normal position of the carriers in the battle fleet formation, with the whole battle fleet steaming out? I have a sort of smattering of naval formations, but not very much.

Admiral KIMMEL. You have touched on one of the most [685] controversial subjects in the whole field of naval tactics. We felt for some time that the carriers should be separated from the battle line, operating on the hit-and-run principle. I think the latest thought on the subject is that the best place for the carrier is right in the battle line, for the protection of the carrier itself and for the protection of the battleships against air attack. I think it is probable there would always be at least one carrier kept right with the battle line.

Now, then, as to your dispositions, any one expedition would depend entirely upon your mission and upon the number of carriers and surface vessels that you had available for the mission. In this war up to the present there has been no such thing as a fleet action, a fleet in the sense of a large number of ships, and they have been small detachments of ships, and the British I think are pretty firmly wedded to the idea that the carrier stays right with the heavy ships except when they are off on some particular mission. You can protect them with the suitable fast ships to accompany them; because as long as you keep the carriers with the battle line you sacrifice the advantage of speed that the carriers have over the battleships; and if you put some heavy cruisers or even light cruisers with the carriers you give them a much greater mobility than they would have with the battleships.

Does that answer the question?

General McNARNEY. Yes. This is just mostly for my own information.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very difficult question to answer, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was not the case on December 7? That is, the battleships were without the protection of the carrier on the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. The battleships that were here?

[686] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Without the protection of the carrier? Yes, sir, in the sense that the carrier was not in port, but there was one carrier within 200 miles of here at the time.

Admiral THEOBALD. When you are in a port you naturally would depend for your main escort on land-based aircraft anyway.

General McNARNEY. You cannot operate a carrier in port.

Admiral KIMMEL. A carrier in port is just nothing, and we have long held—had a practice here that when a carrier comes into port she flies off her aircraft and puts them at the base, and we provided at each one of these fields ammunition, bombs, and whatnot to arm the planes of the carriers, so that in event of being caught in port those planes could be useful. They were all taken off the carrier the minute it came into port, because they would be vulnerable not only to attack and the destruction of the planes because they couldn't get them off in port, but their planes would be useless too, so we always removed them from the carrier when we came into port.

Admiral STANDLEY. What field did you use here for them, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. We used three fields. The north island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What?

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. Ford Island.

Admiral KIMMEL. Ewa; that's the marine field. And the landing field—mat over here at Kaneohe Bay. I might add that one of the first things that I hammered on when I took command was to get an agreement with the Army whereby we could use all their fields, any or all of them, and whereby they could use any or all of ours, and I issued orders that all Navy planes should by squadrons visit and be serviced at each one of the Army fields, and that was carried out, and they were familiar with all the Army fields, and I am quite sure that the Army [687] were quite familiar with all our fields.

General McCoy. You spoke of one field, Admiral, as—

Admiral KIMMEL. (interposing). Now pardon me.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I just add one other thing: And when I spoke of the places that we put the carrier planes when they came in, we normally put them at our own naval fields.

Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. You spoke of one of your fields as Tamarim Bay?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Kaneohe.

Admiral KIMMEL. Naval air station, Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the seaplane station over here to the northward of the Island.

General McCoy. On this Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. On Oahu, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You know where Bellows Field is.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is just over there (indicating).

Admiral KIMMEL. We haven't got a map of Oahu? Have you got a map?

Admiral THEOBALD. This (indicating on a map) is Kaneohe Bay, and this is the naval air station in here (indicating).

General McCoy. Did you have any normal anchorage for the fleet in this archipelago outside of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. When the fleet first came out here we spent a great deal of our time in Lahaina road, anchorage over there.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is on the Island of Maui. There is a harbor down at Hilo which would take a couple of battleships and a number of smaller craft. Those are the two principal [688] places that we used outside of this.

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kahului.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kahului.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we haven't used them.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have in the past, destroyers.

Admiral KIMMEL. And at Kahului, too. But when the situation became more tense and we were afraid of submarines, we stopped the practice of anchoring in any of those open roadsteads or in the harbor at Hilo, which is only partially protected by breakwater and subject to submarine attack, and we used Pearl Harbor exclusively as an anchorage for heavy ships. We did permit submarines to anchor and work around Lahaina, and certain of the other smaller craft would from time to time be permitted to go to these other ports, but broadly speaking from the time I took command we had only one anchorage, which was Pearl Harbor. Lahaina, of course, is absolutely open. Lahaina. The anchorage at Lahaina is absolutely open, and studies were made several years ago to mine Lahaina to the extent necessary to make it unsafe for submarines to come in there, and a great many plans were made along that line. There are very swift currents over there, and it was finally decided that if we put mines in the number necessary to protect that harbor there was an enormous area to mine and that we would destroy more of our own ships than we did of the enemy, due to mines breaking loose in those swift currents, certainly after a short time, and that project was entirely abandoned.

General McCoy. When I was here in Hawaii about ten years ago I talked to the admiral commanding the base, only just an informal visit, and he expressed at that time considerable apprehension of the battle fleet being caught in Pearl Harbor, in its very narrow channels, and so forth.

[689] Admiral KIMMEL. That's right. That was an apprehension I shared with him, and it was my constant concern all the time I was here.

General McCoy. At that time, however, he was thinking only of submarines; he was not then concerned with the air. More recently I served with one of your officers who served here up until a few months ago, and in talking to him about it, over the more recent concern of the Navy for defense from the air, he said that when he was out here—I think probably most of his service being before your time—the fleet

kept under way and stayed outside of Pearl Harbor and only went into the harbor by division but kept the main fleet outside of Pearl Harbor, conscious of the new danger from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, that's possible during the period of the fleet problem over a month or six weeks, perhaps, but over several months I can see no way by which we could do it.

General McCoy. I take it, then, since you have been in command with the security of the fleet constantly in your mind, that your problem was more concerned with the safety from submarines than from air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was constantly concerned with the question of submarines, and we took very effective steps, I think, to keep a submarine from getting any surface ships. At least they didn't get any.

General McCoy. At these times of successive warnings from the Department I take it, then, that the fleet was mostly in Pearl Harbor rather than outside?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. We kept them in the operating areas, and we tried to change them around a little bit, and we tried to be constantly on the alert against submarines, but we did not keep them in harbor during all this time. We kept them at sea as much as we thought was profitable for our training and [690] for the preparation for war and maintaining what security we could. We had to accept a submarine menace in the operating areas over a long period of time. We had to accept it, because if you keep a fleet in port you might just as well disband them, quit: they are no good to you.

General McCoy. Could you furnish us with a statement as to the times since you have had command that the fleet has been in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. How many—well, I can give you a very—

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, you can do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you a general statement right now which I think will serve your purpose.

General McCoy. Well, that would be satisfactory.

Admiral KIMMEL. When I took over command of the fleet—

Admiral STANDLEY. What date?

Admiral KIMMEL. On February 1, 1941. (Continuing:) Admiral Richardson had placed in operation an operating schedule whereby one-half the fleet went to sea and the other half of the fleet remained in port, and the half that were in port would sortie, and then the other half would come in.

I continued that for something like a month after I took command. It was too strenuous an operating schedule, and we had no opportunity to have upkeep on our ships, to keep up—overhaul the engines and machinery and perform necessary work to keep them going. We had a situation where some of the type commanders would never see a unit of his command at all. I modified that and divided the fleet: instead of two task forces or two operating forces, I divided them into three task forces. At the same time that I divided them into the three task forces I prescribed a mission, a specialized mission for each one, in addition to the general mission of all naval units. I presented that, I think, the other day. We then had one task force

at sea all the time, sometimes two, so I would say [691] that they were at sea about 40% of the time and in port about 60% of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, any one ship would be so?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were times when the light force were kept out 60% of the time and in port 40% of the time, but I had to take very drastic steps to relieve the pressure on the light forces in order to be sure that we could keep them going.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that would mean, then, as I think you explained the other day, that sometimes but a third of the fleet would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And sometimes two-thirds would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. And this particular occasion happened to be a time when two-thirds were in?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

General McCoy. And that was on the normal operating schedule?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You can examine those. We have them all, from way back.

General McCoy. Well, I think the statement of the Admiral—

The CHAIRMAN. This is an approximately correct statement, isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you the details, of course, but I don't think it would be profitable.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we need them.

General McCoy. This is sufficient, I think.

[692] Admiral THEOBALD. You can add this: that about every first time the force went out for ten days, nine to ten days, and about
(See following page.)

every second time the force went out nothing whatever stayed at this
(See following page.)

end, and we had five days of combined tactical—of minor strategy between the forces out. So that about every second time the force went out it got about a time and a half at sea over and above its 33 1/3% at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Sort of staggered the thing.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection it might be well to state that during all the time I was in command I made it a practice to invite the Army to take part in the exercises which we were planning, and on a great many occasions they did take part, particularly the air. On other occasions the Army requested that we hold certain maneuvers for them and come in and do this and that, and we tried to meet their wishes to the best of our ability, and I want to say that I think the Army cooperated, and I certainly tried to cooperate, better than any other place that I have ever served. We did try to get together. A whole lot of this stuff is, we lack experience.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day—

Admiral KIMMEL. Will you cut that out? That's all right. I don't—that last saying I would rather not say.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day I asked him what special measures of security for the fleet he took when the fleet was in the harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes?

General McCoy. That is, his responsibility was primarily for the protection of the fleet when it was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And it was brought out that he didn't know when the fleet was in the harbor and that on this occasion

[692 Corrected A] On page 692, line 2, delete the word "first."

On page 692, line 3, after the word "out" delete the words "nothing whatever stayed at this end" and insert the words, "About every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out."

On page 692, line 15 from the bottom, delete the sentence, "A whole lot of the staff is we lack experience."

On page 692, lines 13, 12, 11, and 10 from the bottom, delete the following:

"General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day—

"Admiral KIMMEL. Will you cut that out? That's all right. I don't—that last saying I would rather not say."

[693] when two-thirds of the fleet were in the harbor he had taken no special precautions for the protection of the fleet, even after the war warning.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say something off the record, sir? I don't want this to go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel made a statement off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me put a question that I think you will answer: Any citizen of Hawaii who had a motor car could find out how much of the fleet was in harbor at any given moment, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All he had to do was drive around the harbor on the road.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he could count them, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And we objected to that very much. There was nothing we could do about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't do anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was nothing we could do about it; we knew that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask, however, following, General (addressing General McCoy), that question: You have previously stated that the movements of the fleet were known to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And were furnished him, all movements of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were in his operating room?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether or not that information was disseminated to the forces in this area, Army and Navy [694] alike?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commandant of the District would know that, wouldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. He would know that, sir. I couldn't—I don't know what—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know that there was a port control office or some such thing in which there was an Army liaison officer, don't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That port control office had a record of every ship that came in or out of this harbor, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, as far as I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you remember there is a port control office down there? The artillery—

General McCoy. And the artillery commander was conscious of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the artillery.

General McCoy. What I was trying to bring out is that there were no dispositions taken by the Army, change in their normal peacetime procedure, when the fleet was in the harbor or at any time after this war warning—

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. — either by the Army or by the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose that in peacetime it wasn't necessary to take any, and I don't know what you could have any more if there were six ships in here or if there were fifteen; the procedure would be just the same to protect that target, I should think, no matter how many or how few boats were in there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say in that connection that one of our concerns—one of my concerns was a system of recognition signals that the Army would understand, and we find that—

Admiral STANDLEY. Air or ships? Air recognition or ships?

[695] Admiral KIMMEL. Ship recognition. We never got anything—well, leave that aside. Ship recognition signal. And we finally got that, never entirely satisfactory, as it never will be, but fairly well ironed out.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask you this, Admiral: I would like to have you expand a little bit on this. You have spoken of this question of overhaul periods. I would like to have you expand on that a little bit for the benefit of the Commission.

I know the story, but—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like you to get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of our ships can continue operating indefinitely without a chance to overhaul their machinery. Our object was to bring the fleet into the war in tiptop operating condition. We didn't want to have them run down at the beginning of the war. We had an extensive program of alterations. These alterations included

the installation of anti-aircraft guns, the installation of radar, the installation of protection, shields around a gun. What do you call them?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Splinter protection.

Admiral KIMMEL. Splinter protection. I couldn't get the word. Splinter protection around the guns. And can you think of anything else?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Those were the main. We were in general incorporating lessons of the war that were being supplied us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but those were specific items. I was trying to get specific items.

Admiral STANDLEY. How about the degaussing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. Degaussing. That was a big item. I knew there was something else. Degaussing. Now, each [696] one of those items required considerable work on a ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Each one of these required work on a ship, and during the periods that they were in port we gave what we call restricted availability at the Navy Yard for as many ships as they could handle and for which material was available to install these items.

Now, the degaussing, incidentally, is a very big job. It is a protection against magnetic mines, and a great deal of that was done right here in this yard on a great many ships.

Oh, yes; there is a listening gear to be put into the smaller type ships, and there was the installation of Y guns which throw depth charges. I know there were a great many other items, and if I had time I could probably get a great many, but I think you have got the general idea now. And by making these ships available during a week or ten days in here we were able to accomplish a great deal in the installation—we wouldn't have had any radar in any of our ships if we had not done that. That was one of the big things. Most of it was installed right here in this yard, some of it on ships which were undergoing overhaul on the coast.

[697] And not only did we prepare for installing the Radar which had been received and the guns which had been received, but we provided the structural work and the wires in the ships, ready to put the Radar or the new guns in the places as soon as they were received in the shortest possible time.

Does that answer your question?

Admiral STANDLEY. I want to develop this question. Was the ship's force engaged in this work in port?

Admiral KIMMEL. The ship's force was engaged in this work in port to the limit of their capacity. Tenders were engaged in this work in port, and the Navy Yard was engaged in this work in port, in addition to the machinery, the permanent installations on the ships, the main motored machinery, and the power, and all working parts for the guns. (See following page.)

One of these ships is a mass of machinery. It is a mass of machinery, and this machinery requires constant overhauling just to keep it in tip-top operating condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, over and above any new overhauling?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above any new alternations.

Admiral STANDLEY. And over and above your annual overhauling period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above the annual overhaul period,
(See following page.)

which takes about 21 to 24 months between the overhaul.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean the Navy Yard overhaul?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. An extensive overhaul.

Admiral KIMMEL. An extensive overhaul. This has been constantly in my mind to keep the ships available, to be able to do something when war came and to be sure that they did not run down.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you adopted a policy of preventing breakdowns rather than run the risk of breakdowns?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[697 Corrected A] On page 697, line 13, delete the word "motored" and insert the word "motive."

On page 697, line 12 from the bottom, delete the words, "annual overhaul period, which takes about 21 to 24 months between the overhaul" and insert the words, "extended overhaul period which occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months."

[698] Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, to avoid having anything wrong with the battleship at sea, you attempted to discover it during the overhaul period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. We had a conversation the other night with Admiral Reeves about the trip of the *Oregon* to Santiago in the Spanish-American War. You are familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And he stated that the *Oregon* progressively became better as they got to Santiago. The machinery was in better operating condition when they got to Florida than when they started.

Now, why was that the case in the *Oregon* when our present ships seem to be so delicate and lack the long-range operations in wartime, when in 1898 the *Oregon* was able to proceed to Santiago and be in better condition than when it left, without any Navy Yard for repairs except for such repairs as they were able to make en route?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the ships of today are much more reliable than the *Oregon* was. In the midst of all this we were convoying, escorting merchant ships from here to Manila and back. We were escorting merchant ships directly across by way of Torres Strait. We had, so far as I can recall at the present time, no breakdowns among those cruisers that they had working, and there were a large number of them, a considerable number of them which made that round trip.

The *Oregon* trip took about two months, I believe, to get to the Battle of Santiago from the time she started until the Battle of Santiago.

General McCoy. I do not think it was that long; was it?

Admiral STANDLEY. It may have been, yes.

Let me answer that question, if I may. The *Oregon* was a brand new ship, just put in commission; and when you put a new ship in commission, it is just like a new automobile. The [699] bearings have to be worn down, the gear has to be tested out, and naturally when it got there it was in better shape than when it started.

Admiral THEOBALD. There is no ship in this fleet which cannot do today what the *Oregon* did, and we can send a ship from here to the East Coast, or to New York, and we will bring them back without any difficulty; that may go along for a year, but at the end of that time you are bound to get your breakdowns. You have to keep them up all the time because you do not know when war is coming.

General McCoy. Under war conditions you could take the fleet over to Singapore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And you could take it from here in case the Panama Canal were blockaded, around South America, and deliver it in the Caribbean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as long as you had fuel. That is the only thing you would have to supply.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have repair crews right on the fleet, right along with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

May I point out at this point that the state of tension with Japan has continued since 1937. It certainly has been active for the past two years. I seem to recall in 1937 that we had quite a scare on the West Coast, particularly against submarines.

Admiral Hepburn was in command of the fleet at that time, and he established a patrol of patrol planes, and he ran it for about a month or six weeks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Here or on the Coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the Coast. At the end of that time his patrol planes were just about worn out, and he had to stop it because he could not keep it up.

That is my recollection now. I am not sure of all the [700] details because I was not there at the time in the fleet, but that is what I have been told.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can testify to that because I was a battle captain in the fleet. (See following page.)

They started in November, and not having a prohibited area, we took some of the sabotage measures that were mentioned. We had some small boats or ships around, and it started in November and lasted until February.

Admiral Hepburn had a patrol about two hundred miles of a search, searching mainly for submarines. He did not have sufficient BP's to run long-range scouts, but scouted only against submarines, on about a 400-mile trip.

At the end of three months, with the losses in life and losses in planes and the breakdown in planes from the scouting operations, it was necessary to stop it sometime in February.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this: The British have run their ships through force of necessity, and the ones which have arrived in our yards were badly run down, in a run-down condition, and that after less than two years of the war.

That is the situation in regard to these planes on the Coast.

Admiral STANDLEY. How would you expect to do that in war conditions, having out planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Only by taking battle crews for each plane and by having new planes come in very rapidly.

(See following page.)

General McNARNEY. To get back to the carriers, Admiral, is it considered by the Navy that the carrier is primarily a defense weapon, or is it an offensive weapon?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

General McNARNEY. Is it primarily used for defense or offense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say it is for offense, sir. You said primarily?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

[700 Corrected A] On page 700, line 4, delete the word "battle" and insert the word "battleship."

On page 700, line 11 from the bottom, delete the words, "Only by taking battle crews for each plane and by having new planes come in very rapidly," and insert the words, "Only by having double crews for each plane and by having new planes coming in very rapidly."

[701] Admiral KIMMEL. We have got to use it for the defense of the battle line gainst air attack. You must have some fighter planes there, but I think the primary mission of the carrier should be offensive.

General McNARNEY. That is just the point I was trying to establish.

General McCoy. You made a casual remark the other day in connection with these patrol planes, that they did not have the new type of gas tanks on them. Is that a fact now?

Admiral KIMMEL. That the airplanes do not have the new war type gas tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are speaking of the leakproof tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. When they fly here from the Coast they do not carry the armor and the leakproof gas tanks on account of the weight. It is a long trip, and this armor and the leakproof gas tanks have to be installed after they arrive here. It cuts down, of course, the radius of operation and action of the planes. That also has been a matter of concern, and it may be that we will finally find that we not have these leakproof gas tanks or the armor because we cannot get the radius when we have them.

General McCoy. How much would the armor and the new tank cut down the radius? Would it be as much as a third?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is considerable. I would say at least 15 or 20%, but that would vary with the different types of planes.

General McCoy. I understand that you are putting them in here now?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we put them in some of the ships.

Admiral THEOBALD. I was on duty over at Kaneohe Bay and they are putting them in now.

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet personally base in

(See following page.)

[701 Corrected A] On page 701, last line, delete the word "personally" and insert the word "permanently."

[702] Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet permanently base in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand you, sir. You mean, when did they first come to this area?

Admiral STANDLEY. No, but when did they begin to base here continuously?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they began to base in Pearl Harbor continuously when they arrived in this area April a year ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. April a year ago?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. They based in Pearl Harbor. Now, they anchored out for exercise periods, and what not, up until about the first of last January, and about the first of last January they decided they could not anchor in the outlying ports any more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has the basing of the fleet continually here added or caused or brought about an increase in the facilities of the overhaul and repair and docking of the fleet at this port?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is unquestionably true, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know the extent to which that has been carried on while you have been here? Do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think you could get that more accurately from Admiral Bloch, but roughly speaking they had about 1,800 employees here in the Navy Yard when Admiral Bloch first arrived. He has something on the order of 8,000 now. I think that is an indication.

I know a great many repair facilities have been added, machine shops, sheet-metal shops, and they have practically added a new dock over here which will dock any ship in the Navy.

Is that what you wanted?

[703] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, that is what I wanted.

Admiral, you took command of the fleet in February, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, the first of February.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your assignment prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which included new 10,000-ton light cruisers with three divisions: two of the new 10,000-ton light cruisers and one of the old 7,500-tons—one division of over 7,500 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you prior to being detailed to the command of Commander-in-Chief made any efforts to get command of the fleet or used any influence to get the command of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. None whatever, sir. I would say the only influence I used to become commander of the fleet was to do my job the best I could. I never wrote anybody in connection with it and I never asked anybody anything about it.

When I was informed that I was to be Commander-in-Chief, I had been out playing golf on a Sunday afternoon. I came back to the dock and the first officer from my staff met me and told me that I was to report to the fleet flagship, that they had a communication for me to see. Captain Delaney was with me. He was then my chief of staff.

I went to the flagship and they showed me the message.

Captain Delaney at that time said to me that he had seen me under trying conditions, many trying conditions, and he thought I was going to faint when I read that message.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was your first information of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the first information that I had that I was to be Commander-in-Chief. I would be less than honest if I did not say that I had knowledge that Admiral Richardson, then

Commander-in-Chief, had indicated that he thought highly of me, and also the Chief of Naval Operations, with whom I had served, Admiral Stark, who also thought highly of me.

[704] However, nobody had said anything about my being Commander-in-Chief except to say, "Some day you will be Commander-in-Chief," and that kind of talk from various people.

It came as a complete surprise to me, and I thought that if I ever became Commander-in-Chief it would be much later in time than when I did get it.

Admiral STANDLEY. As Commander-in-Chief, the effectiveness and the efficiency of your fleet depends, to a large extent, upon the morale of the personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you, as Commander-in-Chief, would be very much concerned with the morale of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would, sir; yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you would also be concerned with the conduct of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, every one.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were at a party on that Saturday night before December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. On December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was that party?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it a large party?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Leary gave the party. There were about a dozen people there, as I recall it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there other parties there largely attended by Naval personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the only one I saw.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in uniform?

[705] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any Naval officers in uniform?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your personal knowledge, what was the conduct of the officers and the men of the fleet here in Pearl Harbor generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had some unfortunate incidents, none of them very serious. I considered the conduct of the officers and the men in this area from the time I took command—and when I knew all about it—as of the highest order. I think they obtained and deserved respect and admiration of the people in Honolulu.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the overhaul work that was being done here, were the officers required to supervise and inspect and oversee the work done?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not only by the Yard but by their own personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any special orders to the personnel of the fleet as a result of the war warning as to the percentages that could be absent from duty, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know how many captains of ships were aboard the ships in command at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified to that, I think, previously.

General McCoy. You spoke about it in a general way, I believe.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can find out. I think there were five. I can give you five of them. I can give you five for the record.

(See following page.)

General McCoy. How many were killed on duty of the commanding officers?

Admiral THEOBALD. Bennion was one.

[705 *Corrected A*] On page 705, line 6 from the bottom, after the word "out." delete the words "I think there were five. I can give you five of them. I can give you five for the record." and insert the words, "I think there were five battleship captains—I can get you a list of them for the record."

[706] General McCoy. There were two captains?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Bennion and Van Valkenburg.

General McCoy. Were any of the captains of the battleships wounded?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I know of.

General McCoy. I am conscious of the death of Vice Admiral Kidd. What was his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was in the Arizona, sir. He had Batdiv 1.

General McCoy. He was on the ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. He was killed on duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I may say that Admiral Calhoun was aboard and Admiral Furlong was aboard.

General McCoy. I would like to have furnished for the record a list of the captains present for duty at the time of the attack and those absent, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did we ask you for the percentages of the personnel on board ship? Did we ask you that on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave that in my testimony, sir, and we had it in considerable detail. I am not sure whether the captains on board would be in that.

General McCoy. Has the Department asked for it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. I noticed in your report to the Navy Department—which was furnished us—that it was of recent date. What date was that, if you recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. 21 December, sir.

General McCoy. Was that the first report you made to the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made telegraphic reports in which I included the essential factors of it and I made damage reports and I made casualty reports.

[707] When the Secretary was here I gave him everything we had on the subject, and he took it back to the Navy Department with him.

It will be some time before a complete report of this can be drawn up. I was relieved as Commander-in-Chief on the 17th of December, and since then I have not run the office of Commander-in-Chief.

I did urge them to get some kind of report to submit to this Board. I signed that report in order to get it through. Technically, I suppose I had no business signing a report. It should have been signed by the Commander-in-Chief, but it was forwarded by him.

General McCoy. That is the report in question, which we have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you state for the Commission, Admiral, the procedure in the Navy, on Naval ships, in regard to the granting of liberty to the men, the number required on board, and the condition and state of armament, and the personnel in connection with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There must be at all times in port on board at least 50% of the enlisted men and 25% of the officers. I gave an order which was issued that there must be on board a sufficient number of men and officers in each watch to man all anti-aircraft batteries, and they must be men who are trained for the job.

That was one of the first orders that I issued after I became Commander-in-Chief, to make sure that they would always have on board a sufficient number of trained personnel to handle the batteries.

In this port there always had to be on deck a head of the department, (See following page.)

a representative of each one of the departments in the ship, required to be on board and ready to do whatever was necessary. They should have on board a sufficient number

[707 *Corrected A*] On page 707, line 4 from the bottom, delete the word "deck" and insert the word "board."

[708] of men to get away, to go to sea, to fight the ship. They must reach a state of efficiency at sea, depending on the number of men they had.

In this particular port we grant liberty from the afternoon until before midnight, when they were all supposed to be back on the ship. I am talking about enlisted men now.

In general, the officers lived on board ship. I had only a few of them who lived ashore in this port, the ones who had their families here, and they were relatively few. Some of the senior officers had their families here, more so than the junior officers because they had more money.

I think I stated previously that we had on board at the time of the attack at least 80% of the men, and probably over 90, and 60 to 75% of the officers. Now, that was by virtue of the fact that we were here at this time in this area, but that was the way it was all the time.

Is that what you wanted?

General McCoy. What was your flagship?

Admiral KIMMEL. My flagship was the Pennsylvania.

General McCoy. Where was the Pennsylvania at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Pennsylvania was in dry dock at the time.

General McCoy. And you were living in your quarters ashore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was living in my quarters ashore.

General McCoy. You had your headquarters established ashore?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had headquarters established ashore. I would like to tell you about that.

General McCoy. Was that normal when the first fleet was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to explain that so that there will not be any misunderstanding about it.

When I knew I was to take command of the fleet, which I [709] knew about three weeks before I was to take command, I immediately started out to find out many things that I did not know about; and among others the one that I was most keenly interested in was the question of war plans or what you are going to do with the fleet, or what the plans of the high command were with respect to the fleet.

I found in the flagship at that time only one commander and one lieutenant who were concerning themselves primarily with war plans.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was no general staff, as we understand it, in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am talking about the war plans section of the Commander-in-Chief's staff. Everybody on the staff has to contribute something to the war plans.

I said to Admiral Richardson, the then commander, that I had thought that his number of officers detailed for war plans was entirely inadequate and that I did not see how the work could be done. I did not see how the work required to be done in that particular section could be done by those two men. He agreed with me.

He said he had no more room on the ship to put the people.

I said, "Suppose I put them in some other ship?" I thought that would be very satisfactory. I consulted with him on this for a

(See following page.)

considerable time, and he said, "Something has to be done."

I said, "How about getting quarters ashore at least for the war plans staff?" and he said, "If you stay on ship and they are ashore, you will find that you won't get along very well; you can't split up your staff. If you do, you do not get the work done."

Shortly after that I came to the conclusion that we had to have more people on the staff of the war plans, and I asked for two additional captains to be detailed. Those were Captains McMorris and McCormack.

[709 Corrected A] On page 709, line 12 from the bottom, after the word "would" insert the word "not."

[710] I arranged to put them in a place over here ashore where they could spread out in their work and put their charts out and such on the day I took command and to have the equipment and the supplies over here.

I asked the Commandant to prepare the third floor of this place, which was unfinished at the time, and I got the officers' quarters also for the occupation of the staff. I said I did not know whether I was coming ashore or not, but I wanted to be able to do so.

I operated that for about six weeks, and found that this division (See following page.)

of the staff—and incidentally there were other people coming to the staff such as Naval Intelligence people, which we were unable to accommodate on the Pennsylvania—and from time to time when matters of secrecy would come up, I would have to come into port, and I therefore found that that interfered with the training on the Pennsylvania.

I finally decided that I could more efficiently run the fleet by establishing an office ashore, more so than I could by remaining on the ship.

That was a drastic step. I knew I would be criticized by some people. I consulted various people on the subject as to the way to solve this problem. Be that as it may, the result was that after about six weeks of operations, I came ashore with my staff and established them here at the Submarine Base.

Of course, I informed the Navy Department of everything I was doing. I arranged it so that my operating staff and the operating files could be put on board the Pennsylvania in a matter of a couple of hours and we could leave port.

I tried to go to sea for the tactical exercises that were held, the maneuvers; and I generally succeeded in getting to sea during these tactical exercises, maneuvers, because I did not want to get out of touch with the sea-going end of it. The Pennsylvania up to the time of the attack was available for me to go aboard at any time.

[710 *Corrected A*] On page 710, line 10, after the word "that" insert the word "Way."

[711] I found that I could accomplish my job very much better by having my staff ashore in quarters where they could work. I think that the progress we made in training the fleet was very largely due to the fact that my staff were ashore and available to the various forces, top commanders for consultation, and that they were there during all this period.

I think that among the senior officers who understood the situation out here, that there was a general approval of the action that I had taken when they saw the results that were produced by it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity at that time? You were acting in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Weren't you Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and also—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And as such you were responsible for the plans which the United States Fleet would use in case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I was not responsible for the plans that the United States Fleet would use in war; I was responsible for the plans the Pacific Fleet would use in war, but I was also responsible for the tactical doctrines and orders that all fleets would use in the organization and prosecution of the war. Perhaps I should not say organization, but in the organization of the task forces.

You know what the doctrines and tactical orders are.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, of course, but I am just trying to get the information for the Commission.

You as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and [712] as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you had a dual responsibility with regard to each of these?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, I have one other question. Do you recall at one time that we had an independent flagship that had the single purpose of being the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What ship was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the old——

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. A merchant ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not a combat ship. The Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It had another name. I think it was the Columbia.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was the Columbia and was changed to the Great Northern.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you recall who the first Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was who hoisted his flag on that ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Koonce.

(See following page.)

Admiral STANDLEY. No, not Koonce. Koonce never had it. He (See following page.)

went to the Seattle.

But it was the established policy because there was not enough space on board any combat ship to take care of the staff of the United States Fleet Commander, that they used that ship.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. I might say there, too, just for the record, that in studies before the war, with respect to a war in the Pacific, that there were a

[712 *Corrected A*] On page 712, lines 9 and 10 from the bottom, delete the word "Koonce" and insert the word "Coontz."

[713] number of people who had come to the conclusion years ago that the proper place for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific was here at Pearl Harbor. Of course, I knew all that. I might add further that the Navy Department was fully informed of what I had done. I announced it at the Secretary's council in Washington in June, and besides I might say that I mean that they all knew it, as I had made representations to the Navy Department for quarters, stating that the quarters in which my staff was housed out here were not adequate and suitable, and they have appropriated or allocated the money for the construction of proper headquarters for the chief of staff out here, and they have broken ground over there for (See following page.) that place.

General McCoy. For the purpose of the record I would like to have you state your age at the time you took command of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was born February 26, 1882, and I was just under 59 years of age when I took command of the fleet.

General McCoy. Could you state offhand the number of officers in your command over whom you were jumped when you were made Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. In my command?

General McCoy. Yes, in your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have to think about it.

General McCoy. Well, off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I can get that for you.

The CHAIRMAN. You can get that from the Naval records.

General McCoy. I think it is pertinent to what might be done to this record to show the whole story.

The CHAIRMAN. Get that information for us, if you will.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. In connection with the description of your staff and its functions ashore, do you know what liaison your staff had with the Army staff? I mean, not through the

[713 Corrected A] On page 713, line 11, delete the words "Chief of Staff" and insert the words "Commander-in-Chief and his Staff."

[714] District but directly. That is, so far as your operations in the War Plans Staff are concerned, did they have direct liaison with the Army staff of General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. In a great many matters we did consult with them freely about many things.

General McCoy. Was there a joint plan of your staff and the Army staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There was between Admiral Bloch and the Army staff, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A joint defense plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but my staff interested themselves in a great many matters and matters that were not directly my responsibility, but we were urging the people to do things.

I know that shortly before this attack took place Captain Delaney, the operations officer of my staff, was urging the District to perfect our Radar communications circuits. Whenever we found anything that could be remedied, we consulted freely with the Army and more particularly with the District about the steps which should be taken. A lot of that was verbal, and a great deal of it was very effective. There are no written records of these things.

General McCoy. Admiral, General Short in his testimony before us stated that between the 27th of November and the 7th of December that there had been personal conferences between you and him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And there was one of these conferences in which General Short, in answer to our questions about this war warning dispatch and so forth, stated that he felt sure that you must have shown it to him, but he did not remember, but he stated that he had in a talk with you asked your opinion about the imminence or the proba-

bility of an air [715] attack, and that you referred to a particular Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And that McMorris had replied—Do you remember that?

The CHAIRMAN. "Admiral, there is no problem."

General McCoy. Do you remember that conversation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall it, but I presume that it took place.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate it evidenced your personal state of mind at that time that you thought there was no probability of an air raid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I have stated that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, can you give us a résumé of your service, staff, education, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have been Commander-in-Chief since the first of last February, as you know. Prior to that I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which job I held for about 18 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Comprising what battle force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Comprising three divisions: two of 10,000 tons and one division of 7,500 tons. Prior to that I was in command of a division of heavy cruisers, scouting force, which command I held for about a year. During that time I made a good-will cruise around South America, and I visited Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Calalo.

Prior to that time I was budget officer of the Navy Department for three years. Before that I was chief of staff for the Commander, Battleships Force; and then prior to that I was commanding officer of a battleship. Prior to that I was a director of ship movements in the office of the Director of Naval Operations. The cruise before that

(See following page.)

I was in command of a squadron of destroyers of battle force. Before that I was on duty in the policy and liaison section of the office of

[715 corrected A] On page 715, line 4 from the bottom, delete second "director" and insert "chief."

[716] the Chief of Naval Operations. Prior to that I took a year's course at the Naval War College.

General McNARNEY. What year was that, may I ask?

Admiral KIMMEL. 1925-1926.

Before that, I went to the War College, I commanded a division

(See following page.)

of destroyers, Asiatic Station. Before that time I was production officer at the Naval Gun Factory, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C. Before that I was executive officer of a battleship. Just prior to that I was on the staff of Admiral Rodman in the North Sea during the war.

Do you want me to go any further?

General McNARNEY. No.

General McCoy. I notice that you had no duty with the Air Forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I am not an air man, although I have taken a very keen interest in air missions.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did you graduate from Annapolis?

Admiral KIMMEL. In 1904, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since this attack on December 7, Admiral, I presume that you have heard gossip and reports to the effect that some of your personnel were not fit for duty due to drink.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been such reports.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard of that.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say about that matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. If that is a fact, I would be very much surprised and disappointed.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no knowledge of any such thing. I saw none and I saw no one who was in any such condition as that.

Admiral THEOBALD. Let me say that no liquor is allowed [716 *Corrected A*] On page 716, line 5, delete the word "that" and the comma following.

[717] on board ship, and if the attack occurred at 7:50 in the morning, very few people would have had any liquor in their system, and if they had been incapacitated for duty, they are normally excused on Sunday; so it is inconceivable that anybody on duty at the time of the attack was under the influence of liquor.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have something similar to the Provost Marshal which is in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. A shore patrol, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any report from them as to the conditions on shore on that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have seen none, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And who is the officer who was responsible for that report?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the senior patrol officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who that would be?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can find out.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us know who he was. We may want to examine him on that point.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a complete surprise to me.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of gossip in the newspapers in the States to the effect that both the Army and the Navy had a lot of shore leave and a lot of drinking and that some in the high command were not fit for duty on the morning in question. You heard of no such thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have come to your notice if there had been such a thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a man by the name of Wayne Fluger?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a party at his house the night before December 7, that you know of?

[718] Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a Japanese named Otani, a fish merchant?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about a party at his place in which Naval men were in attendance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I never heard of this second man.

Admiral THEOBALD. Admiral Fletcher is quite familiar with Wayne Fluger. (See following page.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Fletcher was at sea.

This is an amazing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you might have heard about it, because the Commission has had communications from some organization in the States making such allegations.

Admiral STANLEY. The same organization; wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBALD. It just staggers me to think of it. It is inconceivable.

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time I have been in Honolulu, which has been ever since the fleet first came out here, my observation leads me to the conclusion that there has been very little drunkenness among the officers and men of this fleet. We have dealt very seriously with the incidents which were reported by the patrol, and they have been isolated instances. I do not mean that the men have not taken a drink or that the officers have not taken a drink, but that drunkenness was something which we would not tolerate; and there was very little of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. May I say something along that line, because I think I can testify to something here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I spent a great many Saturday nights in public places dancing, such as the Royal Hawaiian, and the night before this attack I was dancing from 8 to 12 at the Pacific Club. A large number of Army and Navy officers frequent those places, and I recognized most of the Navy officers,

[718 *Corrected A*] On page 718, line 8, delete the word "familiar" and insert the word "friendly."

[719] and it would be my duty to send anyone back who was not in a proper condition. I have never seen any such instances where I have recognized the people. I have seen officers who had a drink. I take a drink myself. But I am staggered at the thought that drinking was in any way a contributing factor to what happened on the morning of the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the first information that I have had of any such thing, and I am astounded.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that the patrol officer would know of how many cases of discipline there were that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And also there would be a report of acts of officers which led to inquiry or court martial?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On that same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get those reports.

I presume there were a great many sailors ashore that night, since you customarily grant leave on Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that pay day in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not think so.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, it was right after the 5th. It was right after the 5th, and the 5th is pay day.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men on leave spend more money getting tight right after pay day, I understand?

Admiral THEOBALD. That would be on the 5th, which was pay day.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection, sir, I do not know, but it is a fact that since we put in commission this new recreation center for the Navy that the large number of men who formerly went to Honolulu do not get any farther than the [720] Navy recreation center, where they see movies and bowl in the bowling alleys, and they sell beer there, nothing more intoxicating than beer, and they stay there and eat their lunches and drink a bottle of beer, and they have their entertainment there at that recreation center, which is just outside—

The CHAIRMAN. I know where it is.

General MCCOY. Who operates that?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General MCCOY. Who operates that center?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy, but there is also a commissioned officer on duty there during all the time there is anyone there.

General MCCOY. Is there a hostess there also?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that that recreation center has helped the morale and the habits of the men?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, very definitely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I would like to say something else. I left my house at 10 minutes before 8 in the morning, and I was at the dock about a quarter to 9 when the thing was still going on. There were a large number of officers on the dock. I did not see one single officer on the dock who was not carrying himself in a perfectly proper manner, and there was no evidence of any officer carrying a hangover from the night before, and I must have seen 150 officers there waiting to get to their ships.

Admiral KIMMEL. I saw many officers that day, and I did not see any officer that I had the slightest suspicion of.

The CHAIRMAN. That you had the slightest suspicion of that he was not capable of—

Admiral KIMMEL. That he was not fully capable of performing his duties.

Now, with respect to this report, there may be some difficulty, because it goes to the type commanders, and there [721] were eight of them, so there may be some delay in getting it.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Does the patrol officer make a report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, the patrol officer makes a report, but you get it quicker than from the people at sea. It may be a little hard to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. The patrol officer is under Admiral Bloch, I suppose?

Admiral KIMMEL. The patrol officer is under the fleet run by the Commander, Base Force, Admiral Calhoun.

The CHAIRMAN. We can find out what action was taken by the Fleet Commander in that report.

It may be better to have the facts, because I do not want to leave any holes open.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the things you and General Short discussed from November 27 to December 7 were principally the relief of the forces on the outlying islands of Midway and Wake, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was some thought then that the Army might relieve the Marines out there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; yes, sir, I think that is correct.

[722] The CHAIRMAN. And, as I understand it, reference to this war warning was merely reference to it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because neither you nor General Short took it as a warning that there would be a raid on Pearl Harbor rather than an aggressive move in the neighborhood of the Philippines or in the Far East?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir. And the Department by their despatches evidenced considerable concern about the security of their outlying bases.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and I think anyone who reads those telegrams will see that the Naval Intelligence indicated aggressive movements many thousand miles from Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient to you, Admiral, I think we shall adjourn now, as we are going to go and look at these plots in a few minutes, and I think we shall adjourn until two o'clock, sir, if that is entirely convenient to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. You want me to be here again?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there may be a few supplementary questions we shall want to ask you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I think this is maybe the time to suggest; you have already Captain DeLany; you are going to have him over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, I would suggest you call—of course Admiral Bloch will be before the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We thought of calling him next.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; and then there is Admiral Pye.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

[723] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Brown, Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Calhoun, and of course anybody else that you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think, McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I want to call Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is in that planning division?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This just occurred to me, Admiral: I have learned that after the attack there were two Navy officers through the balance of the day up in the radar control room. Was that by your instruction? That is after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think they were sent up there by Admiral Bellinger, wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBOLD. I think compatwing 2, Admiral Bellinger. Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we want to call Admiral Bellinger.

Admiral KIMMEL. I guess you want Admiral Bellinger. I forgot him. Admiral Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well. I think we shall suspend until two o'clock, then, gentlemen.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I think we shall suspend; until two o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I might add one thing here, sir, that just occurs to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In connection with the size of the staff. After the attack took place and Admiral Pye's flagship, the California, was untenable, he came ashore and reported to me with all of his staff; and since that attack his staff, which is a very large one—the commander battle force—and mine have been constantly occupied with the work of running the fleet. Now, to be sure, during this particular period there were an [724] enormous number of things to be done. I think they have done a very fine job, but it indicates very clearly that our previous estimates of what we would require in the Commander-in-Chief's staff are very far short of what we really—

The CHAIRMAN. Of what you needed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of what we do need.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we shall recess until two o'clock, and it may be we shall have no questions or very few questions for you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we are always thinking of something else that we have to cover.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I am always available, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Well, we shall not hesitate to call you back if there is anything we think of, but you might report at two o'clock in any event.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

[725]

AFTERNOON RECESS

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S. NAVY—

Resumed

Admiral STANDLEY. May we go ahead?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in connection with your position here and duties and responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, what plans, if any, did you have, and what was your responsibility, for the defense of Midway and Wake Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the direct administration in command of Midway and Wake under the Commandant 14th Naval District, and of course I was responsible for everything that he did. I was responsible for the defense of Wake and for the defense of Midway, and for putting Marines and guns and all other defensive weapons out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Originally, as you know, or whether you know it or not, Wake and Midway were developed commercially.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Navy had nothing to do with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were developed during the existence of treaties which prohibited our putting any defense on the islands in that area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When was the policy to put armaments on them and make them into offensive and defensive posts and military posts: When was that change made, if you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was at the time of the Hepburn report, the Hepburn Board. Hepburn was the senior member of the Board in the Navy Department, and Marquart was a member of [726] the Board.

Admiral STANDLEY. And Greenslade was on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know whether Greenslade was on it.

Admiral STANDLEY. At any rate, it was known as the Hepburn Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was about three years ago. No, it was longer than that, I guess.

General MCCOY. When I retired in the autumn of 1938, it was just about the time the Hepburn report was submitted to Congress.

Admiral KIMMEL. When was that?

General MCCOY. In the autumn of 1938 when I retired.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, about three years ago, I should say, that the Board recommended the development of Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and I think also Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sitka.

They started then to get together defense battalions of Marines out there, stationed on these islands for the defense of the islands.

When the situation became tense or became what we might call tense, these Marine battalions were brought out here. We had these Marine defense battalions here long before it was possible or advisable to put them on the islands because the minute you put Marines on the islands you have the supply problem on your hands, and we had to reduce the number of workmen there.

I cannot give you the exact dates—I can find them—but my recollection now is that there were no Marines on any of the islands when I took command; that we sent a few Marines to Midway, to Johnston, and to Palmyra before we sent them to Wake, and the Navy Department urged us to do that. We could not send as many as we wanted to send in the beginning on account of the lack of facilities for supplying them, particularly food and water.

[727] Admiral STANDLEY. Then this was the policy and the plans which resulted in the development in the Department itself and not out here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it dates back to the Hepburn report. It dates back to the Hepburn report, and they began to prepare these defense battalions, oh, some time ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it your belief that in case the fleet had to move or in case of hostilities that the Marines would be able to defend those islands without the help of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was felt that the Marines on those islands would put up a very good defense, and that it would require a considerable effort on the part of Japan to capture the islands. We had hopes that Midway might do pretty well. In Wake there was a considerable difference of opinion about whether it was advisable to put guns and Marines on Wake, and I thought a long time about it and finally decided that I would recommend that we put guns and the Marines on Wake, because we felt that an expedition to Wake, to attack it, would force the Japanese to expose some of their fleet, which we hoped we would be able to get there to and catch. On the other

(See following page.)

hand, having Wake would permit a considerable coverage of the fleet as long as we held it in any advance to the westward that we found it expedient to make in any forays.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, Wake and Midway were part of a plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Wake and Midway were part of a plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which involved the movement of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has there been any—

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[727 *Corrected A*] On page 727, line 14 from the bottom, before the word "catch" delete the word "and."

[728] Admiral KIMMEL. The size of the fleet to be kept out here was a very vital factor in whether or not we should have Midway and Wake. As a matter of fact, the Hepburn Board did not contemplate war in two oceans. The policy in regard to the islands was very much the same even after we had withdrawn something like 25% of the force that we originally had out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the time of your release here after December
(See following page.)

7, Admiral, was there any effort to relieve the garrison at Wake or Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. I answered a question similar to that the other day with the request that you question my successor on the subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. After December 7 was my question.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not want to answer that, but I will since you press me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you rather that this answer not go on the record?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer it, and then you can put it in the record or not as you please.

I approved a plan which sent a carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, accompanied by a tanker, TANGIER, a submarine

tender from which I took all torpedoes and things of that kind and loaded with ammunition of known weight. We also put on the carrier
(See following page.)

some 15 fighting planes which we felt we could fly off and get onto Wake.

At the same time we sent a similar force down to the eastern Marshalls to create a diversion in the direction of the eastern Marshalls and get this force that was going to Wake within striking distance of Wake, and send in the supply ship with three destroyers to ward off submarines and be prepared either to relieve Wake and supply them with ammunition and other supplies which would enable them to last two

[728 *Corrected A*] On page 728, line 8, delete the word "release" and insert the word "relief."

On page 728, line 10 from the bottom, delete the words "of known weight" and insert the words "and supplies."

[729] or three months longer, or at least a month longer, or to evacuate Wake without landing any supplies, depending on the conditions as we found them there.

The orders that we issued were to reinforce Wake and evacuate some 650-odd civilians.

Now, we still have a problem out here, or still had a problem at Wake to get a channel in there where you could run a ship into it, and we hoped against hope that we might be able to continue the work sufficiently to get the channel in there and make it easier to supply. In my mind the decision as to whether it should be evacuated or not was to be made when we found the conditions there. I reported the plan, that I had placed in execution, to the Navy Department and got back a message saying that it was heartily concurred in, or words to that effect.

Then I turned the command over. Perhaps you had better get the rest of the story later.

If you want that in the record, all right. I might add one thing more for the information of the Commission. I received—I think it was on the 16th—a message from the Navy Department saying that I was to be relieved very shortly and that Admiral Pye was to be my relief, and directed me to inform Pye.

When I received that message, Pye had been in the office with me and knew everything that was going on. He immediately came over when the attack occurred and became my personal advisor there, as I told you before.

So, I decided that the best thing for me to do in view of this force that I was setting in motion was to permit my successor to handle his operations, because I did not want to be relieved right in the middle of it. I sent a message to the Navy Department in which I said that Admiral Pye was thoroughly familiar with the details and the operations under way and planned.

[730] Of course, the Department did not know that, as I had not told them before, and stated, "In view of your message I recommend that I be detached immediately in order that my successor can make a decision in regard to these operations," and the next day I got

orders detaching me. I went down and turned over the whole command to Admiral Pye.

As I say, I did not want to put that in the record, but since you insist, that is a fact. Those are the facts.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the same day that you received that message, "This is a war warning," to wit, on the 27th of November—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). —General Short received a long telegram from the War Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he show it to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that was sent down to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember that telegram (handing document to Admiral Kimmel)?

Admiral KIMMEL. I remember that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short discuss that telegram with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say yes; but I cannot swear to it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short tell you that he interpreted that telegram as meaning that he should take measures against sabotage rather than take measures on what we call his Alerts 2 and 3, which would put his troops in war positions and alarm the civilian population? Was there any discussion on that between you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of his having told me what he proposed to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember his discussing that [731] with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Against sabotage? No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That he was going to put his troops on a war footing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I do not remember that at all. I have no recollection of it.

I may say that on the afternoon of the 24th of November I received (See following page.)

the so-called war warning, and when I tried to get hold of Admiral Bloch and instead got Captain Earle. He brought this dispatch and I read it. I received the same dispatch from the Navy Department a couple of days later saying that this warning had been transmitted to various places. So I had it twice, as a matter of fact, the same message; this message that the War Department had transmittted. Burr gave it to the Commandant of the District, and Burr was bringing it to me when I asked for Earle. My recollection is that Earle and Burr both came over to my office, but I never saw Burr. That is my recollection, but I did see the dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. In that (indicating) General Short says that he had conferences with you on November 27, December 1, December 2, and December 3, and all of them with reference to the relief of the Marine garrisons at Midway and Wake and with reference to his communications with his superior officers about that matter, the relief of the Marine garrisons.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a great deal about that, and in addition to Midway and Wake, Canton and Christmas.

The CHAIRMAN. He says that on December 4 Major Fleming of his staff saw Colonel Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer, about ordnance that was to be sent to Canton Island. That would be in accordance with your understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had the Navy Department any telephone service to your headquarters? Or was it that you had to depend only on the Navy radio?

[731 *Corrected A*] On page 731, line 7, delete the word "twenty-fourth" and insert the word "twenty-seventh."

[732] Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy Department in Washington?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never have used the telephone, but during the attack and afterward Admiral Bloch told me that he talked over the telephone to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be a public telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so; I think so.

General McCoy. You had no scrambler telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a scrambler.

General McCoy. You had a secret scrambler phone here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there is not, so far as I know. I have never heard of any Navy telephone between here and the Navy Department. I think the only telephone to the mainland is a commercial telephone set. You could get that information from Admiral Bloch, who would know better than I would.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have no more questions. Do you, General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral THEOBALD. You asked for these papers this morning. That shows those junior to Admiral Kimmel on the permanent Rear Admiral's list, and the second shows those detached from the fleet at or about the time that Admiral Kimmel assumed duties of Commander-in-Chief.

(See following page.)

The CHAIRMAN. That will be inserted in the record.

(The documents above referred to are as follows:)

[732 *Corrected A*] On page 732, line 7 from the bottom, strike out entire paragraph and insert the following: "You asked for this paper this morning. It shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief."

[732b]

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

ADMIRALS AT SEA JUMPED BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL WHEN HE BECAME CINC.

A & CinC, U. S. Fleet

Admiral T. C. Hart—Class of 1897.

Admiral E. J. King—Class of 1901.

Rear Admiral D. M. LeBreton—Class of 1904.

Rear Admiral A. C. Pickens—Class of 1904.

As CinC, Pacific Fleet

Admiral C. P. Snyder—Class of 1900. (2)
 Vice Admiral W. S. Pye—Class of 1901.
 Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews—Class of 1901. (2)
 Vice Admiral W. F. Halsey—Class of 1904. (1)
 Rear Admiral A. P. Fairfield—Class of 1901. (2)
 Rear Admiral W. N. Vernou—Class of 1901. (2)
 Rear Admiral E. J. Marquart—Class of 1902.
 Rear Admiral G. J. Rowcliffe—Class of 1902. (2)
 Later reported as junior to Admiral Kimmel in Fleet Organization although senior on Rear Admiral's List :—
 Vice Admiral Wilson Brown—Class of 1902.
 Rear Admiral Walter Anderson—Class of 1903.

NOTES :—

- (1) Junior to Admiral Kimmel on permanent Rear Admiral's List.
- (2) Detached from the fleet at or about the time that Admiral Kimmel assumed duties of Commander-in-Chief.

[733] Admiral THEOBALD. Most pay days are on the 5th. The men are paid between the 1st and 5th of each month, with the majority paid on the 5th; so that a vast majority of the crew was last paid on the 5th of December. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order staggering the pay days.

The CHAIRMAN. For some reason the Army had also contemplated a similar staggering of the pay days, which, I think, had just gone into effect then.

Admiral KIMMEL. Our orders had not gone into effect. They were due to go into effect in January.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything more from Admiral Kimmel at the moment?

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will excuse you for the time being.

General McCoy. I think the Admiral should know that we may probably want to call him back after we have heard the subordinates.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I will be here, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Bloch.

(Rear Admiral Bloch and Commander Momsen entered the hearing room.)

Admiral BLOCH. May I have permission to bring Commander Momsen in here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CLAUDE CHARLES BLOCH,
 U. S. NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name, Admiral?

Admiral BLOCH. Claude Charles Bloch, Rear Admiral, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you graduate from the Academy, Admiral?

[734] Admiral BLOCH. January, 1899.

The CHAIRMAN. From that time on will you briefly give us what your duties and your services were in the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I left the Naval Academy and went to the West Coast and joined the U. S. S. IOWA, on which I served for a period of three months during the Spanish War. From the IOWA I went

to the Philippines and served in the Philippines and in China in the OREGON and the S. S. WHEELEY, and in the WHEELEY to Alaska; detached from the WHEELEY, and I came to the West Coast and joined the PHILADELPHIA.

I cruised on the West Coast and South and Central America for a period of about a year. Then I went to Samoa and served there for three years, approximately. Then I went back to Washington and took a post-graduate course in ordnance. I left there in 1906 and joined the U. S. S. VIRGINIA, on which ship I served over a year and then became staff lieutenant on the staff of Admiral Sebree on the U. S. S. TENNESSEE. I served in the Pacific with Admiral Sebree until 1909.

I then went to the Navy Powder Factory at Indianhead in charge of the Powder Factory. I served there until 1911. Then I joined the DELAWARE in that year as gunnery officer, and subsequently became navigator. I was detached from the DELAWARE in 1913 and went to the Bureau of Ordnance in charge of the armor and projectile division.

I served there until July, 1916, and went to sea in the MASSACHUSETTS as executive, and subsequently to the ARIZONA as navigator and as executive afterward.

I was detached from the ARIZONA in April or May, 1918, and went to the transport force in command of the U. S. S. PLATTSBURG. I served on this ship until October, and I then took command of the old battleship MASSACHUSETTS. Then I went to the office of the Chief of Operations in Washington, where I served for two or three months, from which I was made Assistant Chief of Ordnance. I served as such until [735] 1921. I came to Hawaii in command of a mine squadron at Hawaii, with the BALTIMORE as flagship. I stayed there approximately seven months, and then I was chief of staff of battleships, Pacific Fleet.

I served in that capacity until 1923, when I was made Chief of Ordnance. I held this position for four years and then I went to sea in command of U. S. S. CALIFORNIA. I served there two years and then went to the War College for one year and then as Commandant, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and then to sea in command of the training squadron.

I served there about nine months and then as Commander, Cruisers, Battle Force, Cruiser Division 3; detached in 1933 to the Navy Department as budget officer. I served as budget officer one year and then as Adjutant General of the Navy until 1936, when I was ordered to sea in command of battleship division 2; in January, 1937, in command of battle force; January, 1938, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet; detached from this detail in January, 1940, and then to Hawaii, where I have served since April, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. As Commander of the 14th Naval District?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, and as Commandant of the Navy Yard.

The CHAIRMAN. You had for a time the same command that Admiral Kimmel held on December 7, 1941?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it, or not, Admiral, always a matter of concern that the Japanese might stage an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. It has been a consideration, but in all estimates of the situation that I am familiar with, while this course of action was mentioned among us which might be taken by the enemy, it was considered remote.

The CHAIRMAN. After you became Commander of the 14th Naval District, what, if any, measures were taken to protect against such a raid?

[736] Admiral BLOCH. When I became Commander of the 14th District, the District had no force of its own. This question has been vigorously pursued, and the result has been that we have gotten one division of destroyers, four destroyers, only one of which has any listening gear, and one division of four mine sweepers.

On occasions I have written letters to the Department pointing out the weakness of our local defenses and have been informed that they were doing everything possible to supplement our forces and were unable to do anything more, and later on they would do something both in the air and surface.

Somewhere about a year ago, or it may have been about eight months ago, I felt that the anti-aircraft protection of Pearl Harbor was weak. I discussed the matter with the then Commander in-Chief, Admiral Richardson. Admiral Richardson discussed the matter with the then Commanding General, General Herron, and General Herron made a survey of what they had and gave me the numbers of aircraft and anti-aircraft guns that were in the possession of the Army, and as a result of this information I wrote a letter to the Navy Department informing them of what I considered to be the weakness in the pursuit planes, bombing planes, and anti-aircraft guns. In a few paragraphs of the letter I expressed the fact that our cooperation here was of a very high order, and as it was necessary to be on good terms I desired that they not disclose the source of the information, because I did not want the Commanding General to think that I was doing anything or telling tales out of school, so to speak. That letter, I think, he has.

[737] The CHAIRMAN. Do you want that letter, gentlemen?

General McCoy. I think that we might have a look at it and see if we want it in the record.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, you know the letter I mean.

Commander MOMSEN. I will make a note of it.

Admiral BLOCH. As a result of this correspondence, I assume, and conferences in Washington between General Marshall and Admiral Stark, the Army separately dispatched a large number of pursuit planes to this area and started to send out some heavy bombers, 4-engine bombers. If my memory serves me correctly I believe we received—we transported here on Navy carriers 102 pursuit ships of the latest type, and 25 heavy bombers came out under their own power, flew all the way here. And there were no anti-aircraft guns forthcoming; they had none to send out here.

Admiral Kimmel succeeded to command about February, 1941. The matter, the question of security measures here, was discussed between Admiral Kimmel and myself and a number of other officers in the fleet and the Army. Admiral Kimmel asked me if I would take the duties of the security—the base defense command here, and I represented to him that I already had a multiplicity of duties, but I would willingly

do anything that was possible. And we discussed the matter with the Army Air Force and the Commanding General, and Admiral Kimmel issued his order, his naval base defense order, which is No. 2 CL-41, at which time he made me a task force commander for the naval base defense force, of the force to be used in this defense force. The first order was the anti-aircraft batteries, secondly the planes and gear that belonged to the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Belonged to what?

Admiral BLOCH. To the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. To the fleet.

Admiral BLOCH. On the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[738] Admiral BLOCH. And the third was certain facilities for harbor entrance patrol and certain facilities for the sweeping. The only forces that really belonged to me, my forces, were the mine sweepers and the destroyers on the channel entrance.

The CHAIRMAN. General, Commander Momsen has gone for that letter.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel's order was quite explicit in dividing the ships into sectors. He gave all the Navy planes of the fighter type that were on the ground to the base defense, and they were in turn turned over to the air commander of the base defense, Admiral Bellinger, and we then had a joint meeting with the Army, and we made a joint agreement whereby it was agreed that in the base defense all fighting planes of the Navy on the ground were to report to the Army for the defense of Oahu, as fighters; and all the heavy bombers the Army had were to report to the Navy for offshore bombing. That agreement was signed by General Short and myself, took effect.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Now, in that agreement I believe it was specified that you would be responsible for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. The Navy was to be, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The Navy was?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As I read it, it says that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District shall provide that (i.) distant reconnaissance.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the reason I said "you."

Admiral BLOCH. We accepted that in the J. C. D. also, distant reconnaissance. J. C. D. is Joint Coast Defense.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe the Army by that agreement was to provide for an inshore patrol or an offshore patrol, I guess [739] they call it.

Admiral BLOCH. An anti-submarine.

The CHAIRMAN. Inshore?

Admiral BLOCH. Inshore. Inshore patrol. Anti-submarine patrol; is that correct?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir, inshore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. That means a patrol around the belt of 15 or 20 miles from the shore, doesn't it?

Admiral BLOCH. We thought somewhat further out, sir; probably 25 to 50 in the submarine zone.

The CHAIRMAN. 25. Now, do you happen to know whether prior to December 7 the Army did conduct any inshore patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. I can't state positively now, no.

The CHAIRMAN. You cannot?

Admiral BLOCH. It is my belief they did not; I don't know, though. And about the reconnaissance, the distant reconnaissance, in Admiral Kimmel's order of 2 CL-41 the patrol planes were reserved to him. I had no patrol planes for distant reconnaissance; I had no force.

The CHAIRMAN. They were reserved to the Commander-in-Chief, were they?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so. You will find that in the order, sir.

Have you got that order (addressing Commander Momsen)?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we haven't seen that order.

Admiral BLOCH. Let's see that order, will you please (addressing Commander Momsen)?

I had no patrol planes, sir.

Commander MOMSEN. 2 CL.

Admiral BLOCH. The continuous patrols provided are, which I wanted to do: the inshore patrol, the boom patrol, and the harbor patrols. The intermittent patrol was a destroyer offshore patrol which I did not have the force to do; and the air [740] patrols, which were the Commander-in-Chief's or his force, were daily search of operating areas as directed by aircraft scouting force.

The CHAIRMAN. Who had command of the aircraft scouting force? (e)?

Admiral BLOCH. Rear Admiral Bellinger under the scouting force, and another chain of the command as the commander-in-chief, commander scouting force, and commander air force scouting force. That is the echelon.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you were out of line of command?

Admiral BLOCH. I was out of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, does that correspond to distant patrol, to distant reconnaissance?

Admiral BLOCH. Not distant—

The CHAIRMAN. I am a layman.

Admiral BLOCH. It would not be distant as the capabilities of the planes, but he specified in this security order what reconnaissance was to be carried out, and that was what he was set to do, the thorough search of the operating areas.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the operating areas?

Admiral BLOCH. We had many areas. This whole sea around this place was divided into squares or irregular areas which we numbered, and when a ship went out for target practice or a division of the fleet went out for maneuvers they were told to go to a certain operating area, A-1 or A-2 or A-3, and that was their baseball diamond for them to play on, and nobody would interfere with them while they were there. Now, there were certain ones of those which were occupied each day by ships, and I assume that the object of this daily reconnaissance of the operating areas was for the purpose of ascertaining if there were hostile submarines or vessels in that area, so the ships would know they were secure while they [741] were working there.

The CHAIRMAN. Keep your voice up, Admiral.

Admiral BLOCH. Excuse me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At a guess, how far distant from the shores of Oahu was the exterior boundary of any of those operating areas?

Admiral BLOCH. How far would you say it was (addressing Commander Momsen)?

The CHAIRMAN. I only want an approximation, of course.

Admiral BLOCH. Hundred miles?

Commander MOMSEN. About, I was going to say, 75 miles.

Admiral BLOCH. 75 to a hundred miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, that order which you have before you did not provide for any reconnaissance out to a point 800 miles from Oahu, or anything like it?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. Those were ordered specifically as occasion demanded, if and when occasion demanded it.

The CHAIRMAN. In peacetime was it, or not, in your judgment as a naval man, necessary to maintain such patrols?

Admiral BLOCH. That, of course, would be based on the information that you had at hand, as a necessity. I remember on one occasion, I think it was in June, that the relations were strained, and I discussed with Admiral Kimmel if he didn't think it would be advisable to go out 300 miles on an arc directly toward Jaluit, and we discussed it at some length, and he did put a patrol in at that time for that. I thought—I had some reason to believe—there were some submarines moving there; I have forgotten what it was; something that came in in Intelligence, and I thought there might be some submarines and that if we went out 300 miles we might see them.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, would or would not such a distant patrol be important if one suspected carriers in the offing?

Admiral BLOCH. I should say it would be very important.

The CHAIRMAN. Very important. Now, what is the fact as [742] to your consciousness on December 6 and 7: had you any notion that there might be carriers in the offing?

Admiral BLOCH. No notion whatever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were acquainted with the fact that the situation was desperate so far as the maintenance of peace went, weren't you?

Admiral BLOCH. Not immediately, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you were present at some conferences at which General Short was present at which telegrams received from the Army headquarters and the Navy headquarters were discussed, were you not?

Admiral BLOCH. On November 27—I think that's the correct date.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is the date.

Admiral BLOCH. —Admiral Kimmel received a despatch from the Department. It was not addressed to me. General Short received a despatch the same day, I understand, from the War Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel sent for me to come over. I happened to be at the hospital at the time when he sent for me, and my chief of staff came and was present when Admiral Kimmel showed him this despatch, and he sent me a paraphrase copy of the despatch, which I saw the next morning. The substance of that despatch, as I recall it, was to the effect that negotiations had ceased in Washington, and this was a warning.

The CHAIRMAN. It used the phrase, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. "This is a warning," and the substance of the despatch, as I recall it, was to the effect that they expected moves in the Far East towards Kra Peninsula and certain places in the Far East, and that certain people had been apprised on the mainland to take steps against sabotage. I saw that despatch.

Acting on that despatch what I did was: some two days [743] subsequently, maybe one day subsequently, a conference of all of the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, which is my force, was called in my office by the commander of the inshore patrol, and he put them on notice that something might happen, and he wanted them to be on the alert; and the Commander-in-Chief, I think on November 29, issued an order that any submarines seen close in to this island should be depth charged, and they were told that they were to do this and they were to be on the alert.

I felt that the situation was such as to justify the putting of an inshore patrol at Honolulu harbor. I have a coast guard under the Navy at Honolulu harbor, and I directed the commander of the coast guard at Honolulu to put vessels outside to run up and down and listen for submarines, to protect for submarines there.

This despatch, as you recall, sir, stated that negotiations had ceased.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I don't think it said that. Did it say "ceased"? I think it said that they would cease. Perhaps I am wrong.

Admiral BLOCH. "Had ceased."

The CHAIRMAN. "Had ceased." Well, perhaps that is right.

Admiral BLOCH. I had that file this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. We haven't got that Navy despatch here, I think. "appear to be terminated." Yes. "appear to be terminated." Something of that kind.

Admiral BLOCH. Subsequent to that date negotiations were reopened. Highly technical discussion. I have no idea of introducing anything like that. They had ceased, and then they had reopened.

Steps that I took are as I have described them, and they remained in effect, and I am very happy to say that at 6:57 on the morning of December 7 one of these destroyers commanded by [744] one of these men who had been put on the alert sighted a submarine, and he opened fire on it, and he sank it. So he was on the job, and that part of the alert was satisfactory, and I wish it had been with everything else, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, then, distant reconnaissance was not attempted about the Island of Oahu except when some occasion arose to make it necessary in some particular direction?

Admiral BLOCH. I have inquired of Admiral Kimmel since this December 7 as to what reconnaissance patrol was out on the morning of the 7th. There was a reconnaissance that went out daily. I didn't know always exactly where they were going, but I knew there was one going, and I heard the planes take off. They take off at early day, and I heard them come back. I lived very close to their take-off area, and there were planes that took off that morning, and I asked Admiral Kimmel where they went; and, as I recall what he told me, there were ten planes sent out to check to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. Correct. And I think he told me three or four hundred miles. I am not sure of that distance. I think that is very nearly accurate.

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is what he told me. I asked him if any had gone north, and he told me none had gone north.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment, sir, was there material here adequate to have conducted prior to December 7 a day patrol effective in practically all directions to the extent of seven or eight hundred miles from shore?

Admiral BLOCH. On December 7, specifically, there were two squadrons of planes absent from here. One had been to Midway and one had been to Wake. They were absent.

The CHAIRMAN. That was on carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir; they were sea planes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were sea planes?

[745] Admiral BLOCH. They were sea planes. One had been to Midway—one was at Midway, and one had been to Wake and was on its way back, and I think it was actually in Midway, was starting back from Midway at the time the thing happened. That took 24 of the planes away from here. We had, as I recall it, six squadrons at the time: 72 planes. That reduced them to 48.

Now, I understand that about 12 planes were under overhaul at the time, and that's hearsay purely and simply, and I know nothing of my own knowledge except what I have been told. That reduced it further to 50 planes. Unquestionably 50 planes still could have gone out over 360 degrees. They wouldn't have been very thick on the outer edge of the circumference, but they could have gone out. But to continue them to go every day for a long period of time would cause more and more of them to have to fall out, and maybe some more would come in, and the question of the efficacy of the search is very questionable.

The CHAIRMAN. Your view is that, to make an efficacious search, there would have had to have been a great many times more available planes over a period of weeks?

Admiral BLOCH. I was commander-in-chief in 1938, and I was on the forces opposing this Island. They had the patrol planes here. They endeavored to make the 360-degree search with the planes they had, and we had a tremendous number of casualties. I think in a few days we lost something like four or five planes, and two of them lost all the crews, but the others recovered personnel, but we lost the planes. I merely give this incident to show an actual experience of where these planes were going out long distances every other day.

The result of this maneuver was that we learned that to conduct a search efficiently and to maintain it required a large number of planes, and they had to be operated more or less day on and day off, so that one day they would go out; [746] the next day they could rest. In other words the strain on the personnel was greater than it was on the matériel.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give me your best judgment then, Admiral Bloch, as to whether on and prior to December 7, even if war had then been declared, there would have been a sufficient force here to conduct an effective reconnaissance out to 800 miles beyond Oahu for, let us say, two weeks hand-running?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think it was possible with the forces at hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in touch with the progress of the newly installed air warning service of the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. Only in general terms as a result of the conversations that I had with the Commanding General from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. At or before December 7, 1941, had you been apprised that that service was working steadily and sweeping the confines of the Island?

Admiral BLOCH. I knew that the installations had been completed, was of the very definite opinion that they had had a great deal of difficulty and that there were many peculiarities and things to be ironed out before they would feel that it was fully effective. I knew generally that the Navy had tried to help the Army train the radar operators. I knew generally that an officer who was supposed to be an expert in radar was here in the fleet and that Admiral Kimmel had sent him up to help the Army get the bugs out of the installation, but I did not know that they operated 24 hours a day, and I did not know that they swept the entire horizon.

The CHAIRMAN. Was anything said to you by the Army, or was it brought to your attention from any source, that they were operating only for the purpose of training the personnel, up to December 7, and that the stations were off the air a good [747] many hours of every 24?

Admiral BLOCH. I did not know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Admiral BLOCH. I had no knowledge of hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been ever requested to detail a Navy Liaison officer to the interceptor command of the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. Not that I know of, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would know of it, wouldn't you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am informed that two Navy officers did appear in the Army control center at, say, about 8:30 on the morning of December 7 and remained there to convey information to the Navy from that time on until some time at night. Did you make the detail of those officers?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge of their going. Do you?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. We sent Lieutenant Commander Marks up.

Admiral BLOCH. We did send one.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps I am in error about 8:30. I believe that the Army testimony is that they appeared about 4:30 that afternoon.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. They asked for an officer in addition to the one that was already up there, Lieutenant Burr.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Burr may have appeared about 8:30.

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. Lieutenant Commander Marks was later in the day. Lieutenant Burr was probably 8:30.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney calls my attention to the fact that the testimony of the Army is that it was manned by a sergeant at the Navy telephone until the Navy officers appeared at 4:30 in the afternoon. What do you know about that?

[748] Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the Navy officers were sent earlier in the day?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Commander MOMSEN. They were not.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I sent that—

The CHAIRMAN. The Army testimony is that the position was taken over about 4:30 by Naval officers.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I think we should clarify the status of Lieutenant Burr. In the exchange of liaison officers between the Army and the Navy I sent the best available material I had, who was Lieutenant Burr, Naval Reserve, to the Commanding General's office, as a liaison officer. He was not sent to the Aircraft Warning Service. He was sent to General Short's office, and he was placed to deal with me and the General and transmit information. He had not—he is not a very experienced officer.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Admiral BLOCH. He is not a very experienced officer. He is a bright fellow, very loyal, very willing, but not a very experienced officer, but he represented the best that I had to send.

Lieutenant Commander Marks is an officer who is not an air warning man or a technical man, but he was one of the watch officers in the operating room at my headquarters. When the Army asked for another officer, Commander Momsen tells me he was sent up there that afternoon to General Short's office.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if I get your testimony correctly, Admiral, it is to the effect that you had no definite information on or before December 7 as to what the Army Warning [749] Service was in fact doing.

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I don't know whether this is a sensible question or not, in view of what you have already said, but if you had had any suspicion of a Japanese carrier attack you would not have been depending on any Aircraft Warning Service to have advised you of its approach or of the planes' approach from it, if you didn't know anything about it?

Admiral BLOCH. If we had had any suspicion that there would have been and likely to be hostilities begin or a carrier raid, I think it's fair to assume that we would have done our best, me or anybody—I mean collectively we would have done our best to have made reconnaissance to find out what the Army Air Warning Service could do, to use it to its fullest, to use our own Radars that we have on our ships to get as much warning—I think we would have done everything that would have been humanly possible to detect it if we had had any remote idea of the possibility of such a thing at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, Gentlemen?

General McNARNEY. Admiral, according to the orders here you appear to be responsible for exercising with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack, which includes exercising supervisory control over Naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through commander patrol wing 2 for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy. That is on paper, but you actually did not have the troops to carry out that mission; is that your testimony?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. Based on Admiral Kimmel's order setting up the base defense I had out my task order—got out my order, and in my order we had several task forces. We had the destroyers at the harbor entrance, we had the mine sweepers sweeping the channel, we had the nets operating, we had the boom patrol, we had the harbor patrol, and the [750] air force commander—my task force commander—was Rear Admiral Bellinger, Commander patwing 2, and he was directed to make all of our land-based carrier planes, which were fighters, available to the Army for operations over shore; and General Martin's order made all of the Army bombers available to the Navy.

Is that the question you wished answered?

General McNARNEY. That is the plan, but who had—

Admiral BLOCH (Interposing.) That was actually done, sir.

General McNARNEY. Yes?

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Bellinger was the Air Force Commander. We had a drill practically once every week. In the inception of it our great difficulties were communications and cooperation, but we finally ironed it out. There was not the slightest doubt in my mind that this Air Force was well drilled, well-prepared, and well trained for this purpose.

General McNARNEY. Yes. I don't think you quite get my question. As I remember your testimony, you said that the patrol wing 2, which was the only force available for distant reconnaissance—

Admiral BLOCH. Distant reconnaissance.

General McNARNEY. —was not under your control.

Admiral BLOCH. That was not under my control, sir.

General McNARNEY. But still you were charged on paper with the responsibility for it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.

General McNARNEY. You had been given the responsibility without the necessary force to execute it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir. On paper I had been given 108 patrol planes for that specific purpose, none of which had ever arrived; not one of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Had ever arrived?

Admiral BLOCH. Never. They have not been—they are never here for that purpose.

[751] The CHAIRMAN. What was being used for patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I am talking about the District patrol that was supposed to cover the District reconnaissance if the District had to do it, and the building program—

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see what you mean.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That they never were put under your command. If there were any of them here, somebody else was controlling them; is that it?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, a little bit different from that, sir, if I may clarify it. We had a plane-building program, and on that plane-building program the assignment of the 14th Naval District was nine squadrons of patrol planes and two squadrons of observation planes, and they were the District forces that were supposed to do this re-

connaissance, but there were none of them ever delivered here because they hadn't been built. The only patrol planes that are here are patrol planes that belong to the fleet wing. That is patrol wing 2. They are the only ones here, and they are not under my command and have never been under my command.

General McNARNEY. It was envisioned that in the future you would be able to do it?

Admiral BLOCH. Sir?

General McNARNEY. I believe it was envisioned that at some time in the future you would be able to undertake that responsibility.

Admiral BLOCH. Sometime in the future, and as a matter of fact as late as the last letter—What was the last letter I wrote about reappraisal of forces (addressing Commander Momsen)?

Commander MOMSEN. 14 January, and there is another one—

Admiral BLOCH. That is 14 January.

Commander MOMSEN. 7 January, '41.

Admiral BLOCH. There is another letter that followed [752] this letter up, and we got a reply back telling us about war plans, remember?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. 14 May.

Admiral BLOCH. No, I don't think—that isn't the one. It's later than that. Have you the letter the Department wrote to us and told us they didn't have the force to supply it, and then they called our attention to some war plan?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes (referring to papers).

Admiral BLOCH. It is the reply to that letter.

Commander MOMSEN. What was that other letter that you were looking for?

Admiral BLOCH. I think it was written somewhere around May.

Commander MOMSEN. May?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

(A letter was handed to Admiral Bloch by Commander Momsen.)

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, that's it. This is a letter written in May in which I point out the weaknesses of the District forces. That isn't the one, either.

Commander MOMSEN. It runs this way, sir (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. I called it a reappraisal of District forces. That's general. That isn't the one. This is written by the Department telling us about the war plans.

Commander MOMSEN. I see.

Admiral BLOCH. Admiral Kimmel put a very forcible endorsement on it.

General McCox. I think we might take the Admiral's statement without—he seems to remember.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I remember it. In January I wrote a letter to the Department asking for forces out here, and they replied to me that they were doing the best they could and they didn't have them. and when they had them they would send them to me; and sometime subsequently, as nearly as I can guess [753] about August, I wrote again to the Department, in what I called a reappraisal of District forces, telling them that in the past year they had made no increments to my forces except some net vessels and some sweepers. and that I pointed out the very serious condition, as I visualized

heavy submarine attacks here, and I had to have patrol vessels, and in the final paragraph of it I urged aircraft for District purposes, to which the Department replied again and said that they knew that this condition existed and they didn't have the things to—the planes and the facilities to give us, but as soon as they were ready—and they were doing everything within their power to get them—they would be sent here. The reason I mention that is that General McNarney was asking about the patrol planes for the distant reconnaissance. I didn't have any.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, on page 5 of CL-41 it describes three conditions of readiness. Which condition was in effect on the night of December 6?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as I know, none of them were, sir. I thought on the morning of December 7 that the Condition 3 was in effect, but subsequent inquiry has led me to believe that no condition was ever designated.

General McNARNEY. Are those conditions war-time conditions, or should one or more of them be in effect during normal peace time?

Admiral BLOCH. They are never in effect in normal peace-time conditions unless you are having maneuvers, but Condition 1 is where action is imminent; Condition 2 is where you know that enemy forces are in the waters and it may happen quickly, and you have half your batteries; Condition 3, you have one quarter your batteries but you are in hostile waters.

General McNARNEY. Then were the provisions of subparagraph 4 under g. on page 4 in effect on December 6, which states, "the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor," and so forth?

[754] Admiral BLOCH. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District is a Naval base defense officer, and as such he shall—you are asking about—

General McNARNEY. Well, subparagraph 4 under g., which states that the senior officer embarked has certain duties.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is just above where you were reading, Admiral, little 4 in brackets; it starts, "The senior * * *."

Admiral BLOCH. "informing the task force commander at sea of the attack and attacking aircraft"?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. No. It is under g. Under g. (4).

The CHAIRMAN. There on page 4.

Admiral BLOCH. Oh:

The senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief shall insure that the ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft fire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths are concerned.

The battle ships were not moored singly, but I think they were moored singly as far as they could be. That is my impression. There were a number of them berthed.

General McNARNEY. Well, do you know whether the provisions of that paragraph were or should have been in force on December 6?

Admiral BLOCH. I assume—I think it was. I think they were, sir.

General McNARNEY. Could you tell us who the senior officer embarked was?

Admiral BLOCH. So nearly as I can, I think it was Vice Admiral Pye. He was in the CALIFORNIA present.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

[755] The CHAIRMAN. You were speaking of the submarine net that closed the harbor.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was under your command?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What officer was immediately in charge of the operation of that net?

Admiral BLOCH. We have two officers, sir, one at Honolulu and one at Pearl Harbor; two nets, an officer in charge of each.

The CHAIRMAN. To your best knowledge was either of those nets open on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BLOCH. On the morning of December 7 at the time the attack occurred they were preparing to open the net, to let the ANTARES in, who was coming in and had begun to come in, but she did not enter. The net I believe had been opened once previously to allow a garbage scow to come in.

The CHAIRMAN. Now you are speaking of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your judgment that the little submarine that got in came in when the net was open on one of those occasions?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe it's quite possible. I don't know.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some suggestion that that submarine could get under the net as it was constructed.

Admiral BLOCH. I believe she could.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. The net is not an anti-submarine net proper. It is an anti-torpedo net, and the object in placing it where it was was to prevent a submarine outside from firing a torpedo into the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Your investigation indicates that the manipulation of the net on that morning was in accordance with [756] orders and in accordance with correct procedure?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, sir.

General McCoy. Would it have been possible for a submarine not of this new small type, but of the type that we are accustomed to, to come into this harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. It is our opinion—I refer to my opinion and the Navy Department's opinion—that any submarine, large-size submarine and regular-sized submarine, could not come into the harbor without showing her periscope. She must show her periscope, and she must be detected.

General McCoy. So that you felt reasonably secure?

Admiral BLOCH. So we felt that there was no reason to put in anti-submarine nets, that an anti-torpedo net was sufficient.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, when you received the message of November 27 from the Navy Department, at that time you thought Condition 3 was in effect?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, I did not.

General McNARNEY. Did you consider placing any of these conditions in effect?

Admiral BLOCH. I can't answer that because I don't remember whether I did or didn't, but I will say this: that all the forces that composed the Naval Base Defense Force were forces that normally were not in my command; they were meant for this task only. They comprised battleships, cruisers, destroyers that were anchored in the berths that formed these sectors for gunfire. All the planes that were in the Naval Base Defense Force were fleet planes that were turned over on occasion of when you had an air-raid drill for this purpose.

I have a very definite feeling now—I say “now,” and I think I should be fair and say “now”—that I could not possibly set a condition of readiness which would interfere with the forces under command of other people and under command of the fleet without apprising the Commander-in-Chief and getting his [757] consent toward having me have him—have him tell me what condition of readiness to take.

I also feel that whatever conditions of readiness I took for the Naval Base Defense Force must be consistent with the conditions and other precautions that are to be taken by other people. I think this is borne out by the fact that since December 7 I sent out a signal prescribing a certain condition of readiness, but I was asked not to prescribe that condition of readiness, that it should be something else, and I changed my dispatch to conform to the desire of the Commander-in-Chief. It is also confirmed by the fact that around November—I guess it was October. Around October 16 or 17 we had another dispatch of some kind, and the outlying islands were placed on the alert, but they were placed on the alert by and with the consent of the Commander-in-Chief. He told me that he wanted them on the alert, and we did place them on the alert.

I also feel that that is borne out by the fact that on at least one occasion some fleet commander wrote a letter to the Commander-in-Chief and said that some of the drills we were having were interfering with certain other exercises he had laid out, and he would get these orders to have a surprise drill on such and such a date, and that he felt that this thing should be laid out ahead of time, and so forth and so on; and I received a directive to do it in advance and to consult everybody, which was very difficult because a lot of them were at sea.

Do you remember who wrote that letter?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. Somebody wrote a letter and said that it was interfering with something they were doing, and after that General Short and I got together, and we fixed certain days for three months. We fixed two days for October, two days for November, and two days for December on which these drills would be held.

[758] General McNARNEY. Admiral, did you ever see a copy of the Standard Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't identify it. I may have seen it.

Commander MOMSEN. We have it.

Admiral BLOCH. We have this (indicating).

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir, we have a copy of that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Are you familiar with the types of alert which are prescribed therein?

Admiral BLOCH. I am more familiar now than I was before December 7. I was under the impression—I talked to General Short a few days ago—that the Army was in alert condition, and I have since learned that they were on a special alert for sabotage only.

General McNARNEY. Well, on the night of December 6 you had no knowledge of what specific alert status the Army was in?

Admiral BLOCH. I knew they were on the alert, and I thought it meant a complete alert, and I spoke to General Short I think the next day or two days afterwards. I went to his office and told him that—or asked him about the alert, and he told me that he was not on complete alert; he was on the alert that related only to sabotage.

General McNARNEY. Now, under these three conditions there is one sentence in there that states, "Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer." Now, you are the Naval Base Defense Officer, are you not?

Admiral BLOCH. I was the Naval Base Defense Officer, and my subordinate who had the aircraft was Admiral Bellinger. He was my task force commander and had the aircraft.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what the condition of aircraft prescribed on December 6 was?

Admiral BLOCH. I know now. Admiral Bellinger had two squadrons or what he called A-5, and the remainder in what he called B-5.

[759] General McNARNEY. Can you tell us what A-5 and B-5 are?

Admiral BLOCH. As I recall, A-5 means two squadrons will be ready on call and all within four hours after that.

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. Ten-minute notice.

Admiral BLOCH. Ten-minute notice? I thought that was A-1. A-5.

Commander MOMSEN. Oh, A-5 was——

Admiral BLOCH. I think it's four hours.

Commander MOMSEN. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. That all planes and all other squadrons were to be ready up to 10 squadrons in A-5 in four hours.

General McNARNEY. That corresponds right closely with the Army.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. They have the same indication, I think.

Commander MOMSEN. It is a joint agreement.

Admiral BLOCH. Same system.

General McNARNEY. Same system.

Admiral BLOCH. I asked Admiral Bellinger how many men he had, and it is my understanding he had 50% of his available men and officers on call to take the air on four hours notice A-5 and B-5, two squadrons in A and the rest of them in B.

Commander MOMSEN. There it is, "readiness," and this is what they had (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. They had A, is all assigned operating craft available and ready for task, and "five" means all types in four hours.

General McNARNEY. Four hours.

Commander MOMSEN. For 5 at Ford Island.

Admiral BLOCH. They had two squadrons at A-5.

Commander MOMSEN. One at Midway, A-1.

Admiral BLOCH. One at Midway in ten minutes.

Commander MOMSEN. Three in B-1.

Admiral BLOCH. Three in B-1 at Ford Island. That is [760] one-half aircraft. Pursuit and fighters in four minutes. Other types in 15 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, were you ever shown this Tentative Manual of the Interceptor Command prepared by the Army (indicating)?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir, we have no record of that.

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. I have no record of it, sir. I have never seen it so far as I know. I didn't know about it. I think it is quite possible that some of our air people might have seen it. I don't know. I never have seen it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any system that was in force on and before December 7 whereby the Navy communicated information as to location of hostile forces to the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. On several occasions when General Short and Admiral Kimmel and I were discussing matters I imagine that we may have discussed what knowledge we had of enemy ships, what our information service showed—our intelligence service showed that we had; but we had no routine for informing them of the location of enemy ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any direct telephone between the 14th Naval District and the Naval Headquarters in Washington?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to use a public telephone if you wanted to telephone, would you?

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, or radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Is the telephone to the mainland—the commercial telephone—a radio telephone or is it a cable?

Admiral BLOCH. Radio telephone, sir, with a protection scrambler on it.

The CHAIRMAN. You can put a scrambler on it here in the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I think they have a scrambler in the [761] telephone company so that people at sea cannot intercept it.

General McNARNEY. You don't have an additional scrambler here?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Such as the Army has at Fort Shafter?

Admiral BLOCH. We have none.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us what, if any, new security measures have been put into effect since December 7?

Admiral BLOCH. Have you a file of this?

Commander MOMSEN. Of securities?

Admiral BLOCH. I can tell you generally.

Commander MOMSEN. I have base defense orders here.

Admiral BLOCH. We have gotten out a number of orders about base defense, and we have put in an offshore patrol. There were 13 more destroyers turned over to me by the fleet, with a commander to go offshore and act as offshore patrol, in addition to my four Navy destroyers and my Coast Guard vessels.

The CHAIRMAN. How far do they work outward, sir?

Admiral BLOCH. Their stations are some 10 to 15 miles offshore. They are listening posts and attack submarines trying to break

through. They also are called upon to supply escorts for incoming merchant ships and man-of-war through the submarine zone and escort them outgoing. We have practically quadrupled our guard around our plant for internal and external security—oil tanks, and so forth and so on. We sent our Marine defense battalion into the field under the Army for anti-aircraft defense. They had 12 guns, and we put them under the Army, and they have gone out under the Army. We have salvaged a number of batteries, three batteries of 5-inch guns, off of Naval ships, and we have emplaced those at the locations chosen by the Army to be used for anti-aircraft defense, with the expectation that our men will only stay there long enough so that the Army can be trained how to use them, [762] and that they will take them over, as it is their responsibility, anti-aircraft defense. We will give them the ammunition and the directors and the mechanism and the whole works.

Of course, we have the blackout, the efficacy of which possibly is in question. And we have done a great many things towards both internal and external security in various subcommands of mine, all of which I am not familiar with; generally I am familiar with.

Commander MOMSEN. Those orders, most were turned over to the Board by Mays several days ago. I think we have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think so?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. I think they were sent to—

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir. We have copies of our local Naval Base Defense. This is the folder, and then you also have a copy of Naval Defense Orders, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. We organized the mine-bomb watchers to watch for falling bombs and mines dropped in the harbor. We organized a mine recovery unit and a bomb recovery unit. All of the orders are the ones we could get together that related to security since December 7. At the request of Colonel Brown we furnished them to the Board, and this is the jacket that has them (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir. We are permitted to keep this for the time being, at least, are we?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Admiral, just as a matter of interest, have you been able to do anything about this great collection of oil tanks? That is, I take it that a great many of them are empty, but still—

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

General McCoy. Certain portions—

Admiral BLOCH. We don't keep any empty unless we have to, of course.

General McCoy. You mean these exposed tanks are all [763] full, are they?

Admiral BLOCH. Of course we are busily constructing, and have been for the past year, an underground storage to take it all underground. We have a project under way known as the Red Hill Project, where we are putting 16 vaults underground. They have 150 feet of mountain over the top of them. We put them in a mountain. The power lines go into that in a tunnel, pumping plant is in the tunnel, and the only exposed place would be at the pier or the wharf where the oil is received and discharged, and the project is still under way, and we expect to have the first two vaults in operation in March that

will roughly hold about the contents of six of these tanks over here. Now, after two months effort we will put a couple more in until the entire project is finished. Work is going very satisfactorily now, but it won't be until March until we get any of it underground.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, there is something on my chest I would like to get off before we leave here.

Admiral BLOCH. Glad to, sir.

General McNARNEY. I suppose you have been up in your water tower many times?

Admiral BLOCH. No, I haven't been up many times. I have been up once, I think.

General McNARNEY. Have you ever looked over your plant here—the location of your machine shops, your storehouses, your barracks, and your warehouses—from the viewpoint of what a wonderful objective it would make for night aerial bombing?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir, many times. I know all about it, sir.

General McNARNEY. Has any effort been made to disperse any of these things—I mean since December 7 now—in view of the fact that you did get an air raid which you didn't expect, or are you going ahead—and I see you are constructing additional warehouses in the same congested area.

[764] Admiral BLOCH. Well, the underlying consideration of this construction, of course, started many years ago.

General McNARNEY. Yes, I realize that.

Admiral BLOCH. A long time before aircraft came in. We had a limited area. Land is the most difficult thing that we have to acquire. Every time you go to Congress to get some land, other than in a war, you can't get it.

General McNARNEY. That is realized perfectly in time of peace, but we are in a war situation now.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, wherever you have your dry docks the machine shops must be close. Wherever your wharves are that you have your ships to repair, the machine shops must be fairly contiguous or you can't do your work efficiently.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. We have considered it: How can we disperse, and how long does it take you to disperse? There is no land adjacent to the Navy Yard today that isn't taken. The Navy Yard is hemmed in tightly by Hickam Field, and when the Army went into Hickam Field they took the waterfront down the channel and they took the land that was adjacent to it. You can't go that way without going on Army land.

Somewhere there was a discussion about putting in a new dry dock, and in deciding on the location of that dry dock I put it just as far away from the other dry docks on land that I had that would be fairly close to our railway and our ground and our power and our water and all the facilities needed as it was physically possible to put it. I put it just as far away from it as I can, jammed it right up by the coal dock.

General McNARNEY. Well, these are very—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Now I suppose you are keen on this scent, but the bell has just rung.

General McNARNEY. Well, I would just like to ask one more question. I feel that I should.

These are very bright moonlight nights at the moment. [765]
Blackout—

Admiral BLOCH. No good.

General McNARNEY. —is no good as far as concerns being able to locate this particular objective.

Admiral BLOCH. The only thing they can't do, they probably can't locate definite buildings.

General McNARNEY. That is correct, but aerial bombing by—

Admiral BLOCH. Mass.

General McNARNEY. —a mass of 40 or 50 planes could pretty well cover the congested area.

Admiral BLOCH. That is correct.

General McNARNEY. What are your new defense measures at the moment?

Admiral BLOCH. New defense measures: Today all guns are manned on all ships that are here. The Army anti-aircraft is in the field. We make this reconnaissance every day. We have the interceptor command ready to go up. We have the patrol planes ready to go out and try to follow carriers, and that is a defense thing, and if the reconnaissance in the daytime does not discover the presence of a carrier, if the Radar doesn't discover the presence of planes coming in, then you don't know it until they get here.

General McNARNEY. That is right.

Admiral BLOCH. And that is just the same as it is anywhere else in the world.

General McNARNEY. But you feel that you are taking all possible precautions with the equipment you have available at the moment?

Admiral BLOCH. With the equipment we have, and within the possibilities of our intelligence, our limitations of intelligence, I think we are doing everything that it is humanly possible to do to protect the place.

General McNARNEY. Well, that is all. I just wanted to reassure myself that you were. This really could be off the [766] record.

General McCoy. I am just wondering, in listening, if there wasn't one other thing that failed in the tragic time, of both the Army and Navy, and that was the complete failure of intelligence. You got no information from the ONI in Washington of the disposition of things from Japan. In other words, the Navy has no secret service from Japan; it has no secret service from the other danger area in the mandated islands. So here you are, sitting at the mercy of an enemy who has all the information about you, and will continue to have, and you have nothing about him until he takes the initiative.

Admiral BLOCH. That's absolutely true, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't that true?

Admiral BLOCH. Absolutely true.

General McCoy. Now, it being true, is there anything we can do about it?

Admiral BLOCH. We certainly can't build up an intelligence service in Japan and the mandated islands now. I don't know how you can do it. We have to rely on our appliances that we have in the way of Radar and reconnaissance, and so forth and so on.

General McCoy. But that puts you purely on the passive defense.

Admiral BLOCH. We are back on our heels. Back on our heels. Now, whether the Japanese have any information service left here or not is open to question.

General McCoy. Well, that is just why I asked the question, because your local intelligence, both in the Army and Navy, completely failed you.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to make this statement; I don't think it should go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us excuse the reporter right now, and then we will be sure not to ask any more questions.

[767] (Whereupon, at 4:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Tuesday, December 30, 1941, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[768]

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[769] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 30, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL CLAUDE CHARLES BLOCH,
U. S. NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, you were here when General Short came to the command of the Hawaiian Department, were you not?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say as to the cooperation between your branch of the service and his during his incumbency here?

Admiral BLOCH. Our cooperation has been extremely good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you feel there has been an effort on both sides to communicate fully the aims and means and to work [770] in full accord, do you?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if there has been any failure in cooperation it was not one of intent on either side?

Admiral BLOCH. Not of intent.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Bloch, were you at any conferences between General Short and Admiral Kimmel during the last days of November and the early days of December?

Admiral BLOCH. I was not present on November 27, and I believe General Short was not present, either, when this warning dispatch came up. That is hearsay.

I have been present on many occasions when General Short and Admiral Kimmel were in conference. I was invited by Admiral Kimmel to be present. Recently the conferences which I attended had to do with the establishment of certain outlying fields for the Army which required Navy cooperation.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at conferences between November 27 and December 7 when there was discussion of substituting the Army units on Wake and Midway for the Marine units out there?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There were such conferences in that period, were there not?

Admiral BLOCH. I remember one, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At that one conference, so far as you know was there any discussion of a possible attack on this island by air, or a raid?

Admiral BLOCH. I can recall no such discussion, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion at that conference of the imminence of hostilities between Japan and the United States?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not remember any definite discussions of the imminence of hostilities. I do have a recollection of some discussion in regard to various warnings that we [771] had from Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give me the tenor of your discussions?

Admiral BLOCH. The conversation was extremely general, largely on what the nature of the re-opening of the negotiations meant, and whether this country would actually go into the war in case the Japanese effort was directed toward southeast Asia. A good deal of the conversation was pure speculation as to whether we would and what the attitude the Congress would take and the President would take, but never, insofar as I recall, anything relating to the imminence of any hostile attack on this island or on our nation; as a matter of fact, I felt that none of us expected that it was probable that Japan would attack us unless we took hostile action first. I thought, and I think we all thought, the same fact, that her force would be against southeast Asia, and that she would not gratuitously take on another adversary unless she had to do it.

The CHAIRMAN. The men in responsible command in the Navy, particularly in the Pacific, have always envisaged the possibility of a sudden air raid on Pearl Harbor, have they not, Admiral?

Admiral BLOCH. The Navy officers in the Pacific whom I know, and with whose thoughts I am familiar, have always thought that there was a possibility of a sudden attack preceding war by Japan; but an air raid on Hawaii was considered remote. I think it would be fair to say that the consensus of opinion was that we thought that the most likely form of attack would be by submarines against our ships operating out of this port and in close proximity to the Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. If you were planning an air raid by carrier on Pearl Harbor for a hostile force, what part of the day would your choice be for the attack?

Admiral BLOCH. The early morning.

[772] General McNARNEY. May I ask a question here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, is your estimate that the most likely attack would be a submarine attack influenced by the hesitancy which has been evidenced throughout all Navies to risk carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. Not entirely so, sir. My thought is that here we had 5,000 miles of water between us and Japan, and the long period of time required for carriers to traverse this distance. They had to carry fuel enough presumably to come over and go back or to get fuel from tankers at sea, which is a difficult operation. That I did not consider likely that a force could make that passage without some prior knowledge or information.

General McNARNEY. However, it is true—

Admiral BLOCH (interposing). Coupled with that was the fact, or it was a factor, that they would risk their valuable units of the fleet, which they can no more afford to do than we could.

General McNARNEY. It has always been a tremendous factor in Naval strategy for several years that you do not want to run the risk of losing carriers?

Admiral BLOCH. Unless it is profitable. I think we always had that idea, that it should be profitable. In other words, if we lost a carrier, we hoped to get two.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that you have thought a good deal about this incident since it occurred?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have any thoughts come to you as to how the United States could have had better security in Pearl Harbor than it had, and if so, will you detail them for us? In other words, I want to know whether the means available having been used to their best extent—and we know that you did not have all the means you requested here for security—but that aside, have you thought of any strategy or tactical [773] measures, security measures, that could have been taken that you think would make this place more impregnable than it was?

Admiral BLOCH. All measures which could have been taken would necessarily have to be taken on the information which made the means justifiable. In one warning which was received from the Navy Department, Admiral Kimmel was authorized to deploy his forces in such way as he desired to do so, but he was cautioned in this that he must not do anything that would be likely to—and I think they used the words “provoke”—provoke the Japanese.

Now, presume for the sake of argument that you could have placed a task force in the North Pacific to try to cover the area north of Midway to the Aleutian Islands, and by means of that get ample warning of everything along that route, but such a task force might have been considered as a direct threat to Japan. They might have said, “This force is there. We are going to take action.” Then the injunction of our superiors not to do anything to precipitate this thing might have been considered to have been violated.

The CHAIRMAN. That would not have been true of task forces to the southward?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. And to the westward?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, to the Marshall Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. There were task forces to the southward and westward?

Admiral BLOCH. Not very far. There had been one recently to the base at Midway, and there was one in the Aleutian Islands and other islands in our group here.

General McCox. It has been a matter of public knowledge that the Aleutian Islands and Dutch Harbor have been well known as defense lines of our outposts of ships? It has been well known for years?

Admiral BLOCH. We know all about these navigable waters, [774] and I think possibly some of our ideas are based on how to use them, but for some time we have had certain forces in that area. However, I do not know that I understand your question.

General McCox. In the public print for years they have been talking about these outpost lines. Here is your fleet. You have a fleet here, and there is Dutch Harbor and Midway and Samoa and your other post islands. They have been called stepping stones. They have all been in the public print for years as called outposts, and those waters are naturally patrolled by American Naval ships.

Admiral BLOCH. From Midway to Unalaska—and that is where they are building another air base—I think is some 2,000 miles. If Midway has sufficient reconnaissance force and you had a long range coming 1,000 miles to the north and Unalaska coming 1,000 miles to the southward, that would still leave intermediate patrols where you would have gaps. Besides the gaps you are also confronted with other difficulties. First the plane cannot carry a full military load, go a thousand miles, and come back home. The next thing is the weather conditions in and around Alaskan waters which are very questionable. Lots of times you cannot get away and lots of times you cannot get back on account of the bad visibility and fog in those waters.

General McCox. I was just posing the question just to get your reaction there. I do not think that our fleet operating anywhere between Unalaska and Midway or Hawaii would in itself constitute “provoking,” or a threat to Japan. There is some defensive element there, isn’t there?

Admiral BLOCH. I hope that the Commission does not believe that my remarks about task forces in that area would indicate that it does counter any force coming through, because if you had a task force at Hawaii, at Midway, and at Unalaska, which is a very long range, they still might miss the enemy coming across there, because that is very rough [775] water. They might have a lot of line squalls this time of year especially, and they have a great deal of fog and dense clouds up there. However, unquestionably, as you look at it in retrospect, it would have been a very lucky thing for us to have found these people.

The CHAIRMAN. Up there?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, up there. Then, had you found them, the Commander-in-Chief would have been confronted with the momentous decision, “What am I going to do about it? We are not at war.”

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I understand that your thought is that if you had this maintainable and distant patrol covering the whole circumference of 360 degrees, that it would have been a valuable defense measure?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand further your view that a well-equipped radar system which could have swept the whole 360-degree arc would have been a valuable protective measure?

Admiral BLOCH. Unquestionably, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand also that your thought is that if both of these warning services had been in operation and if either of them had furnished a timely warning, that the forces on the Island would have given a much better account of themselves than they did give?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, I think so. That is if——

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if——

Admiral BLOCH. If these approaching airships were definitely determined to be hostile.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that was implied in my question by saying "a timely warning."

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have these measures outlined by Mr. Justice been put into effect since the 7th of December?

Admiral BLOCH. Before I answer your question, General, [776] I would like to correct my arithmetic given in the testimony yesterday. I stated that there were 72 patrol bombers available and two squadrons of 24 were at Midway, leaving 48, and 12 under overhaul, leaving 50. I meant 36. My arithmetic was bad then.

If these 36 planes could have maintained a 360-degree patrol as far as their radius of action would permit them to do so, it would have been very thin on the outer circumference.

Does that answer your question?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, since December 7 our strength in patrol planes, in spite of our losses, has been increasing with respect to that original 72 figure. Also, our forces have been increased by certain long-range four-engine Army bombers which arrived here.

Today they are maintained under the directive to the Commander-in-Chief causing them to go on distant reconnaissance. He has only been given this directive about distant reconnaissance since December 7. They have been out each day seven or eight hundred miles with the planes which are available for that purpose. I think it is an efficient search within its limitations, but spread pretty thin on the periphery, and within the limitations of the weather conditions in the area.

General McCoy. I take it, Mr. Justice, that your statement that, also in addition to the Radar and the flying patrols and surface patrols, that you also had in mind with respect to the thinness in the air the offshore patrol and service ships?

Admiral BLOCH. I am not familiar with that, sir.

General McCoy. You had nothing to do with it?

Admiral BLOCH. That is the function of the Commander-in-Chief. It is possible that the information may be in my office and that it has been sent to me, but I am not sufficiently [777] familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, supplementing what the General has said, I suppose if you had sufficient destroyers to allow for your covering a 360-degree circumference and the destroyers could be out about seven

or eight hundred miles offshore, that that would be a very definite protection?

Admiral BLOCH. Mr. Justice, the entire history of the World War indicates that there has never been enough small craft. The British trawlers, British sweepers, and British destroyers during the World War operated for 28 days out of 30 at sea. This fact has been known to us for years, as far back as 1933.

I pressed the Department to put old destroyers in commission. There were a lot of them laid up. Finally they were put in commission, but we do not have them here. We do not have sufficient forces for that kind of search here.

General MCCOY. I take it these waters are covered by Japanese fishing boats in normal times and on the 7th of December?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not think so, sir. There are a lot of Japanese sampans which operate out of this place on fishing expeditions, presumably, but unquestionably some few of them may have had Japanese agents on board; but it is my considered opinion that the great majority of them were bona fide fishermen.

General MCCOY. But a Japanese fishing fleet does cover the Pacific?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, and many times I have sent out and brought in sampans where it was reported to me by the fleet that they were interfering with the operations of the fleet. On only one occasion was there anything discovered. I know on one occasion we found a Japanese on board who had come into this country illegally, and he was turned over to the Immigration authorities for deportation.

General McNARNEY. I would like to ask you a question or [778] two as a Naval officer of long experience. When anything happens such as the attack on December 7, there is a tendency for the pendulum to swing from one side way over to the other. Have you given any thought to the possibility for the use of the fleet, the patrol planes, and all the heavy bombers in a purely defensive mission, and may not that considerably lessen the value to the United States of any prosecution of the war? Of course, we are now talking in terms of higher strategy.

Admiral BLOCH. I have given much thought to it, and I haven't information in my possession to know what our next policy is going to be, or what the United States policy is going to be, whether we are digging in for an attack here on a purely defensive basis, but I am certain that such an attitude will cause defeat. Nothing is more destructive to morale than to be on the defensive. You must be on the offensive. We have a fine Navy, a fine personnel, and I know that you have a fine Army, a fine personnel in the Army. I believe these men want to see the enemy and they want to fight.

General McNARNEY. Do you think the insistence of this Commission in questioning as to why distant reconnaissance was not out and as to why the things were not done may tend to fix in the minds of the people questioned that the policy may be purely defensive and that we may be giving an impression which we should not? Is that the way our questions sound to you?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no opinion to give.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you are entitled to an opinion, Admiral. Please be free and express any opinion you have. We want your help, Admiral, and you can give it to us.

General McCoy. I think we might tell the Admiral that our instructions cover such a thing.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Both Secretaries have asked us to find out whether there has been anything in the way of a particular outmoded strategy in the Pacific or elsewhere, and while we have no one [779] to instruct, either the General Staff of the Army or the Office of Naval Operations in the Navy, we will render our opinions for what they are worth.

Admiral Bloch. I am very glad to give you my opinion for what it is worth, but I am afraid it is not worth very much, but I am very glad to give you my opinion.

Our whole conception of war in the Pacific has been to be on the offensive, and that we would go on the offensive and that our combat forces, sea forces, would be taken away from here. Our J. C. D. is based on the supposition that the fleet would be away from here and that the Army General and the Commandant of this District would have to defend this place the best they could and with what they had.

That is the reason the Navy Department put in this building program and allowed 108 patrol planes for this place, so that when the fleet went away they would always have something here for distant reconnaissance. However, we never have been able to get on the offensive.

The question arises, Why weren't we able to get on the offensive? Now, a highly ethical question arises, a question which involves national honor and national ethics. Why didn't we do this to Japan before they did it to us?

The **CHAIRMAN.** Could we have done it?

Admiral Bloch. I think so, sir. If they can do it, we can do it. We are better than they are. There is no doubt in my mind but what we are better than they are. If we can get at them, we can lick them, and if we have the tools to do it with.

General McCoy. We still have.

Admiral Bloch. But some of them are pretty badly dulled.

I may say that my personal discussions on this thing and my personal opinion, which probably are not worth putting down on paper—

The **CHAIRMAN.** They are very much worth being put down.

[780] **General McCoy.** When you were Cincus you would not have stayed here defending Hawaii, would you?

Admiral Bloch. When I was Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet they would not have found any of our ships here. They would have always been somewhere else, but sooner or later they would come in here on detachment.

The **CHAIRMAN.** For refueling and repairing?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN.** And for reconditioning?

Admiral Bloch. Yes. This base here is really a great big service station. Ships which come in here are supposed to be entitled to rest, freedom from watches, and sufficient time to put oil, food, and stores on board, and for hospitalization and recreation, and then to stay here a few days and then to go out. They are not supposed to stay here. The place is supposed to be so defended that they do not have to do that, sir.

General McCoy. Where did you keep your main fleet when you were in command?

Admiral BLOCH. When I was in command of the fleet the normal bases were on the West Coast of North America, in the United States. On one occasion, from the 1st of January, 1939, I was directed to take the entire fleet to the Atlantic, and we took them to the Atlantic. We had our maneuvers and war games in the Caribbean and out in the Middle Atlantic, and at the termination of these activities we all went to ports on the North Atlantic and the South Atlantic Coast. We were here only two days until we got an order to get under way and return to the West Coast. This was in a tense period.

We turned around within two days then and started west and came back to the West Coast and remained there the entire time that I retained command of the fleet.

General McCoy. What year was that?

Admiral BLOCH. I was in command of the battle force for [781] one year and in command of the Fleet for two years.

General McCoy. What year with the Fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. With the Fleet, 1938 to 1940.

General McCoy. 1938 to 1940?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. When did the Fleet come to Hawaii as a fleet and with bases in Hawaii?

Admiral BLOCH. The Fleet came to Hawaii in April, 1940.

General McCoy. After you were relieved as Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. Just after I arrived here as Commander-in-Chief they came here for a two-weeks visit. That was for fleet problems and maneuvers. At the termination of the problems and the maneuvers they came into Honolulu Harbor, and they were then supposed to return to the West Coast.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they ever returned to the West Coast?

Admiral BLOCH. Not as a fleet. They returned, but not a complete fleet.

General McCoy. In other words, the Fleet has been based here since that time?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you remember the habits of your successor as to entering Pearl Harbor with his main striking force, his battle force? In other words, I am trying to make a comparison with respect to this present condition of the whole fleet practically, the battle fleet in Pearl Harbor. Has that been the custom, for the Fleet to come in here, during Admiral Richardson's command, if you remember?

Admiral BLOCH. When Admiral Richardson first arrived in April he thought that he was going to stay two weeks. He had the whole fleet in here for repairs before he went back to the Coast. As time went on he ascertained that his stay here was indefinite. He did not know how long he was going to stay and he changed, altered his plans.

[782] He then adopted the practice of having one half of the fleet in and one half out. He had two big units that went to sea, and they would go out for ten days and in for two weeks, and then out for ten days.

It was largely at my request that he had fixed the days for coming in and for going out. The reason being that I desired to economize

on the tug hire, as I desired to have as little interruption with the dredging operations in the channel as possible. He had them going in and out all the time, and that stopped the dredging, and I wanted to have them on certain days.

Then, later on in Admiral Richardson's encumbancy I think he began to alter the days of entrance and sortie. He sent back to the coast units of three battleships, nine destroyers, and three cruisers, small forces of the fleet, for a tour of two or three weeks, and then they would come back. In the meantime, half of what was left was still going on.

General McCox. During that period there were problems whenever the fleet was at sea, I imagine?

Admiral BLOCH. They conducted training to a large extent: gunnery practice, steaming without lights, night gunnery practice, and anti-aircraft gunnery and trying out the various forms of tactics and strategy.

Largely it was training, a training practice. The turnover of the enlisted personnel at that time was quite heavy. The men were coming together, enlisted men, and there were new ones always coming in. It was a constant coming together, and it required constant training of officers and men.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to have the Commission know what the routine of training was throughout the year. Will you explain what it was throughout the year?

Admiral BLOCH. Due to the fact that a large number of [783] officers and personnel was transferred to new duties and to the fleet, we had adopted the annual cycle of training to begin about the first of July. Then we would try to get all the new officers and many of the new men coming in and then we started out with the elemental forms of gunnery, and as we went on we would work up to the more delicate problems as they became more familiar with them. About the first of June every year the fleet was in top form. They had these trained men on them and they would take many of them to sea.

They had the engineering training, searching out boats, firing, repairing the machinery, keeping the machinery going, maintaining high speeds over long periods and running without lights, and so on.

General McCox. These problems were when the fleet was at sea.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCox. During this period since you have been District Commander here or since the fleet has been based here, have there been any problems in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so, sir.

General McCox. I mean in the sense of protection against what occurred?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, many of them. Many of them. We had occasion for exercises when the carrier has been sent to sea and has been directed to send its planes and make a raiding attack here from an unknown position. We did not know where it was, and we would sound an air raid alarm, and the Army interceptors would check with the Army bombers, and the Army bombers would take off and the Navy interceptors would report to the Army interceptors, and the patrol planes would take off and make reconnaissance and try to find the carrier. The carrier had a large target and the bombers would

drop bombs on the target. There were numerous instances of those drills.

[784] The CHAIRMAN. And part of that was the manning of the anti-aircraft by such of the fleet as were in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, all ships in the harbor manned the anti-aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel had a diagram by which he divided the sectors of fire from the various battleships. There was a drawing.

Admiral BLOCH. I did not know about that. We call this the naval base defense here.

General McCoy. Did these movements, that were shown to be necessary in the problems, go into effect automatically when the fleet came in, in these normal movements in and out of the harbor, or while they were in the harbor?

Admiral BLOCH. They were in effect all the time, sir, and we had frequent drills. Once a week we had a blackout drill. Normally we had that on Sunday night. The reason for having it on Sunday night was that that was the only night of the week that we did not have men out under water working in the construction of the drydock, and we did not want to risk their lives, so we had it on Sunday for about twenty minutes or so—9:10 to 9:30, say. We had a lane for everything going in or out, and had the men in the power houses to cut the switches. Once a week in the early period we had these drills.

On one occasion we had a plane come in and drop incendiaries. We were teaching the people about incendiaries and what to do with them. On another occasion we had a plane come in and drop a mine and we had a mine recovery unit and a mine lookout unit, and they were supposed to take this mine, and we showed them what to do with it. We tried to cover all the cases and to drill them for it. We tried to visualize everything.

General McCoy. Did you visualize at any time an attack by torpedo planes in the harbor?

[785] Admiral BLOCH. I did not, sir. The best information on that was in the Navy Department, in the Bureau of Ordnance, and among our discussions and in correspondence we had received definite information, a definite statement from the Navy Department to the effect that torpedoes could not be dropped effectively in less than 70 feet of water, and we did not have that much water here, so we did not think it was a problem.

General McCoy. Has there been any modification of that communication since then that you are conscious of?

Admiral BLOCH. I have heard of none, sir.

General McCoy. To whom was that letter addressed?

The CHAIRMAN. That was addressed to Admiral Kimmel.

General McCoy. Did you ever see any letter addressed to Admiral Kimmel which modified that statement of the Department?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, I do not recall any, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I do not think it modified it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, at the end of that letter they still stated that they thought it was not necessary to put these booms in. They referred to Taranto and stated that although it might modify it possibly, they still insisted that there was no necessity for the booms, under the circumstances.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to say something on the question of baffles. By "baffles" we mean "nets." This harbor is quite a large harbor and we have a fine channel.

However, when you begin to obstruct it with nets—and one net is not 100% effective, but two nets placed 100 feet apart and 50 or 100 feet from the shipside, that is supposed to be 90% effective. When you place these nets in the harbor off the shipside 200 feet, or 66 yards, you are encroaching very much on the seaplane takeoff.

One of our great difficulties in this place has been not only the clearance for our surface ships but we must also keep the seaplane takeoff clear at all times. We put a buoy in the [786] harbor to aid our ships, to aid them in the takeoff, but every so often one of these seaplanes comes down and hits the buoy and we lose the plane and kill a lot of men.

That has been the constant experience and anxiety and the responsibility of the people here, and we have tried to keep them clear.

General McCoy. That would not be the case with our baffles on December 7th.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. I meant to put it in the form of a question. I did not mean to make it in the form of a statement.

Admiral BLOCH. We had our planes go down a line, like a lane. You could draw a line covering your reasonable clearance on each side, but our planes are like everything else. They get off the road a little to the side of the line, and that question of baffles is being considered in connection with placing the seaplane lanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where are the seaplane lanes on this map?

Admiral BLOCH. This F-2 berth here is a carrier berth, and the seaplane lane passes about 100 yards northeast of Hospital Point and about 100 yards off ship F-2, and then in an easterly direction usually leaving the water about F-4 or F-5 and climbing so as to clear the ships in the sea berths, banking to the left, climbing, and heading out. That is the seaplane area (indicating).

General McCoy. Has that been used now since 7 December?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. I notice that there are baffles there now.

Admiral BLOCH. On this side, sir (indicating).

General McCoy. So far as I can remember, there are some in here (indicating on map) and some in here (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. We have a baffle here today (indicating) which I put down. It runs from here to here (indicating). We have target rafts there (indicating). The target rafts cross [787] here (indicating). This brings the caissons to these drydocks (indicating). We have tried to close up the target rafts with improvised nets suspended under them, to put this in position here (indicating) so a torpedo could not be fired in there (indicating).

So far as I know, there are no baffles on that side (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the floating drydock?

Admiral BLOCH. The floating drydock is in here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the observation tower where we were?

Admiral BLOCH. The observation tower is right here (indicating).

General McCoy. This is where the ARIZONA is? (Indicating)

Admiral BLOCH. That is it.

General McCoy. I noticed something in here (indicating).

Admiral BLOCH. There is no baffle there, sir, that I know of, and I think I would know about it. I think the Commandant of the Navy Yard would know about it since I have been relieved of those duties. I have been relieved in that respect to take over other matters.

General McCoy. I noticed that the ships were moored two and two along that mooring. Why was that?

Admiral BLOCH. I can only answer that by saying that I assume that they had two and two to accommodate them. There are three carrier berths for the F-9 and F-10. We tried to always keep this clear for carriers, and sometimes we put a seaplane down on one, which is F-10. Both berths were taken, either singly or doubly, so there were not enough berths for them all to go singly.

General McCoy. That would indicate that there was no thought of any danger from air attack?

[788] Admiral BLOCH. The responsibility, according to Admiral Kimmel's orders, is vested in the senior officer present embarked, as shown in this order on page 4, G-4.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the disposition of the fleet in the harbor was the responsibility of the senior officer in port embarked.

Admiral BLOCH. The mechanics of assigning the berths, as I recall it, was the Commander-in-Chief getting out an order on the subject that certain berths were available to carriers and certain berths were available to battleships, and certain berths were available to cruisers, and certain berths were available to destroyers, and certain berths were available to auxiliary vessels.

In addition, there were two or three berths at the Navy Yard which could be used for battleships or for cruisers if and when the Navy Yard did not need them for repair purposes.

The next step was to tell the various battleship, cruiser, and destroyer commanders where their battleships, destroyers, and cruisers were to go.

General McCoy. If there had been anticipated the danger from an air raid such as occurred, what do you think would have been the proper disposition of the battleships?

Admiral BLOCH. The orders contemplated that in an air raid or the imminence of an air raid, that the fleet sorties to get as many out as they could.

General McCoy. I assume that at the time on the 7th of December that there was no anticipation on the part of the Navy of an air raid?

Admiral BLOCH. Nothing that I know of, sir. I have not discussed it, and I don't think anyone else discussed it or considered that an air raid was possible.

General McCoy. There was consideration given to the fact that while the fleet was in here there was danger from submarines?

[789] Admiral BLOCH. In 1938, when the fleet came to Pearl Harbor, there were no security orders in effect. So, acting as Commander-in-Chief, I directed the Commander of the Base Force and the Commandant, District, to put into effect security measures, the proper security measures.

At that time no carrier had ever come into Pearl Harbor. These carriers normally anchored at Waikiki. Security provisions were put into effect for a channel entrance at Pearl Harbor. One of our most probable forms of attack was a block ship coming in between the fleet and the channel and blocking the ships.

We had a channel entrance patrol listening for submarines and getting instructions on vessels coming in. We allowed for a destroyer at Waikiki to guard the carriers there, and we also made provisions for certain type of weapons, machine guns, and measures were put in force as a protection against sabotaging ships from sampans and small boats on the shore side.

Up until 1941 more or less the same provisions remained in existence. In 1941 Admiral Kimmel decided that he wanted to transfer these security measures from the base force to somebody who was permanently on shore.

He asked me to take it over, and I told him I would do what I possibly could. I felt that I had enough to do already, but I was willing to take it, and that is the inception of this base defense order, the naval base defense order here, or rather this is the fleet security order, which is a modification of the other.

I think it should be understood that the naval base defense order is purely a naval order. That was for the purpose of the security of the fleet not only against submarines and block ships, but the fact that they might possibly stage an air raid at some time, and there would be a provision for it. [790] That is with the understanding that the naval base defense force and the commandant of the district only had a force relating to the channel entrance patrol by mine sweeping, and all the other forces came from the fleet, namely the ships in the sectors and shore-based aircraft over which the commandant only had supervisory control. Under existing danger that supervisory control would be transferred to the qualified fleet rear admiral who had the actual command, and for this aircraft that was Admiral Bellinger, in command of patwing 2, the air base defense officer.

In this defense order, which started and was used as a method of control for a period of months, they tried to get the Army in on it so that if we had a sudden transition from peace to war that the thing would work naturally. I think they did all in their power to do it and they cooperated very well on it.

General McCoy. Before December 7th had you thought it possible for airplanes to put six battleships out of commission in so short a time?

Admiral BLOCH. Not in Pearl Harbor. In the first place, I did not think they could use torpedoes in Pearl Harbor. I think I had definite authority for that then, that they could not use torpedoes. While I knew that bombs are extremely destructive, I did not have very much apprehension that battleships could be bombed enough to penetrate decks and to get into the machinery parts because the battleships are very heavily protected against that form of attack. I knew that there might always be a hit close to a ship which might do underwater damage, but I thought the protection was sufficient to protect against such underwater damage.

General McCoy. Has there been anything in the war up to date before this that would indicate that battleships are so vulnerable to airplane torpedo attacks?

Admiral BLOCH. Only one similar instance, so far as I know, [791] and that is Taranto. I knew the British went in there and made a torpedo attack, and I knew the torpedoes were effective and I

knew that certain Italian battleships were put out of commission, but whether permanently or temporarily, I do not know.

General McCoy. Has this attack shown that the Japanese have some new form of torpedo?

Admiral BLOCH. A much greater power.

General McCoy. Than any others?

Admiral BLOCH. We have recovered some of their torpedoes. The torpedoes themselves from the viewpoint of mechanism are very antiquated. They had torpedoes in use, the steering gear and so forth, that we were using back in 1905 and 1906. They used Whitehead engines and they had very small air flasks and probably a very short range and at a very slow speed, but they carried a tremendous explosive charge. One torpedo that we recovered from the submarine had a thousand pound explosive charge in it.

Now, one of these torpedoes would not destroy a battleship or sink it, but put four or five of those torpedoes close alongside and it will sink it. I am trying to tell you just what has happened.

General McCoy. An examination has not disclosed how many torpedoes hit our battleships?

Admiral BLOCH. Most of our examinations have been made by divers, necessarily, and we have not the information of the damage yet. The best that could be determined by the divers in some of the ships in question is that the damage is quite extensive. I do not know how many torpedoes there were.

General McCoy. Do you know how many torpedoes struck the NEVADA as it was going out?

Admiral BLOCH. My recollection may be wrong, but I think it was two.

General McCoy. Were they from a plane or from a submarine?

[792] Admiral BLOCH. They were from a plane.

Incidentally, that NEVADA incident was one of the incidents which showed very heroic action.

The NEVADA was standing out in pursuance of this base defense order to go out. Either one plane or two planes or three planes attacked it. I think three planes attacked it and torpedoed it, and there were some planes bombing it at the same time. She immediately lost her power, her electricity, and she was helpless and adrift, but two Navy Yard tugs, manned entirely by enlisted men, went out in literally a hail of bombs and machine gunfire and went alongside that ship and took her and pushed her on the beach near Hospital Point. I do not know their names. I am trying to find out, but it was quite a feat, and it gives you great faith in your men.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was to keep her from sinking in the channel?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. It was in the direction of Hospital Point. I was notified and I directed the men to push her to the Waipio side. The ship is there, chained to the shore, so that she won't slip in the channel because the channel is very deep there. She is resting practically on the bottom and partially afloat.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have a few questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. Since December 7th you said you had been relieved of your duties as Commandant of the Yard?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that a permanent setup now?

Admiral BLOCH. Immediately after December 7th I found that I had so many additional and arduous duties imposed on me by what had happened that I asked Admiral Kimmel to give me Admiral Furlong as an assistant, inasmuch as Admiral Furlong's flagship [793] had been sunk.

He issued the order and Admiral Furlong reported to me as assistant commandant, and I specifically assigned him to the industrial and the salvage end, and to certain other lines that I did not have time to take care of.

I believe that Admiral Kimmel informed the Navy Department that he had done so, because within a few days orders came from the Navy Department detaching me from the Yard, continuing the duties as Commandant, and then Admiral Furlong took the Yard.

Of course the whole thing is a very difficult thing because of the fact that for thirty years one man has been doing both jobs, and to keep down overhead, clerks, officers, and everything else, and we had only one set of clerks, officers, and so on.

Now they have two which means two sets of clerks, officers, and two aides, and so on.

Then, in order to save, particularly on the tugs, automobiles, and a hundred other things, I simply directed them to use these things without distinction, so that they could use them as a pool.

First, take the waters in the harbor. The only waters which belong to the Navy Yard are those repair berths, but I only had one captain in the Yard, and if he had the tugs, the same one man would run the gate, and the same one man would run the boilers; so I told the captain to run all the water, and he is still running all the water, so far as I know, because otherwise they have this double set of jobs. They will have to take these vessels and use the vessels; so it will require cooperation with respect to this pool.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Department has recognized the need for that situation?

Admiral BLOCH. The Department issued an order.

General MCCOY. The captain of the Yard is not under you?

[794] Admiral BLOCH. He is under the Commandant of the Navy Yard, yes. He has been all the time except that one man formerly had both jobs.

Admiral STANDLEY. With reference to the discussion of the torpedo attack on this harbor and with reference to the letters from the Navy Department in which they announced the decision not to install anti-torpedo baffles in this harbor, and in view of the fact that you were commander and one time chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, and a graduate of the post-graduate course in ordnance, and somewhat of an expert in ordnance, did your opinion coincide with that of the Department in regard to these baffles?

Admiral BLOCH. When I left the Bureau of Ordnance in 1927, aircraft torpedoes were in their infancy. They were in their infancy then. You had to get quite close to the water to drop them, and they were very erratic; and so, based on my experience I really knew nothing about it and I had to depend on the people who were supposed to be in the know, up-to-date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, referring to the questions in regard to double berthings, within your knowledge, have the fleet visits to this harbor, their entrance into and berthing in the harbor, been used in order to determine the base needs for the fleet in here?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that all the berthing capacity of the harbor is based on what the fleet might need. There are projects for additional berths. I do not know whether the money has even been appropriated for them. It has been discussed.

Take, for instance, the berths for airplane carriers. When an airplane carrier comes into port for two weeks' repair, if she leaves the planes on deck, the flyers go stale during those two weeks; they cannot fly. So, the provision was that when a carrier came in, the planes would fly away to some shore [795] base so that these flyers can exercise every day. In past days when the fleet was in here for one week or two weeks, the planes were left on board the carrier. But as soon as these short visits of the fleet had become long visits, then we had to make some sort of arrangements to take care of these carrier planes when they were in port.

In sending them to a shore base you run up against the capacity of the field, taxing the field facilities for this large number of personnel, and not only the pilots, but the mechanics and ground crews also. That is, on many occasions we found that these ground crews had to live right close to the berths, and we built a catwalk over one so that they could come ashore every morning.

So we attempted to make more berths here available in order to place the carriers somewhere near the land where the carrier planes would be based. We were considering having carrier seaplanes around here (indicating on map) and around here (indicating).

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, the facilities of this harbor were in a constant state of development, depending on the fleet needs as they developed?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the doubling up in berths was for the purpose of taking care of ships in the harbor as they came in?

Admiral BLOCH. I think you have to say there were on that day two berths vacant. F-2 was vacant and F-9 was vacant, and it was possible to have a battleship at F-2 and it was possible to have a battleship at F-9, and to have the other berths occupied by smaller vessels. These berths are controlled by the fleet.

So, with the UTAH at F-11, a battleship could have gone to F-11 and the UTAH could have gone somewhere else.

The RALEIGH was at F-12. A battleship could have gone to [796] F-12 and the RALEIGH somewhere else. The DETROIT was at F-13. A battleship could have gone to F-13, and the DETROIT could have gone somewhere else. So, you see, it would be possible for the berths to have these battleships and to have the doubling up.

Admiral STANDLEY. But the routine was to have the battleships berthed and doubled up?

Admiral BLOCH. They have doubled up before, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was another incident on the morning of December 7. There was a submarine sunk?

Admiral BLOCH. At 6:57.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that was reported to you immediately?

Admiral BLOCH. At 7:12 I received it.

Admiral STANDLEY. What did you do when you got that report?

Admiral BLOCH. My thought was, Is it a correct report or is it another false report? because we had got them before. I said, "Find out about it."

The chief of staff reported it to me. It was reported to the Commander-in-Chief and reported to me at the same time.

When it came to me the chief of staff was there and I said, "Is this a false report, or do you know anything about it?"

He said, "Well, this is the despatch," and he read the despatch to me. Afterward it was borne out that it wasn't given to him correctly or he didn't understand it; I don't know which.

However, I could not tell whether it was a bona fide report or whether it was a sound contact or whether he had actually seen it. In other words, many times you get a sound contact and it does not turn out to be correct. If you see it, it is usually correct.

I said, "What have you done about it?"

[797] He said, "Commander Momsen," who lived next to him and who is here, "said he will let you know as soon as he finds out."

I did not hear anything until I heard the explosion in close proximity to my house, and that was around 7:55.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether or not any report of that was made to the Army by the Navy?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge. Commander Momsen just said it was not. It was a naval matter. As justification for this attack, Mr. Justice, you asked me yesterday, "Who started the war?"—well, the President issued a proclamation prohibiting submarines from running submerged within the territorial waters and the area three miles south of the entrance to Pearl Harbor, three miles square, and that vicinity is the area in which all ships are prohibited from entering without the consent of the authority in command. So the legal grounds are sound.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you give us a list of the recommendations for improvements of the facilities in this harbor? I mean a list of things that have been recommended but are being held in abeyance for lack of funds or priorities. Can you give us such a list?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have many projects here?

Admiral BLOCH. There are a great many live projects here, so far as construction is concerned, but the mere addition, the appropriation of money is no good. I have more money now than I can expend. There is not enough men to get the money working.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is what I would like to get: a list of these items and the reasons why they have not been accomplished, either for lack of funds or any other reason.

General McNARNEY. Could you add the list of priorities. [798] under which you are working?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, that is since December 7th?

General McNARNEY. That is what I want.

The CHAIRMAN. We want the new ones. That is what we want.

Admiral BLOCH. Well, along the lines of Admiral Standley's question, I would like to say that my requests to the Department have been

repeated and persistent, about certain things, about getting the necessary ships here for the patrolling of this area.

It is not sufficient to patrol around Honolulu or Pearl Harbor—which is the most important place—but the normal economic life of these islands and the other islands must go on. You must keep the people employed. You must maintain the livelihood of every man who works on a sugar plantation or a pineapple plantation on these other islands.

There are a number of them, what we call nisei. That is first generation Japanese, American citizens.

These men must be kept employed and they must have their means of livelihood or you will have them around your necks. You must patrol with respect to the vessels out of this harbor and the other islands to protect against submarines here; you have to keep the ships going back and forth, bringing your sugar and pineapples back, and the wages and what they are to buy with their wages, and so forth. Today we have not enough ships here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you furnish us with that list?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes. The Navy Department has it, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But we would like to have it, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. I would like to read this. The Navy Department said in reply to my requests:

[799] The augmentation of local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District is proceeding as fast as the availability of the ships, funds, personnel, matériel and priorities will permit.

Now, Mr. Sarnoff, who has something to do with the listening gear, is here, and I got him in the corner and said, "Why could we not get more? Why can't we get these?"

Then about the aircraft. We have a big aircraft building program. In connection with the aircraft building program there are 108 patrol planes which are to be used for distant reconnaissance or for district purposes by the Army when the fleet will be away and they take their force away with them. I think these planes are promised for somewhere during the end of 1942 or the first part of 1943.

In a recent letter to Admiral Kimmell I requested him to please give me some small planes to get out and look around here. The problem was to have some small planes for looking out for submarines.

He told me he had none to spare. He wrote the Navy Department and asked for 24. I urged it. They came back and they had none to give to me.

The Army has by J. C. D. 42 an offshore patrol and an air patrol. It is their responsibility by the joint agreement, but they haven't any planes suitable for that purpose.

I think General Martin told me that he had only three that could be used for that purpose. You cannot use these big planes for that. You cannot use the fighters for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Admiral BLOCH. The fighter is a one-man plane.

The CHAIRMAN. He cannot drop a bomb?

Admiral BLOCH. He cannot drop a bomb. Then they are too big and they cannot see very well.

As I understand it, in the conference with General Martin [800] the last time I talked to him—and I had several conferences with him—I think he said he had only three planes which were useful for this purpose.

I asked and I do not know whether General Martin was here last year, but they came over and arranged with the commander of the submarine force to patrol with them and see what a submarine looked like submerged and on the surface. I think they did that. I think they made an honest effort to try to do these things, but I do not think they had the planes suitable for that purpose.

When was he last time I sent you over to discuss it, Commander Momsen?

Commander MOMSEN. The 25th of November, and they had only two planes then. One of the three had been cracked up.

Admiral BLOCH. None of them had depth charges. They could carry bombs but not depth charges.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give us a list of your requests that you made?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I do not want the Commission to think that I am complaining, complaining about what I have not gotten, about what the Department has not sent down for me, because I think the Department has done its level best.

General McNARNEY. The same problems have existed in other commands.

Admiral BLOCH. I know all these men in the Department are just as loyal and just as honest and just as conscientious as I am and they are doing their level best. I know they are doing their level best and I have been trying to do my level best. I could not do as well probably, and I do not know anybody who could do better.

I do not know why I should even mention these things except that I have been asked these questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is very important that we should [801] know the conditions, whether it is somebody's fault or nobody's fault.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the situation. We want to know the conditions.

When I was in London a short time ago I passed an aircraft factory making spare parts, and the factory was located in a sort of rectangle, surrounded on all sides by roads, and over that factory area they had smudge, smoke pots, with apparently a can with a smokestack in it, and the purpose of that was that when there was a raid they would light the smokestacks on the windward side which set up a smokescreen over that whole factory area.

Does it occur to you that might possibly be used here?

Admiral BLOCH. It has been discussed for some time. I suggested to my subordinates—and I am an inventor too—to put some oil tanks over to windward or some oil fuel there, and in case of an air raid you could fire them, make a fire, and cover everything; but then they run into the question of our own fighters. Our fighters must take off in this way over here (indicating on the map). They land the planes and take off here (indicating). The seaplanes here (indicating) and the land planes here (indicating). The Army takes off down here (indicating), and you run into these conditions all over.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the same thing with the balloons?

Admiral BLOCH. We discussed balloons. I recall that General Short had been harangued by the air people and he said he should throw them out. I advised him to put that J. C. D. 42 in, but they left the question of balloons to future consideration and determination. In other words, they left it as an open question.

Is that correct?

Commander MOMSEN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. On April 11th you and General Short signed jointly the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

[802] Admiral STANDLEY. You refer to the method of unity of command as prescribed in Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 5. Are the plans for the defense of this area—the plans of the Commanding General and the plans of the Commandant of the District and the Commander-in-Chief—are those plans based on a definite program of defense outlined by the Department?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't know which you are referring to. My Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is dated 11 April 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is right. And paragraph 3—

Admiral BLOCH. 3.

Admiral STANDLEY. —method of coordination.

Admiral BLOCH. Coordination will be by mutual cooperation.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but you speak of Joint Action of the Army and Navy 1935. Are not the plans for this area based upon joint mission and a joint action by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. This whole Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is based on the master plan, which is gotten out by General Short—by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. This is a corollary to the basic plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is your plan—

Admiral BLOCH. To support that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your own plan to support the main plan?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. He gets the Naval District and ultimately get the War Department operations order.

Admiral STANDLEY. I know all about the Navy. This is something you fellows don't know about.

Now, in following up this joint agreement in which the Commandant was responsible for distant reconnaissance, and it was to be by mutual cooperation, and so forth, on the 5th [803] of November General Short issued a Standing Operating Procedure?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Covering the duties and responsibilities and operations of his whole command, describing certain alerts for certain conditions, and what not. Have you got any parallel to this for the Commandant of the District?

Admiral BLOCH. We have one. It's—oh, that's different. We have one, but it's a very secret classification. That is our war plan—I don't think this ought to go in the record, sir,—with all of our operating orders and everything.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Now, then, in the development of these individual plans or parallel plans did your war plans and General Short's war plans defense collaborate in working these up?

Admiral BLOCH. I am sure they were collaborating. I don't know whether we had anything to do with the preparation of General Short's standard procedure. That was the procedure. I don't know whether we had anything to do with that. As a matter of fact I could not identify it yesterday until it was shown to me and Commander Momsen said that he had it. I don't know how long—

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is your War Plans Officer?

Admiral BLOCH. Commander Momsen, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, we can call him later.

Admiral BLOCH. He has only been here a very short time. I will say that he has only been here since—August?

Commander MOMSEN. No, sir. October.

Admiral BLOCH. October.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. And do you know whether or not in your war plans in the development of these things there is an exchange of information back and forth?

Admiral BLOCH. I am quite sure there is, certainly.

Commander MOMSEN. Very free.

Admiral BLOCH. What?

[804] Commander MOMSEN. Very free exchange of information.

Admiral BLOCH. I am quite sure there is. My previous War Plans Officer was Captain Gill, and half the time he was at General Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department. And Colonel Throckmorton and various members of the Army General Staff were down in our office. Sometimes I saw them and discussed matters with them, and I know the interchange of information was free and full.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know, sir, what orders General Short had issued as a result of the November 27 message from General Marshall?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir, not specifically. I saw General Short very frequently. We discussed matters of interest. We usually were, both of us, quite busy, and when we saw each other we had something definite to talk about.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that his order—

Admiral BLOCH (interposing). I knew that he was on an alert. He told me that he was on an alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you know that his alert was the alert he had provided against sabotage?

Admiral BLOCH. Not until after December 7. After December 7 I went to visit General Short in his office to discuss certain matters with him, and I asked him—I said, "Weren't you on the alert?" That I understood you to tell me, that you were on the alert. He said, "Oh, I was on the alert that related to sabotage only," and he had a number for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes: No. 1.

Admiral BLOCH. Now, you see, maybe he told me Alert 1, and maybe I made a mistake because of the numbers. Our Condition 1 is our highest condition.

The CHAIRMAN. Just the reverse of his.

Admiral BLOCH. You see, our Condition 1 is the highest condition we can go to. Now, I don't know how I got that [805] impression, but I had the definite impression that he was on a real alert.

The CHAIRMAN. A high alert?

Admiral BLOCH. High alert, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, in developing your plans for the defense weren't your plans based on a war condition: that is, the condition that would hold if war was declared?

Admiral BLOCH. This whole Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan is based on the basic war plan, and the basic war plan is not put into effect until the Navy Department tells us to put it into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. What I am trying to get at, this procedure here, you see—take the Alert No. 1, the interceptor command, you see: it's a war procedure. Now, you have got an ideal plan there: when war breaks you do so and so. Well, now, what I am trying to get at, there are certain things in both plans that are not in effect until war breaks.

General McNARNEY. One of the messages put it "WPL. 2CL-41."

Commander MOMSEN. That's right; on the 7th, WPL.

Admiral BLOCH. We got this after the order went into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the famous telegram that didn't get through.

Admiral BLOCH. This JCD-42 is based on the basic war plan, and although it says that

This agreement is in effect immediately and will remain in effect until it is renounced or part of it is renounced by one side or the other,

that was only the agreement, because this is a corollary to the basic war plan, and the basic war plan wasn't put into effect until after this thing happened.

General McCoy. What was your conception of the dispatch of November 27 which started out, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral BLOCH. General McCoy, that dispatch arrived here in the afternoon of November 27, and I had left the Yard [806] to go to the hospital to see a patient at the hospital, and they sent for my chief of staff, Captain Earle, and he went over, and they showed him this dispatch, and while he was there an Army officer came in with the General's copy of the—I think this is correct; I may be wrong, because this is some yarn that I have heard: that an Army officer came in with a copy of the dispatch that General Short had received, and Admiral Kimmel made arrangements. I understood that his dispatch—he was directed to show his dispatch to the military authorities, that he made arrangements that his dispatch was to go to General Short.

Now, I didn't see the dispatch, the original dispatch, but they paraphrased it. Our regulations require that a secret dispatch can be written but one place: one copy, one place. That is for security of the code. But they twist the words around and make new phrases and give you a paraphrase, and that is what was sent to me, and it was in effect a war warning, as I remember the wording, and it also stated, as I remember, that the peace—the negotiations had ceased. I think that was an unfortunate expression in this way: because three or four days later when the negotiations were re-opened they were no longer ceased, and it had the effect of nullifying that dispatch. I think that is a logical conclusion.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the habit of the Japanese to attack before declaration of war?

Admiral BLOCH. I knew of their past history in the Russian War, their attack on Chemulpo; I knew of their attacks in the China incidents of 1932 and 1936. I knew they had—that was their procedure, but I still believe—

General McCoy. And that was also the case in all the Axis attacks on Czecho Slovakia and Austria.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.

General McCoy. And Poland and Russia, and so forth.

Admiral BLOCH. But I still believed, as I said earlier in the day, from information that I had received, that this [807] movement of the Japanese which was in the offing would be directed against Southeastern China; and even if they attacked Southeastern China and they attacked the British in Malaya and even if they attacked the Dutch East Indies, I didn't think that they would take on another adversary unless they had to.

General McCoy. Especially as they were still having peace conferences?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir. And, furthermore, I didn't feel at all sure what our country was going to do even if they had done all those things. And I thought that the Japanese had their hands full and they had all these things, and they didn't—they probably had decided that we wouldn't do anything, or they had decided something—obviously, they must have decided that we were going to do something, or they wouldn't have made that attack, because I don't think they wanted to go to war with us while they were in all this other trouble. All of my information was to the effect that nobody in Washington was even certain what was to be done.

Of course, you can try to prevent your being influenced by the public press, but subconsciously it gets in its work. It does affect—you read these speeches by various men that are interested in this and interested in that, and talks of disunity and talks of what the probable action will be, and challenges to put this up to Congress to see if they will declare war, and so forth. All of those things may have a subconscious effect on you.

Admiral STANLEY. Admiral, there have been numerous reports of evidence that certain of these Japanese that had been recovered, either from the submarine or from planes, have had indications that they were graduates of certain colleges, colleges here, in the way of rings and so forth. Have you received any official report to that effect?

Admiral BLOCH. No official reports. I have heard it, [808] and probably have been unwise enough to repeat it once or twice, but so far as I know the reports are unsubstantiated.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we thank you very much indeed, sir.

Admiral BLOCH. Thank you, sir, very much, for your consideration and courtesy.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope you will observe what I said yesterday about no communications about what has been said here.

General McCoy. We have questioned the Admiral, haven't we, about the conduct of his troops, and so forth?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we have not.

General MCCOY. We did Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. We did Admiral Kimmel. I think we asked you about the shore patrol, didn't we? About whether you had a shore patrol?

Admiral BLOCH. I didn't have the shore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't have the shore patrol. If you think it is worthwhile we might ask him about that.

General MCCOY. Well, I think as a matter of record we might have that.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral, there have been considerable rumors and communications to this Commission indicating that officers and men of the Fleet were in no condition to serve on the morning of December 7 because they had been to drunken parties the night before. What if anything do you know about that?

Admiral BLOCH. I have no knowledge of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard anything that is credible on that subject?

Admiral BLOCH. None at all, nothing whatever. I will say further, speaking generally, that the discipline, behavior, conduct, and morale of the men attached to the Navy and Army here is of the highest possible standard.

[809] The CHAIRMAN. You have had a great deal of experience in a long life of service in the Navy.

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are the conditions, in your judgment, in Hawaii better or worse than they have been in your past experience at other places?

Admiral BLOCH. Normal. Absolutely normal. For instance, we have the recreation center in the Navy Yard. When that was opened in August probably one quarter of the men who formerly went to town ceased to go to town; they would go to the recreation center, and they would play billiards and pool, and they would have boxing matches and motion pictures. And they also sold beer there. But it had a tremendous effect on keeping men out of town, and that was what we were anxious to do. We had rare cases of misconduct. I don't think that the number of general courts martial that I have ordered in the past year will exceed 45.

Admiral STANDLEY. Men and officers?

Admiral BLOCH. Men and officers. And we have a lot of them. I suppose that we have 3,500 men, something like that. Very small percentage. So far as I know, the conduct of the officers has been good. I suppose there are rare cases of misconduct in the case of officers. In my district I think I have had two cases of officers that I had to court martial for—either court martial or request their resignation for unsobriety. The few men that I have court-martialed have either been for desertion or some man reported in from some ship that left here, and I tried him for desertion. There have been three or four cases of theft; clothing usually, in one case money. But—

The CHAIRMAN. How about drunkenness?

Admiral BLOCH. A few cases of drunkenness, sir.

General MCCOY. Out of how many men?

The CHAIRMAN. 3,500, he says.

Admiral BLOCH. I say that would probably be the average [810] over a year. Just now there are more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, are there any notorious places in and around Honolulu?

Admiral BLOCH. You mean houses of prostitution?

Admiral STANDLEY. No; I mean in the way of clubs or places where they might give parties, large parties that officers attend where there might be drinking or could be drinking, and a lot of insobriety, and so forth?

Admiral BLOCH. I think there are. I am not familiar with the night life in Honolulu, but I think there are. We have a club in the Navy Yard, an officers' club, that gave a dinner dance every Saturday night, and their capacity for dinner I think was 250 and for dancing about 450. The average Naval officer came to it because it didn't cost him anything. If he came to dinner it only cost him a dollar; if he came after dinner it didn't cost him anything. And they had good music, and those parties only lasted until midnight; I made them close at midnight.

General McCoy. Was there such a party on this particular Saturday night of the 6th?

Admiral BLOCH. I think so. I think they had them every Saturday night. Now, the territorial laws, which I followed in the Navy Yard, in the Naval District, all of the establishments of the Navy, prohibited any liquor being served after midnight, and it was strictly enforced, and we served nothing after midnight.

General McCoy. Has any church association or any temperance association or any woman's club protested to you about any conduct, of unusual or drunken conduct of your men?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't recall any specific complaint. I have an indistinct recollection of somebody writing in about something, and I had it investigated and found it to be unsubstantiated. That was several months ago. I sent it up to our intelligence office and told them to investigate the case, [811] and they reported—

General McCoy. Is there an Army and Navy YMCA in Honolulu?

Admiral BLOCH. Sir?

General McCoy. Is there an Army and Navy YMCA?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, quite a large one. Quite a large one, very well conducted. Very well conducted, very well run.

General McCoy. Is that a usual place of rendezvous of soldiers and sailors, so far as you know?

Admiral BLOCH. A great many of them go there and lounge, and a great many of them spend the night there. Most of the men who were unmarried and had no families here came back to their ships or the station. I should say, as a rough guess, that by midnight or 1 o'clock any given night when liberty men had gone ashore—in the first place, we only allowed about something like a quarter or a half of them to go, maybe a half in the afternoon and a quarter in the evening—that my estimate would be that by 1 o'clock probably 80% of them were back on board ship. They were better off on the ship, and they woke up at their job, and they have their breakfasts on board.

General McCoy. Do you have a hostess on the post here, an official hostess?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is always an officer in charge, I understand, at the recreation center.

Admiral BLOCH. We have an officer in charge there, sir, and my instructions to that officer were that officers would not be permitted to use the recreation center. It was for the enlisted men, and I didn't want to make them embarrassed by the presence of an officer, but there would always be an officer of the administration there to maintain order, and we also had a shore patrol detail there at all times to eject anybody who gave any trouble.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

[812] General McCoy. May I ask the Admiral where he was on Saturday night?

Admiral BLOCH. I think I went to bed about 8:30, sir. I was very tired, sir. I had played golf in the afternoon. I came home about 5:30 and had my dinner and read a book, and about 8:30 or 9 I think I went to bed.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all. Thank you, sir.

We shall have Captain McMorris.

I have here, gentlemen, the full list of the officers who were on and off the various ships, and the ships are classified in this list by their nature: battleships, cruisers, and so forth.

I have also here the shore patrol reports of the 6th, 7th, and 8th December; also the patrol logs submitted in answer to our request to Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel BROWN. We have Captain DeLany first on the list, and he is here.

General McCoy. Did I get into the record yesterday how many captains were aboard their ships?

The CHAIRMAN. You got something, but the Navy was not complete. Here it is complete. It is here now.

Will you be sworn, Captain?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name?

Captain DeLANY. Walter Stanley DeLany, Captain, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your duty, Captain DeLany, on December 7, 1941?

Captain DeLANY. I was Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer of the Commander-in-Chief, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As such officer was it part of your [813] function to know and to advise the Commander-in-Chief of enemy operations in the Pacific?

Captain DeLANY. Only partially, sir. My immediate duties as Operations Officer were the employment schedule of the Fleet that would combine the tactical training, the aviation training, the gunnery training, and the material upkeep of the Fleet into a schedule that would permit training for war. I was also responsible for the coordination of Fleet activities to match the plans of the War Section of the staff and for the organization of the Fleet into task forces

that would permit their training to match their missions as outlined by the War Plans Section of the Commander-in-Chief's staff.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you knowledge of the disposition of the forces on the night of December 6 and morning of December 7?

Captain DeLANY. Our own forces, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Our own forces.

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state what task forces were in harbor at Pearl Harbor on the night of December 6?

Captain DeLANY. May I refer to my notes?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Captain DeLANY. Task Force 1 was in port, and that was two divisions of battleships, five battleships total, one division of light cruisers; four cruisers; 17 destroyers in two squadrons; one destroyer flotilla flagship; one old mine layer, the OGLALA; a division of light mine layers under overhaul; and then the ships of the base force with the ARGONNE flagship, the repair ships, and the incidental vessels of the fleet that normally remain in port for services.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what task forces, in whole or in part, were at sea, and approximately where were they, on the night of December 6, morning of December 7?

Captain DeLANY. Task Force 8 in command of Vice Admiral [814] Halsey, with the carrier ENTERPRISE and a division of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers. They were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu. They were returning from an expedition to Wake Island, where they had landed a squadron of Marine fighters.

Task Force 12, consisting of the LEXINGTON and a division of heavy cruisers, five destroyers. They were approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway on a mission which required them to land a squadron of Marine bombers on that island. There were two submarines patrolling off Midway and two submarines patrolling off Wake, and there were four submarines returning to Oahu or Pearl Harbor from overhaul, and there were three en route from Mare Island and one joining the fleet, a new submarine. On the morning of the 7th there were three patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the security order in the operating areas to the southward of Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they Navy planes?

Captain DeLANY. Four patrol planes, yes, sir; four Navy patrol planes preparing to go to Lahina Roads to operate with the submarines in that area in a tactical exercise which involved the use of recognition between submarines and aircraft, identification of the submarines by aircraft, and training to develop intertype tactics that would permit either type to conduct the other by radio to intercept an attack of enemy forces. There was one heavy cruiser, the MINNEAPOLIS, with four light mine layers, operating to the southward of Oahu in intertype training, and one heavy cruiser, the INDIANAPOLIS, with four of the same type actually operating off Johnston Island to conduct training in reconnaissance of the island by aircraft and actual landing by using surf boats on the island.

I think that is about it.

The CHAIRMAN. That indicates the disposition of all the Naval forces?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, as I—

[815] The CHAIRMAN. At that time?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Where was Admiral Halsey's task force? I have forgotten that.

Captain DeLANY. About 200 miles west of Oahu, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Headed for Oahu?

Captain DeLANY. Headed for Oahu. And incidentally, in that connection, at 6:15 that morning he had launched a flight of 18 or 19 planes with a directive to search from his launching position a sector of 45—045 to 135 to a distance of 150 miles and then land at Ewa Field on the completion of that flight.

General McCoy. What field was that?

Captain DeLANY. Ewa Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Ewa.

Captain DeLANY. Where the Marines are.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the Marines' air field.

Captain DeLANY. The Marine squadron was based there, sir.

General McCoy. Near Barbers Point?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir, between Pearl Harbor and Barbers Point, to the westward of Pearl Harbor along the shore line there, sir, where the old mooring mast is.

General McCoy. When did they land there?

Captain DeLANY. Well, they came in, as I recall, some place around after 9 o'clock, after they had been engaged by the enemy and surprised in the air, as everybody else was.

General McCoy. Did they bring down any enemy planes themselves?

Captain DeLANY. I talked to two of the pilots who came into the operations office soon after they landed and as quickly as they could get over to report the results of their flight and the thing, and they felt that they had. I can't say that definitely.

General McCoy. They were surprised in the air, were they?

[816] Captain DeLANY. Oh, yes, sir, because they had taken off at 6:15 with no knowledge of anything that was happening, and although the warning went out from the Commander-in-Chief very soon after the attack occurred I have no way of knowing whether the planes in the air actually got that word, but I do know from talking to the pilots that came in that they were surprised in the air by the Japanese planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were the tasks of the planes of the ENTERPRISE changed after the receipt of the attack on the ENTERPRISE, or did they continue and land at Ewa?

Captain DeLANY. As I recall it, nine of them came in there, sir, eventually landed, and later on in the day were armed and gassed and sent out on a search mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said it was part of your duty only incidentally to know of the probable disposition of enemy fleets?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what branch of the service is that duty directly placed? War plans?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir. The operational section maintains close contact with War Plans, and War Plans maintains the disposition of the enemy forces more closely than the operational section does, sir, in normal peace-time operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the War Plans paraphernalia that we inspected yesterday, rather than Operations paraphernalia?

Captain DELANY. You saw the operational section there, sir, and then I think you went from the operational section into War Plans Section, where they have that long table, that covers the entire Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Captain DELANY. What you saw in the operational section, sir, was the Coastal Frontier area on which we maintain the 700-mile patrol now, with the positions of all the forces in that area plotted, but in War Plans I think you saw the extension into the entire Pacific.

[817] The CHAIRMAN. Quite so.

Where were you on the evening of December 6, Captain?

Captain DELANY. I was in my home, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack broke?

Captain DELANY. I was in the bathroom, sir. The staff duty officer called me. I didn't recognize Lieutenant Commander Black, who was the junior staff duty officer; I didn't recognize his voice, and when he told me that there was an air attack on Pearl Harbor I attempted to exchange some light talk back and forth across the telephone until I did recognize his voice and recognized the seriousness of it; and it just so happened at that particular time that the other two members of the operational section were playing tennis on the court right behind the house there, so as soon as I got word I yelled to them on the court, and they changed into their—got out of their tennis clothes and followed me down within a few minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the matter was a complete and absolute surprise to you?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And seemed incredible?

Captain DELANY. I didn't believe it. As I say, I exchanged a lot of light talk over the telephone before I did recognize the junior staff duty officer's voice.

The CHAIRMAN. There is staff duty officer on duty in your division at all times, or was then?

Captain DELANY. Not exactly, no, sir; we had a double watch. The senior watch was the senior members of the staff, and the junior watch was the junior members of the staff, and there were two people on duty at all times.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a watch on at all times?

Captain DELANY. Oh, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a duty officer there at all times?

[818] Captain DELANY. As I say, the senior watch and the junior watch, and they were on continuously, and that of course is in addition to the communication watch officers. I think there are—there were five or six of them on duty at all times in the regular watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it part of your duty to discuss with the commander-in-chief the disposition of his forces in the light of the probable location of enemy forces? Perhaps I don't make that very clear. Was it your duty to discuss with the commander-in-chief, if he called you into counsel, the probabilities of enemy action?

Captain DELANY. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you had any discussions between November 27 and December 7 as to the probability of Japanese Naval action or air action?

Captain DELANY. Never from a point of view of what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. That possibility was not discussed? The possibility of an air raid?

Captain DELANY. No. It was a matter of much discussion among all of us, including the commander-in-chief, about the fact that we were badly protected in the place here; and, as you know, our security order had given a lot of thought to the possibility of an attack, but there had been no indication from anything that we had that would lead us to the thought that the December 7 incident would occur.

The CHAIRMAN. What were deciderata in your view to strengthen the defense of this harbor, this base?

Captain DELANY. Well, above everything else, very suitable anti-aircraft defense.

The CHAIRMAN. And was the anti-aircraft defense, the ground anti-aircraft defense, insufficient to adequately protect the base?

[819] Captain DELANY. In my opinion, very definitely, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I understand requests for additional material had been made and could not be supplied?

Captain DELANY. In numerous instances I know, because I wrote the letters myself and discussed it frequently and at length with the Commander-in-Chief, with War Plans, and I know that the Army and Commandant of the District and everybody else was attempting to strengthen the defense.

The CHAIRMAN. Was any thought given to the dangers of having large segments of the Fleet berthed in Pearl Harbor in time of war?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, from my own point of view, and I know from talking with other people that the presence of the big ships in Pearl Harbor was always a matter of grave concern to us, particularly in view of the fact that there were not enough berths in the harbor to disperse them properly, and we were rather snuggled up together there in the very restricted moorings available for the big ships.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the air defense of Pearl Harbor as such, had you?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, except that my Operations Section prepared the security letter which provided for the division of the harbor into sectors, the establishment of sector commands, the provision in the security order that sector commanders were responsible for the berthing of their ships within their sectors in order to secure the maximum anti-aircraft fire from the ships in there. That security letter was, as I say, prepared in my section after discussion with the air people, the gunnery people, and others of the staff.

The CHAIRMAN. You had nothing to do with the aircraft defense of the harbor, had you, the defense by planes against hostile planes?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, only from the point of view of again having included in our security order and in our training [820] exercise the requirement that frequent air-raid drills would be held, and upon the completion of every drill to analyze our communication difficulties, and the general review of the drill to iron out the wrinkles and get it working smoother always.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command of the Navy's air here? Admiral Bellinger?

Captain DeLANY. Admiral Bellinger was comtaskforce, and as patwing 2 and as required in the Naval Base Defense Plan Admiral Bellinger is the Naval Base Defense Air Officer, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he would be more competent to speak of the adequacy and arrangement of that form of defense than you?

Captain DeLANY. I feel sure of it, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, you spoke a minute ago of the probability of an air raid. Was that remote in your mind?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the others?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commander-in-Chief?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you mean remote at any time or remote because of the information you had at this time?

Captain DeLANY. I mean the latter, sir. Remote from——

Admiral STANDLEY. Remote because of the information that you had now?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have the Army and the Navy held exercises more or less frequently where air raids were made on this island?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then the possibility of an air raid was not overlooked?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, no, sir. We went to the point of [821] conducting air-raid drills when, for instance, a carrier was returning with its task force. The carrier would represent the attacking force, and the patrol wings—patrol planes here—and the Army bombers would coordinate.

Admiral STANDLEY. Simulate an air raid?

Captain DeLANY. And the Navy planes, any carrier-based planes in the harbor here, their fighters, would immediately revert to the Army in accordance with the Joint Agreement, and the drill would be carried out even to the extent of having attacking planes drop papers representing incendiary bombs and drop markers in the harbor to represent mines, requiring the ships in the harbor to spot the mines, and also in an effort to iron out the very difficult communication problems that we were trying to get squared away that eventually developed into the warning net as we have it now.

General McCoy. You mean since the 7th of December?

Captain DeLANY. Oh, no, sir. I mean since the 15th of February, sir. The full provisions of that security letter there have been carried out in numerous drills here. The drills even came as surprise, where the Commander-in-Chief and the Commandant and the Com-

manding General would by the fleet hook up the drill, and the warning would sound in the harbor, and everybody——

General MCCOY. There was no such drill on on the 7th day of December?

Captain DELANY. I didn't understand you, sir.

General MCCOY. There was no such drill on the 7th of December?

Captain DELANY. No, sir. I think, as I remember it, the last air-raid drill was sometime around the—well, towards the end of November. I don't recall any drills in the first seven days of——

General MCCOY. There was nothing occurred in your mind as a result of the warning message of the Navy Department on the 27th of November to alter your dispositions for the [822] immediate future?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I didn't attach any significance to the possibility of that dispatch meaning that the attack was going to be made on Pearl Harbor or even that the attack was to be made against the United States, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were familiar with all of the messages—you would be familiar with all of the messages received by Admiral Kimmel?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, I feel that I am thoroughly familiar with all the messages that came in and all the personal and official correspondence that passed between him and the Navy Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is nothing in those messages that changed your views that at that time an air raid was improbable?

Captain DELANY. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Did you prepare a new estimate of the situation as a result of that war warning message on the 27th?

Captain DELANY. There were—the duty officer was required and he kept with him the action to be taken in the event that there was a declaration of war, just what steps would be taken by the forces at sea and also the forces in port, and that was a standing order from the Commander-in-Chief that was kept in the possession of the duty officer, and as I recall it the last—the change was made—the new estimate was made on the Saturday before the attack was made.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel has read us that; he brought it with him.

Captain DELANY. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. The last revision.

General MCCOY. And it didn't meet the situation?

Captain DELANY. I didn't understand.

General MCCOY. I say, it did not meet the situation of December 7?

[823] Captain DELANY. No, sir, because nobody had anticipated an act like that.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not intended to, was it?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, there was no intention of that.

General MCCOY. It was intended, however, to go into effect on the declaration of war?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, in accordance——

General MCCOY. Did it go into effect?

Captain DELANY. The position that we found ourselves in on the 7th of December changed the conception of the war from an offensive

one to a defensive one instantly, because our plan as we had been carrying around in our pockets was purely an offensive move.

General MCCOY. And you were unable to carry out any of those offensive actions as a result of the attack?

Captain DELANY. That is correct, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Captain, can you tell us how many submarines you had available for duty on November 27?

Captain DELANY. There were nine in the operating area; that is, two at Wake, two at Midway, and five actually in Pearl Harbor. There were four, three from overhaul and another one en route out here, and there were four at San Diego conducting the sound school which were available to be brought out here.

General McNARNEY. There were nine available in the area on November 27?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Were there any instructions for their deployment or for placing them in observation, given between the 27th and December 6?

Captain DELANY. I don't believe I can answer that question correctly because I don't recall when the two submarines were sent to Midway and to Wake.

General McNARNEY. Do you recall of any drills in which the submarines took up locations in observation between Midway [824] and the Aleutians?

Captain DELANY. Midway and the—?

General McNARNEY. Aleutian Islands.

Captain DELANY. No. I know that there were—if I remember correctly there were five submarines that were supposed to make special engine tests, and that the plan for their tests was to send them about 700 miles to the northward of Oahu and return at a constant speed in order to get certain engine data, but that trip was never completed.

General McNARNEY. Did your war plans provide for any observation to the northward.

Captain DELANY. Yes, our raiding and reconnaissance provided for that, and in addition to that, light—or heavy cruisers of Taskforce 3 were also assigned to that.

General McNARNEY. You stated that on the morning of the 7th the whole conception immediately changed from the offense to the defense. What orders were issued reorganizing the task forces, if any?

Captain DELANY. On the morning of the 7th?

General McNARNEY. Well, on the 7th or immediately thereafter while Admiral Kimmel was still in command.

Captain DELANY. The only order that—well, there was no reorganization of task forces, because the fleet had been in a task force organization since the early summer and then had been further subdivided into task forces sometime around the 15th of November, if I recall the date correctly, and that organization provided for the task forces as they are now operating under different numbers now, but basically the same composition.

General McNARNEY. Then, the loss of the capital ships did not require the reorganization of the task forces?

Captain DeLANY. No, because the battleships were pulled out of Task Force 1, but there still remained the carrier and the cruisers and the destroyers that were part of the original Task Force 1.

[825] General McNARNEY. Were any plans made prior to Admiral Kimmel's relief for the relief of Wake?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Will you tell us what they were?

Captain DeLANY. Well, there was a task force sent out there to relieve Wake.

General McNARNEY. What happened to it?

Captain DeLANY. Wake was taken before it got there.

General McNARNEY. When did it leave? Do you know?

Captain DeLANY. I believe that it was the 13th of December. I am not positive. I can't recall the date. I mean I don't have the dates in my head.

General McNARNEY. Will you get that for us, please?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, I will get the information.

General McNARNEY. And also the composition of the force.

Captain DeLANY. I can tell you the composition of the force. It was a carrier and three heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers, and it went out there as Task Force 14.

General McNARNEY. Yes. What was its mission?

Captain DeLANY. The relief of Wake.

General McCoy. How many days does it take to get to Wake with such a task force under war conditions?

Captain DeLANY. That force went out with a tanker that could only make 13 knots, because there were no other fast tankers that we could—a fast tanker had been assigned to Task Force 11, which was off in another direction. So at 13 knots that's about 300 and some odd miles a day, which would take almost 7 days to get out there, sir.

General McCoy. Did it engage any Japanese en route?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McCoy. It didn't proceed to Wake, then?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. When was it recalled?

Captain DeLANY. I can't tell you the dates, sir; I don't [826] have my schedule here, and I can't remember them. I've got the setup on what task force and time at sea and in port in my office; and rather than tell you a wrong date, I would rather give you the information correctly, sir, from my—

General McNARNEY. Did you receive any report that an enemy submarine had been seen off the harbor entrance at 6:18 a. m. on the morning of the 7th?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir. When I got down to the office I was told that, sir.

General McNARNEY. What vessel was that, do you remember, that reported that?

Captain DeLANY. The ANTARES.

General McNARNEY. The ANTARES.

General McCoy. What time did you give the warning to the fleet as to the attack?

Captain DeLANY. 7:52, as I remember the record on the signal from the signal tower here, sir.

General McCoy. Was that acknowledged as received that morning by all the task forces?

Captain DeLany. Oh, yes, sir. The signal tower in the harbor is in plain sight of everybody in the harbor.

General McCoy. No. I mean the task forces at sea.

Captain DeLaney. Oh. Right after 8 o'clock. I don't know the exact time, sir.

General McCoy. As far as you know, they all received it immediately?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any orders given them at all, or were they left at their own dispositions?

Captain DeLany. No, sir. I think it was at 8:15 or some very close time to that, the signal was sent by the Commander-in-Chief for Task Forces 12 and 8 to assemble as directed by Comtaskforce 8, who was the senior task force commander at sea, and that enemy information would be given to them as soon as we [827] could obtain it; and then when the ships in port had sortied in order that they would be organized into a task force and knew who their boss was, and so forth, at sea, they were organized into a Task Force 1 because they contained some of the cruisers and destroyers originally assigned to Task Force 1, which had been in port; and Admiral Draemel in the DETROIT was assigned to command of that task force. So that it gave us three task forces at sea as soon as that task force——

General McCoy. What was their mission?

Captain DeLany. Sir?

General McCoy. What was their general mission?

Captain DeLany. The general mission was, as I stated here, to assemble as directed by Comtaskforce 8 to attempt to locate the enemy, and Comtaskforce 8 was the senior task force commander in the area, and that is the reason why that message was sent that way.

General McCoy. Was there any information of the enemy given them that day?

Captain DeLany. As I remember the sequence of events Comtaskforce 8 sent a dispatch to the Commander-in-Chief and said that: could he depend on him for scouting for enemy, and we sent back and said that there were only 12 VP's available in the area and that we would furnish him such information as they could obtain; and then very soon after that, beginning around 9:50 or sometime along in there, we began to get these messages of carriers being sighted to the southwest of Barbers Point.

General McCoy. Where did those reports come from?

Captain DeLany. One report that we received had the call sign of the MINNEAPOLIS, which was the heavy cruiser that was operating normally in that area. I don't know whether she ever sent that message or not.

General McCoy. I think that ought to be checked up to see, because one of the very points that Mr. Knox asked us to look into was those reports.

[828] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you any reason to believe that it was a false report?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir, I haven't any reason to believe that, but I have no knowledge that any particular ship originated the report. I do know that the light mine layers that were operating with the MINNEAPOLIS, very soon after that report was received, came to us with a dispatch and said that she was in the southwest corner of Sail 2, which is the operating area in that section, and as we originally received the message it said that carriers were in sight, and then later on within some very short time after that the ship itself corrected the dispatch to say that they were not in sight.

General McNARNEY. What type of ship is the ANTARES that saw this?

Captain DeLANY. She is a cargo ship, sir. She had been on a mission down around the Canton-Christmas area with supplies.

General McNARNEY. Is that manned by Navy personnel?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know to whom they reported sighting the submarine?

Captain DeLANY. As I recall it, the senior officer on the ANTARES at that time was the commander of train squadron 8 in the base force, who had been sent down on the ANTARES to look over the territory; and, as I remember his telling me, he said he sent the signal to a lower tower—or the signal tower, rather, reporting the thing and asking for an offshore patrol—one of the destroyers in the offshore patrol come out. The destroyer was on the southward—to the southward of Oahu here, performing the natural, ordinary offshore patrol duty.

General McNARNEY. Have you any information as to the time it reached your headquarters?

Captain DeLANY. The duty officer told me that he had [829] gotten it around 7 or 7:15.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Momsen said 7:15.

General McCoy. Have you definite information of any other losses that you caused the enemy? I have seen reports of our losses, but very vague reports of what you did to the Japanese.

Captain DeLANY. I have no knowledge of that, sir, except what I have seen from our own intelligence section over there and what I have seen in the newspapers.

General McCoy. Who would make the report of losses to the enemy to the Navy Department?

Captain DeLANY. The Commander-in-Chief would, sir.

General McCoy. Aren't those prepared by you?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Who would prepare them?

Captain DeLANY. I think that the combination of the intelligence section and the flag secretary would have that, sir, but I can't give you any figures on it. I don't know what the—I have not seen the report of enemy losses.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it any part of your duty, Captain, to be familiar with the organization and functioning of the interceptor command?

Captain DeLANY. Yes, sir. I was actively interested in that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your interest?

Captain DELANY. I mean only from my own point of view and being interested in what I refer to again as the security setup.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. What information did you have as at December 7 as to how the Aircraft Warning Service was operating? Did you know anything about it?

Captain DELANY. I don't know how it was operating on the 7th because on that day the communications from the Army intelligence center—"Robert," as they call it now—had not [830] been installed in our office at all.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there had been no wire communications set up between the control room and your office on that day?

Captain DELANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if any information were to come from the control room to your office it would have to go by some circuitous route, would it?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And up to the 7th had any Navy officer been detailed as liaison officer at the control room?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, I think there's—so far as the operational section of the staff was concerned—we were very much interested in that, naturally. Commander Hitchcock, who had been Naval Attache in London for Air over there, had come back to the fleet and had spent some time with the fleet. We were interested in it because he knew the British setup there very closely. At my request he went out and talked to the Army before he left here and was detached and went back to take his command, and then Taylor came out here, and I would say probably ten days—probably a week before the 7th of December Taylor spent several days in the office there and finally furnished us with a diagram of the setup as it was gradually getting into a working condition; and I was particularly interested from the Navy point of view and called a conference with patwing 2's representative and Taylor and the task representative, and they sat down there and discussed just what had to be done to make this thing effective, and I find out afterwards from talking to some of these people that I had become quite vehement in my discussion, because the thing resulted in everybody sitting around with the district communications people and the telephone people, and everybody just pounding on this thing trying to get it finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you were conscious that it wasn't in [831] a very satisfactory operating state on December 7, were you?

Captain DELANY. Oh, yes, I had known that, and as I remember we had been straining—

The CHAIRMAN. You had been trying to get it.

Captain DELANY. —and pushing on the thing to try to get the thing set up.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no knowledge of what actual orders for operation had been issued by the Army?

Captain DELANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On December 7?

Captain DELANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't know whether it was attempting to operate all day or part of a day or what?

Captain DELANY. I knew that for some little time before the 7th December that the station had been operating for practice purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain DELANY. And by our roundy-go-round telephone system we were able to get some information out of it, but we hadn't gotten to the point where our direct lines and complete warning net had been installed.

The CHAIRMAN. Now the warning net is practical?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are on a direct line of warning net with all the interceptor stations now?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You also have a Navy officer sitting in the control room?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To call you?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And advise you?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think probably it is also his duty to [832] claim your ships, isn't it—that Navy officer in there? If they spot a plane and you claim it, how is that done?

Captain DELANY. If the Radar picks up a plane, information goes out to patwing 2 first.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, they claim it?

Captain DELANY. They claim it. If he doesn't claim it, then it comes to the fleet to find out whether we've got anything in the air; and if nobody claims it—

The CHAIRMAN. That settles it.

Captain DELANY. —it is an enemy plane. And the same thing is true as far as a surface ship is concerned: the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Commander gets the first crack at the ship in his particular area; and if he can't claim it then they come to us to determine whether it's a unit of the operating fleet; and if we can't claim it then the sector is placed into a hostile procedure. •

The CHAIRMAN. What is your observation? Is the thing now working pretty smoothly and pretty well?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir, it is, and it is getting better all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. As the operators become more expert?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your understanding, it was not a very substantial reed on which to lean on December 7, was it, Captain, for information?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, it certainly was not, because it had never gotten to the point where we felt that there was anything to it except a very good thing when it was completed. And even now we are hanging on a shoestring, literally, because all our communications are—as you noticed in the office there, sir, there are just little wires running all over the place that act as the chain of communication until we can get the thing built substantially and basically as it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. There is still much substantial construction [833] to be put in of a permanent nature, isn't there?

Captain DELANY. Oh, my, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You wouldn't be surprised if your communications were cut off at any minute by some mishap?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I certainly wouldn't, and it's a very unfortunate thing that we do have to depend on that.

General McNARNEY. Captain, referring to your security letter 2CL-41, paragraph g. on page 4 gives the directions for security against air attack. Sub 7 lists certain conditions of readiness. Was it normal to have a condition of readiness during time of peace or during these disturbed days just prior to the declaration of war?

Captain DELANY. Well, of course, when you mention "just prior to the declaration of war" that's something that we weren't too sure about, but it was a fact that more attention had been paid to the security of the fleet in the operating areas than in the base where we had to take off the pressure to get material work done and get crews rested up and give them a chance to ease off a bit. But I do feel that a lot of attention has been paid to the security of fleet at sea but not too very much to the security of the fleet in port.

General McNARNEY. Was any one of these three conditions mentioned actually in effect then?

Captain DELANY. Not to my knowledge. I don't recall seeing anything from the Naval Base Defense Officer prescribing a condition of readiness in the harbor.

General McNARNEY. Would it be normal for the Base Defense Officer to contact the Cinc before he placed one of those conditions in effect?

Captain DELANY. I think it would, yes.

General MCCOY. Do you think the fleet is safe in Pearl Harbor now?

Captain DELANY. Do I think the fleet is safe in Pearl Harbor now? No, sir.

[834] The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it can be made safe?

Captain DELANY. For limited operations, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "limited operations"?

Captain DELANY. It's my own personal opinion that this can never be an operating base.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words—and we want you to be perfectly free in your opinion—

Captain DELANY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it is your opinion that the fleet ought not to be based in Pearl Harbor?

Captain DELANY. I have always felt that way, sir. If the command of the coastal frontier or the Commandant of the District will have the forces that are now being used by the fleet, the base may be made reasonably secure, but in my opinion material, personnel, or nothing else of an operating fleet can be used 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year, as would be required here, because they would be required to protect themselves all the time they were at sea; and the same planes, the same guns, the same men that protected the ship while they cruised at sea would then have to come back into port and still protect itself here, and I don't believe that that is possible. Now, as I say, if the forces in the District were such that the fleet could get some relaxation here on their men and material, then it is possible that the fleet could operate from here, but I don't believe the area is big enough to accommodate what the fleet requires and what the base

requires—what the fleet requires for its defense at sea and what the base requires for its defense in port here.

General McCoy. In other words, the fleet would then have to be based on the Coast, the mainland?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir, I feel that way.

General McCoy. In other words, we would have to give up permanently the defense of the Pacific?

[835] Captain DeLany. Oh, no, I don't feel that.

General McCoy. Well, you would give up 2,000 miles outpost advantage in operating the fleet, wouldn't you?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, you don't see the American fleet, then, being on the offensive any more?

Captain DeLany. Oh, I don't see that point of view at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think you could devise an offensive without basing the fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Captain DeLany. I think it has to be, until Pearl Harbor can permit the fleet to operate from it, sir.

General McCoy. Is that all due to the recent attack and the greater danger from the air?

Captain DeLany. Not in my opinion, sir. I believe it can be shown that—I have been in the fleet for three and a half years, almost four years, on my present cruise, sir, and there has nothing happened that has ever changed my point of view about the inadequacy of Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. National policy, then, would have to be subordinate to the safety of the fleet?

Captain DeLany. Well, I am not prepared to answer that, sir.

General McCoy. The fleet was sent here by direction of the President, I take it, on lines of national policy rather than Naval policy?

Captain DeLany. That would be my idea.

The CHAIRMAN. As I gather your thought, Captain, it is that by an enormous increase in materiel and personnel in the 14th Naval District it might be possible to make Pearl Harbor a very much safer place for the fleet than it is now and has been heretofore?

Captain DeLany. Oh, yes. Undoubtedly so, yes, sir. In my opinion, if there were enough patrol planes to cover [836] this area continuously as we are doing now with the patrol planes of the fleet and there was an enormous protective force—striking force of Army bombers and an enormous force of combat planes on the Islands well scattered, then I believe that the fleet could stay here, and with very reasonable security, because there would be sufficient warning to permit it probably to sortie, get to the place where it would be at sea ready to fight.

General McCoy. Is it possible to have the fleet remain at sea the major part of the time, say, over at Lahaina or in that region, and only a few ships come in at a time?

Captain DeLany. I think it would be very difficult to protect in an area like Lahaina Roads, even with mine fields. As a matter of fact, our study of that thing shows that it is almost impossible to protect Lahaina and permit it to be used as an anchorage.

General McCoy. A fleet, then, is a very uncertain and unsafe thing anywhere you are at sea, in time of war?

Captain DeLany. No, sir, I don't feel that way.

General McCoy. These same conditions apply to your enemy, don't they? They are farther from their base than you are?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, you are thinking only in terms of security of the fleet from an enemy attack?

Captain DeLany. Oh, no, sir, not by anything; not by any reason, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Our time for adjournment has come, Captain. We shall adjourn until 2 o'clock.

Captain DeLany. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you come back?

Captain DeLany. Yes, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, the nature of our inquiry here [837] is such that we have to ask persons who testify here not to talk over what is discussed here with anyone.

Captain DeLany. All right.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[838]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. You had some more questions of the Captain?

Admiral Standley. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANEY, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

Admiral Standley. In your testimony you gave your opinion in regard to the use of Pearl Harbor as an operating base. Will you go further and explain what you mean by an operating base and to what extent you had in mind the use of it as a base of any kind?

Captain DeLany. If I may recall what I meant to state that I said that in practically four years of sea service in this present cruise there has happened nothing to change my opinion of Pearl Harbor with regard to being a safe operating base, and I believe, in response to an inquiry by you, sir, that I said that if any commander of the Hawaiian coastal frontier defense had the forces available to him that the fleet is now supplied with, that it was probable that the base could be made secure against surprise attacks, and that my impression of an operating base was one to which the fleet can come after its operations at sea where they can come freely—that is, freely to come for recreation and liberty and be free from the strains that were attendant upon wartime sea cruising.

I think if Pearl Harbor is able to defend the fleet in here, that then the fleet can continue to operate from here, but under the present situation it is not, as I see it, sufficiently defended to permit the fleet to ease off the strain which is attendant upon seagoing.

General McNarney. If your definition of an operating base is correct, wouldn't it be impossible to conduct offensive operations except from a secure operating base?

[839] Captain DeLany. No, sir, I do not mean to imply that, but I do believe that, as I said before, that the matériel and the person-

nel of the fleet cannot continue to operate 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, of a campaign, and as I see the fleet operating in Pearl Harbor here and I see the matériel of the fleet being used that way, I felt that the fleet cannot continue to operate during these times under that matériel and personnel strain.

General McNARNEY. Well, I am confused in my mind.

Captain DELANY. There is nothing defensive in my attitude at all. I believe this can be secure enough for the fleet to operate here, but I do not mean to imply that the fleet had to be at a place where there can be no possibility of an attack being made on it.

General McNARNEY. My conception of an operating base is a place from which the fleet can conduct operations and you could conduct operations from any place where you could get fuel, men, and ammunition.

Captain DELANY. That is evidenced by the fact that we are operating from here now, sir.

General McNARNEY. But you have more than that; you have recreation facilities and everything else.

Captain DELANY. Under what circumstances? Apparently I do not understand your point of view on that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Your definition of an operating base is what I would call the main base, well to the rear, where you could go back when there is no possibility of enemy action.

Captain DELANY. No, sir. I do not mean to imply that at all. I do not mean to imply that.

General McNARNEY. I think it is probably just a confusion in the definition of the terms.

Captain DELANY. I do not mean to imply that the fleet cannot operate from here, but I do believe that the fleet [840] cannot operate here for long extended operations if it must use the same measures in port to defend itself as it must use on the high seas.

In other words, if every ship in port must always be in a complete watertight condition to defend itself against torpedo attacks, then in my personal opinion the crew on board cannot recuperate from its operations at sea. If the anti-aircraft battery must be manned continually, and if the ship's complements, ships' personnel must be used to handle all of their operations, ammunition, and so forth, without any opportunity to recuperate when they come into port, then I believe it is not the type of operating base which lends itself to extended operations at the base.

General McNARNEY. You are talking about the piping peace days?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I am not.

General McNARNEY. But the human animal can stand quite a bit. Do you have three watches or two watches?

Captain DELANY. We have four watches.

General McNARNEY. If you have four watches, why couldn't your anti-aircraft guns be manned for a year at a stretch without any offdays?

Captain DELANY. They can.

General McNARNEY. Admiral Byrd spent a year at the South Pole and he did not come in for relief or recreation. They had nothing. The human animal can stand quite a lot.

Captain DELANY. Yes, I agree with you.

General McNARNEY. I was at the front in the last war with an aviation unit. We were in action for four months and never had any relief or such. The men could do that.

Captain DELANY. Yes, I agree with you, but I do not visualize this as a four-month war.

[841] General McNARNEY. Well, a year, then. You could do it a year.

Captain DELANY. I do not believe you could have stayed on operations like that for a year.

General McNARNEY. I am sure we would. We were like the OREGON. We were in better shape at the end than when we started.

Captain DELANY. I was in Queenstown for 16 months, sir, and we operated on a tough schedule there, but we had protection or we felt we had protection in port, and you can understand the nervous strain of sea operations for 16 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let us see if this is what you mean. You say nothing has happened in your four years' service to change your opinion as to the safety of this place as an operating base?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As I understand it, when you came down here four years ago you felt that Pearl Harbor was not sufficiently protected to give absolute safety or safety for an operating base, in your opinion?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there has been nothing happened in the past four years which has changed your view?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You still say that safety is not provided for?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not intend to say that Pearl Harbor could not be made or could not be used nor that it could not be made a proper operating base?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I had no intention of implying that, and if the forces in this frontier are strengthened to the point, almost equal to what the fleet is now giving them, [842] that the fleet will have security, and with our searches, rendering the fleet safe from surprise attack, but I do feel that we are using the facilities, the facilities of the fleet to protect the base, and it is my conception that these fleet facilities must be available for offensive actions in advance of this base, and therefore that we are burning up our personnel and material in defense of the defense and they are not available for our offensive movements from this base.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that in the war plans, this was not intended as a defensive point, but as a point from which the offensive operations would begin?

Captain DELANY. This was the first stepping stone in the western advancement of all our war plans, and all our war plans are based on that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything more from the Captain?

General McNARNEY. No.

General MCCOY. No.

Captain DeLANY. You asked a question on that, sir, about the movements of the task forces.

General McNARNEY. The submarines?

Captain DeLANY. About the question of Wake.

General McNARNEY. Of the movement of task forces to Wake.

Captain DeLANY. May I add this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain DeLANY. Task force 8, which was the one closest to Oahu on the 7th of December, came in on the 8th of December, and went out on the morning of the 9th, and was stationed in the sector north of Oahu as a covering force.

Task force 11, which had been 12, came in on the 13th and went out on the 15th with the mission assigned as a raid on Jaluit.

[843] Task force 14, which was the SARATOGA and a new task force which was organized because the SARATOGA just got back from the mainland with her planes, and went out on the 16th with the mission for the relief of Wake.

Task force 14 was recalled from that mission on the 22nd of December.

General McNARNEY. This is off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Call Captain McMorris.

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN CHARLES HORATIO McMORRIS, WAR PLANS OFFICE, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name, please.

Captain McMORRIS. Charles Horatio McMorris, War Plans Office, Staff of Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Captain, were you present at any conferences between Admiral Kimmel and General Short, between November 27 and December 7, last?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir. I can't recall the specific time. They were conversations, rather informal conferences.

The CHAIRMAN. Was one of the topics of consideration at that time the substitution of Army forces for Marines at Midway or Wake?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir. In accordance with the suggestion received from the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion at any of these conferences as to the probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McMORRIS. In a discussion as to whether to send pursuit planes to Midway and Wake—that was proposed by the War and Navy Departments—the matter of the probability of an [844] air attack on Pearl Harbor was touched upon, and as I recall on that subject, which was fairly brief, Admiral Kimmel asked me when I thought there would be an attack on Pearl Harbor by air, and I said, "Never."

The CHAIRMAN. And of course you believed it?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir, I believed it, unfortunately.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on duty here at Pearl Harbor, Captain?

Captain McMORRIS. I came to the staff of the Commander-in-Chief 1 February, when Admiral Kimmel assumed command. Prior to that time I had been in this area for over a year as operations officer for Vice Admiral Andrews, command of scouting force.

The CHAIRMAN. During that time the situation with Japan had been more or less tense, had it not?

Captain McMORRIS. During a great part of the time, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In that time, did the officers with whom you were in contact professionally discuss the possibility of an air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Captain McMORRIS. Unquestionably the subject was mentioned from time to time.

The CHAIRMAN. As you gathered the reactions of these professional associates of yours, what was the general view as to the probability or possibility of such an attack?

Captain McMORRIS. I can recall no officer who felt that there was a serious probability, and that perhaps all of us considered it a remote possibility.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you, as operations officer, on the staff of Admiral Kimmel, conscious of any weakness of the defenses of this port against an air raid?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir. Both as operations officer in the scouting force and later as war plans officer of the Commander-in-Chief, I participated in various discussions . [845] regarding certain weaknesses that we felt to be existent in this place, with particular reference to the limited number of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. Very soon after I joined Admiral Kimmel's staff, strong representations regarding these deficiencies were made.

I accompanied Admiral Kimmel on a trip to Washington in May and June, and that matter was very much on the agenda.

Insofar as I was concerned personally, I felt at that time that it was a proper and necessary thing to know, as I believed, for the conditions which existed at the time, to consider the possibility that we might suffer some severe reverses in which the defense here would be a matter of grave importance.

One of the things that I feared very much was that a considerable portion of this fleet might be moved out of the Pacific when Hawaii would be dependent upon its own defenses, and I felt in that case it would be quite weak.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if I get your thought, the fleet defenses, as long as a large fleet was here, might be used as auxiliaries to the land defenses or harbor defenses?

Captain McMORRIS. I would put it a little differently but I think the general idea you have is the same. It was my feeling that an offensive division of the fleet could so concern the enemy from shore defenses as it would make it highly inadvisable to separate their own forces and bring them into this area.

That was the fundamental thought I had in my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Up to date, since December 7th, the harbor defenses of Pearl Harbor, as such, are being supplemented by the fleet matériel and personnel?

Captain McMorris. Yes. I am not completely familiar with the details in that connection but I might say also that for some time there have been standing orders and a great many drills held before December 7th in which the ships which were in the [846] port would augment the Army defenses by the use of their own batteries.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. The Commander-in-Chief and his staff were not concerned with the joint plan of the Army in the defense of Oahu, were they?

Captain McMorris. No, sir. That is, categorically to say there were discussions as to what the fleet may be doing, but there wasn't any formalized plan for the fleet to be a part of the defenses of Pearl Harbor except as I have outlined with regard to the ships in port taking part in the anti-aircraft defense. I mean the operations between the fleet and the rather meager local defense forces of the District and part of the permanent establishment.

General McNARNEY. As war plans officer of the Commander-in-Chief, were you familiar with the war plans of the Army for the defense of Oahu?

Captain McMorris. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You said you felt that the Army defenses were inadequate. How could you tell that they were inadequate if you were not familiar with what they were supposed to do?

Captain McMorris. In company with General Gardiner and General Herron, I made a brief tour—a Cook's tour, so to speak—of the Island, and I saw something of their planes and the available guns, the searchlights, and so forth, insofar as the anti-aircraft defenses were concerned and taking into account the general knowledge I had, limited though it may be, in regard to the defenses that had been found necessary in Europe.

It seemed that the anti-aircraft protection here was weak and that, I think, I may safely say that that feeling in that connection was shared by the generals in question.

[847] I may say also that the development of the radar had promise of increasing the value of such defenses, and I knew the Army authorities were very anxious and much concerned over the delay in getting some of that equipment; so I meant no criticism or any implication of the Army defenses. That is, I am giving a general impression which, I think, is still quite sound.

The CHAIRMAN. The liaison of the Army and Navy was through District No. 14?

Captain McMorris. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Particularly and specifically the liaison between the Army and the Navy?

Captain McMorris. Yes.

General McNARNEY. With respect to this letter issued for security 2 CL-41, I suppose you are familiar with that?

Captain McMorris. Not in detail, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether or not subparagraph (g) on page 4, and particularly subparagraph (7) on page 55, which defines certain conditions of readiness—do you know whether or not it was in practice to establish certain of those conditions when the fleet was in port or a major portion of it was in port?

Captain McMorris. I am not sure, sir, about the operations of the fleet in that, but you can get that information. I am not prepared to answer that question.

The CHAIRMAN. Your specific charge was war plans?

Captain McMorris. I was looking more to the future than to the immediate present.

General McNARNEY. Can you tell the Commission, Captain, the method, the mental processes of the estimate of the situation or the discussions actually drawn up and the orders for the operations immediately following the attack on December 7? I would like to know what you did. You, as war plans officer, [848] are, I imagine, responsible for making recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief with respect to immediate action against the enemy?

Captain McMorris. If such information is so available, and when I say "we" I mean my particular section, and to make such deductions as we could as to the probable area for those operations.

Our suggestions were made to the Commander-in-Chief or to the operations officer as to the employment of the forces then out; that more specifically on December 7th that they were mostly as to the place of attack and were inclined strongly to believe that the attack had come from both the northward and the southward; and that with the disposition of the carriers at sea we felt that the chance of intercepting the northern route was probably quite remote, while the chance of intercepting the southward route looked, at least, to hold some promise, and the forces we had at sea were already in the southward area; that as these produced no results in the searches in operation, it became necessary as a result, to bring the forces into Pearl Harbor to refuel them, and we had a serious concern about the submarine menace of ships coming and going.

Among our recommendations in the war plans was to use a very considerable portion of light forces for anti-submarine operations and to disperse carriers to the northward of Oahu with a view to intercepting the enemy on its return.

We also advised the utilization of not only patrol planes available but the utilization of planes and such long range planes as might be made available by the Army authorities for making maximum daylight searches.

In the early days, particularly 7 December, we even [849] included in our suggestions more specific recommendations as to the areas for search since the number of available planes limits the arc and radius of the search.

While those were the immediate matters under consideration, we were also formulating plans for offensive operations to be commenced as early as possible, or rather as soon as we felt that the existing situation had clarified.

General McNARNEY. When did you first hear of the attack on Wake?

Captain McMorris. 7 December. I don't recall the hour now, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did your section submit any plans for its relief?

Captain McMorris. Not on that day. The earliest suggestion made with regard to the relief of Wake was on the succeeding Wednesday when the repeated attacks began to give me concern over the possi-

bility that the ammunition supply might become depleted. A cargo ship was in the vicinity of Wake without an escort when the report of the first attack was received.

The Commandant of the District directed the return of that ship, as it seemed improbable that it would be possible to discharge it under the existing circumstances at that time, and another ship was made available for carrying ammunition and stores and reinforcements.

I felt that although the garrison at Wake was small that it would require a considerable effort on the part of the enemy to take that place. I realized the necessity for expediting relief measures if it were to be held for a prolonged period.

The most available ship was deemed to be the Tangier, a seaplane tender, and minimizing the danger there of explosives as well as not to carry into that area valuable stores. She discharged her torpedoes, aviation gasoline, and most of her [850] bombs, prior to loading her equipment for Wake.

General McNARNEY. Was the Tangier one of those converted destroyers?

Captain McMORRIS. She was a 17½ knot ship of about 10,000 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. A cargo ship?

Captain McMORRIS. Yes. I do not know how much detail you want me to go into, General.

General McNARNEY. No. I think you are covering just what I would like to hear.

Captain McMORRIS. It was felt that such an expedition should have a strong escort in order to insure the relief expedition getting through. It was felt particularly necessary to get additional fighting planes to Wake, and the only ones that could be made available was a squadron of marine planes enroute from San Diego on the SARATOGA.

General McCox. When did the SARATOGA arrive here with those planes?

Captain McMORRIS. It was originally expected on the 12th but actually arrived here on the 14th.

General McCox. That is what delayed the relief expedition, was it?

Captain McMORRIS. That was one of the delays, the primary delay. In the departure of the SARATOGA, which required refueling here, there was some delay in that, and the necessity for fueling expedition at sea, particularly the arrival in the vicinity of Wake, and it was further delayed somewhat because the only tanker immediately available was a 13-knot tanker whereas the Tangier could make 17 knots. It was a case of using the cargo ship and the tanker that was immediately available.

At the same time that this relief expedition was under consideration, the war plans section proposed and the Commander-in-Chief adopted a plan for making a diversion in the southeastern Marshalls. It was realized that Wake, even with a strong covering force, that the Tangier would be in considerable danger because it was necessary to discharge her cargo into boats and barges in the open sea, and if the weather should prove unfavorable, she might be delayed there for a prolonged period. I recall one instance where they required 28 days off Wake to discharge a ship.

The contemplated date for the relief expedition to arrive was initially 21 December, but delays necessitated changing the date to 23 December.

I think that is the substance of it.

General McNARNEY. Was it essential to take a tanker along? What was the necessity of refueling?

Captain McMORRIS. Particularly the destroyers, and the hazards of getting 2,000 or more miles away from the base with the fueling of cruisers as well as destroyers depleted, where a strong enemy force might be encountered and high speed required—all that made it imprudent to take that risk, particularly as the time that the force might be required to operate in the general vicinity of Wake was indefinite.

General McNARNEY. What is the cruising range of cruisers? I understood it to be about 10,000 miles.

Captain McMORRIS. They do have about 10,000 miles with clean bottom and when cruising at an economical speed. As speed increases, the fuel consumption rises rapidly. Moreover, where the enemy may be encountered, it is necessary to burn additional fuel so that the reserve boiler power is immediately ready for use in case of contact with the enemy.

General McNARNEY. I take it that the plan was to reinforce and carry on the existing defense on Wake rather than to defeat or search out and defeat the forces attacking them by fleet action?

Captain McMORRIS. Immediately, yes. However, as in all [852] operations, once you are in contact with the enemy, the defeat of that enemy is the primary consideration.

General McNARNEY. Yes, but what strikes me particularly is that I do not see how you could plan to carry reinforcements to Wake, which was under attack, without first defeating the forces making that attack because they would not let you put a cargo ship off there and unload it until you had defeated them first.

Captain McMORRIS. That is true, but the attack coming to Wake was by shore-based planes. Whether they came in from Eniwetok or Rongelap, it was not expedient to attempt first to destroy that base, but with the marine fighting planes established ashore and with the planes from the carrier and the assistance of the carrier radar, it was believed that the hazard from the enemy bombers would not be great.

It had been noted that the daily attacks on Wake came about noon, leading strongly to the belief that they took off about daylight, getting back to their own base by dark, and that the attacks had been made by horizontal bombers.

It was our conclusion that, as the attack came on, that the ship by its own maneuvering and the protection afforded by the fighters would make the chance of relief excellent. Aside from the bombers, if enemy surface craft attempted to interfere, they would have to come to Wake, and initially at least, we felt that the force sent would be ample to deal with such surface craft as might reasonably be expected there.

It was not deemed feasible to attempt a search of the wide ocean areas around Wake before bringing the cargo and carrier in, because the search would have to be made each day, and it would be only moderately effective and dangerous to the cargo vessel. There would be danger from such a source.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any knowledge of the method by which the British used to supply Tobruk in the face of [853] shore-based aircraft?

Captain McMORRIS. I have no detailed knowledge of that, sir. I might say that the offshore-based aircraft that would be approaching Wake would be coming from a base some 600 miles away.

General McNARNEY. Then it would be comparatively more simple at Wake than it was at Tobruk?

(There was no answer.)

[854] General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General? Nothing?

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still Admiral Pye's operating officer?

Captain McMORRIS. His planning officer; yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who made the decisions to change the plans for this Wake force? Admiral Pye?

Captain McMORRIS. Admiral Pye, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, we have to request that nothing that goes on in this room shall be discussed outside the room.

Captain McMORRIS. Yes, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Admiral Pye was very busy, but he can be here on five minutes' notice, so he has just been called.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. Stenographer, will you note that the list of commanding officers present on their ships on the morning of the attack is to be marked "Kimmel Exhibit No. 2," and not copied in the notes.

(List of commanding officers present on their ships on the morning of attack was marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. Copies of the daily reports of the shore patrol for December 7, and 8, produced by Admiral Kimmel, will be marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 3 and not copied.

(Copies of daily reports of shore patrol, December 6, 7, and 8, were marked Kimmel Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Admiral?

[855] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM SATTERLEE PYE, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Admiral PYE. William Satterlee Pye, Vice Admiral, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to December 7, sir, you were in command of what unit of the fleet?

Admiral PYE. Commander Battle Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that known as a task force of a particular number?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. It was a reorganization of the fleet, not as a Navy Department reorganization but by the Commander-in-Chief, into three task forces. The task force of which I was in charge was Task Force 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that include all the battleships?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. It included two divisions of battleships; one division of light cruisers, normally five ships; two squadrons of destroyers; and a light cruiser-destroyer-flagship, the Raleigh.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any battleships except those belonging to your command in harbor on the night of December 6?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir. Division 1, the ARIZONA, OKLAHOMA, and NEVADA were part of Task Force 2 but under my command in the organization as Commander Battle Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, when had the battleships in your force and those belonging to Task Force 2 come into harbor, if you know?

Admiral PYE. The task force of which I had command entered port on the 28th of November. The Task Force 2 battleships about five days later.

The CHAIRMAN. December 2 or thereabouts.

[856] Admiral PYE. About December 2, as I recall.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you, sir, on the morning of December 7?

Admiral PYE. I spent the night at the Halekulani Hotel in Honolulu where my wife was staying. Do you wish me to describe what I did that morning, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. At about 8 o'clock in the morning I had just finished shaving, and I heard gunfire. From one window of my apartment I could view the general direction of Pearl Harbor, and looking out the window I saw bursts of anti-aircraft gunfire projectiles. I said to my wife, "It seems funny that the Army would be having target practice on Sunday morning," and naturally was a little disturbed at the possibility that it might be something else.

I dressed immediately, but before I had finished dressing one of my staff called on the telephone and said he would be by for me in ten minutes. He is living further out and at about that distance from me by car.

I went down to the place where he would meet me. Before he arrived Admiral Leary, who lived in the same apartment with me, came down at just the same time, and we were offered a ride to the Navy Yard by a Mr. Kimball, who is the manager of the Halekulani Hotel, so we left word for my staff officer that I had gone on.

As we approached the Navy Yard there was still considerable firing going on, but when I got to the officers' club landing, the boat which had been ordered for me was awaiting. As I got into the boat the two staff officers, one of whom had telephoned me and another who lived nearby, got out of their car and joined me in the boat. We went directly to the CALIFORNIA.

The CHAIRMAN. She was your flagship?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

[857] On the way across the harbor we saw the damage that had been done to a number of the battleships, including the CALIFORNIA, which at the time that I boarded here had a slight list to port.

I immediately went to the bridge and found my chief of staff there, consulted with him as to the orders which had been given, and found that he had complied with the orders which were included in our battle book, which was always available to the staff officer on duty to indicate to him all that the orders required in such an emergency.

While we were consulting on the bridge another attack developed. When the guns began firing it was impossible for us to continue our conversation, and we walked into the flag conning tower. Shortly after this, possibly not over 10 or 15 seconds, there were a number of bombs fell on and in the immediate vicinity of the CALIFORNIA. There was one definite explosion and at least three which appeared to be near hits, due to the violent movement of the ship as the bomb exploded.

Communications in the flag conning tower were lost about this time. After a few minutes they were restored, and all of the orders necessary for the sortie had been issued, but about this time we received a message from the signal tower of the station saying there was a submarine in the channel. I then issued further orders to the commander of destroyers battle force to detail some of the destroyers which were then making a sortie to sweep the north channel in an endeavor to locate the submarine which had been reported.

Not long after this there was a second bombing attack, but to the best of my recollection there were no direct hits. Although I believe the ship says there were two altogether, I wasn't cognizant of the second explosion. But soon again communications failed. During this period between these first and second bombing attacks the NEVADA, which had gotten under way, passed us in the channel; and, having been informed [858] that there were submarines in the channel, and being afraid that if she were torpedoed there it might block the channel, I sent her a signal not to go out, but about this time she was either hit by a bomb or mine and quite seriously damaged. She was beached just clear of the channel and clear of the entrance to the dry dock, the commanding officer having used considerable judgment and skill in managing to keep her clear of both places.

There were two light cruisers that had gone out just previous to the NEVADA and before I had received this message of the submarine in the channel. There were two other cruisers of this group. There are normally five in the division, but one was away on convoy duty, so there were four present. There were two of these four at piers in the Navy Yard. They had not yet gone out, and I was uninformed as to whether or not they had been damaged; but, believing that the proper place for me was at sea if I could get there in any vessel of my force, I told my chief of staff to get my operating staff officers together and we would shift over to any other ship of the force that could get out. We got a boat alongside, and about this time, before we had gotten into the boat, we received a signal from the Commander-in-Chief that no further ships were to sortie. I didn't know how long this order would be in effect, so I with the staff—my staff members—reported to the Commander-in-Chief to obtain such instructions from him as he might have to give me under the circumstances. He then told me that he had given instructions for no further sortie and directed me to remain with him to assist him until he gave me further orders.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you cognizant of the Navy Department's communication of November 27?

Admiral PYE. I was cognizant of it after it had been received for about four days. My task force was at sea at the time it was received.

[859] The CHAIRMAN. Did you when you learned of it accord it any significance as a warning of a possible air raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral PYE. I did not believe that that was probable. In fact, I can say that I didn't think it was of sufficient danger, under the conditions, for changing our regular operating plan. I had been familiar with the advice which we had received as to the probable impracticability—at least, that torpedo planes would not be effective in such shallow water. We had had numerous drills in anti-aircraft raids, and from these I think that there was no question but what we developed the feeling that we would have adequate time to man our guns fully before raiders could arrive.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon what would you in your professional judgment depend for such adequate warning, Admiral?

Admiral PYE. I would have depended to the maximum extent upon scouting by aircraft, but it was reasonable to suppose that with all of the Army observation posts it would be impracticable for enemy aircraft to arrive in this position in such a fashion that we could not fully man our guns.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed that the Army Warning Service was in operation?

Admiral PYE. I had no information, because I was at sea 50% of the time and had a definite job to do at sea, and which I was trying to do to the best of my ability.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you assume that the Army's anti-aircraft warning service was in full operation?

Admiral PYE. I assumed that it was in adequate operation to give us the warning, because on these anti-air-raid drills we had so been warned by the warning net, by the Commandant of the District.

The CHAIRMAN. When was the last of those drills in which you had any part, sir?

Admiral PYE. About the date? We can get those, very [860] presumably. I have here the last of the exercises conducted at sea, but I haven't the date of that, sir, but I can get it.

The CHAIRMAN. It may have been in the latter part of November, may it not?

Admiral PYE. Yes, I think it was after we came in that last time, but if I remember correctly it was 7:30 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Of, say, October 29?

Admiral PYE. I would like to give you that.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean November 29.

Admiral PYE. I would like to give you that definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Commander Covington could get us that supplied.

Admiral PYE. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you know whether those messages actually came from the Army Warning Service, or were they canned messages sent by the District Commander?

Admiral PYE. I don't know, because we got our information from the air raid in the District.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you spoke also, Admiral, of a scouting service, distant scouting service. I presume it was no part of your duty to know what scouting service was being maintained at that time?

Admiral PYE. That was not in my task force, and my only information was that it was being done to the maximum capacity consistent with the planes that they had and the necessity for training.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it surprise you to know that there was no day scouting practically at all, either inshore or distant?

Admiral PYE. I should think that that might be considered a surprise, because we could see—whenever we were in the operating areas we were always covered by patrol planes in the morning search.

[861] The CHAIRMAN. You were?

Admiral PYE. All the operating areas as a rule were covered. Now, the number of vessels operating in the areas at the time was very few, because the two task forces with the carriers had gone to the westward.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. And the three battleships of Division 1 were operating in that area.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, you spoke of the attacks on the flagship as by bombs. Were they bombs or torpedoes?

Admiral PYE. I spoke of, that after I arrived she had been torpedoed in the first attack previous to that.

General McNARNEY. And the second attack was by bombers?

Admiral PYE. The second attack, apparently—

General McNARNEY. Horizontal or dive?

Admiral PYE. I couldn't—I didn't see them. When the guns began firing I was still talking to my chief of staff, and I walked into the flag conning tower. I believe they were high bombers.

General McCox. Did your ship sink as a result of those bombs or from the original torpedo attack? Do you know?

Admiral PYE. Unquestionably from the torpedoes. There was a bad fire from the bombs, which lasted until fairly well that afternoon, but it was put under control.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, what was the status of your ships—your task force—and your type ships in regard to the percentage of complement on board, officers and men, and their ability to carry on the ship's duties and functions, and also the state of the batteries, particularly your anti-aircraft batteries, manning?

Admiral PYE. Liberty had been granted—could be granted to one half the crew. The officers were in duty section watch. That is one quarter of the officers on board, and each duty section had been organized as an anti-aircraft bat- [862] tery watch complete. We have had anti-aircraft battery watches a watch in four, for some months. In order to do that on a watch-and-four basis it was essential to train additional men in the battleships, taking part of the 5-inch secondary batteries and people from the—a few people from the turrets, to complete the four watches for anti-aircraft defense. We have considered that for anti-submarine work the anti-aircraft guns were equally valuable to the 5-inch 51's, which were the torpedo defense battery; so that in each section there was a complete anti-aircraft watch which had been organized for months and had been constantly trained.

The CHAIRMAN. Then that means that at no time in 24 hours were any of the anti-aircraft batteries lacking in an adequate crew?

Admiral PYE. They had adequate crews on board.

General McNARNEY. How about your damage control crew?

Admiral PYE. -The damage control crew were not particularly specified except that there was a section—we divided the two watches, each watch into two sections, so that one section is always on duty, and then they were the primary people to do the work, but in this Honolulu area the number of men that were ashore at any time was comparatively small. In fact, I have—

(A document was handed to Admiral Pye by Commander Momsen.)

Admiral PYE. I asked for this in order to determine what the percentage of officers and crew were:

The HONOLULU had 50% of officers on board and 98% of her crew.

The HELENA had 78% of her officers and 98% of her crew.

The TENNESSEE had her duty watch section and in addition to that 38 other officers. The entire complement of enlisted men were on board with the exception of 111 men. Her complement was at this time about 1700.

[863] The PENNSYLVANIA had 40 officers on board and all enlisted men with the exception of 32 petty officers on liberty.

The ARIZONA had 37 officers and all of her enlisted men with the exception of about 40—maximum of 40 men.

The NEVADA stated hers in a little different way, stating it with regard to the anti-aircraft officers. There were six of the nine officers assigned to anti-aircraft work on board and 95% of her enlisted personnel.

The CALIFORNIA had 49 officers on board and all but six men of her enlisted complement.

The MARYLAND had all officers of her anti-aircraft battery on board except one, and all of her crew except a few on patrol and special liberty.

The WEST VIRGINIA reports 80% of her officers on board and 95% of her crew.

In the destroyers, officers and men, in addition to the duty section, on board, approximately 50% of the officers, an average, and from 80 to 90% of the crew.

The knowledge that so few people were ashore here made us feel that the ships were really better protected than the particular orders that were in force, because although 50% of the crew were allowed to go ashore they practically didn't go; and they all, with the exception of those who had families here or were given special liberty, had to be back at 1 in the morning.

General McNARNEY. Captain, can you give us a paper showing the number of damage-control officers who were present for duty when the attack started?

Admiral PYE. Well, sir, it would be very difficult to. I can get it.

General McNARNEY. I mean only battleships. I only care about the battleships.

Admiral PYE. Well, you see, it's very difficult to get any records now. I can. Most of the battleships that are in [864] commission are gone. We can see what we can do, but—

General McNARNEY. Well, give it to us for the ones that were sunk then.

Admiral PYE. Well, I mean those officers, some of them, are gone. They have been split all over the place, you know.

General McNARNEY. Well, will not your records show who was the damage control officer?

Admiral PYE. Oh, the name of the man who was the damage control officer?

General McNARNEY. The name of the man and where he was on the morning when the attack started.

Commander MOMSEN. The CALIFORNIA, Lieutenant Commander Little.

General McNARNEY. And possibly I would like to interview one or two of them.

Admiral PYE. Well, I noted that Lieutenant Commander Little was the officer on board, the head department on board the CALIFORNIA. He is the damage control officer and was present, in the place at present. I think we can get him.

General McNARNEY. Perhaps we would like to have a report on all the battleships under your command.

Admiral PYE. Yes, we can get that.

General McNARNEY. And the names of a couple that were present, that we could see.

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, this state of readiness or the condition of your battery had been in existence for some time prior to December 7; is that correct?

Admiral PYE. In port.

Admiral STANDLEY. In port, yes.

Admiral PYE. On November 27 while my task force was at sea we received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to put in effect certain paragraphs of his security order which had not been in effect before that. May I read this: The three [865] paragraphs of this order which were put in effect by the Commander-in-Chief on the night of the 27th of November for ships at sea were inner air patrol for disposition or formations when in operating areas.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that page? What is the number and page?

Admiral PYE. This is a security order.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Ships at sea, d. I have got it.

Admiral PYE. e., f., and g.

The CHAIRMAN. e., f., and g?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, which required us to go into Condition Readiness 3 on our torpedo defense batteries. Torpedo defense in this sense, though, by Commander-in-Chief's order, had been meant to be the form—the anti-aircraft defense, which was only used for torpedo—

The CHAIRMAN. Condition 3 is the lowest of the three?

Admiral PYE. But that meant a continuous watch on.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral PYE. All guns to be manned. I have also some matter in regard to the guns that were manned and the times that fire was opened by the various ships, if you care to have them introduced.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel has produced a running report from the ships, showing, I think, at what hour and minute each of them got into fire. I am not sure that it covers that, but I think so.

Admiral PYE. I think that is the same report, and that was prepared by my order, but I think he will present it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He attached it to his report to the Department, which he has furnished us as an appendix.

Admiral PYE. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. So I think it is in there.

Commander Momsen produced a document.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is it.

[866] Commander MOMSEN. This was prepared by Admiral Pye, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. That is it.

This is not on the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral PYE. Commander Battleships states with regard to that: he had two machine guns and two 5-inch guns, in reply to my letter asking the situation in the battleships—of course, in the battleships as a task force or a type force commander, rather, who was my subordinate and the commander of those ships. I sent him a letter asking that he report these things, and in his letter he says:

Commander Battleship, Battle Force, on April 29, 1941, made effective the condition of readiness that battleships at anchor as prescribed in his letter on the subject of Security (battleships). Provision is made for the following condition: machine guns 1 and 2; anti-aircraft guns 3 and 4 (or 5 and 6). That is two 5-inch guns and two machine guns, and the antiaircraft guns had 15 rounds per gun and a crew available at all times. The machine guns were manned continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that there were crews at their stations and ammunition at their hands?

Admiral PYE. In the immediate vicinity.

The CHAIRMAN. In the immediate vicinity.

Admiral PYE. They were not actually at the guns, but near them.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you through?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, you have stated, I think, before, that you did not expect an air raid at that time?

Admiral PYE. We certainly were planning consciously to prevent one if we could, but I can't say that we expected one.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, if you had expected at that time [867] an air raid as being just as probable as you might expect a submarine raid outside when you were at sea, and if you had no knowledge as to the immediate or the exact time that this attack would come, would there have been any different disposition of your anti-aircraft battery guns?

Admiral PYE. It is pretty hard to say, Admiral. Now, I tell you, we are getting right down to the point now. We are at war.

Admiral STANDLEY. I know that.

Admiral PYE. I know, but I mean we have had the guns manned for three weeks now, and the personnel are wearing out. I mean we can't keep that up continuously. Right now there is a question whether we hadn't better cut down the number of guns that are being manned. We don't do anything else but man the guns; and in this particular situation, to my mind, it was more essential to train people and do the work than it was to keep those guns manned when we believed that the

time was such—and which was true—that the time wasn't very great, and if we had ten minutes' more warning everybody would have been there, and we didn't anticipate that they could get in without ten minutes' warning.

General McCox. Do you think they can now?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. I think that, of course, the installation of the Army Radar system is our greatest safeguard against a raid. That, unfortunately, as I have since learned, was not sufficiently developed at the time to be considered absolutely effective. We have given them several additional Radars from the Navy; and now, with the number that they have and with the training of the personnel, I consider that the greatest safeguard that we have.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, before the advent of Radar the ships had been in here about a year, year and a half now, haven't they? Nearly two years?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

[868] Admiral STANDLEY. And how long have you had Radar here?

Admiral PYE. We have had Radar in the CALIFORNIA going back about six months, I should think, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, prior to that time you had no Radar, you had no warning?

Admiral PYE. That's true.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had nothing to warn you, in that sense, of the approach of planes. Was there an effective search conducted every morning by the patrol planes prior to that time, or did that make any change in the situation here?

Admiral PYE. No, I don't think it made any change in the situation, Admiral. The number of planes that they have had out here has been limited at all times. The situation, of course, has been more tense, but the Radar from the ships was not used in port because it must be high enough to obtain the direction of the planes without interception of the hills, so from the port here there is a very limited arc from which any Radar could have been used from the ships. I feel that if we had gone to war a year ago our chances of having a raid of this nature would have just that much greater. The development along the whole line of protection against air attack has been considerable in this past year, and we have very conscientiously drilled at it. We have reams of papers here to show the exercises that we have conducted, and I have been particularly interested in the Radar and in the listening gear for submarines; and when we had these intertype exercises within the task force there has seldom been a time when we haven't had tracking and trailing exercises for the destroyers with submarines and anti-aircraft exercises of various kinds, and particularly in the last few months we have been using the Radar to assist us in destroyer attacks.

The CHAIRMAN. In destroyer what?

Admiral PYE. That is, against destroyer attack.

[869] The CHAIRMAN. Destroyer attacks.

Admiral PYE. The Radar has been quite effective against them. In the exercise that we had immediately preceding this disaster, in which I had one task force in a minor problem, we decided not to use any destroyer screen but to organize our forces in groups and to

attempt to locate the attacking destroyer simply by Radar. We were attacked by 17 destroyers, and so far as we could judge by the results, of course, they were that there was only one attack, one ship, one destroyer that got through into the screen, through the screen, and to attack the train.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, you perhaps think, then, in view of the operation of the Radar at the moment, that the pendulum has swung a little bit too far? In other words, you are using too much of the effective strength of the fleet for purely protective purposes?

Admiral PYE. I am inclined to believe that. Of course I do think that the pendulum always swings from one to the other, and the Department was quite concerned over the lack of pursuit in the air immediately after this December 7; and, as I was given the unity of command, I felt that I was responsible for knowing exactly what the pursuit were doing, and I had a conference with General Emmons and decided upon a policy for the use of the pursuit planes. At that time there were still three battleships in port that would soon be available for use and a task force comprising a carrier and three cruisers. We tentatively decided upon a policy to keep one third of the pursuit planes in the air from a half hour before daylight until about two hours after daylight, to keep one sixth in the air during daylight between 8 and a half hour before dark, to again put one third in the air one hour before sunset until a half hour after sunset. After this policy had been in effect about three days I was informed that it was too strenuous, that both the matériel and personnel were wearing out under it; and [870] although the number of pursuit planes has been now increased to 101, in order to conserve matériel and pilots we have had to reduce the requirements to one squadron, usually about 18 planes, from the period one half hour before sunrise until 8 o'clock, no planes in the air from 8 o'clock until one hour before sunset, but one third on five minutes' notice, and one squadron in the air from one hour before sunset until a half hour after sunset.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what state of readiness is in effect for the pursuits during the hours of darkness?

Admiral PYE. They have one squadron on standby five-minute notice.

The CHAIRMAN. What force is doing the distant patrol now, Admiral?

Admiral PYE. The patrol is being done by a combination of Navy patrol planes and Army B-17's, long-range bomber.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to be able to keep that up as you are doing now with the present personnel and matériel?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. We had to cut it down 70 degrees yesterday. The Army lost one bomber. They are preparing for a special flight which required a certain number, and it is also requiring for a special flight—requires another squadron. So we have had to cut it down, so that yesterday there was about 70 degrees short of the 360. That is made up in the morning from two to three hundred miles by battleship planes from the sunken ships and by utility planes of a smaller radius.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are these, the plans that have been put into effect under this unity-of-command policy by you and General Em-

mons, in the large, in accordance with the war plans previously written?

Admiral PYE. It had been in the war plans many years ago, and during recent years it had been removed from the war plans, and I believe that there was no provision unless it was so [871] specifically designated by the President. There was no unity of command previous to this order.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, but what I mean is: After this order of unity of command and after it was put into effect, you and General Emmons have had a conference, and you have put these defense and protective measures into effect?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those measures visualized and anticipated in the war plans provided for if you had the force to carry them out previously?

Admiral PYE. Not to my knowledge, Admiral, but I am not as conversant with the plan on shore as I might have been had I been Commander-in-Chief. So far as I know there was coordination—there was discussion, but I never was personally present at any such.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, isn't it within your knowledge that the plans provided for an offshore patrol and search, if permitted?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, the war plans provided for an offshore patrol, both for surface and air craft if the facilities and equipment permitted?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, it was, but I didn't quite get your question. I mean I didn't understand exactly what you meant as to whether or not they had actually planned to do any particular thing with them. I did call in the general plan, but what arrangement they had made to do that I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. No. What I am getting at: It was planned that on the outbreak of war—

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. —these measures would go into effect?

Admiral PYE. That would be certain measures go into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

[872] Admiral PYE. But whether or not there would be unity of command, I don't think—

Admiral STANDLEY. The unity of command was just due to the fact that you had suddenly coordinated command of the post here. But these measures that you put in were not because of unity of command. It is something that has been planned for many years; isn't that true?

Admiral PYE. It is true in a general sense, yes, and specifically I think there was an agreement before this that the Army pursuit command would handle all of the Navy and Marine fighting planes that were available, at the same time that the Navy patrol 2 would handle all the Army bombers that could be made available for search and for attack under certain conditions—under attack on carriers or submarines or anything which did not threaten the coast line of the Hawaiian Islands.

Admiral STANDLEY. But has that agreement now been modified by the present arrangements?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. The only agreement was, in having unity of command I had to know specifically what the pursuit plan was doing because I was being asked from Washington, so I was responsible then to determine with General Emmons, in consultation with him, how much should be done with what we had; and I did too much. I mean in our effort to do the most we could we did more than we should have, than is safe to continue.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I am trying to get at, that these plans were conducted——

Admiral PYE. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. —if you had the force to do them, and even more if you had a force: you would do more than you are doing now?

Admiral PYE. Absolutely.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have another question or two, Admiral, relative to the night of December 6.

[873] The CHAIRMAN. He said he was in bed.

Admiral PYE. At the Halekulani Hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but did you go to a party?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or was it a dinner party?

Admiral PYE. I was at a dinner party that night.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the Hotel Halekulani?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, at the hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it a large party?

Admiral PYE. About 20, as I recall, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there other dinner parties and a large party at the hotel?

Admiral PYE. I think there was one other party, about 12; I can't say definitely.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not such, however, that you would consider it a large Naval party?

Admiral PYE. Well, this one was. This one was a Navy party, about 20.

Admiral STANDLEY. About 20. But not such as you would have two or three hundred Naval officers there?

Admiral PYE. No, sir. It was a private party.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you in uniform that night?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not in uniform?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the conduct of the officers on this station as far as you are cognizant of it, with regard to drunken parties, parties at which a large number of Naval officers are drunk, that sort of thing? What is your general observation?

Admiral PYE. I consider the condition has been excellent. I have seen no drunkenness whatsoever.

Admiral STANDLEY. Along the lines that we were discussing there, the unity of command, and so forth, when did the unity [874] of command go into effect?

Admiral PYE. I believe it was the 17th or 18th. I would have to check that.

General McCoy. What day did you take command, Admiral, of the fleet?

Admiral PYE. 17th.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the day Admiral Kimmel was relieved?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there unity of command invoked before, prior, or at the time?

Admiral PYE. It was after.

Admiral STANDLEY. After that time?

Admiral PYE. And I think it was the same time, I recall, that same evening, General Emmons reported to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. General Emmons in his report has referred to a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, and he refers there to the joint action. He said, "until and if the method of unity of command is invoked as prescribed in Joint Action Army and Navy 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9b." So that would seem to indicate that unity of command was contemplated in the War Plans 1935.

Admiral PYE. It seems to me it was just about that time it was taken out, if I remember correctly, Admiral.

(At this point the reporter was excused from the hearing room, and later recalled.)

General McCoy. Admiral, I have recalled the stenographer, and I would like to make a record of these last few questions I put to you, for a special purpose.

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And I shall repeat them.

Admiral PYE. All right.

General McCoy. Just the last two or three questions I asked you.

[875] In view of the attack and the serious damage inflicted by it, do you think the usefulness and availability of the Naval station should be restudied?

Admiral PYE. I think, insofar as its protection is concerned, it should be restudied. I do not believe that there is any other suitable base in this area, and if we intend to conduct war in this area this base must be held and used.

General McCoy. It means, then, that the Government must be made aware, if not already so, that it must be held at all costs, and that therefore they must furnish reinforcements of personnel?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Fighting planes and other protective measures?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir, I agree with that absolutely.

General McCoy. Particularly fighter planes and anti-aircraft guns?

Admiral PYE. I think those are among the most essential elements of defense, but the Commanding General I believe feels troops for the defense of the outlying islands are almost equally essential.

General McCoy. I think he has been informed of another division being sent immediately for that purpose.

Admiral PYE. I know he asked for two divisions.

General McCoy. Two?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you please go over again the special defenses against aerial torpedoes that have already been installed for the additional protection of ships in the harbor and dry docks?

Admiral PRY. The additional defenses which have been installed since December 7 for the protection of ships and dry-dock caissons comprise a net—an anti-torpedo net in two sections which extends across the harbor in such a manner [876] as to protect the caissons of both dry docks and one major ship berth at pier 1010.

Other protection is afforded to ships moored in berths at North Island by means of long-range practice target rafts which are approximately a hundred feet long and draw 24 feet of water, to the bottom of which has been added an additional 5 feet of steel plate.

General McCoy. Have additional security measures been taken against sabotage?

Admiral PRY. What steps the District Commandant has taken in addition to those that were effective before, I cannot personally say. I do know that they have been increased, but in exactly what respects I am not informed.

General McCoy. Have there been any steps taken to lessen concentration of Naval vessels in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral PRY. Yes, there has been. No ships are kept in Pearl Harbor any longer than absolutely essential for fueling, overhauling, or relaxation of personnel, and to date none has been in port more than 48 hours. That of course applies to the bigger ships, General.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral PRY. Because the destroyers, the mine sweepers, and things like that, we have to run them in and out all the time, and the off-shore patrol work and the harbor entrance work, but the big ships are kept out just as much as possible.

General McCoy. The Secretary of the Navy on his return emphasized the completeness of the Naval and military information in the hands of the Japanese prior to the attack, the meticulous details of their plans of attack. That raises the question of the complete failure on the part of the Army intelligence and of the F. B. I. and the Navy intelligence to inform the responsible commanders effectively of such espionage and such plans of the Japanese. Are you conscious or have you thought of any way to prevent that in the future?

[877] **Admiral PRY.** No, sir; I think that's beyond me. But in this submarine that ran aground out near Bellows Field there and they got almost everything the fellows had, he had his Navy confidential chart. Now, that was a '37 issue, but things haven't changed very much, but he had down there on every berth the name of a ship, and those ships were in those positions about three weeks before this attack. So unquestionably somebody was watching the ships and informing them of the berths; and it is quite apparent from the berths that were attacked that they knew where the big ships were supposed to be. I think that each pilot was told to attack a certain berth. I don't think he was given any initiative at all as to picking out his ship, because Berth F-9, where there is usually a carrier, was the UTAH, and the UTAH was sunk. Berths at 1010 dock they had marked ARIZONA, but it happened to be OGLALA. And another berth they had marked—there was one—they had two carriers in there and the UTAH—the UTAH or the DETROIT—RALEIGH—was at the other berth.

Now, I don't think those pilots picked out their ships at all. I think each one of them had a definite berth to shoot up here no mat-

ter what was in it, but they hoped that the thing that was there before would be in it then. There would have been no use in their shooting up these things over here (indicating on a map), and they didn't know what the effectiveness of this was going to be (indicating); and in these two here at 1010 dock was where they had the ARIZONA marked, but the ARIZONA really was over here (indicating), but three weeks ago she was going in dry dock there, and she was berthed in that berth for about three or four days awaiting to get her turn in dry dock, and somebody gave them that picture, because that is the only time the ARIZONA had been there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, I think the General's question was whether or not any steps have been taken that [878] would tend to prevent information of that kind getting out from Honolulu.

Admiral PYE. The General informed me that they had arrested for detention about 250 persons who were supposed to be alien sympathizers, probably alien citizens. These are being detained in a concentration camp within the city, and I have not much detailed information as to that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether a copy of that chart that was taken out of the submarine was available here or not? The Secretary I think had a photostat copy of it. Do you know whether one is available or not?

[879] Admiral PYE. I think the chart itself is; should be.

Admiral STANDLEY. The chart itself is?

Admiral PYE. Yes, Sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a note of this (addressing Mr. Howe)?

General MCCOY. Admiral, there seems to be one other vital danger that is not under your control, but it is perfectly obvious that you have not been informed of any successful espionage on the part of the American agents of what is happening in Japanese naval concentrations?

Admiral PYE. No, sir, we know nothing of it except what we can get by radio direction finder.

General MCCOY. That leaves the force here, or any American force, very much at the mercy of the Japanese fleet where it is able to concentrate and take the initiative; and, as you are quite conscious, we are on the defense, so that we are still at the mercy of any initiated enterprise on the part of the Japanese fleet; is that not the fact?

Admiral PYE. Well, it certainly is a fact that we are at a tremendous disadvantage, yes, sir. We have no information actually of their bases. We don't know what they have in the Mandates. We have only reports from various sources, which we hope are correct, that we are not certain of. Of course, I think that that is due, again, to the fact that our country did not see fit to enforce its rights upon the Japanese in visiting the Mandates. We had certain free ports, but Admiral Standley can verify that when we tried to get ships in there we didn't have any luck. They were free ports but not to us.

General MCCOY. Well, now, that is a condition, not theory. Don't you think that that ought to be brought plainly to the responsibility of the Navy Department, from your responsibility here lacking that? They know it, of course, [880] but at the same time I think that in your responsible position on the outpost it would seem to me

something that you should forcibly bring to the attention of the Navy Department.

Admiral PYE. Well, I think that is very true, that we need it. I don't think it is necessary to bring it to the Navy Department's attention. I think they are perfectly convinced of it. I do feel that it is up to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific to do what he can about it, just as long as he can, to try to get planes in there; to fly in and—well, we are taking steps to try to get more information than we have.

General MCCOY. I have no further questions.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, is there any radio watch for local transmitters on the islands to see whether anybody is transmitting out?

Admiral PYE. Yes. The minute the military governor was installed they issued an order for all aliens to turn in their radios. They also issued an order that no sending sets would be allowed by anybody except by their authority, and I think there are only four sending sets that have been authorized for use. In addition to that they have made a search by patrol cars and direction finders to locate some of the sending stations that we did know were sending for the first few days after the attack, and at least on one occasion an Army sergeant located one of these, or at least they located for him a house in which they thought there was a sending set operating, and he went to there, opened the door, found a Jap operating a set, and he didn't stop to question; he just shot.

Now, that is the one particular case that I have definite knowledge of, but I have spoken to the General about it. We had a conference on that radio business the other day. The Commandant of the Yard—or the District, really wants to license all radio receiving sets, and the General isn't quite [881] satisfied that that is the best thing to do. There is some advantage in keeping the long-wave sets out if you can stop them from using them on the short wave, because then you can use your own propaganda on your local stations, and they can't get the other, but the difficulty is that it does not take much of an expert to change a long to a short or a short to a long, and you can't be sure that the fellow is not going to change it when you are not looking. But they are studying that proposition. It was put up by the Commandant, and I had a conference with General Emmons about it, because the Army at present desire to have a little counter propaganda in the Japanese language, and that is what you have got to balance it against. You have got to balance whether your counter propaganda is better than to let them have the chance of having what they hear from the long distance. Of course, if you could be perfectly certain that they couldn't receive the Japanese stations and could receive your local stations, why, you would probably be better off, but it is very difficult to be certain that they can't. But there is a very large Japanese population on these islands, and they must know something, and you really have got to feed them something, and it is better to feed them what we want them to hear than for the other fellows to do it.

General McNARNEY. Do you happen to know who gave the original directive for the preparation of plans for the relief of Wake?

Admiral PYE. Well, I think you've got to go back some time for the original relief of Wake. Of course, back on October 22, I believe, when the change of government took place, I was then on the other coast, so I don't know any of the details at that time, but I believe Admiral Kimmel decided to increase the forces at Wake at least by the 12 fighting planes which were afterward landed out there, flown [882] from the Enterprise. At the time, on December 7, the USS BURROUGHS was within two or three hundred miles of it, with various extra stores and radar, more munitions and things that never got there because of the war. The ship was turned around, or turned around; I don't know which. I didn't know anything about it until afterward, and I don't know who gave the order for her to turn around, but she did not get to Wake.

The first connection that I personally had with it was: while I was acting with Admiral Kimmel, before I took over, there was a proposition made to send two destroyers to Wake. That was the day that the Secretary of the Navy was here. I believed it should be done, but it wasn't done.

General McNARNEY. Do you recall the date?

Admiral PYE. I think about the 11th.

Commander MOMSEN. I can look that up.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Secretary arrived at San Diego coming back on Sunday. No. Saturday.

Admiral PYE. Saturday.

Admiral STANDLEY. This happened some time the previous month. The 7th—

Admiral PYE. 14th, 13th, 12th, 11th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Sunday was the 13th when he arrived in San Diego.

Admiral PYE. Well, I think it was the 11th, then. That was not done. We had some difficulty in making any other movement early because of the logistic situation. The ENTERPRISE had been well out to Wake, within two hundred miles of Wake, in order to fly off these 12 fighting planes that went there. On December 7th she was three hundred miles from here, so she had traveled in the neighborhood of 4,000 miles, so she didn't have very much fuel there.

The LEXINGTON group which had gone out toward Midway intending to land some additional material at Midway had not arrived at Midway but was several hundred miles short of it on [883] December 7, and they were immediately directed to return in this direction. They did not get to Midway. It was hoped that the LEXINGTON might be able to fuel from a tanker. Well, the tanker was then down in the direction of the LEXINGTON group to meet them, in hopes that they could be ready again to move out towards Wake with possible relief. It took them—they waited four days before they could get any weather to fuel any ship, and finally the CHICAGO, one of the heavy cruisers was able to get some fuel, but the weather conditions even then were so bad that they did not dare to attempt it with the carrier on account of the tremendous overhang on the bow of the carrier. By that time they were so low in fuel that they decided that they would have to bring them back here as long as they couldn't fuel there. So when the ENTERPRISE came in, say on the 9th, as I recall it, of course things were still pretty uncertain;

we didn't know whether the other people had gone back or not, and the Commander-in-Chief did not want to have that ship in here any longer than possible. So they got in in the afternoon and were told they had to get out at four o'clock the next morning. There was some delay in the tanker getting alongside. The winds were adverse, and the tanker was alongside the cruiser and had difficulty getting away.

So when the ENTERPRISE left at four o'clock in the morning she only had about 65% of fuel instead of being filled up. So we had to get her out so we could get the LEXINGTON in, and we got the LEXINGTON in the next day and fueled her, and by that time the SARATOGA was coming from the West Coast, and she was due, and she had a marine fighting squadron of planes that were suitable for land work but not suitable for ship work. So we decided then to shift from the LEXINGTON to the SARATOGA, bring the SARATOGA in and fuel her and then send her to the westward to relieve Guam with the Tangier, which is an aviation tender which was filled up with gasoline, stores, and ammunition.

[884] The CHAIRMAN. We know the story from there on.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral PYE. You know the story from there on?

The CHAIRMAN. We know the story from there on.

Admiral PYE. This question of fueling at sea—for a year now every time we have had a week's exercises we have always had some ships fuel, and we have had other ships tow other ships, but when you get out in these broad swells they have here in the broad Pacific it is a difficult job. The logistics of operating these things at 2,000 miles from base, where you can't be sure you will have an open channel in advance, is turning a lot of hair gray, and it will turn lots more before we are through with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall excuse the stenographer, then.

(At 4:55 o'clock p. m. an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Wednesday, December 31, 1941, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[885]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[886] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1941

**LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
*Pearl Harbor, T. H.***

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Bellinger.

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK NEISON LYNCH
BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Please give your full name to the reporter.

Admiral BELLINGER. Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your command on and prior to 7 December last?

Admiral BELLINGER. In order that I may not forget some of the titles I held, I would like to refer to a memorandum [887] I made this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral BELLINGER. Command of patrol wing 2, which placed me in command of the patrol squadrons and aircraft centers assigned to patrol wing 2. In addition I was commander, fleet air detachment, which gives control of all aircraft based on Ford Island.

By special directive from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, I was also placed in command for operational control of patrol wing 1, which comprised squadrons patrol wing 1 plus tenders, aircraft tenders attached to patrol wing 1.

Later this force was designated task force 9, and I was commander of task force 9.

In addition I was Commander Naval Base Defense Force, which functioned under the Commandant 14th Naval District and under the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet.

In addition I was liaison with the Commandant 14th Naval District for all aviation development affecting the patrol planes in this area and all outlying islands including Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston.

Admiral STANDLEY. I wish you would give me the number of planes and types of planes in your command, as part of your last answer.

General McCoy. May I insert a question before that?

Do I understand that you have been responsible as chief air officer on duty here in command of everything having to do with the air activities except those pertaining to the fleet itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. With reference to all planes that were under my command directly, which included patrol wing 1 and patrol wing 2 and such planes of the fleet as were shore-based; while shore-based they came under my direction.

They were subject, of course, to the orders of the commands [888] to which they were attached, but while shore-based and as such they were under my instructions.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me understand, Admiral, for my own information: Was patrol wing 1 a part of the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, and also patrol wing 2.

The CHAIRMAN. And also patrol wing 2?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And those two were land-based?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And while they were land-based, they were under your exclusive command?

Admiral BELLINGER. You are referring to patrol wings 1 and 2?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. They were at all times under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether operating with the fleet or shore-based?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. They were always either shore-based or tender-based. The are large flying ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Not the sort used on carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any responsibility in connection with the planes assigned to carriers?

Admiral BELLINGER. Only when they were shore-based.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would only be when they were removed from the carriers? And based on land?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that involve temporary basing when they would be removed from the carrier?

Admiral BELLINGER. Whenever any planes landed on Ford Island they became a part of the fleet air detachment while they were on Ford Island.

[889] General McNARNEY. Does that include Marine planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Marine planes if on Ford Island, yes. They were attached to and a part of the fleet, and all fleet planes when shore-based came under the fleet air detachment.

The CHAIRMAN. Weren't some of these Marine planes based at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they under you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. At present they are, but since Sunday—you refer to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The setup has taken place wherein I have been charged with arranging and controlling with reference to Ewa, Kaneohe, Kauai, and Ford Island.

The CHAIRMAN. So you now have an over-all command which covers those planes at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes. May I explain further?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The planes that are attached to the Marines or to any other portion of the fleet except patrol wings 1 and 2 do not remain permanently under my command. They are only under my command when they are shore-based, and they may be removed from such status at any time by the responsible commander who has charge of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would be the commander who could remove the Marine planes based on Ewa from your command, and how would he do it?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Commander, Aircraft Battle Force, is in command of all carrier detachments. The Commander Battleships is in command of all battleship planes that may be based on shore. The Commander Cruisers is in charge of all cruiser planes that may be based on shore. They come and they go as directed by those commanders.

[890] The Marines are a part of aircraft battle force similar to the carrier groups that are based on carriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Then if the Commander Battle Force, for example, desired a number of planes for a mission somewhere beyond the operating area of the Hawaiian Islands, the planes he would call for for that purpose would automatically be removed from your control for the time being?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And similarly from those other commanders who might call for planes and remove them from a shore base?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that the situation prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then your status in the respective commands has not materially changed since December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Except with regard to the Marine planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. It merely refers to the adding more responsibility in connection with the Maui airport or locating the base on the Ewa base.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me see if we can clear this up a little bit.

Admiral, suppose a carrier comes in and ties up at a buoy and retains her planes on board. In that case, although she is tied up in this harbor, these planes would be under the command of the carrier and you would have nothing to do with them?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct. They would not be shore-based.

Admiral STANDLEY. But if before she comes in her planes take off and land on shore, either at Ford Island or some other place, they are then under your command?

[891] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, under my command.

Admiral STANDLEY. Before the 7th you did not have Maui under your command?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So it was only in case they landed on Oahu that you had command of those carrier planes if they landed ashore?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had Marine planes at Ewa?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And with those Marine planes, as long as they were at Ewa, operated by the Marines, would they be in exactly the same status as those carrier planes that are on the deck of the carrier when she is in port?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not exactly, no, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what is the difference?

Admiral BELLINGER. They operate under the Marines but in connection with the Naval Base Defense Air Force operations. They can be put by my instructions in operation if and when they are based at Ewa.

May I explain a little off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead and make your explanation on the record, Admiral.

Admiral BELLINGER. This [referring to a document] is Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2C1-41 revised.

The CHAIRMAN. We have it.

Admiral BELLINGER. As of October 14, 1941.

There was an original one which stated practically the same thing insofar as the air units are concerned, and it was issued several months prior.

This directive places the Commandant 14th Naval District as the Naval Base Defense Officer, and as such, "He shall exercise supervisory control over the Naval Shore-Based Aircraft, arranging through Commander, Patrol Wing 2, for coordination for joint air effort between Army and Navy."

[892] By the authority of this letter and by action resulting therefrom, there was prepared a joint estimate of the situation which affected the Naval Base Defense Air Force operating under the Commandant 14th Naval District.

That joint estimate is dated March 31, 1941, and it is signed by myself and General F. L. Martin, Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just a minute. Let me get that straight. What is the date of that?

The CHAIRMAN. March 31.

Admiral BELLINGER. March 31, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. That was prepared under the predecessor order.

Admiral BELLINGER. The first one.

Admiral STANDLEY. The first one?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

In arriving at decisions in that joint order there was set up a searching and attacking group under command patrol wing 2, and the following units in accordance with the current conditions of readiness: patrol squadrons, shore-based VOV units; shore-based carrier VV and VT.

Admiral STANDLEY. What does that mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. They are planes on the battleships and cruisers; shore-based carrier VS planes; shore-based Marine VS and VV squadrons; Army bombardment squadrons; Army reconnaissance squadrons; Navy utility squadrons. Then there was the air combat group under the command of Hawaiian Air Force, which included the Army pursuit squadrons, shore-based carrier VF squadrons, and the shore-based Marine VS squadrons, and one division of shore-based carrier VS planes. The latter was primarily for trailing aircraft.

In this estimate of the situation there is a statement:

Aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain for any extended period their bases on [893] Oahu, and a patrol extensive enough to insure that air attack from Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment did that statement that you have last read continue to apply to the situation to and including December 7, 1941?

Admiral BELLINGER. To and including December 7 and including up to date.

The CHAIRMAN. You were then, as I understand it, setting up an estimate and plan which was an ideal, to be attained if sufficient units were supplied to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Exactly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had in mind to inform the Commission in what respects and to what extent your available materiel was sufficient on December 7? If you have, you may do it now or when it seems appropriate to do it in your statement.

Admiral BELLINGER. On December 7 the total number of patrol planes available to my command was 81. Of those a total of 72 were available for flight. There were at Kaneohe 33 available for flight.

The CHAIRMAN. Thirty-three what?

Admiral BELLINGER. Thirty-three patrol planes.

At Pearl there were 28 patrol planes available for flight. At Midway there were 11 planes available for flight. Of those at Pearl, 12 planes had returned from Midway on 5 December after arduous duty at Midway and Wake since 17 October.

This squadron was in a relatively poor matériel condition because of its extended operations at advance bases with inadequate facilities for normal repair and upkeep.

That actually gives an availability of 60 planes available for flight at Kaneohe, Pearl, and Midway or 49 at Pearl and Kaneohe.

[894] Of those 60 planes three planes, armed with two depth charges, were conducting a search assigned to the fleet operating area in accordance with United States Pacific Fleet Letter No. 2CL-41 revised.

Three additional planes of that particular squadron were on 30-minute notice. At Midway five planes were conducting search of a sector out to a radius of 450 miles.

[895] General McCoy. I would like to get clear in my mind. He spoke of 12 planes having returned. Now, are those included in the 49 that were reported available for flight at Pearl and Kaneohe?

The CHAIRMAN. These 12 planes that had come back on the Friday, you are not counting those in the 49?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Those are in addition to the 49?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are in addition to the 49. But you would not call them fit for use to repel a surprise attack? Or would you?

Admiral BELLINGER. Their primary use was for search operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Search; that is right. They would not be available, then, for search?

Admiral BELLINGER. The 49 planes?

The CHAIRMAN. No; the 12 that had just gotten back.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I would say they were not. Anything can be done in an emergency.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Or anything is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not like to send them out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Normally speaking, they were not available for continued flight operations.

General McCoy. And they were not in flight that morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what else have you got? Now we have got your search planes force detailed as of that morning. What else?

Admiral BELLINGER. Of the planes at Kaneohe, Pearl, and Midway, the following were operating:

Three planes armed with two depth charges, each conducting a search of assigned fleet operating areas in accordance with [896] U. S. Pacific Fleet letter No. 2CL-41 revised.

Three planes at Kaneohe in Condition 2. That is, thirty-minute notice.

Five planes were conducting search of sector 120 degrees-170 degrees, radius 450 miles, departed Midway at 1820 GCT.

Two planes departed Midway at same time to rendezvous with LEXINGTON at a point 400 miles bearing 130 degrees from Midway to serve as escort for marine scouting planes.

Four additional planes armed with two 500-pound bombs were each on the alert at Midway as a ready striking force.

These four planes took off at about 2230 GCT upon receipt of information on the attack on Pearl Harbor and searched sector 060 to 100 degrees, radius 400 miles.

The 12th plane of that squadron at Midway was under repair in the hangar at Midway.

There were four planes from Pearl conducting intertype tactics in area C-5 with U. S. submarines.

General McCoy. That was over at Lahaina anchorage?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. That is in the sea area and operating area at sea which is assigned to submarines. It is in the direction of—in that direction, yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is the way it has been described to us before, I believe.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

All planes except those under repair were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

There are a lot of details about all this; I don't know whether you want me to go into it or not. I don't want to confuse the issue, but—

Admiral STANDLEY. I think what we want to know is the disposition of your forces at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that what he is giving us in detail.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So the details of repairs, and that sort [897] of thing, I don't think we need.

Admiral BELLINGER. There is one point I would like to bring out: that replacement of squadrons with new type planes took place as follows; the dates are the arrival of squadrons at Oahu:

VP-11, 12 planes on 28 October, 1941.

VP-24, 6 planes on 28 October, 1941.

VP-12, 12 planes on 8 November, 1941.

VP-23, 12 planes on 23 November, 1941.

VP-14, 12 planes on 23 November, 1941.

These replacement squadrons were patrol planes of the PBY-5 type. They were experiencing the usual shakedown difficulties and were hampered in maintenance by an almost complete absence of spare parts. In addition, a program for installation of leakproof tanks, armor, and modified engine nose sections was in progress. The installation was planned to be a long drawn out affair in order not to place too many planes out of commission at any one time. The leakproof tanks and the armor were considered necessary with reference to readiness for war, as it was expected in accordance with plans that these planes would not remain permanently in the Oahu area but would operate from advance bases in accordance with plans: advance bases, namely, Midway, Wake, Palmyra, Johnston, and such other bases that might be occupied for strategic reasons wherein the planes would operate from aircraft tenders.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I gather, Admiral that you have given us your total available planes for search?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what planes did you have available for the functions of your command on the morning of December 7?

General McCoy. Before he answers that question I would like to ask him whether these replacements that he has just noted were included in the available planes, of 49, that you have given.

[898] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. You mean when I gave the list out of the dates that the various squadrons arrived? Yes, sir.

The squadrons of older planes were flown to the Pacific Coast, and the squadron took over new planes and flew them back here.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we come to my question as to planes available for other purposes.

Admiral BELLINGER. The marine air group: 18 scout bombers were in commission. Three——

The CHAIRMAN. For what uses——

Admiral BELLINGER. Excuse me. I've got to continue or it doesn't make sense.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral BELLINGER. Three of these 18 were Condition 4; that is, two hours. Ready in two hours.

There were 15 scout bombers in Condition 5; that is, in four hours.

The utility wing comprises planes which are really noncombatant planes and are merely for utility services to the fleet. There were 30 planes of various types in the utility wing, and of these 22 were in Condition 5; that is, ready in four hours.

The report from the Hawaiian Air Force, Commander Hawaiian Air Force——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me. Before you go to that: The utility planes were not of any value in repelling or preventing a surprise attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now go to your Hawaiian Air Force, if you will.

Admiral BELLINGER. I may elaborate just a moment on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. By force of circumstances we are using some of the utility planes for search in a limited sense, and [399] filling out deficiencies that exist.

The CHAIRMAN. When you say you "are" I take it you imply that you were not doing so on and before December 7.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

To continue: The report from the Commander Hawaiian Air Force received on Friday, which was evidently to continue through till Monday, was: 8 B-17's, 21 B-18's, 6 A-20's, all in condition easy five, which means all aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; can be made ready in four hours.

The CHAIRMAN. On and before December 7 had you, under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan between Army and Navy, dated April 11, 1941, called upon the Army for the use of any of its planes for search purposes?

Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with air raid drills I had.

The CHAIRMAN. But only for those drills?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. And in order that arrangements could be made to get more out of these drills by having more planes take part in them, a schedule of these drills was set up between the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, the Commanding General, and the Commander-in-Chief I think approved. I believe that.

General McCoy. Could you normally——

Admiral BELLINGER (interposing). Leave off that latter. It was set up between the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and the Commanding General, Hawaiian Force.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, what I am interested in particularly is whether you had reinforced the search planes at your command for

the purpose of routine search by calling on the Army for additional ships for distant reconnaissance.

Admiral BELLINGER. In connection with any drills we had had—

[900] The CHAIRMAN. I am not interested in drills. I am interested in routine search.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I had not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we were informed by the Army, and I wanted it to be confirmed.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Should you take advantage of that reinforcement for distant search, had you authority to call directly on the Army air commander for reinforcement or addition to your own forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have control over only what planes are made available.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. If no planes are made available I have none. So in connection with operations, which were as I say drills, between the Army and Navy in these air raid operational drills the number of planes available was limited, and so expressed to me, because of necessity to conduct the training which they had to conduct, and I knew from experience and liaison with them of their difficulties.

General McCoy. I take it, on the morning of the 6th, in the normal operation of the Navy patrols, that you were called upon to make certain patrols and certain liaison with the submarine commands?

Admiral BELLINGER. The submarine activities on the morning of the 7th were purely drill, arranged for as a schedule prior to that date.

General McCoy. I understand that there were two patrols to the south and southwest that you were called upon that morning to undertake and did undertake.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. The search of operating areas in the early morning is what is required by this letter 2 CL-41, and that was done.

[901] General McCoy. You did not, on that morning, call on the Army for help?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, not until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, is it your understanding that the Joint Coastal Frontier Plan of the Army and Navy and the plan for the naval base defense, to which you have referred,—Is it your understanding that those were in operation prior to December 7, or were they war plans?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were really war plans, yes, sir. For instance, I was set up as Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force. Plans were made, but I was also scheduled in case of war to base somewhere else, in accordance with plans. In other words, Patrol Wing 2 and Patrol Wing 1, which were definitely under my command, were mobile forces supposed to operate with the fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. In case of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. And they were not in any plans set up except for perhaps one or two squadrons to remain here, but primarily with reference to forming some sort of relief for the squadrons that may be operating at advance bases. They were considered mobile squadrons and were planned as such in all plans.

The CHAIRMAN. Were these plans—joint plans with the Army, and the base defense plan,—supposed to be in full operation before December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely with what was available.

The CHAIRMAN. Merely with what was available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely with what was made available.

The CHAIRMAN. Made available. Now, you have said your force was deficient for the purposes for which it was organized. In your judgment, how far was it deficient? In other words, what additional matériel would you have needed to carry out in routine manner, before the declaration of war, the defense [902] operations that the plans contemplated?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have made considerable study of this situation. I made recommendation—excuse me. May I talk off the record a second? I made a recommendation about something which does not apply definitely to this naval base defense air force business but applies to the command which I was supposed to exercise in connection with—after war was declared.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. And in that plan I recommended as a starter, 180 4-engine land plane bombers and 180 pursuit planes to work under the Navy in connection with operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Are pursuit planes the same as search planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. They are fighting planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Well, what about search planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The bombing—the land plane bombers,—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Land plane bombers could be so used?

Admiral BELLINGER. — on account of their speed, the radius of action, particularly the B-24, is considered superior in every respect to the PBV type of planes which I was operating, which are very slow and ineffectual in many ways. At the present time I have submitted a complete study of this to the Commander-in-Chief; and in that study, which is now I believe in his hands, I am asking for as many B-24 type planes—4-engine bombardment planes—up to 102 at present, to take over the search that is evidently necessary from this Oahu area.

General McCoy. Are they to be assigned to the Army or the Navy?

ADMIRAL BELLINGER. I am asking them for the Navy. The PBV type of plane, as I say, is very slow, takes too long to cover the necessary area. There are other things connected with this number of planes in the way of equipment, such as [903] radar, which is designed to increase the effectiveness of the search, particularly when the weather—when the visibility is not good.

General McCoy. Has that report been made since the 7th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. That report has been made since the 7th of December. A prior report with reference to the recommendation I spoke about was made—I think I have a record of that here, but perhaps two and a half months ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, I notice that in this summary of the situation under date of March 31, 1941, and your naval base defense plan, under 1-C it is said,

A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As you were a party to this statement, that was your definite view?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that—was this paper [indicating] brought to the attention of the Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BELLINGER. This paper is part of an operation order dated April 9, 1941, and which was approved by Rear Admiral C. C. Bloch, Commander Naval Base Defense Force, who was under the Commander-in-Chief as such.

The CHAIRMAN. I read that statement that I have quoted to you as envisaging that notwithstanding the fact the United States was no at war with Japan a successful raid on Pearl Harbor or Oahu might cripple the United States Fleet's offensive action should such war occur. Am I right in so construing it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, it was a matter of knowledge that a surprise air raid by Japan, either at or just prior to the [904] declaration of war, might seriously cripple the mission of our Pacific Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment and knowledge, was that fact and the inability of the command here to meet adequately such a raid brought to the attention of the Navy Department?

Admiral BELLINGER. In answering that question I would like to refer to a letter which I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations through official channels on January 16, 1941:

I arrived here on October 30, 1940, with the point of view that the International situation was critical, especially in the Pacific, and I was impressed with the need of being ready today rather than tomorrow for any eventuality that might arise. After taking over command of Patrol Wing TWO and looking over the situation, I was surprised to find that here in the Hawaiian Islands, an important naval advanced outpost, we were operating on a shoestring and the more I looked the thinner the shoestring appeared to be.

War readiness of Patrol Plane Squadrons is dependent not only on the planes, and equipment that comprise these squadrons but also on many operating needs and requirements at Air Stations and outlying bases over which the Patrol Wing Commander has no direct control. Needs and requirements for War Readiness include: spare planes, spare engines, hangar and beach equipment, squadron equipment, spare parts, stores, material, bombs, ammunition, base operating facilities, overhaul and repair facilities, qualified personnel to man all base facilities and shops, all in sufficient adequacy to insure continuous operating readiness. These cannot be provided overnight. [905] The isolation of this locality from the source of supply, the distance, and time involved, make careful and comprehensive long distance planning mandatory. I am informed that in the past, the average interval between the normal request and receipt of material has been nine months.

A reference to which I refer—I am not quoting this from my letter now—states as follows:

"In about one year practically all fleet aircraft except Patrol Wing TWO will have armor and fuel protection." unquote.

As there are no plans to modernize the present patrol planes comprising Patrol Wing TWO, this evidently means that there is no intention to replace the present obsolescent type of patrol planes in Patrol Wing TWO prior to one year and that Patrol Wing TWO will practically be the last Wing to be furnished

new planes. This, together with the many existing deficiencies, indicates to me that the Navy Department as a whole does not view the situation in the Pacific with alarm or else is not taking steps in keeping with their view.

Presumably, the offices and bureaus concerned are familiar with the situation in the Hawaiian Area over which they have particular cognizance; certainly enough correspondence has already been written concerning patrol plane needs to enable bureaus and offices to take the necessary steps to provide and to anticipate such needs.

If war should break in the Pacific, there is much work cut out for patrol planes and undoubtedly much will be expected of them. Considerably more attention [906] will have to be paid to anticipating their needs and action taken to provide deficiencies by all the bureaus and offices concerned if patrol planes are to perform according to expectations.

It is therefore urgently recommended that those concerned with War Plans and those in the Planning and Procurement Divisions of all bureaus and offices view the patrol plane situation in the Hawaiian Area in the light of the International situation in the Pacific; that each bureau and office check and recheck their planning and procurement lists for present requirements and future needs and that immediate steps be taken to furnish the personnel, material, facilities and equipment required and under their cognizance, to meet the present emergency and probable eventualities. The tremendous and all consuming work of those in the Navy Department is fully appreciated and there is no intent to criticize or to shift responsibility. This letter is written merely in an effort to insure that we may not be "too late."

Then I list a lot of deficiencies. That was practically the first letter I wrote after coming out here. There have been a great many letters, many of which have been equally as strong.

The CHAIRMAN. The thing I fail to find in that letter, Admiral, is any reference to the necessity to protect this base from sudden air raids, anticipatory to war. Your letter as I listen to it indicates the needs for additional materiel in offensive operations when and if undertaken at the outbreak of a war. What if any warning did you or anyone else, to your knowledge, in this fleet and naval district, give to those in Washington of the utter inadequacy to meet a raid, which it is plain all those in command here had in mind?

[907] Admiral BELLINGER. This letter which I read, as I say, was dated January 16, 1941, and prior to the formation of the naval base defense air force. It was merely to indicate the general situation here.

General McCoy. It was your responsibility, however, if the Navy couldn't do what you asked, to be prepared with what you had to meet any surprise attack in a critical situation, was it not, even if they didn't supply what you asked for?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was my job to do the best I could with everything I had. No question of that.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of the fact that from 1905 on, Japan had always attacked before a declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were you also conscious that the Germans had also attacked before the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And usually on a week-end?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you take additional precautions over week-ends?

Admiral BELLINGER. There have been on some week-ends, yes, sir, but on this particular week-end there were no special precautions taken, no, sir.

General McCoy. Did you not immediately prior to that tragic weekend receive a war warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, except what I could glean from papers, newspapers.

General McCoy. Did you not see the despatch that came from the Navy Department on November 27?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Were you not informed of it?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Have you seen it since?

[908] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. When was it shown to you?

Admiral BELLINGER. I read it perhaps five or six days ago.

General McCoy. Had you seen that, would you have been particularly solicitous and taken special precautions as a result of a war warning of that sort?

Admiral BELLINGER. I hope I would have, and I think I would have.

[909] The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if you had been impressed by it, what measures would have been taken? This is hindsight, sir, but I would like to have your view.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is a question what could have been done continuously with what we had. I will state the situation now as a result of the experience since this 7th, and also from what we estimated prior to the 7th. The question is, with the number of planes and with the number of crews for the planes, how long can you maintain a search operation of so many planes at distances of between seven to eight hundred miles radii?

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any special danger at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have been concerned, conscious of this danger, as this letter indicates, at periods of time, but particularly since arrival here. I also viewed the information gleaned from the newspapers with considerable alarm and interest.

General McCoy. And were you completely surprised on the 7th of December?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I was completely surprised. I was recuperating. It was to be my first day up since Tuesday with the flu. I heard some noise of planes, which sounded as if they were diving, and I heard the thud of a bomb; and then in about 20 seconds the telephone rang. My operations officer informed me that there was an air raid and that it was a real one.

I arrived in the operations office, I should say, in about 15 or 20 minutes or less while the first bombardment was going on.

I should say that it was a surprise. As a matter of fact it has been expressed—I have heard it expressed by senior officers wondering if an attack of this kind would be made here or would ever be made.

[910] General McCoy. Did you think it possible that such an attack could be made?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, and it is possible today, and the same way almost as on December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. In spite of the prophylactic measures that you have put into operation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. It is not with any degree of assurance that we can locate and prevent a carrier from coming in here and getting within range undetected, as the last attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And that irrespective of how much of a search force you are provided with by the Department?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. With more planes, more effective planes, a search can be made more effective. For instance, for the commander of a search group to be able to state with some assurance that no hostile carrier could reach a spot 250 miles away from Oahu and launch an attack without prior detection would require an effective daily search through 360 degrees to a distance of at least 800 miles. Assuming a 15-mile radius of visibility, this would require a daily 16-hour flight of 84 planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Which even today you cannot afford?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have not got that many.

General McCoy. Do you have that many with the additional reinforcements from the Army?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. At the present time we are using from 12 to 16 planes from the Army of the B-17 type to assist in the search. We are using from 25 to 30 in that search. We are endeavoring to have a 46-plane search every day from seven to eight hundred miles, but that cannot be kept up.

General McCoy. In other words, that imminence of danger now is due to the fact that you are on the defensive and that the Japanese can take the initiative?

[911] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. In other words, you are not safe without attacking the Japanese in their bases or at a considerable distance from Hawaii?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Has not the United States Fleet been prepared to do that prior to this time and now?

Admiral BELLINGER. The United States Fleet to attack the enemy in their bases, you mean?

General McNARNEY. Or other defense bases. In other words, you are in the same position as the Japanese. They have defense bases in the Marshall Islands. We have defense bases here on these stepping stone islands. In other words, you do not say the Japanese can do things that we cannot do?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, because I do not say that.

General McCoy. Wouldn't the proper way to stop that be for us to take the initiative and to do the same thing that the Japanese are doing?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

There is one situation that I would like to discuss a little bit on that. That is the Wake Island relation. That is one island sitting out in the Pacific within range of at least three Japanese islands. This puts Wake Island is a little different status than the Japanese islands.

General McCoy. However, our fleet on that day was considered to be much more powerful than the Japanese fleet, was it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. That depends on where our fleet was going to go. To meet out in the open sea is one thing, but to go over there and meet them is another thing.

General McCoy. In other words, we were waiting for an overt attack on the part of the Japanese?

Admiral BELLINGER. Apparently, yes, sir. We were waiting for war to be declared or waiting for an amicable situation to [912] prevail.

General McCoy. Were you familiar with the plans of the Commander-in-Chief to take advantage of an attack on Wake?

Admiral BELLINGER. To take advantage of an attack on Wake?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think so, no, sir. I do not know whether I understand you exactly. Do you mean whether I am familiar with the plan to take advantage of a Japanese attack on Wake? To take advantage of it?

General McCoy. Prior to December 7, did you ever know of any such plan?

Admiral BELLINGER. I was familiar with the war plan, Rainbow 5, war plan.

General McCoy. But not familiar with the specific proposed action of the task force that if Wake should be attacked that the task force would take advantage of the Japanese Fleet attacking Wake and to dispose of it? Have you heard of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I am not familiar with that detail; no, sir.

General McCoy. Did you receive any special instructions from the Commander-in-Chief after the 27th of November that would indicate certain plans for offensive action on the part of the United States Fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. The plans which had to do with the landing of these Marine squadrons at Wake and Midway I was familiar with, and I had knowledge of the patrol planes out there, also. I was familiar with the orders to carry depth charges in patrol planes.

At 7:35 on the morning of Sunday, the 7th, a message was decoded which stated that one of our patrol planes under my command had sunk an enemy submarine one mile off Pearl Harbor entrance.

General McCoy. Did you receive that before the attack [913] from the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. When did you get that?

Admiral BELLINGER. I got that when I got down to the office right after the attack.

General McCoy. When had it been received there?

Admiral BELLINGER. At 7:35. At 7:35 the message was decoded and the information received by the staff duty officer. At 7:37 it was relayed to the operations officer. At 7:40 it was relayed by telephone to the staff duty officer of the Commander-in-Chief.

General McCoy. What did your staff do?

Admiral BELLINGER. At 7:50 my operations officer had a search plan drafted. At 7:57 the first bomb was dropped near the hangar on Ford Island.

At 7:58 the message was broadcast to all ships saying, "Air raid, Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill."

I think that identical message was sent by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet also.

General McCoy. Was that the only information you had prior to the attack of the presence of hostile forces of any kind in this vicinity?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. There had been no previous reports of submarines in this vicinity?

Admiral BELLINGER. None that I knew of, sir.

General McCoy. Did any part of your force at any place on this island see any hostile planes in the air prior to the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you, or was the Army to your knowledge, maintaining an inshore patrol on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. By "inshore patrol" you mean—

The CHAIRMAN. I mean a patrol around the circumference [914] of Oahu to a distance of 20 or 30 miles out.

Admiral BELLINGER. I am not informed of any patrol of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. I have been informed by the Admiral in charge of 14th Naval District that he had been advised by the Army that they had but two or three planes capable of such work, but he did not know whether they were out on that morning, and you say you do not know?

Admiral BELLINGER. No.

General McCoy. Did you have any conferences with the Army Air Corps Commander, General Martin, on the days preceding the attack and immediately preceding the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have had many conferences with him on joint boards, trying to work out situations to prevent conflicts and to adjust matters for the good of both services.

As a matter of fact, the last one is right here. I think this is a copy of it, which was signed by General Martin and myself. It was the general subject of aviation facilities on Oahu.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that?

Admiral BELLINGER. 31 October 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the nature of that conference?

Admiral BELLINGER. The opening paragraph of this reads as follows:

In compliance with the radiogram to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department dated 2 October 1941 and a similar radiogram to the Commandant, 14th Naval District, a joint Army-Navy Board was convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating area for all purposes for the entire Hawaiian Area with particular recommendations on the jurisdiction of Kahuku Point area.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the result of the conference?

Admiral BELLINGER. The idea was to get another field [915] on Oahu for the basing of additional pursuit planes for the Army, and the Navy had a small place at Kahuku Point, and that was being used by the carrier planes for training. The question was whether that place was better for the Army or this place called Kipapa.

Admiral STANDLEY. This was just a question of the regular co-ordination of facilities?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, but it states some fundamentals which might indicate a general situation. So far as the Navy end of it is concerned, it was indicating the necessity of developing every possible site that was suitable for the use of aircraft, for the operation of aircraft both in Oahu and all these islands around here.

General McCoy. Admiral, I have been hearing a great deal on this subject of preparedness and the preparations seeming to be inadequate with what was available and provided for, and the question of human judgment and error not playing a predominant part, but just for the sake of following through that human element and the well known operations that are affected by rank, were you or General Martin the senior?

Admiral BELLINGER. General Martin was.

General McCoy. So far as you remember, did the question of rank in the relations between you two affect the situation in any way?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Since December 7 there has gone into effect the unity of command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Has it affected your relations in any way so far?

Admiral BELLINGER. Scarcely none, scarcely none. My relations, dealings, are with General Tinker or perhaps General Rudolph when the question is direct with the bombardment wing.

Of course, the situation is quite different now and then [916] in regard to the closer activities that are continually going on.

General McCoy. You spoke about the great danger and the peril still in this base to the fleet that might be in this base. In other words, with all the warning now about the effects and the knowledge that you are in a state of war and prepared, you still feel that there is great peril here from an air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. With the determined effort to press through this and the probability of supplies, I should say that there is no assurance. Of course, there will be more guns and more people to man the guns and they will be more in a state of alert than formerly. All that will have an effect. The interceptor command is continuously in operation.

General McCoy. Do you have any confidence in that giving a warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not fully, sir; no, sir.

General McCoy. And why not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because planes have come in and have not been detected.

General McCoy. Do you feel that an attack such as was delivered before would come in without being detected?

Admiral BELLINGER. I would not say it is impossible, no, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, war is a state where there can still be errors of judgment and failure of a man or part of the machinery?

Admiral BELLINGER. And also of the mechanics.

General McCoy. But isn't that the case in every war situation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, but you can't make anything to cure that situation, when there are other people working to try to break it down.

General McCoy. The great danger comes from the other side [917] having the initiative?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, that is a great danger. It occurs to me also, and I feel that there is considerable danger internally.

General McCoy. That is, from the Japanese population here, you mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, from the point of view of sabotage of communications and control. We are still in the horse-and-buggy days out here in many ways. There is no question about that. Our method of control of communication, I think, is rotten.

General McCoy. I do not understand what you mean when you say "rotten."

Admiral BELLINGER. Maybe I better not say that, but I have been feeling very strongly about this subject and before the 7th of December.

General McCoy. You mean your material and communications?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. They are old-fashioned?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Why do you think the Navy Department has not given you the latest type of things that you want?

Admiral BELLINGER. I presume that they have been very busy and particularly busy in the Atlantic.

General McCoy. So that is the case in war, that there are places that cannot be perfectly defended?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. And the proper national strategy governs?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In other words, we have a very hard problem to face, but in a sense you have to make the best of what you have available.

Admiral BELLINGER. It is a most difficult problem.

General McCoy. Hasn't that always been the case? Have [918] you ever seen a time when the fleet was ready to go to war?

Admiral BELLINGER. A ship may be ready, but there are many other conditions that they have to go to to make them ready.

General McCoy. In other words, this is not an unusual state of affairs where you have an enemy force. They may not be any more ready than we are?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is true, yes, perfectly.

General McCoy. But it all goes around to the circle to the fact that they have the initiative?

Admiral BELLINGER. Any island that is on the defensive where there are aircraft carriers available to come in or where land-based aircraft can reach them, that island is in a very precarious position on the defensive.

General McCoy. It is great gamble for the enemy to send its aircraft carriers into this vicinity, is it not?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, and I hope they feel that it is a great gamble.

General McCoy. Isn't it a part of the fleet's duty to prevent that?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Discounting the element of surprise, what do you think your orders to effectively ward off a carrier raid would be?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think you had better ask General Davidson that, because that is his job.

General McNARNEY. Well, you are an air man, and we want your opinion as well as General Davidson's.

Admiral BELLINGER. The question is numbers. That is one thing. Then there is the question of control, and there is no definite assurance that it can be warded off.

General McNARNEY. Weren't you able to ward off your last attack with your planes getting in the air and getting the anti-aircraft guns working effectively?

[919] Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. The planes had no effect in warding off the attack on that Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. We had understood that the last raid by the Japanese planes did very little damage because they were compelled to fly very high.

Admiral BELLINGER. The anti-aircraft guns were going then.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that they have been effective in keeping off the planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I do think that had some effect, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your fighter planes were not out, you say?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were very few, very few, and I am really only speaking of the Pearl Harbor area where I was, in the center of it.

General McCoy. Were you able to get any fighter planes in the air at all?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were none. All the fighter planes there were were under the fighter commands. I am a little confused on that.

General McCoy. Weren't any under the command of the land-based planes you had?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral BELLINGER. The fighters came under the Army.

General McCoy. Did you have Navy fighter planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. The Navy fighter planes came under the command of the Army as the Army bombardment planes came under mine.

General McCoy. Had they been put by you under that Army command?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Where were the fighter planes of the Navy at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. They were at Ewa. There were seven [920] fighters, and five in condition, and that means that was the report that went out to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force. That is, seven fighters in four hours at Ewa with the Marines.

General McCoy. Did they get into the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think they were all destroyed or rather damaged before they could get into the air. None of them were in the air during the attack.

General McCoy. I notice that a number of Japanese planes have been brought down. Was there any damage, so far as you know, done to the enemy by any of your particular commands?

Admiral BELLINGER. Merely from the anti-aircraft guns, or from the aircraft tenders under my command.

General McCoy. Do we have a report of the losses at the different air fields? That is, with reference to the Navy?

General McNARNEY. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. I have seen none.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Did you know the existing status of the Army Radar system?

Admiral BELLINGER. I knew it was in process of being set up. I had been over to the interceptor command and looked it over. I talked

with the Navy liaison officer about it. I knew that General Davidson had gone to the mainland in connection with getting some first-hand information, and he had just recently come back and was working on that end of it.

General McNARNEY. I think you said you had no information about the message of November 27, which we call a war warning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I had no information on it.

General McNARNEY. Did you visit the Hawaiian Air Force or the interceptor command between November 27 and December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. With respect to the Navy fighters, [921] Marine fighters, which were becoming available to the Army, what was the method of passage of command? Was it automatic?

Admiral BELLINGER. Daily.

General McNARNEY. Automatic?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was a daily report. It was the report in the afternoon of the fighters situation and their availability.

General McNARNEY. Did the rendering of that report give General Davidson the authority to order those planes out?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, all General Davidson had to do would be to call up Ewa and give instructions as to what these planes were to do?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. This operations order signed by me and dated April 9 states that it includes all shore-based carrier VF squadrons and all shore-based Marine VF squadrons as part of air combat group, and their orders are to operate as directed by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that a routine operation?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, the question of the availability of planes always comes into the picture. For instance, when I speak of planes when they land on Ford Island as coming under my jurisdiction, they arrive there for a purpose and under the directions of their commander and to carry out some schedule of operations.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or for repairs?

Admiral BELLINGER. Or for repairs, rest, and training, and the availability of these planes to me is under the Naval Base Defense Air Force with their directives in connection with the commander under whom they are working normally.

General McNARNEY. Then in effect this agreement really meant nothing if the commander of it—

Admiral BELLINGER. (Interposing) The agreement was a [922] coordination agreement, trying to get something out of nothing or something out of very little.

General McNARNEY. Well, practically nothing.

If those five planes that were in commission on that Sunday morning had been given a mission by you, say, to go on patrol, and in the meantime General Davidson had, before they had taken off, sent an order down with respect to a flight disposition which he desired, which order would have taken preference?

Admiral BELLINGER. They would have taken General Davidson's order because that is the setup. They operate under his orders, and the communication is sent up by the squadron commander through the group commander under General Davidson's command.

General McNARNEY. You said with fleet action patrol wing 1 would be operating from advance bases?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, but in connection with a campaign or a plan of campaign, which plans were set up, the patrol planes were scheduled to operate at advance bases.

General McNARNEY. Where would your command be based in that case?

Admiral BELLINGER. At Midway. That was the plan.

General McNARNEY. Under that situation, who took over here as Air Base Defense Officer?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was the question: How was that going to be arranged?

It was something which was of very great concern because it should be the District affair purely rather than a fleet affair.

General McNARNEY. There was no definite plan as to what would take place at the time of such passage of command or control?

Admiral BELLINGER. If the patrol planes moved out, as they were set up to do in our war plans, there would be very little to do it with.

[923] Now, the reason I spoke about this agreement, the joint board (indicating a document), is that there was a great deal expressed in that concerning who was going to do what or in reference to future plans.

I would like to talk off the record on this because it brings up a lot of the plan of the Army in this of the defense of this island which is in the statement in here. You may want all this, but I do not know whether you want it or not.

This is the statement which I would like to quote from the joint agreement, or rather from a report signed by General Martin and myself. This statement is the Navy's statement in this report:

The principal joint task assigned to Army and Navy forces permanently based in the Hawaiian Islands is to hold Oahu as a main outlying Naval base. The importance of Oahu in the Hawaiian group is due entirely to the existence of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and its attending activities. The existence of Army forces and Naval District forces in great numbers in the Hawaiian Islands is solely for the purpose of maintaining the usefulness of Pearl Harbor as a base for the various units of the fleet. The value of Pearl Harbor Naval Base to the fleet is in providing the means for fleet units to be maintained and continued in effective operating readiness at a point well advanced to the westward. It therefore appears that any military or Naval air units on Oahu which unnecessarily interfere with the maintenance of proper readiness of the fleet and which are not required on Oahu for the security of Oahu, but are required in the Hawaiian group area, should be based on other islands in the Hawaiian group.

A portion of the statement by the Army representative is as follows:

The mission of the Army on Oahu is to defend Pearl Harbor Naval Base against all attacks by an enemy. The [924] contribution to be made by the Hawaiian Air Force in carrying out this mission is: 1, to search for and destroy enemy surface craft within a radius of action by bombardment aviation; 2, to detect and intercept and destroy enemy aircraft in the vicinity of Oahu by pursuit plane aviation.

I just read this to give you an idea of it.

General McNARNEY. Were you particularly concerned about the possibility of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. Did I have anything to do with trying to prevent it?

General McNARNEY. Are you concerned about the sabotage of the forces under your control and your equipment?

Admiral BELLINGER. The answer is yes; yes, I am concerned about it, yes. I have been constantly looking for it, as far as it can be done.

General McNARNEY. Did you find any evidences of any actual acts of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. None that I could put down definitely as sabotage.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you make any special disposition of your planes at the various fields on that day to prevent sabotage or to obviate sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. We have been constantly on the alert to prevent sabotage and to detect it, but not specifically, especially on that day, especially on the 7th.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not have your planes removed or dispersed because of sabotage and in order to prevent it?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not any more than we had planned. We have been endeavoring to disperse the planes as practicably as possible and still maintain operations efficiently, and at the same time to maintain a watch, and we endeavored to detect the possibility of sabotage internally as well as externally.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had some planes anchored off at Kaneohe? [925]

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that particularly on account of the fear of sabotage?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, on account of endeavoring to find the best methods to disperse the planes in case of an attack. As a matter of fact, that method that was attempted at Kaneohe and Pearl of dispersing the patrol planes by anchoring them out, unless they could have been hidden, almost meant certain losses.

General McNARNEY. There would have been a different condition under high-altitude bombing attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Probably, but not exactly. The answer is that when a plane on the water is sunk, it is ruined, and one piece of shrapnel or several bullets may cause it to be sunk.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or it catches on fire?

Admiral BELLINGER. If it catches on fire there is very little chance to put it out except from just what fire apparatus there is on board.

General McCoy. In other words, battleships at anchor and your planes at anchor are both vulnerable to air attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. The question is where is the best place to secure the patrol planes, whether on the water or on the beach. From our past experience on the 7th and the kind of attack that was made we thought the best place was the beach, because in the water they may be put out of commission permanently, but on the beach they may be put out of commission temporarily and still be able to be repaired.

General McNARNEY. I will ask you to put yourself in the place of a Japanese commander, air commander, and you have gone with one or two carriers to make an attack on Oahu, when would you make that with regard to the time of the month, the time of day, and the method of attack, and assume also that you know [926] the condition of Oahu and Pearl Harbor at the moment.

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, there are many things to be considered. If I had information of the weather I would utilize that in getting into position to make the attack. For instance, there are many conditions out at sea which may enable a carrier, if it knows enough about the weather, to take a position in that area where the visibility is very low and flying is very bad, and get into a position where they could make the attack. That has been done in the war games, to my knowledge, by a ship that I was on.

Whether the Japanese know enough about weather conditions to be able to do that accurately enough, I do not know.

General McNARNEY. What is the direction of the weather from Japan over here? Does the weather move from Manchuria and China in this direction?

Admiral BELLINGER. Southeasterly.

General McNARNEY. Then normally, they should have better information on weather conditions than we have?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is what I thought, but I have taken that up with the meteorologist and he has informed me that he does not think that they know as much about it as we do in this area.

General McNARNEY. We did not think they knew as much about bombing and torpedoing and a few other things, which they seem to have known about. They may know something about this also.

Admiral BELLINGER. Does that answer your question?

General McNARNEY. I would like to have you explain further.

Admiral BELLINGER. Considering the direction of the wind, the carrier had best take a position where when it is recovering the planes, they will be getting away from the island so that the carrier can get to the southeastward and northeastward and those general quadrants.

[927] I think that would place the carriers in a place where they would not be running toward Oahu when they were recovering the planes. They should be running away from here or paralleling here.

Then, knowing that the Radar, at the present at least, has made errors which get into it at the change between day and night, there is a question of an attacking flight coming in at that time.

There is also the question of attacking on moonlight nights, which would carry it into the question of navigating of the planes satisfactorily to come in and make the attack on moonlight nights. Of course, the question of landing on board at night requires planes to be able to find the ship, and for this a certain amount of night light is required on deck, but not very much. There is a special radio homing which is available to some of the carriers and to some of the planes that enables the planes to get together with the ship at night, with the carrier having to make what is called MO.

So, it depends on what the Japanese have in the way of these electrical radio sets and so on, whether they can operate at night or not, or whether they are attacking and have to leave in time so that they can return to their ships during the daylight.

Very probably the early morning daylight attack is one of special consideration, and I would say that is most likely. When I say, "most likely," I mean most likely of success.

General McNARNEY. You do not think a moonlight attack is likely to be the most probable next performance or the next attack that will be made on Oahu?

Admiral BELLINGER. I do not know. I do not know whether these planes can go back to the carrier without making MO. I do not know whether their planes can locate their carrier definitely by this MO.

We have these problems, and I think they must have them too. [928] I do not think they want to lose any more planes than they have, but a moonlight night is something that gives me very much concern, and it might be attempted.

[929] General McNARNEY. I am very much concerned about these nights right now,—

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, I am too.

General McNARNEY. —when the moon is going to be high about an hour before daybreak, and the state of our night fighter defense is, I think, probably very inefficient. Of course, they haven't had any training, and it is a very difficult job for night fighters.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And it takes months of experience, really, before a pilot gets good at it at all, before he gets an opportunity to actually try it out at night.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we shall adjourn until two o'clock, and will you be back, Admiral, at two?

Admiral BELLINGER. At two o'clock?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary to ask all the witnesses who appear before us not to discuss their testimony or what goes on in this room with anyone.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I shall ask you to observe that.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Two o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:05 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[930]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL PATRICK GLEASON LYNCH BELLINGER, UNITED STATES NAVY—Resumed

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Stenographer, will you note that Admiral Pye, in answer to inquiries which he promised to obtain the answers for, has advised the Commission as follows:

That an air raid drill was held 12 November and an air raid drill scheduled but not held 29 November in view of a sortie; that an air raid drill was scheduled to be held again on 13 December.

The Secretary of the Navy arrived at 0700 on 11 December and departed at 1600 on 12 December.

Gentlemen, have you anything more?

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I want to ask some questions.

Admiral, have you seen that order (handling a document to Admiral Bellinger)?

The CHAIRMAN. Showing the Admiral order—What does it say, Admiral?

Admiral BELLINGER. It says Joint-headed "Joint Air Operations to be included as a part of Annex No. 7 HCF-39."

The CHAIRMAN. That is enough. Is it dated?

Admiral BELLINGER. 30 March, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right. Now you may answer whether you have seen it.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is the procedure outlined in the first paragraph there as to the availability of planes to each service on the Island of Oahu—is that in effect now?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

[931] Admiral STANDLEY. Then let me see if my understanding is correct: That order prescribes that each responsible officer is, whatever his responsibility, to make available to the other service, without requests from the other service, planes that are under the authority of the other service in time of war. In other words, in emergency or for games and whatnot, you would inform the air general here of the fighting planes under your control which would go to him in the event of an emergency or games or whatnot. He would inform you of the bombers that would come to you, and that would be done without a request from either one of the other. Is that correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. That is correct, sir, and I would like to elaborate a little bit. This was signed on 20 March. For some time after that was in effect there was a misunderstanding, which was cleared up later, and it was cleared up by a letter I prepared for Admiral Bloch to sign, to send to General Short. What needed clearing up was this point: when so-and-so agreed that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent; in other words, prior to the 7th or, rather, prior to this arrangement which was effective—

Admiral STANDLEY. Of what date?

Admiral BELLINGER. I can't remember the dates. There is a letter on the subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. Prior to December 7, however?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, quite prior to that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Possibly in July. I don't remember the date exactly. The point was brought out that in my operation order the fighter squadrons were directed to operate as directed by Commander Hawaiian Air Force. That similar directive was not in effect with reference to the bombardment force. They operated, so to speak, by request of the Navy and were released to operate in that fashion, as directed by the Commander Hawaiian Air Force to the bombardment wing or from [932] the Commanding General down.

Admiral STANDLEY. And your letter of that prior date cleared that up?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that, what?

Admiral BELLINGER. So that there would be standing orders for them to operate under the Navy for the bombardment, and the—similar to the way that the Navy fighters operated under the Army.

Admiral STANDLEY. And what was your procedure as to availability, as to announcing to each other?

Admiral BELLINGER. Every afternoon at—as of 3 p. m.—let me check that a second, please. (Referring to papers)—a despatch would be sent in from the various units to me, from the Navy, and with reference to the fighters I would send to the Army, and the Army Commanding General would send a similar despatch to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. That procedure was actually in operation on the 7th?

Admiral BELLINGER. That was in operation, and I was reading this morning when you asked a question of planes available; I was reading from despatches that had been received.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in all the testimony that we have had here I get the impression that your plans involved, and had to involve, daily operations and availability—they had to be reconciled with plans which would become effective when war was declared or in emergency, in the event of an emergency. Is that understanding correct?

Admiral BELLINGER. I want to make sure that I understand that question. You mean that these plans to be carried out in whole would only be carried out in an emergency?

Admiral STANDLEY. In their entirety in an emergency.

[933] Admiral BELLINGER. In their entirety, yes, sir, that is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, they provided for search or for operations which could not be carried out under the conditions of training or building or repairs, or whatnot, that you were doing from day to day?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But they would become effective in toto upon the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or an emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. For instance, at the present time I am exercising authority which I could not exercise before.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is because of the declaration of war?

Admiral BELLINGER. Because—yes, sir, but because of the facts of the case. In other words, the other forces—for instance, like an aircraft battle force under Vice Admiral Halsey—have certain plans for their operations; and when those plans are in here or were in here, seldom were they available because of the operations that were scheduled for them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Training operations, you mean?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now they are available for emergency? For war emergency?

Admiral BELLINGER. As the circumstances permit. For instance, when they come in now they are only in for a very short time, and it is practically necessary that the pilots have rest and recuperation and the planes have maintenance. So that they are not available to me actually because they are here. It is only actually as the facts are.

Say, for instance, when I reported fighting squadrons to General Davidson, I [934] reported, for instance, 50% were available. The others were in a state of maintenance or recuperation of personnel, and that I did not want these 50%, even, that were available, called unless it were necessary to call them, but that they could be made available in thirty minutes, because they needed sleep and recuperation when they took off in the next 48 hours or so to return to the carrier.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, today the plans that have been evolved here are in as complete operation as they can be with the forces available?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think so. When I say "in complete operation," there is a lot to be done, and a lot of training to do the job. We are calling upon Army aircraft to do jobs which they haven't trained for, and which they are doing very well, considering everything, but they have never been called upon before to do it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but that is consistent with the forces available?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. Isn't that the best training that you could get in war time?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, if we don't make a mistake in the meantime. There is danger involved in all this—considerable. I mean by this, in lack of identification of vessels. And that is a very serious proposition.

Admiral STANDLEY. And under these conditions you still feel that the plans here are not completely effective and did not remove the dangers involved?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I am not satisfied with them at all. I am not satisfied with the method of control, the communication facilities available, with the types of planes to do the job, and with the numbers available.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are steps still being pursued that would tend to eliminate these shortages? Is everything being done, [935] as far as you know?

Admiral BELLINGER. I have tried many ways to get things done since I have been here, as I showed in that first letter. That was one of the—that letter was designed to paint the picture out here. That has been followed up with reams of correspondence on every—in various ways. I have even told a bureau that that bureau would have to assume the responsibility for lack of readiness if they didn't do such and so. They did it, afterwards.

This is a letter—I don't know whether there is any use of reading this or not, but it is dated 16 August.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is necessary to read it to us. Tell us the effect of it.

Admiral BELLINGER. The effect of it—or the subject of it is "Regulation communication facilities at Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay." I would like to read just a paragraph in that letter:

This situation as well as other similar situations at the Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, and at other new developments in this area, including Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra, was visualized many months ago, and reference which was that "shoestring" letter I read this morning—

(a)—was written with the idea of inviting attention of the Navy Department to the impending situation, in the hopes that officers and bureaus concerned would

take such steps in their planning and procurement as to prevent these and other imminent deficiencies. While not singled out for specific mention, the provision of communication facilities at Kaneohe was clearly indicated to be a matter of urgency in that it was an integral part of a more comprehensive necessity. During the seven months that have elapsed since reference (a)—

this "shoestring" letter—

was written, there [936] has been no improvement in the communication facilities at Kaneohe. Now, as then, the most reliable and quickest means of communication between Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe has been a flight between the two stations.

I further stated that unless the improvement in communications took place it may be necessary to abandon Kaneohe as an operating base until they were fixed up.

Now, the communication facilities for control of aircraft are quite extensive, to control them properly. The setup for running this naval base defense air force plan, insofar as communication control—that is, of getting information, having information coming in, and issuing the necessary orders to the various units concerned—is most necessary, and that is something that at present time is set up, but it is telephoned, and it is field type telephone or the normal telephone. There is a makeshift high-frequency radio set we rigged up to try to reach Hickam. That is the bombardment wing. But the telephone is the way we have got to get messages out to most places. Everyone is working to beat the band in assisting to try to get this set up, but they need a great deal of material out here. There is a great deal to be done.

The CHAIRMAN. General, have you any questions?

Admiral BELLINGER. May I elaborate a little bit on something that I think I brought out this morning?

General McCoy. Possibly some of these questions will enable you to do that.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. These questions are based on a certain report to the Navy Department:

Its initial success—that is, the attack of the Japanese—which included almost all the damage done, was due to a lack of state of readiness against such an air attack, by both [937] branches of the service. Would you answer that with respect to your own command? I would just like an answer yes or no.

Admiral BELLINGER. They came in as a complete surprise. No question of that. And we were unable to locate the carrier afterwards. If you will note, in the setup of the naval base defense force estimate—that is the air estimate—that there is a feeling—or excuse me. There is—wait a minute; let me check it (referring to documents).

General McCoy. I beg your pardon. I just want your own opinion, without any reference to anything, on these questions. You have answered that question. Now I shall pose another one:

There was to a lesser degree the same lack of dispersal of planes on Navy stations, and although the possibility of sabotage was not given the same prominence in naval minds, both arms of service lost most of their planes on the ground in the initial attack by the enemy. Is that correct, from your point of view?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, but—

General McCoy. The Navy regarded the principal danger from a Japanese stroke without warning was a submarine attack, and consequently made all necessary provisions to cope with such an attack. Was that correct, from your point of view?

Admiral BELLINGER. I can't answer that question completely. Our main effort, as far as patrol wing 2, was against submarines.

General McCoy. The Navy morning patrol was sent out at dawn to the southward where the Commander-in-Chief had reason to suspect an attack might come. Is that your understanding?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. It was sent out in accordance with the operating areas assignment, which were used by portions of the fleet, and instructions require the areas that were in use to be searched in the morning early. That is in accordance with this letter.

[938] Admiral STANDLEY. That was searches for what?

General McCoy. We don't want—

Admiral BELLINGER. I have got them listed here in a—

Admiral STANDLEY. What we want to know, Admiral Bellinger, is, what were they searching for?

Admiral BELLINGER. They are searching for submarines primarily, and they reported any unidentified vessel, but at this time particularly for submarines. They were to bomb any submarine sighted, outside of a definite area that was delineated.

Admiral STANDLEY. What were your orders? To report any unidentified vessels?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. That has been the orders for some time.

General McCoy. What proportion of your officers and men were present for duty at the time of the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. There were three divisions of six planes each that were either in the air, operating, or on 30 minutes' notice at their bases; the remainder were on 4 hours' notice.

General McCoy. It being Sunday, were any large proportion of officers and men absent from the station?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think there were, any more than any other day or any less than any other day, because we had an operating schedule which was in accordance with assignment to duty in the departments.

General McCoy. When you reported to your command post were your staff officers all there?

Admiral BELLINGER. The duty officer and the operation officer were there, and I went down with one, which was assistant operation officer, and the War Plans officer was there inside of about three or four minutes after I was.

[939] General McCoy. You feel that everybody came at the sound of the guns, as it were?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, I do that.

General McCoy. Did I understand that you received the first report of the bombing or torpedoing or destruction of that submarine at seven-ten, sir, somewhere along then?

The CHAIRMAN. No. Seven thirty-five.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not receive it until after.

General McCoy. I mean was it the first report? Did the report first come into your headquarters or your operating—

General McCoy. Did I understand that you received the first received first report of it.

General McCoy. Was that from one of your planes or from a surface ship?

Admiral BELLINGER. From a destroyer, I think.

General McCoy. Yes. That is all I want to know.

Admiral BELLINGER. Unfortunately, my patrol plane coded the message to the effect that he had sunk an enemy submarine one hour off Pearl Harbor entrance.

General McCoy. Were you conscious, after the attack, of any attempt to jam the communications in the air?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't know whether—excuse me. The telephone circuits and radio all went out of the picture for a while.

General McCoy. Was that due to the attack itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. It was before—

General McCoy. Was that due to the attack itself?

Admiral BELLINGER. I feel very sure that it was due to that. I, to transmit messages down to the operating outfit, went down from the office to see what the situation was and get in touch—in personal touch with the squadron commanders to give orders and see what planes were available. That was between or during the latter stage of the first bombing.

[940] General McCoy. Three waves of enemy air force swept over Pearl Harbor during the assault. As above stated, the first was substantially unopposed. Is that correct, from your remembrance?

Admiral BELLINGER. When I went from my house down to the office—my house is at one end of the island, and the office is at the other, and you can make the trip in about two minutes, between two and three minutes, I assume, and I reached there, I should say, about fifteen minutes, between fifteen and twenty minutes after the first bomb fell—there was considerable firing of anti-aircraft going on from ships, and from then on there was a continuous firing at enemy planes while enemy planes were there.

General McCoy. Well, were you conscious of three distinct attacks during the morning?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. There were two, as far as I know of. There was a high-altitude attack which may be classified as a separate attack, but that was going on during the first low phase, low attack. I saw one squadron myself, or—excuse me—one flight.

General McCoy. What was your estimate—that is, not only your personal estimate but I mean the estimate of your command—as to the number of Japanese planes that made the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. I am making this estimate entirely from various forms of information which has come in to me, and not from my personal estimate at all, because I had no time to watch them or count them:

There were three high-altitude bombing formations that passed over this area, each one from five planes to nine planes; the one I saw I estimated five planes, hurriedly. I hurriedly estimated five planes. They were about 8,000 feet. There was a slight broken cloud intervening between [941] the planes and the ground, the high-

altitude planes, which made it very good for the planes and not so good for the anti-aircraft fire. The torpedo planes, perhaps 21 or 27. Dive bombing, I don't know. And fighters, I don't know. I have heard some observers state that they thought a hundred planes were over in this area (indicating).

General McCoy. Do you think there was any new explosive or new type of bomb or torpedo that was unusual to your experience in our own service?

Admiral BELLINGER. They used an armor-piercing bomb made of an 11-inch shell—I think it was 11-inch—on some of the planes, at least. That was a little novel, and it did very effective work, apparently. The torpedoes, of course, did most effective work, and in a way that was not supposed to be practicable, in that in the water depths that was available and existed in Pearl Harbor it wasn't thought that torpedoes could be launched without hitting the bottom before hitting the ship.

General McCoy. Have you had any experience as a flying man with launching torpedoes from planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Not as a pilot, but in general operations and in observing and studying, yes.

General McCoy. We have some torpedo planes, then, in our service, have we?

Admiral BELLINGER. The planes that I have myself here, the patrol planes, can carry torpedoes.

General McCoy. Have they ever done so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. We have them available——

General McCoy. Are any of them available now——

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. —of that type for carrying torpedoes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Are there torpedoes available?

[942] Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, they are ready with war heads on.

General McCoy. The statement is here made, speaking about the different attacks, that they would indicate an attacking force of somewhere between 150 and 300 planes. You have only given us about 50 or 60 in your estimate. Have you heard this higher estimate?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. You would not think there were anything like 200 or 300 planes in the attack?

Admiral BELLINGER. Of course, the planes that were delegated to go to the various places like Wheeler Field, Schofield, Kaneohe, Hickam, and Pearl, and Ewa, were all special groups assigned to go to those places, in my opinion.

General McCoy. So that there might have been, all told, a couple of hundred planes, possibly?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. To go back to the torpedo plane: Is it a normal function of training the Navy to use torpedo planes?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you had that training here?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir. We have dropped them at sea, and we have planned to drop them, quite a lot of them.

General McCoy. That was developed in the America Navy first, was it not: the torpedo plane?

Admiral BELLINGER. I think Admiral Fiske claims to be the originator of the idea.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question just before you leave that?

General McCoy. You may.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the limit, if any, on the height from which we must drop our torpedoes now?

Admiral BELLINGER. The torpedoes that we have endeavored [943] to drop were at 75 feet, not over, and also at slow—at speeds not in excess of a hundred knots; meaner 80 knots. There are torpedoes, though, which I expected to—and maybe these can be changed—which will permit dropping at higher speeds, I think 150 knots, and also from approximately a hundred and fifty to two hundred feet. But actually, in fact, to make the torpedo attack effective I think the torpedo has got to be launched at speeds in excess of 200 knots, at least, and be able to be dropped from 200 feet, at least.

General McCoy. Have you had any indications or information that would lead you to estimate that there will be a renewal of the Japanese attack, probably with landing forces, in the near future?

Admiral BELLINGER. I talked to Admiral Kimmel on the telephone on Sunday about noon, I think, and I said to him then I expected another attack at any time.

General McCoy. Do you still feel that way?

Admiral BELLINGER. That day I thought that they probably would—that they would refuel and come back; and as they didn't do that—I don't know why they didn't, because they had a grand opportunity. I feel that they will come back, yes, and I feel that a great deal more should be done about getting ready when they do come back.

General McCoy. You mean here locally?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Or still dependent upon Washington?

Admiral BELLINGER. It's dependent on Washington.

General McCoy. Can't anything more be done here without Washington? Washington may be somewhat embarrassed for other reasons.

Admiral BELLINGER. Of course, everything as far as we can be—as far as I know about it, with all ingenuity, everybody is working, and with the endeavor to get as ready as [944] possible with what they have.

General McCoy. The statement was made: The Army and Naval commands received a general war warning on November 27. I understood you to say that you did not receive the war warning.

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Not even indirectly?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. As I say, the first time I saw it was approximately five or six days ago.

General McCoy. He speaks of the loss of 75% of the Army's air forces on the island and the loss of even a larger percentage of the Navy's air forces in Oahu. 75%. Did you lose 75% of your forces here?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Did you think so at that time?

Admiral BELLINGER. We lost approximately—more than that number were out of commission temporarily. We put back in commission, and probably will be able to put back more in commission gradually, so that—it is very difficult to keep track of these planes now, but I think it probably will be about 48 planes out of 81.

General McCoy. More nearly 50%, then, than 75?

Admiral BELLINGER. It is more nearly about 45%, as far as patrol planes are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you make a memorandum, Admiral, to furnish the Commission the dates of the joint air raid operational drills for the three months preceding December 7 which were conducted on the island?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And just give us a memorandum of the dates?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood from your answers to me that you had not specifically called the Department's attention to [945] the weaknesses of coastal defense against air raid attack, although you had called the Department's attention to the deficiencies of personnel and material for the purposes of the war plans.

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not write a letter to the Navy Department concerning that, no, sir. The estimate of the situation spoke for itself, so I thought. And that went through the regular channels high up.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that estimate does call attention to the offshore patrol as well as your fleet patrol?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't want to repeat. May I speak off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral BELLINGER. Because I read this this morning.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Have you further questions, General?

General McCoy. Would that indicate to you, Admiral, that the fleet should not come into this harbor except a few ships at a time, and only when absolutely necessary for servicing?

Admiral BELLINGER. I don't think that they can feel secure here, no, sir.

General McCoy. You don't think what?

Admiral BELLINGER. I say I don't think that they can feel secure.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have not thought so over this past period of months?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. This has brought the picture very clearly to the front.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean that you didn't think they were secure in case of hostile attack or hostilities?

Admiral BELLINGER. No. I mean that—now when you speak about ships coming in here, in the light of past experience and [946] the capabilities that have been shown by the Japanese I don't think that a ship can feel secure just because it is in Pearl Harbor base.

Admiral STANDLEY. During hostilities here?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, during hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. And you didn't think there had to be any means taken to secure them if they were in hostilities; isn't that so?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not expecting hostilities of this nature, were you?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. Not—no, sir.

General McCoy. Do you think that the fleet should be kept at sea, or go to some nearby anchorage outside of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BELLINGER. The ships will have to come in here to get supplies and to get services and for docking when necessary.

General McCoy. Can't they be taken out to the fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, not the—no, sir, that wouldn't be feasible either, because I should say they would be probably safer in here, maybe, than out in the open.

General McCoy. How about the Japanese fleet? They seem to be able to keep to the open and to supply themselves and to fuel themselves?

Admiral BELLINGER. Well, so are we. Our ships have been doing the same thing as they have.

General McCoy. Why can't they continue to do it when Pearl Harbor is such a dangerous place?

Admiral BELLINGER. There are certain upkeep periods that have to be—upkeep, maintenance work, that have to be done to these ships to keep them going, and they have got to come into port, some port, to get it done.

[947] General McCoy. Haven't you ships that can make repairs at sea?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir. I mean that would not be practicable.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, as a matter of fact the Japanese ships don't keep to the sea; they have ports all over the Marshall Islands to go into. They stay out for some periods, but they don't keep to sea. They go into ports just like Honolulu.

Admiral BELLINGER. The fact of the number of Mandate Islands that they have available to go to makes it a situation for them that is quite an advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. You will get me that data about drills?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir.

I want to add something to my testimony: I quoted this morning from a joint paper signed by General Martin and myself concerning an agreement, and I would like to bring out, in connection with the statement which was attributed to General Martin in the report concerning the mission of the Army in this area, that the Army air corps was planning and expecting approximately 180-odd 4-engine bombers in this area for carrying out the search and bombardment operations required under the base defense plan.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. State briefly, for the information of the Commission, the types of planes that you have in connection with your responsibilities here and duty. What I mean is this: I mean the planes of carriers, battleships, cruisers, the utilities, the patrols, and I mean that kind.

Admiral BELLINGER. You want that put that way?

[948] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, that way.

Admiral BELLINGER. The patrol planes, which are the large flying boats, twin-engine, and at present I have two 4-engine temporarily; the carrier planes, which are divided up into the scouts, torpedo bombers, dive bombers; the battleship planes and the cruiser planes, which are single-pontoon, single-engine planes; and the utility planes, which are various types from amphibian—amphibians, transports, and even an older type of flying boat. We have three of those now. The marine planes are similar in general types to the carrier planes except that they do not have torpedo planes; but all of these planes except the patrol planes are migrating, shifting quantities.

[949] You might change that and say merely a temporary responsibility for longer or shorter periods, as the case might be.

General McNARNEY. Just forget what I said about that.

Admiral BELLINGER. I thought it was in this paper.

General McNARNEY. Because, after searching my memory, I remember that when I left the Department, some time ago, it was 105. I do not know whether they increased it or not. However, I do remember General Martin said he did recommend 184 and he supposed they approved his recommendation because they gave him 180 of the planes that the Army expected to get.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. May I ask one or two more questions in general?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Our report, which has to go to the public, will have to answer certain questions. Among others, the people in the United States are very much interested in knowing the estimate of the situation before this attack with regard to the Japanese forces, and particularly their air forces.

Did you know that the Japanese could put over such an effective attack here, or did you dream that would be possible, prior to December 7?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir, I did not think they could pull off an attack like that as accurately and as well done as they did.

General McCoy. Has it been your impression in past years that the Japanese air force was rather a weak one?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, sir, but I had not discounted it at all. I thought they had a good air force because they have had so very much experience and practice in actual warfare, but I did not expect the accuracy with which they did things. Not only have they done things here but also with [950] reference to the reports of what they have done at Wake. For instance, there is the report from Wake about the pattern bombing by planes at 18,000 feet, which is quite remarkable; and also it is reported that they are strafing from 18,000 feet with machine-gun fire, which is quite remarkable. I may state that this is second-hand, from observers, who stated that planes in making their bombing attack on Wake used strafing, machine-gun fire, and they did the bomb run from about 18,000 feet, and they did it accurately.

General McCoy. Have you served in the Asiatic fleet?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Or in Japan?

Admiral BELLINGER. No, sir; I have been over there but never served at any time there.

General McCoy. Has the Navy had air officers in Japan in recent years?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you, as a responsible air commander, been furnished that information by them about the Japanese air force?

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, we get reports continuously.

General McCoy. They gave no indication of the strength or effectiveness of the Japanese forces?

Admiral BELLINGER. Oh, yes, the estimates of it, but not the ability and accuracy of the pilots in getting through at the ship. That is the technical skill and the way they launched their torpedoes. For instance, doing pattern bombing from high altitudes and dive bombing. Their dive bombing is more of a glide than a dive bombing, as we understand it, but even so they are accurate.

For instance, these ships were around Ford Island. There was nobody killed on Ford Island, which is lucky, of course; but there were only two bombs dropped on Ford Island. One was deliberately dropped on the hangar, apparently, and one [951] of them was accidentally dropped—or so I say—dropped in the patio in the dispensary. But, I think they were aimed at a ship, which, of course, indicates pretty accurate bombing considering the fact that many of the ships are close to Ford Island.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is all.

If you think that the agreement between you and General Martin would be informative to us, would you mind sending it to us and preparing six copies?

Admiral BELLINGER. I did not know whether you wanted it or not. I can do that very easily.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose you do that. If it is surplusage, it will do no harm.

Admiral BELLINGER. Because the whole thing is about the Kahuku Point area, and I had to go into the whole policy of the Navy, and I did not know whether I should give it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, everything that goes into our records is perfectly secret and will not be disclosed.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Send it to our Recorder at your convenience.

Admiral BELLINGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We now have Admiral Calhoun.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM LOWNDES CALHOUN, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name for the record, Admiral?

Admiral CALHOUN. William Lowndes Calhoun, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commander Base Force, United States [952] Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, what is your flagship as such commander?

Admiral CALHOUN. The U. S. S. ARGONNE, moored at 1010 dock, Navy Yard, Pearl.

The CHAIRMAN. What does your command consist of, sir?

Admiral CALHOUN. Auxiliary vessels of the fleet for training squadrons to furnish certain things. First, Squadron No. 2, that furnishes repairing, hospitalization, salvage, and administration; No. 4, that furnishes all transport; No. 6, that furnishes all target practice requirements and in war advance base facilities; No. 8, that furnishes all fleet logistics, fuel, ammunition, food.

Admiral STANDLEY. I just want you to point out where the ARGONNE was here (indicating map).

Admiral CALHOUN. This is 1010 dock here, sir (indicating). That is the same position. That is exactly in the same position as she was the afternoon of Saturday, December 6, and on Sunday, December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on Saturday evening, December 6, Admiral?

Admiral CALHOUN. At my home, 448 Kuamoo, Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not at the Navy Yard that night?

Admiral CALHOUN. No, sir; however, Saturday, December 6, was the first evening I had spent at home for seven days.

The CHAIRMAN. What I had in mind particularly was your possible knowledge of the condition and morale of the men on leave Saturday night. I assume that your commitment was in connection with the transports that took them to and from the docks and their ships.

Admiral CALHOUN. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the condition of the forces with reference to the use of liquor that night, or have you heard anything about that?

[953] Admiral CALHOUN. I know considerable by official reports that have come to me from the patrol, which operates under me. I am the senior patrol officer. Furthermore, I run, by orders of the Commander-in-Chief, the boat pool which consists of all boats that are left in by the ships that are absent and the boats that are in by ships that are present that they desire the Commander of the Base Force to care for.

The morale and condition of the liberty parties, both officers and men, as evidenced by their return on Sunday morning, was of the highest, such as would reflect the greatest credit upon the fleet and the nation.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you, as responsible officer, are cognizant of the fact that there was not any considerable amount of drunkenness or disability from that cause by the return from leave of the enlisted men and officers on this particular night, December 6?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, sir, and not only cognizant, but absolutely positive; and that if any drinking had occurred, that it was negligible, and that the men so rose to the occasion that I can state with authority as my considered opinion that none was evidenced, and I am in a broad position to make that statement.

Admiral STANDLEY. What time did you return to the Yard?

Admiral CALHOUN. 8:35 to 8:37 a. m. I was able to make an early return due to the fact that whenever absent from ship I keep a chauffeur nearby, and I caught an Army antiaircraft artillery, which was immediately starting down on the first attack, and I came through

with them in their military police escort and they got me back in short time.

I arrive ahead of practically all the returning liberty party and was on board the ARGONNE and officially was recorded at 8:40.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the attack going on when you got on board ship?

[954] Admiral CALHOUN. The first wave of torpedo bombing had passed. I arrived just at the beginning of the second wave of high bombing and dive bombing, and again what I would have called the third wave of bombing as strafing, but I saw the second and third waves.

Admiral STANDLEY. In general, Admiral, briefly tell us your observations so far as those two waves of attack were concerned.

Admiral CALHOUN. Moored at our 1010 dock, as shown by the diagram which has been presented to you, the ARGONNE had a broad panoramic view of every ship under attack except the UTAH across Ford Island and the RALEIGH across Ford Island, and the HONOLULU back in the repair basin (indicating on the map).

I observed boats carrying liberty parties from all landings back to their ships with the greatest expedition and in good order. I observed the anti-aircraft fire with the dive bombers attacking the NEVADA, which had gotten under way from Berth Fox astern of the ARIZONA, which had reached a position just off to the entrance of No. 2 dry dock.

I saw them dive-bombing the fleet with three planes coming down, and the anti-aircraft fire of the fleet obliterated the first one, and the second two planes pulled out of their dives and scurried southward without dropping any bombs. I could see this because through my powerful glasses I could readily see the bombs as they were dropped.

As regards morale, my mine force rescued the crew of the UTAH which had been torpedoed near here (indicating), near F11 berth, bringing 200 of them to the 1010 dock where it was moored about 8:42. Fifteen or twenty of these men were as naked as the day they were born. Their clothing was blown off them and they were covered with fuel oil, and some were wounded slightly.

Two 1,500-ton destroyers, lying by the berth in the same [955] slip, just across from the ARGONNE, desired augmentation of the crew to put to sea as some of their men had been returned.

We asked these rescued UTAH sailors for volunteers, and force was necessary to restrain the 200 of them from going where only 55 were wanted. The men were so anxious that they could not wait for the boat; they jumped overboard and they swam over there, the 55 of them.

I observed in detail the anti-aircraft fire of the CALIFORNIA, which had been stricken and had settled to the bottom, but every gun was manned and it was firing under orderly control and with bursts of telling effect on the second and third waves of the attack, that I have previously mentioned.

The TENNESSEE, next in order, which was pinched in behind the overturned OKLAHOMA, was firing in the same manner as the CALIFORNIA.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that was the MARYLAND behind the CALIFORNIA; the TENNESSEE was back of the WEST VIRGINIA.

Admiral CALHOUN. That is right. That is the MARYLAND. That is correct, sir.

The MARYLAND, although slightly damaged, was not maintaining anti-aircraft fire in any more manifest manner than the CALIFORNIA.

The TENNESSEE pitched in behind the WEST VIRGINIA, which at this time had been stricken, settled to the bottom, but was firing under the troubled conditions of the oil fire from the WEST VIRGINIA and the ARIZONA, maintaining a very accurate and hot fire each and every time it was needed.

There can be no question that the conduct of every man in the Pacific Fleet does and did reflect great lustre on any and all of the traditions of the Navy.

A little garbage scow with a crew of five men put its nose against the WEST VIRGINIA, and with these high-powered pumps, which are placed there for cleaning out the garbage [956] receptacles after they got at sea—for 48 hours without relief it maintained its position with its bow against the WEST VIRGINIA and broke up the oil fires that were beginning to form and float in toward the TENNESSEE and the MARYLAND.

I think it accomplished a great deal in saving those two ships from great damage.

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, there were between 300 and 400 bed patients in the Naval Hospital. That night at supper when they got ready to change them, practically every patient who was able to walk was absent. He had returned to his ship or any ship that he could catch and had gone to sea. They did not return to the hospital for several days. That is the official report of my staff medical officer, Captain Michael, who is the commander in charge of liaison between the hospital ashore and the ships of the fleet.

As regards morale and training, I am Fleet Target Practice Officer. I furnish all services for fire, both antiaircraft and surface long-range, short-range, day and night. As gunnery officer of wide experience, having served as gunnery officer on the MARYLAND, the battleship CALIFORNIA, and the battleship MISSISSIPPI. I am very much interested in gunnery and have kept in close touch with the firing of the fleet, all of which goes through the mill in the camera hold of the ARGONNE:

I have held my rank on duty under three Commanders-in-Chief: under Admiral C. C. Bloch, under Admiral J. O. Richardson, and under Admiral H. E. Kimmel; and without any attempt of criticism of the previous regimes, I officially state that the records show that the gunnery of the Pacific Fleet is now at one of the highest peaks that it has ever been since I have been in the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of the second and third waves of the attack. Was there any evidence that the third wave did not get home?

[957] Admiral CALHOUN. The third wave?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral CALHOUN. Every evidence in the world. I did not see the slightest damage. Better than that, I know from what I saw that not the slightest damage occurred on the third wave except possibly machine-gun strafing. I am also equally positive that of the second dive-bombing attack, that had the NEVADA not been required to stop, as it was known she had taken a torpedo hit, it might possibly have gone in and obstructed the channel. I doubt that they would have gotten the NEVADA because every bomb dropped at her was missing her until she stopped. They were falling all around her fore-castle. As soon as she stopped they hit the NEVADA's fore-castle. From the inspection and the reports of my salvage officer they show that 7 or 8 medium-sized, small-sized bombs hit on the fore-castle of the NEVADA.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that third wave's lack of damage due to gunfiring, or the plane attack, or what?

Admiral CALHOUN. I believe the third wave was principally sent in to photograph. However, I do not think they got in position to take any good pictures at the battleship line because the anti-aircraft fire of the fleet was well under control and very effective and was driving them off. The only plane that I saw cross the 1010 dock toward the battleship line was shot down by either the ARGONNE or the HELENA and fell in the water just off Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your estimate of the number of planes in the second and third waves?

Admiral CALHOUN. Forty-five or fifty.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the two of them?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, in the two. That does not include the torpedo planes. I never saw the torpedo planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. The torpedo planes came over as the first wave?

[958] Admiral CALHOUN. Their damage came first, yes, although I think the high bombers may have preceded, about the same time, for a coordinated attack, but did not reach their position, and their bombs did not fall until long after the torpedoes had done their damage.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

Admiral CALHOUN. May I just add one think that I think I should state, sir, on the question of morale?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral CALHOUN. As force commander I have been present at every force type commander conference held by Admiral Kimmel because I have never been absent on tactical maneuvers. With my long knowledge at being present at sea and by hearing, I know that Admiral Kimmel has shown and has required the responsible officers under him to read and to be thoroughly conversant with every letter that has passed between him and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and this also applies to his dispatchers. Every one of us was kept fully informed by the Commander-in-Chief, and I do not believe—and I am a Junior Rear Admiral, as you know, sir—but I do not believe I have ever been in a command where constructive criticism has been more welcome than it has been under Admiral Kimmel.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you made acquainted with the contents of the Navy dispatch of November 27 which contains the expression, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did Admiral Kimmel show you that dispatch soon after it was received?

Admiral CALHOUN. I would say sometime around the 29th or 30th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any discussions as to what [959] the meaning of that phrase was as respects the possible hostile attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral CALHOUN. Admiral Kimmel told those present what he was doing, that he was sending—Am I allowed to state it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Everything here is secret.

Admiral CALHOUN. He told me he was sending the ENTERPRISE as a task force to take the planes to Wake and to Midway; that he had dispatched patrol planes to Midway and that he had dispatched submarines on patrol to Midway; but as to any discussion, there was none.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, he told you what steps he had taken?

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He said nothing about the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor itself?

Admiral CALHOUN. I have been present in Admiral Kimmel's office when the possibility of a torpedo attack on Pearl Harbor was discussed. I can't remember the date, but it should be a matter of official record for this board, and I feel sure it is.

Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel took up the question with Operations, and whether I saw the letter he wrote or not, I did see the answer, and the answer stated that torpedo-plane attacks could not be successful in less than 75 feet of water, and 40 to 45 feet of water was the controlling depth in this harbor and that torpedo-plane attacks were considered negligible.

I remember that discussion, but as to whether that was just prior to December 7 or not would be easy to ascertain as to the date of that letter, which, I know, is in the Commander-in-Chief's files.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We have seen it.

Admiral CALHOUN. I also know, due to the fact that for a year I ran the safety patrol of the fleet, that when it was [960] taken over from me by the Commandant 14th Naval District under the orders of Admiral Kimmel, that I was given and still possess copies of the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor, and that was thoroughly and full discussed.

With respect to the question of air attack on Pearl Harbor, as we had received so many valuable reports from Great Britain, and very recently had Captain Mountbatten lecture to us, that I feel and I know for myself that a great deal of confidence was placed in the Radar net which we had on our drills, and that they have aided and proved to be successful, and that if any plane ever got in through that net on drills, I have not been informed of it.

That has been discussed by Admiral Bellinger and the Army air representative—I believe General Martin—which I hold in my posses-

sion, but as to any discussion other than on that time the letter went to Operations concerning the attack on Pearl Harbor, I do not have any recollection of it other than that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. It is necessary for our purposes to ask the witnesses not to discuss with any other person what has gone on in this room.

Admiral CALHOUN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We are trying to keep our record absolutely secret.

Admiral CALHOUN. I understand that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Call Admiral Furlong.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM REA FURLONG, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name for the reporter?

Admiral FURLONG. William Rea Furlong, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Commander Mine Craft Battle Force on [961] December 7, 1941.

I note that there is one chart here, but I will give you the others as well.

The CHAIRMAN. We each have a copy.

Admiral FURLONG. I have them here.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long have you been in command of the Mine Force?

Admiral FURLONG. Since April 10, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty did you have prior to being in command of the Mine Force?

Admiral FURLONG. Prior to the Mine Force I was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your flagship?

Admiral FURLONG. My flagship was the OGLALA, mine layer, 5,000 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was she moored on the morning of December 7?

Admiral FURLONG. The OGLALA was moored at this point (indicating) on the chart, which is an extension of No. 1 dry dock, known as 1010 dock outboard of the cruiser HELENA.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you on board the OGLALA on the night of December 6 and the morning of December 7?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir. I sleep on board and live on board every night, and I was on board that night and the morning of the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give the board a brief account of the attack that morning about what you observed?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes. As commander of Mine Craft, in addition to the OGLALA in the position that has just been indicated on the chart, the first division of mine craft was on the eastern side of the harbor in the Navy Yard, which is known as repair basin, which has been designated on the chart under the names of the ships, four vessels: the PRUITT, the SICARD, the TRACEY, and the PREBIE.

[962] On the opposite side of the harbor to the westward was Mine Division 2, all the way over to the Middle Loch position, the

four vessels; namely, RAMSAY, the BREESE, the MONTGOMERY, and the GAMBLE.

From a vantage point on the opposite side of the harbor here. (indicating) and between these two divisions (indicating) I was able not only by my own observation but by reports of these two divisions to get a very comprehensive picture of the action.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you asleep or up at the time of the first attack?

Admiral FURLONG. I was up. I was walking on deck at a few minutes before 8 o'clock, and I was waiting for my boy to announce breakfast.

As I walked on deck I heard some—and I am speaking about the OGLALA now—I heard some planes, but we are always hearing planes, and I paid no particular attention to the planes except that as soon as I heard them, almost, a bomb fell on the seaward end of Ford Island.

That is the first bomb, and it fell on the ramp over in this position (indicating). Immediately following that, a plane flew by me from the southward, up the channel between me and Ford Island, and on the chart about there (indicating).

The plane flew just a couple of hundred yards away from me, and because the deck as I stand on it on the OGLALA is a high deck, it was only a couple of hundred yards away. I could have almost thrown something at it and I could have hit it.

As it passed, I saw the rising sun, and I knew it was a Japanese plane. I called out, "Japanese. Man your stations."

But it was unnecessary for me to do that because the men also had heard this explosion and they were busy manning their stations and closing all the doors and manning all the stations immediately and manning the guns. But, to go through and [963] follow the bombs in quick order and not have too many side remarks, I will just follow along the sequence in which some of these things happened.

The second bomb fell within a few seconds after the first bomb fell, and this second one fell a little more in here (indicating), because the first one went on the ramp. The second one set afire a building there, but neither of these bombs destroyed a lot of planes that I observed parked right on the island like they did in the after damage.

Following those two bombs, I noticed bombs and high explosives and water coming up around the battleships moored along the side here (indicating), and many of those were missing and sending up great plumes of water.

Others hit the ships, and directly great flames and smoke filled that whole area from the oil fire in the ARIZONA and in the WEST VIRGINIA, and this oil fire floated on the water.

The smoke was so bad it drifted toward the station along Ford Island, and I had difficulty trying to see something over toward Ford Island on the seaward and where it was told me there was a Japanese submarine, but it was a buoy at that end.

Following these bombs, which occurred about the same time—it is hard to get the exact minute of these because I was busy, but the torpedoes were firing into the battleships, but just the exact sequence of the drops I do not know, but it was very close, about the same time.

Then the next bomb that fell went on the PENNSYLVANIA in the dry dock just over here (indicating). That came down but in-

stead of getting the PENNSYLVANIA in a fullhit, it got her in the bow and got two destroyers, the CASSIN and DOWNES, and burned them up. I knew there was a fire because I saw the smoke.

Following that, the next bomb fell opposite me there (indicating) and the SHAW was at the floating dry dock which [964] is this (indicating) and look here (indicating) at 1010 dock, and the floating dock is over toward Ford Island.

The SHAW is probably marked on the chart, but the SHAW was in the floating dry dock toward Ford Island.

The SHAW was in the dock, and the SHAW was hit and it was set on fire, and she was ruined and wrecked. From the bridge forward was burned entirely.

As for the dock itself, they sunk the dock in order to save it, but it will be all right. It is getting along nicely now, and the SHAW will be taken back to the States with a false bow.

Now, that is about the sequence of what damage was done there. There was a great deal more damage, but it was not serious. There were hits on the dry dock as well as the docks and this fire on the docks, but that is more or less easily repaired.

General McNARNEY. With respect to these first bombing attacks, were they from dive bombers or the level horizontal bombers?

Admiral FURLONG. They were very low. Some of them were 100 feet and some 500 feet, and some as low as 80 feet above the ships. The dive bombing by them was different from the dive bombing in the sense of the American Navy.

General McNARNEY. It is low-altitude bombing?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, low-altitude bombing.

I will now go back to the OGLALA. After the bombs fell on the battleships, some planes came in and dropped three drops close together. They did not send up any plumes between the OGLALA and Ford Island right in the channel very close to Ford Island, and as I saw these three drops I thought it was a mine, but they were torpedo planes, a torpedo plane or maybe three torpedo planes because they were three distinct drops.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that by one plane or by different [965] planes?

Admiral FURLONG. I could not tell you that, but the planes were there, and there were three drops, and they were very close together, possible from three planes, but they were in formation, because they were very close together, and fell a short distance from the OGLALA.

They dropped at the OGLALA, and a sailor who stood by me at the time pointed and said, "There is a torpedo coming." Of course, I could do nothing about it. The ship was moored, and you could just look at it, but that torpedo went under the OGLALA and hit the OGLALA and the HELENA. It hit the OGLALA inboard, the port side, and also hit the HELENA at the same place at the outboard side.

On seeing this I was not sure but what there might have been some mine under there. So I sent the signal officer and went to the bridge and told them to send and signal the fleet to look out for mines in the channel for any ships going out, as the ships were sortieing, and I myself had taken, as soon as I saw the torpedo, the initiative, and I sent the signal about the sortie.

It was following after that when I had received a radio from the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander of the Battle Force, who also had sent me one, but none of that was necessary because we had seen what was going on.

With respect to the torpedo I did not realize and I did not feel in the OGLALA that we were going to sink. A fireman came from the fire room some few minutes after the torpedo hit us and said that the fire rooms were flooded. The water came up on the flooring and he had to turn off the oil and the heat under the boilers, which was a very good thing because he might have had some troubles with a steam explosion in the boilers. So, he turned everything off and reported that there was a flood in the engine room. So everything was done in that regard and the doors were closed.

[966] The ship did not seem to settle very much, but finally it did settle slowly and gradually. In fact, it settled so slowly and was on an even keel for a while that we had no trouble in keeping up our fire but kept on shooting at any plane within range. When I saw she was settling and the fire room being flooded, I went to the HELENA to get some submersible pumps for the OGLALA. I found that we had not power, and then I thought to clear the HELENA, because the HELENA didn't seem to be hurt, just as I did not know how badly ours was hurt, so I thought I will clear the HELENA and let her get out. [967] So I sent the men on the forecandle to cast off the line and sent more men on quarterdeck to handle lines on the dock, and started to try to heave her astern. I looked across the channel. Very close between us and Ford Island, close enough so that I could hail the men, there was a dredger working, a dredge, with two small contractor's tugs, and by hallooing and motioning I had those tugs come alongside the OGLALA, and we pushed her astern clear of the HELENA so that the HELENA could get out, secured her to the pier astern of the HELENA.

As soon as the tugs had me pushed in—they were very small tugs—a Navy Yard tug showed up to try to help to give another little push, and we secured; and just before that, a few minutes before, I noticed the NEVADA, which you will see on the chart is the ship farthest down there (indicating), had gotten—it was coming out, and she was coming out and came out the channel. I thought of the mines, and I gave her a signal which she received and acknowledged and she said she got—I asked her the next day and she said she got the signal saying there were mines set there—to look out for them, but she was too much under headway and too near it, so that she continued on. When she got in that position a great number of planes—it must have been bombers because there were great numbers of bombs fell in the water all around her, plumes going up, and one hit her on the bow, and I saw her just give quite a heave from that one on the bow, and one hit her on the starboard side and sent up some black smoke.

Well, I thought that there she is in the channel and there is going to be trouble if that ship sinks in the channel, so I took these two tugs that were there with me at the OGLALA, and I told them to go to the NEVADA to get her out of the channel. They went to the NEVADA and assisted her, and she had some power, her own power, and she went over there on her own power to the—over on the other side of the

channel, not on Ford Island but [968] over on—(indicating on map).

The CHAIRMAN. Over here?

Admiral FURLONG. Over there. And she had hard bottom there to go on, but she said this: that the bomb had cut her fire mains and she had no water, and she said it was a great blessing that those tugs were there to help her because the tugs put out her fire, or we might have had another ARIZONA, and the action of those tugs—and it shows the use of the tugs, or something, other than just pushing the ship around, for the use of fire in occasions like that, and we are taking steps in the Yard to get some more fire equipment on the other tugs. But they did that service to the NEVADA.

Now, on the OGLALA there is not much more to say except that the men kept up a fire there. There was attack after attack, from before eight o'clock until the different times up until eleven, and at nine-thirty, though, we had gotten such a list, about 40 degrees, that we couldn't stick to the decks any longer, the men on the top of the deckhouse where the machine guns were, and before that I had to take them away from the 3-inch guns, which were lower. And I told them to abandon ship, and I went off with them, and they slid off the deckhouse out to the dock at about 45 degrees with their guns, and they set their guns up on the dock, and the doctor and many of the crew set up there receiving the wounded and the injured from the battleships that were being ferried over to the dock.

In the OGLALA we had, providentially I feel, only four people wounded, and that was from strafing. The later attacks after the bombing, we received—that I hadn't mentioned before—many strafing attacks, and particularly strafing that came from the east. Apparently after they flew over Hickam Field they continued on. And they strafed the OGLALA and the HELENA.

The HELENA, which was right alongside of us, had eight killed and 58 very severely burned from oil fires when that [969] torpedo hit in the engine room and in the fire rooms of the HELENA. And the only—besides four wounded there was a young man in the OGLALA, a young officer from California, who was a young reserve that we just had, a very fine young fellow by the name of Wilhelm, who was my assistant communication officer; and when I had gone on the forecastle in the beginning of the thing to see that the gun was going in the forecastle, he came up there, and I noticed him standing there, and there wasn't anything he could do, because the others were attending to the fire of the guns. But the reason I mention it is this: that four or five days after the action he just broke down entirely from shellshock and went off his head entirely and has been sent home. But aside from him and the four wounded, that was the only casualties we had.

Now, in Mine Division 1, which is at the Yard, they were quartered in barracks a short distance from where their ships are—their men were. Of course, there were a certain number of them on each—all the ships, but the great bulk were in the Yard because this division was in the Yard for its only annual overhaul, which lasts two or three months, and the machinery was out of the ships, and pieces of the bridge structure were off where the gunnery replacements—new gunnery replacements were to go in, and there was degaussing to go on,

and there was—oh—a great deal of work such as is done once a year in this ship. But those men went immediately to their ships and got there very early in the action, within a few minutes after the thing happened, got their guns set up and ammunition going, so as to meet the second and third and fourth waves, and went into other ships that were nearby that had guns, and served them. Now, in going into those ships and in serving, they lost five men killed.

Those men were three from the TRACY, the commanding officer being Lieutenant Commander Phelan; one from the PRUITT, [970] Commanding Officer being Lieutenant Commander Herron; and one from the SICARD, Commanding Officer Schultz. I can give the men's names to the reporters if they would like them; you probably don't want that detail.

Those boys were killed in manning guns in the PENNSYLVANIA, and they manned guns in the NEW ORLEANS, which was near, and in the CUMMINGS. Some of them went to sea in the CUMMINGS.

To go to the other division on the other end of the channel, Mine Division 2, they took part in the first phase of the action, of the gun action, because many of the planes, the Japanese planes, went out and left right over those divisions there in the Middle Loch going to the west. And so that that division knocked down six planes: five there in Middle Loch and one as that division sortied in the channel, as it came up the channel. One plane flew low coming up the entrance to the channel, and one of the ships knocked it down.

While over there at that place I could see some other division, but will not bother the Commission with the details of it, the exact location of where all the planes fell, the Japanese planes. I had all the officers from both divisions together, so that we wouldn't double up too much on the planes we knocked down, and that we would—four or five people seeing the same plane, we would only call it one plane. But, all of those together, after I went over it thoroughly and checked and rechecked, I found that we had seen in those divisions 18 planes knocked down, a great many of them there in that Middle Loch. For instance, one fell on Pearl City, which is the peninsula there near Middle Loch, on the shore. Another one fell in the water near Pearl City. Others fell on the peninsula called Beckoning Point over here on this side, and burned up. One of the ships knocked the whole head off of a plane with a 3-inch .23 caliber gun that we thought wasn't [971] very good but did knock it down, at very short range, and it fell on Beckoning Point.

When those ships sortied they had an attack in the forenoon around eleven-thirty and up until noon, with two very good contacts of submarines, one off Barbers Point and one down off the entrance to the harbor, Mindivs 2. I think that's about all. I saw two planes myself fall down, one passing over the battleships at about 2,000 feet altitude and one passing over the OGLALA and the HELENA and the PENNSYLVANIA at about the same height, 2,000 feet, coming from the northeast to the southwest, and they went down in flames towards Fort Weaver, and some of them went that far.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, did you observe any high bombing planes, any planes bombing from very high altitudes?

Admiral FURLONG. I personally didn't observe them, anything higher than these two that I saw in flames around two, three thousand

fect, but I have a report from my ships in which there was observed high bombing, and I have it here and can dig it out, the exact person who observed it, and when.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have a chance to estimate the number of planes that were in the various waves that you speak of: one, two, three, and four?

Admiral FURLONG. I couldn't estimate any more than just as [972] I looked into the air there were probably no more than maybe five or ten visible at any one time, but they came in so many waves that—and one after another; there was a distinct lull at one time around just before nine o'clock in the action, in which for a few minutes there wasn't anything happening, and then the waves came on again, I remember. One of the men that was on watch in one of the destroyers whose duty it was to write down times of waves reported first one coming in from the southeast, a wave, then another dive bombing and high bombing waves from the northeast, and then another one coming in from the east, and there were four or five distinct waves, I know, that came in, and different people in the reports to me have estimated them up as high as 50 to 80 planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, what generally is the condition of your command in regard to sobriety and overstaying liberty, and so forth?

Admiral FURLONG. Oh, it is excellent, Admiral. We don't have any trouble with that. You see, it is so well controlled here, it couldn't happen if they wanted to, because we have all these patrols on shore, and at a certain hour everybody has to be back, and if they are not back they are just picked up and sent back. So there is no trouble.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have many cases of court martial for drunkenness?

Admiral FURLONG. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or anything of that kind?

Admiral FURLONG. Oh, no. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy?

General MCCOY. Just as a matter of interest I would like to know what happened to the HELENA, because in the report we [973] have as to the salvage she is not mentioned.

Admiral FURLONG. The HELENA had her starboard engine entirely—it's entirely wrecked, and auxiliary machinery in it is entirely wrecked, and I will read you the official report of the investigation of the HELENA sent to the Navy Department: "Further examination"—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, we don't want that official report.

Admiral FURLONG. Just give him a report, and I won't—you don't need to—

General MCCOY. Will she be salvaged?

Admiral FURLONG. She will be salvaged. Her starboard engine—she will be fixed up here at the Yard, and she will be sent to the States where the engine can be worked upon and new engines obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all we want to know.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one other question, Mr. Chairman: Admiral, you have just come from being Chief of Bureau of Ordnance, you stated?

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you any knowledge of the Bureau's action and opinion as to the use of torpedoes in shallow waters?

Admiral FURLONG. We had contemplated using torpedoes, and we do use torpedoes in all our—both aircraft and ships, and we can set them to go at a very shallow depth. For instance, submarines can shoot at other submarines on the surface.

Admiral STANDLEY. But dropping them from aircraft in shallow water.

Admiral FURLONG. Oh.

Admiral STANDLEY. In restricted waters. Do you know anything of that use of them?

Admiral FURLONG. Well, I have conducted experiments with [974] dropping them at Narragansett Bay, and we of course would drop them from low altitudes such as the Japanese dropped them here, but I feel that possibly some of these Japanese torpedoes may have stuck in the mud, because of the three that came toward us we were hit only by one that I know of, and they do take a dive on going into the water, but they soon get their depth set for—

Admiral STANDLEY. You don't know of any action that the Bureau of Ordnance has taken in regard to that matter, or reports that they have made?

Admiral FURLONG. No. There is—I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. When you were Chief of Bureau?

Admiral FURLONG. I don't know—well, yes, I know everything that we did about the torpedoes. For instance, one thing, we heard that the British had developed a torpedo along the lines that we were working on at Newport, in which they were able to drop them at a greater height than we were, and that they have certain apparatus that they put on the outside of the torpedo which allowed the—stabilized it in the air and which let it down all right. The Secretary of the Navy asked the British representative for a sample of that torpedo, and I got the representatives of the British that were there to give us the designs of it, so that they were—I am sure that the Bureau—of course they came along after I left. The torpedo arrived, but the designs of the stabilizing fins for the air did not come until after I had left, although they were ordered, and I am sure the Bureau would go along with that, because we were ourselves experimenting on the same thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you aware of any letter written by the Chief of Naval Operations in which he stated that the difficulties and obstacles of dropping torpedoes from planes in the harbor here were such that such a contingency was almost negligible and that the placing of baffles for that reason was not justified?

[975] Admiral FURLONG. No, I never heard of that, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all, Admiral.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked all the witnesses here, sir, if they will agree not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Their own testimony or anything else that was said.

Admiral FURLONG. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall now adjourn until Friday morning.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 4:20 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until Friday, January 2, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.).

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44.P31:P31 P23

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 23

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

Printed for the use of the
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript Pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 and 29, 1946.,
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

KEYED TO PAGES OF THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTS, REPRESENTED IN THESE VOLUMES BY NUMERALS IN ITALICS IN BRACKETS, EXCEPT WITNESSES BEFORE JOINT COMMITTEE

Witness	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 143 (Roberts Commission, Dec. 18, 1941, to Jan. 23, 1942)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 144 (Hart Inquiry, Feb. 12 to June 15, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 145 (Army Pearl Harbor Board, July 20 to Oct. 20, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 146 (Navy Court of Inquiry, July 24 to Oct. 19, 1944)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 147 (Clarke Investigation, Sept. 14 to 16, 1944; July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 148 (Clausen Investigation, Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945)	Joint Committee Exhibit No. 149 (Hewitt Inquiry, May 14 to July 11, 1945)	Joint Congressional Committee, Nov. 15, 1945, to May 31, 1946
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[977] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

FRIDAY, JANUARY 2, 1942

**LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
*Pearl Harbor, T. H.***

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on Wednesday, December 31, 1941, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired.

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

Colonel BROWN. Admiral Halsey, Damage Control Officer of the
ARIZONA, is here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Bring Admiral Halsey in.

Good morning, Admiral. Will you be sworn?

[978] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM FREDERICK
HALSEY, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDING AIRCRAFT
BATTLE FORCE, PACIFIC FLEET**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Be seated, sir, and give your name to the reporter.

I would like Commander Covington, please.

Admiral HALSEY. William Frederick Halsey, Vice Admiral, United
States Navy, Commanding Aircraft Battle Force, Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Covington, I would like you to get,
if you will, please, the record of the receipt of the message from the
Chief of Naval Operations which he forwarded on the 24th of Novem-
ber.

Commander COVINGTON. You want the message itself?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Commander COVINGTON. 24th? That is not the 27th, Mr. Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. 24. I want to know if there is one here.

Were you in Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7, Admiral?

Admiral HALSEY. I was not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were with a task force?

Admiral HALSEY. I was.

The CHAIRMAN. On the high seas?

Admiral HALSEY. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel has suggested that you be called as a witness here, and I am not sure what he had in mind with respect to your testimony. Have you anything in mind, sir, that could be helpful to this Commission in connection with this air-raid attack?

Admiral HALSEY. Possibly my experience as a sea and Naval officer at sea at the time, what we knew and didn't know, principally, and what happened.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, where was your force at the moment, [979] on that morning?

Admiral HALSEY. At the time of the attack we were some 150 to 175 miles to the westward, southward and westward.

The CHAIRMAN. Was either the MINNEAPOLIS or the INDIANAPOLIS a ship of your fleet?

Admiral HALSEY. They were neither ship in my task force. I had Task Force 8, and the INDIANAPOLIS was in task force—I have forgotten the number of it, they were changing so fast; and the MINNEAPOLIS I believe was acting independently to the southward of Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any intimation of hostile ships on the surface or hostile planes in the air on that morning? I mean on your own fleet and before you heard from Oahu.

Admiral HALSEY. I had no intimation. One half hour before sunrise we flew off a scouting flight to cover 60 degrees from either bow of my force, to scout to a distance of 150 miles and then to land at Ford Island. We received no reports from any scout of any hostile ships or aircraft during this flight. I had been on the bridge from approximately 5:30 in the morning until about 8, when I went down below to my cabin to get breakfast. At this time and for ten days preceding a strict radio silence had been enjoined on my force.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why?

Admiral HALSEY. Why? Oh, yes. Do you want the answer to that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. The reason for this radio silence—I suppose I can talk freely here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, absolutely.

Admiral HALSEY. The reason for this radio silence is the fact that we had gone to the vicinity of Wake Island to land 12 Marine fighting planes, and there had been a warning from the Chief of Naval Operations that the conversations with the Japanese representatives were about to break down, and to be prepared for eventualities. It was suggested at that time that [980] 50 Army pursuit planes be placed on Wake and 50 pursuit be placed on Midway. There was a

conference in Admiral Kimmel's office, I believe on the 27th—I am sure the 27th of November, attended by General Short, General Martin, his chief of staff, Vice Admiral Brown, Rear Admiral Bellinger, and many members of Admiral Kimmel's staff,—I don't suppose you want them emunerated?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral HALSEY. And myself.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been informed that that conference had to do with conditions on Wake and Midway, relief of Marines, and what not.

Admiral HALSEY. You don't want me to go into this?

General McCoy. I would like to hear the Admiral give his version of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we would like to have your version of it.

Admiral HALSEY. For various reasons it was decided not to send the Army pursuit ships to these two islands at that time. There are many things that have happened since then, and I am not quite sure of my memory on the thing, but one of the principal reasons advanced was that we could land the Army pursuit ships on Wake and Midway, but there would be no way of getting them off because they could not land on board a carrier.

Another reason was the lack of experienced—and this is entirely from memory, I mean—the lack of experienced pilots to handle the ships over water, which they had not been used to doing. There was much discussion on this point, and it was finally agreed that if we did have to meet the Japanese it would be better to meet them with the best available airplanes we had. The Army pursuit is a much better fighting plane than the Navy fighters because it is not necessary to sacrifice weight in these planes in beefing them up for landings on carriers.

[981] It was finally decided that Marine planes should be sent to Wake, and the U. S. S. WRIGHT was dispatched about the 25th or 26th of November with spares, a skeleton of ground crew, and various equipment and ammunition. After landing this ammunition—after landing this equipment—the personnel and equipment, the WRIGHT was supposed to pick up—the WRIGHT was supposed to return to Midway and land other equipment at that point. There was no intention at that time to land any fighting planes at Midway, the principal reason being that there were only six or possibly a few more Marine fighting planes remaining.

However, there was a squadron of Marine scouting and bombing planes that could make the flight from Oahu to Midway, and they were prepared—they were instructed to make all preliminary flights necessary for a long-distance flight. This had to be done in a secretive manner, and they were told that they were being tested for long-distance flights.

The day before, the 27th of November, my task force leaving on the 28th, the lieutenant colonel commanding the Marine air group, Colonel Larkin, was instructed by me to have 12 planes ready to join the ENTERPRISE at sea. They were told to proceed from Ewa Field to Ford Island and to report to the ENTERPRISE group commander. I told Colonel Larkin to tell the commander of this group

of 12 planes that we had some special experimental work we wanted to accomplish and that they would be on board for possibly two nights. We took two Army P-40 planes to sea with us when we left Pearl Harbor. These planes were flown off the carrier so as to make sure that it could be done. We found out afterwards that it had already been done on another carrier on the East Coast.

General McCoy. Were these two-engine planes?

Admiral HALSEY. All single-engine planes, sir.

We proceeded—on leaving port I directed all ships to assume a condition of readiness for instant combat: bring ammunition up to the guns, keep it there. I directed the war heads on the torpedoes, the aviation torpedoes—

[982] General McCoy. What kind of torpedoes?

Admiral HALSEY. Aviation torpedoes, aerial torpedo—they were just plain torpedoes but adapted for the use on planes. (Continuing) —be placed on the torpedoes, that bombs be broken out and brought up where they could be immediately brought to the flight deck, and that fuses be ready to be placed in immediately. I had all machine guns on the planes loaded—had all the machine-gun ammunition in the planes in a fully loaded condition. We daily scouted 200 miles ahead of the ship.

On arrival in the vicinity of Wake, and still to keep radio silence, there was a prearranged time for the flight of the Marine planes to take off so they would land at Wake, as I remember it, at 9:30 in the morning.

General McCoy. What date was that?

Admiral HALSEY. That was on the—let's see. The 28th was a Friday, and this was on the following Wednesday. Third of December this time; where we were, the 4th of December, across the date line.

We put off an early morning scouting flight that morning to cover our advance, but with instructions not to approach within anti-aircraft fire of Wake. The 12 Marine planes were flown off, and six scouting planes were detailed to escort them into Wake. The trip to Wake of these planes was made without incident. On completion of this flight we retraced our steps to Pearl Harbor, carrying out the same daily scouting flights. During this cruise it was necessary to refuel all the destroyers once on the way out and four destroyers on the way back.

As I sat down to breakfast that morning they brought me in a dispatch which said, "Air raid. This is not a drill." I have forgotten the exact wording of the dispatch, but "Air raid. This is not a drill." My first reaction was, a very strong one—

[983] Admiral STANDLEY. From whom was that dispatch?

Admiral HALSEY. I beg your pardon?

Admiral STANDLEY. From whom was that dispatch?

Admiral HALSEY. From the Commander-in-Chief.

[984] My first reaction to this despatch was that my planes were being fired on. By a coincidence, my planes were due to arrive at Pearl Harbor just at the time the first attack took place. It took me a matter of minutes to realize that this was not the case, and I was very much perturbed in that I was afraid that my planes were being shot at, as we still maintained the radio silence.

However, there were lanes of approach that our people knew about and I felt sure they would be recognized in coming in.

Immediately I found it was business, we armed our remaining scouting and bombing planes, which amounted to fifteen, I believe, with 1,000 pound bombs, and we placed the torpedoes on the eighteen available torpedo planes.

We hoped we would receive some information as to the whereabouts of the enemy carriers. At this time we were close aboard or very close aboard Kaula Rock, which is just to the southward of Niihau.

We received various messages, most of which were confusing, in regard to the possible whereabouts of enemy carriers, and other messages of no value of any sort. We decided there was no information.

There was a possibility of these carriers being to the northward and westward of Kauai. I then directed commander of cruiser division 5, who was in my task force and had three cruisers, to launch six planes and to scout that area and then return his planes to Pearl Harbor.

During this flight one plane of cruiser division 5 said he had contacted with enemy fighter. This report was never forwarded to us by voice or key, and the lad made his first report when he arrived at Pearl Harbor and reported to commander patrol wing 2, Admiral Bellinger.

If he did have contact with an enemy plane, it was [985] probable that this was the Japanese plane that landed on Niihau.

Later in the day I requested that my planes at Pearl be returned to the ship, and stated that I was depending on the forces in Pearl for information, and I was holding my striking group for action.

I was then informed that a search—I have forgotten the area of this search of doubtful utility—had been made, and requesting me to make a search.

Before this we had received a message from the MINNEAPOLIS stating an enemy carrier or enemy carriers were in the sail area. This was followed up shortly afterwards by a message stating—I think it was specifically—that there were two enemy carriers in the southwestern half of sail 1.

Admiral STANDLEY. Sail 1 being where?

Admiral HALSEY. Being southward of Oahu.

The CHAIRMAN. And sail 2 being where?

Admiral HALSEY. They are in the area southward. I don't know if that is on the chart, but they are just the operating areas.

The CHAIRMAN. Both of them are to the southward?

Admiral HALSEY. Both of them are to the southward of Oahu.

General MCCOY. This was about what time, Admiral?

Admiral HALSEY. This was about one or two o'clock in the afternoon.

Upon receiving this message we launched fifteen scouting bombers with 1,000 bombs and a full load of gas—320 gallons.

They had hardly formed up over the ship when another message came from the MINNEAPOLIS that there are no enemy carriers in sight of the MINNEAPOLIS.

The CHAIRMAN. And the MINNEAPOLIS was where at that time?

Admiral HALSEY. It was to the southward of Oahu. It was [986] not working with me; it was working independently.

Admiral REEVES. Did the MINNEAPOLIS give her position at the time she sent the message?

Admiral HALSEY. I don't remember, Admiral, whether she did or not, but we knew in general where she was and we were prepared

to send these out because the sail area is not very large and we could cover that area with the fifteen planes.

Admiral REEVES. You knew the operating area that she was in?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

We then held these planes overhead until the message arrived from the Commander-in-Chief stating that scouting around Oahu had not been adequately covered, and giving the areas that had been covered.

We placed these on a chart and picked out what we thought would be a good area to cover with the planes we had. We then directed a search of 200 miles with these fifteen planes in that sector.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that sector, sir? What direction was it?

Admiral HALSEY. It was to the southward and westward, sir. I might add here that with the very meager information we had, it indicated to us that the enemy was probably to the southward and westward. Apparently I was just 180 degrees wrong.

These planes scouted this area, and we finally received a report from one plane of an enemy carrier and cruiser in latitude such and such and longitude such and such.

At this time it was a quarter past to half past four. We launched our eighteen torpedo planes and four scouting bombing planes with smoke tanks and six fighting planes as a combat patrol over this attacking force.

A further report from the plane making the so-called [987] contact with the carrier said he was being chased by an enemy fighter and then he went off the air. This attacking group that we launched was launched just before dusk. I had hoped that we would be able to reach and report the position of this carrier before dark, and they did; but unfortunately there was nothing there. They searched back and forth and found nothing.

In the meantime, Rear Admiral Draemel had joined me with various ships that had gotten out of Pearl Harbor after the attack. I directed him to take charge with all his force, and in addition my three cruisers and all destroyers except two that we kept with the carrier, to form a scouting line and search the area where the reported contact had been made. He joined me the next morning at daylight.

I held the carrier clear of this position, ready to attack if anything was discovered.

We directed this attacking force to land at Ford Island upon completion of their duty. Unfortunately most of them did not do this. The 18 torpedo planes and the 4 smokers returned to the vicinity of the ship, and we returned them on board on a very dark night without accident.

The 6 fighters came into Ford Island, and 4 of them were shot down by their own anti-aircraft.

General McNARNEY. What time was that, Admiral?

Admiral HALSEY. What time?

General McNARNEY. What time of the day was that?

Admiral HALSEY. That they landed on board?

General McNARNEY. No, that they were shot down.

Admiral HALSEY. Somewhere between 7:30 and 9. I do not have the exact time.

I might say that when the first attack occurred there was no more radio silence, and the air was full of messages.

I had no information at this time of what had been the results of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. I reported [988] that I was sending in this flight and requested that they be not fired on when they landed.

The first information I had of the seriousness of the situation at Pearl Harbor was, I believe, the next morning when Admiral Draemel sent me a signal, "Believe Admiral Anderson's force immobilized."

Shortly after that our planes were landed on board and we got the first story of what had actually happened here.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you lying then, sir?

Admiral HALSEY. At that time we were about 70 miles to the southward of Pearl.

I might add that the lad who reported the contact with the enemy was very badly out on his navigation. He ended up in Kaneohe after dark that night. On questioning him when he returned on board the next day, I am still very much in doubt as to what he actually saw at that time; certainly no carrier or cruiser. On questioning him about the fighting planes he mentioned several planes, twin-engine, and they must have been Army A-20's.

We lost some planes and lives in this first flight to Ford Island this morning.

Do you care for the numbers?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. We lost that early morning—

Admiral REEVES. Which morning was that?

Admiral HALSEY. That was the morning of the 7th of December. That was before then.

We launched the command air group and 17 scouting bombing planes.

The losses in the bombing and scouting were: 6-B-3, pilot, passenger, plane, missing.

6-B-9, pilot and passenger injured, plane at Naval Air Station, Pearl, for repair.

[989] Scout squadron 6. 6-S-3. Pilot and passenger killed; plane crashed.

6-S-15. Pilot, passenger, and plane missing.

6-S-9. Pilot parachuted; broken leg. Passenger killed, plane crashed.

6-S-4. Pilot parachuted. No injury. Passenger killed by gunfire. Plane crashed.

I might say here that this plane shot away all its ammunition from the rear gun. The pilot said he shot one Japanese plane, going down in flames. His passenger was reported being wounded. He lost control of the plane at 1,000 feet and jumped, and he was shot at on the way down in his parachute, and he landed in the road over in Ewa. He made his way to Pearl Harbor without telling anybody his experiences, and he immediately jumped in another plane and went out on a 200 mile scouting flight.

6-S-14. Pilot, minor injuries, Passenger, hospitalized, wounded. Plane crashed.

6-S-16. Pilot and passenger, no injuries. Plane crashed Burns Field Kauai.

This man saw a Japanese plane and immediately dove on him and then landed on Kauai and was hospitalized there for one or two days.

He then requested to make a reconnaissance flight, which he did, and he came in and landed, but they had constructions at the field and he got too close to one and smashed his plane, not seriously.

Dusk Attack Group:

6-F-1. Pilot died, hospital. Plane crashed and burned.

6-F-4. Pilot parachuted to safety. Plane crashed.

6-F-15. Pilot killed. Plane crashed.

6-F-18. Pilot parachuted, died. Plane crashed.

3-F-15. Pilot uninjured. Plane at Naval Air Station, Pearl, for repair. She had 28 or 30 bullet holes in her.

[990] The summary is: 4 pilots killed and 2 pilots missing; 3 passengers killed and 2 passengers missing; 2 planes missing and 9 planes crashed, some of which are capable and have since been repaired.

General McNARNEY. Did the firing on our planes take place after dark?

Admiral HALSEY: Yes. This is hearsay, and I have not checked it, but they came in with lights on and everybody having been notified, and the communications were that they were to get through, to come into the field. They made one mistake, which is a perfectly normal one. Instead of landing when they first shot at the field, they circled, and then somebody with an itching trigger finger turned loose, and then everybody turned loose.

This lad that finally landed his plane with 28 or 30 bullet holes in her went to Ewa field and then went right over the top of the trees and came in at full speed and landed.

General McNARNEY. Did they attempt to land at Ford Island or at Ewa?

Admiral HALSEY. Ford Island.

General McNARNEY. Do you happen to know whether the first report from the MINNEAPOLIS as to the information of the enemy forces in the sail area was actually sent by the MINNEAPOLIS or was it a spurious report?

Admiral HALSEY. I have asked for a check of those reports but to date I have not gotten one. It is a very difficult thing—where we are out and she is in—to get these things; but I have asked for those but we have not gotten them.

My presumption is that this report was an actual report, but that it was an error in coding.

I might add another thing. The Commander-in-Chief directed me to take charge of the force at sea at this time, as Vice Admiral Brown's task force was close aboard or fairly [991] close aboard Midway, preparing to land some marine planes. Admiral Brown himself in the INDIANAPOLIS was down by Johnston Island.

Again, with the very meager information I had, I still thought that enemy carriers were to the southward and westward. I picked out an arbitrary spot to the southward and westward of Barbers Point at about 200 miles, and directed Admiral Brown's task force to intercept and destroy enemy carriers probably running to the bases in the Marshall Islands.

They then asked the Commander-in-Chief whether this canceled the order for landing the marine planes at Midway. I took it upon myself to reply that the order was canceled and to carry out my

order. I sent this for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, and he confirmed my action. Again, I was wrong 180 degrees in my guess.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, in your practice maneuvers in the operating area, did you ever operate to the northward?

Admiral HALSEY. Normally, no. All operating areas were to the southward of Oahu, the principal reason being the necessity of targets and various things which were gotten at more easily to the southward area, and the weather is usually much better for handling the targets in that area than it is to the northward, but we have done considerable operations to the northward.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have done none to the northward?

Admiral HALSEY. We have done considerable operations to the northward, but the normal training periods are to the southward.

General McNARNEY. Do you think it had any effect on the actual direction of the attack?

Admiral HALSEY. Undoubtedly, sir.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you consider the carrier primarily an offensive or defensive weapon?

[992] Admiral HALSEY. An offensive.

General McNARNEY. Would you give the Commission a very brief statement as to your ideas as to the strategy of the operations of a carrier force?

Admiral HALSEY. What is that?

General McNARNEY. Of a carrier force.

Admiral HALSEY. I did not get the first part of the question.

General McNARNEY. I say the strategy of carrier operations.

Admiral HALSEY. I think General Forrest's description is the best thing I know, to get the other fellow with everything you have and as fast as you can and to dump it on him. You have to scout out and find it, and as soon as you find it, send everything you can at him and hit him with it.

General McNARNEY. As a commander of a task force, you would have no hesitancy in using your carrier as an offensive weapon?

Admiral HALSEY. I would consider myself to be a very poor specimen of a naval officer if I thought in any other direction.

General McNARNEY. You do not believe a carrier is designed primarily to protect the heavy units of the fleet?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, decidedly not.

General McNARNEY. Do you think the Japanese have the same idea as to carrier operations?

Admiral HALSEY. The Japanese from the operations here showed that they plainly did not.

The CHAIRMAN. They do not?

Admiral HALSEY. That they do not have.

General McNARNEY. Have you ever considered the possibility of a carrier raid on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

[993] General McNARNEY. And what were your ideas in the matter?

Admiral HALSEY. I did not think they would do it.

General McNARNEY. And why not?

Admiral HALSEY. I thought it would be taking too much of a chance for it. I did not think they would do it. I thought they would be fully occupied out in the East. I thought their equipment, according to the reports we had, was below what it turned out to be, and I thought the number of planes they had definitely were very much below what they turned out to be. I did not think they would take the chance. I thought they would try some underhand method of attack, such as they did, but I thought it would be submarines. However, the whole of the security orders around here were written on the strength of the possibility of such an attack.

General McNARNEY. When did the ENTERPRISE return to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral HALSEY. About five o'clock in the afternoon of the 8th of December.

General McNARNEY. By whose direction?

Admiral HALSEY. The Commander-in-Chief's.

General McNARNEY. How soon could it have been prepared to take to sea again?

Admiral HALSEY. We left at four o'clock the next morning.

General McNARNEY. You were fully fueled and ready to operate?

Admiral HALSEY. We were ready to operate but we were not fully fueled. We had 40 to 50% of fuel on board. Outside of that we were practically ready to operate, and remain out for one week.

General McNARNEY. How soon after the afternoon of December 8th could you have prepared a task force for operations in the vicinity of Wake?

Admiral HALSEY. As soon as we could have gotten fuel [994] on board.

General McNARNEY. What would your guess be as to that?

Admiral HALSEY. To have my task force left here, three cruisers, nine destroyers, and the ENTERPRISE, all completely fueled with the exception of the ENTERPRISE—and the ENTERPRISE could have been completely fueled within and left by eight o'clock that morning.

General McNARNEY. Would it have been necessary to take a tanker with you? That would be for operations in the vicinity of Wake?

Admiral HALSEY. Depending on how long you were going to remain there. On my first trip to wake we had no tanker and we were at sea from the 28th of November until the 8th of December.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, I have nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. At the conference of November 27th, Admiral, were you shown or apprised of a despatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which, among other things, said, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral HALSEY. I don't remember the words, "This is a war warning." I was shown and had been shown all despatches, and I was kept fully informed at all times of everything that the Commander-in-Chief had.

The CHAIRMAN. So if, on the afternoon of November 27th, he received a despatch from the CNO containing that phrase, you probably saw it?

Admiral HALSEY. Undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. It raised no thought in your mind of a hostile air attack on Pearl Harbor should war break out?

Admiral HALSEY. I was rather busy at that time, sir, thinking of what might happen to my own task force on the way [995] to Wake and back, and I fully expected that I might be in combat before I got back here.

The CHAIRMAN. The Naval Intelligence at that time had indication, as you were apprised of, indicating hostile action by Japan far to the westward of Hawaii; is that correct?

Admiral HALSEY. Not necessarily. The message from the CNO led me to believe that something was going to happen, and I was prepared to take action immediately in case I met any hostile forces on my way to or from Wake.

The CHAIRMAN. From your experience, sir, what would you say would be the reasonable time to sortie off Pearl Harbor a force which included six battleships tied up there and auxiliary vessels which, according to your knowledge, was there on Sunday morning, December 7, and if you were in command when do you think you could accomplish the sortie?

Admiral HALSEY. My own craft—and I mean the destroyers and so forth—could start to get out almost immediately. The cruisers, I should say, would be ready to start within an hour, and the battleships within two hours. That is, to make the start out.

When Admiral Reeves was in command he gave us a surprise sortie in San Pedro, and I believe that is about the time it took to accomplish the sortie, and I believe it took that time and I believe we were out in less than two hours.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it have been the practice on such a Sunday morning to have steam up on the battleships tied up?

Admiral HALSEY. It is never the practice in port to have steam up; it is not necessary except for the—

The CHAIRMAN. One boiler?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then it would involve the time of getting full steam up?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

[996] The CHAIRMAN. That is why it would take something like two hours to get moving?

Admiral HALSEY. A destroyer can get under way with one boiler very quickly. They raise steam as she goes out.

The CHAIRMAN. In the event of a hostile air attack, the effort would be to sortie the battleships?

Admiral HALSEY. A great deal depends, sir. We might have had a very much worse catastrophe here if these vessels had been in the process of sortieing when this happened. For instance, my ship, my task force had planned to be off Pearl Harbor about seven o'clock in the morning, and by the grace of God we had bad weather out there that held us up and I could not have gotten in until about four o'clock in the afternoon.

It might have happened that I would be in the middle of the channel when this thing happened, and that would have been very serious, because we would have been sunk, and then we would have something.

Admiral REEVES. What is your flatship, Admiral?

Admiral HALSEY. The USS ENTERPRISE.

The CHAIRMAN. The USS ENTERPRISE, a carrier.

Admiral REEVES. In connection with the question of sortieing following an air attack, you might run into an even worse submarine attack outside the harbor, might you not?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. It is a question of sortieing or not to sortie?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, except if we have the planes available.

With respect to the question of submarines, since this thing occurred I have had eight different contacts with enemy submarines on the surface, none of which had been closed than 30 or 40 miles, but we have been able to bomb these people on the surface as they were crash diving.

[997] On one occasion the same lad that I described as having parachuted out of his plane and being shot at on the way down and who jumped in another plane caught a submarine on the surface and dove on it, and he was machine gunned all the way down by two machine guns on the submarine. When he got down he dropped his bomb, a 500-pound bomb, on a four-tenth second; he pulled short and came back and he saw the submarine going down again with the machine guns still firing.

Now, whether we hurt them or whether they are just stupid, I don't know.

I believe of the first five contacts we had with any submarines to the northward of Oahu that there were three submarines they caught in the morning and bombed them and started looking for them in the afternoon and caught two of those three on the surface in the afternoon.

On the last trip when we were covering two task forces on the way to Jaulit and Wake there was one caught on the surface and bombed. About two or three hours later he came up and on the telephone made a tremendous fuss. Unfortunately we had nobody on the ship who could understand Japanese, but we decided we would look for him that afternoon and we sent a scouting expedition out of three planes to hunt for him, and they found him again on the surface and bombed him the second time and had two good detonations. [998] A third bomb was a dud, undoubtedly due to the fact that it was dropped from too low an altitude. It takes—you have to have a thousand feet to drop them. We had another contact. We were not sure whether it was a whale or a submarine. This lad dove on him and made a direct hit, and there is no question about that, and some of his friends were ribbing him about it; he said, "Well, if it was a whale it was the first whale I have ever seen that exhausts through its tail."

Admiral REEVES. To return, Admiral, to this question of sortie in case of a surprise air attack in Pearl Harbor, there are several factors to be considered. Of course, dispersal of the ships is advisable, but in attempting to disperse battleships moored in Pearl Harbor you would have to consider, would you not, the risk of their being sunk in the channel getting out, and the added risk of a second attack not from airplanes but from submarines after you got out?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. So that the decision to sortie after a surprise air attack has been made would necessarily have to cover those considerations, would it not?

Admiral HALSEY. I think very decidedly so, sir. Unless you have a long warning of an air attack, which is highly improbable, I think probably one of the worst things you could do would be to attempt to sortie your force.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, that is the point I wanted to bring out. If you can sortie deliberately with protection against submarines before the air attack strikes you, it is one thing, but to sortie after the air attack has been made you would run the risk of this group waiting for you outside.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

General McCoy. Isn't it possible, however, knowing that submarines would probably be waiting for you, to make proper preparations for preventing them from doing any harm, and do harm to them rather? For instance, I notice outside the [999] harbor ever since the 7th of December they have been keeping a very close patrol of fast submarine chasers and destroyers and all kinds of craft, so that it would naturally be more dangerous for the enemy than for yourselves, wouldn't it? Or couldn't you make it that way if it has not already been made? I would assume that it has already been made perfectly safe for our ships to go out, because they have been going in and out ever since the attack, with submarines all around here.

Admiral REEVES. The proper preparation against submarine attack on the sortie of a fleet would involve several days of preparation. When I sortied the fleet into Pearl Harbor I had 30 submarines outside waiting to attack us. I spent three days and three nights, patrolling the area outside of Pearl Harbor in relatively shoal water, and when the fleet sortied we had fair assurance that it was impossible for any submarine to be in this area of shoal water.

General McCoy. Well, that is the fact now, isn't it? I mean normally when at war you have these waters at the entrance of Pearl Harbor thoroughly patrolled all the time?

Admiral REEVES. We were discussing a surprise attack such as this.

General McCoy. No, but in war time it would be different, wouldn't it, than it was, of course?

Admiral REEVES. Oh, yes. I do not think that a surprise attack in war time would have the same surprise elements in it that this thing had.

General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, have you heard anything of a radio signal from the MINNEAPOLIS on the morning of December 7 to the effect that she had sighted Japanese naval vessels?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir. I reported that in my—(indicating). Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is covered in your testimony. And you think that that was probably a mistake?

Admiral HALSEY. I think it was. My own idea of it in [1000] discussing it with various people was that it was an error in coding.

The CHAIRMAN. An error in coding?

Admiral HALSEY. Instead of saying that there were no vessels in sight, they coded it wrong and said there were vessels in sight.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Admiral HALSEY. That is purely my own idea of it.

General McCoy. Is it not customary in such a code message to repeat the "not" or the "no" several times?

Admiral HALSEY. Not in a code message.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know anything about the monitoring of the radio messages on the island here? Do you know how many monitoring sets are maintained here?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Who would be likely to know about that in the Navy commands?

Admiral HALSEY. The communication officer on the CinC's staff. I don't exactly understand—I possibly don't understand what you mean by "monitoring."

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, where radio messages are likely to be received from a friendly fleet there are operators who sit and work the needle on a dial constantly in order to determine, within the sector they are monitoring, the nature of the messages that are coming in and endeavor to find the channel on which their own or any other message they are interested in is to come in.

Admiral HALSEY. I didn't understand what you meant. My answer would be very different, sir. That is done, insofar as the equipment is available, on practically every ship in the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. And at every station?

Admiral HALSEY. Pardon?

Admiral STANDLEY. And at every station?

Admiral HALSEY. *And at every station.*

[1001] The CHAIRMAN. It has been reported to me that there are but four monitor sets operated, or were prior to December 7, on the island, which would mean that each monitor would have to take one quarter of the 360 degrees on the dial, or whatever number of degrees short-wave messages come in on. Do you know anything about that?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir. That is, what you are talking about now are stations here. That probably would be under Admiral Bloch.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. And probably they do have—they are very lucky if they have a watch in four on that thing and keep it going. That means 12 men going day and night. You can't keep them on more than about four hours at a time.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral HALSEY. But I question that. I think probably they may have 12 so-called experts, and I think they have a lot more than that, strikers and lower-rated men.

General McCoy. Admiral, have you investigated, or has so far as you know the Commander-in-Chief investigated, the unfortunate happening to your returning planes to Ford Island and to the Naval or to the Marine field?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir. It has been investigated, and, as I say, the only answer is communications breaking down, although Ford Island Tower and Ford Island knew it. It was very difficult to get these communications for the ships scattered around, and I don't know if any of the shore batteries fired or not, but they were all on edge, having been through that experience in the morning, and one man with an itchy trigger finger turned loose, and everything burst loose.

General McCoy. Had they received your message that you were sending the planes to land there?

Admiral HALSEY. Oh, yes. Yes, indeed, that message had been received, and there was a—I don't know how many people in the Ford Island control tower attempting to get this word [1002] around to everybody, so they would not fire on them.

General McCoy. You speak of having 18 torpedo planes on your carrier; the ENTERPRISE, I take it.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you think those torpedo planes are as effective as the Japanese planes proved to be?

Admiral HALSEY. I hope they are a lot better, sir.

General McCoy. Do they carry as heavy a load?

Admiral HALSEY. Just as heavy a load, yes.

General McCoy. What?

Admiral HALSEY. Just as heavy a load, and they are just as good planes, and our lads will carry them in just as far.

Admiral REEVES. You mean the war head's charge, General?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. That is what I interpreted it to mean.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. You speak of having been 180 degrees wrong. Did you come by that from elimination?

Admiral HALSEY. I determined that by the fact that the next day or the day after—I have forgotten which—these carriers attacked Midway, so that they must have been up to the northward or we would have caught them on our search to the southward. Incidentally, I could not search with my ships that far because I did not have enough fuel left, and I had to conserve that and be ready to go fast if anybody was there and get them, and then let somebody tow me in if necessary.

Admiral Standley. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, concerning this discussion about sortie, are you cognizant of the two messages which were sent out, one by the Commander-in-Chief and one by Admiral Furlong, directing sortie on that morning?

Admiral HALSEY. Directing sortie?

Admiral STANDLEY. Sortie of the fleet.

[1003] Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, I am not.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know that those orders were issued?

Admiral HALSEY. I do not.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your fleet actually sortied?

Admiral HALSEY. Pardon, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But the fleet, the part of the fleet that was able, actually did sortie that morning and during the attack?

Admiral HALSEY. They did.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

Admiral HALSEY. That is true.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were asked a question in the beginning of your statement as to why radio silence. Would you please answer that, the reason for radio silence?

Admiral HALSEY. Because we were on a very secret mission, to land these Marine fighting planes on Wake without the then possible enemy learning of it. I might say, the results—I saw a report the other day of what these 12 fighting planes accomplished on Wake, and despite the fact that there was no Radar on Wake—it hadn't been landed—it was little short of remarkable.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, the reason for radio silence was that you suspected or you thought it possible that there might be a Japanese attack?

Admiral HALSEY. Exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you in your considerations and your studies and your estimates of the situation envisaged a surprise attack by the Japanese?

Admiral HALSEY. In general, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why, or from what, did you draw that conclusion?

Admiral HALSEY. From their action against the Russians in 1904 at Port Arthur and from the—let's see—their action against the Chinese, I felt that they would stab us in the back if and when they saw the opportunity.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you then were in the position and the condition to meet any surprise attack that might have been delivered on your force?

Admiral HALSEY. I thought we were, sir, very decidedly.

Admiral REEVES. You were on a complete war footing, in other words?

Admiral HALSEY. Absolutely a war footing, except I was not using bombs and torpedoes at that time. I could have gotten my planes armed with bombs in less than half an hour and my torpedo planes armed in, oh, an hour to an hour and a half.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, you had sent out a scouting flight in the morning of December 7.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the purpose of that flight?

Admiral HALSEY. To see that there was no possible enemy—to see that there were no possible hostile craft between me and my base.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, it was a protection of your own force?

Admiral HALSEY. It was a protection of my own force, with, of course, the full knowledge that I would, if I saw anything, report it to high authority, not for action but for information.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it known at Ewa Field or at Pearl that those planes of that flight were to land at Ewa on the completion of their flight?

Admiral HALSEY. That is a normal thing, sir, when carriers are returning, to send their planes in. I was nervous about that, but in order not to break radio silence I didn't break it, and there were approach lanes, altitudes to come in, and everything else to identify them as friendly planes, and people knew where they came in, and I did not think there would [1005] be any trouble. In fact, I gave it hardly a thought until I got the first report of this air raid. Then I thought that my planes were suspected of making a raid.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then, observers on the island might have anticipated the approach of friendly squadrons or groups of planes from almost any direction from the carrier?

Admiral HALSEY. From almost any direction from a carrier, except that there were certain specified lanes in which they had to enter, at a certain specified altitude, from a certain distance.

Admiral STANDLEY. You speak of a number of conflicting messages received on the ENTERPRISE that morning, messages which led you to believe that the enemy carriers were to the southward. Have you made any attempt or has your communication officer made any attempt to analyze your messages received, to determine whether or not those were real messages or phony messages, messages attempting to deceive?

Admiral HALSEY. The messages I do not think we have made any special attempt to analyze, except that we know the messages giving so-called radio bearings and the suspected position of the carriers were genuine. The other messages that came out about battleships four miles south of Barbers Point and sampans flying the American flag and coasting up and down the eastern Coast of Oahu flying—an American vessel and American planes and parachute troops landing, and describing their uniform and the marks on their sleeve—I just throw those into the discard, didn't pay any attention to them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you are certain that various messages received were phony messages?

Admiral HALSEY. I don't know if they were phony or excitable messages.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, Admiral, how long have you been serving in this station?

Admiral HALSEY. In my present position, or how long in the fleet?

[1006] Admiral STANDLEY. No; the present position in the Hawaiian area.

Admiral HALSEY. I have been out here since the fleet originally arrived in April, April 30—I don't want to get twisted up on my years. When did I come out here? '39 or '40, I guess. April, 1940.

Admiral STANDLEY. During your duties, during the time that you have been on duty at this station, your present command, have there been estimates, various estimates, of the situation made as to possibilities of attack from enemies in the Pacific?

Admiral HALSEY. In this way: There has been a planning force, which is a very large one, under Admiral Kimmel, that has been working up plans for a war in the Pacific. At the time that Admiral Kimmel took over command there were security orders about patrols of destroyers when we lay at Lahaina Roads, and various boat patrols while we were in Pearl Harbor. There was very little done about the organization of defenses of Pearl Harbor. He immediately insisted that this be gone into and gone into very thoroughly, that the Army and the Navy get together, particularly about the air defenses of Pearl. He insisted on—there was a total lack or almost a total lack of bombs and ammunition in this area. He moved heaven and earth to get this ammunition out to Pearl. He said he wanted something started, and started right away. That was general instructions to everybody.

On the strength of that I got in touch with General Martin, told him what we had. I finally passed it on to Admiral Bellinger, who

was permanently ashore as commander of Patrol Wing 2, to take charge of the Navy defense forces.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, we know that.

Admiral HALSEY. All right.

Admiral STANDLEY. What I am trying to get at is this.

Admiral HALSEY. I beg your pardon.

Admiral STANDLEY. If you don't mind, yes. We know that. [1007] We have got that phase of it. What I wanted—I have all these things, and various plans—you have war plans in the Pacific, have you not?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And if this were the situation: if war were declared, let us say, prior to December 7, if war had been declared then, where would you have expected an attack? From which direction would you have expected the attack to come if you had made any plans?

Admiral HALSEY. I think that there would have been a very difficult decision to—a very difficult conclusion to arrive at, Admiral. I think that a coverage with what we had in the way of Navy patrol planes and Army bombers and Army Radar was the best thing we could hope for. It might have come from any direction in 360 degrees.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, let us suppose, Admiral, that we did not have adequate force to patrol all areas 360 degrees around Hawaii. What sectors would you have considered searching first?

Admiral HALSEY. The southward and westward first, and to the northward.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why the southward and westward first?

Admiral HALSEY. Just because that is on a line with their Japanese possessions, and I know that they are—I believe; I don't know—I believe that their carriers are more or less oil hogs, and they have to nurse them.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, then, you believe that the attack would normally come from the mandate islands?

Admiral HALSEY. Exactly.

Admiral STANDLEY. And your search would have been in that direction?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would that have any influence in regard to the direction in which you searched on the morning of the 7th?

[1008] Admiral HALSEY. Undoubtedly.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, normally in Pearl Harbor you have under your command what vessels? When your force, the force of which you are normally in command, is in Pearl Harbor, what vessels have you under your command?

Admiral HALSEY. Previous to the 28th of November we had been operating in three task forces out here: Task Force 1, Task Force 2, and Task Force 3. I had command of Task Force 2. That consisted of three battleships, the NEVADA, OKLAHOMA, and ARIZONA, crudiv 5,—

Admiral STANDLEY. Crudiv 5 consists of what?

Admiral HALSEY. That consists of the NORTHAMPTON, SALT LAKE CITY, PENSACOLA, and CHESTER.

Admiral STANDLEY. Large cruisers?

Admiral HALSEY. Ten thousand-ton heavy cruisers. (Continuing) —and one to—it was changed—one to two squadrons of destroyers or mine layers.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you say the aircraft carriers?

Admiral HALSEY. Pardon.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you say the aircraft carriers? Did you have any aircraft carriers?

Admiral HALSEY. And the ENTERPRISE.

The CHAIRMAN. And the ENTERPRISE.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many men were normally in that command, approximately?

Admiral HALSEY. Oh, I would say approximately 6500 men.

Admiral STANDLEY. Probably between six and seven thousand men?

Admiral HALSEY. Six and seven thousand, yes, sir; that is a very rough estimate.

Admiral STANDLEY. And as commander of that force, Admiral, are you familiar with the regulations for liberty of your men in this port?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are those regulations as regards [1009] time?

Admiral HALSEY. Now or then?

Admiral STANDLEY. Then.

Admiral HALSEY. The regulations were that the——

Admiral STANDLEY. I mean prior to December 7.

Admiral HALSEY. —men's liberty expired at—the non-rated men's liberty expired at—I am a little bit leery of this thing, a little bit confused about it now, because I haven't thought about it for a long time, but it expired, as I remember it, at 10 o'clock at night or 9 o'clock at night. The rated men and chief petty officers—first-class petty officers went up to 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning except those men who had families residing here, who were allowed to remain ashore overnight.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, except those men who had families and lived here, all men were required to be back aboard ship?

Admiral HALSEY. Without refreshing my memory I am a little bit uncertain about that. I think it may be the chief petty officers had overnight liberty if they required—if they wanted it. I am not absolutely certain on the point.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who would know positively about it, if you know?

Admiral HALSEY. They have it. I can look it up on the records. They had it in the Commander-in-Chief's records.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you mind looking it up and simply submitting a memorandum? You can send it to the Recorder, at any time.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to know absolutely the correct statement on the liberty.

General McCoy. Have those orders been changed since the 7th of December?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir. One quarter of the crew is now allowed ashore between the hours of 9 in the morning and 5 o'clock in the night, provided that all anti-aircraft [1010] batteries can be fully

manned, and that has since been changed so that officers and men who have bona fide homes may on special request and with special permission remain ashore overnight.

General McCoy. Are the officers obliged to remain aboard ship now, or are they given certain liberty?

Admiral HALSEY. Those that have families ashore, one quarter of them may remain, but they have to be back by 7 o'clock in the morning.

Admiral STANDLEY. What would be your regulations or standing orders in regard to the men aboard for duty? What proportion of your crew and officers, if any, was required to be aboard for duty when you were in port yet?

Admiral HALSEY. Again I would have to refresh my memory on that. I think it was 50% had to remain on board.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you give us a memorandum?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, I will give you a memorandum on that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there any special regulations in regard to sufficient complement to man the anti-aircraft batteries?

Admiral HALSEY. Not at that time, unless an air-raid warning was called.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like you to check on that, too, sir.

General McCoy. Admiral, when you were talking about this conference with the Army and Navy staffs and commanders, I am not sure that you were quite consistent about the dates.

Admiral HALSEY. I may be wrong on that date. I thought it was the 27th. It may have been the 26th. It was either the 26th or the 27th.

General McCoy. You also speak, as I remember—it is not to trip you up; I just want to get the record straight. You spoke of a conference which you attended, you thought, on the 27th, and that you were informed then of a dispatch from the [1011] Navy Department?

Admiral HALSEY. I think I would recognize that dispatch if I saw it.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see this dispatch which was received on the 25th, Admiral (indicating)?

Admiral HALSEY. This one is 24th at 2:05.

The CHAIRMAN. It was received the 25th here.

Admiral HALSEY. It was received here the 25th. See, that would be—

The CHAIRMAN. In the morning.

Admiral HALSEY. 3035 would be 6:35 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. I think I have seen this dispatch. This is not the one I referred to and spoke about sending the Army P-40's to Wake and Midway, but I am sure I have seen this dispatch, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then the dispatch about the Army planes was after the other dispatch of the 27th?

Admiral HALSEY. It was an identical dispatch sent to the Army general and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, that is still another dispatch than the one we have.

Admiral HALSEY. That is the one I am referring to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is still another that we haven't been looking at critically.

Admiral HALSEY. It mentioned sending 50 Army pursuits.

General McCoy. To get back so that we shall be sure to have this record straight about this conference, I think you mentioned that you thought it was on the 27th, but later on in talking about the WRIGHT—

The CHAIRMAN. You said she went on the 26th, I think.

General McCoy. You said she went on before that date.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. So I just want you to clear up that little [1012] inconsistency in the record.

Admiral HALSEY. It is an inconsistency—inconsistent testimony on my part; there is no inconsistency in the acts we were doing for some ten days or two weeks or more previous to this time. The Commander-in-Chief had decided that he had to increase defenses of Wake and Midway. The only air that he had control of that he could put out there were either carrier planes or Marine planes. He had given orders through me to work up skeleton crews—ground crews—for both places, to take such accessories and spare parts as we had available, and to get them ready to go on practically instant notice. Sometime within a week before the 27th of November he had directed that this be carried out. The WRIGHT was then loaded, with this purpose, not only for the Marine planes that were going to Wake and Midway but also for the patrol planes that were going to base in these two places. This was all done a matter of many days before the conference of which I spoke.

General McCoy. And the WRIGHT sailed, as I remember, on the—

Admiral HALSEY. She sailed, I am sure—What day was Thanksgiving? She sailed on Thanksgiving Day.

Admiral STANDLEY. 27th.

Admiral HALSEY. No, no. It was before that, sir.

General McNARNEY. 20th, I believe.

Admiral HALSEY. What?

General McNARNEY. Thanksgiving was the 20th this year, I believe.

Mr. HOWE. Yes, it was.

Admiral HALSEY. It could have been that soon—well, maybe it was. I remember—this is off the record: I remember being in swimming at Waikiki Beach. I thought it was Thanksgiving; maybe it was the Sunday I was in swimming and I saw the WRIGHT—swimming around—sort of steaming out, and I knew where she was bound. It was some date before I put to sea.

[1013] General McCoy. So that it was before this conference of the 27th?

Admiral HALSEY. The arrangements had been made for it long before this conference of the 27th.

General McCoy. Were you also in command of the task force that went out to relieve Wake?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir.

General McCoy. Later on?

Admiral HALSEY. The two task forces that went out—the task force that went out to relieve Wake was in command of Admiral Fletcher.

I came in to refuel and followed them out two days later to back them up.

General MCCOY. I notice your aircraft carrier here at the dock. Is it protected against submarine attack by nets or baffles of any kind?

Admiral HALSEY. We have target rafts all around the ship.

General MCCOY. Was that the case before December 7?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in ordinary procedure when a secret message is received is it paraphrased before it is circulated or shown to people who have a right to see it?

Admiral HALSEY. Oh, yes, that is—I presume that is always done.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is?

Admiral HALSEY. I have never looked into that, Admiral, but I am quite sure it is always done.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you received or saw no message in which there was a statement that it was a war warning?

Admiral HALSEY. I cannot be sure of that. I think it would have made an impression on me if I had seen it, and I do not remember.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, will you note that we shall ask the Navy to furnish the paraphrase of this message, and that we return now the message itself, through the Recorder's hands.

[1014] Admiral, will you give the Commission your estimate of the air situation here at Pearl Harbor and the defense against air attack as it stands today, as to adequacy?

Admiral HALSEY. I would be very glad to answer that question, sir, but I have no first-hand knowledge of what is present. I know in general terms what is supposed to be done. I know what my own force is supposed to contribute towards that end. I do not know how many bombing planes the Army has available, I do not know how many pursuit planes the Army has available, and I don't know, except within rather wide limitations, the number of patrol planes, which don't come under me, that are available.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, let me break that down. Let me break your answer down. What is your force supposed to contribute towards anti-aircraft defense of this Island?

Admiral HALSEY. When my planes are based ashore—and when I speak of “my planes” I speak of the——

The CHAIRMAN. The carriers.

Admiral HALSEY. —planes on the three carriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral HALSEY. The fighting planes, on an air-raid alarm, pass immediately over to the command of the pursuit. They call it the pursuit wing?

General McNARNEY. Interceptor force now.

Admiral HALSEY. Inter—?

General McNARNEY. Interceptor command now.

Admiral HALSEY. Interceptor. They are passed completely over to the interceptor command. A certain number of scouts and bombers are made available to chase the enemy out in case he is dropping in, to find out where his carriers are, and the remaining planes are to be used as a striking group. They are all fully armed when ashore: the torpedo planes with their torpedoes on board, the scout bombers with the

500-pound bomb [1015] on board, and the fighting planes with a full load of ammunition.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather that when carriers are in port the planes are always based on shore.

Admiral HALSEY. Always.

The CHAIRMAN. You empty the carrier of planes before she docks, do you not?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I also gather from your answer that none of your planes would be patrol planes for distant reconnaissance from land bases?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, they would not, except on a minor scale in case of necessity; some of my planes can scout 300—

The CHAIRMAN. Two hundred miles?

Admiral HALSEY. Three hundred and fifty.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, what is your conception of a proper scout reconnaissance for the protection of Pearl Harbor as a routine reconnaissance in time of war?

Admiral HALSEY. A 360-degree search, which would go as far as you can cover and still have ammunition on board to hit anything that you see on the way out there.

The CHAIRMAN. And get back home.

Admiral HALSEY. And get back home.

The CHAIRMAN. The same day.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir, morning and night.

The CHAIRMAN. And, whatever may be the available planes on this island at the moment, you would feel that they were inadequate for the purpose unless they could conduct such a 360-degree search to at least eight to nine hundred miles from the coast of Oahu every day?

Admiral HALSEY. I would; absolutely inadequate. Of course, the planes that we have now in carrying a bomb can not proceed further than 700 miles, including the Army B-17's.

[1016] The CHAIRMAN. That is hardly enough, is it, to be sure?

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, it is not enough, but it is the best we can do with what we've got.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps it is unfair to ask you, sir, a hypothetical question, but if you had been in command of the defense against air attack of this Island and had what you considered an important warning of probable impending or possible impending attack, would you have been satisfied, if you had the means to do it, with anything less than such a search daily?

Admiral HALSEY. No, I would not. I might add that—I think I am correct in this statement—at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor the Army bombers were not being used in search.

The CHAIRMAN. You are correct in that, sir?

Admiral HALSEY. And there was not unity of command at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Not as it has been established since December 17. There was, however, a cooperative agreement that I think would have covered the situation.

Admiral HALSEY. I use that expression—

The CHAIRMAN. Technically.

Admiral HALSEY. —advisedly, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, to follow that for a moment, under the conditions of training and the conditions of supplying outlying stations, as I presume you are familiar, prior to December 7, do you think you would have made any different disposition or would there have been any different disposition made if there had been unity of command?

Admiral HALSEY. If I had been in command?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, or if there had been unity of command.

Admiral HALSEY. Absolutely not, sir. Absolutely not. [1017] I think that Admiral Kimmel far exceeded any authority he had in making every effort possible, with very inadequate means, of bringing those outlying islands up to the greatest strength he possibly could.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, one other question I want to ask you. You spoke about the task of following the planes out to locate the carrier.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Under whom would those planes operate?

Admiral HALSEY. Under Admiral Bellinger.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir; as Commander of the Base Air Defense.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your knowledge was any such effort made on the morning of the 7th?

Admiral HALSEY. I have no knowledge of anything that happened on the morning of the 7th. I got one report from one of my planes that had landed on Hickam Field that the enemy planes had apparently disappeared to the northward and westward. I had no report from any Radars anywhere else, although my own Radar showed activity in that general direction, which I took to be Army and patrol-boat planes. We have no recognition signals in any of our planes.

General McCoy. However, those planes coming in to the two fields from your carrier have communications by which they can communicate with the control officer at each field, haven't they?

Admiral HALSEY. Absolutely, sir. They are on—they were at that time on the Luke Field control tower frequency, which is different from the other fields around here that I am speaking of.

General McCoy. Do you know whether they communicated to the control officer on their arrival or immediately before their arrival, asking for authority to land?

[1018] Admiral HALSEY. We do not ask for authority to land in the Naval planes, sir. We do not. Up to that time we had not been controlling them down to the ground. They come in at certain areas—as I say, in certain lanes, certain altitude recognized. They come over and land at Luke Field. Sometimes they call up beforehand. Under ordinary peace-time conditions we would have signaled in to Pearl: "Carrier group leaving ENTERPRISE for Pearl." Under these conditions we made no report and depended upon the fact that they were coming in in the recognized lanes at the recognized altitudes.

General McCoy. I understand that you did send a message after you heard of the attack.

Admiral HALSEY. It was too late then, sir. Our planes were in here.

General McCoy. Some of them came in at night, though, I understand.

Admiral HALSEY. Oh, they—pardon me. I thought you were talking about the forenoon flight. The night flight, we did report that they were all coming in.

Admiral STANDLEY. Tell him about the Ewa Field. They came in from the carrier in the morning, see, at 8 o'clock. The ones that landed at night came in down at the seaplane base.

General McCoy. Yes, but I wanted to make sure that I got it right, that he did—as soon as he heard of the attack he did communicate.

Admiral HALSEY. That night flight.

General McCoy. For these night flights coming in?

Admiral HALSEY. That night flight, I communicated fully that they were coming in.

General McCoy. Do you know whether your communications officer got an acknowledgement of that?

Admiral HALSEY. Oh, yes. It was fully known by the authorities.

[1019] Admiral STANDLEY. Has a board of investigation been ordered on that? And if so, whom?

Admiral HALSEY. On what, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. On the firing on those planes.

Admiral HALSEY. No, sir, there has been no board of investigation ordered on anything around here that I know of so far. I presume that they considered that this Commission would cover it. I don't know. I might add, we had only been in port two days up until day before yesterday since the 28th day of November, so we have had very little time for any boards or anything.

Admiral STANDLEY. In answer to a question you stated that the regulations in regard to liberty had been changed since December 7.

Admiral HALSEY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why?

Admiral HALSEY. I presume so that there would be no question of not having adequate men on board to man the guns and man the fleet, officers and men on board to man the guns and man the fleet at all times, and I think that the same regulations would have gone into effect anywhere under a wartime condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. But men are now going on liberty in the morning?

Admiral HALSEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the reason for that? Is it not because the ships are operating on a strenuous schedule, and this is to provide liberty for the men when they come in here?

Admiral HALSEY. I was just considering that point. I think that is the only reason for it, sir. The officers and men, I might add, are getting the smallest amount of relaxation, particularly fliers. They come in from ten days to twelve days strenuous work out at sea, and they immediately [1020] land ashore, and 50% of them are on almost immediate notice, so that they never get away from this strain and tension they are under. We are trying now to see if we can't possibly take some place uptown and get these lads absolutely away from everything and put them up there and let them think of something else besides flying and fighting.

General McCoy. Isn't this a time of particularly imminent danger, however, for this fleet in port?

Admiral Halsey. I quite agree, sir, and I quite agree with everything that we are doing, but at the same time we still have to think of the morale of the men, and we can't afford to break them down, to be always on their toes, when there is a chance to let them relax.

Admiral Standley. Isn't that the purpose of a base for a fleet?

Admiral Halsey. Pardon, sir.

Admiral Standley. Isn't that one of the purposes of a base for the fleet?

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely.

Admiral Standley. A place where the ships can come in and let the crew relax?

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely.

Admiral Reeves. Admiral, I want to ask you two or three questions. How far is Midway from Honolulu?

Admiral Halsey. Roughly 1100 miles.

Admiral Reeves. I would like to ask you your opinion of the security of Pearl Harbor as a base, and of vessels of the fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor. I want to know what your view of their security would be under these conditions if you had long-range scouts or patrol planes based and operating from Midway, also operating from Honolulu, and operated daily to a radius of, we will assume, 800 miles from Honolulu at dusk; in addition to that patrol, if you had planes scouting from Honolulu to a radius of 360 miles at dawn; and in addition to these planes you had Radar stations on Oahu operating [1021] 24 hours a day; and, in addition to those, you had striking forces of airplanes based on Oahu. Assuming all that, what is your view of the security of Pearl Harbor and of vessels of the fleet anchored in Pearl Harbor against an air attack, either surprise or otherwise? What is your opinion of the security of Pearl Harbor and the vessels in it under those conditions?

Admiral Halsey. I think under those conditions the vessels in Pearl Harbor would be as secure as it is humanly possible to make them.

Admiral Reeves. Do you think they would be as secure as they would be if they were operating continuously at sea?

Admiral Halsey. From horizontal bombers, there is a small probability that they might be more secure at sea. From dive-bombing attacks and torpedo-plane attacks I think they would be much more secure in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Reeves. Considering all the various manners and methods by which a fleet is menaced, including submarines, aircraft bombing of all sorts, do you think the security of the fleet would be greater in Pearl Harbor or at sea?

Admiral Halsey. In Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Reeves. Do you think that the provision of aircraft and the setting up of the procedure that I outlined is a practicable one?

Admiral Halsey. Absolutely, if we can hold Midway.

Admiral Reeves. Do you think that this patrol and protection of Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, could be effected by planes operating from Oahu if Midway were eliminated?

Admiral Halsey. I do.

Admiral REEVES. It would be better protected if we had Midway to give us advance warning? The difference would be that you would require more planes on Oahu to do it than if you based some at Midway?

Admiral HALSEY. Well, I base that, sir, on the fact that [1022] the patrol from Midway would give us possibly more advance warning than we could get from our patrol here.

Admiral REEVES. Right. That was what I wanted to bring out.

General McCoy. With the American Fleet based in Pearl Harbor, is not Midway safe from the Japanese?

Admiral HALSEY. If we can get our fleet out there in time and hit what they bring in, it is safe.

General McCoy. Isn't that what you would welcome?

Admiral HALSEY. I would welcome it, yes, sir, if I could be out there and get them.

General McCoy. Well, isn't there a task force out in that direction all the time?

Admiral HALSEY. There hasn't been, up to the time that this thing happened. Since then we have had task forces out there. As a matter of fact, I was telling Admiral Standley yesterday, I sent two, I believe, rather unique signals. About 5 o'clock in the afternoon on the 24th of December I sent a signal to my force, "Merry Christmas," the first time I had a chance to get a signal through. About 5 o'clock on the following day I sent another signal, "Merry Christmas," repeated it when I crossed the date line.

General McCoy. I flew over the fleet anchorage in the West Indies last spring. It was then in Vieques Sound, and I talked to some Naval men about that new plan for making Vieques Sound much more sheltered by the building of breakwaters, and so forth, and I was told that the new naval base at San Juan, Puerto Rico, was what might be called an operating base but that the fleet would never go in there, first, because it was too large and, next, because the capital ships couldn't go into San Juan, but that it was the ideal situation for a fleet rendezvous, assuming that Vieques would be made more secure from weather by the contemplated breakwaters and that the near-by operating base, with the submarine base [1023] at the Virgin Islands, and so forth, made it an ideal situation.

Now, isn't that situation pretty much the same here? Haven't you a fleet anchorage over here at Lanai—isn't it?

The CHAIRMAN. Lahaina.

Admiral HALSEY. Lahaina Roads.

General McCoy. What is it called?

Admiral HALSEY. Lahaina Roads.

General McCoy. Lahaina Roads.

Admiral HALSEY. Between Lanai and Maui and Molokai.

General McCoy. Isn't that the same situation that they have, practically, at San Juan, Vieques, there?

Admiral HALSEY. I am not familiar with the Vieques fleet anchorage, never having seen it, but the great trouble with Lahaina Roads is, there is no way of protecting the fleet from submarine attack. The waters are too deep and the current is too swift for any effective mining. Maybe they can come to some sort of a scheme. We are wide

open in all directions to submarine attack, and it is a very unsafe anchorage at the moment.

General McCoy. And it cannot be mined?

Admiral Halsey. That is, not to any secure position.

General McCoy. So far as you know, has that ever been considered and careful surveys made on those lines?

Admiral Halsey. It has, I am quite sure. I personally have never been mixed up in it, but I have talked lots about it and heard people discuss it, and they have looked into it and they have found out it is a very difficult thing to do. As a matter of fact, up until a year ago last October the fleet used to use Lahaina Roads as a base. I went back to the West Coast or mainland in the middle of October; I stayed there until the middle of January, and I came back here. They had stopped using Lahaina for that very reason and were basing all the ships here in Pearl and keeping the fleet at sea at [1024] all times.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Lahaina Roads, then?

Admiral Halsey. It is right between Molokai and Maui and Lanai.

The CHAIRMAN. In here (indicating on map).

[1025] The CHAIRMAN. Any more questions of the Admiral?

Admiral Standley. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, due to the nature of our mission here we have asked all witnesses to observe the rule that nothing that goes on in this room may be mentioned to anyone outside this room.

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very greatly indebted to you for your testimony.

Admiral Halsey. Yes, sir. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Fuqua.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER SAMUEL GLENN FUQUA, DAMAGE CONTROL OFFICER, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name and rank, Commander?

Commander Fuqua. Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy, First Lieutenant and Damage Control Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the USS ARIZONA?

Commander Fuqua. Yes, the USS ARIZONA.

General McNarney. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Commander Fuqua. I was aboard ship, sir.

General McNarney. Did you stay on board that night?

Commander Fuqua. Yes, I had head of department duty there that night.

General McNarney. Will you describe to the Commission your duties as damage control officer?

Commander Fuqua. The damage control officer has to do with the watertight integrity of the ship and to keep it afloat in case of damage in battle.

General McNarney. What is the size of the detail under control for this purpose? [1026]

Commander Fuqua. I do not understand the question.

General McNARNEY. How big is the damage control section? Do you have a certain number of petty officers and enlisted men in that damage section, or do they all have their own duties?

Commander FUQUA. No, sir. I had a lieutenant who was assistant damage control officer, a chief boatswain, a carpenter, and an ensign. I had about 35 artificers, ship fitters and maintenance men under my direct supervision.

General McNARNEY. Do you know how many of those were present for duty on the morning of December 7?

Commander FUQUA. To my knowledge they were all present except the assistant damage control officer.

General McNARNEY. What was the state of the watertight integrity at the time of the attack?

Commander FUQUA. To the best of my knowledge all watertight integrity doors below the third deck were closed. From 1600 until eight o'clock the following day the watertight doors below the third deck are required to be closed.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that answer?

Commander FUQUA. From 1600 to eight o'clock the following morning, the watertight doors below the third deck are required to be closed.

Admiral REEVES. Could you speak a little louder?

Commander FUQUA. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Is there any inspection to see whether these regulations are carried out?

Commander FUQUA. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Was there any inspection made on the evening of December 6?

Commander FUQUA. Yes.

General McNARNEY. As damage control officer, what instructions if any did you give when the attack first started?

[1027] Commander FUQUA. When the attack first started I was in the ward room having breakfast.

Admiral STANDLEY. Could you speak a little louder?

The CHAIRMAN. He was in the ward room.

Commander FUQUA. I was in the ward room having breakfast. There was a short signal on the air raid siren of about one second duration. I notified the anti-aircraft control officer, who was in the ward room at this time, to man the anti-aircraft batteries. He told me that he thought they were just testing the loud speakers.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Commander FUQUA. He thought they were just testing the loud speakers, as the loud speaker system had gone out previous to the attack.

I said, "No. That sounds like an air raid alarm to me."

However, I still thought there was a possibility that someone had brushed against the handle on the alarm.

After the anti-aircraft control officer on duty had left the ward room, I proceeded to the telephone in the ward room and telephoned to the officer on the deck to pass the word, "Anti-aircraft batteries." When I was unable to get him on the phone I proceeded to the port side of the quarterdeck. As I came out the port side of the quarterdeck there was a plane flew up overhead at a height of 50 feet with machine guns firing. I glanced up and I saw it was a Japanese plane.

Then I proceeded to No. 4 turret to the starboard side of the quarter-deck, on the double.

When I rounded the No. 4 turret I saw the officer of the deck up forward and reported to him to sound general quarters and pass the word—

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Commander FUQUA. I reported to the officer of the deck to sound general quarters and pass the word—

[1028] Admiral REEVES. You passed the word to what?

Commander FUQUA. I passed the word to the officer of the deck to sound general quarters and pass the word to set material condition ZED as final damage control condition for battle.

Admiral REEVES. What does ZED mean?

Commander FUQUA. Everything is closed up except the necessary hatches that have to remain open during battle. About this time I heard a plane overhead. I glanced up. I saw a bomb dropping which appeared to me was going to land on me or close by.

The next thing I remember I came to on deck in a position about six feet aft the starboard gangway. I got to my feet and looked around to see what it was that had knocked me down. Then I saw I was lying about six feet from a bomb hole in the deck. This bomb had hit the face plate of No. 4 turret, had glanced off that and gone through the deck and had exploded in the captain's pantry.

General McNARNEY. How many decks down was that?

Commander FUQUA. It pierced one deck.

Then I glanced up forward and saw the whole midship a mass of flames in that section of the ship.

Admiral REEVES. What is that?

Commander FUQUA. A mass of flames.

Admiral REEVES. A mass of flames?

Commander FUQUA. Yes, sir.

Shall I continue?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander FUQUA. Then I ran forward to make preparation to fight the fire. There I met Major Shapler, United States Marine Corps, who had just come down from the after defense station.

He told me at this time that he observed a bomb go down [1029] the stack. As the fire hose were laid out in the quarterdeck in an effort to fight the fire, there was no water in any hose.

At this time, which I judge to be about 0815, the ship had apparently broken in two as there was water lying on the deck just abaft of the break of the deck at frame 88.

I then attempted to keep the fire back by dipping water from the side in buckets and by the use of CO₂ fire extinguisher. We were able to keep the fire from spreading aft until we could pick the wounded up off the deck and place them in boats to transfer them to Ford Island.

General McNARNEY. What was feeding the fire?

Commander FUQUA. What?

General McNARNEY. What was feeding the fire at this time?

Commander FUQUA. It was oil all over the ship as far aft as frame 90 and on the water.

I would judge about 8:15 or 8:20 I saw a tremendous mass of flames, the height of 300 feet, rise in the air forward, and shook the ship aft as if it would fall apart like a pack of cards.

It was then I realized that the forward magazine had exploded. I then directed that the after magazine be flooded. This was done, but the man who flooded the after magazine was not saved.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Commander FUQUA. He was not saved. He is missing.

At this time, about 8:20, all the guns on the boat deck had ceased firing.

Being that the ship was no longer in a fighting condition, I ordered the remaining people in the after turrets to abandon ship. The only possible thing that I could see that could be done at this time was to transfer the wounded and those burned, who were running out of the flames, to Ford Island.

[1030] With the assistance of a rescue boat from the USS SOLACE, approximately 100 men who were burned and wounded were transferred to Ford Island. After this operation was completed, at about 0845, I made a thorough search of the after part of the ship, which was accessible, for wounded and uninjured personnel.

About 0845 I directed that the forward lines of the USS VESTAL, which vessel was tied up to the port side astern, be cut. This was done and I believe the VESTAL cut their own after lines.

Admiral STANDLEY. And this vessel drifted clear?

Commander FUQUA. Drifted clear.

General MCCOY. Was it on fire?

Commander FUQUA. From the knowledge gained later, the VESTAL did receive two bomb hits, one forward and one aft. As I understand it, the forward bomb hit started the fire, and the after bomb passed clear through the VESTAL without exploding.

I finally left the ship myself about 0915, and proceeded to the receiving barracks at Pearl Harbor to report in. I learned later from the battle report of the USS VESTAL that the ARIZONA received one torpedo hit and possibly two; these torpedoes passing under the stern of the VESTAL and apparently striking the ARIZONA up about frame 35 on the port side. However, this was not possible to verify as the entire forward part of the ship was destroyed.

Admiral REEVES. Was frame 35 up by the forward magazine?

Commander FUQUA. That is right at the forward magazine.

General McNARNEY. Will you describe to the Commission by what means you would keep it afloat if the torpedo hit and your vessel started to list? What would your action be as damage control officer?

Commander FUQUA. The action would depend on the amount of [1031] list from it. If the list was such as not to interfere with the operation of the guns and the machinery, the list would be removed by shifting immediately in the water in order to bring the ship back on an even keel. However, if the list was such as to interfere with the operation of the gun battery or the machinery, the ship could be brought back on an even keel by counter flooding the voids on the opposite side from the side at which the torpedo struck. That is the diagonal position.

General McNARNEY. There was no opportunity or necessity in this particular case to take such action?

Commander FUQUA. No, sir, there was no opportunity for this.

General McNARNEY. Were you the senior officer on board that morning?

Commander FUQUA. I was the senior survivor. The captain and the admiral were on board.

General MCCOY. Where were they?

Commander FUQUA. I would like to add something to that statement about the captain and the admiral.

Shortly after I came to on deck, not having seen the admiral or the captain and knowing they were on board, I directed that the captain's hatch on the starboard side of the quarterdeck be opened. Then I sent an officer down to look in the captain's cabin and the admiral's cabin to see if they were there. The search revealed that they were not there.

I then inquired from the personnel available at that time if they had seen the captain or the admiral. The officer of the deck had gotten trapped in the officer of the deck's booth forward on the starboard side of the quarterdeck by fire, and had to jump overboard. No one had seen the captain or the admiral.

[1032] I learned later from the officer of the deck that he had seen the captain proceed to the bridge. This was apparently a little before I came to on deck or while I was lying on deck as a result of the bomb hit.

After the fire, which was put out after burning for a period of two days amidships, I went on board to search for the bodies. We found the admiral's body on the boat deck, or we found a body which I believe to be the admiral's body on the boat deck, just at the foot of the flag bridge ladder. The captain's body was never found. However, the captain's ring and some coat buttons were found on the flag bridge.

Ensign D. Hein, United States Navy, was on the bridge during the attack. In some manner he got off the bridge. I discovered him about two days after the attack in the United States Naval Hospital in Pearl Harbor. In his statement he stated that he saw the captain himself and a quartermaster on the bridge. He also stated that the quartermaster reported to the captain that there was a bomb hit either by or on No. 2 turret. The next thing he reported was that the ship was sinking like an earthquake had struck it, and the bridge was in flames. He was lying on the deck in front of the wheel, and he struggled to his feet and ran off the bridge down the flag bridge to the port side and fell onto the boat deck.

Those are his words: The boat deck was a mass of flames, and the men were dying all around. He said that he thought he would lie down and die with them. Then he thought that he would go down the port side of the quarterdeck and lie down there, which he did.

In picking up the wounded off the deck aft, he was one of the persons I apparently put in the boats.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

Commander FUQUA. I might add that in order for the torpedo to strike the forward magazine, it has to pierce two voids and two oil tanks.

[1033] General McNARNEY. I have another question here. Do you think that a bomb could go down the smokestack of a vessel in view of the fact that a bomb does not fall straight?

Commander FUQUA. I could not say, sir. I suppose it is possible, but it seems to me improbable.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any recollection of the height at which these bombs were released?

Commander FUQUA. I would say between eight and ten thousand feet. As I glanced up, when I was going around No. 4 turret, I saw these planes—as I remember, there were five—and they were between eight and ten thousand feet, I would judge.

General McCoy. I thought you said one plane was only 50 feet above you?

Commander FUQUA. I believe that was a torpedo plane which released a torpedo and was strafing as it passed over.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Please observe the caution and do not discuss what you have testified to here with anyone.

Commander FUQUA. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Ensign Ball.

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN NILE EVERETT BALL, COMMANDING OFFICER, MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT SQUADRON ONE, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name.

Ensign BALL. Nile Everett Ball.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your command on the morning of December 7, Ensign?

Ensign BALL. I was officer of the deck, torpedo boat squadron one. We had six boats in the squadron, sir, and they were nested in three nests alongside the dock, and we [1034] had a barge known as YR-20, which is the headquarters of the office and the nests of the guns.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you standing when the attack started?

Ensign BALL. On the front of the barge.

The CHAIRMAN. On the front of the barge?

Ensign BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were your machine guns?

Ensign BALL. Two on the barge and two on each of these oil boats alongside the barge.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do?

Ensign BALL. You mean at the time I first noticed the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ensign BALL. I was standing talking to the chief machinist mate, and I noticed the planes coming in over Ford Island and I saw the rising sun on them, and it was apparent that it was a Japanese attack, but his statement was, "Surely they are not Japanese planes."

Anyhow, two things happened that convinced me that they were not our planes, and that was I noticed the explosion, and then they approached and I saw some planes coming in a dive with machine guns rattling. Then I gave the order to man the guns.

The CHAIRMAN. How soon did you get your guns into action?

Ensign BALL. I would say in about two minutes time.

The CHAIRMAN. Your ammunition was in the boxes?

Ensign BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In the clips for such guns?

Ensign BALL. Yes, but there were two steps involved in connection with the firing. One of them was, the air compressor had to be started—the generator in the engine part—and the air compressor

started in to operate the turrets; and [1035] to pick up the boxes and put them into machine guns was the next thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to hit any of these oncoming planes?

Ensign BALL. The best I could find out from the men who were not actually firing and who had a chance to watch was that they definitely saw bullets go into these three planes; but there was no definite assurance that we were totally responsible for any one plane.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the caliber of your guns?

Ensign BALL. Fifty caliber, sir.

General MCCOY. Were they in easy range?

Ensign BALL. They were in easy range, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Flying low?

Ensign BALL. Yes. For instance, the one we feel most certain we can claim credit for was one of the torpedo planes that approached from over the sub base, using this channel to come into the sub base as a bowling alley and launch the torpedoes, and they were down within 50 feet.

The CHAIRMAN. They were?

Ensign BALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would this bowling alley end up?

Ensign BALL. This channel goes into Ford Island just about the middle, and you have that row of battleships right here (indicating). They would go into them and I could not see how they launched their attack from that point, but some officers on the motor torpedo boat on the dock, they saw them launch their fish, and they said one they hit was the CALIFORNIA and then they would go off, peel off, and come back, and then peel off to the right and launch one at the battleship aft.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give us as well as you can [1036] the sequence of the fighting planes from what you observed and where they came from. In other words, tell us the direction of the waves and how many there were. Do you have any definite picture of that in your mind?

Ensign BALL. I noticed somewhere in the neighborhood of eight, as I remember—six or eight of them. They seemed to be coming in from the west, and as they came in over the west, over the drydock in which the PENNSYLVANIA was—

The CHAIRMAN. Over the PENNSYLVANIA drydock? The floating dock?

Ensign BALL. No, sir, not the floating drydock.

The CHAIRMAN. The stationary drydock?

Ensign BALL. Yes. They came in from that direction as from Hickam Field, like they just went over Hickam Field, and it was about within a minute or two after that that they started to come down the channel here (indicating). That is this channel right here.

The CHAIRMAN. This channel?

Ensign BALL. Yes. They would come in this channel and that is the bowling alley they used.

Then within two or three minutes after that they started to peel off out of the sun and come out of the sun and come across the sub base over there.

Admiral REEVES. Could you tell the torpedo planes from the fighters or from the dive bombers?

Ensign BALL. Well, Admiral, unless it is close enough for me to see the torpedo. I can usually tell the fighters, but the bigger ones, I do not know them by silhouette.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was no one approaching from Ford Island toward you?

Ensign BALL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then circling and coming back in that direction?

[1037] Ensign BALL. The ones I noticed were coming more from the north and at a high altitude. Some seemed to come out over Ford Island coming from the northwest and they seemed to go to the northeast.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were coming from the northeast and going out northwest? Going out toward Ford Island?

Ensign BALL. They were coming in over Ford Island and then going in this direction (indicating). Say this is northwest (indicating) and they were coming in over Ford Island, because they had the hangars there, and then they dropped bombs on the hangars, and then they would come into position about over the battleships and then they would go over them and get into position to raid again, and then they would go off in that direction to the northeast.

Admiral STANDLEY. The picture was that you saw the planes coming in over Hickam Field and coming over the PENNSYLVANIA?

Ensign BALL. Yes, and then they came in this way (indicating) as far as the other side of the barracks, coming out of the sun because the sun was up in that position (indicating), but when they started to come out of the sun, they were high, except the first ones, which came down low, the torpedo planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there distinct waves of them?

Ensign BALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the difference in time between them?

Ensign BALL. In my opinion—and that would be purely a guess—but I would say between the first wave and the second wave there was maybe twenty minutes or maybe fifteen minutes, but I do not know, because we were busy trying to prepare ourselves.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is your estimate as to the number [1038] of planes engaged in all the waves?

Ensign BALL. I could estimate it, but I really do not think it would be a good estimation, due to the fact that I was busy and did not have time to stay and watch the fight, because I had so many things to.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

General McCoy. What is your first name?

Ensign BALL. Nile, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ensign.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room.

Ensign BALL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:45 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1039]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN IRVING HALL MAYFIELD, U. S. NAVY,
DISTRICT INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Captain MAYFIELD. Irving Hall Mayfield, Captain, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, what was your duty on the morning of December 7 last?

Captain MAYFIELD. I was District Intelligence Office, 14th Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have your office here or in the City of Honolulu?

Captain MAYFIELD. In the City of Honolulu, sir, sixth floor of the Alexander Young Hotel.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that that was in close proximity to the Army Intelligence and with the F. B. I. office.

Captain MAYFIELD. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did those agencies work in harmony with you?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any difficulty about exchange of information at any time between you?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your function was anti-sabotage to discover Japanese espionage and I suppose any other information of a military or naval nature that you could gather in this island?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

[1040] The CHAIRMAN. Or in these islands. How long had you held that office, sir?

Captain MAYFIELD. On the 15th of March, 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there anything that you or your staff discovered which could in any way indicate the presence of hostile forces in this neighborhood about December 6 or 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the attack on December 7 have you discovered any means of communication that the Japanese have from this island?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. May I qualify that, sir, to say that I know they did communicate by the regular channels of the regular commercial communication companies.

The CHAIRMAN. Telephone and cable?

Captain MAYFIELD. Telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there a cable to Tokyo?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir; telephone, cable, and radio.

The CHAIRMAN. And radio. Have the files of those commercial companies been opened to you since the declaration of war?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, but they had not before.

The CHAIRMAN. They had not. I understand. And you had no authority under the law to examine them before the attack?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And as a result of your investigation of those messages have you come to any conclusion as to where the focus or center of the Japanese information was on this island?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did find some messages from the consulate, did you not?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have they been decoded or translated or interpreted since December 7?

[1041] Captain MAYFIELD. Not all of them, sir, but practically all that were sent or received since the first of December I believe have been.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they disclose that is of importance here?

Captain MAYFIELD. They disclosed the consulate general was receiving information as to ship movements and reporting it to his home government.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, when ships were coming into port here and when they were going out?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were in port, and so forth?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he use a code?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been able to break it, have you?

Captain MAYFIELD. Not I personally, sir, but an agency here has.

The CHAIRMAN. Has. You had no information that led you to think that there was an offshore signaling system in operation here prior to December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you obtain any information that the cruiser MINNEAPOLIS on the morning of December 7 was in contact with Japanese ships?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any information that a cruiser—I should think it would be the MINNEAPOLIS—had her planes engaged by Japanese planes on the morning of December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. May I say there, sir, that such information would not necessarily come to me. That would go to Fleet Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Fleet Intelligence. And you do not have anything to do with Fleet Intelligence? You are District [1042] Intelligence Officer?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, I do have a complete exchange of necessary or desirable information between myself and Fleet Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Wouldn't that information, Captain, come to the communication officer rather than the intelligence officer?

Captain MAYFIELD. Regarding the MINNEAPOLIS, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If her planes were engaged by enemy planes?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The communication officer would have a record of that, wouldn't he?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, he should have.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not necessarily, but——

The CHAIRMAN. Intelligence?

Captain MAYFIELD. He would not ordinarily forward it to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. Did any of the messages which you later obtained refer to movement of Japanese men-of-war?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. To whom were the messages addressed that the consulate general sent reporting movements of ships?

Captain MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, sir, they were addressed to Tojo, the minister, in some instances for delivery to the Japanese Navy Department.

Admiral REEVES. They went to Tokyo?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Were any messages that you have discovered inquiries of the consulate general requesting reports or information?

[1043] Captain MAYFIELD. I believe there was one—I can't be positive of this—asking that he make report of movements.

Admiral REEVES. Movements of what?

Captain MAYFIELD. Of American men-of-war.

Admiral REEVES. Where did that come from? Do you know?

Captain MAYFIELD. To the best of my recollection, it was from Tokyo, sir. I have seen so many messages in the last few weeks, sir, that it is difficult for me to remember each one.

Admiral REEVES. What do you know about the fifth column in Oahu?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe it exists, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You have no information in regard to the personnel in the fifth column?

Captain MAYFIELD. Not definite information, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did you have a list of the individuals that were suspect?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did you have anything definite in regard to any of them?

Captain MAYFIELD. Nothing conclusive. The Federal Bureau of Investigation and District Intelligence—Naval District Intelligence organization—were of the opinion that the so-called consular agents were perhaps a fundamental part of the organization.

Admiral REEVES. Were any of the suspect individuals that you had on your list American citizens?

Captain MAYFIELD. I think they were, sir. I would hesitate to give a yes or no answer.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean the Japanese citizens or——

Admiral REEVES. Yes, I mean American.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, I understand what you meant.

Admiral REEVES. Naturalized Japanese. Or plain American citizens, for that matter.

[1044] Captain MAYFIELD. Some of them I would think were, sir. I would hate to say yes or no to that, sir, without checking.

Admiral REEVES. You think some of them were Americans?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I mean by that, not naturalized but American.

Captain MAYFIELD. American-born.

Admiral REEVES. American people.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Not of Japanese descent.

Captain MAYFIELD. Oh. No, sir, I didn't mean that. There were a number of suspects of various races, naturalized citizens.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Captain MAYFIELD. American citizens who were on the suspect lists of the three investigative agencies.

Admiral REEVES. What do you know about the Japanese fishing fleet?

Captain MAYFIELD. Very little definitely, sir.

Admiral REEVES. About how many Japanese-owned and -operated boats are there in these waters?

Captain MAYFIELD. I couldn't give you that information, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Couldn't even estimate it?

Captain MAYFIELD. It would be purely a guess, sir. I would say, as a guess, probably 75.

Admiral REEVES. You have made no list of them and made no investigation in regard to them?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Have you a complete list of the Japanese fishing boats?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe I have a complete list, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Their ownership?

[1045] Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And registration?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Have you a list of the equipment carried on each of these boats?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Have you found on these Japanese fishing boats any equipment not connected with fishing?

Captain MAYFIELD. Nothing except radios that I have any knowledge of, sir, and ordinary navigational equipment as might be expected in a boat of that type.

Admiral REEVES. You found nothing that would be preparatory to carrying torpedoes or launching torpedoes?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. On the fishing boats?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Have the fishing boats operated in a suspicious manner at any time, so far as you know?

Captain MAYFIELD. There have been many reports of such operations, sir. Of those whose investigation I have knowledge of, no suspicion was ever confirmed as to any subversive action. May I add there, sir, that the investigation of those craft is nominally done either by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Coast Guard.

Admiral REEVES. You would know of the result of the investigation, of course?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. No instance of fishing boats making contact with Japanese men-of-war off Honolulu?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. No instance of Japanese fishing boats leaving in a sudden group on a rumor of a school of fish and then returning a few days later as a group?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have heard of none, sir.

[1046] Admiral REEVES. Would these Japanese fishing boats be intimately familiar with all the inlets and waters of the Hawaiian Islands?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Have any of them operated in inlets or coastal waters they would not ordinarily operate in as fishing boats? Have they entered certain portions or inlets around the Island where fishing boats would not ordinarily enter?

Captain MAYFIELD. Not to the best of my knowledge, sir.

Admiral REEVES. How closely are you in touch with the intelligence work done by Commander Wilson?

Captain MAYFIELD. Very close touch.

Admiral REEVES. He is not under you, is he?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. His work is of an entirely different type than yours, is it not?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, but we collaborate on a great many things.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it come to your notice that in the Japanese submarine beached here near Bellows Field the bread on board was Love's bread?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir, It had not.

The CHAIRMAN. Manufactured on the Islands.

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There has come no rumor of that to you at all?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it to be the fact; I don't know where I gathered that information. Would that indicate that some Japanese fishing boat or something of the kind was working offshore to supply Japanese from here?

Captain MAYFIELD. That has long been my suspicion, sir, but I have never been able to—

The CHAIRMAN. Confirm it?

[1047] General McNARNEY. Do any Japanese fishing boats have a right to enter Pearl Harbor?

Captain MAYFIELD. Do any of them?

General McNARNEY. Have the right to enter Pearl Harbor?

Captain MAYFIELD. I am not familiar with the details of the regulations in that respect, sir, which are issued by the Commandant of the Yard or the Captain of the Yard.

The CHAIRMAN. How large a force of investigators have you under you, Captain?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have at the present time ten, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ten men?

Captain MAYFIELD. For investigative work.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain MAYFIELD. I have others for other—

The CHAIRMAN. Clerical work?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of a man here, Japanese, named Otani, a fish dealer, wholesale fish dealer?

Captain MAYFIELD. I don't recall the name, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it come to your attention that he advertised a large party, opening his retail fish market, on Saturday evening, the 6th?

Captain MAYFIELD. I don't believe so, sir. I cannot remember.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some rumor I have heard since I have been here that a number of Japanese establishments held open house on Saturday evening, the 6th, and served a great deal of liquor. Have you heard anything of that?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has your attention been called to an advertisement that was run in both of the local papers on the evening of December 5 by the Japanese Importing Company advertising its silks?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have seen such an advertisement by [1048] the Hawaii Importing Company.

The CHAIRMAN. I guess it is Hawaii Importing Company. With a Japanese column down the left-hand side of the advertisement?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has that been translated?

Captain MAYFIELD. I am not sure that I have seen that particular advertisement, sir, with the Japanese column.

The CHAIRMAN. I haven't, either, but someone here on the Island has told me about it.

Captain MAYFIELD. I have seen many copies of that particular advertisement from the Hawaii Importing Company listing various kinds of silk.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain MAYFIELD. Some of these names of silk were alleged not to exist, that it was not the name of a silk. That I have been investigating, and at least on one or two instances by investigators now tell me that that is a recognized——

The CHAIRMAN. Name of a silk?

Captain MAYFIELD. Name of a silk.

Admiral REEVES. Have you a staff of translators in your organization?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Covering all languages or just merely the Japanese language?

Captain MAYFIELD. Practically all languages, sir. I have one man who is a phenomenal linguist.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any information as to anyone connected with the Kita message that was discovered and decoded after the consulate was seized? Have you any information as to anyone connected with that other than the Japanese consul?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think there was someone else connected [1049] with it?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that person capable of any further subversive activities?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. He was on the suspect list and was immediately arrested on the beginning of hostilities.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you confirm the fact that there was fire burning on Maui on the morning of the attack or the night before the attack?

Captain MAYFIELD. The best of my information is that there was such a fire burning, sir. I am attempting at the present moment to check that definitely.

The CHAIRMAN. That was one of the signals in the secret message that were to be displayed?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir. In that connection, sir, to the best of my knowledge the signals that were to be given from the other places mentioned in that message were not given.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know of any light in the dormer window?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think you know where the dormer window was?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do. Do you know where the clothes line was on which the white clothes were to hang?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe I have that within three houses.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, if the Navy could have obtained any knowledge of that code there would have been an alert on the 5th, 6th, and 7th of December?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there really was no way, within the law of the United States, that you could get to those messages?

[1050] Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have had to break the law in order to get those messages from the commercial companies?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. I would question that. Did you try by friendly interest with those companies to get them?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. How long ahead of the incident?

Captain MAYFIELD. Since I arrived, sir.

General McCoy. Did you take it up through the Navy Department to go to their chiefs in America on that subject?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You tried to deal with their local representatives here?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir. I had had previous experience in such matters and knew that it was against the law, against international treaty; and when one high official of one communication company was here I did arrange through him to obtain in a roundabout way certain information from the files of his company. The local manager in each case of each of the companies declined to accept the responsibility of allowing me access to his files.

The CHAIRMAN. And didn't?

Captain MAYFIELD. I had obtained such information in another locality on a previous occasion years before, due to the connivance, if I may use the word, of the local manager.

The CHAIRMAN. This superior executive happened to be the executive of the company that didn't have the messages you needed?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. They gave us—those were some of the most important messages.

The CHAIRMAN. Before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But they didn't spell any attack?

[1051] Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. It was the custom of the Japanese consulate general to switch its traffic each month; for the month of November practically all of their traffic was given to Mackay Radio, for the month of December to the Radio Corporation of America.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Radio Corporation of America was not cooperative to give you messages; is that it?

Captain MAYFIELD. They did at the end, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "at the end"?

Captain MAYFIELD. Just shortly before.

The CHAIRMAN. Before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't get this Kita message from them, did you?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And they didn't turn that over to you?

Captain MAYFIELD. The manager turned over—went through his files and gave me copies of every message—that is, he said that he gave me a copy of every message—from the 1st of December on.

The CHAIRMAN. This is before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This message, however, didn't purport to be from the consul, did it? I think it purported to be from somebody named Kita, didn't it?

Captain MAYFIELD. He is their consulate general, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Kita is the consulate general?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you unfortunately didn't catch this message?

Captain MAYFIELD. In time, no, sir, because the code had to be broken and the message translated.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see. Then you got it. The F. B. I. got a copy of this message in code when they raided the [1052] consulate?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You had already gotten it?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir, not that one.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you had not?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you suppose that slipped?

Captain MAYFIELD. I don't know, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you think that there are methods available to the Japanese or their agents now in Oahu for communication to outside areas?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe there are, sir.

Admiral REEVES. By what method do you think they may be communicating?

Captain MAYFIELD. By some short-wave radios.

Admiral REEVES. That reminds me. Have you a list of the transmitting stations in Oahu, or are there stations of which you have no knowledge?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe there are stations of which I have no knowledge. All amateur stations, of course, are licensed, but there was no way to prevent a person buying material and assembling it into a transmitter and using it.

Admiral REEVES. Have you made any effort by interception and direction finders to locate these unauthorized sending stations?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have not, sir, no, sir. That has not been considered as in my province.

Admiral REEVES. Is there any agency that has been doing that?

Captain MAYFIELD. The Army is now trying to do it, sir, with direction finder stations located at various points to get cross bearings; but, as you know, sir, the range of the radio spectrum, it is so—it is very difficult to locate the station and get the direction finder stations on it unless it [1053] transmits for a considerable period of time.

Admiral REEVES. Had the Army made this effort before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. I don't know, sir, or to what extent. I believe they had made some effort, but the plan that I speak of was only placed into effect perhaps two weeks ago.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know if they have had any success whatever?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard from gossip that they seized several stations as a result of that guessing match.

Captain MAYFIELD. Assuming that the bearings from these stations are taken on the same transmission, it is frequently due to difficulty of terrain, to make sure that the wave of the transmitter—of the direction finder is accurate and then to actually get to the exact locality of the transmitting station.

The CHAIRMAN. I think also, Captain, it is not at all impossible for a man to buy a receiving set and, if he knows anything about this radio business, to transmute that into a sending set with very little alteration. I have so heard.

Captain MAYFIELD. I am not sufficiently expert, sir,—

The CHAIRMAN. I am not an expert, but I have heard that said.

Captain MAYFIELD. But I do believe, sir, that he could buy the necessary parts—

The CHAIRMAN. Parts, yes.

Captain MAYFIELD. And build it. There are a number of amateurs who are capable of doing such things. I do know of a rumor, which I believe to be true, that there were a number of amateurs who were paid small amounts by the Japanese-language newspapers to listen to the Domei news, the Japanese news, copy it, and then turn it over to the newspaper.

The CHAIRMAN. There are Japanese short-wave broadcasts [1054] that come in here regularly now, are there not?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, about 36 hours out of 24.

The CHAIRMAN. I am told it comes in clearer than that from the Pacific Coast.

Captain MAYFIELD. I think that would depend on many—

The CHAIRMAN. Has it been attempted to jam it?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have heard that an attempt has been made, sir. How effective it was I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there is any American propaganda being locally broadcast in Japanese on the Island now?

Captain MAYFIELD. To the best of my knowledge there is not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, do you have direct communication with the Director of Naval Intelligence in Washington, or are your communications solely through the Commandant of the District?

Captain MAYFIELD. Through the Naval Communications system, sir, I send in dispatches, if I have reason to, without—necessarily without reference to the Commandant.

Admiral STANDLEY. Commandant of the District?

Captain MAYFIELD. Unless it affects him.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he communicates with you the same way?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did he give you any information prior to December 7 in regard to movements of Japanese vessels?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You received no message from him?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. That information probably, Admiral, would go to the Commandant for operations rather than to District Intelligence.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but you got no such message?

[1055] Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you receive any message warning about subversive activities and warning about directing guarding against, prior to December 7, immediately prior to November—

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Between November 26—

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Nothing direct from Naval Intelligence?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. I was attempting to operate my organization under the directive of the Secretary of the Navy directing that the intelligence organization be completely mobilized for M-day, but I had received no information as to when M-day was.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that a specific instruction from the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain MAYFIELD. To all Naval Districts.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long ago?

Captain MAYFIELD. It was dated either the 25th or the 27th of May. I think it was the 27th. If my memory is correct, the President declared an emergency on the 25th.

Admiral REEVES. Captain, is not the presence of such a large number of Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands a cover or camouflage for agents?

Captain MAYFIELD. Could be very easily, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I mean there are so many Japanese people here—

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. —that Japanese agents are difficult to find in that maze?

Captain MAYFIELD. Very difficult, sir. It has been my experience, with which I believe the other two investigative agencies agree, that to investigate a Japanese is exceedingly difficult and can really only be done by another Japanese.

[1056] Admiral REEVES. Have you any solution to offer to improve that condition?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Ninety percent, I understand, of the Japanese-blood Americans go to language schools and speak Japanese; is that right?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe that is true, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the Japanese on this Island live in Japanese quarters of the town or spread out all over town?

Captain MAYFIELD. Both, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Both?

Captain MAYFIELD. There are localities almost entirely Japanese, and then you will find Japanese spread out in any section of town. The same applies to Chinese, Koreans, and others.

General McCoy. Aren't there amongst those American-Japanese some persons whom you could trust as American agents?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have not found one, sir.

General McCoy. You haven't had any confidence in any of them?

Captain MAYFIELD. Not to that extent, sir.

General McCoy. Out of 120,000 people here?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have had no Japanese-blood agent under you?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. I have had one man as a translator and interpreter whom I trust to a very considerable degree, but I would not trust him with very confidential or secret matter.

General McCoy. Have any Japanese of American naturalization or American citizenship willingly come to you with any information at any time?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. About the Japanese?

[1057] Captain MAYFIELD. Not concrete definite information, sir.

General McCoy. But warning you in some respect?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir. I believe, if I may with the permission of the court venture an opinion, that the Japanese that I know best and that other Americans know best are the ones who are really to a very large extent straight-forward and honest and that they themselves do not know the spies. I have been told that by a number of them. They have come to me and volunteered assistance. I couldn't—didn't feel that I could give them names of suspects, but I asked them to furnish me information as to who they suspected might be carrying on subversive action, sabotage, espionage. They don't know.

Admiral REEVES. Never furnished you the name of a single person?

Captain MAYFIELD. They have furnished me names, yes, sir, but no definite information.

Admiral REEVES. Have you ever found that the names furnished by any of these Japanese have really been suspicious to you? Have you ever confirmed their suspicion?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. If every Japanese on this Island of Oahu were transported to some other place, would that help you in your work?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you think you can ever be successful in your intelligence work unless that is done?

Captain MAYFIELD. I believe that a reasonable measure of success could be attained, given a long time in which to accomplish it.

The CHAIRMAN. But we are in war now.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And to close up sources of information, to cover up sources of vital military information being [1058] transmitted from this Island outboard, there is only one way to do it, and that is to get all the Japanese herded together and under control.

Captain MAYFIELD. I am not sure that that would stop it, sir. There are other people who might be capable of—

Admiral REEVES. You think, in other words, that there are Japanese agents which are not Japanese?

Captain MAYFIELD. That is my suspicion, sir. I have nothing definite to found it upon.

General McCoy. Have you interviewed this American lawyer who was counsellor to the Japanese consul?

Captain MAYFIELD. I don't remember his name, sir.

General McCoy. Were you not conscious there was an American counsellor?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And that he was—

Captain MAYFIELD. I personally have not interviewed him, no, sir.

General McCoy. And that he was employed up to the date of the 7th of December?

Captain MAYFIELD. I have heard of that, sir, but I have not interviewed him personally.

General McCoy. Do you know whether the Army Intelligence Officer has?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir, I do not.

General McCoy. Were you not conscious that there was such a one before the 7th of December?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was he a suspect?

Captain MAYFIELD. I cannot remember, sir. I would have to have his name and then search my files.

General McCoy. I don't know anything about him; I only saw it in the newspaper.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

[1059] General McCoy. That he resigned the day of the 7th.

Captain MAYFIELD. There are many—

The CHAIRMAN. Of course he would not in times of peace—or even, I think, now in times of war—be a source of information, General. Whatever was communicated to him would be communicated in professional confidence.

General McCoy. I question that, because I have been an intelligence officer myself, and I have used an agent of the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the lawyer?

General McCoy. He was not a lawyer.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. But he was employed by the Japanese Embassy, and that has been a very common case in Manila, I know.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me there are difficulties about either Admiral Reeves' suggestion or yours; I think the Constitution of the United States would have to be amended in order to deport an American citizen from this island, and I do not think you could ever compel a lawyer to tell what he had learned in professional confidence.

General McCoy. No, you don't compel him; you arrange so that he willingly does it. A man who will be counsellor of the Japanese consulate in the time of the last six months could be bought very easily, I should think. He certainly would be a very primary source of information.

Mr. Chairman, will you show those warning telegrams to the intelligence officer?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly. These are paraphrases, Captain, of original messages (handing documents to the witness).

General McCoy. Does it use the term "war warning" in that paraphrase?

The CHAIRMAN. There is one of them that has the "war warning," just the 27th. [1060]

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. Haven't you seen those before?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. And you have not been informed of a war warning?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. How were you conscious of the imminence of trouble and emergency before December 7, or were you not conscious of it?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. Not even from the newspapers?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. You speak of this very complete information service that you since discovered through the Japanese consulate. You would naturally assume that would be the case through a consulate, wouldn't you?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. You wouldn't?

Captain MAYFIELD. I did not assume that it would be through the consulate. In fact, I doubted if it was through the consulate, that the consulate was the head of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean your suspicion was that the consulate arranged for somebody else to be sending these messages so as to throw suspicion away from his office?

Captain MAYFIELD. Not that, sir, but I felt that the consulate would perhaps be advised of the existence and would cooperate with the net, but that the consulate—this was my own suspicion—that the consulate itself was not the head of the net nor necessarily an important part of the net, as the consulate might expect to be closed in similar fashion to the German and Italian consulates, and that therefore they must have prepared a plan which could be carried on without any assistance from the consulate.

[1061] General McCoy. Did you receive from Naval Intelligence prior to December 7 any reports from the Navy attache in Tokyo?

Captain MAYFIELD. From time to time, yes, sir, I have.

General McCoy. Did they not give warning or tell of naval movements, just as the Japanese consulate did here to his government?

Captain MAYFIELD. None that I saw, sir, except possibly movements for—nothing indicating an approach in this direction.

General McCoy. In other words, we are left with no information from Japan, and the Japanese government getting everything that happens on our side; is that not correct?

Captain MAYFIELD. That is my belief, sir.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of that before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Is there no way that you can think of remedying such a dangerous situation or helping to remedy it?

Captain MAYFIELD. We were doing our very best to gain the information, sir. The most reasonable source was the files of the various communication companies, which were not opened to us.

General McCoy. Well, now, I question that, again. I have got to have this clarified. You told us that you hadn't received any of these code messages prior to December 7. Then you go and tell us that you did arrange beforehand.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir, I did.

General McCoy. Yes. Well, then I should think—

Captain MAYFIELD. That was only with one company, sir.

General McCoy. Well, having done it with one company, don't you think it was likely that you could have with the others if you went about it the right way?

Captain MAYFIELD. Both—I was trying to get the information from other companies, but the local managers declined to [1062] give it to me.

General McCoy. Did you know that the chairman of the board of the RCA is a retired officer of the United States Army, General Harbord?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you know that the president of that company is a colonel in the Reserve Corps?

Captain MAYFIELD. Mr. Sarnoff, sir?

General McCoy. Yes, sir.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir. I didn't know that he was in the Army Reserve, no, sir.

General McCoy. Well, he is a colonel in the Army Reserve.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes.

General McCoy. Don't you think that you could have arranged through them to have gotten information here confidentially?

Captain MAYFIELD. I did arrange through Mr. Sarnoff when he was here, sir.

General McCoy. I thought you said that the RCA had the December—

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what he got.

Captain MAYFIELD. And that is what I got.

General McCoy. But yet you did not get this message, this important message that would have blown the whole thing open; to your Commander-in-Chief? You mean to say that you did not get that before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are wrong about that, Captain.

Captain MAYFIELD. I didn't get it decoded.

General McCoy. Well, that is the point.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Now, how long ahead did you have that in [1063] code form?

Captain MAYFIELD. I can't answer that offhand, sir.

General McCoy. Well, I should like to be informed of that, and I should like to know why it was not decoded until after the attack. And I should like to ask one or two other questions:

Is it not a fact that you left the Commander-in-Chief absolutely without any warning of any kind of what happened, from the point of view of the intelligence?

Captain MAYFIELD. I had no warning myself, sir.

General McCoy. Well, you say, then, that you did not give the Commander-in-Chief any warning of any kind before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. I didn't have any information about that to warn him.

General McCoy. Well, answer my question:

You did not inform him?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

General McCoy. That is all I wanted to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. You will get us the information of when you were given that Kita message, the code message?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And what you did with it, where you forwarded it, and when, and when you got the return?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just put that on a memorandum and submit it as part of your testimony.

Are there any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one I want to ask.

Captain, have you knowledge of the reports that Japanese tankers would come to the mainland for oil and bring a crew of reserves and that they would go ashore in uniform of the Japanese Navy and that while ashore they would change uniforms, and another thirty would come back and go back to the ship? [1064] In other words, they used that means of exchanging Japanese.

Captain MAYFIELD. I never heard of that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You never heard of that method?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right.

General McCoy. I would like to ask one other question: Did the Commander-in-Chief know that you had that message uncoded prior to December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. I did not have it uncoded prior to December 7.

General McCoy. No, you didn't have it uncoded. I said, did he know that you had it in your possession before December 7?

Captain MAYFIELD. To the best of my knowledge he did not, sir.

General McCoy. Why didn't you tell him?

Captain MAYFIELD. That was a message—that particular message—there have been so many messages. To the best of my recollection that particular message was one of the messages that came from the consulate and not one that I obtained from the communication company.

General McCoy. But you just informed me that you had it in an uncoded form prior to December 7.

Captain MAYFIELD. And I would like to retract that statement, sir. I do not believe that that is correct, but I will have to verify that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will find that you did have it and that also it was probably found in mutilated form in the consulate.

Admiral STANDLEY. It might help, Mr. Chairman, if we would all know just exactly what message you are talking about. I think before we should go into this question we might have the full data as to the message we have reference to.

[1065] The CHAIRMAN. The message is a message of 3 December, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo, "Secret Military Message No." blank; "By Chief of Consulate's code) To: Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff. From: Fujii.

"Re signals I wish to simplify communications as follows."

And then it goes on to give a code of communications which will show by various signs: that all battle force has sailed; several aircraft carriers plan to put to sea; all carriers have sailed, on certain dates, which are the dates from 4th to 6th inclusive. Then the signals: set a light in Lanikai beach house at night.

One light indicates code sign number 1, which tells what the carriers are doing. One light from 9 to 10 p. m. indicates two; two lights indicate five, six, seven, and eight, which are all code signals for battleships being in or out of the harbor, and so forth.

2. On Lanikai coast during daytime from 8 a. m. until noon every hour one piece of linen cloth indicates one, two, three, or four of the code. Two pieces of linen cloth indicate five, six, seven, and eight of the code.

3. In Lanikai Bay during the daytime in front of harbor (offing) a star boat with one star on sail indicates one, two, three, four; two: a star and figure "III" indicates five, six, seven, and eight.

Light in the dormer window of Kalama house from 7 p. m. to 1 a. m. every hour indicates three, four, five, six, seven, eight.

KGMB want ads 9:45 a. m.:

A Chinese rug, and so forth, for sale, in the want ad column, apply to P. O. Box 1476, indicates three or six.

A complete chicken farm, and so forth, four to seven.

Beauty operator wanted, five or eight.

If a signal in any of these methods is impossible, on Maui Island at a point located between lower road six miles [1066] north of Kula Sanatorium, and so forth, which can be seen from the sea to the southwest and southeast of Maui, until the receipt of the signal "EXEX". This will be repeated for several days: A small fire on the high peak.

Seven p. m. to eight a. m. indicates three or six; eight p. m. to nine p. m. indicates four or seven; nine p. m. to ten p. m. indicates five or eight.

That is the message.

Captain MAYFIELD. That message I did not have decoded until after the 7th. When that message was decoded and shown to the Commandant he immediately directed that I be informed. F. B. I. and my organization immediately divided the territory. My organization took the Lanikai sector, and Federal Bureau of Investigation the Kalama sector. We immediately sent men to investigate. My men remained there for about eight days and were unable to find that any of those signals were ever sent. Many of the occupants of the houses had moved out immediately subsequent to December 7. Those occupants were interviewed around town to endeavor to discover if they had seen any such signals. I have been unable to discover any person who saw any of those signals made. A number of people who were questioned by my agents at Lanikai stated that the sailboat signal could not have been given for a period of at least a week preceding the 7th because no sailboats were out of that type, the small star boat; that the weather and sea were far too rough for sailing of that type of boat.

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, now you know the message; we have identified the message. Do you know or do your records show when you got that message and how you got it?

Captain MAYFIELD. I am not sure that I can definitely show from my records when that particular message was received. I believe that that was among the messages received from the consulate which, when I saw they were in code, were immediately sent to Rochefort. There was no way of telling which was [1067] important and which was not important from the code until it had been translated.

Admiral STANDLEY. And Rochefort is the communication or the intelligence officer for the Commander-in-Chief?

Captain MAYFIELD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Or for the District?

Captain MAYFIELD. He is under the District, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The District. But that bunch of messages were sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the District?

Captain MAYFIELD. They were sent by me, sir, directly to Commander Rochefort.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there is where messages of this type would have been decoded?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the only place?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is the only one that can do it, I suppose?

Captain MAYFIELD. So far as I know, that is the only agency that can do it.

General McCoy. I know we were questioning the Army intelligence officer.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Fielder, isn't it?

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. This message came in question, and we tried to follow it through him, and he said, as I remember, that such messages were turned over to you for the experts.

Captain MAYFIELD. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And that the Army did not have—

Captain MAYFIELD (interposing). Yes, sir. And at that time, sir, there were also coming in other bits of information in Japanese or in code. If it was something from a plane or believed from a plane, it was immediately sent to the [1068] fleet intelligence officer, since he had readily at his command aviators and submarine officers, which I did not have. Commander Rochefort has the only unit capable of breaking codes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And when was the first time you heard the results of that decoding?

Captain MAYFIELD. I can't from memory give you the exact date, sir, but it was one or more days after December 7.

Admiral STANDLEY. And prior to December 7 you had no information or no intimation that any such information was in those messages?

Captain MAYFIELD. None whatever, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Captain. We shall ask you not to discuss or impart to anyone or with anyone anything that has gone on in this room.

Captain MAYFIELD. Aye, Aye, sir.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name and rank to the reporter, please?

Commander LAYTON. Lieutenant Commander Layton, Edwin Thomas.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Layton, you are fleet intelligence officer, are you?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As such did you have any information which would lead you to suspect hostile Japanese operations in the first week in December? And if so, what?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir. From various sources available to naval intelligence, and principally reports of naval attaches, naval observers, Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, from the intelligence unit of the Sixteenth Naval District—

[1069] The CHAIRMAN. Where is that?

Commander LAYTON. Cavite, sir (continuing)—and the intelligence unit, the Fourteenth Naval District, there were available dispatches which gave rise to a firm belief that some action by Japan was impending.

From the best evidence available, as I recall it, about the middle of November the normal organization of the Japanese fleet was disrupted; and, while this disruption may have taken place prior, it was apparent at about that time the Commander-in-Chief of the second fleet was placed in a position far more important than his normal

administrative job. That is, it appeared as if, instead of prospective operations by fleets, there was to be an operation by task forces or task force, and that the Commander-in-Chief of the second fleet was to be put in supreme command of this operation.

From radio intelligence it was apparent that the direction of this move was to the south. From reports of attaches and observers along the China coast and from British intelligence, the movement of troop ships, their cargo, troops, and type of equipment indicated an expedition which would be amphibious in nature: that is, requiring an act of landing and transportation ashore.

When this became apparent a report was made to the Chief of Naval Operations by the Fourteenth Naval District unit and was commented on by the Sixteenth Naval District unit at Cavite. This task force seemed to include most of the second fleet less certain units, all of the third fleet plus certain units from the first fleet, plus the great majority or all of the combined air force, and associated with it was the French Indo-China force or sometimes called the Southern Expeditionary force, and the South China fleet.

I think I have covered it.

The CHAIRMAN. From that what did you, as an intelligence officer, deduce as to the direction of the hostile movement?

[1070] Commander LAYTON. To the south, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "To the south"?

Commander LAYTON. Toward the Malay barrier, or against Singapore direct, or against their objective, oil, in the Netherlands Indies, or a combination movement with the possible inclusion of preparatory acts against the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the intelligence data that you have just outlined indicate the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir. It would—with the exception of carrier division 3.

The CHAIRMAN. You spoke of some air force.

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not the carriers of the Japanese navy?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir. The combined air force as I spoke of it consists of the shore-based aircraft of combatant nature from the various locations in Japan and its possessions. It is distinct and completely separate from the carrier aviation force.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, had your intelligence, in the late days of November or early days of December, any inkling of the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers?

Commander LAYTON. There had been no positive indications of the location of the Japanese carriers with the exception of carrier division 3, which was associated with the Southern movement for some time.

The CHAIRMAN. What was carrier division 3? Two carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Two carriers, sir; the Ryujo and the Hosho.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did your command have knowledge of the number of Japanese carriers in their navy?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many were there?

Commander LAYTON. Ten, sir.

[1071] The CHAIRMAN. So you have accounted for two?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the other eight I understand you to say there were no definite indications as to their location?

Commander LAYTON. No positive indications of their location.

The CHAIRMAN. What presumptive?

Commander LAYTON. It is very difficult in this nature of intelligence to say where a man is from his traffic. If he receives it by the broadcast method he can be at sea, but he is sometimes in port. When carriers are not heard from, if they do not originate traffic, they are most likely in port, because there they are on low-frequency low-power circuits that cannot be heard, or on the ship-shore circuit, which is very low power, and sometimes they have a direct wire to the beach. While of course the traffic originated for them from without their area is still received and still on the air, that condition exists. That condition also exists a good part of the time, and it is only when they originate traffic themselves at sea that direction-finder bearing can be taken to ascertain their general line of bearing; and with the direction-finder net—for instance, Oahu and Cavite and Guam—a fairly good strategic cut is made as to their location; also, when they are at sea, by the type of their traffic; whether it is a tactical traffic or administrative traffic—that is, they use their own tactical calls or their own administrative calls—one may deduce and surmise the type of exercises they are involved in, and also, from the type of traffic they have had before that, what is their immediate objective.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what was the type of carrier traffic that you were listening in on in the fortnight before December 7?

Commander LAYTON. I myself cannot speak from firsthand. [1072] I received this information from the officer who is called chief of combat intelligence at the Fourteenth Naval District, who furnished me a daily summary.

The CHAIRMAN. And who is he?

Commander LAYTON. Commander J. J. Rochefort.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. All right. What did he report to you?

Commander LAYTON. The traffic for the carriers was heard, but there had been no traffic originated by the carriers, and on the daily sheet sent over—the daily summary is shown. Would you care to see one (indicating)?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Commander LAYTON. Just open one at random: the general combined fleet, air fourth fleet. After this they are in more detail. General combined fleet, fourth fleet, fifth fleet, submarines, China, and third fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Which fleet is carriers?

Commander LAYTON. It is called the carrier fleet, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The carrier fleet?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Commander LAYTON. And on these were carried carriers: "No information."

The CHAIRMAN. "No information." Now, you had to depend on his appraisal of what he picked up?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And to depend on his summary?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And from what he gave you in that footnote you could make no definite surmise that the remaining eight carriers were out of port?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir. Of course, along with his information plus incoming dispatches I reported each day to Admiral Kimmel at 8:15, in which we went over the situation of [1073] that day as it pertained to the past days and made an oral and informal summary of the intentions, disposition, composition, and the fact that there were carriers not known within the summary, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if the carriers wanted to fool you the best way for them to fool you would be not to talk, wouldn't it?

Commander LAYTON. That is the best way to fool anyone, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And from the lack of signals in the sea to the northward of Oahu in the days preceding this attack, you have suspected the carriers were not talking, have you not?

Commander LAYTON. In reviewing it I have suspected that they sailed under sealed orders, and I am positive, from reviewing the record, that they did not talking, because our operations would have certainly heard them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I thought.

Commander LAYTON. As a matter of fact, that morning after the attack had commenced I was phoned from Combat Intelligence, and he said that the Commander-in-Chief of the carrier fleet is being heard now, but the only direction finder we can put on him is the bilateral. It gives it either north and south or east and west, two ways, and the bearing is either north or south, and they knew it the instant he spoke.

[1074] The CHAIRMAN. I suppose you were familiar with these telegrams from the CNO of the 24th and 27th of November?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a part of the intelligence you had to appraise?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions.

General McNARNEY. How long did this carrier silence persist, Commander?

Commander LAYTON. Could I review the record? Specifically I do not remember.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Commander LAYTON. On the 13th of November there is a report: "Carriers remain relatively inactive. Settsu is still with them and they may be engaged in target practice."

The CHAIRMAN. That is the summary? Is that where that is from?

Commander LAYTON. That is the summary, yes.

I left out one matter. May I refer to it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander LAYTON. On or about the 24th of November, the splitting of the Japanese fleet into these task forces and the apparent intentions became very marked, and I mention the despatch sent by the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding that. In his despatch he stated that there was considerable concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls which comprised Airon 24 and at least one carrier division plus units of probably one-third of the submarine fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that carrier division would probably be composed of three carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Two, sir.

[1075] The CHAIRMAN. Now, if they came across, it would be natural for that fleet to stop at Jaluit for refueling?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And if they stopped at Jaluit, your summaries indicate they were never picked up afterward?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. That is correct.

The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District in commenting to the Fourteenth Naval District in a despatch said that they had no indication as to it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, they were at the Marshalls?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

General McNARNEY. You lost a carrier on the 13th of November. You subsequently picked up one division on the 24th of November, but there was no other information from that one carrier in the Marshalls from the 13th of November until the 7th of December; is that correct?

Commander LAYTON. Nothing specific, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. Nothing specific?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Did that in itself raise any question in your mind?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir, because that same situation has arisen at other times. As I said before, if they are in port and not using their radio, they may still receive traffic as they did during this period, but they will originate none, and during the course of the year there are other times when such units are not heard.

General McNARNEY. It would be interesting to me if you would check back in your records and give me other periods of the year in which there were such silences.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I can get that from our records.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, search your records, and when you have the information, put it in a form which may be presented to us [1076] as your testimony, or come back here and we will hear you.

General McNARNEY. This lack of traffic was not specifically commented upon by the Commander-in-Chief as something to be noted?

Commander LAYTON. As a matter of fact, the Commander-in-Chief commented upon that specific matter and I gave him the same statement I made here, that that happens frequently and it is a normal assumption that they were then in port.

Incidentally, the carriers prior to that had done considerable around the China coast toward Takau in Formosa; and prior to that there had been carrier concentrations and activities in Louchoo Island at Naha.

General McNARNEY. Didn't the formation of the task forces under the C&C of the second fleet with available carrier force arouse your curiosity?

Commander LAYTON. In a way, yes, sir. They formed a similar task force, although not as large, in the group when they first participated in their so-called "Benevolent Mediation" in Thai and French Indo China last February, at which time they had one carrier division

assigned for a covering force which went down there for a display of power that was necessary; and again in June or July when they forced their demands on French Indo China to base the armed troops in North French Indo China.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did they come from?

Commander LAYTON. One carrier division, one heavy cruiser division, two destroyer squadrons, one seaplane tender division, plus the third fleet, when it was organized, plus the other time, the South China fleet.

General McNARNEY. How much larger was this task force under the second fleet than the task force you just spoke of?

Commander LAYTON. Roughly, three times, sir.

General McNARNEY. Three times in combat vessels?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

[1077] General McNARNEY. How much larger in transports?

Commander LAYTON. Well, I do not know exactly how many transports. I am a little out of my detail. However, we have estimated the first and second base forces with the third fleet consisted of 27 and 17 transports respectively covered by converted subchasers, mine sweepers, mine layers, and other small craft, or medium small craft.

General McNARNEY. Am I right in my assumption that the Japanese second fleet was about three times as large as the other organization you mentioned?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir, the organization under the command of the second fleet; that is, the second fleet less certain units plus certain of the first fleet units plus the third fleet plus the South China fleet, the southern expeditionary forces—was in force at least three times larger than the units previously employed in the French Indo China area.

Admiral REEVES. In this organization under the second fleet commander, which is three times greater than the previous organization, it contained two carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Whereas the previous organization contained only one carrier?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Commander LAYTON. No, they contained two carriers.

The CHAIRMAN. But one division.

Commander LAYTON. One division in each.

Admiral REEVES. So the number of carriers was the same?

Commander LAYTON. The number of carriers was the same, yes.

Admiral REEVES. That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to the sending of the radio or the absence of the radio being due to the fact that the ships were in port and not sending out the radio, does that [1078] apply to battleships also?

Commander LAYTON. It applies to all types, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to have this same thing to show the battleships in port and when there was no traffic there.

Commander LAYTON. Yes, I will cover the entire area during the year.

The CHAIRMAN. Give us a memorandum on that.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask you this question: Has the Naval Intelligence in Washington all the information for making the estimates of the situation and drawing conclusions? That is, from the Philippines, from Guam, and the Fourteenth District?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And in addition to that they have their own information?

Commander LAYTON. From my knowledge, they have, sir, but I do not know how much.

Admiral STANDLEY. If that is true, wouldn't they be in a better position to estimate the whole situation than you are here?

Commander LAYTON. That is the way the system is laid.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are an intelligence officer for the Commander of the Fleet of the United States, you do not expect that anything of value to you as to any important situation would be withheld from you by the authorities in Washington, do you?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It would be part of their duty to send you everything?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then why did you say they did not?

[1079] Commander LAYTON. I merely meant that as an answer to a specific question that we were receiving copies of reports.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean they have more incoming matter, which they digest, and then send you the gist of it?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That would naturally be the case because their work does cover a broader field than yours?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, and also the war plan and the general naval intelligence service plan is such that Washington will be the central distribution point of these specific units like the one in the Sixteenth District and the Fourteenth District and the one at Guam, who in turn will keep the commanders fully informed.

Admiral STANDLEY. You felt sure you would receive all conclusions from the naval intelligence that were of any importance to you, but not the unnecessary details?

Commander LAYTON. Exactly; yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did they give you any warning of this attack?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir, not here in Hawaii; no, sir. There was a warning that the negotiations were breaking down.

General McCoy. You mean the ones you saw?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The ones we have here (indicating)?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

General McCoy. Have you been able to verify your statement since the attack from what happened at Wake and the reports from Wake and the reports from the Philippine operations as to the presence of the Japanese fleet in the Philippines and the Japanese task forces at Wake?

Commander LAYTON. In general, yes, but specifically in some cases it is quite difficult, but I would like to review this in one respect. That is, that the Japanese change their [1080] calls and if there is a difference in the calls, then your organization must change.

The Japanese normally change their calls on the first of November and the first of March or April. That is the sea call. They would also change their shore calls twice a year. They did that one month earlier; they changed their calls on the first of October. That was obvious, because they were having a lot of communications, and about the 30th of October it was apparent that they were going to do something in the line of communications. By that time we had them pretty well lined up. We had the major units lined up.

They changed on 1 November, Japanese time 000. Their communications became very involved. They would send the same message time and time again, obviously because they were not sending it to the right address, and the same message to one man would be sent and would come back later.

That was remarked by the interceptor operators, who were trained along that line. That continued for October.

The CHAIRMAN. For November.

Commander LAYTON. For November. So, you see, to state specifically which unit is a little difficult.

Then they changed again on December 1st, and that was remarked upon; but then they have been increasing their means of communication, of security, which they tried out during November. So, to answer your question specifically, is a little difficult.

I might say this, that the reports from the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and the reports from the American observer in Singapore, and the Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East naval forces, have tended to confirm the initial distribution of the task force in the south.

The attack on Wake, I am positive, was made with part of the task force that attacked here, plus, aided by having [1081] reinforcements from certain forces from the Marshalls area.

General MCCOY. Why didn't the so-called relief force which went to Wake attack that force instead of turning around and coming back?

Commander LAYTON. General, I cannot say that. That is really out of my sphere.

General MCCOY. You would, of course, inform the commander of that force what you knew of before he left?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir, and he was kept informed while he was at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. I assume that was the decision of the Commander-in-Chief?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What is your best estimate of the force attacking Wake? That is, land-based and sea planes.

Commander LAYTON. The Commander-in-Chief's estimate of the land and sea plane tenders of the third division in the movements as of the 7th of December was 262 planes, of which amount 150 were estimated to be in the Marshalls. This was not unusual, as they had had aircraft concentration in that area before.

General McNARNEY. Were those all land-based aircraft?

Commander LAYTON. With the exception of some of the sea planes that are based on land and some sea planes based on tenders, and a converted tanker and converted freighter.

All these initial attacks on Wake were made by Navy twin-engine bombers, probably based on Eniwetok and Wotze or Taroa in the Malolead Atoll.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you show those to me on the map?
(The witness indicated on the map.)

Commander LAYTON. It is my belief that the four-engine sea planes which bombed Wake came from at or near the Atoll of Utrik.

[1082] The sea borne forces are not as clear, but I estimate that they were the old cruisers, Tenryu and Tatsuta, and possibly accompanied by the new cruisers Tone and Chikuma. It is positive that Wake was attacked by carrier-based planes the day before the landing was successful. From the best information available I believe this carrier, Soryu, was one of those which attacked Hawaii. The transports were probably from the six based with headquarters at Jaluit.

General McNARNEY. How many four-engine and two-engine bombers do you think they used?

Commander LAYTON. The four-engine sea planes amounted to a maximum of eighteen, as I recall it, and the two-engine bombers amounted to as high as forty-one, I believe.

General McNARNEY. What is your estimate of the number of carriers used in the attack on Oahu?

Commander LAYTON. Four, sir.

General McNARNEY. Have you arrived at their names?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir. From the recovered documents, instruments such as radios, drift sight, and so forth, I have identified definitely four carriers: the Akagi, which is the flag of the first carrier fleet, the Kaga, the Hiryu, and the Soryu.

From the captured documents and such, which gave the composition of the striking force, it appears that there were six carriers involved in the operation. The lack of definite indications of the other two leads us to believe that they were held in reserve to attack any task force or group, particularly carriers of ours, attempting to cut off or to close in on the four carriers in the attack.

This task force, according to the documents, consisted of six carriers: the Akagi, the Kaga, the Hiryu, the Soryu, the Shokaku, and the Zuikaku; the cruisers Tone and Chikuma; the ex-battle cruisers Hiyei and Kirishima, plus Desron, one [1083] from the first fleet, which consisted of the old cruiser Abukuma, and three destroyer divisions, a total of 12 destroyers.

General McNARNEY. What do you mean by an ex-battle cruiser? What are they now?

Commander LAYTON. They are carried officially as battleships since they were modernized.

General McNARNEY. What speed do they have?

Commander LAYTON. 26 knots.

General McNARNEY. How many planes were on the four carriers which you believed were involved?

Commander LAYTON. From the best information available the Kaga and Akagi carried and operated a maximum of 60 planes in each; the Hiryu and Soryu operating a maximum of 53 planes each.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any information tending to show which of these carriers the torpedo planes were on?

Commander LAYTON. I am positive that the torpedo planes, the 12, were from the Kaga. From the one torpedo plane wreck salvage, I recovered a mimeographed chartlet with these anchorages, and each anchorage was marked or numbered. Although much the worse for wear from 12 days in the water, there were 12 targets picked up off the plane and its course was marked in red. The others were picked up with the course marked in blue.

From the location of this plane and its position when shot down, I believe it was a red plane and that there were 12—from the instruments and documents picked up—from the Kaga. The documents will not show the number of torpedo planes on the Kaga because the Kaga planes could have gone to the Shokaku, and the Shokaku planes could have gone to the Kaga.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any idea about the blue planes?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

[1084] In the task force organization of this striking force, this being a radio group carrying signals in the sea planes, they gave calls of the first wing and the second wing, and the first wing consisted of four squadrons of torpedo planes, one each from the Akagi, the Kaga, the Hiryu, and the Soryu. That is, there were two 12-plane squadrons with the exception of the Hiryu and Soryu, which were only 10.

The second wing consisted of six squadrons, four squadrons being dive bombers and two squadrons being torpedo planes.

By Japanese torpedo planes, as understood in the Japanese Navy, are meant the torpedo planes both carrier and high-altitude horizontal bombers.

General McNARNEY. From that would you make an estimate that there were four squadrons of torpedo planes and four squadrons of dive bombers and two squadrons of dive and high-altitude bombers in the attack?

Commander LAYTON. That is my estimate with the exception of your last statement. I believe there were four squadrons of torpedo planes and horizontal bombers, four squadrons of dive bombers plus four squadrons or more of fighters.

I have not recovered documents to give me the fighter organization.

General McNARNEY. Of the first and second wings, as I understand it, they had ten squadrons, from your statement?

Commander LAYTON. Twelve, sir; six in each. The first wing had four squadrons of torpedo bombers and two squadrons of dive bombers; the second wing had four squadrons of dive bombers and two squadrons of torpedo planes.

It is possible that the Shokaku and Zuikaku were in the attack.

General McNARNEY. A total of 12 squadrons of bombers and torpedo planes?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

[1085] I have it here, four or more squadrons of torpedo planes and horizontal bombers; four or more squadrons of dive bombers plus considerably more than four squadrons of fighters.

General McNARNEY. Can you break these bomber and torpedo squadrons down except to say you have a total of 12? You have four in each, which gives you only eight.

Commander LAYTON. I left off the planes from the Shokaku and Zuikaku which, I do not believe, participated in the action, and they were not included in the organization which I gave.

General McNARNEY. Oh, I understand you now.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I think that the torpedo planes—that is, the two squadrons—were actually torpedo planes, and the other half of the two squadrons were horizontal bombers.

I have one picture that shows 12 horizontal bombers in flight.

General McNARNEY. That is one squadron?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

General McCoy. It is possible for horizontal bombing to be done so as to hit battleships successfully and, as was mentioned, to have only two bombs fall on Ford Island?

Commander LAYTON. General, I do not understand.

General McCoy. I am just referring to some testimony of Admiral Bellinger which he gave, stating that only two bombs fell on Ford Island; yet on the perimeter of Ford Island ships were bombed very successfully. That does not look like horizontal bombing to me. That is, from a high altitude. I cannot conceive that they are so accurate. Certainly it was not pattern bombing.

Commander LAYTON. From reading the reports I have not believed that it was pattern bombing. The impression that I have received was that the hits received by some of the [1086] battleships were horizontal bombing and indicated a degree of accuracy.

General McCoy. And very low?

The CHAIRMAN. Six thousand feet.

Commander LAYTON. They were quite high, I would say. Well, I would say somewhere between six and ten thousand feet, from the bulk of evidence, and from the commanding officers.

There was a very interesting telegram came in from Singapore which gave the results of Japanese horizontal bombing, which were equally accurate, and they gave the height as 12,000 feet.

I would say the MPI was plus or minus 9 to 15 feet rather than yards.

General McNARNEY. You did not recover anything in the way of a bomb sight, did you?

Commander Layton. No, sir, the torpedo plane carried no bomb sight, but in the horizontal bombs that shot down they set the fuse too short, because they did not get high enough.

General McNARNEY. What was the fuse setting, if you know?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Will you find that out?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And add that to it.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Let me see if I have your estimate of the planes in the attack. There were two torpedo plane squadrons, two horizontal bomber squadrons, and four dive bomber squadrons and at least four fighter squadrons. Is that right?

Commander LAYTON. Four and many more fighters.

Admiral REEVES. Fighting planes?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That is 12 squadrons at that time?

[1087] Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. How many in the fighter squadrons?

Commander LAYTON. Twelve.

Admiral REEVES. There were 12 in which squadron?

Commander LAYTON. Twelve has been their tactical unit, although in the operations from what I have heard it is frequent that they will gather in from other units other planes into their unit and they may have a tactical unit of 18 planes, but 12 is the operating unit from the carrier.

Could I add something which you wanted me to say about the bombs on Ford Island?

From what I have read, the bombing of Ford Island was dive bombing, and that immediately thereafter the torpedo planes were seen approaching the island and along with the torpedo planes were horizontal and dive bombers. That is the first wave that Ford Island was only dive bombed and only strafed.

I believe, although I may be incorrect, that the majority of the attack on the Army air fields was to cut down the pursuits and some was done by the fighters, but they did not want to waste the big bombs, but to save these torpedoes for the battle line and for the carriers. Incidentally, they thought they had a carrier on that position, at Ford Island, because they had that particularly lined up.

The CHAIRMAN. As we have been given the picture, the first two bombs hit on the nose in Ford Island.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You think they were dive bombers?

Commander LAYTON. From the reports I have read and the messages I have seen and from the reports of officers and commanders, that was the first thing they saw.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, dive bombers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. They saw the dive bombers and [1088] heard the whine of the bomber coming down and then finally pulling out of the dive.

General McNARNEY. From your analyses of the reports, how many attacks were there?

Commander LAYTON. They seemed to be waves to me. The first wave was about 7:51; the second wave somewhere around 8:30; and the third wave commenced about 9 o'clock.

General McCoy. What is your estimate of the enemy losses?

Commander LAYTON. I have estimated the planes shot down in and about Pearl Harbor by the Navy fighters to be between 12 and 18 planes. I have attempted to find out and to make a better analysis, but there are so many conflicting reports—that is, everyone claims the same plane—that I would like to get a better summation.

In time I expect to have in better detail when all the ships have been heard from who have been asked to send in the chart showing where each plane has dropped.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of the fact that a number of planes did not reach their carrier on the return?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, sir, for two reasons: first, that of the danger involving the return to the carriers due to lack of fuel, and the second reason is that the Japanese themselves announced that

they lost 29 planes. Incidentally, that is the highest plane loss the Japanese have ever announced, including the time she lost 53 on the Emperor's birthday, when she announced none.

General McNARNEY. If she announced that she has lost 29 planes, she would normally announce only those planes which she knew the United States knew she had lost. In other words, the 29 planes were lost over Oahu.

Commander LAYTON. That may be true, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Then that would come very close to your estimate of 28.

[1089] General McNARNEY. In other words, there is no reason why Japan would announced losses about which we knew nothing?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir. As a matter of fact, Japan rarely announces losses of planes. The standard ending of a communique is "All planes returned safely."

General McNARNEY. I know it is the common practice of the British to announce only those losses of which they think the Germans know about. They never announce losses which they think the Germans do not know.

Commander LAYTON. That has occurred to me.

General McCoy. How many planes did the Army shoot down?

Commander LAYTON. I do not know, General. There was a communique out which stated that they shot down 22, I believe.

General McCoy. It was 21 they reported to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. I think it was 22 sure and possibly 28.

General McCoy. What about the story that the Navy picked up about a lost squadron at sea which could not get back to the carrier?

Commander LAYTON. I have not heard they lost a squadron, sir. I have heard of a lost fighter who was lost and who had attacked the NORTHAMPTON in a scouting section south of Niihau, and after making several attempts, with 25 bullet holes in it, it left with smoke streaming out of it.

The CHAIRMAN. We heard testimony in the hearings at Fort Shafter that some 18 planes had been heard to call that they were out of gas and then could not reach their carrier.

Commander LAYTON. Commander Rochefort can testify to that. I know there was a call identified as a leader—how big a leader I do not know. That was at sea around 12:35 local time. He said, "I have fuel for ten minutes."

At 12:40 local time he said, "I will fly as long as I have fuel."

[1090] The CHAIRMAN. That was from the leader?

Commander LAYTON. He made the call Kanure, which the interceptor operator who took it and was handling his messages thought that he was possibly the commander of that group.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you were at conferences with the Commander-in-Chief, I presume, between November 27 and December 7, respecting the instant situation?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I was in conferences daily.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you the slightest suspicion of a possible air attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Commander LAYTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not, when you had the warning and from what you knew about the situation that Japan would strike and probably strike hard and even before war was declared?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. That had all been considered.

The CHAIRMAN. That had all been considered?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, that had all been considered and discussed.

The Admiral, in fact, said one day, "Where are the battleships?"

I said, "I don't know. Their location has not been known for more than a week."

He said, "Do you think they could be off here or out at sea without our knowing it?"

I said, "Yes, if they have maintained radio silence."

He said, "Do you think they are?" and I said, "No."

He said, "Where do you think they are?" and I said, "I estimate they are in port, having completed two weeks' operations, and they are having overhaul for new operations."

[1091] General McNARNEY. Was there some discussion held with reference to the carriers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, only not so specific. The Admiral knew of the carriers down there, I am sure.

General McNARNEY. He did not wonder whether they might be opposite Oahu?

Commander LAYTON. I do not doubt that he did because he has a mind that could make you wonder very much.

That was mentioned at the same time but the repetition was not made.

General McNARNEY. Was there any discussion as to where the carriers were the previous two weeks?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I said they had been down at Takau in Formosa, and they had been active with the target ship Settsu on the 17th, I believe, and there had been considerable air activity; that carrier division 3 was enroute or in the South China Sea, and one of the carrier divisions was reported to be in or near the Mandates, and the others were getting their bases all set, but their location was not known.

Could I add one observation here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander LAYTON. Another point in that same discussion was brought up. While I am no strategist, I made the observation that the formation of the task force, as I saw it, of the strength to the south, that the best of their cruisers, the Tone and Chikuma, were not in the force, and that most of their fast power was headed to the south, and that the idea of carriers operating by themselves without a good strong support did not look very logical.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not in the discussion?

Commander LAYTON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That was your own ratiocination?

Commander LAYTON. Yes, that was my own opinion, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Not being a Navy man myself, the enumeration of the task forces in which these attacking [1092] carriers were, sounded to me like a not inconsiderable force.

Commander LAYTON. You mean the carrier fleet?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. As you enumerated them where you have battle cruisers, destroyers, and so on, it would seem that it would have taken a very considerable task force from here to equal that force in strength, would it not?

Commander LAYTON. It would take a considerable force, but they would be quite vulnerable.

The CHAIRMAN. They would?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say so?

Commander LAYTON. That is my opinion. I am not an expert.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither am I.

Commander LAYTON. That a carrier is very vulnerable—although potent also. However, when a carrier is caught without her planes absolutely ready or her area patrols or if it is bad weather and she cannot get her aerial patrols up, or if she has a hole in her sound screen, then a submarine can do a tremendous amount of damage.

If the weather is bad and scouting cannot be continued over a wide area, superior forces, and even light cruisers which are not superior, can throw a shell onto her carrier deck and render the use of her own planes impossible.

Admiral REEVES. As I understand your estimate, there were four and possibly six carriers in the division.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And two cruisers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. The Tone and Chikuma and two ex-battle cruisers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And 12 destroyers?

[1093] Commander LAYTON. Yes, and the old cruisers.

Admiral REEVES. And that is the striking force?

Commander LAYTON. Yes. As I obtained that from the radio call sheet out of the plane.

Admiral REEVES. Then in strength, that is hardly equal to the strength of our task force, three of which we had out, except in carriers. That is, a carrier in each one, three heavy cruisers—

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And 12 destroyers?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And that was 12. They did have more carriers in this one group?

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. What are those old cruisers?

Commander LAYTON. In guns they have 14-inch guns; in armor they have 8-inch side armor, but they are very vulnerable to a good 8-inch shell.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We find it necessary to ask all the witnesses not to discuss anything that has occurred in this room. Do not discuss it with anyone.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I trust you will observe that.

Commander LAYTON. Yes. I will prepare this matter for you.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and send it to the Recorder, Mr. Howe, whenever you have it ready.

Commander LAYTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With the permission of the Commission I am going to insert in the record the paraphrases of these two messages which have been referred to during the testimony of this and other witnesses.

[1094] (The two messages above referred to are as follows:)

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Secret

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

(Classification)

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch.

Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

"In our opinion a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. This is indicated by the doubtful chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan coupled with statements of their government and movements of their army and naval forces. In order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action utmost secrecy is mandatory. The Chief of Staff requests that action addressees inform local army senior officers. He has seen this dispatch and concurs. Guam will be advised in separate correspondence."

CBO WJE

Date 25 Nov 41

Serial No. 11-763

Originator OPNAV

Action CINCAF CINCPAC Commandants 11th, 12th, 13th, and 15th Naval Dists.

Information Spenavo London CINCLANT.

[1095]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

Secret

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

(Classification)

U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

Paraphrase

This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch.

Please return to coding officer for burning when of no further use.

"Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo."

CBO WJE

Date 28 Nov 41

Serial No. 11-856

Originator OPNAV 272337

Action CINCPAC CINCAF

Information CINCLANT Spenavo.

[1096] **TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER JOSEPH JOHN ROCHEFORT,
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMBAT INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES
NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name and rank to the reporter?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Joseph John Rochefort, Commander, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, you are the Chief Intelligence Officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, are you not?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. If I may amend that, sir, I am the officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, as distinguished from the District Intelligence Officer with which I have no connection.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not get the distinction between your function and that of the Fleet Intelligence Officer on the one hand and the District Intelligence Officer on the other. Will you distinguish that for me?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The District Intelligence Officer is a member of the District Staff of the Commandant. His duty has more to do with defense. That is, it is in connection with subversive activities, aliens, sabotage, and that sort of thing.

Combat Intelligence is a term that has been derived from a unit of the fleet and has to do with intelligence that is obtained particularly during and prior to hostilities and has to do with the functions of the enemy. In other words, on the staff of the operations section, which is primarily concerned with movement as to intelligence and organization and more with enemy movements—I might say that my duties and the fleet intelligence officer are quite parallel except that his duties also comprise the duties normally of the District Intelligence Officer.

The CHAIRMAN. The District Intelligence Officer did have [1097] an arrangement with the RCA to obtain transcriptions of certain commercial messages forwarded from Honolulu, and particularly by Kita, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, between 1 December and 6 December, 1941. They were in a code which he was unable to read and he turned them over to you for assistance; is that correct?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I refer now particularly to a telegram which was forwarded on the 3rd of December and I ask you if you remember when you received that from the District Intelligence Officer.

Commander ROCHEFORT. It was either Thursday night, the 4th of December, or Friday, the 5th of December. I believe it was during the night, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you make a record of the receipt of such things?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have to rely on your memory?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I will put it this way: the reason we do not is that they do not exist. The document in question, as far as we are concerned, up to the 7th of December, did not exist.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, there used to be a federal law, sir, about that, but that does not exist now. There is no record of it at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to break that message?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you tell me when you broke it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, about approximately midnight Wednesday 10 December.

The CHAIRMAN. Not until then?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that neither the District Intelligence [1098] Officer, your command, the Fourteenth Naval District, or the Commander of the fleet had any knowledge of the contents or meaning of that message until after December 7?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that one of a number of messages handed to you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, there were several messages handed to us either Thursday night or Friday. That is, I was informed to make the regular arrangement, but there were, I think, three or four such messages.

The CHAIRMAN. In a batch?

Commander ROCHEFORT. In a batch received Thursday night.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to uncode any of them before the 8th?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So this one failed of uncoding not because it was the last but because you were not able to break it until then?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, it was a variation of several systems, and actually we did have the key to it. There was the point that the fellow who did his job did it backwards, which we never suspected. The fellow set the message up backwards, which held us up three or four days. If he had done his job properly we would have had it Friday morning.

General McNARNEY. You mean the coder?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes. As a matter of fact, that had happened at other times but we did not try that particular point until Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander, did you pick up any radio talk after the attack which indicated that some of the Japanese planes were unable to reach their carrier for lack of gas?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the effect of the information that [1099] you did pick up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The sequence of the events, as I recall them, was a series of messages from a plane or a squadron of planes or a group of planes to the effect that he asked for a bearing on his ship. Then he said he had ten minutes of gas left and he said he would fly as long as possible, and then he said he had five minutes supply left, and that is all we heard. He said nothing after that.

We identified him at the time as being a commander of a group of planes, possible a subdivision, or a squadron commander.

General McCoy. Were you able to spot him on the map at the time?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. The transmission time was very brief. The transmissions were only a matter of two or three seconds,

and it is extremely difficult to get any sort of bearing within that period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a system of monitoring radio communications on this island?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We have a system, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many monitoring stations do you have regularly?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We had on the 3rd of December three direction finders, and in addition one in Dutch Harbor, and one in Samoa. They together comprised the mid-Pacific direction finder net under the direction of the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. They have been used and are being used to detect transmissions and to obtain bearings on the same. That has been in existence for a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you consider that number of stations sufficient for the purpose?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I would like to add one more station at Midway, which was installed last August at the direction of [1100] the Commandant.

Insofar as the transmissions from the Japanese fleet in the Western Pacific are concerned I believe the stations are being used in the Far East net in Guam and Cavite, and they are loosely connected with us, and we control the whole outfit.

Insofar as the fleet itself is concerned, I think that the stations are sufficient insofar as local transmission is concerned. Additional stations might be used, however.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the local stations? Do you monitor these local messages?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I am not referring to the local stations; I mean the enemy units that may be picked up. I do not mean anything on this island at all, sir.

[1101] The CHAIRMAN. No.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That has been decided as a function of the Army by the Joint Board.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That is their function, and we are not in that. I mean by "local stations" enemy units within five or six hundred miles, some tactical setup.

The CHAIRMAN. What I meant was the manipulation of sets to discover who is sending messages.

Admiral STANDLEY. From our own force.

The CHAIRMAN. From our own—from the Island and to the Island. I am particularly thinking of interception of Japanese espionage or sabotage messages.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Oh, sir, that is done physically by the F. C. C. under the Army control.

Admiral REEVES. What is the F. C. C.?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Federal Communications Commission, sir. They have what they refer to as monitoring sets. We never use the term in what we speak of at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is what I got: "monitoring sets."

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, they use that term, and they consist of small mobile units which run around in automobile trucks,

and they get bearings and that sort of thing, and they will get the bearing from here (indicating) and run out two or three miles and get another bearing.

The CHAIRMAN. And find out where the set is working?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. They refer to those as monitoring sets.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And those are all under the control of the F. C. C.

The CHAIRMAN. They are?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. We have nothing to do with that at all.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose we can find out who has got [1102] control of that here?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, we can. The Army has been handling that matter. It probably would be Colonel Bicknell, and I understand there is some discussion now relative to coordinating some of the D. F.'s used by the various Naval air stations for homing planes, tying all those in together, but that has always been a function of the F. C. C.

The CHAIRMAN. You have nothing to do with it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. No, sir. Our business has to do with the Japanese, but I think there has perhaps been a little misconception, sir, there. When we refer to D. F. stations—direction finder stations—we are referring to the Navy net.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Which envisages picking up transmissions and running them through.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thought that perhaps your intelligence service was attempting to spot these little stations on the Island through this monitoring.

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. We are not designed for that.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Commander ROCHEFORT. As an example, our main D. F. station is very inaccurate under two or three hundred miles.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Commander ROCHEFORT. So it is of no advantage.

The CHAIRMAN. It wouldn't be useful?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. It is built for four or five thousand miles.

Admiral STANDLEY. Commander, what is the procedure in regard to guarding wave lengths of the different task groups, and that sort of thing, in the communication center?

Commander ROCHEFORT. You mean of our own transmission, sir?

[1103] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That is done by the District communication officer, sir. He controls certain frequencies of our transmission from the District communication offices at Wahiawa, and the fleet in turn guards the so-called fleet frequencies. The District guards the shore frequencies and the regular schedules with Washington, Cavite, and Dutch Harbor, and so on, and the fleet guards their own, and we are operating just the opposite way from that: we are guarding everybody else's frequencies but our own.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Your direction finder.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. We are not at all interested in our own transmission at all as to the combat intelligence unit.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think what the Chairman is after—I know what he is trying to get at is who received or would receive messages coming in here from various sources, some our own, some from operating outfits, shore boats, fishing boats, and what not. Would the guards of our wave lengths in the communication center give him that information?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. If the transmissions, either enemy or our own, were on frequencies or frequencies close to our own frequencies—that is, the frequencies assigned us by the Federal Communications Commission—were close to that, they would naturally intercept them. If, however, a transmission was made on a frequency which was not a fleet frequency or not a shore frequency, we will say perhaps a frequency that might have been assigned to the Germans, we would probably not be covering it here at all. It is purely a—

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then, there are two things that you probably aren't covering. You probably aren't spotting illicit sending stations on the Island at all, and you wouldn't [1104] be spotting communications into the Island unless they were on or near some of the frequencies you have; is that right?

Commander ROCHEFORT. If I may say so, I think we are still a little off from each other. I was referring initially to the direction finders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand this.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Now we are talking about transmissions that are either from enemy or our own. We make an attempt in our organization to cover every possible transmission that is being transmitted by the Germans, Italians, Japanese, or who it may be; and the number that we actually cover is limited only by the number of men we have and the number of receivers we have. At the present time we are covering in our so-called interceptor watch, which intercepts enemy transmissions in the form of radio messages and copies the radio messages intact—we are covering perhaps 10 to 15 to 20 frequencies which are more or less well-defined.

In other words, we know that Tokyo has a circuit with Sasebo and Kure and Yokosuka. We copy that constantly. In Tokyo is what we call the Yutsu broadcast, which is a fleet broadcast sent out to everybody, and we copy that, and we copy the various commanders-in-chief. We copy those so-called standard ones.

Then we have, in addition to that, what we call the search watch, depending again on the limitation of the number of operators, but each operator has usually two to three receivers, which is about his maximum he can control.

The CHAIRMAN. And he works around on different frequencies?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We just search from the bottom of the band to the top of the band; we just go from one end of it to the other.

The CHAIRMAN. And the search would be much more complete if you had a greater number of operators?

[1105] Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And less of an arc to cover?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The only limiting factor is the number of trained men and the number of receivers that are available.

Now, we have plenty of receivers, but the number of trained men is rather limited, and every effort has been made by everybody concerned—the Department, the fleet, and ourselves—to build that up, but the attrition is rather high, and at the present time we have 65, 70 men that are doing just that and nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course they have to work in short shifts, because it is very intense work?

Commander ROCHEFORT. It is rather intense, sir, because it differs from—in a technical sense it differs from our own in that our own stuff comes in very loud, it is our own language, and everything else; and this stuff we are getting—we have to reach out for it and pull it in. It is much more difficult to copy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. But we cover—I think that we may say that we cover the thing very completely.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, you have not got a net out for messages that are coming in to foreign agents on the Island here by little weak short-wave sets from somewhere else, have you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, but I think that we would hear them if they were, what you might say, on any standard frequencies or perhaps any standard transmitters, or if they were in a very low wave band or on a very high wave band we would miss them; but if they were on anything standard such as a trans-Pacific telephone between Tokyo and South America or on any of the propaganda broadcasts from Tokyo, on any of that sort of thing we would hear them, because we copy them fairly solid. We also copy the German schedules very [1106] solid that we can hear.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the other end of the proposition, picking up fellows who are illicitly sending from small sets on the Island, you are not equipped to pick them up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That is, not as a sender—as I said, it is the—that comes under the defensive; sabotage or anything of that nature is really the D. I. O. We are concerned with what the enemy fleet is doing.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand. Are there any further questions, gentlemen?

Admiral REEVES. I think we might in a sense cover the testimony that we have just had from the fleet intelligence.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I understood from him that much of the data which he sent he receives from your office.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Admiral REEVES. You collect it and transmit it to him?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I understood from him that there are blank spaces in the whereabouts of the Japanese carriers.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That you would hear them at times, and then there would be periods when you did not hear them, and you translated that to mean that they were perhaps in port; at least, they were maintaining radio silence on high frequency. Do you remember the last three of the Japanese carriers prior to December 7?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. Beginning about the——

Admiral REEVES. This is sort of repetition.

The CHAIRMAN. I know, but it straightens it up.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Beginning about the first of November it became apparent to us in a study of the traffic that there was something afoot. We couldn't put our hands on it as to what it was to be or any direction or anything [1107] else being indicated, but it became apparent that there was something building up. It had the same appearance as the move against Hainan some years ago and as the move against Indo-China last spring. We have been forecasting just by studying the traffic. Everything seemed to be centered around Palao. Then later the activities seemed to move out in this direction toward Jaluit, which indications were all reported by daily summaries to the fleet and to the Commandant.

About the 25th or 26th of November it also became apparent that there was a concentration of submarines and aircraft carriers, and it looked like one battleship division, in the Marshall area, which was one of the first indications we had had of close cooperation between the aircraft and the submarines. That built up until about the end of the month we were so sure of the thing and so positive that we sent a dispatch to the Department telling them of our thoughts on the matter, of what we had worked out, and it still looked like everything was down around Palao with the exception of these vessels over in the Marshalls that didn't make sense. We were quite positive that the carriers were there. We knew that. That was approximately the end of November or possibly the first of December.

Admiral REEVES. How many carriers did you estimate they had?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We estimated one division, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Two carriers?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Two carriers or possibly three.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And one battleship division, with all of the 4th Fleet submarines and at least one or two squadrons of submarines from the fleet itself. In other words, the submarines in the Marshalls had been built up quite a bit. About a day after that the carriers just completely dropped from sight; never heard another word from [1108] them. And the only thing we could say was that the carriers were not heard. We just hadn't heard the carriers any more. Whether they were the same carriers that came here, whether they were the covering force of carriers, of course, we don't know, but they just completely dropped out of the picture approximately the first of December; battleships likewise.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you hadn't located all the carrier fleet of Japanese planes in the Marshalls?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir; only one division.

The CHAIRMAN. But only a couple, one division?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, one division; it would be two or three.

The CHAIRMAN. And then there was information that one division was down in the neighborhood of Thailand with that enormous fleet down there?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, that was all stated also.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And that would leave a matter of four carriers unheard of anywhere, wouldn't it?

Admiral REEVES. Six.

The CHAIRMAN. Six?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. If there were three in the Marshalls and three in Thailand, that left them actually one carrier or one carrier and three converted carriers.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. A maximum of four.

The CHAIRMAN. But if there were two in each of those places it would have left them a maximum of six?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, including the converted carriers it left them that.

Admiral REEVES. There were either four or six whose whereabouts you didn't know?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, but these we did—

Admiral REEVES. Well, when did you hear of these carriers again?

[1109] Commander ROCHEFORT. The 7th of December, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Well, now, the carriers that attacked here, how many do you estimate in that fleet?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I estimate three, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Three?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Three, yes, sir. A possible four, but I am inclined to believe three, and the others were, I would say, in the immediate area within 500 miles.

Admiral REEVES. They were in reserve?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The other three, perhaps.

General McNARNEY. Can you name the ones that you think were here?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir: the Kaga, the Akagi, and the Soryu. If there was a fourth one it was the Hiryu. That is Cardiv 1 and Cardiv 2, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Well, which ones do you think were in the Marshalls?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The division in the Marshalls, sir, we thought at the time that it was Cardiv 1, the Kaga and the Akagi, but we weren't sure. There were no names mentioned.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, it was two of those that seem to have been here, isn't it?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they worked around, your theory—

Admiral REEVES. Did you hear the—is it Shokaku?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Shokaku.

Admiral REEVES. How do you spell it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. S-h-o-k-a-k-u.

Admiral REEVES. The Shokaku.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And the Zuikaku.

Admiral REEVES. How do you spell that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Z-u-i-k-a-k-u.

[1110] Admiral REEVES. Had you heard them at any time?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. They never appeared in the picture at all, but they were in the striking force. From the information

we received subsequent—that is, during the 7th—from guards and one thing and another, the striking force was composed of the Kaga, the Akagi, the Hiryu, the Soryu, the Shokaku, and Zuikaku, six carriers, the Kirishima and the Hiei, two old battleships.

Admiral REEVES. How do you spell Kirishima?

Commander ROCHEFORT. K-i-r-i-s-h-i-m-a. And the Hiei, H-i-e-i, two old battleships; and the two old cruisers, the Tone and the Chikuma.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. One desron and an unknown number of destroyers. That was the so-called striking force.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And it was listed as the No. 1 striking force.

Now, of those carriers either three or four came here.

Admiral REEVES. Were in the attack?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. The cruisers did not show up until the following day when the Abukuma sent a message that he bore 90 degrees 110 miles from somebody else, which indicated that he was actually with the organization. He belongs in the 4th Fleet normally, which is the Mandate fleet.

Admiral REEVES. Well, now let me ask: There were carriers operating in the vicinity of Wake Island?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know how many and which they were?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, it was the Soryu and Hiryu.

Admiral REEVES. The Soryu and Hiryu?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And the Soryu you think was here?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

[1111] Admiral REEVES. And the Hiryu?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The Hiryu, I question whether she was here or not. She may have been in this immediate area, but I question whether she participated in the attack.

Admiral REEVES. How do you spell Hiryu?

Commander ROCHEFORT. H-i-r-y-u, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And you are sure that they were at Wake Island?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. We gave a bearing to the fleet Sunday evening placing the Soryu by name close aboard Wake, I would say within a hundred miles of Wake, and it turned out that Wake had an attack that Sunday afternoon. We didn't know about that until later, but the radio bearings—he had given bearings—put the Soryu right close to Wake, about a hundred—between a hundred and two hundred miles to the northwest of Wake.

General McNARNEY. What date?

Admiral REEVES. What date?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That would be Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. December 2?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, that was the—

The CHAIRMAN. The following Sunday.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That was the day before Wake was captured.

Admiral REEVES. That would be December 14.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, that would be the following Sunday.

General MCCOY. Wake was captured the 22nd.

Commander ROCHEFORT. 22nd. It took two weeks. Yes, sir, it would be two weeks; it would be the 21st.

Admiral REEVES. It would be December 21?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. They had plenty of time to get there.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

[1112] Commander ROCHEFORT. We had run them out, sir—several times we had received bearings from the Soryu. On Tuesday, for example, we have a report here, which would be the 9th, they had some air operations, and they had some trouble, apparently. They lost some planes. They were conducting homing operations for planes on Tuesday, the 9th. That placed them about 500, 600 miles northwest of here on Tuesday, the 9th, and they were having some difficulty themselves with their planes.

Admiral REEVES. What other forces did you locate at Wake on the 21st?

Commander ROCHEFORT. On the 21st we located——

Admiral REEVES. Or about that date?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We located—during the night of Sunday we located what looked like a cruiser. We call them a fleet unit. We couldn't identify them: a cruiser and several Naval auxiliaries which Wake Island said the next day were transports.

Admiral REEVES. I see. Is this information given to the fleet?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Was it given—well, you wouldn't know, would you, whether it was given to the task force that he had operating near Wake at that time?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I didn't know that.

Admiral REEVES. You didn't know that?

Commander ROCHEFORT. The arrangements we make—we had and do have still now—are that we make a daily report to the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. A daily summary report. And in addition to that we give the Commander-in-Chief, as it occurs, anything of any immediate interest. Regardless of what it is, we give him that immediately. What action is taken on it, of [1113] course, we don't know.

Admiral REEVES. Well, did you know of our task force in the vicinity of Wake?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You did?

Commander ROCHEFORT. We did know that, and——

Admiral REEVES. Do you know how far our task force was from Wake on December 21 when you located these carriers there?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Not definitely, sir. I do know that they were to have landed their planes on Monday afternoon.

Admiral REEVES. The 22d?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, they were to have landed planes on Wake. I make that statement because the other fellow to the south was to have his D-day started at 1630 here Sunday, and this other thing

up at Wake was to have been 24 hours later, which would have placed it Monday afternoon our time, local time.

General McNARNEY. How soon after the attack December 7 did you have a definite location of any of the carriers or cruisers or battle-ships taking part in this task force?

Commander ROCHEFORT. About 10:30 Sunday morning we received one bearing from our radio station at Heeia. The CXK, the big radio direction at Lualualei, had gone out of commission due to a failure of communications. We didn't know at the time what it was, and yet still don't know. I am inclined to think it was just excitement of various people in pulling out plugs. We couldn't reach them through any communication, so we had to use the station at Heeia, which is a radio direction finder that can give only reciprocal. It is termed a bilateral one, and they gave us calls and they told us—this was approximately 10:30 Sunday morning—that the man in command was Commander Carrier Divisions. We had [1114] already identified him as Comcardivs, and they call themselves the 1st Air Fleet, but we had always identified him as Comcardivs or our Comairbatfor. He bore either 357 or 178. That was approximately 10:30 Sunday morning, and other bearings received from the same station were approximately on the same bearing. It varied two or three degrees one way or the other. Beginning about noon Sunday no other bearings—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, wait. That wouldn't identify them for an attack, would it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. This was two or three hours after the attack, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No, but if you wanted to go out and attack him, would that one bearing help you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would it show you he was?

Commander ROCHEFORT. He couldn't be more than 200 miles to the north or 200 miles to the south.

The CHAIRMAN. He would be either—

Commander ROCHEFORT. Either one or the other, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. One or the other.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. He had to be one or the other.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And through a limitation of aircraft operations he would be expected to be within 200 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Nothing else was heard that day from any of the units other than airplanes returning to the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. In which they gave numerous bearings, such as, "You bear from me 314" and "You bear from me 324," and "Your course is so and so." Other than those bits of information there were no transmissions from the ships [1115] until Tuesday, when the position of at least one carrier was fixed as being approximately four or five hundred miles between here and Midway to the north, generally on a line with the Island, sir; I would say probably a little north of French Frigate.

Admiral REEVES. Would not the reciprocal bearing which you had—What was it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. 178-357, sir.

Admiral REEVES. 178-357?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Would not that reciprocal, coupled with the message from the carrier to planes in the air, "You bear such a direction from me"—would not those two bearings identify the carrier as being north or south? That is on the assumption that the planes were between him and the Island somewhere.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. And if they bore 180 from the carrier, the carrier must be north of Oahu?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, do you mean to say that you would have deduced from that whether the carrier was north or south? You would have deduced—

Admiral REEVES. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —he was north?

Admiral REEVES. Now, we will say here this is 178—call it 180. That would mean that the carrier was due south of us. Or reciprocal 360 it would be due north of us.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral REEVES. Now, if the carrier radioed to a plane, "You bear 180 from me," the plane was south of the carrier.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, and going north.

Admiral REEVES. Returning from Oahu. Therefore the carrier must be north of Oahu.

[1116] The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Commander ROCHEFORT. I give this direction, sir, incidentally—when I say "314" it might have been 316, 315.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. This is from memory.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. The only thing we got after 10:30 were the fragments of plane text messages from the airplanes who were apparently lost.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Evidently still flying home to their carriers.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes. They were still going home, and it came about the same as this fellow who said that he was running out of gas.

Admiral REEVES. The direction finder on the carrier picks up the direction of the plane from the plane's radio and then informs the plane where he is in reference to the carrier.

General MCCOY. That was reported to the fleet intelligence officer, was it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. When I say the fleet intelligence officer I mean that the only people that we dealt with, by direction of the Commandant—and we still deal with them—is the fleet intelligence officer, and he is our—and he is the other end of the telephone line from us, and he feeds everything he gets from us to the proper sources.

General McNARNEY. Whose responsibility would it be to forward the information available at 10:30 a. m. on December 7, these bearings, to the task force then at sea?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, that would be an opinion on my part, sir; I would say the Commander-in-Chief.

General McNARNEY. It would not be yours?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. We are in a shore establishment, sir.

General McNARNEY. As soon as you transmit it to the [1117] fleet intelligence officer your responsibility for the dissemination of information has ceased?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir. You see, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief about the only way in which we were interested in the units at sea was in connection with the plot of the Pacific which we maintain; and in connection with that and the routing of convoys times will occur when convoys may pass close to one another without each one having any knowledge of that, and by arrangement with the Commander-in-Chief we were directed to inform those people direct, but other than that we have no—we would not issue any orders or issue any directives or anything to any AA units of the fleet, naturally.

General McNARNEY. Is this 10:30 December 7 the time of the receipt of this or the time of dispatch to the fleet intelligence officer?

Commander ROCHEFORT. They were practically simultaneous, sir. I say 10:30. It may have been 10:28 or 10:32; I mean it is an approximate time. It was still during the attack; the attack was still going on at that time. In other words, it was probably the first wave going back—the torpedo planes going back is what it was. Insofar as the responsibility of getting the information out, I am hardly qualified to pass on that.

General McNARNEY. Would that be Fleet Operations that should do that or Fleet Intelligence?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I don't think Fleet Intelligence would issue any instructions to the fleet, sir. At least, they didn't when I was in the fleet. Of course that depends on the organization of the staff, and it depends on the Commander-in-Chief's wishes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, gentlemen? Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. I wonder if Commander Rochefort has any [1118] information or intelligence that he thinks might be useful to the Commission in our investigation here that we haven't covered.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, of course we have that series of dispatches, and everything, that Mr. Justice Roberts just referred to, but of course there has been considerable work done on that sort of traffic, on the so-called diplomatic traffic, but there was very little attempt to cover any of the so-called consular traffic. In the first place, from personal knowledge of mine, we have been unable to get it from the companies.

The CHAIRMAN. They just wouldn't give it up?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, they were amply protected by law, sir.

The Chairman. I know they were.

Commander ROCHEFORT. And there was question there of jeopardizing themselves and running afoul of the various law agencies, and one thing another, we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. The net result being that no attempt had been made—no concerted effort had been made to get in until I understand Mr. Sarnoff was here, and we put it up to him again. I say “we”; I mean the people in the District. And I understand that he had made arrangements for obtaining it in the future. We could read most of that stuff as it came in. The simpler ones we could read. Of course, in the new system it would take a week or a month to run it through. For example, one message was sent on the 30th of December from Tokyo to Shanghai which was delivered to us and which we could read right off, but no attempt out here has been made to copy that sort of thing. We did have a large file of it that we have accumulated since the 7th of December, but—

Admiral REEVES. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[1119] The CHAIRMAN. Commander, I understand you to say that you think no difference in the plans would have been made if the Commander-in-Chief had had the Kita message of December 3 soon after it was sent?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. Because similar messages stating the in and out of the fleet and the constitution of the fleet in Pearl Harbor had been a common matter of sending back and forth, in your judgment?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Commander ROCHEFORT. That matter had been going on for a number of years.

The CHAIRMAN. That matter had been going on for a number of years?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Are you familiar with the message sent on the morning of December 7 by the chief of staff of the Army which was not received until later in the day?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir, I have not seen it.

General McNARNEY. Is there a copy of that available here?

The CHAIRMAN. December 7.

General McCoy. The message of Marshall says that didn't get through until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think it is in General Short's testimony. It is not in General Short's testimony, is it?

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the message in which he said that the negotiations—handed it to him at 1; I think he mentioned the hour 1 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, their burning their papers.

Commander ROCHEFORT. We had that information on Wednesday, sir, relative to the burning. As a matter of fact, we sent—

[1120] The CHAIRMAN. Now, you had information on Wednesday that the consul here was burning his papers, didn't you?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. We are the one that gave that to Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Commander ROCHEFORT. We told them he was. They told us that London and Washington were burning them, and then we told them also that these people here were.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Please observe the caution not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose that on the 7th you had gotten a message that indicated that the Japanese were presenting an ultimatum, that they were destroying their code machine and burning their codes, that the significance of this action was not understood but that everybody should be on the alert: would that have changed your view as to the probability of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor, as an experienced Naval officer?

Commander ROCHEFORT. If I had received a message such as that I would have taken whatever steps I could have taken to insure an adequate defense against sabotage and perhaps a daylight raid, insofar as the material would permit: in other words, insofar as the planes that we had. If I had received such a message I don't think that I would have expected six aircraft carriers the same day.

General McNARNEY. For the sake of argument, Commander, if you intercepted that message and you were the only one in receipt of it, what would you have done with it?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Well, that message there, sir, (indicating)?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Commander ROCHEFORT. You mean if I had been, say, the [1121] watch officer that received it?

General McNARNEY. That is right.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Or the duty officer that received it?

General McNARNEY. That is right.

Commander ROCHEFORT. I would have delivered it immediately to the senior officer, to the responsible officer.

General McNARNEY. Who would that be?

Commander ROCHEFORT. That would be the commanding general, sir. That is, I am assuming that is an Army message now. Or if it were a Navy message—

General McNARNEY. No; I mean it is a Navy message.

Commander ROCHEFORT. If it were a Navy message I would deliver it immediately to the Commandant; or if I were attached to the fleet I would deliver it immediately to the Commander-in-Chief.

General McNARNEY. With what recommendation or what remarks, as an intelligence officer, as we will assume that you were—let us go back now. We will assume that you delivered this message to Admiral Bloch and he asked you for your interpretation of it.

Commander ROCHEFORT. I would tell him it looked damn' bad and we ought to take whatever steps we could.

General McNARNEY. It to you would have been much more serious than the message referring to the signals that you spoke of at a later date?

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir, it would have been. Of course, the message referring to the signals, with what I know about the Japanese, were run by the foreign office people, having no connection with the military at all. In other words, the foreign office has always collected a vast amount of useless information. Our records over there indicated—we have hundreds of messages over there that are just trash collected by the foreign office, of which this report of [1122]

departures and arrivals and all that sort of thing, and burning of lights and that sort of thing, have been a part. However, any action indicated by the military of Japan, Army or Navy, would have been much more significant than anything started by the Foreign Office.

Admiral REEVES. You would have interpreted this message, would you, that it meant war?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I would have interpreted that message, sir, that it meant at least a complete breaking off of relations in the immediate future; at least that.

Admiral REEVES. Would you have considered this message more significant than a message which said, "This is a war warning"?

Commander ROCHEFORT. No, sir. That would have been fairly serious itself.

Admiral REEVES. You saw such a message, did you not?

Commander ROCHEFORT. I saw a message indicating a breakdown of negotiations, yes, sir. It started out something like that, a breakdown of negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that message look as if it were for military consumption rather than State Department consumption? And I now refer to the Kita message.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "Chief of Third Section," and so forth.

Commander ROCHEFORT. I may say so, sir, that those are our translations on there, and in many cases where they will refer a thing to the Third Section of the Naval General Staff or to the Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, and everything, it doesn't mean the same to them as it does to our Navy Department. It doesn't mean the same at all. For example, last summer all of the commercial shipping in the Pacific, all the Japanese commercial shipping in the Pacific, was controlled and handled by what we would call the Ship Movement Section of the Navy Department, and I don't believe it was the ship movement section of the Japanese Navy Department. I think it was a [1123] civilian organization, but it may or may not have had the orders from the Navy Department.

The CHAIRMAN. It may or may not have had what?

Commander ROCHEFORT. A directive from the Navy. They have so many things that are semi-military and semi-naval.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks, Commander.

Commander ROCHEFORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall adjourn until tomorrow morning at 9:30.

(Whereupon, at 5:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Saturday, January 3, 1942, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[1124]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1125] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

SATURDAY, JANUARY 3, 1942

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission; Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. I have a letter here under date 1 January 1942 from Admiral Bloch, which embodies a correction of certain of his testimony. I think the reporter should add this and have it embodied in the statement of his notes as part of Admiral Bloch's testimony. The letter is as follows:

When I was before the commission, questions were asked me about the anti-torpedo net at the entrance to Pearl Harbor, whether or not it was closed and whether or not it was possible for the enemy submarine to have followed some vessel in through the gate.

[1126] As I recall, I told the commission that the gate had been closed but that it had been opened to permit a garbage scow to pass in and that it might have been possible for the submarine to have followed this scow in. Since that time, I have ascertained that my statement before the commission was not entirely correct and I would like to revise it as follows:

"The procedure prior to December 7, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, only opening it when it was necessary for some vessel to pass through. It was opened at daylight, it being the idea that the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel and other vessels in that vicinity would detect any submerged or partially submerged submarine. On December 7, 1941, the net was opened at 0458 for two sweepers to enter, these vessels having been out for the regular morning sweep. As far as can be ascertained, the net was kept open

until 0840 when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted at 0745 by YT-153 near channel buoy No. 17, close to the coal dock. The time that the submarine passed the net is not known but it is probable that it passed in very close to 0700."

I request that you please bring this to the attention of the commission as the testimony which I gave before them was based on information which I then had but which now appears to be incorrect.

The CHAIRMAN. I have also a memorandum from Captain Mayfield, which I will ask the reporter to embody in the notes of today.

I will now read it:

JAN. 2, 1942.

Memorandum for the Commission.

Subject: Long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at Lanikai, Kalama and on island [1127] of Maul.

Subject message was received from the communication company and delivered via officer messenger to the office of Commander Rochefort on either December 4th or 5th 1941.

Decoding and translation were completed during night December 10th—11th, 1941.

I received a copy of the translation the forenoon of December 11th 1941.

Respectfully,

I. H. MAYFIELD,
Captain U. S. Navy.

Have the Major bring the first witness in.

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN NATHAN FREDERICK ASHER, U. S. S. BLUE, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name and rank to the reporter?

Ensign ASHER. Nathan Frederick Asher, Ensign, United States Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty were you performing on the morning of December 7?

Ensign ASHER. I was commanding officer, U. S. S. BLUE.

Admiral STANDLEY. U. S. S. BLUE?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, Destroyer 387, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you a Naval Academy graduate?

Ensign ASHER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What class?

Ensign ASHER. 1939, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was the BLUE when the attack began on Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?

Ensign ASHER. The BLUE is moored singly at Berth X-Ray 7; the HELM was alongside the BLUE that morning, but she got under way about 7 o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you tell us what you observed [1128] happened that morning?

Ensign ASHER. I was seated in the Wardroom with three other officers from the BLUE when the gangway watch notified me that the UTAH had been torpedoed by Japanese aircraft. I immediately dashed out of the Wardroom and ordered to sound the general alarm and to pass the word to man all battle stations.

I proceeded to the bridge and there I saw a number of Japanese airplanes diving at ships in Pearl Harbor. I called the engine room

and told the engineer to light off No. 2 boiler. No. 1 boiler was already lit off for auxiliary purposes.

I told the control man to notify the control to open fire immediately on enemy planes. I did not wait for any signal to open fire because I had heard some machine-gun fire from other ships in the harbor.

We had no ammunition by the guns; all ammunition was in the magazine. We had approximately 960 rounds of .50 caliber machine-gun bullets belted at each machine.

We opened fire with our machine guns at approximately five minutes after 8, and about seven minutes after 8 we opened up with our 5-inch guns, with our main battery, at the Japanese planes diving in the harbor.

The signal was hoisted in our sector to prepare to get under way, and we had already made our preparation, and upon the execution of that signal I ordered the chain unshackled and we cut loose our wire to free ourselves from the buoy in the quickest manner, and we proceeded out of the channel through the north channel out of Pearl Harbor.

While we were under way we maintained our fire at the Japanese planes diving at the ships and we saw four planes that I think we shot down—four planes in the attack.

Before we got under way No. 4 gun crew shot a plane which crashed near Pearl City. When the crew saw that plane down, [1129] they stopped shooting and proceeded to pat each other on the back. Then the chief gunner's mate went back there, thinking there was a casualty because he did not hear the firing. Then they went back to their battle stations and continued fire.

When we got abeam where the UTAH had been torpedoed we noticed a lot of wood floating in the water. I presume that came from the topside of the UTAH after she had gone down. We stopped our engines so we would drift through it without causing any damage to our hold plating.

When we were abeam of Westlock Channel we saw a series of bombs, which I first thought was the ammunition dump going up but which I now believe was just a series of six bombs dropped by planes which dove at us.

When we neared the entrance of the channel we were attacked by approximately three or four planes, and we were hit by none.

When we were abeam Weaver Field, I went at 25 knots. There was a mine sweeper in front of me, and I did not see his paravane and I ran through his paravane and I believe I cut it in two.

Before we had gotten under way I received a signal over the voice radio to sortie eastward, and I believe that came from Batdiv 4. I set the course 120 through and proceeded to a regular assigned sector, patrol sector 3. When I got to the middle sector, I slowed down to 10 knots and started patrolling, using the echo range.

About 20 minutes after we slowed down I noticed that we had our first contact about 1300 yards. I developed the contact and dropped four depth charges.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was a submarine contact?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, a submarine contact. I ran by the spot where I dropped the depth charges and turned around and picked up what I thought was the same contact and I didn't know whether it was the

first contact or another because the second contact was in approximately the same position. I [1130] dropped two additional depth charges. I then turned around and observed a large oil slick on the water, and we observed bubbles coming to the surface along the length of approximately 200 feet.

At that time everybody on the bridge thought the submarine was coming to the surface; so I ordered action to the starboard and to man the batteries ready to open fire if she did surface, but nothing ever developed from that. So I believe that submarine was sunk.

Then we proceeded patrolling, and in about 30 minutes after that the ST. LOUIS came steaming out, and we got our third contact, and that contact was in the vicinity of the ST. LOUIS.

I hoisted the signal emergency unit. I believe it was 2:10. I do not recall the exact number. I headed at flank speed to the spot and dropped two additional depth charges. I circled around and observed an oil slick over that depth charge from that contact. I did not see any air bubbles rising to the surface as on the second attack.

Then the ST. LOUIS sent us a visual to screen. I took the screen and we proceeded at a course 180. We were joined by the MONAGHAN and the PHILLIPS, and the BLUE took the screen station to the starboard, and the MONAGHAN took the screen station to the port bow of the ST. LOUIS, and the ST. LOUIS sent us a signal.

They had received word that there were enemy ships off Barbers Point. The ST. LOUIS sent us a signal to proceed to engage the enemy. We cleared the ship for action—we started to clear the ship before we got under way from Pearl Harbor. Then we got our torpedoes ready for torpedo attack. We had nine torpedoes ready for attack and we got our smoke devices ready to lay a screen. We headed for Barbers Point but did not see anything, and we later joined the rest of the force, which consisted of the ST. LOUIS plus Desron 1, Desron 6, [1131] the DETROIT, the NEW ORLEANS, and the PHOENIX.

We joined that force, and the BLUE was directed to take a station five miles off in place of the DETROIT; so we joined the remainder of our division. While we were proceeding to join the rest of our division, the torpedo war head fell on deck and started to roll around. I was forced to slow down to five knots, and the chief torpedo man grappled with the war head and chucked it over the side on my orders because I did not think we had time to lash it securely.

Then we joined the rest of our force and later on formed the disposition for that night.

The following morning we were directed to screen the ENTERPRISE with Destroyer Squadron 1 and return to Pearl Harbor Monday evening at 9 o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the BLUE in for?

Ensign ASHER. It was in for regular buoy upkeep.

Admiral STANDLEY. Buoy upkeep?

Ensign ASHER. Yes. We had just returned from a week's operation at sea. We returned on Friday.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not expect quite to get away before the end of the week?

Ensign ASHER. No, sir, we expected to be in port about another week.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you the senior officer on board that morning?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What other officers are there on board the BLUE that are senior to you?

Ensign ASHER. The commanding officer and the executive officer, the gunnery officer and the engineering officer.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were ashore?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir, they were ashore.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that the routine procedure for destroyers to go in for weekly overhauls?

[1132] Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir. We have four qualified officers on the deck in port and we stand one and four. The four are the gunnery officer, the engineering officer, the communications officer, and myself.

The communications officer was ashore at the time plus another reserve engineer.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there a senior officer assigned to the group under overhaul?

Ensign ASHER. Normally there is, sir, yes, but the HELM had left us that morning at approximately 7 o'clock to go to Westlock, and we were left singly at the buoy.

Admiral STANDLEY. So you were the senior officer present at that time by the buoy?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many men of the crew were on board, or what percentage of the crew were on board that morning?

Ensign ASHER. I think it was approximately 80%, sir. That is about 135 men.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did they have liberty the previous evening?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When did that liberty expire?

Ensign ASHER. Well, for the chief and the first-class petty officers it did not expire until 7:30 Monday morning, and for other ratings it expired on board 1 o'clock Sunday morning.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many planes would you estimate you observed in the attack from the time you opened fire until you went out of the channel and were outside?

Ensign ASHER. I would say about 80 planes, sir; there were a number of them that were flying very high in groups of five or six. They were out of range of our AA guns flying from the south, flying north, and took a course directly [1133] over Ford Island. I observed about four flights of these planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What height would you estimate they were flying?

Ensign ASHER. Oh, I am hardly a good judge of height, and my estimate would not be anything but a guess, but I would say they were about 15,000 feet or more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you talk with any air men in regard to the height of these planes as to what their height was?

Ensign ASHER. No, sir, I have not.

General McCoy. With respect to the height of these planes did you notice what type planes they were? Do you think they were

a different type from those that were flying low, or were they simply planes which had gone up after making the attack?

Ensign ASHER. I think they were planes that went up after making the attack, sir. They looked to be the same kind. I did not bother to look at them very long because I was very busy with other things at the time, but they looked to be the same type. They did not look like any large bombers. They were single-engine size.

General MCCOY. Were you conscious of recognizing any torpedo planes?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir. I recognized a number of torpedo planes. They seemed to be the ones that were flying very low and making deliberate attacks on the battleships. They were flying at a height of a few hundred feet.

General MCCOY. . You spoke of one that was shot.

Ensign ASHER. Yes, they shot the wing off that one.

General MCCOY. Was that a torpedo plane?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir, that was a torpedo plane.

General MCCOY. There has been talk in the newspapers about dive bombers. Did you see what seemed to be dive bombers, or were they simply low-flying bombing planes?

Ensign ASHER. I would say they were low-flying planes, [1134] sir. I did not see any dive-bomber attacks. They all flew very low. None of them came in from any high altitude at a steep angle to make an attack. I would say they were all low-flying bombers.

Admiral STANDLEY. You said your ammunition of your 5-inch guns was in the magazine. You had ammunition in belts at the machine guns?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Ensign ASHER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the state of readiness of your anti-aircraft battery and machine guns?

Ensign ASHER. We had belted ammunition, 960 rounds at each gun, and the ready boxes were dogged down. That was at the station.

Admiral STANDLEY. What about the crews for the guns?

Ensign ASHER. We did not have any guns manned. We did not have any readiness at the guns.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there any order in regard to having the crews available to man these guns?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir, from the duty section. We have men for each station from the duty section, and we would still be able to open fire with all machine guns and two AA guns.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, in the routine orders the men who are on leave do not amount to sufficient number to destroy a full crew for every gun? You keep sufficient for your guns always?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir, we do.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the men on the BLUE when they got back on Saturday night?

Ensign ASHER. There were several men who, I would say, had been drinking and still had a hangover, but in the morning of the attack they all snapped to and very readily and they [1135] all remarked that they had never sobered—the few that were under the

influence of liquor—later said they had never sobered up so fast in their lives, and one of these same men performed very outstanding work, as range operator, and later worked as range finder operator.

General McCoy. Did your crew click after the first surprise?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, sir, they clicked 100%, and I think we were one of the first to open fire with the 5-inch battery, I believe, in that vicinity, and our machine guns opened very promptly, and I still do not see how they got their ammunition from the magazines to the guns in the fast and swift manner that they did.

We maintained our continuous fire without any interruption except when the No. 4 ammunition hoist stopped and we failed to get ammunition up to No. 4 again for a while, but that was very readily repaired. The fault in that was due to the oil being shut off by mistake.

General McCoy. Will you explain that incident in full, please?

Ensign ASHER. Well, when the ammunition hoist stopped, this gun captain from No. 1 gun went to No. 4 ammunition handling room to try to repair the casualty, and they could not get the hoist started. He got on his knees and started to pray and said, "Oh, Lord! Oh, Lord! Make this gun ammunition hoist work just this once." He was praying with tears coming from his eyes, and this tall colored fellow who was stationed in the handling room, looked down and said, "Why, Smith, you got the oil turned off."

He immediately jumped to his feet and said, "It's all right, Lord, I got it now." They got the hoist started and got the ammunition up.

After we got out of the channel, there was one thing I left out. As soon as we cleared the channel I lit off No. 3 [1136] and 4 boilers so we would have enough steam for maximum speed, and they kept the four boilers lit until we returned to port on Monday night.

We took our ammunition and filled up my stateroom plus the communication officer's stateroom with star shells. We kept those staterooms filled. Then we replenished our depth charge racks after we joined the rest of the force.

We did that while going out at 20 knots, and I think they did very excellent work, the men taking those depth charges out of the storage lockers and putting them in the racks at that speed.

General McCoy. Were you on the bridge all this time?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, I was on the bridge until I returned to port Monday night. The control officer remained in control during the entire period, and the assistant first lieutenant went about the ship attempting to bolster up the morale of the crew, which I ordered him to do, and I ordered that the crew be properly fed. We set up three messes while we were out and fed them regular chow.

General McCoy. Did he report favorably about the morale?

Ensign ASHER. He reported favorably about the morale of the crew, and I think the morale was outstanding.

Soon after that I set Condition 3 watch to maintain readiness at machine guns and all AA guns plus the torpedo tubes. Then we let them go below and sleep, but they said they would rather stay at the guns and be there in case anything happened.

They did sleep at their guns, and there was one man selected to remain awake at all times so he could wake them up instantly. The

men preferred to remain at their battle stations until they returned to port to the regular Condition 3 watch.

General McCoy. Were you fully equipped while you were on the bridge with weapons, field glasses, and so forth?

[1173] Ensign ASHER. We had field glasses, yes, sir. We did not have any small arms on the bridge.

General McCoy. What did you do with the field glasses?

Ensign ASHER. Well, I threw the field glasses overside. I do not know what my motive was. I just was kind of mad.

General McCoy. Did you throw your field glasses at anything?

Ensign ASHER. Well, just in the direction of a diving plane, sir. It was just a momentary outbreak, I guess, sir.

General McCoy. They were flying very close?

Ensign ASHER. Yes, they seemed to be coming in between the WHITNEY and the BLUE, and then headed down the north channel launching the torpedoes.

General McCoy. Whom was your ship named after?

Ensign ASHER. After Victor Blue, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know what Admiral Victor Blue did in the Spanish War?

Ensign ASHER. I do not know exactly, sir. I know he performed outstandingly in the Spanish-American War, sir.

General McCoy. Yes, he was one of the heroes of that war, and I hope there will be a similar instance here.

That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have a few questions. I notice that Admiral Nimitz is trying to get some Naval Crosses for some of the members of the Navy. Were you included in that? Have you received any commendation for your work on that day?

Ensign ASHER. No, sir, thus far I have received no word, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. We are indebted to you for your testimony, Ensign. Please do not indicate to anyone what has gone on in this room.

Ensign ASHER. No, sir. Thank you, sir.

[1138] General McCoy. I have one or two questions. Wait a moment.

Were they Naval officers or Reserve officers?

Ensign ASHER. They were Reserve officers, sir. I wish to commend them very highly, sir. I did so in my letter to the Commander-in-Chief on the report of the air raid.

They were Ensign Moldafsky, who is now torpedo officer and communications officer while the regular communications officer was in the hospital. That is, he was formerly communications officer.

There is also Ensign Wolfe, who was assistant gunnery officer who performed remarkably well and remained in control during the entire time and solely controlled the battery during the fire; also Officer Scott, who is a newcomer to the BLUE as my assistant. He was greatly responsible for keeping up the morale of the men. He circled around the ship, giving them the glad hand.

That is about all I have to add.

General McCoy. Thank you very much.

Ensign ASHER. Thank you, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF CHIEF CHARLES HERBERT SHAW, CHIEF TORPEDO
MAN, U. S. S. BLUE, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name and rank to the reporter?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Charles Herbert Shaw, Chief Torpedoman, U. S. S. BLUE.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty were you performing on the morning of December 7?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. While I was on board I was chief torpedoman on the ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. The U. S. S. BLUE?

[1139] Chief Torpedoman SHAW. The U. S. S. BLUE, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What time did you report on board?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. I stayed on board the whole 48; I didn't go ashore.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you on the duty section?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you a part of the duty section?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know approximately how many of the C. P. O.'s were on board?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. I believe they were ashore, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many are there on board?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, I do not know, just offhand, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. About how many are there?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. About 14, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. About 14?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you tell the Commission your experiences on the morning of December 7?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, we were just about finishing breakfast.

Admiral STANDLEY. Finishing breakfast at what time?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, it seemed to be just about five minutes to 8, because the general alarm went off, and everybody made the remark, "General alarm on Sunday morning? What has happened? What's funny about it?" because we usually do not—we usually sound the general alarm every morning to test out, except Sunday morning.

About that time the chief quartermaster on duty went up on deck and then came back and passed the word that the Japanese were attacking us and to man the machine guns.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then what happened?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. At that time I came up and I had six torpedoes which I had brought below, the water compartments and the fuel tanks, and there were two of them charged up, and also one of the ones was in the shack and the after body was on deck. So, the first thing I did was to get these charges up and in a fully ready condition and also the other one back together and put them in a ready condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. What happened to that torpedo that was not together?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. The one that missed fire?

Admiral STANDLEY. The one that the boy lost overboard.

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. We had the torpedo all ready and the tripping latch on the tube was on. I was standing alongside there. We closed the door on the impulse charge chamber and were putting in another impulse when it went off.

As the torpedo went off, it went forward and broke the guide stud and the head went off on the deck, and that was rolled over the side. We were just making a turn about that time, and they pushed it off.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean when the torpedo was fired?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, sir, that torpedo fired.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then what happened to it?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. The torpedo fired in the tube. After it was turned forward, the forward torpedo was turned aft, and when the torpedo fired it sheared the guide stud off the head and the air flask, and it dropped on the deck and they pushed it over the side.

Admiral STANDLEY. These were war heads?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, sir. That front nose ring was smashed and it cut through the middle of the war head itself where it hit the other forward head. That head there was smashed up on the side, and the torpedo in the forward tube had gone forward and broke the guide stud. As it hit there it bounced forward again and the tripping latch in the tube was down; so that started the torpedo off. It was in a fully ready condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did it explode after it went overboard?

[1141] Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir. I imagine the fan was out of shape when she turned over.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was unarmed?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. It was unarmed, but in a fully ready condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. It would have required a run to be armed?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Let me see if I get this straight for the moment. One torpedo in the after tube was turned forward?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the forward torpedo tube was turned aft?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And one torpedo had the impulse charge in the chamber and it went off?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And it fired off the torpedo?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And that torpedo hit the forward tube?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And the head was sheared off?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. The torpedo in the after tube was sheared.

Admiral REEVES. The bolts or rivets were sheared off from the air flask?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That was the head that went on deck?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Did you do anything then?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. The torpedo in the after tube—the air flask to the air body that was aft, that I had to crawl in there and to line the turn aft and to secure that the best way I could because here was no guide stud holding [1142] it back, and the same way with the forward tube. I had that to line up, too, to close the air arm to keep them from running.

Admiral REEVES. Has the BLUE standard torpedoes?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir. We have four-barreled torpedoes.

Admiral REEVES. Those are the two torpedoes?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, sir, on the starboard side.

Admiral REEVES. The others were already in commission?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. When did you get those torpedoes to the disabled side?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Those torpedoes were all ready, I would say, about 12 or 1 o'clock. All the torpedoes were ready in the station.

Admiral REEVES. You were busy then most of the time with these torpedoes?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then you did not observe much about the planes?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Just what I could see from the starboard side.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there anything that you think would be of interest to the Commission?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, I don't know, sir, unless it would be these logs and the smoke as we were going out. I think we were very lucky with these logs and the smoke.

I also did observe what seemed to be a string of bombs going up Westlock that seemed to explode, and the first group seemed to hit in the channel on the left bank, and the other group hit just inside the jungle and you could see the spouts in the sand.

They got outside and depth charged. I did not observe what happened to the first one, but after the second one there seemed to be a big black oil slick come up.

[1143] Admiral STANDLEY. Do depth charges themselves make any oil slick?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, I don't know, sir. Most of the times I have seen them if the water is a little shallow, they will kind of have a muddy stuff come up, but this time it seemed to be a black oil slick. It was not that of mud.

Admiral STANDLEY. In this case what was it?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. In this case it seemed to be like an oil slick.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you married?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is your wife here?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir, she is in San Diego.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are the habits generally of the petty officers and chief petty officers when they go to shore? Do they go up to Honolulu frequently at nights? I mean those whose families are not here. What is the general practice, if you know?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, on the BLUE, I don't think the men stay in town very much.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long has the BLUE been here?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. It first came out when the fleet came out in 1939 and then went back to the States one time for about six weeks, and for a longer time at Bremerton for overhaul. I believe that is all except I went down to San Diego one time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you been ashore in Honolulu on any Saturday nights?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. I have quite a while back, but I have not been ashore in about six weeks now.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the general condition around Honolulu with respect to the liberty men? Do the liberty men usually visit places on shore leave?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, most of the fairly decent [1144] places are so crowded that you can hardly get in any of them, it seems to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Most of what?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Places you can get a beer or something like that, but you can get that just any place.

General McCoy. Are there any places that the sailors can go to such as the YMCA's or any clubs kept up by any organizations here for the benefit of the enlisted personnel?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. I believe there is, but the only place I have ever gone to was the YMCA.

General McCoy. Is that an adequate and pleasant place to go to?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Well, it seemed pleasant enough to go to, but there are so many trying to get accommodations there that it—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it is overcrowded?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, it is overcrowded and if you go ashore on Saturday and if you do not get a room by 1 o'clock there is no use in going, because they are all filled.

General McCoy. Was that the only place in which you could get a room?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, there are several other hotels. The only other place I ever stayed at was the Alexander Young.

General McCoy. Have you ever been to the Outrigger Canoe Club?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No.

General McCoy. Have you ever heard of it?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, I haven't, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the shape of the men on this Sunday morning when they came back from leave?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. This Sunday morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. One of the first ones to man the torpedoes came back 20 minutes before it happened, and I saw [1145] nothing wrong with him, because he performed his work right along with me.

The CHAIRMAN. You saw nothing about him in the way of intoxication?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir, not in the BLUE.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the BLUE?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Around the streets when you finished your work, did you notice any unusual conditions, evidences of drunkenness in the street among the men?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, no more than it looked more suspicious because a man would be in uniform, but I don't think any more than in any other place.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you ashore in San Diego?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you notice the conditions there of a great many sailors on the streets on Saturday nights?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. When I have been there it seemed to me just about the same as here.

Admiral STANDLEY. About the same as here?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you notice any particular difference in the conduct of the men there and here?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Not except probably I think a little better.

Admiral STANDLEY. A little better here?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. No, a little better at San Diego. They seemed to be more happy there than here. That is all.

Admiral REEVES. How many torpedo tubes are mounted on the BLUE?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Four four-barrel tubes.

Admiral REEVES. What number of torpedoes does she carry?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Sixteen.

Admiral REEVES. One for each tube?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

[1146] Admiral REEVES. When you cleared the entrance that Sunday morning, how many of those tubes and torpedoes were ready and in commission?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Nine torpedoes were ready to fire except to put the impulse charge in.

Admiral REEVES. You had them ready at noon?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes, just about noon, because all we had to do was charge the air flask and refill them with fuel and water and ignite them.

Admiral REEVES. Those were torpedoes under overhaul?

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Admiral REEVES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss with anyone on the outside what has been said in this room.

Chief Torpedoman SHAW. Yes.

Colonel BROWN. This is Ensign Landreth.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Ensign?

**TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN LEWIS LANDRETH, U. S. S. NEVADA,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name and rank?

Ensign LANDRETH. John Lewis Landreth, Ensign.

Admiral REEVES. Where are you stationed, Ensign?

Ensign LANDRETH. On the NEVADA, sir.

Admiral REEVES. What special duty do you have there?

Ensign LANDRETH. I was in the anti-aircraft section, sir. I was in the anti-aircraft directory.

Admiral REEVES. Controlling the fire for the anti-aircraft operations?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Where were you on Sunday morning, December 7?

Ensign LANDRETH. I was on board, sir.

[1147] Admiral REEVES. Will you tell the Commission what you experienced and what you saw on that Sunday morning?

Ensign LANDRETH. Well, when I got up to my station I saw the ARIZONA already, directly ahead of the NEVADA, already in a very bad shape. She was afire and down by the bow and sinking rapidly. She looked to be in a very bad condition.

General MCCOY. How soon was this after the attack?

Ensign LANDRETH. It was about three minutes after 8. That is as close as I can say.

General MCCOY. You were below deck when it happened?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, I was below deck when the general alarm went.

Admiral REEVES. Proceed with your statement.

Ensign LANDRETH. Then the directory got on some high-altitude bombers and began to pick up some coming straight down the line, down the battle line, and it was a few minutes after this that we received the first torpedo.

The plane came in very close, about midway of the channel, and dropped his torpedo and then turned right.

Admiral REEVES. How far was she when he dropped the torpedo?

Ensign LANDRETH. She was about midway in the channel, I would say, about 500 yards, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did you see her drop the torpedo?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes. After we got the torpedo, it evidently didn't cause a great deal of jar, not as much as we expected; but it did jar loose her synchronizer from the range finder. Then it was a little difficult and slower because of the limited field of the range finder; so we went into local control until we could get on with both the director and the range finder, at which time we went back into direct control.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the plane which fired that torpedo hit by anything?

Ensign LANDRETH. Not until after it dropped its torpedo. [1148] I did not see it hit, but I understood it was hit when it turned away and went astern, and there was a man with the .30 caliber machine gun and I understand that man riddled the plane and it crashed aft of the NEVADA.

There was a second torpedo plane came in at us which did not get to us. It apparently was hit by machine-gun fire. It seemed afire and it started to smoke. It then turned to the left and went away without firing its torpedo on us.

During the next hour we picked up some high-altitude bombers as best we could and got in to shift to direct control as soon as possible, and we stayed in local control until we could get set on it.

After about an hour the ship got under way. When we got about in the middle of the channel we were then attacked by dive bombers, and of course our setup there was under local control. [1149] We could do nothing but watch up in the directory. They dropped quite a few on us before any hit, probably ten, fifteen, maybe ten or fifteen came in and dropped, and they were going some short, and sprays were rising out in the water probably a hundred, two hundred feet, and others were going over us, over toward Ford Island, and then we began to get hits. The most noticeable to us were the ones that—one went right through our directory platform. We had—three planes came in. One plane came in and dropped one short. We could see that one go short and land out in the water. Another one came in a little too far to the left and dropped it over us, and the third one came in right in between those, and we could see before he did that it was going to be fairly close, and when he dropped it the bomb came right directly at our directory, and we were certain it was going to hit us. It hit about a foot from the director and went through the director platform, went through the navigation bridge deck, went through the signal bridge and down into the captain's cabin and exploded somewhere probably below the captain's cabin, caused great damage in personnel in casemate 4 and casemate 6, just went below and was stopped by the third deck, armor deck.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your captain aboard?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was in command?

Ensign LANDRETH. Lieutenant Commander Thomas was the duty commander, and he was in charge of the ship, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, after that last bad hit what did you do? What did the ship do?

Ensign LANDRETH. Well, we stayed there, and very shortly after that we received another hit on the boat deck, and we were also receiving hits all this time on the forecastle. In fact, we were hit on the forecastle before we were hit—got the [1150] hit through the director platform, several hits. The first one, the chief boatswain's mate, was on the forecastle directing activities up there, and a direct hit struck up there which killed him, hit very close to him.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to go on out of the channel?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir. We went over by the floating drydock first. We were given orders not to go out of the channel. We went over by the floating drydock, and then we got away from there. A destroyer I understand exploded over there, and we went over where we are now across from the air station.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you go over there under your own power, so far as you know?

Ensign LANDRETH. I think we were aided by tugs at that point, although I am not absolutely certain of that, sir. After we got over there the activity subsided. We looked around, and we couldn't get communications with the guns, and everything apparently was abandoned on the boat deck. Of course we had had great casualties, especially from the bomb that had struck on the boat deck, so we abandoned our station, went into sky patrol where Ensign Taussig was. Ensign Taussig had been hurt very early in the battle. He was in the starboard director. And went out and looked around, and things

were pretty much afire around. The signal bridge was ablaze, and had gone up to the navbridge and coming up on top our own platform. In fact, just before we took Ensign Taussing down, the sky control was beginning to blaze on the starboard side.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get that fire out?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir. That went for quite a while, that blaze, and practically it destroyed most of the structure up there.

General MCCOY. When did you abandon ship?

[1151] Ensign LANDRETH. We didn't abandon ship, sir. We stayed on the ship throughout. The battle was over. We took Ensign Taussing down, and by that time officers who had not been on the ship were coming on the ship, and they were organizing firefighting parties, and we were trying to—we didn't have any water up on the boat deck to fight fire. We were trying to get all the ammunition out of the ready boxes to keep them from exploding. On the port side we did get all ammunition on out. On the starboard side there was one ready box that exploded. We went below to attempt to get water up there to fight the fires, and the engineers were having some difficulty in getting the water up there. Then we had very little ammunition up, and our hoists were no longer operative, and so we went—I went below to attempt to get some ammunition up. By this time there were officers had come aboard and had taken charge of the anti-aircraft battery. Plenty of officers up there at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still living on the NEVADA?

Ensign LANDRETH. Not living on her, sir. We are still standing watches out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. There is a watch on board. Where did you get the water to fight the fire with on the upper deck when you didn't have any water on board before?

Ensign LANDRETH. They were fighting fire with both buckets and with firefighting equipment, their CO₂.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did the tugs that pushed you over there, shoved you over there—did they take part in the firefighting?

Ensign LANDRETH. I am not certain about that, sir. I was below decks trying to get water from the engineers, and we were trying to get ammunition. I wasn't up there during most of the firefighting.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were on deck during most of the [1152] attack, practically all through the attack?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir. I was in the director during the entire battle, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the altitude or elevation of the director? How long does it take you to get up there, when one is down below? Is it an elevated station?

Ensign LANDRETH. How high is it?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, how high.

Ensign LANDRETH. It is just above the navigation bridge, sir. From the boat deck, next is the signal bridge, then the navigation bridge, and then we are right on the deck above that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your estimate of the number of planes that took part in that attack that morning?

Ensign LANDRETH. In the—on the entire—?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, during the entire morning. What would be your estimate?

Ensign LANDRETH. I would have said between 150 and 200 planes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you observe high flights of planes?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your estimate of the height of those planes?

Ensign LANDRETH. I estimated them at 10,000 feet, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they high bombers or were they apparently planes that had expended their ammunition and were flying back over?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir; they were high-altitude bombers.

Admiral STANDLEY. High bombers?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir. They were flying in in V formation.

General McNARNEY. Did your director indicate an altitude which you could read off?

[1153] Ensign LANDRETH. It did, but I don't remember what it was, sir. I don't remember observing that.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the direction from which this flight came, if you observed from what direction?

Ensign LANDRETH. It came from dead ahead, right down the battle line, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that a torpedo plane, the first plane?

Ensign LANDRETH. Oh, the torpedo plane——

Admiral STANDLEY. No; I mean the first flight that you observed. What was that? Was it torpedo or was it strafing, or what kind of a flight?

Ensign LANDRETH. The first that I observed was the torpedo planes. I understand the strafing planes came in first. I understand on the starboard side while I was up there there was still strafing going on, but I didn't observe any strafing.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now this is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral REEVES. You have described one torpedo hit on the NEVADA alongside your mooring, and a second torpedo plane which turned away without launching its torpedo. Were there any other torpedo hits on the NEVADA at her mooring?

Ensign LANDRETH. Not as far as I know, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Were there any bomb hits on the NEVADA at her mooring?

Ensign LANDRETH. I do not believe so, sir. I believe the bomb hits were all received after she got out into the channel.

Admiral REEVES. All the bombing, then, on the NEVADA occurred while she was under way, and not while she was stationed at her mooring?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir.

[1154] Admiral REEVES. Were there any other torpedo attacks on the NEVADA after she got under way?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir, not as far as I know.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know where the torpedo hit the NEVADA?

Ensign LANDRETH. It hit her forward, sir, about a hundred feet—a hundred and fifty feet from the bow.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know why it became necessary to beach the NEVADA? Was it due to that torpedo hit?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir, I don't believe it was, although it might have been.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know of any other underwater damage to the NEVADA except the torpedo hit?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir. Of course it has—now it has quite a few holes in it caused from the bombs, that are under water. It was an hour after we got the torpedo hit that we got under way, sir. That's the reason I say that I don't think the torpedo caused the necessary—caused the beaching.

Admiral REEVES. I have no more questions.

General MCCOY. Did the captain get back aboard ship before the ship was aground?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir, I don't believe so. I think it was after it was aground, although I am not certain of that either, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you a part of the duty section that night?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You could have gone ashore had you wanted to?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you know of the number or of the percentage of the crew that were on board?

[1155] Ensign LANDRETH. Percentage of the crew or the officers, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. The crew that was on board the next morning.

Ensign LANDRETH. It would have been a pretty high percent of the crew aboard, sir, because almost all our—most of our men were aboard, sir: that is, in the Sixth Division, and I think there was a high percentage of the crew was aboard.

Admiral STANLEY. What percentage of the officers would you say were on board?

Ensign LANDRETH. I would say 95%.

Admiral STANDLEY. What complement—what was the number of officers required to be on board to satisfy the duty conditions?

Ensign LANDRETH. One-fourth, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the contemplated officers total complement of the Nevada?

Ensign LANDRETH. I am not absolutely certain of the figure, sir. I think there was about 80.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many officers like you who were not in the duty section were on board that morning?

Ensign LANDRETH. Well, there weren't a great number, although I am not certain of a figure, sir. I don't think there were very—there were not an awful lot, not very many.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did any cases come under your observation where you think that enlisted men were not fit for duty that morning on account of drunkenness?

Ensign LANDRETH. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Insobriety?

Ensign LANDRETH. None came under my observation.

Admiral STANDLEY. They all functioned and performed their duties under stress?

[1156] Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir. They were all—our division I think did very well, sir, in all cases. I saw no cases that didn't perform better than we expected them to.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ensign. Please observe the rule not to speak of what has gone on in this hearing room to anyone outside.

Ensign LANDRETH. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Admiral REEVES. What class were you in at Annapolis?

Ensign LANDRETH. '41, sir.

Admiral REEVES. '41?

Ensign LANDRETH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Larkin, will you be sworn?

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLAUDE A. LARKIN,
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name and rank?

Colonel LARKIN. Claude A. Larkin, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Larkin, what is your duty on the island of Oahu, or was it on December 7?

Colonel LARKIN. I am in command of the flying field at Ewa.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to the attack what force of planes and what types of planes did you have under your command there?

Colonel LARKIN. I had 47 aircraft of the fighter type, dive bomber type, and utility type.

The CHAIRMAN. Were all of the 47 in condition for use on that morning?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir. 33 of them were in condition.

[1157] The CHAIRMAN. How were they disposed before the attack?

Colonel LARKIN. They were parked around the perimeter of the landing areas with a reasonable degree of security in the way of dispersion.

The CHAIRMAN. Any of them anchored offshore?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir. They are all land planes.

The CHAIRMAN. These were all land planes?

Colonel LARKIN. These were all land planes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those were available for distant reconnaissance?

Colonel LARKIN. Nineteen to a medium distance.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call medium distance?

Colonel LARKIN. The particular type on the field at that time, up to 200 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Prior to December 7 had any of them been regularly and as a matter of routine used for reconnaissance to that extent?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir, not as a regular matter of routine. We had worked on tactical problems up to 150 miles.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of those planes under your command in the air on the morning of December 7?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:50?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In what state of readiness were they, and how many were in a state of readiness?

Colonel LARKIN. They were all on 2-hour readiness, and one-third of the total 33 were on 30-minute standby.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of those planes were destroyed in the attack?

Colonel LARKIN. All of them were either destroyed or totally disabled for a matter of days.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the attack came on?

[1158] Colonel LARKIN. I was on my way from my home in Honolulu to Ewa, arriving at Ewa during the first attack at or about 8:25.

The CHAIRMAN. From your own observation and from the reports that have been rendered to you can you state, first, what character of planes made the first attack on Ewa Field?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. A formation of between 18 and 24 fighter aircraft, fighter type Japanese aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the fighter type, as I understand, uses machine guns?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They are not bombers? Or are they bombers?

Colonel LARKIN. At times they are bombers, but in this attack they used only guns, at that particular attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. From what direction, as you are advised, did that attack come in?

Colonel LARKIN. From the north and west at an altitude of about 1,000 feet, distance of between one and two miles.

The CHAIRMAN. And then planed down to use their guns on your field?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. That attack lasted between twenty and thirty minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there subsequent waves came over?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When, and what sort of waves?

Colonel LARKIN. There were two other distinct attacks made, one about fifteen minutes after the first attack, made by single-engined dive bombers which were very comparable to our SBD type aircraft. That attack lasted from about fifteen to twenty-five minutes, and that second attack was followed by a third attack at about fifteen minutes later, lasting about fifteen to twenty minutes. The last attack was made by fighter aircraft. After the third and last attack there [1159] were two or three two-plane sections remaining over the field until the Japanese aircraft had assembled in the vicinity of Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, from Barbers Point where did they go, to your observation, after they had assembled?

Colonel LARKIN. My observation, they went south and west to sea.

The CHAIRMAN. What number of planes made that exit from the island to the south and west?

Colonel LARKIN. That I can't say. We estimated that there were 25 fighter types covering the rendezvous or assembly point of the Japanese aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you anti-aircraft equipment on your field?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir, not—we had .30 caliber guns, nothing larger.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they in action when you arrived at the field?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you advised how promptly they got in action on the attack?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir; just as quickly as the alarm was sounded some of those guns went into action, and after the first attack we reorganized and armed and put all guns, including rifles, Thompson machine guns, and anything we could get, into action.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you able to bring down any of the enemy planes?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. We are positive of one and quite sure of the second one.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was the ammunition for your anti-aircraft fire at the time of the attack?

Colonel LARKIN. I had ammunition in every squadron [1160] ordnance room, in the central ordnance room, and in the guard house at the entrance to the flying field.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't at the guns?

Colonel LARKIN. It was in—not actually at the guns—in the vicinity where all guns could have been loaded in two to three minutes' time.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been by orders of any superior officer put on the alert against an aircraft raid?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had any order been issued to be on the alert against such a raid?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir. Only in the directives as issued and orders previously; no order that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Nor in the day or so previously, giving you warning of an aircraft raid?

Colonel LARKIN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what were the directives that were in operation at the time, were in effect?

Colonel LARKIN. The condition of alert and readiness, which was thirty minutes, requiring one-third of all tactical aircraft to be on thirty-minute readiness, all aircraft to be on two-hour readiness.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, from whom did that order issue to you, sir?

Colonel LARKIN. That comes through my chain of command and from commander aircraft battle force, who is my immediate superior in this area.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the commander aircraft battle force?

Colonel LARKIN. Admiral Halsey.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Halsey.

Colonel LARKIN. At this particular time Admiral Halsey was at sea, and in that case I then come under commander patrol wing 2, who is Admiral Bellinger with the exception [1161] of the fighter aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Which are to be held at the command of General Davidson?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir; interceptor command of the island.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. General?

General McCox. Did you get any orders at all that day from General Davidson?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. How many fighters did you have available for that interceptor command?

Colonel LARKIN. I had seven. Twelve of that squadron were on Wake Island at the time.

General McNARNEY. How many of your men were available to go in the air after the attack?

Colonel LARKIN. None.

General McNARNEY. What have you got now?

Colonel LARKIN. I have five SBD's, one R3D2, which is commonly known as a DC-5. I have turned over two F-4F fighter type to commander aircraft battle force, and one other utility aircraft. I have eight 17-scouter type aircraft in Midway and fourteen fighter types in Midway, of my group.

General McCoy. Did any of Admiral Halsey's carrier planes return to the field that morning?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. At what time?

Colonel LARKIN. There were four—there were six came in between the first and second attacks, about 8:30 to 8:35. They landed. I immediately ordered them into the air. After the third attack four SBD's from the ENTERPRISE came in. We armed them with 500-pound bombs and reloaded their machine guns, and I reported they were there ready. About ten o'clock they were ordered off my field. Three of them could get away. One [1162] had a hole in his gas tank and remained on the field until the tenth of December. that landed at Ford Island that night?

General McCoy. Did you shoot down any of your own planes that day?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir. We had none in the air.

General McCoy. No. I mean of those from the fleet, from the ENTERPRISE.

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. They all came in safely?

Colonel LARKIN. They all came in safely.

General McCoy. Did they report their coming to the control officer?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

General McCoy. Why?

Colonel LARKIN. That I don't know.

General McCoy. They have a normal lane to come in, I believe, have they not?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. They came down in the normal method of identification and procedure and came to our field, and we took them aboard.

General McNARNEY. What happened to the ones you ordered into the air after the first attack?

Colonel LARKIN. They did not return to Ewa. I think later on they went to Ford Island; that is, to the best of my knowledge.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there was a flight of planes off Admiral Halsey's fleet that landed in there that night, was there not?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know whether there was a flight of his planes that landed at Ford Island that night?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been informed that he had sent out [1163] a search late in the evening from his fleet and that those planes came in at night, and some of them through error were fired on. You know nothing of that incident?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They may have landed at Ford Island?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. None—

General McCoy. Were any of these planes shot down by the Japanese?

Colonel LARKIN. That I can't definitely say. We saw one of these planes—I can't definitely say it was one that had landed on my—on Ewa Field. We saw one of these ENTERPRISE airplanes and one Japanese airplane collide in the air. Both of them fell and burned about a half mile south and east of Ewa, Ewa flying field.

The CHAIRMAN. But you do not know whether that is one of those that you had sent up from the field or was that was coming in from the ENTERPRISE?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, you say that these ENTERPRISE planes were landed safely?

Colonel LARKIN. On my field, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. On your field?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And except for that one incident of the crash, none of them was fired upon, none of them disabled, none of them wrecked, pilots killed and passengers killed, in coming in?

Colonel LARKIN. That is correct.

Colonel BROWN. I believe, sir, he is talking about a landing in the morning, and those that were fired on came in at night on Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do not take this.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[1164] Colonel LARKIN. All the planes that landed at Ewa landed in the morning and were taken and either put in the air immediately or rearmed and refueled and ordered into the air by Ford Island control, and by Wheeler control.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke, Colonel, about a condition of readiness. Are you familiar with an estimate of the situation which is entitled, "Addendum to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41," under date of March 31? I will show it to you.

Will you hand that to him, sir?

(A document was handed to the witness.)

Admiral STANDLEY. You might look through that and see if you recognize it.

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir, I have never seen that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where did you get your instructions in regard to the readiness condition?

Colonel LARKIN. We got them through orders, verbal, telephone, and mailgrams, and different conditions through commander aircraft battle force.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you sit in or take part in any of the conferences and discussions between the commander patrol wing 2 and the commanding general Hawaiian air force?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir. I might clarify that, Admiral, by saying, I assumed command at Ewa on the 18th of November.

Admiral STANDLEY. Oh.

General McCoy. Had you received any war warning from your superiors?

Colonel LARKIN. The normal orders only, and reading over letters, bulletins, and the normal routine orders was my only source of information.

General McCoy. You were not conscious of receiving any war warning on the 27th of November?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

[1165] General McCoy. There were no orders, as far as you remember, that changed your normal status of training and responsibility prior to December 6 due to the imminence of hostilities?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, your force consisted of VS and VB?

Colonel LARKIN. And VF.

Admiral STANDLEY. And VF. Now, then, the VS and the VB's were part of a task force?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you recall what that task force designation was?

Colonel LARKIN. Task force 3 at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. And as part of the base defense force where were they assigned? In other words, under certain conditions part of your planes automatically went to General Martin, and under the same conditions part of them went to Admiral Bellinger?

Colonel LARKIN. The task force 3, the VS and VB airplanes went to Admiral Bellinger; the VF airplanes went to General Martin as the interceptor command.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Now, how were you informed or where did you inform yourself of that task force? Where did you get that information when you arrived here?

Colonel LARKIN. By conference with my executive officer and my operations officer and my staff who had been here prior to my arrival.

Admiral STANDLEY. So then you were not familiar at all with this, that is, in detail, except as you got it from your subordinates here, this general estimate of the situation?

Colonel LARKIN. That is correct. I have never seen that estimate.

[1166] Admiral STANDLEY. You are not cognizant of this statement—wait a minute now; I will get what I want.

In paragraph IV. (e) it says: "None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred."

Are you familiar with that decision?

Colonel LARKIN. I have heard that discussed. I am not entirely familiar with it.

Admiral STANDLEY. In paragraph IV. (a), "Action open to us," in the same pamphlet:

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practical measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

Are you familiar with that decision, too?

Colonel LARKIN. Not from that publication. I have heard that and have discussed that particular phase of that publication.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that the generally accepted decision on the evening of December 6?

Colonel LARKIN. I believe it was, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where were you on the night of December 7?

The CHAIRMAN. December 6?

General McNARNEY. On December 7.

Colonel LARKIN. I was in camp at Ewa.

General McNARNEY. Sunday night. Did any of your anti-aircraft weapons go into action during that night?

Colonel LARKIN. No. We had no truly anti-aircraft. We had only .30 calibers that had been taken from the rear seats of our destroyed planes, plus ten .30 caliber water-cooled [1167] more or less ground machine guns.

General McNARNEY. None of these weapons went into action?

Colonel LARKIN. None.

General McNARNEY. Sunday night?

Colonel LARKIN. Sunday night.

Admiral STANDLEY. I want to ask some more questions, General.

General McNARNEY. Go ahead.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, this is a part of the assigned mission of the search and attack group: "Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group." I understand all of your planes were out of commission.

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether any of that task group did perform that part of the mission, did try to trail the planes?

Colonel LARKIN. I do not know.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of your personnel on the morning of December 7, Colonel? Were they present at their stations?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir, I would say more than 80% were present, both officers and men.

The CHAIRMAN. Had leaves been granted the night before?

Colonel LARKIN. Only the regular liberty for the men and shore leave for certain officers. I required a certain number of officers on the station at all times.

The CHAIRMAN. When did your enlisted personnel come back from leave?

Colonel LARKIN. The single men come in at twelve. The married men with families on the island, a certain percentage had permission to stay at home.

The CHAIRMAN. Any evidence that the men on leave had imbibed too much the night before?

[1168] Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you know of it if there had been instances of it in your command?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are clear about it?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. Only—may I clarify that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Colonel LARKIN. Due to the distance of Ewa from Honolulu my personnel get into Honolulu very seldom. They go to the little sugar

mill town of Ewa and the little sugar mill town of Waipahu, and there are few of them get into Honolulu proper.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, in the case of disciplinary measures who in your command hears the mast on reports of infractions of discipline?

The CHAIRMAN. Who takes the mast for reports?

Colonel LARKIN. The squadron commanders handle the more or less routine ordinary offenses. I hold mast for the more serious or major offenses.

Admiral STANDLEY. You would know, then, in that capacity, if there was general infraction of the regulations or propriety in regard to sobriety?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir; I can definitely say, that morning during the attack I did not see one man who had more than he could handle.

General MCCOY. Did your command come to the front and center quickly and click throughout as you would have them do?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. I asked a question. I am not sure whether I made it comprehensive enough to cover the point of whether you received any orders at all during the day of the attack from higher authority.

Colonel LARKIN. None whatever, except when I reported the four SBD type aircraft had landed; we had rearmed them, and I [1169] reported them in a state of readiness for anything within their capabilities, and they were held by orders of the operation officer compatwing 2 in that state until 10 o'clock, when they were ordered to Ford Island.

General MCCOY. Were the communications working that day throughout to higher command?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir; not too well, but they were working. They were satisfactory.

General MCCOY. Were you informed of what happened during the day at any time at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. Meager information. By "meager" I mean the highlights I would be directly interested in.

General MCCOY. In other words, you got no orders, but you did get sufficient information to know what was happening?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Did that apply also to your liaison with the Army?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. I talked to the interceptor command on two or—three occasions on the 7th of December.

General MCCOY. Would you be informed by the interceptor command of any missions that they sent up that day from other fields?

Colonel LARKIN. No, sir.

General MCCOY. And you were given no mission whatever during that whole day?

Colonel LARKIN. None whatever.

General MCCOY. Either from Army or Navy?

Colonel LARKIN. That is correct. I might add that I had informed both the interceptor command, Army, and my immediate superior, compatwing 2, that I had no planes available.

The CHAIRMAN. Except as you altered that information when the four planes that came in were available?

[1170] Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. I might clarify that: they were not mine; they belonged to the ENTERPRISE carrier group.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I see.

General McCoy. But you informed them of the missions that you gave them?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, was it routine for you to inform the proper authorities of the availability of planes under your command?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Each day?

Colonel LARKIN. Each day.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was likewise your duty to inform those same commanders if there was any change in that status; is that correct too?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that procedure you obtained from your subordinates?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And not from the prescribed procedure in this order?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir. Our method was, my operations officer every afternoon at three o'clock told my immediate superiors what planes we would have available for the next day's operations. Planes and types.

The CHAIRMAN. That was so that either your immediate commander or in the proper circumstances the commander of patwing 2 could order your planes on missions?

Colonel LARKIN. That is correct.

General McCoy. Colonel, were you the senior marine air officer in Oahu?

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any other question for the Colonel?

[1171] (There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, we have asked all the witnesses who have appeared before us not to discuss what has gone on in this room, or their testimony, with anyone.

Colonel LARKIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And we shall ask you to observe that. Thank you very much.

Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF CHIEF CARPENTER'S MATE JAMES JOSEPH CURLEY, UNITED STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you sit down there, sir, and give your name, rank, and command to the reporter?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. James Joseph Curley, sir, chief carpenter's mate.

The CHAIRMAN. What ship were you on?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. USS NEVADA, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the NEVADA on the morning of December 7?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. You mean when the trouble started?

The CHAIRMAN. When the attack came on.

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. When the attack came on I was in the chiefs' quarters, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were in your own quarters?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been on leave the night before?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had there been many men on leave from the NEVADA the night before?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That I couldn't say, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. I don't know. The only [1172] men that would be on leave would be the—that is, on liberty—would be the chiefs and first-class petty officers, and there wouldn't be many of them because most of them have their families in the States.

The CHAIRMAN. The enlisted personnel that had leave or liberty on Saturday night would all be back on the ship before Sunday morning, would they?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And to your knowledge they were back?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What shape was the crew in that morning to perform its duty, according to your observation?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Excellent, sir.

[1173] The CHAIRMAN. You saw nobody who was the worse for having had a bad night Saturday night?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What first drew your attention to the attack?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. I was talking to the chief ship's fitter who had just relieved the security patrol. He had taken over the 8 patrol watch that morning, and he and I heard the machine-gun chatter. He having the security watch, he ran to the topside. I followed him.

When we got up there there was a plane with the rising sun insignia on it, at which she turned her belly to us toward the opposite side of the ship from where we were at, but we could see it from the deck shop.

Then I heard the explosion somewhere in the harbor, and we were notified to man our general-quarter stations.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge, how many torpedoes did the NEVADA receive while she was in the berth?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. One that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that disable her so that she could not navigate?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir. The NEVADA got under way to sail in 14 minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. In 14 minutes?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many boilers had been operating through the night?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Well, that I could not say. I am a deck petty officer, but I imagine it would be one for auxiliary purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, was there any emergency lookout? What was your duty?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. My duty was to man the repair tube.

[1174] The CHAIRMAN. What force was under you for that duty?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Well sir, I had 15 men in my repair party located in the forward part of the ship surrounding the No. 1 and No. 2 barbettes on the third deck.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your crew take their stations there with you?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, all my men were aboard.

The CHAIRMAN. What were you called upon to do from the time of the attack until the NEVADA was beached?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. There wasn't anything we were called upon to do, sir. Everything we do is what we had to do every time during drill, to close all the Zed fittings which would lead to the magazine below our station.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you do that?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

Our party is divided into two groups, and we had two talkers. The first one is the first repair party and the second is the second repair party, and their duties were to immediately open up the air to the guns.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that done?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That was done, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Neither you nor any of your party were under any obligation to man the guns?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. You were not a part of the gun crew?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir, we were not a part of the gun crew.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your anti-aircraft fire get into action on the ship promptly, as you observed it?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir. They must have; they must have.

The CHAIRMAN. When the NEVADA found it necessary, in order to get out of the channel, to beach, did she do it under [1175] her own power?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. We had orders not to leave the harbor, sir. We had already been hit, and I guess it was because they did not want to block the channel that they did that. They did not want to block the channel for other ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you say that a heavy bomb hit on the bow of the NEVADA after she got under way and when she was going down past Ford Island?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. I should say three or four bomb hits there were, and then I was knocked out.

The CHAIRMAN. You were knocked out?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you come to or did they have to bring you to?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. They gave me artificial respiration, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that from the force of the bomb?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir, it was the smoke coming up from the officers' quarters; it didn't penetrate the armor plate, however. The armor deck withstood the bombs wonderfully.

The CHAIRMAN. They did withstand the bombs well?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes. That is in the vicinity of our station.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. We could see the deck come right down and go right up.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that 4-inch?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That is 5½-inch.

The CHAIRMAN. 5½-inch?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

What was the state of readiness of the NEVADA habitually [1176] when she was in port?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Well, we always had a guard watch, sir, and the guard watch was always observing.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. The guard patrol was always observing our ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was some of your division a part of the security watch?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. How was the rest of the watch constituted?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. The chief ship's fitter was in charge of the watch and we must keep the machine guns manned, and that is his duty, to check all the men manning the machine guns on the third deck patrol and the topside patrol where we are always on alert.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that was part of the routine of the battleship NEVADA when she was in port?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That is everyday routine; at sea we have the security patrol also.

The CHAIRMAN. That means that the liberty group was cut down to take care of the security patrol?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. The security patrol was taken from the duty section, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Chief, you are a part of the damage control organization of the ship, are you not?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. I think you said that several bomb hits on the NEVADA did not penetrate the armored deck?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. In the vicinity of my station, sir. That would be from frame 30 to frame 60 port and starboard side.

Admiral REEVES. I think the testimony was that most of the bomb hits were in the forward part of the ship. That would come within the area which you supervised, would it not?

[1177] Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Well, from the topside and what we can see, they all appear to be forward of frame 30.

Admiral REEVES. Forward of frame 30?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know whether any of the bomb hits penetrated the underwater integrity of the ship?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. They are patching up forward on the starboard and port side in the vicinity of the gasoline store.

Admiral REEVES. Where was that torpedo hit?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. The torpedo hit was abreast of No. 2 barrette on the port side about frame 43, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was within your area?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Why did they beach the NEVADA? Do you know?

• Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Was it due to this torpedo hit or to the bomb hits?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That I could not say because I was out about that time.

Admiral REEVES. You have no knowledge personally on any underwater damage by this torpedo?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. All I could see was that they are working on the patches forward of frame 30.

General McCoy. How large are these holes you are speaking of?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That I do not know, sir, only what is rumor.

Admiral STANDLEY. The previous testimony has indicated that there were several holes in the ship made by bombs.

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Those are the ones I am speaking of, forward of frame 30.

[1178] Admiral STANDLEY. That is up forward where the big hole is?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. That is forward of the big hole. The big hole is approximately at frame 43.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the cause of this puncture? Was it caused by the bomb going through the side, or how did it happen?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Evidently the bomb went through the ship's side and then skidded out through the side.

Admiral STANDLEY. What caused this big hole?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Which one?

The CHAIRMAN. The biggest hole of all. The one they are putting the big patch on.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the underwater damage due to the torpedo and not to these bomb hits?

The CHAIRMAN. The big hole was caused by the torpedo and not by the bombs?

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Please do not discuss your testimony with anyone or mention what has gone on here.

Chief Carpenter's Mate CURLEY. Yes, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Captain Daubin, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN FREELAND ALLEN DAUBIN, COMMANDER
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name?

Captain DAUBIN. Freeland Allen Daubin, Captain, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, I understand that you have some documents which were recovered from some of the Japanese troops in the attack on December 7?

[1179] Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What are they, sir?

Captain DAUBIN. I have some charts and copies of the log that we recovered from the Japanese submarine No. 19.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the one that went ashore near Bellows Field?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are these in shape so that they can be left with the Commission? Are these copies or originals?

Captain DAUBIN. These are copies, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, they are secret.

Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir, very secret.

The CHAIRMAN. The Commission has a number of these secret papers which have been submitted to it, and it will not disclose anything except with the approval of the Secretaries of War and Navy, when it comes to make its report.

Do you feel that under those circumstances it would be proper to leave them with us?

Captain DAUBIN. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Have you anything to add, Captain, that you think will be helpful to the inquiry which this Commission is undertaking?

Captain DAUBIN. I have nothing to add, sir, except the information that is contained in these charts and the log from the Japanese submarine No. 19.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be that when you have submitted these papers that we will have to ask for some explanations of them; and you will be available?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir. I am right here in the base. I am in command.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral STANDLEY. I understand, Captain, that these originals have all been forwarded to the Navy Department?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir.

[1180] The CHAIRMAN. What is this in the brown envelope?

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the description of the submarine, isn't it?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The designation on this document in the brown envelope is, "Description and photographs Japanese midget submarine No. 19."

Captain DAUBIN. It starts on page 8.

The CHAIRMAN. The log starts on page 8?

Captain DAUBIN. And it continues to page 20 in that book.

I might add that there are some extracts from the log of the Japanese submarine No. 19 that was picked up out in the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. The envelope will be marked Daubin Exhibit No. 1.

(Brown envelope was marked Daubin Exhibit No. 1.)

The CHAIRMAN. I also notice a brown paper folder which I understand contains photostats of certain maps?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And charts?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And designations in typewriting attached to the various maps?

Captain DAUBIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be marked Daubin Exhibit 2.

(Folder of charts was marked Daubin Exhibit 2.)

Captain DAUBIN. I might add that in reading these you have to use a glass, sir. I will give you a glass for that purpose (handing magnifying glass to the chairman).

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Captain.

Colonel BROWN. Boatswain Bothne.

[1181] **TESTIMONY OF BOATSWAIN ADOLPH MARCUS BOTHNE,
U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, U. S. NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name, sir.

Boatswain BOTHNE. Adolph Marcus Bothne.

The CHAIRMAN. And what was your duty on December 7, 1941, Boatswain?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I was ship's boatswain, U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did you spend the night of December 6?

Boatswain BOTHNE. On board the U. S. S. OKLAHOMA.

The CHAIRMAN. What were you doing at the time the attack came on?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I was in the after end of the superstructure deck where the side cleaners' lockers are. I had my side cleaners ready to go overside.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you finished your breakfast?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. From where you were, did you have a view of the harbor?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was it which first attracted your attention to the attack?

Boatswain BOTHNE. The mate in the 6th Division started screaming, "Get the guns covered; them Japs are bombing everything in sight."

The CHAIRMAN. Had you heard any machine-gun fire or bombs before that?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do when you heard the screaming?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I went down to the main deck aft of midships where the loud speaker is and passed the word for general quarters and set material condition Zed.

The CHAIRMAN. How did the men respond? Promptly?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Prompt, yes, sir.

[1182] The CHAIRMAN. How soon after were you delivering fire?

Boatswain BOTHNE. We were delivering no fire from the five twenty fives, and I didn't hear any .50 caliber, although the men said they were firing with the .50 caliber, afterward, but I didn't hear a shot of fire on the OKLAHOMA that morning, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened to the OKLAHOMA itself?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I walked out on deck and passed this word; the torpedo hit aft of frame 115.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would that be between the bow and the stern? I do not know where frame 115 is.

Boatswain BOTHNE. Almost astern, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The OKLAHOMA was lying in the outside berth?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Outside the MARYLAND?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the man launch the torpedo?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir. I got out on deck after that.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the effect of that hit, Boatswain? What was the effect on the ship?

Boatswain BOTHNE. None that I noticed right then, sir. I didn't even feel the ship shake.

The CHAIRMAN. What happened next, according to your observation?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I went back to see why the anti-aircraft batteries were not firing, and the ready boxes were still locked on the port side.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the crews there?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what happened?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Then I went forward. We had the fire and rescue chest at the stack there, and as I walked forward there was another torpedo hit about a third of the way aft [1183] of the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. What did that do to the ship?

Boatswain BOTHNE. I still didn't notice any effect from it.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir, never felt it even.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what happened?

Boatswain BOTHNE. The fire and rescue chest was locked: so I went amidships to the gear locker and picked out a hammer and a cold chisel.

The CHAIRMAN. To knock the locks off?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes, and when I got it there was a third torpedo hit in the middle of the ship, and the ship started to list noticeably then. I had to walk uphill to go to the starboard side, and after they had the ready boxes open there and the ammunition out they had no air to load the guns, and one of the men said there was no fire locks on the guns.

The ship was listing badly to port at that time. I didn't notice any action on the MARYLAND up to that time, but decided we would go over to the MARYLAND guns and get them in action.

We went overside and started for the MARYLAND and got to the blister ledge, and the MARYLAND lines were still holding, although the ship was listing 45 degrees. So I yelled up to everybody to stay where they were. They picked it up, and everybody sat along the blister ledge.

We were all perched along the blister ledge and there must have been about 150 men there.

Then the ship seemed to hesitate, to be stationary.

The CHAIRMAN. Then what happened?

Boatswain BOTHNE. They hit it with another torpedo.

The CHAIRMAN. Another one? Four?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes, because that one I felt, because she bounced up, and when she settled down she turned.

The CHAIRMAN. What complement was there on the OKLAHOMA [1184] that morning of the attack?

Boatswain BOTHNE. About 1200.

The CHAIRMAN. They were all on board ship? The whole 1200 were aboard?

Boatswain BOTHNE. There were a few men ashore, the chiefs and the first class and the group that had overnight privilege. There were very few had their families out at that time. Very few stayed out overnight.

The CHAIRMAN. How much of this group of 1200 men got off the OKLAHOMA? Your fellows sitting along the ledge jumped to the MARYLAND, I suppose?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Most of them went down in the water.

The CHAIRMAN. They did?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes. I slid down the side myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Into the water?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Into the water, and then got into a motor launch, and we picked up two boatloads of men out of the water.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a serious loss of life on the OKLAHOMA?

Boatswain BOTHNE. About 400, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't say!

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the captain on board when this occurred?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He was ashore?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was commanding officer at the time or who was senior?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Commander Kenworthy.

The CHAIRMAN. Was he second in command?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What particular security order was there that required the gun crew to be at their guns all the time, [1185] Boatswain? Isn't there an order in force that requires the crews to be at the anti-aircraft guns?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Not to my knowledge in port, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What were the orders with respect to the manning of the guns and the organization of the gun crews? What were the orders that were then in force. Do you know what the orders were?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any duty with respect to firing the anti-aircraft guns?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That was not part of your duty?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not part of the gun crew?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So far as you know, none of the OKLAHOMA guns got into action before she turned over?

Boatswain BOTHNE. The anti-aircraft five twenty fives.

The CHAIRMAN. The five twenty fives did get into action?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Did not get into action.

The CHAIRMAN. Did not?

Boatswain BOTHNE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not hear the .50 caliber, but you were told by someone that they were fired?

Boatswain BOTHNE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Please do not discuss your testimony here or mention to anyone what has gone on here.

Boatswain BOTHNE. Aye, aye, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Carpenter's Mate Staff.

[1186] **TESTIMONY OF CARPENTER'S MATE WALTER FREDRICK STAFF, SECOND CLASS, U. S. S. OKLAHOMA, U. S. NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name.

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Walter Fredrick Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. What ship are you with?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. The OKLAHOMA.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you off ship on Saturday night, December 6?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I was off Saturday. I came back early, about 7 o'clock Saturday evening.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your rank?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Carpenter's mate, second class.

The CHAIRMAN. Carpenter's mate, second class?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on board ship when the attack came on?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I was in the carpenter's shop.

The CHAIRMAN. You therefore did not have a view of the harbor at that time?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No, sir, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. When you learned that there was an attack, what did you do?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I passed the word general quarters and went promptly to my quarters.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no duty at that time with respect to the anti-aircraft guns?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you do or where did you go when the general quarters was called?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I went to the forward part of the ship, to the pump room, to the fresh water tanks.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that your station under Condition Zed?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Then during the attack you remained inside [1187] the ship and not out on deck?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, sir, I was inside the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. From your position, what did you learn was going on?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I felt several explosions, but they seemed to be from the anti-aircraft fire, and there was just a jar and we were busy setting Zed when the lights went out.

The CHAIRMAN. The lights went out?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you remain at your station until the ship listed?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes. The ship was on a very bad list.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you called upon to abandon ship?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No, I didn't hear any word at all because the man could not get any station on the telephone.

The CHAIRMAN. The phones were out of order?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When the ship turned over, where were you?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. There was a bad list on it; the ship was very bad and we had four men with us, and two of them got hysterical and they started to leave when the lights went out. They started to leave, and it was a very bad list, so we followed them.

The CHAIRMAN. You got on deck?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No, sir, we didn't get out. It rolled over.

The CHAIRMAN. How did you get out?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. They took us out Tuesday morning through the ship.

The CHAIRMAN. So that after it had gone over, there was still air in it and you could still stay above water?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, there was a good bit of [1188] air and fuel oil.

The CHAIRMAN. You got caught in there when it turned over?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many got out?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Two of us got out and two of them drowned when it rolled over.

The CHAIRMAN. There were some other men who also got out?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, they got 34 of them altogether, and two of them died.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us any idea of how long it was from the time that you felt the first little jar until that ship went over?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. My watch stopped at that time, two minutes after 8.

The CHAIRMAN. Two minutes after 8?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. It must have been a quarter to 8 when they first sounded the alarm, or very close to it.

The CHAIRMAN. So in a matter of 15 minutes, according to your guess, your ship turned over?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. I would say that is very close to a quarter to 8 when they sounded the alarm.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are very liberal in your estimate. Our general impression is that it was 7:55.

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. It could have been.

The CHAIRMAN. That would mean that the ship went over in seven or eight minutes?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you feel each individual and separate torpedo shock?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Well, I felt several jars. I did not know they were torpedoes. When the lights went out we were down in the station, and that was the worst explosion.

The CHAIRMAN. The testimony that we have had indicates that there were four torpedoes shot into her side.

[1189] Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, I felt at least four explosions.

The CHAIRMAN. You felt at least four explosions?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they came very close together?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, very close together.

General McCoy. Were you able to get any food?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No.

General McCoy. After you were trapped in? You had no water?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. No, no food at all or water.

General McCoy. How much of a space were you confined in?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. It was a large space but we had to stay on the high side. It was locked up, and we did manage to get in, but we had to beat the lock off.

General McCoy. How did you call attention to the fact that you were there? How did they find you?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. We tapped with wrenches.

General McCoy. There were two of you rescued there?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

General McCoy. Were you much the worse for wear?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Sir?

General McCoy. Were you much the worse for wear when you got out?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Oh, very weak and hungry.

General McCoy. You felt you were being rescued, didn't you, when the thing first happened?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Well, not at first, I didn't.

General McCoy. You were there from Sunday morning until Tuesday?

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes.

General McCoy. I have no other questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. How do you account for the fresh air in there?

[1190] Carpenter's Mate STAFF. We were in the forward air compressor room and we had the compressed air, I suppose, from those tanks.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Do not discuss with anyone on the outside what has been asked you here.

Carpenter's Mate STAFF. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn now until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1191]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. m. at the expiration of the recess.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, will you note that there is a communication from Admiral Halsey in answer to the request of the Commission for information with respect to the liberty granted the personnel of the fleet. This will not be copied in the notes of testimony but is marked Halsey No. 1, for the information of the Commission.

(Document with respect to liberty granted personnel of the fleet was marked Halsey Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JAMES MARSHALL SHOEMAKER,
UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, please?

Captain SHOEMAKER. James Marshall Shoemaker.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Captain, U. S. Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And your duty on December 7, 1941?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Commanding officer, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of the attack, sir?

Captain SHOEMAKER. At the onset of the attack I was in my quarters on the Naval Air Station.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I was on the Naval Air Station.

The CHAIRMAN. You were home that evening?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I was home that evening.

[1192] The CHAIRMAN. What effective force had you at your command on the morning of the attack?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I had a trained seamen guard of 200 men, a marine detachment of approximately 100 men, and two officers.

The CHAIRMAN. What materiel?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Rifles, pistols, aircraft machine guns, both .30 caliber and .50 caliber; no heavier weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any planes under your control?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I had four aeroplanes—pardon me; five aeroplanes of the utility unit of the Naval Air Station. They were not damaged.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not part of your function to command or control fighter planes or bombing planes?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or planes of that type?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, I had no combatant planes under my command.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your station attacked?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. My station was surrounded by the fleet moorings, and it was in the middle of the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. How many bombs fell on your air field?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The island—the Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, comprises the island of Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor. On Ford Island, as nearly as we could count, there were a total of 11 bombs struck the island. Most of those bombs were aimed at battleships moored alongside.

The CHAIRMAN. And fell on the island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. That's correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your force get into action promptly with anti-aircraft?

Captain SHOEMAKER. My force got into action with the second attack, and, as far as we could tell, very effectively.

[1193] The CHAIRMAN. They were not in action on the first attack?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, they were not.

The CHAIRMAN. The ammunition not there? Was the ammunition not there to—

Captain SHOEMAKER. The ammunition was distributed with my sub-armories on the island. The men were taken—we all were—completely by surprise with the first attack.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were not able to get their ammunition from the armories in time to get their guns into action?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, that's correct.

The CHAIRMAN. There had been no orders requiring you to have any ammunition at the guns?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If such an order were to be given, who was your commanding officer who would give you such orders?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember some planes from task force No. 3 coming into your field on the night of Sunday, the 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on the field on the evening of December 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I beg your pardon, Admiral—or Mr. Justice Roberts. I was thinking of the 6th. I do remember that, planes coming in on the 7th. I was on the field, and during the latter part of their attempts to get onto the field I was in the land-plane control tower.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of those planes were fired on by some of your force, weren't they?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Those planes were fired on by every gun in the Pearl Harbor area, as nearly as I could tell. There were six land

planes approached the field. Four of them were shot down. I might add that the firing did not start on Ford Island; it started in the Navy Yard area. [1194]

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had had no warning at Ford Island that those planes intended to land, I understand.

Captain SHOEMAKER. As nearly as I can tell, those planes contacted the land-plane control tower by radio as they approached the island, and were told to come right in. The leader said he was going to circle Pearl Harbor before landing, and he was told, "No. Come right in and land." Unfortunately, he didn't do what he was told.

The CHAIRMAN. He did circle, did he?

Captain SHOEMAKER. He started to circle, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And then somebody let fly?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Somebody let fly, and I never saw so many bullets in the air in my life and never expect to—all tracer bullets at night. It was dark.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

General McNARNEY. Were the airplanes lighted? Did they have warning lights on?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I just saw one, General. They had the running—I am told—this is hearsay—that they had—they all had their running lights on as they approached Pearl Harbor from the direction of the Pearl Harbor channel or Hickam Field.

General McNARNEY. How about the landing lights?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Several turned them off when the firing started, so I am told.

General McNARNEY. How about the landing lights? Were the landing lights on?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The landing lights were not lit on the field at the time.

General McNARNEY. I mean on the airplanes.

[1195] Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir. No landing lights. Running lights. What we call running lights, red and blue—green wing tip lights.

General McNARNEY. Did you not receive a message from the task force that the planes were on the way?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Those messages come to the fleet air detachment, General, which is a separate entity from the Naval Air Station.

General McNARNEY. Would that be to Admiral Bellinger?

Captain SHOEMAKER. It would be Admiral Bellinger's representative, yes, sir: commander fleet air detachment.

General McNARNEY. Did your personnel in the control tower know that they were on the way?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, they did.

General McNARNEY. Prior to the time that they contacted them?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I think so. This is, again, hearsay. I was told that they did.

General McCoy. Isn't the control tower under your command? Is the control tower and personnel under your command?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The control tower is under my command, General, but it is manned by the fleet personnel normally. At this time

the personnel in the control tower, with the exception of the ENTERPRISE group commander, who was there, were my personnel. The ENTERPRISE group commander, however, I am told was there at the time these planes approached the island. They were planes from his air group.

General McNARNEY. Did the guns on Ford Island participate after the other guns opened up?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, they did.

General McNARNEY. The gun crews on Ford Island had not been warned, then, that friendly airplanes were to come in that evening?

[1196] Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir. There wasn't time, as I remember it. I myself didn't know they were coming in until I saw the shooting start as I was driving down toward the control tower.

General McCoy. Were you conscious that it was a mistake at that point?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, I was not.

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, where was your anti-aircraft battery mounted over on Ford Island on the night of the 6th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. On the night of the 7th, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. On the night of the 7th, yes.

Captain SHOEMAKER. On the night of the 7th we had anti-aircraft guns in improvised emplacements in at least 50 places on Ford Island, all around.

The CHAIRMAN. That post had then been set up during the day of Sunday, the 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. That had, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, your anti-aircraft equipment had been increased during that Sunday on Ford Island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, it had. A large number of these guns were manned by refugees from the battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of the guns had been taken off the battleships?

Captain SHOEMAKER. That is correct. They had come ashore with their light machine guns.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you any permanent installations over there on Ford Island, any anti-aircraft guns?

Captain SHOEMAKER. We have nothing larger than 37-millimeter, Admiral. We have an armory anti-aircraft battery that has four 37-millimeter guns on the Island, a No. 50.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are they a permanent installation?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The emplacements are permanent. [1197] The guns were unfortunately missing on the 7th. The armory wasn't there. The anti-aircraft defense battalion, or company, rather, was not on the Island on the 7th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you still got an Army company on Ford Island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are they doing there?

Captain SHOEMAKER. They are manning 37-millimeter and .50 caliber guns around the edge of the Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which is part of the anti-aircraft defense force?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Part of the anti-aircraft and surface defense also against raiding parties and enemy aircraft.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that Army company on the morning of Sunday, the 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. They were at their regular station, which I believe is Camp Malekole out by Barbers Point.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they withdrawn every night from Ford Island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. They had come aboard Ford Island from time to time in the last several months for a few days on tactical exercises.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Captain SHOEMAKER. But they had never been permanently stationed there.

General McNARNEY. Were they there on the night of December 7?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, they were not.

General McNARNEY. They hadn't arrived the day of December 7 at all?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, they didn't show up on December 7. I asked Colonel Potts, who was their commanding officer, I believe. He said that they were not allowed to come to Ford [1198] Island on the 7th.

General McCoy. Were they asked for?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, we didn't ask for them. We presumed that doctrine would send them there immediately there was an attack, but they didn't show up.

General McCoy. Under whose command were they?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I don't know, General.

Admiral STANDLEY. Since the 7th have there been any guns installed, any change in the battery as it was on the night of the 7th over there?

Captain SHOEMAKER. We have readjusted the anti-aircraft and surface defenses of Ford Island, Admiral, by removing a great number of improvised emplacements and spotting them scientifically around the Island with the help of the Army.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, then, you have increased your anti-aircraft fire?

Captain SHOEMAKER. We have increased its effect, sir. We have increased its effectiveness, yes, sir, greatly.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have. Do you grant regular liberty at Ford Island, of the men at Ford Island, every day?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Our liberty schedule calls for men to be ashore during daylight one day in four, except for married men, who may option the daylight liberty one day in four or overnight liberty one day in four; one-fourth of the men, that is.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the regulation in effect before the 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Before the 7th there was 50% ashore and 50% aboard.

Admiral STANDLEY. How did you get your liberty men back and forth?

Captain SHOEMAKER. By boats and ferry. May I go back to that question about how was the liberty before the 7th? [1199] The married men only were allowed ashore after midnight.

Admiral STANDLEY. On the 7th; prior to the 7th.

Captain SHOEMAKER. Prior to the 7th, yes, sir. The transportation between Ford Island and the Navy Yard is by our boats and by our ferryboat.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did the ferryboat operate on the morning of the 7th?

Captain SHOEMAKER. It did, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What schedule did it keep? Do you recall or do you know?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The ferry was ready to leave Merry Point just at the time of the first attack, on the 0800 trip. The officer of the day held it up until the first attack had passed. The ferryboat then came aboard the Island crowded with men anxious to get to their stations.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do men on the battleships, liberty men, also come off on that ferryboat?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir. They used their own ships' boats, except for carrier personnel or sea plane tender personnel, who were moored to our own docks there on Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the reason for the crowding of the ferry at eight o'clock if you only give liberty until midnight? Who were the men that came off from it?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Enlisted men from the Naval Air Station and, I am told, from the great number of the ships moored next to Ford Island. I don't mean to say that really was crowded. I was told there was about 150 men on the ferry, which would be about our overnight crowd.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who handled the mast cases at Ford Island, regular punishment at the mast?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I do, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You handle that?

[1200] Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the record of your command in regard to sobriety of your men?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Very few cases of drunkenness, Admiral. Very few.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many officers live on the station?

Captain SHOEMAKER. At the present time they all live on the station; at that time a total of about 80 officers, roughly half of which are ensigns, before the 7th. Roughly 20 officers lived on the station. I beg your pardon. Roughly 40, of which 20 were ensigns living in the bachelor officers' quarters.

Admiral STANDLEY. In general what are their habits in regard to overnight leaves? Are they generally ashore or generally in their quarters?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The bachelor officers, sir, or the station——

Admiral STANDLEY. Bachelor officers.

Captain SHOEMAKER. The station officers for—commissioned officers occupying quarters on Ford Island, for the most part, were always aboard after midnight. Bachelor officers I venture to say were aboard earlier than that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether there were any night clubs or whatnot that can be open after midnight in Honolulu?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, I don't. I do know that there were a number when I lived in town that were open after midnight, but the bars closed at midnight in accordance with the local law.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any recreation facilities on Ford Island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, limited.

Admiral STANDLEY. For both officer's and men?

[1201] Captain SHOEMAKER. For both officers and men, yes, sir. We have a small golf course for officers and men. Shall I enumerate them, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Captain SHOEMAKER. We have a small golf course for officers and men, tennis court for officers and men, two swimming pools for enlisted men, one swimming pool for officers, a beer garden for enlisted men, a small officers' club with attached bar for officers, a recreation room in the bachelor officers' quarters with a bar attached for officers, sailboats, and boxing ring where we held weekly boxing meets. There may be more, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Baseball diamond?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The baseball diamond had been ruined by new construction this summer and was to be replaced this winter.

Admiral STANDLEY. In regard to entertainments at night or dances, do you have any of those entertainments over there?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The entertainments at night on the Island were held roughly once a month in a small clubhouse with dance floor for officers. The enlisted men had their beer garden open until ten o'clock at night. However, our dances for enlisted men were held in Honolulu. Our last enlisted men's dance was held on the 19th of November. 19th of November in the Armory in Honolulu, where we had 2,000 men, free beer, and no drunks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you aware of any advertisements or notification on the 6th of December to the effect that certain clubs or fisheries or whatnot in Honolulu were going to be opened and were giving free drinks?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir. This is the first time I have heard of that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Nothing like that came to your knowledge?

[1202] Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do they have a club over at the Navy Yard—over on this side in the Naval Station?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, they have an officers' club and an enlisted men's recreation center.

Admiral STANDLEY. How often do the officers give dances in those clubs?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Once a week, I believe, Admiral. I am not sure. I have been to several of them. I think it is—I think it was every Saturday night.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do the officers as a general thing attend those dances or do they prefer to go uptown?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I can't answer that, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. On the morning of December 7 how many airplanes were on Ford Island other than those under your command?

Captain SHOEMAKER. There were two squadrons of utility planes, totaling probably 30 or 40 utility planes, and I think two and a half squadrons of patrol planes.

Admiral REEVES. Were the patrol planes hauled out or were they moored?

Captain SHOEMAKER. All of the patrol planes were clustered around hangar 6, the hangar that was bombed.

Admiral REEVES. Do you think Ford Island was attacked direct on the bomb hits or accidentally?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir. I think that the first blow struck in Pearl Harbor was a bombing attack on our sea plane hangar.

Admiral REEVES. You think it was directed at the hangar?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I am sure it was, yes, sir. We had a total of six bomb hits in the vicinity of the hangar, [1203] including one that hit the hangar, and there were no ships in the vicinity at all. I believe that that was the first blow struck here, followed by the torpedo attack?

Admiral REEVES. You think your hangar was bombed before the torpedo attack?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir. Yes, sir, I do.

Admiral REEVES. Captain, did you observe the high-altitude bombers that day?

Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, I did not. I saw dive bombing but no high-altitude bombing.

Admiral REEVES. You are sure it was dive bombing and not level flight at a relatively low altitude?

Captain SHOEMAKER. The bombing attacks that I personally saw were, you might call, glide bombing.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Captain SHOEMAKER. Gliding down at an angle of about 30 degrees below the horizontal. I saw bombing attacks on the RALEIGH and on the DOBBIN, and that was the technique used, a rather gentle glide.

Admiral REEVES. And in these gliding attacks they dropped bombs?

Captain SHOEMAKER. They did, yes, sir, and they didn't hit anything on the DOBBIN. They dropped three at the DOBBIN, one after the other, and all missed.

Admiral REEVES. From about what altitude were they dropped?

Captain SHOEMAKER. It looked to be about 300 feet, perhaps 400 feet.

The CHAIRMAN. And then they pulled out?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Pulled right out and went away in—weaved their way out.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't see any high altitude bombing yourself?

[1204] Captain SHOEMAKER. No, sir, I did not. I saw some Japanese planes circling overhead, but I thought at the instant they were photographic planes. I did not see any high-altitude bombing.

General MCCOY. If there had been high-altitude bombing, there probably would have been a great many more shell struck Ford Island?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I am sure of that, General. I am positive of that. I remember noting that the clouds were broken over Ford

Island. A high-altitude bombing attack would have been rather difficult.

General McNARNEY. Could you tell if there was any noticeable delay on the bombs from the time they struck until the time they exploded?

Captain SHOEMAKER. There was some delay. They did not strike on impact, but that—

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they did not explode on impact.

Captain SHOEMAKER. They did not explode on impact. Thank you, sir. But they exploded right under the water. The ones in the attack on the DOBBIN are the only ones I saw hit the water; I didn't see any other bombs hit. I saw other bombs being dropped, but I didn't see where they hit.

Admiral REEVES. There were no dud bombs dropped on Ford Island that you later recovered?

Captain SHOEMAKER. None. The fleet bomb expert thought he had found three duds in a small field over there, but after they dug down quite a ways they found that they had all exploded in the ground, all three of them.

Admiral REEVES. Have you heard that some of these Japanese bombs were converted 15-inch shell?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I have heard that, but this bomb expert assures me that that isn't so, that they were not converted shell. They were a very heavy-case bomb, however. I have a piece of [1205] steel about this big and this thick (indicating) that went through my bedroom in my quarters after I had gone to the war, and he says that's a piece of a Japanese bomb.

Admiral REEVES. Were they what you would call armor-piercing bombs?

Captain SHOEMAKER. Yes, sir, a very heavy case with a relatively light charge.

Admiral REEVES. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Captain. Will you please observe the caution not to discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone?

Captain SHOEMAKER. I shall, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Captain SHOEMAKER. Good day, gentlemen.

Major ALLEN. Mr. Justice, Mr. Howe just called from Admiral Kimmel's quarters and says that Admiral Kimmel would like to know if there would be any objection if Admiral Theobald was present when Admiral Kimmel went over the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. There would be objection.

Major ALLEN. There would be objection?

The CHAIRMAN. There would be objection.

Major ALLEN. Very well, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, advise Mr. Howe that it is Admiral Kimmel's testimony, for which the Admiral takes responsibility, and he will have to con his own testimony.

Major ALLEN. Very well, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Commander Martin.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir.

[1206] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER HAROLD MONTGOMERY MARTIN, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDING U. S. NAVY AIR STATION, KANEOHE BAY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name and rank?

Commander MARTIN. Commander Harold Montgomery Martin, Commander United States Navy, commanding U. S. Navy Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Territory of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Martin, where were you on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Commander MARTIN. At home, sir, in quarters A, Navy Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Commander MARTIN. At home, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any special orders with respect to your air station other than the routine that had been pursued prior to December 7?

Commander MARTIN. We had been warned on Friday, the 5th, indirectly that the possibilities of sabotage were unusually imminent.

The CHAIRMAN. What if any dispositions did you make to meet that danger?

Commander MARTIN. We had been expecting sabotage attempts for quite some time and had taken all measures that we could think of to meet them. On the morning of the 6th at personnel inspection the crew was again addressed on the possibilities of this particular danger, and the standing orders emphasized, mostly with a view of keeping the people in the alert status that they had been for some time, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What forces and what material had you under your command at your station on the morning of December 7?

Commander MARTIN. Under my command at the air station were [1207] 303 naval personnel plus 31 officers and 93 marine plus two officers.

The CHAIRMAN. What planes?

Commander MARTIN. The planes at the Naval Air Station, with the exception of one utility plane, are assigned to commander patrol wing 1, who uses our station as a base.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was commander of patrol wing 1 at that time?

Commander MARTIN. Commander Knefler McGinnis.

The CHAIRMAN. And to what superior officer did he report?

Commander MARTIN. At the present time patrol wing 1—or at that time, rather, patrol wing 1 was operating under the command of commander patrol wing 2.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Admiral Bellinger.

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you state to us what the resources of patrol wing 1 on your field were that morning?

Commander MARTIN. Patrol wing 1 had attached to it 36 PBY type aircraft, all of which I believe were in commission. Three of these were out on the patrol that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Commander MARTIN. I do not know the particular sector that had been assigned to patrol wing 1 as of that date.

The CHAIRMAN. In what state were the others as respects readiness?

Commander MARTIN. I am not too familiar with the exact condition of the personnel at that time, but I believe that most of the crews were in their barracks or at their quarters in BOQ.

One other thing I might add: there was at that time the regular watch on the hangar, which consists of a ready-duty plane and a crew of about 30 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your field attacked by the Japanese?

Commander MARTIN. The station itself was, sir. The [1208] station consists of both the sea plane area and the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of those planes anchored out?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir. Four planes were moored in Kaneohe Bay at about a thousand yards apart.

The CHAIRMAN. The rest were at the field or at the hangar or where?

Commander MARTIN. The remaining planes were parked on the ramp except for four which were in No. 1 hangar.

The CHAIRMAN. Now describe the attack and its effect, if you will.

Commander MARTIN. About 7:45 I was having a cup of coffee in my quarters, which are the most seaward quarters of the station, when—May I give this in the first person, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Commander MARTIN. —when I heard a group of planes. I walked to the window and had the impression that a carrier group was about to land at our field. The first unusual thing that I noticed was that they were making a right-hand turn, which is contrary to the station flight rules. They were about 800 feet and approaching almost head on. At about that time they exposed their fuselage, and my young son invited my attention to the fact that they had red circles on them. It is rather hazy from then on, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the best you can.

Commander MARTIN. I grabbed a pair of trousers and jumped in the car and drove to the administration building. I had just gotten in the car when the firing commenced. The planes by that time were very low but were momentarily hid from my view by the high hill, Hawaiioloa. While rounding the high hill I noticed one plane climbing toward our tower—they were right down off the rooftops—and shooting at the control tower. When I reached the administration building the firing had become quite heavy, and the first plane on the water had [1209] begun to burn. A message was telephoned to the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer, who informed me that they also were being attacked. I thought at first that it might have been an isolated raid here.

The first attack apparently consisted of 12 fighters who in appearance resembled the Army's P-36's. That attack lasted about eight minutes, during which time all exposed planes were set on fire. Fire apparatus and firefighting crews rushed to the burning planes, and along with the assistance of the contractors' civilian personnel attempt was made to drag the burning planes clear of the hangars. Salvage operations were well along, and it looked as if the hangar could be saved, when the second attack (about 25 minutes later) commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the force that made the second attack?

Commander MARTIN. The second attack consisted of apparently 18 planes, half of which appeared to be bombers, dive bombers, although their attack could best be described as glide bombing. Preceding and during the actual bombing another strafing attack was made. About 18 bombs have been located, most of them falling on the southern side of the hangars and on the southeastern corner of No. 1 hangar. This attack destroyed the planes in the hangars. The fire engine ignited the hangar itself. In size the bombs apparently were between 150 pounds and 200-pound and from the fragments we have collected appear to have been armor-piercing shells, since the case was extremely heavy.

By the time the second attack had developed, anti-aircraft measures had been established and rifles and machine guns distributed to the personnel. During the second attack one fighter was obviously badly hit, apparently wounded, because he flew straight into the hill. Several other planes appeared to be giving off a vapor mixture which looked as it might be [1210] leaking gasoline. One other plane was reported from several sources to have crashed off Kailua Beach some distance at sea, but has not been found as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your anti-aircraft artillery get into action on the occasion of the first attack?

Commander MARTIN. Our anti-aircraft consists merely of machine guns and rifles, but there was a great deal of fire before the end of the first attack, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no .50 calibers, then?

Commander MARTIN. The patrol wings manned all of the .50 calibers which were in the planes, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the planes, however, were set afire, I understand.

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir, but in the initial attack, before, it looked like some of them were going to be saved. The burning started rather slowly. It was from incendiary bullets, and even while some of them were burning they—

The CHAIRMAN. They fired them?

Commander MARTIN. —they were firing the machine guns, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No plane escaped such damage as would render it for the time unusable?

Commander MARTIN. I have been informed that out of the—I didn't quite understand. Did you say that "no plane"?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you whether any plane escaped attack so that it would be usable at the moment.

Commander MARTIN. The answer to that is No, sir. Nine of the planes have since—

The CHAIRMAN. Been restored?

Commander MARTIN. Been restored, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Were you in touch with Bellows Field at that time?

[1211] Commander MARTIN. Many of the stories and information that has since been gained—we are unable to substantiate the evidence itself, but apparently one plane from the group that commenced the attack on Kaneohe dropped off and, flying real low, strafed Bellows Field. I have been informed that a civilian em-

ployee of the contractors phoned Bellows Field at the first attack, but they by that time were also being attacked.

General McCoy. So you feel that on the first attack they attacked you before they did Bellows Field?

Commander MARTIN. I think one of the group that came in over our station went over to Bellows Field afterwards, sir; yes, sir, that is the best information I have.

General McCoy. So it was practically simultaneous?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir. We are only about ten miles apart in air line distance.

General McCoy. Did you get any warning from outside your post at any time prior to the attack?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir. From all that I can learn I believe the firing commenced at Kaneohe first of all.

General McCoy. At what time?

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:45.

Commander MARTIN. It was sometime after 7:45, very—one or two minutes, I would guess.

General McCoy. Did you notice the direction from which these planes came?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir; they approached from slightly west of north.

General McCoy. Did you notice any torpedo planes?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir. To amplify that other question, sir, the second attack, which consisted of bombers, was noticed by Mrs. Martin as coming in directly from the seaward, which is slightly east of north. The view up there is absolutely wide open so that you can see.

[1212] General McCoy. You noticed nothing suspicious of any kind prior to the attack?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Will you please observe the rule that nothing that has taken place in this room is to be discussed with anyone outside?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir.

[1213] Colonel BROWN. Colonel Weddington, Mr. Chairman.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON,
COMMANDING OFFICER, BELLOWS FIELD, UNITED STATES
ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name, please?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Leonard D. Weddington.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a colonel in the United States Army?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your post and duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, Colonel?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Commanding officer, Bellows Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that field attacked on that morning?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By what force?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. First there was a single airplane, and about an hour later about nine airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the first, single plane came over?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. At my home about a mile from the post.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the post within view of your home?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At that moment?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the plane?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You got word that it had been attacked, did you?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes. My driver came from the post and told me it had been attacked. They had gotten word of the attack of the other post and that one man had been wounded in [1214] the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us the approximate hour of that single-plane attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. About 8:35, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of attack was it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. It was a fighter airplane with no bombs; machine gun only and strafing—no diving.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it disappear to? Where did it go?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Toward Kaneohe.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the field when the second attack came, I take it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What type were the nine planes that made that attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were fighters.

The CHAIRMAN. No bombs?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No dive bombers?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Machine gunning?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they fly high or low?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Fairly high. I do not believe any of them were over 1500 feet high.

The CHAIRMAN. What damage did that attack do?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. About the material—they wounded one man and set afire a gasoline tank truck, and a few holes in the rooves and shot down one officer of the 44th Squadron who was getting into his airplane to take off, and shot down two that took off, and damaged one O-49 airplane, and one O-47 was hit, but the damage was so slight as to be disregarded.

The CHAIRMAN. What airplanes did you have at that time? What was your total number of planes there?

[1215] Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 86th Subdivision had two O-46's, and I believe five or six O-47's.

The 44th Squadron was there for gunnery practice, and I believe they had either 11 or 12 P-40's.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they were parked on the field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were parked on our field, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They had been left there on Saturday?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir. They had been there about three weeks, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes in the air from your field when the attack came on?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes fit to take the air after the attack at your field occurred?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. After the first or second?

The CHAIRMAN. Either one.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, we got the P-40's ready between the first and second attacks, because we did not know whether they were coming back there, but we still knew the attack was going on over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of your planes actually get in the air?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Two of them got in the air but were shot down immediately as they got off the runway.

The CHAIRMAN. None got off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. One O-47 took off after the attack was over and tried to track them but never caught them.

The CHAIRMAN. Never caught them?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which direction did they go as they left your field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Toward Kauai.

The CHAIRMAN. Toward Kauai?

[1216] Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were over Kaneohe going from our place.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be to sea east and north?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. West and north.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is correct, west and north.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. West of northwest.

General McNARNEY. How many P-40's were available after the first attack to take off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. After the first attack?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I am not positive, but I believe there were 11 or 12.

General McNARNEY. Where they in commission?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I am not sure.

General McNARNEY. Where did the pilots of the P-40's spend the night of December 6?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Part of them were back in Wheeler Field. Part of them were in their tents. They had tents separate from the tents occupied by the other officers in the post.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether they were in a state of readiness on the night of December 6?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The only readiness that we had on was a No. 1 Alert, which was ground, sabotage only, and they being for aerial gunnery were only responsible for a close guard on their own airplanes and had nothing to do with the ground defense of the post.

General McNARNEY. How many of those P-40 pilots got off there prior to the second attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I haven't heard a report on it. I saw three or four before the second attack.

General McNARNEY. How many P-40's did they attempt to get off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Attempt to get off?

[1217] General McNARNEY. Yes, that they attempted to get off.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Well, counting the one man that was shot getting in the airplane, that made three.

General McNARNEY. . There were only three pilots in the ships?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, because they didn't have ammunition and they weren't going out to them until the ammunition was loaded.

General McNARNEY. They were loading the ammunition?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, they had the airplanes loaded with .30 calibre, and as fast as they got the .50 they would try to get off.

General McNARNEY. When did you get the order to go on Alert No. 1?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe it was the latter part of November, I think it was. It was probably the 27th or 28th.

General McNARNEY. What steps did you take in connection with it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 50 men were armed, who composed the ground defense unit, and were trained to take their positions and were assigned the positions and were issued what little ammunition we had, but the guard itself was depleted after about two days, I think, because the ground defense unit was turned into the post guard, and it was reorganized.

General McNARNEY. What positions were your airplanes in under this order?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. During this alert?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were all in one bunch.

General McNARNEY. Was it customary to keep them that way all the time or only when you were on Alert No. 1?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. All the time.

General McNARNEY. All the time?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, our space was very limited there. It was impossible at the time to keep the number of [1218] airplanes that we had there under cover—that is, more than possibly 25 to 50. So, for the convenience of the guard they were kept together in a place.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any ground anti-aircraft defense in the planes on December 7?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Any anti-aircraft defense?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Not when the first attack came.

General McNARNEY. Did you get any in the planes before the second attack came?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What did that consist of?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 298th Infantry, Hawaiian National Guard, got two .30 caliber anti-air craft machine guns into position at the end of the runway in a hole they had there for it and we got all the machine guns we had issued, but they had no ammunition in

the belts, and as I told the ground defense officer when I arrived at the field—he asked me about setting the machine guns out, and I told him to get the machine guns into position and shoot at the Japanese, because I saw it was Japanese, and if we did secure the ammunition to get it to its position.

General McNARNEY. Where did you have to go to get the ammunition?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We had to come to the crater, and all the ammunition we got that we got out of storage 86, that was already belted for the machine-gun fire, out of the 86th Squadron Reserve. The post had no ammunition; it wasn't authorized any ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Did your fire have any effect?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I saw the effect of one man firing. I saw the gasoline coming from one of them during the attack. After this man had fired on him, I saw he was afire and he had a stream of gas coming from that tank.

The CHAIRMAN. These planes which attacked you you attacked [1219] only with machine guns?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. That is all: only with machine guns, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a hangar out there?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel. We will ask you to observe the caution and do not discuss what you have testified to here or what has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it with anyone outside.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Colonel BROWN. Ensign Beardall.

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN REGINALD BEARDALL, JR., U. S. S. RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, Ensign?

Ensign BEARDALL. John Reginald Beardall, Jr., sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an ensign in the United States Navy?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you graduate from the Academy?

Ensign BEARDALL. 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what ship were you connected on the 7th of December, 1941?

Ensign BEARDALL. The U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A cruiser?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Ensign BEARDALL. I was in Honolulu, sir, on shore leave, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you get back to your command?

Ensign BEARDALL. At 1:15, approximately, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of shape were you in when you got back?

[1220] Ensign BEARDALL. Well, not the best shape, sir, but not the worst.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have some drinks?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, I had some drinks.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first you knew about the attack on that morning?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, I was asleep in my room below, sir, and the torpedo struck us amidships, and the concussion woke me up.

I got out of bed and went to the quarterdeck, and the word was passed about that time that we were being attacked by Japanese planes.

I saw a plane which was already passing over us. I could see the rising sun on the wing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it disappear to?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, it went over and then banked around to the left.

The CHAIRMAN. Over where?

Ensign BEARDALL. It passed over the RALEIGH and banked around to the left, and it was coming out down the entrance.

The CHAIRMAN. Then did you see that plane return again?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, we lost the plane.

The CHAIRMAN. And what orders were passed on the RALEIGH?

Ensign BEARDALL. To man the AA battery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What state of readiness was your particular battery in?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, we had ammunition at all 3-inch guns.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it was there before you got there?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, it was in the ready boxes at the guns. The machine guns had a thousand rounds apiece, and the 1.1 machine guns had 1904 rounds in each of the clip rooms.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of your gun crew at your station were on hand?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, it was a ship's order for one half [1221] of the AA battery to be on board at all times and one half in each liberty group.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your one half available?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes; sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How quickly did you get firing?

Ensign BEARDALL. In approximately five minutes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of the complement of the RALEIGH was on board ship when the attack took place?

Ensign BEARDALL. I should say two thirds.

The CHAIRMAN. And what proportion of the officer personnel was on board ship?

Ensign BEARDALL. I should say about two fifths.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your commander?

Ensign BEARDALL. Captain R. B. Simons.

The CHAIRMAN. He was on board?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He took command?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your personnel in good shape at the work that morning?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, I think in exceptionally good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been your general observation since you have been in Oahu as to the conduct of the officers and the men when on leave? Has there been a great amount of drinking going on when they have leaves?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, I do not believe there is any at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the morale has been good in that respect?

Ensign BEARDALL. I think the morale has been very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the RALEIGH get in the way of hits?

Ensign BEARDALL. She had a bomb hit aft, which exploded after passing through the ship.

[1222] The CHAIRMAN. In the water?

Ensign BEARDALL. It passed through the ship and went out the side and exploded on the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. On the bottom?

Ensign BEARDALL. On the bottom of the bay.

The CHAIRMAN. In the harbor, you mean?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no attempt to get her under way or to move her?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, the engineering spaces were flooded, or at least half of them were.

The CHAIRMAN. When you got to your gun position, what kind of planes did you observe making the attack? You spoke of one torpedo plane. Did you see any others?

Ensign BEARDALL. I remember the torpedo plane in the vicinity, but there was no other attack on the RALEIGH at that time. In fact, there were no other attacks on that side of the island.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any dive bombers?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, I saw Ford Island bombed, and the RALEIGH was dive-bombed by 15 planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of which missed her?

Ensign BEARDALL. Most of them missed her, yes. They were close misses.

The CHAIRMAN. No high bombing?

Ensign BEARDALL. I saw some planes that were flying at a high altitude, sir, but I did not personally see them drop a bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. They may have been photographing?

Ensign BEARDALL. They may have been, or they may have been forming up.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Ensign, are you in the water integrity group of the RALEIGH?

[1223] Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, in the gunnery department, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have a water-tight integrity group there?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Can you state, from your knowledge, the general condition as to procedure after the RALEIGH was bombed? What happened?

Ensign BEARDALL. Condition Zed was set right away, sir, and then we went ahead with counterflooding afterward. I learned that more

from the reports of what I heard other people say than from any observation I made myself.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether the RALEIGH was thought to be sinking?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was thought to be turning over?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, we stood by to abandon ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that condition corrected by watertight integrity control?

Ensign BEARDALL. Somewhat. We were sinking slowly, and a lighter came by after the attack started and they passed some wire cables around the hull, and about an hour and a half after we had some sort of outrigger affair on the port side due to this lighter being connected to us by wires.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that condition lasted through a period of two or three days?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, they stayed alongside the lighter until we went into the Navy Yard a week ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the RALEIGH is in dry dock now?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, it is in dry dock this morning.

Admiral REEVES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

[1224] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ensign. Please observe the caution not to discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it on the outside.

Ensign BEARDALL. Aye, aye, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Seaman Berry.

TESTIMONY OF SEAMAN FRANK MAUTHE BERRY, SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, U. S. S. RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name, sir.

Seaman BERRY. Frank Mauthe Berry.

The CHAIRMAN. What ship are you connected with?

Seaman BERRY. U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What type ship is that?

Seaman BERRY. A light cruiser, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was she moored on the morning of December 7?

Seaman BERRY. The north side of Ford Island just forward of the UTAH.

The CHAIRMAN. On the north side?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, that is Berth Fox 13.

The CHAIRMAN. Next to the UTAH?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, just forward of her, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been on liberty Saturday night, the 6th?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, I had duty; I had watch.

The CHAIRMAN. You had duty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In what part of the ship were you when the attack started?

Seaman BERRY. I was on the port side quarterdeck and this torpedo hit right underneath us.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the first thing you knew about the attack the torpedo that hit or did you see bombs and machine gunning before that?

[1225] Seaman BERRY. Well, the starboard side quarterdeck was painted, so the watch on the port side and I didn't notice any bombing of Ford Island, but we did notice a plane in the air flying very high, but I didn't think anything of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that might be practice?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. As a matter of fact, the officer of the deck thought it was practice, and he asked me if I thought we should call the AA battery for a practice drill.

The CHAIRMAN. The first thing that woke up the crew and the officers of the RALEIGH was when she was hit by a torpedo?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that on the other side from where the torpedo hit?

Seaman BERRY. I watched them drop.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to know. How did they drop the torpedo?

Seaman BERRY. How did they drop it?

The CHAIRMAN. Was it low?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, he came in quite low.

The CHAIRMAN. How far away from you did he launch the torpedo? That is a pretty wide stretch of water from you, isn't it?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. He dropped it a little beyond midstream.

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond midstream?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you realize he was torpedoing at the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Sir?

General McCoy. Did you realize that he was shooting at the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Well, at the time I saw it drop I did not know what it was. I really did not know what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You really did not know they were dropping [1226] a torpedo at you, did you?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. I asked the officer of the deck what was dropping, and he said, "I don't know." He thought it was practice.

The CHAIRMAN. You even then did not know it was a torpedo plane?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that torpedo which hit you do much damage to the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Well, we didn't list a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Seaman BERRY. No, it was just a gradual listing. Of course, it vibrated the ship a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. It did vibrate the ship a lot?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, it did. There was water by our feet and there was water at the quarterdeck, and it got washing around a little.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that there was a general quarters call on?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. I ran to the opposite side of the quarter-deck where the alarm is and I pulled the alarm, but it did not go off.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not go off?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, the electricity went the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get the anti-aircraft guns into action on your ship?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, I think we were the first ones.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the crews? How were the guns manned at that time Sunday morning?

Seaman BERRY. They were manned at all times. You mean before the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Was the ammunition at the guns?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. The ready boxes were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the gun crew on board?

[1227] Seaman BERRY. Well, yes, sir. Of course, at the time they attacked, any man who is near the gun will man the gun. There was a crew, but anybody who is standing by and who can work it will go in.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a rule that a certain part of every gun crew is to be on board and a certain part on liberty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were on hand?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And anybody who could work the gun got to it?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. The guncrews were on.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get hit again?

Seaman BERRY. Well, about an hour later we were hit; a bomb struck aft.

The CHAIRMAN. Aft?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it do serious damage?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, it wasn't severe; it just went through the ship and out through the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I have.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty were you performing?

Seaman BERRY. I had the quartermaster watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many planes do you estimate took part in the attack. How many planes were there? It has been indicated that there were possibly three waves. How many planes would you estimate took part in the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. That is altogether?

Seaman BERRY. I would be afraid to estimate it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we do not suppose that you took time out to count them.

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. After that, I got on the gun myself and started to work on the gun. I was opening up the new cases that came up from the magazines and taking the caps off.

[1228] Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still on board ship?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, I am still on board.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there were quite a number of men from the RALEIGH on liberty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On shore leave?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes.
 The CHAIRMAN. They all came back about what time that night?
 Seaman BERRY. Well, the biggest part of the liberty party came back about 1 o'clock, but we still had quite a few stayed all night.
 The CHAIRMAN. The liberty party?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes.
 The CHAIRMAN. And petty officers?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes. There is quite a few on special liberty.
 The CHAIRMAN. Were those that came back in good condition for work?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes.
 The CHAIRMAN. Or were some of them tight?
 Seaman BERRY. Well, I only saw three or four of them, sir.
 The CHAIRMAN. They seemed to have had a few drinks?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, but they got right to work. It didn't stop them any.
 The CHAIRMAN. These fellows were working the next morning?
 Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, and they worked all that night; no one hardly got any sleep. They were pumping the flooded compartments.
 The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?
 Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Did the bomb or the torpedo destroy the power of your ship?
 Seaman BERRY. The torpedo destroyed the power right at the beginning.
 Admiral STANDLEY. And you had no electricity or force in [1229] the water mains? You had no pressure?
 Seaman BERRY. No pressure, no, sir; none in the freshwater lines. We did not have anything.
 Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.
 The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss with anyone your testimony or what has been said here. Thank you very much.
 Ensign BERRY. Aye, aye, sir.
 Colonel BROWN. Lieutenant Commander Taylor.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR,
 U. S. NAVAL RESERVE**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)
 The CHAIRMAN. State your full name.
 Commander TAYLOR. William E. G. Taylor.
 The CHAIRMAN. Commander Taylor, you had something to do with the installation of the detector device on the island of Oahu, did you not?
 Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
 The CHAIRMAN. I understand that you had some contact with this device in England?
 Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
 The CHAIRMAN. And the Army borrowed you to aid them in setting up the system here?
 Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In what state of preparedness or readiness was the interceptor command here or the warning system or the warning net and the rest of the paraphernalia on or about December 7, 1941?

Commander TAYLOR. It was not ready by any means, sir, for air warning, for air interception, and we were still trying to pull the last threads of it together and to get the information center mounted. I think we had something in the neighborhood of two or three more weeks work before we could get them functioning.

[1230] The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, it would ultimately have in this information center a naval liaison officer?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it would have several liaison officers—to have a regular watch of naval liaison officers.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't instituted for the practice drills that had taken place?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We had asked for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You had asked for them?

Commander TAYLOR. They were forthcoming from the Commander-in-Chief and we expected to have them within a week. They were being withdrawn from the fleet pool. We were going to get the reserve ensigns and get them trained to do the job there, but it would have taken a week or ten days to train them to do the job properly.

The CHAIRMAN. But no such thing had been instituted on December 7?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you cognizant of the fact that when Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, General Short also ordered the interceptor command or the air warning system to be in operation from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. each day?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conference with General Short about the purpose of that order?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, I have not seen the General. I never have seen the General.

The CHAIRMAN. You never saw the General?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your understanding as to the reason why that was put into effect?

Commander TAYLOR. We had the place operated from 6 o'clock in the morning until 11:30, as the equipment was breaking down occasionally; the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and then I believe it was General Short's order that the [1231] operations should be from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. They didn't install the commercial power.

We were planning as soon as possible to get the full operations resumed and to go on a 24-hour basis. At the time, on December 7, and up until that time, the information center was functioning under two departments: under the Hawaiian Department and under the interceptor command; so we had a little bit of confusion as to which was going to operate it.

The CHAIRMAN. The interceptor command and the Signal Service were both busy with it?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McCoy. There were no permanent stations operating at that time, though?

Commander TAYLOR. Detector stations?

General McCoy. No. permanent stations.

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, there were no permanent stations here at all. We had mobile detector stations. We still have them on the island. They are the only ones we have.

As I understand it, the permanent radar systems that are to be put in will be practically the same equipment but will be housed instead of on truck.

General McCoy. But with different power?

Commander TAYLOR. It would eventually be commercial power, yes, but it would be some time before it would be put in.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the warning net connecting the mobile stations at the different places with the information center that you have in now is a temporary affair?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And what are the lines? Are they just temporary lines?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Some of them are temporary, but they are all in cable.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in a cable?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, it is all in a cable, but the [1232] temporary is the best equipment that we could get and get it in a hurry. It is to be installed in bombproof.

General McCoy. Has it been installed in bombproof yet?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, the bombproof is not ready, and the telephone equipment has not arrived from the mainland. I think it will probably take two weeks or a month to get it installed in there when the equipment arrives.

General McCoy. So it is still a very sketchy performance?

Commander TAYLOR. It works very well, but it is not bombproof. It is in a pretty vulnerable place, although it is fairly well guarded, but it is very easy to sabotage it if anybody wants to.

The CHAIRMAN. It is still subject to these local break-downs?

Commander TAYLOR. Occasionally, yes, sir. It is very crude equipment.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has the operation been satisfactory since December 7 considering the state of preparedness of the personnel?

Commander TAYLOR. In some respects, yes, sir, because we do think they are good for air warning. It is pretty good for interception, but we can't get height when they get back there from the land just off-shore. We can't make interception with it.

General McNARNEY. Do you believe there is need for a system of ground observers to supplement the radar?

Commander TAYLOR. We have ground observers, but unless we can get a very good observer system with trained people we find that they are more of a hindrance than a help because we get so many false reports coming in.

On the day of the raid we had the Coast Artillery—which we are using—and they sent in very queer reports.

General McNARNEY. Is there any attempt to filter those out?

[1233] Commander TAYLOR. Yes, we filter those out now, which means rechecking and rechecking, because they are not well trained observers.

General McNARNEY. But it could be better?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. As time goes on?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it is getting better, yes.

General McNARNEY. How long do you think it will be before you have an efficient service?

Commander TAYLOR. I think it is almost as efficient as can be made with the best equipment. I do not think there is any better equipment being made on the mainland.

General McNARNEY. So far as you know, there is no equipment being made which will give you altitude?

Commander TAYLOR. Nothing I know of that is in production, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know about the I. F. F. equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Is any scheduled to come out?

Commander TAYLOR. The I. F. F. equipment I do not believe will work in this case because the I. F. F. will only show up on the detector station on the proper frequency. The I. F. F. and the detector station have to be on the same frequency. These stations are on the same frequency, but the carrier planes have a different frequency; so the I. F. F. may work on the carriers and won't work when it comes into port, and vice versa.

We improvised this after December 7. We made an improvised system for the planes, which was to keep track of every plane at sea and when they came in, and we used the approach procedure so that nothing could come in until we had a chance to look it over carefully before it got to port. When anything not identified came in against the approach procedure [1234] we deemed it hostile and sent fighters off to intercept them.

General McNARNEY. With the information you have, can you identify them for interception purposes?

Commander TAYLOR. Well, we can't depend on getting the fighters at the proper height. With the proper detector equipment you could send out one or two planes to intercept a raid because you could put them at the proper height; but with this thing you have to send out a couple of squadrons to find them.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there is no equipment available in the United States which will obtain height for you?

Commander TAYLOR. Nothing. The only equipment I know which does obtain height is the equipment used aboard ships. We borrowed one of those sets and installed it here in our system, but unfortunately it won't work in these mountains.

The CHAIRMAN. It will not work?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We are trying to find something to make it work now.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know why it will?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do know why?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not very hopeful?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes. We do not think we will have any success.

General McNARNEY. Why won't it work?

Commander TAYLOR. It has, in addition to this beam, which heads out straight, it has two side lobes which pick up the mountain range, so you can't pick up anything in any direction. That is, we can pick up beyond that, but we have a 20- to 30-mile blind area in the mountain range, and it shows up on the screen 360 degrees around.

General McNARNEY. You cannot locate it?

Commander TAYLOR. From where our blind spot is.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the objection to the blind spot if [1235] it is only 20 miles from the system?

Commander TAYLOR. That is on the net we can pick up things at a distance, but we can't make interception. We can't get height to get interception, but we hope we will be able to direct our fighters and to see our fighters as they go out.

The CHAIRMAN. This blind space prevents you from seeing your fighters as they go out?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, we never know where our fighters are.

General McNARNEY. Do the British have the same trouble?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. They have got four different types of detector equipment. Theirs is working very well, but ours is very obsolete and crude equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, to make this a real information station means that we have to get the British plans and to get instruments constructed in accordance with them?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, at least as good as their equipment is, and it would take perhaps two types of equipment to work the island here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Haven't we got any of the British types?

Commander TAYLOR. To my best knowledge we have the information on the British radar equipment, but we do not have any of the equipment in production.

General MCCOY. Do you have reason to think that the enemy has the radar?

Commander TAYLOR. I was told the enemy has a low-frequency detector unit. I know the Germans have had it for fighter control and they also started to use it for fire control in France this last March. When we sent our raids over there, France, we could see their fighters come up to intercept them, and they used the same sort of detector, the fighter detector system, that the British use.

The British knew the Germans were working on the equipment before the war started.

[1236] The CHAIRMAN. The Germans developed it originally?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, the Germans and the British were both working on it before the war started. They talked very freely about it. Before the war the British had a very good detector system and operations room and that was all set up before the war started.

The Germans apparently didn't have the system working, but now they are using the same equipment for fighter control, and I assume that they have passed it on to the Japanese.

General MCCOY. I understood they had it on the BISMARCK.

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, and it is very evident in their anti-aircraft defense and they are accurate on heights.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you enter the regular service, sir?

Commander TAYLOR. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. When did you enter the regular naval service?

Commander TAYLOR. I never had been in the regular Navy; I was in the Naval Reserve since 1925, and after that the Marines, and when the war began I joined the British air corps and then came back to do this work.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your profession, sir?

Commander TAYLOR. I have been in naval aviation most of my life.

The CHAIRMAN. Naval aviation?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. With respect to the information about the operation of the radar, did you communicate particularly with the Commander-in-Chief and his staff in regard to your work?

Commander TAYLOR. I worked very closely with the Commander-in-Chief's staff, and I found them more helpful than anyone else.

Admiral STANDLEY. Can you tell me how this training and this station operated? That is the one we saw the other day.

[1237] Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the warning station where you have the big board and the various operators there?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is under the interceptor command?

Commander TAYLOR. It is now, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it under the Signal Corps?

Commander TAYLOR. It was the Signal Corps's responsibility to develop the information center and train the personnel.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then turn over to the interceptor command?

Commander TAYLOR. The interceptor command, I think, was the one to put in the controller and do the interceptions.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Signal Service was still to do the maintenance?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the kind of training that was given there before December 7? What was the process of operator training?

Commander TAYLOR. The first thing to do was to put out the detector station and to train the operators around the island to read the screen and to pass the information to us. It takes a long time to train these operators, and we did not have anywhere near enough.

The next thing was to train the plotters on the board, who are at the other end of the direct telephone line from the detector operators.

We got the detector stations and the plotters functioning together.

The thing was to get the detector station connected up with the system of plotting and sending in the instructions and the pursuits—we were working on the fighters and pursuits at Hickam Field, giving the technical information and working on the radar station.

[1238] Then the next thing was to try to get the anti-aircraft guns and to control them. We were just getting the officers in the positions in the information center at the time that war was declared. We did not get them all in, and it takes time getting the men trained in the different types of equipment, but we had gotten a few anti-aircraft people and had gotten control of the guns.

The Navy personnel were forthcoming, and we had gotten the bombers and I think we had only two from them. That is about all we asked for up to that time.

The only other person we had on training—we had one officer on watch, and on the morning of December 7 we had one officer who had no experience as a controller and was there trying to learn as much as he could about the information center.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was this a case where you felt you were responsible for setting this up or rather forcing this on the organization, or rather that it was up to you to push the thing and get the officers?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you were having a little difficulty getting the personnel?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes. I do not think most of the people realized the importance of the thing until they actually got in and looked at it. It sometimes does take a little time and sometimes a conference to get things going.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was nothing whatever reliable about your warning service that morning of December 7?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, nothing, nothing at all. That raid coming in might have been the Army or Navy planes or they might have been ferrying planes going to Australia or might have been anything. On that morning we could not have identified those planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Someone said that after the attack that station was more or less manned and that these planes [1239] were tracked on the detector?

Commander TAYLOR. I did not get there until 9:30 that morning, sir, and the station was going. We were trying to man all stations as fast as we could. We are using our crews, but there was a large amount of unworthy information coming in and going out as to what was going on, and I could just barely remember what went on. I spoke to the sergeant who was the man at the phone whether he passed any information to the Navy, and he said he did. He did give the information that the raid was coming from the southwest, which still may be true, but we were working on a 24-hour basis for three or four days until we got the thing going, and it is pretty hard to tell that in particular.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that due to the untrained personnel and the confusion going on that it is pretty hard to depend or to put any dependence on what happened after 9:30 that morning?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. I saw the historical plot afterward. There is one man who keeps a plot of everything that shows up on the board. It was analyzed, and I could not be sure what went on.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you see the plot that was made of the supposedly oncoming Japanese ships?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes. If it had come in on the board when I was there it would not have meant anything to me with the stage of development of this information center here at the time. We would have a pretty difficult time finding out. We would have to go to Kaneohe Bay and we would have to go to those at Pearl Harbor and all the bombing squadrons and the carriers which never warn us when they come in.

It may have been a carrier group or it may have been a ferrying flight which was coming over.

Admiral STANDLEY. If you had been there and had seen it on the screen, what would you have done?

[1240] Commander TAYLOR. I don't think I would have done anything.

General MCCOY. You would have thought they were friendly planes coming in?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. You are probably the most experienced controller on the island at this time?

Commander TAYLOR. I was the only one, so far as I know, but I do not think anybody could have said what they were. We have times when a whole carrier group of 72 planes may come in from a distance at sea.

General McNARNEY. What experience have you had as controller?

Commander TAYLOR. I haven't had very much at controlling, but I worked in the operations room with the air force and I was a squadron commander, and occasionally—very infrequently—I would go over and control my own planes; but I had no actual experience as a controller. I would just take over the control just for the fun of it.

General McNARNEY. What squadron did you have?

Commander TAYLOR. I had the First Eagle Squadron.

General McNARNEY. How long did you have it?

Commander TAYLOR. I had it from October until June this year.

General MCCOY. I congratulate you on being here.

Commander TAYLOR. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Do not discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room.

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

[1241] TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN, U. S. NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name, Admiral?

Admiral BROWN. Wilson Brown.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on December 7 and are now commander of one of the task forces based in Honolulu, or in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. On December 7 the task force I had command of was divided into two groups. The major group was under the command of Admiral Newton and consisted of the carrier LEXINGTON and two cruisers escorting with seven destroyers and was on a mission to Wake under the independent orders from the Commander-in-Chief to deliver some Marines and fighting planes at Wake.

My personal command at that time was the cruiser INDIANAPOLIS, my flagship, and five old destroyers now used for mine-sweeping purposes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was your flagship on the morning of December 7?

Admiral BROWN. We were at Johnston Island, Mr. President. We had gone there for the purposes of seeking advice from the local experts and to test out the Higgins landing boat and to land them on the coral reefs and to land them with the use of dynamite in clearing away the coral obstructions.

I would like to say, if I may, that the major mission of my task force up until December 7 had been to develop the technique and to assemble the matériel for land operations, and our work for the previous six months had been directed particularly to that end, working with the Army and the Marines and developing the technique in assembling matériel for amphibious operations.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the INDIANAPOLIS actually at Johnston Island on the morning of December 7?

[1242] Admiral BROWN. Yes. We had just arrived at Johnston Island and we had loaded one boat from shore when we received word.

The CHAIRMAN. Upon receipt of the first dispatch, how did you move, sir?

Admiral BROWN. We immediately notified the commanding officer of Johnston Island. We were in a quite exposed condition, exposed submarine waters, and I was immediately conscious that they might have submarines at sea or at each of the islands. We had our planes in the air and we recovered the planes.

Then I immediately received orders from the Commander-in-Chief to go, as directed, by the senior officer afloat at sea, who was commanding Task Force No. 8 under a mission.

We received instructions before we recovered our planes to rendezvous at a given destination set up northwest about 500 miles away.

The CHAIRMAN. You immediately started on to your rendezvous?

Admiral BROWN. Yes. The mine sweeper D. M. S. with what technique we had, they were to return immediately to Pearl Harbor as part of the squadron, my hope being that if the attacking carriers returned by the southern route that we would have a direct line on them from Pearl Harbor to Jaulit, and we hoped we might make contact with them by these destroyers.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, did either your destroyers or your flagship or your planes make any contact with them?

Admiral BROWN. No, sir.

To pursue the history on the INDIANAPOLIS and the rest of the task force, it was about noon on Sunday that I received other orders from the commander of Task Force 8 which indications led to the conclusion that the enemy might be withdrawing from a given position southwest of Pearl Harbor toward Jaluit, which would have put the INDIANAPOLIS practically on the line, [1243] as we were the closest to that line. So, instead of joining the rest of the task force we immediately proceeded back to the position toward Johnston and searched with my planes on Sunday and on Monday, and then joined up with the rest of the task force on Tuesday morning, when we continued the search.

If the enemy left from a point southwest of Pearl Harbor and maintained a speed of not greater than 20 knots, then we should have lined up with them the next day; which leads me to the belief that they are able to maintain such a speed of 20 knots, which seems im-

probable because of the fuel limitation, or that they retired to the northwest.

[1244] The CHAIRMAN. The indications seem to point rather to the latter possibility now; do you not think so?

Admiral BROWN. I have not had time, sir. I have been to sea most of the time. I haven't heard or discussed it with others, but—and I do not know how much information they have here now as to their probable movement.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in personal contact with the Commander-in-Chief between November 27 and December 7?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you any discussion with him, or was there any discussion by him in your presence, of the impending threat of actual hostilities?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, the Commander-in-Chief kept me fully informed of all developments. He showed me his personal correspondence and all dispatches and all secret instructions, and I believe that I was fully informed of the situation as he saw it and as it was made known to us.

The CHAIRMAN. He made certain dispositions, I understand, toward Wake and/or Midway based upon the thought that there might be an outbreak of hostilities.

Admiral BROWN. He was making every effort to increase the strength of those outposts, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion of a possible hostile raid from the air on Pearl Harbor in these talks?

Admiral BROWN. I think we all had in mind the probability that Japan would have submarines in these waters before they made any declaration of war. We had in mind the possibility of her sending carriers to raid shipping. I remember that at some time previous to December 7—I don't know how long before—we discussed the possibility of her sending raiders to attack this island, and our general conclusion was that they would not take the chance. At least, that was my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it highly improbable?

[1245] Admiral BROWN. I thought it highly improbable because, in the first place, the patrol wings have been on practically a war status for at least three months, and I think longer, making daily patrols, including Saturday and Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, let me stop you there. Where do you get the information that that is so, that your statement in that respect is accurate?

Admiral BROWN. Well, I think I was so informed by Admiral Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that there was no regular patrol at a distance of six, seven, or eight hundred miles in any given sector at any time?

Admiral BROWN. No, sir, I am not familiar with that.

The CHAIRMAN. Your belief was quite to the contrary? Your belief was quite to the contrary, whether misinformed or not?

Admiral BROWN. I knew, of course, that the number of planes available to make what you might call a thorough search was inadequate, but I believed that a search of a kind was being made every day.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by "a search of a kind," Admiral?

Admiral BROWN. Well, what I had in mind was that patrol planes left this island and made a circle of the island morning and afternoon.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, that is what I should call, not being much of an airman or a sailor, an inshore patrol; isn't that what you call it, to patrol a distance of fifty miles, we will say, around the island? Fifty miles out?

Admiral BROWN. I am not familiar with what their instructions were and how far they went.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a thing in the standing procedure of the Army that is called an inshore patrol, by which I [1246] understand they meant a nearby patrol of the shores of the island. Our information is that there was no such patrol maintained.

Admiral BROWN. Well, I can't, of course, speak with firsthand knowledge, but—

The CHAIRMAN. You thought there was such?

Admiral BROWN. I thought there was, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, with respect to a distance patrol, did you think that there was any sort of adequate distance patrol? And by "distance patrol" I mean a patrol that might discover a carrier which would run in under cover of darkness.

Admiral BROWN. Well, nothing like the patrol that is being carried out at the present time.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral BROWN. I, of course, knew that. I knew we didn't have a sufficient number of planes to conduct such a search; but I thought, from the enemy's standpoint, having their agents here, and plenty of them, who are very accurately informed, that they knew there was a great deal of air activity and that the chance of being picked up by the number of planes that were constantly in the air here—if I had been in their boots I would have thought I had a very slim chance of getting in without getting caught.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. Admiral, were any of your forces directed to take part in the operations for the relief of Wake?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, we were trying to—the then task force 12 returned to port on I think it was 14 December. We were here for one day. I had instructions to proceed with that force and a tanker to deliver an attack on Jaluit or such other enemy base in the Marshalls as I might select, 24 hours prior to the time that the reinforcements were due to be [1247] landed at Wake. We left within 24 hours and were prepared to carry out that assignment, when we received instructions from the Commander-in-Chief not to do it but to proceed to the support of the other task force that had been ordered to land reinforcements at Wake.

General McNARNEY. What was your approximate position when you received orders to support the other task force?

Admiral BROWN. I had decided, rather than attack Jaluit, which had been indicated in my original orders, that I would attack the Gilberts. I made that decision because I believed that it was a very great hazard of the carrier to take her into a position where we could deliver an effective attack on Jaluit; whereas, having information that came to us while we were enroute that the Japanese had

seized and occupied the Gilberts and had a considerable air force there—the term was that the Yokohama—“a Yokohama group and carrier”—that we would slow up their move to the southward and that we would create the diversion which was the primary purpose of my original orders. My orders to attack at the south were given in the hope that such an attack would draw their air forces down to the south and allow the other task force to get into Wake without being attacked; so that at the time my orders were changed I was within 36 hours high-speed steaming of Jaluit.

General McNARNEY. What date were your orders changed?

Admiral BROWN. I think I would have to consult the record for that. Let's see. It was about 36 hours before D-day, and I am a little hazy now about what D-day was.

General McNARNEY. Was D-day Sunday, the 21st?

Admiral BROWN. No. D-day was delayed by the Commander-in-Chief 24 hours after I left, and we were to attack Monday morning, and the reinforcements were to be launched on Tuesday morning.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be Monday morning the 22nd, [1248] would it not?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General McCoy. That was the week following; that is, the 14th? Monday, the 14th?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral BROWN. No, sir; two weeks later.

The CHAIRMAN. Monday, the 22nd.

General McNARNEY. Did you ever make contact with the other task force?

Admiral BROWN. Not by sight, no, sir. Immediately upon the receipt of change of orders we steamed to the Gilberts. And, see, our position was pretty well south. We were down about latitude—I think it was seven, and they were up in twenty-something.

(The witness went to a map.)

The CHAIRMAN. That is ten, isn't it (indicating)?

Admiral BROWN. We had been up in here (indicating). We came pretty close to Howland and Baker. I think we were down about latitude three, and then we proceeded immediately to the northwest. The other one we assumed was approaching from the north of Wake. We got to a position about here (indicating) when our instructions were to return to Pearl.

General McNARNEY. Did you make any contact with any enemy at all?

Admiral BROWN. We saw nothing. We had one very disappointing false alarm. Throughout our trip to and from we had our search planes out covering an area sometimes a hundred miles and sometimes two hundred miles, and one of them reported an enemy carrier at one time, and we thought we had the chance of a lifetime, but it proved to be a dynamite barge that had been cast loose by one of the contractors a week before that drifted about nearly a thousand miles from the place where it was let go.

General McNARNEY. Was your personal reaction to being [1249] recalled one of disappointment?

Admiral BROWN. Well, naturally we were all tremendously anxious to relieve Wake. I was personally very conscious of the serious risk

that we were putting our carrier in. My personal opinion at this time is that carriers are our greatest naval asset. The fuel situation on such an expedition is one of serious concern. We had covered something over 2,000 miles at rather high speed to meet the time schedule. We had a tanker with us and refueled all destroyers, all ships of the force, in rather rough water, barely in time to be able to proceed to carry out the orders. But had we carried it out, all of the destroyers would have been almost out of fuel 24 hours after the attack, which is not a pleasant situation to be in. If weather had enabled us to reservice them or if we had not been in the presence of a superior enemy naval force, we could have refueled, but that question of fuel on these long distances is a very serious one.

General McCoy. What was the extreme range of your destroyers?

Admiral BROWN. Well, we were very disappointed to find that under the conditions of operating in constant readiness for higher speed the radius is not nearly as great as the theoretical radius.

General McCoy. What is the theoretical radius?

Admiral BROWN. The theoretical radius of these destroyers at economical speeds is about 6,000, but steaming at 15 knots and being ready to go to 20, and within a limited time to be ready to go to 25, and from then on up to full speed, they burn nearly 50% more than the theoretical, so that under those conditions the steaming radius is not much in excess of 2,000 miles. This past week—

General McCoy. Hadn't that been discovered before this period?

[1250] Admiral BROWN. Yes, but I think not fully appreciated. We have had, of course, for the past several years—for the past 20 years we have had fleet problems that simulate war conditions as closely as we can do it, but these expenditures this past month have been a source of concern to me and greater than I had expected.

General McCoy. Did you receive through the Commander-in-Chief or any other means a war warning from the Navy Department on November 27 or thereafter?

Admiral BROWN. I was here at Pearl Harbor at that time, sir, and I saw all of his communications, I think, up until the day I left, which was the Friday before: the 5th.

General McCoy. Do you remember a dispatch which started out, "This is a war warning"?

Admiral BROWN. No, sir, I do not. I think that must have been received after I left.

General McCoy. Would you show the Admiral those dispatches, please?

The CHAIRMAN. Have you our paraphrases of them?

Mr. HOWE. Yes.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. I have them out in the file.

The CHAIRMAN. We have taken only paraphrases of them.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In the meantime have you any questions?

General McCoy. Yes.

How long have you been on this station, Admiral?

Admiral BROWN. Since the first of last February, sir.

General McCoy. February?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Prior to these recent task group assignments what force had you? What was your command?

Admiral BROWN. They had three major task force organizations in effect for the past six months, as my memory serves me, [1251] when, I explained, I relieved Andrews as Commander of the scouting force; and then several months after relieving, the whole fleet was broken up into three major task forces, and I had command of Task Force 3, and the major mission assigned to me was, as I said before, to develop the technique and assemble the necessary material for amphibious operations.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the telegram here (indicating).

Admiral BROWN. No, sir, I do not remember to have seen that. And yet I note that it was sent the 28th of November.

The CHAIRMAN. Received 28 November.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Sent the 27th.

Admiral BROWN. I remember to have seen instructions from operations about taking a defensive deployment and to have discussed that with the Commander-in-Chief. I do not recollect the first phase of the dispatch predicting an aggressive move.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the dispatch of November 24 which is underneath the one you have looked at, Admiral?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you sure?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. I don't remember that in just that form, but I remember the sense of the second one.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, this is a paraphrase.

General McCoy. You are sure that you did not see the war warning of the 27th?

Admiral BROWN. Well, I was under the impression that I have seen everything, but I am sure that if worded as that is it would have made an impression. I have no recollection of having seen that one, but I was under the impression that I had seen everything that the Commander-in-Chief received, and I know that that was his intention, that all flag officers should see them.

General McCoy. That was a very important dispatch of the [1252] 27th.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. I was in almost daily communication with the Commander-in-Chief at the time I was in. I am a little—I think I was in a little period of about one week—the 7th—I probably was at sea at the time that message was received, the 27th.

Admiral STANDLEY. To continue, Admiral, prior to the forming of these three task groups—and what was that time? When were these three major task groups formed?

Admiral BROWN. Well, it is my recollection, Admiral, about April or May.

Admiral STANDLEY. And prior to that time you as commander of the scouting force were operating out of Pearl Harbor for training purposes?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Target practice?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And training?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When you took your force out of Pearl Harbor—the scout force I am talking about now—for training purposes, what was the condition you set for the ships when they left harbor?

Admiral BROWN. We were on practically war conditions, sir, except, that is, we never anchored; we kept under way at all times. We darkened ship. We did not have a condition watch at all times on the anti-aircraft battery, but we had drills from dawn until night, intensively, throughout the time since I arrived until this moment. Of course, the entire fleet here considered their major mission one of training and preparing men for the increased Navy, and I think our thoughts were very largely concentrated to that end. I have never known the Navy to work harder than it has in the past year.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the condition you set when you [1253] were out on those training periods was practically one of a war status, a cruising status?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, except that we did not maintain at all times the state of readiness that we do now, at present in condition 3 or 2 at all times, which means that we have all anti-aircraft guns manned, we have at least one of the turrets manned at all times, and we have people standing by. That is a very killing routine for the crew. It means that nobody gets very much sleep, and a very broken sleep. But the so-called intertype tactics which were intended to simulate possible war action—we did fully simulate all war conditions; and the cruisers of the scouting force, when sent on escort duty with vessels to the Philippines and other places, were on a full war basis. They darkened ship, and they were standing in condition 3 at all times with all their anti-aircraft manned.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, then, ships operating out of here for training, and so forth, were in a status of apprehension as to surprise attack?

Admiral BROWN. Partly that, Admiral, and partly as a method of training for war. I think we were all—I know that I was apprehensive of a possible submarine attack at any time. I never would have agreed to anchor at Lahaina. The ships were under way all the time; they were darkened; we zigzagged; we behaved as if—we didn't exchange umpires; we haven't for the past three or four months.

Admiral STANDLEY. And, as I understand it, the division of the fleet into task forces with an operating period so that either one or two of the task forces were out all the time was intended to avoid the risk of anchoring outside of Pearl Harbor.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. I believe that that was one of the purposes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the purpose of that was to avoid [1254] a surprise submarine attack?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, but, as I say, primarily for training, I think.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you said yourself, you would not think of anchoring your fleet in Lahaina Roads.

Admiral BROWN. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why not?

Admiral BROWN. Possibility of a surprise attack.

General McCoy. But by submarines, you mean?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You had no anticipation of an air attack?

Admiral BROWN. No, sir, I hadn't. I suppose perhaps my state of mind was influenced too much by what I thought they might do. I expected the Japanese to take action against Singapore or Thailand, in the hopes that the United States would not carry out its threat to take a hand. I did not expect them to start the ball with an attack on this place.

General McCoy. As the result of that dispatch of November 24, assuming that you had not seen the war warning, as a result of that dispatch did you take any additional measures of security at sea?

Admiral BROWN. Not at sea, no, sir, because I feel that for the past six months the forces at sea have taken all necessary precautions.

General McCoy. On the other hand, since war is declared you say that you have taken other precautions?

Admiral BROWN. We have stricter watches, sir. In the meantime we are not getting the same kind of—the kind of training for our enlisted men that we did before. It has stopped some of that training.

General McCoy. But you were training for war, were you not?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And you are at war.

[1255] Admiral BROWN. Now we are at war, and we are not getting the amount of target practice that we did before. We are not having time to instruct individuals.

General McCoy. In other words, your fleet was not prepared for war then?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, I think we were prepared for war. It is, I think, the same thing in the Army, that you have to keep developing your new men as they come in, and we are trying to double the size of our personnel in four years. Had we gone to a strictly war basis six months ago we wouldn't have as many trained officers and men today as we have now. And of course we have had a great many apparent crises in the course of the past six months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in regard to the personnel situation here in this Hawaiian area, what has been the condition in regard to the attrition of crews of your ship due to expiration of enlistments and sending them back home?

Admiral BROWN. It has been a matter of great concern, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you tell us what percentage of the crew you would probably send back?

Admiral BROWN. I can't give you the figures, Admiral, by expiration of enlistment. That has been very great. I think that the changes of personnel aboard ship have been due more to transfers to put new ships in commission, and they have taken our trained men out and been very slow in sending us recruits to train up.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then is it not true that a considerable period is wasted because men will not reenlist on board here but go back to the States and reenlist there?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, there was a good deal of that.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that required new men coming in?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which would not be the case if they [1256] were in home port?

Admiral BROWN. Well, I am afraid a lot of them were tempted by the very high pay; what percentage I am not in a position to say. I think that the commander of base port would know that better than any of the rest of us. I have been very much pleased by the number who have reenlisted in spite of the condition, because I think it is a very great temptation to them to accept these high-priced jobs ashore when men have got families and children to bring up. But as to whether being out here or whether we were based on the West Coast would have affected that number, I think it would some but not a great deal.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. Admiral, you stated that on the 14th of December you were ordered to take command of a task force and to attack Jaluit?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. What was the composition of that force?

Admiral BROWN. It consisted of the carrier LEXINGTON, the three cruisers INDIANAPOLIS, CHICAGO, and PORTLAND, and nine destroyers.

Admiral REEVES. And you stated that you abandoned attacking Jaluit and decided to attack the Gilbert Islands instead. That was on your own initiative and decision?

Admiral BROWN. No, Admiral. If I may correct your question, my orders were not specifically to attack Jaluit. My orders were to attack Jaluit or such other base as I might decide, or not to make any attack at all if my best judgment indicated that to be necessary. That is the way my orders read.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, that is what I understood, but your decision not to attack Jaluit but to attack the Gilberts was your own decision?

[1257] Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. After sailing?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did you report the objective that you had selected to the Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral BROWN. No, sir. I sent no radio communication whatever from the time I left until I received the orders to change, expecting that any such communication would be intercepted and they would have an inkling that we were down there.

Admiral REEVES. But before you reached the Gilberts you received orders from the Commander-in-Chief directing you to support another task force which was to relieve Wake; is that correct?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. For brevity what your task force called?

Admiral BROWN. My task force was called No. 11.

Admiral REEVES. No. 11. And the force relieving Wake?

Admiral BROWN. Was No. 14.

Admiral REEVES. Who commanded that?

Admiral BROWN. Admiral Fletcher.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know the composition of that force?

Admiral BROWN. He had the carrier SARATOGA and three cruisers—I can't name them—and a number of destroyers, I think about six.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know of any other task force connected with this expedition to Wake?

Admiral BROWN. Well, task force 8 was sent out also, consisting of the carrier ENTERPRISE, as a supporting force. I think they were stationed somewhere in the neighborhood of Midway.

Admiral REEVES. The ENTERPRISE. And any other ships?

[1258] Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir. There were some cruisers and destroyers with that force.

Admiral REEVES. You don't know how many?

Admiral BROWN. Not more than three cruisers and I think about six destroyers.

Admiral REEVES. And before you had joined task force No. 14—

Admiral BROWN. (interposing). Excuse me. I never did join it.

Admiral REEVES. I say, before you joined task force No. 14 enroute to Wake Island,—

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. —what were the next orders you received?

Admiral BROWN. I was told to return to Pearl Harbor. I was told that Wake was already occupied, and to return to Pearl Harbor.

Admiral REEVES. Who issued those orders?

Admiral BROWN. Commander-in-Chief, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you remember the date you got those orders?

Admiral BROWN. Well, I think it was that Monday, which would have been the 22nd, I think.

Admiral REEVES. Monday, the 22nd?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Was that D-day?

Admiral BROWN. That was D-minus-one day, sir; they were one day ahead of us.

Admiral REEVES. One day short?

Admiral BROWN. They were one day ahead of us.

Admiral REEVES. This was one day before Wake was to be relieved?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know if the relief force No. 14 [1259] received similar orders?

Admiral BROWN. I am quite sure they did, yes, sir. I think that they were—it was in the same dispatch as my own. Both forces were to return toward Pearl.

Admiral REEVES. I suppose you have no idea why this expedition was canceled?

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir, I was told—my dispatch indicated that intercepted dispatches showed an assembly of a strong force in the Marshalls: number of ships, types unknown, and I have been told by Admiral Pye since, that he considered that to bring the carriers into that position at that time was inviting loss of one or more carriers.

Admiral REEVES. I have no more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral. Our Commission is such that we feel it necessary to ask you not to discuss your testimony with anyone, sir.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or anything that happened here. Thank you very much, sir.

Admiral BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are sorry to have to drag you right in after a bad term of service. I hope you will have a good rest.

Admiral BROWN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We shall adjourn, to meet Monday morning at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel at 9:30 o'clock a. m.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until Monday, January 5, 1942, at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, at 9:30 o'clock a. m.)

[1260]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1261] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

MONDAY, JANUARY 5, 1942

**SUITE 300, ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Honolulu, T. H.**

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on Saturday, January 3, 1942, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Waterhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, sir.

[1262] **TESTIMONY OF GEORGE SHADFORD WATERHOUSE, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT OF THE BISHOP NATIONAL BANK OF HONOLULU, PRESIDENT OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF HONOLULU**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name, Mr. Waterhouse?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. George Shadford Waterhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. What business are you in in Honolulu?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I am executive vice president of the Bishop National Bank of Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. You are also president of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I am at the present time, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you lived in Honolulu?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Sixty-six years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You were born here?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, have you had occasion to observe the conditions here on Saturday nights and pay nights among certain members of the Army personnel and Navy personnel on leave in the city of Honolulu?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. To a certain extent, yes. •

The CHAIRMAN. Where do you live, sir?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I live up Nuuanu Valley on Coelho Way.

General McCoy. Is that near the golf club?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. It is about a quarter of a mile below the club.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had occasion to be in town on Saturday nights from time to time?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What can you say as to the behavior of the men of the Army and of the fleet here on Saturday nights?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, you see something occasionally that is out of order, but as a general rule it was very fine, I think.

[1263] The CHAIRMAN. You did not see what you would call excessive drunkenness and disorderly conduct, did you?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that when men are on leave that some men will get drunk?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How has been the military and naval policing of their own forces here? Has it been adequate?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Adequate, yes, sir; that is, in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of talk to the effect that there was drunkenness on Saturday night which affected the morale of the fleet and of the Army on Sunday morning when this attack came on. Do you have any personal knowledge that would confirm that accusation?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, have you heard from anyone who purports to have personal knowledge any such statement with respect to the situation on Saturday night to the effect that it was bad?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, I have heard general rumors of a party out at Schofield, quite a wild party that night. That is, that is only a rumor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the only rumor that you have heard?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything else?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, nothing else. That is the only one I heard.

The CHAIRMAN. General, any questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you heard any rumors as to the presence or lack of presence of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet or of any of his senior officers on that morning, on the [1264] morning of December 7?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. On the morning of December 7? Yes, I heard rumors but they were from—I didn't take much account of them. I heard one rumor that Admiral Kimmel was on the golf course and another that he was on Kauai hunting. Now, I do not know that. That is simply a humor but I have not put much faith in that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Waterhouse, have you ever gone out on Saturday night to dinners at any hotels or other places where they have Saturday night music and dining and so forth?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I have at times, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What has been the decorum or conduct of the naval officers at those dinners? Have they been wild parties, as you would express it, or have they been just as you would expect them to be in any place?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. What I would expect at any place. There is a great deal of dancing and some drinking, but I have never seen—and when I say “never”—maybe once or twice, but nothing in any way excessive—very seldom anything excessive.

Admiral STANDLEY. If there was anything excessive it was an individual case rather than a general practice?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. It was so that I had no objection to my wife dancing with the officers; so you could see what I felt about it.

General McCoy. Were you surprised at this attack?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I was, sir. I was very surprised. I would not believe it at first. I thought it was just a practice until I saw something hit on the side of the hill very close to the house about a quarter of a mile up and the dirt and dust rise and then the whizz of the bullet or something came past us.

General McCoy. Had you had any warning of any kind before the attack?

[1265] **Mr. WATERHOUSE.** None at all.

General McCoy. What was the first warning that you had?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. The radio announcement that the Japanese were attacking us.

General McCoy. Did you believe it?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I did not correctly, no.

General McCoy. Until you saw these things?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, for about a half hour I didn't credit it.

General McCoy. Have you ever dined at Schofield on Saturday night?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. That is the night for the customary what might be called post hop?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, I think it is.

General McCoy. And dinner dancing?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

General McCoy. On any of these occasions that you went up there was there any undue action due to drinking or what you might call a wild party?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No. I had no criticism about any of these parties myself. I am not a heavy drinker and still I had no criticism.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you attended the Saturday night hops at the Naval Station, Pearl Harbor?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your opinion of those?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Perfectly all right, so far as I saw them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Thank you.

General MCCOY. Have you ever seen any commanding general or admirals here under the influence of liquor?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Never.

General MCCOY. Never?

[1266] Mr. WATERHOUSE. No.

General McNARNEY. Mr. Waterhouse, among your business associates what is the general reputation of General Short with regard to his alertness and as to his general efficiency and the way he handles his command?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. There is a great deal of confidence in General Short I think. There are certain rumors going around about the way he fell down.

General McNARNEY. I do not want rumors but your information about the general reputation of him.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I know there is a great deal of confidence in him because we did get up a letter in his favor and most of the people who were asked to sign it signed it.

General McNARNEY. Was that the general feeling prior to December 7th?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. The only criticism I heard against General Short was that he was anti-British. There were numerous Britishers told me they had no use for him. That is the only criticism I ever heard of General Short. Otherwise, everyone in the business community seemed to be in favor of him, to have every confidence in him.

General McNARNEY. You were perfectly satisfied that the War Department had placed a competent officer in command?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How about Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, there was some criticism about the Admiral downtown that he would not cooperate with the Army. Otherwise, everybody seemed to have confidence in him, but there was a certain criticism downtown that he would not cooperate with the Army. Now, whether that is true or not I can't say but that was the feeling downtown in the street.

General McNARNEY. You have nothing concrete to offer in that respect?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, I have not. I asked someone, some [1267] businessman, what he meant by that and he said, "Well, I have heard—he did not say from whom—but he said, "I have heard there was criticism of Admiral Kimmel that the flyers should take turns in patrolling and that Admiral Kimmel replied the Navy can take care of itself."

Otherwise there was perfect confidence in Admiral Kimmel. Most of us admired Admiral Kimmel.

General McNARNEY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, did you approve of the action of the military authorities in declaring martial law here in the emergency?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, I did. I did not approve of the Governor handing it over to the military authorities, but I approved of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the martial law?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, of the martial law.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a very difficult problem here with a large Japanese population?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In your judgment is it wise to give the population any latitude at this time or should they be held firmly in control?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I am very proud of the situation so far as Honolulu is concerned. I have heard that it is not so on the Island of Hawaii, but so far as Honolulu is concerned I am very proud of the situation.

The Japs did not have any organized fifth column, which they were afraid to, because there were so many good organizations that they were afraid to begin anything. That is my feeling.

I would not favor corraling them as a whole. I would not favor that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, are you conscious of the [1268] fact that there was a very large number of so-called Japanese agents loose on this island before December 7th?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I understood that the F. B. I. had picked up about 650 and there were a good many of them here, but that is just my feeling, being proud of the situation, because those people who were in here were not fifth columnists—those who had come in later and found the situation to be well in hand here, that they were afraid to. I believe they could have done a great amount of harm to Honolulu if they had been organized. They could have fired lumber piles and the oil tanks and the waterworks, but they were afraid to organize because of the feeling that there was among the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Waterhouse, as a leading businessman and citizen here, would you advocate going back to the peacetime conditions now and letting the Japanese have the liberty which they had in peacetime?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. I think the F. B. I. gathered up all the ones to be afraid of; I would, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You know, of course, that the Japanese espionage on this island prior to December 7 was perfect? You know that, do you not?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, but at the same time that was not organized; they did not organize; they could have done more harm to us.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of sabotage?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If the Japanese are turned loose, do you think there is any security against the Japanese Government being advised again of conditions exactly the same as they were before December 7?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, I don't believe they could. I think [1269] the wrong was all in the immigration station. The Japanese Hotel Association was listed in our telephone book, the Japanese Hotel Association.

In regard to the immigration station they ran the immigration station, and it was entirely wrong in my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the Japanese Hotel Association really ran the immigration station?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, look in the old telephone book. The Japanese Hotel Association was in care of the immigration station and they ran the immigration station and all these people coming from Japan came through that way and got in without trouble.

Now the situation is different. I have no fear from now on. That is my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Waterhouse, going back to General Short, with respect to General Short's activities here and his efforts to coordinate the civilian activities and the facilities and so forth, have they been greater, in your opinion, than those who preceded him?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No. He carried on along the same lines as General Herron did. He just urged us to prepare the same way as it was started by General Herron.

Admiral STANDLEY. But he did take a very active interest?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, he got us, to a certain extent, prepared. I think.

General MCCOY. In your remark about the lack of cooperation by the Navy which was, I think you stated, just gossip—

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, it was.

General MCCOY. Could such gossip be probably due to the fact that you were in closer relation with the Army than you were with the Navy?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, it came from the downtown businessmen, [1970] but I am in closer touch perhaps with the Army than with the Navy, but the Army people with whom I associated would never make a remark to me of this sort. They never have; they never criticized the Navy at all, but this came from business people.

Neither General Frank nor General Martin ever criticized the Navy in any way, and I knew both of those people very well.

Admiral REEVES. Referring to the rumors as to the conduct of the Army and Navy personnel on liberty, briefly what is your estimate as to those rumors?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, I did place a little—I thought it was probably true about the Army and the Navy because I talked to a good many officers in the Navy of lower rank than the Admiral, and the feeling against the Army is not cooperative at all so far as my conversation with these people was concerned.

Admiral REEVES. I was referring to their conduct, sobriety, drunkenness, and that sort of thing. What credence did you place in the rumors regarding that phase?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Oh, I didn't believe it myself because I have never seen it. I have been out a good many times to dinners and things of that sort on Saturday night with both the Army and the Navy and I have never seen anything to criticize and I did not believe it.

Admiral REEVES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

General MCCOY. May I ask another question just as a matter of general interest?

Is there any one man here in the Hawaiian Islands, an American, that you would describe as the leading citizen of Hawaii?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, I do not believe so.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, you know the general purpose of this inquiry?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

[1271] The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else on your mind, any fact, which you think might be helpful to us in coming to a conclusion?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No. I do not like to say something, but there is a feeling downtown wondering why General Martin was included in the order, because he was under General Short, following the instructions of General Short presumably.

The feeling downtown is wondering why General Martin was included and not some of the lower admirals, for instance.

As a matter of fact, General Martin never drank at all, if you care to have that information.

The CHAIRMAN. We happen to know that.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, the nature of this inquiry is such that we will ask you not to discuss your testimony outside this room or to say what went on in this room.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Before he goes I would like to ask him this question: Mr. Waterhouse, are you familiar with the so-called big five companies of Honolulu?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I am.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you name them, please?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Alexander & Baldwin; C. Brewer & Company.

Admiral STANDLEY. What do they do?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. They are sugar agents.

Castle & Cook; American Factors.

Admiral STANDLEY. What do they do?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. American Factors are sugar agents and they also do a general mercantile business and wholesale business.

Then there is Theo. Davies & Company.

Admiral STANDLEY. What business are they in?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. They are sugar agents and general merchandise.

[1272] The CHAIRMAN. Are you connected with any of them, sir?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, no. I am executive vice president of the bank, and my brother, who is president of Alexander & Baldwin, is president of the bank. In that I am connected with them.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there also representatives of this firm represented on your board?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. The manager of Davies & Company, Mr. Russell, is on our board.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Colonel BROWN. This is Bishop Littell.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Bishop?

**TESTIMONY OF THE RT. REV. SAMUEL HARRINGTON LITTELL,
BISHOP OF HONOLULU, PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH OF
AMERICA**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name, Bishop?

Bishop LITTELL. Samuel Harrington Littell.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are Bishop of the Episcopal Church here?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on the island, Bishop?

Bishop LITTELL. Twelve years.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you held your present office during those twelve years?

Bishop LITTELL. All the time, yes. I was consecrated Bishop here. I came from China. I was 31 years in Hangkow and was transferred here 12 years ago.

The CHAIRMAN. We have heard a lot of rumors, Bishop, about the conduct of the officers and the men of the Army and the fleet on the Saturday night preceding this attack here [1273] with respect to intoxication. Do you have any personal knowledge by which you can throw any light on that particular matter?

Bishop LITTELL. First of all, I live downtown in Honolulu, right in the city, and I did not happen to be there because I had a full day in preparation for my Church, but I have the word of persons whose word I have confidence in who have reported things to me which I can only say second-hand. I am not giving any personal testimony, but I can testify about other Saturday nights.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been the general condition on Saturday nights as you observed them? Of course, there is a large number of men on leave then?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It runs into the thousands?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, it does, but for the most part I think they are extremely well behaved and disciplined. The Army has been most careful in having its own Army police downtown and the Army men who do not behave are taken care of and are taken away into the custody of the Army, so we do not have the same condition with the Army as with the Navy situation. The Navy is a much more difficult proposition.

There is the question of the ships coming and going. There is not the continuity that there is in the Army. There is nothing against it and I think the Navy has tried well to cope with the situation, but you have times when you have large numbers of the fleet and also the Army in town, but it is better than at any other time.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean in these recent months?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, far better than ever before. There is no question about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, you understand, Bishop, that when the fleet comes in here it comes in from a very strenuous term of service at sea?

[1274] Bishop LITTELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And it is necessary to give these boys shore liberty for recreational purposes?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And to relieve that strain from arduous duty?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, and I sympathize with that, and as far as the ships changing from time to time and different men coming ashore, different personnel and different officers in charge, and there is not the continuity that you have in the Army. Naturally I do not say anything against that because it is better than it has been in my 12 years here.

But to get back to the Saturday nights, I can only give testimony from people who know firsthand, and I am an officer—that is to say, I am a very active member of the Temperance League of Hawaii, and then you may put me down as a narrow-minded prohibitionist and a total abstainer, but I ask you to forget that.

I am interested in temperance and that is what I am interested in, temperance and discipline and the welfare and control, and that is one of the aims of this Temperance League, rather than absolute abstinence. So my object has been not to narrow it down to being a complete prohibitionist. That has not been the work which we are pressing for, but to work for temperance, and temperance to me means temperance in everything, work, recreation, and so on, and total abstinence is a misuse of the word "temperance."

Now, I have had some effect in getting into that organization many people like myself who are not total abstainers but by no means who are in favor of an open house, so to speak.

However, the thing that disturbs me so because it is so continuous is the unceasing cocktail parties given in the homes of the commissioned officers in town.

[1275] That has been a serious matter in regard to what we might call the temporary use of their time and strength and intelligence. Now, what you heard about the Saturday nights among the officers may be being too drunk or groggy and what I would have expected from other Saturday nights, that you could hardly get them to work.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you have heard?

Bishop LITTELL. On other occasions, and I have been, being a Bishop, invited to cocktail parties, if it is some official function and it is a case of being in and out and perhaps staying a short time, but the cocktail parties among the services have been beyond all reason and all social requirements, and I am not talking about the quantity of drinking, but I think there has been right up to the 7th, but it has been a little more dangerous in that it has been quieter in their homes than in the case of a service man who would be seen drinking.

But that brings up the whole question of the community welfare and the connection with other people and what the officers and the men do in the Army and the Navy in regard to drinking and the morale in town and the effect it has. Many times I am included among those invited to these cocktail parties and when there is going to be a wild one, I am not included.

I get invitations and I go on occasions and occasionally not. My wife and I go to pay our respects and we do or do not take anything; generally we don't. I may take some tea or something. We are not looked upon as anything queer if we do or if we don't.

However, there is the pressure from sources now upon the office of the Military Governor to relax these restrictions as it was announced recently, which would result in letting down the restrictions completely. That will have, I say, a [1276] serious effect on the town in the case of morale. Now, that was plainly something coming from Colonel Green's office which would have the effect of getting great attention as though to increase the idea that nothing is going to happen here again.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you think that to open up this town again and take off the military law would be a very dangerous thing?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, sir; even if it is only on beer, because it is an indication to the civilian population that things here are not so bad after all. Now, they are bad here after all, and if there is a relaxing of the alertness on the part of this community then something may happen.

The CHAIRMAN. Your present view is that it would be a great mistake to relax the military law?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, and not only in alcohol.

The CHAIRMAN. But in every way?

Bishop LITTELL. Yes. And it will have a bad effect on the community and the community will continue to go down in this sense of the urgency and will defeat the purpose of it, because they will say that the military men do not think it is so bad and they will think it cannot happen again and believe that it won't happen again, and there is an enormous sense of relaxation in many cases and of relief. I do not think it is just a case of patience regarding a blackout. That will come presently, but the blackout is not the cause. It is just the general feeling as they read in the paper the other day in the dispatch under Colonel Green's name about the relaxation, that they would want to sell liquor, and they say that it is all right because the Army knows about it.

If the Army and the Navy do these things it will let them down, and they should not, unless they want our morale to go to pieces.

Now, all I am saying here is under the seal.

[1277] I might say that if anybody wants to keep up morale in this community that the best thing to do is to keep the restrictions in effect and to leave things under the conditions that they are and there will be no such thing happen.

We want to do everything we can. We have been trying to help to keep the morale up. Nobody has worked harder than I have in connection with this thing. When it started sometime ago, everybody pooh-poohed the idea, but our house has been an open house since last January for the enlisted men. We have got others interested in it and some arranging parties for the men and setting up places for entertainment purposes and taking care of the men. However, for the Army to say that it is all right and to release these restrictions at this time is just to tell the people that it is no as bad as we thought it was and it is not going to happen again and we will let you know in plenty of time when it does happen and they will say that it is not so bad.

The CHAIRMAN. What effect will the relaxation of the stiff control have on those of Japanese blood?

Bishop LITTELL. It is not a question of loyalty; it is mostly a question of leaders, but it will be one of the first things, in my mind, that will get back to Japan. That is the liquor business which now has been worked out so completely, and then they will know that what happened on December 6th and 7th is about to be relaxed again and they will know about it and rejoice.

They know and you know the reason for it, particularly with respect to the question of restrictions. We require automobile licenses. Ships must be at top-notch perfection. We require licenses for plumbing, electrical fixtures, and practically any business that affects the lives of people must be at top-notch perfection. When they ordered martial law it was saying that it was one of the requirements that the men must [1278] be at top notch, and it was a most important thing that they be at top notch. How are these civilian people or the Army service people going to get in top-notch condition unless they do that?

Now, this is not a lecture. I am not interested in a temperance lecture, but I am just saying these things. First, we must have top-notch alertness in all of us as a requirement or we cannot have good morale.

I was talking with our police official here and I was told that there was only one arrest on New Year's Eve for drunkenness and that is a very fine thing. That is one of the most important things that has ever happened here or anywhere else that I know of, particularly in a population of this size. That is one of the first things to think about.

When you are speaking of the highest efficiency in morale, and you let these things down, then word gets around that you are not proclaiming an absolute prohibition on the sale of liquor, then they will say that the seriousness of the things that went into effect on December 7th do not hold now. Then it becomes a case where you let down the restrictions and the morale goes down too.

If you change the communication from the office of the Military Governor as made that Sunday morning and relax the conditions, then you get a general let down. You cannot put into an airplane something defective. You cannot put anything in when it is not going to work out, because you cannot have old defective machinery. You can't speak about sabotaging personal efficiency and the intelligence and physical help of people by having these things in effect and then letting them down, and I tell you that it is all a part of the general picture and those things are in the minds of people and they may say that the same reasons are not true at this time, but I think they are the same reasons.

The second thing is the pressure for income to the Territory. It is the same old almighty dollar again, which [1279] has ruined us for many years, or is the root of many evils, as St. Paul says.

There is the organized pressure from the trade, and I realize that it is one of the sources of the largest income and there was the suggestion of no income coming in to the Territory.

I think that may be true that that was perhaps one of the official reasons, but the pressure was there from the people who want to sell as well as the reason with respect to the income to the Territory.

Now, the same is true with respect to automobiles and rubber tires and many other things that may be necessary, but we have these restrictions now on all of them and many of them are money-producing things to the Territory. I am not just picking out this one. Those are the two things I wanted to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Leaving the liquor question aside for the moment, do you think it would be a safe thing to turn back the government here to the civil authority and to lift the military control entirely?

Bishop LITTELL. Not for a minute, no more than a minute, no more than I think we are ready for statehood here at this time. Of course it is going to be up to the Military Government and there should be full cooperation. We ought to try to get in all cases the elements which have not been fully cooperative or have not been sympathetic.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you fear the wide-open situation as it was before December 7 and its effect on the Japanese sympathizers?

Bishop LITTELL. I have not mentioned the Japanese; I am speaking of the white people, and what I say is not for publication.

The CHAIRMAN. No, of course not.

[1280] Bishop LITTELL. The reason for a large measure of the lack of civilian sympathy with the growing forces of the last two or three years and with the military control which is necessary, is on the part of the controllers of business, the real rulers of the industry, the business people, the trade, the corporations, on these islands, and the work they have carried on. I think you may have heard them referred to as the Big Five.

All I need to say is that the Big Five has seen the increased threat to their absolute control of everything on this island coming in with the increases in the Army and the Navy. The Big Five is not back of me in our civilian work that we have tried to build up with the forces of the Army and the Navy.

I am invited to Army and Navy functions and I always try to go because I am a civilian and also because I have connections in the Army and the Navy through the chaplains. Whenever I was invited to these functions it always makes one think why none of the heads of the social or business life here were present at those functions.

General Herron has done more in that respect in recent years to bring the two groups together and to entertain them, and I have attended some of these, but you would not find anybody there by the name of Castle or Cooke or Waterhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you mean that they do not want any interference here?

Bishop LITTELL. They know that the Army interference and the martial law is the final step which takes away the possibility of their control here.

Now, if this got into the public press, my name would be mud.

The CHAIRMAN. It is confidential.

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, I know, but we are talking about life in the community and you have got to realize the situation [1281] here. I can make an exception of Walter Dillingham. He is an exception, Walter is, but his brother is as bad as the rest of them.

Then William Castle is taking over the Red Cross, but the Red Cross is a harmless thing, and it does not interfere with their activities, but at the Army or Navy public functions there are not these people present. Then you could go through the names of the people who make these appointments and who hold them like that.

Up until two or three years ago they were against statehood because they controlled things in the Territory. Then when something or other came from Washington or they didn't like the appointment of Governor Poindexter and they said they would elect their own Governor. Then about two years ago when the situation changed they went over for statehood and they wanted to get statehood as fast as possible. It then became a question for the voters and they controlled all the plantation labor and they controlled all the business, business houses connected up with them, and they had many people in their employ and connected up with them, and they were in favor of statehood.

Then in the last November election which was supposed to be a secret ballot, it was over half, but it was not a full vote in favor of statehood.

That was taken as the main issue to the Legislature but it was not a sweeping vote.

I was on the mainland so I did not vote, but I was very much interested in knowing about that vote, since it was a very important thing here, wishing to make this the 49th state, but it was never mentioned in either house of the Legislature in the sixty days.

Then when they had the M-day business and we had a special session of the Legislature to pass certain measures including [1282] an appropriation for money to live on, it was not mentioned, and it was supposed to be the most important issue, the plebiscite among the people, but they did not dare to mention it because it would have been turned down.

Now, that has nothing to do with the Japanese. Of course the Japanese were involved, because there were many Japanese laborers, but it was not the issue. That was not the question. The issue was who was going to run this island and who was going to run things as they were before.

The issue was who was going to run the island. The issue has nothing to do with race or nationality or loyalty or disloyalty. It was who was going to run these islands. Was the President of the United States going to be the one who would appoint the Governor or not? I think it would be a very sad day on this island to have anyone else do the appointing than the President of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is beyond the scope of our inquiry.

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, I know it is, but I am getting back to morale, because the business life and social life is tied up with it. We are at war and we have to expect certain things. They should not be holding off, the leaders of industry, because they do have a monopoly and they do many things, and they are out of the reach of many people.

If you speak to them there is absolute loyalty to the United States. There is no question about that. That is all I want to say on that, but there is that lack of cordiality on the part of the business leaders, and that is something that I have run up against all the time, and it is very difficult to get any of these people together, except perhaps Walter Dillingham, and they would not come over to the Bishop's house or

have an entertainment or take part in it, and there are others, and they have turned us down flat be- [1283] cause they were not interested, the Castles and Cookes and those of the Matson Line. They have everything in their hands.

Of course this is not for publication.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Bishop LITTELL. I cannot be quoted in public or give my opinion on topics or tell my clergy or laity what I think about any topics in any church. In other words, I may be familiar with politics but none of my clergymen can discuss things in that way and I may not know whether they are Republicans or Democrats, and as soon as you mention politics in the Church, that is not the proper function, and if it is a Democratic sermon the Republicans do not like it, and vice versa.

I am explaining just what I think here, and I am not against the Big Five, but I know they are the ones who have made it impossible in many ways, and we sympathize with the Army and the Navy and they may not be in sympathy with the Army and Navy developments here because their whole business is threatened. That is all on that.

If you want me to go on, keep on on morale, and the reason why the morale is not good in certain respects is, among other things, because of the lack of access to privies and toilets, and these same people control the land and the buildings and so forth.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that is beyond the scope of our inquiry.

Bishop LITTELL. Yes, but I am thinking about morale, and when these people do not have a place to go, for the civilians to go to, or the Army and Navy men, when you have around ten or fifteen thousand here and they have no place to go to for the necessity of relieving nature and they are around the Cathedral grounds and the Capitol grounds, and pretty nearly everywhere they can go, then it is a serious [1284] question.

One of the first things I did was to take it up with General Short and ask him what he was going to do about it. He took it up with the Mayor and with the committee and they took it up with the Park Commission to find places so that they might enlarge the park facilities and where they had two toilets they put in four stand-up places or they made twelve instead of six.

Now, that is a matter of health which has an effect on morale, and when these people come into town and they do not have any place to go and you have the large increase in the Army and Navy and the defense workers and they have no place, and the defense workers have nothing, and there are not sufficient places for them to relieve themselves and it is a health problem and a very serious one, and you have a lot of defense workers here.

Then there are not sufficient drinking fountains for them, for the soldiers and the sailors, and they cannot quench their thirst when they are ashore, and they go down to the beach or to Punchbowl or those places around town and they drift into various places and they cannot get anything to quench their thirst or go into any place unless they come into a hotel where they may not be wanted or they cannot go into a bank where they do not feel at home and they do not have any water to drink, but the soldiers and sailors should have a place where they can get a drink when they come in; to have a drink of water, and some place for other purposes. That is a serious situation

that has been caused by the necessity of the Army and the Navy and these defense workers coming to this outpost.

There we have a situation of some 155,000 people where they do not have any place to get a drink of water, and then all these defense people coming in where they come to town for [1285] certain business or recreation, why it becomes more than a civilian problem.

I think that is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

Bishop LITTELL. I did not know exactly what you wanted to ask me and Mr. Howe said that you would develop it when I got here.

I am interested in civilian morale. I believe this letting down would be bad. Those things are necessary; those three things, not to let down on the liquor restriction, and the second is to use more of the people who really control the finances here, and the third is the question of having some place where these men can quench their thirst. We should have all these things.

I thank you, gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, bishop.

[1286] Colonel BROWN. Mr. Eichelberger.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eichelberger, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF MR. LESLIE ERNEST EICHELBERGER, YMCA SECRETARY, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Leslie Ernest Eichelberger.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business, Mr. Eichelberger?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am YMCA secretary.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been such?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. About 24 years.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on the island?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Ten years.

The CHAIRMAN. And have you been YMCA secretary or connected with the YMCA here during that ten years?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. All of that time, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What facilities has the YMCA in Honolulu?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The civilian YMCA has three large buildings, all three with dormitories and physical equipment, the gymnasium, swimming pools, and the customary YMCA equipment. You are familiar with the Army and Navy YMCA?

The CHAIRMAN. We want to hear about it from you, sir.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The Army and Navy YMCA is not under my jurisdiction, because the Army and Navy Department is handled directly by our Army-Navy Committee from New York. It has a very large and very fine building.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. It is also in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Located?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Just a block from the Central YMCA. It is on Hotel Street at Richards.

The CHAIRMAN. Who, to your knowledge, is in charge of that branch?

[1287] Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Weslie Wilke, W-i-l-k-e.

The CHAIRMAN. Has he been here for some time?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, he has been here seven or eight years at least.

The CHAIRMAN. And would be available?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Would be available and would be very happy, I am sure, to cooperate.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the soldiers and sailors on leave or liberty use your civilian YMCA buildings?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As well as the Army and Navy building?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir; not to the same extent, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. But very largely, at that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, Mr. Eichelberger, have you ever been in any other city that was adjacent to a large naval station or a large Army post?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Not for a long period, but I have been for short periods at San Diego and other similar places.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your observation as to the morale, as far as drinking and carousing is concerned, of the enlisted men who come on leave and liberty into Honolulu? Is it good? Is it fair? Is it bad, to your personal knowledge?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Chairman, that is so difficult to answer, because we only notice the ones who are drinking.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I would say fair or better than fair.

The CHAIRMAN. You quite understand that in a large Navy post where big units of the fleet come in the men necessarily are given shore liberty?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. For recuperation.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

[1288] The CHAIRMAN. And you understand that the problem always arises then, when liquor is available, of policing the men's use of liquor?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. It is a very serious problem, and in general the men respond very well.

The CHAIRMAN. They do?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. In my opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not think the condition has been outstandingly bad here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No. It has been distressing but not proportionately—not worse than it would be in any similar concentration of men, civilians or university men or any other crowd.

The CHAIRMAN. That is exactly what we wanted to know, sir.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you observed the effect of the declaration of military law here after the attack?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was a wise thing to put military law into effect?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I suppose it was necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is just as necessary now as it was when it was put into effect, having in mind the large proportion of Japanese blood in this town?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I am more familiar with those of Japanese blood than many people, because one of our branches has at least 80% of its membership of Japanese blood, 2,000 or more members. I have no greater fear from them, as a rule, than from any other second-generation people on the mainland. I think their percentage would be just as easily controlled and just as loyal.

The CHAIRMAN. How would you control espionage if you didn't do it by military government? It was not controlled before December 7. That is obvious now.

[1289] Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Obvious to you, isn't it?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I have had no first-hand evidence, your Honor.

The CHAIRMAN. I can say to you that it is perfectly evident—

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. —that Japanese sources on this island furnished the most meticulous information to the Japanese military organization.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Well, that is obvious, that someone did, surely.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I think so. Now, how could you control that if you threw the town open to the civil authorities again as it was open for the months before December 7? I want your view as a citizen, how you would control it.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. As a citizen I feel that during the emergency perhaps martial law is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the emergency is over?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I do not. It very obviously is not.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the lesson of one attack indicates the possibility of another attack on Pearl Harbor?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes. I think the average civilian has less fear of further attacks than the service personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that is a good attitude here now?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think it shows splendid confidence in the armed forces.

The CHAIRMAN. The same confidence they had on and before December 7?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think so; I think every bit as good. In other words, I have talked with many people, and I think they have a feeling that something slipped one time that isn't going to slip again.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose nothing slips and that our armed [1290] forces do the very best they can in the course of an attack here; the attack might yet be a very serious thing for these aliens; might it not?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And is it your view that every measure ought to be taken by the Army and Navy, even military law, if they think that important, in order to mitigate the seriousness of an attack if one comes or prevent one if possible? Or would you think that it now is the time to go back to civil government with all the liberties of the citizen that were permitted to those of foreign blood before the attack?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Chairman, I feel that military law is probably necessary. I would like to see it relaxed insofar as safety measures would warrant. There are certain specific ways in which citizens, civilians, wish it might be relaxed. I think in general they are willing to yield in judgment if the authorities don't think it should be relaxed, but I think they would like some explanations in some cases as to why it isn't relaxed.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you in mind the curfew?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, for one thing.

The CHAIRMAN. The blackout?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The blackout. If the blackout could be relaxed in any way without hazarding the population, even if it were made a curfew after 9 o'clock, or something of that sort. Now, perhaps there is just as great danger between 6 and 9 as there is any other time—that is not for me to say—but there is great restlessness and dissatisfaction because of the curtailing of the early evening activities: people who work until 5 o'clock and rush home to eat in the dark, and don't see their friends; they work Sundays—many of them, that is.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a great hardship.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. It is war, and they are willing to accept it if it is essential, but if it is not entirely [1291] essential it would be very reassuring if there could be a little relaxation there.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Mr. Eichelberger, you stated that you have talked to a great many people about the situation here. What was your general impression of the feeling of the people in Oahu as to the efficiency of General Short, who was placed here in command of the Army forces?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I think I haven't known anyone intimately who would know of his efficiency as a military man. There was confidence in his attitude as a military governor, and prior to his assumption of the position of military governor there was good will on the part of the civilian population and a feeling that he understood the interracial situation and was sympathetic to the problems of the island.

General McNARNEY. How about Admiral Kimmel?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Less was known about him in the circles in which I move, and I didn't hear him discussed. I heard General Short discussed more often by people interested in civilian morale and in reassuring the citizens of Oriental ancestry that they would get a square deal. There had been great fear of mass concentration camps and things of that sort. General Short's attitude had been quite reassuring in that connection, along with that of Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. and other men who had assured the population that there would not be unfair mass roundups, and that established confidence in his jurisdiction when he became military governor.

General McCox. In connection with your concern about the restrictions of martial law, does that also apply to the embargo on liquor? Would you think that that should be relaxed?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. My personal judgment and my objective judgment might be at variance there. I would personally be happy if it were not relaxed. Objectively it may be necessary to relax it somewhat.

[1292] General McCox. Why?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. I can't say why. I can only say that there is pressure on those of us who would rather it were not relaxed. There is pressure on us to change our opinion. Perhaps that is commercial pressure. Perhaps it is from some other source.

General MCCOY. To what source do you attribute it?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. There are many men who want to have access to liquor regardless of whether it might be slightly harmful or not; I mean harmful from a defense standpoint.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think the attitude of business-as-usual on the islands has something to do with the liquor business as well as other businesses here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Probably the liquor people feel there is discrimination against them, and they perhaps don't see as clearly as some others do that an intoxicated man or a partly intoxicated man is difficult for a sentry to handle.

The CHAIRMAN. He is a liability.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. He certainly is.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. May I volunteer one or two other comments?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; I was going to ask if you had any thoughts that would be useful to us.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Mr. Justice, some of us feel that morale on this island and in the whole Territory would be greatly helped if the mainland mail and inter-island mail could be expedited some way. We know from cablegrams that letters are held up somewhere between the Coast and here and have been for several weeks at a time: remittances to people who receive salaries from the mainland; things of that sort are causing a great deal of embarrassment because of conditions [1293] which we do not understand.

Now, if there could be any way of speeding up mail, I am sure you appreciate that problem, because it causes some concern. Now, one group will say, "It's probably held in censorship," and another one will say, "I'm afraid they are sinking more boats with mail on than we're told." And so the feeling of confidence is lessened by the mere fact that mail isn't coming through. If it is held up in censorship, if that statement could simply be made it would relieve some tension.

Then, we feel that there is a great deal of breakdown of morale because of the children being kept home from school. I am sure the military governor is aiming to open the schools as soon as possible. We would like to urge that. The civilians feel that some slight hazard from bombs isn't as great as the certain hazard of idleness and the enforced concentration of children in their own neighborhoods without anything to do, and we would hope there could be something done there.

Then, if there could be—your Honor, I appreciate that perhaps I have no right to make such suggestions because I know that there are reasons which I don't know about, but if there could be some more frankness officially about submarine operations in the vicinity it would be reassuring. We get news that submarines have shelled nearby cities. We get great volumes that submarines have been sunk, but no official statements. If we could know that a submarine was sunk the

day after Lahaina was shelled, or some such thing, it would be very reassuring to the civilian population. They know the Navy and the Air Force are on the alert, but in as far as it lies within the judgment of the authorities a little more frankness in that direction would be very helpful.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course that is military.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is military, granted, and that is why I say I hesitated even to make that suggestion.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[1294] Mr. EICHELBERGER. The mail, the schools, some help on the blackout, and possibly a little more information about getting some of the trespassers would be helpful.

General McCoy. Who supports the YMCA?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The population. It is locally supported entirely.

General McCoy. Does the major part of the support come from big business here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. About a little over 50% of it comes from the Community Welfare Fund, which is contributed to by all businesses large and small and individuals. The balance comes from our own membership income, men paying for service they receive.

General McCoy. Do you get any support from the mainland?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Quite the opposite. We contribute rather generously to enterprises outside of the Territory: that is, to our national council work and to foreign work in South America and in the Orient and elsewhere.

General McCoy. Is there a U. S. O. organization here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You work through them, too, do you?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You are a part of that?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. We are a part of the U. S. O.

General McCoy. Have they a new building here?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. The building was just begun when the December 7 raid occurred, and of course it is suspended now, but the work is being done through the member agencies and is under way in very good shape, although not in very visible shape, not nearly as dramatically as if there were a building with the label on it.

General McCoy. Have you any association with the Red Cross?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In what way?

[1295] Mr. EICHELBERGER. Acquainted with many of the people who are officials and volunteers in it.

General McCoy. It does work in connection with the Army and Navy on posts and in the hospitals, as I understand it.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. Yes, but it also is doing a great deal in the city in first-aid classes, in bandage, dressing, and things of that sort. and there is a Red Cross motor corps of drivers who are ready on call, women who have cars of their own, many things of that sort. It is certainly not limited to the posts.

General McCoy. Have you a YMCA building at each one of the Army and Navy posts?

Mr. EICHELBERGER. No, sir. The only building of any size is the one downtown, which is an Army and Navy YMCA. There was a small Navy YMCA at Pearl Harbor, but there hasn't been a building anywhere else on the island. Mr. Wilke of the Army and Navy YMCA has assigned men to be resident at Schofield and to operate activities there, but without a building.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Eichelberger, the nature of our inquiry is such that we shall ask you not to discuss your testimony before us or anything that has gone on here with anyone outside.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. That is granted.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. EICHELBERGER. And a pleasure to meet you.

The CHAIRMAN. A pleasure to have you here, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Gabrielson, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

[1296] **TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM A. GABRIELSON, CHIEF OF POLICE, HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. GABRIELSON. William A. Gabrielson.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the Chief of Police of Honolulu?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been for how long?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Since the 9th day of August, 1932.

The CHAIRMAN. And as such official have you had occasion to observe the conduct of the men from the Army and Navy who are in leave in Honolulu, particularly on Saturday nights?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you ever had an official station near any other large Army or Navy concentration on the mainland?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your first experience in a city which had a Navy Yard and an Army post was in Honolulu, then?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, I wouldn't say that. I was on the San Diego Police Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh. Well, then you did see something of that kind before?

Mr. GABRIELSON. That was prior to 1917.

The CHAIRMAN. The concentration of Navy men and Army men was not so large there at that time?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, what is your opinion as to the effectiveness of the control of drunkenness by the Army and Navy in respect of their men on leave here?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It is very good.

The CHAIRMAN. It is good?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, excellent.

The CHAIRMAN. There are cases of drunkenness, of course?

[1297] Mr. GABRIELSON. Lots of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You understand that when men are given leave and liquor is available you have a police problem?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that police problem has been well handled by the Army and Navy patrols, do you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I would like to say that it is inconceivable the support and the cooperation between the civilian police, the shore patrol, and the military police.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been good, has it?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It has been excellent. It couldn't be any better.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think, or not, that this necessary evil of men taking too much liquor when they are on leave has been well controlled here?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It has.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the morale in that respect of the Army and Navy men been better or worse than that of the civilian population over which you have control, in your opinion and observation?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, I think it would be about the same.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You get drunks in the civil population on Saturday evenings, don't you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Plenty of them. Our drunks are increasing about 25% a year over the preceding year.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you don't have any jurisdiction over the Army or the Navy drunks, do you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, we do.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you do? Turn them over to the M. P.'s?

[1298] Mr. GABRIELSON. We turn them over to the M. P.'s or either branch.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. GABRIELSON. If we arrest them and bring them in they are simply turned over to them without any charges.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. They handle the cases themselves?

Mr. GABRIELSON. They handle them, yes, sir. On a busy shore patrol—or a busy Navy night when the Navy has their pay day, in town we have shore patrol walk with the civilian police.

The CHAIRMAN. I see.

Mr. GABRIELSON. In that way that stops any argument that you haven't a right to arrest.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GABRIELSON. And that has worked out very satisfactorily.

Mr. CHAIRMAN. We have heard rumors, Chief, that there was an unusual amount of wild parties and drinking on Saturday night, December 6. What is your official knowledge of any such thing?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I have no official knowledge; only hearsay.

The CHAIRMAN. You have heard rumors to that effect?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you credited the rumors?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not believe them?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Oh, yes, I do, because we had an awful lot of troubles with officers living off the post and these drunken parties. We have an awful lot of complaints. In those drunken parties or noisy parties we go out—our policy is to go out and inform the people. We very seldom make an arrest, because if we did we would have no corroboration testimony the next day, because all people want to do is to have that party stopped. And that could easily be accounted for; [1299] when they get loose they want to have a good time.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you have had complaints of parties at officers' homes where the officers live out of the Navy Yard or off the post?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir; out here at Waikiki a lot of it. And at the same time we have had a lot of civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. Complaints about civilian parties?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir, a lot of it. Probably two thirds of our police problems here are what we call Hawaiian love; that is, a person gets drunk and then goes home and talks to his wife by hand. We have an awful lot of that. Many times practically every officer of the beat is on one of those parties, on one of those complaints.

The CHAIRMAN. Goes home and is rough?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Very rough. That is a Hawaiian custom.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. Does that apply to the Army and Navy personnel, this last?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, no, no. No. That is a Hawaiian custom, you might say, of the people who were born and raised here. No; very little of it in the Army or Navy.

General McNARNEY. Have you any record of the number of officers or enlisted men living off the post whom it was necessary to warn on the night of December 6?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I could get that if there was any that came in, because we keep a complete record.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you get it for us?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And just memo it to us as part of your testimony.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir. We have a complete record of every report that comes in to the Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Please give us that for the testimony.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir. I will send it right on.

[1300] General McCoy. That is for Saturday night.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Saturday night, December 6, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know anything about the rumors that certain Japanese places of refreshment were serving free drinks to white people on the night of December 6?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir, I never heard that.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of an opening of a new market by one Otani, a prominent Japanese?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that opening?

Mr. GABRIELSON. That was December 5 is when I got the invitation to attend.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that free liquor was served there?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It would be the custom for them to do it, to some of their best guests—or to their guests. That is a custom of the islands here.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know where Otani is now?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I understand he is interned.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions?

Admiral REEVES. From your observation and experience do you think the conditions on Saturday night, December 6, were worse than on any other Saturday night?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir; they were just normal.

Admiral REEVES. That is all I want to ask.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Chief, are there a large number of enlisted men ashore during week days, too, when the fleet is in the harbor?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any material or perceptible difference between Saturday night and Wednesday night when the fleet is in?

[1301] Mr. GABRIELSON. As a rule there are more officers—there are more sailors on shore on a Saturday than there are on other nights. Saturday night is our busy night, and right after the first there are always more soldiers and more sailors. There were a lot of sailors—I was around; I am around every Saturday night checking up, and there was a lot of sailors on shore Saturday night.

Admiral STANDLEY. But there also are a lot of sailors on shore during week nights?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know how late they were on shore on Saturday night, the majority of them?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I think around 11 o'clock. Most of them go back between—before 11 or right after 11. They change the hour of shore leave sometimes, but between 11 and 12 we have quite a problem up there in front of the Army and Navy YMCA.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean a transportation problem?

Mr. GABRIELSON. A transportation problem, yes, sir, of getting those busses in, and we stop traffic flowing Waikiki on Hotel Street so that the busses will have the whole street, and the taxis, to get the sailors out. We have taken as high as 10,500 out in an hour.

General McCoy. Would that problem be the case on Saturday night?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I don't think there was that large a shore leave on that Saturday night. It was just a normal Saturday night. With the anticipation of Christmas coming along we anticipated a greater amount of sailors, soldiers, and civilians on the streets on those nights. They started to shop early this year. In fact, the stores reported a far greater sale in November than they ever had in the history of the community.

Admiral STANDLEY. Chief, are you kept advised of the liberty hours of the fleet in here?

[1302] Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are your forces in any way connected with picking up AOL's after midnight or after 1 o'clock?

Mr. GABRIELSON. We did for a while when they had the shore leave up to dark some months ago. They curtailed the shore leave, and we would assist the shore patrol in picking them up, and we would pick them up if there was no shore patrol officer with us.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long ago was that? Do you remember?

Mr. GABRIELSON. That was some months back; the exact time I don't know.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know the occasion for that change?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir, I don't. I don't recall why it was.

Admiral STANDLEY. Chief, there is a rumor I have heard, which apparently came from someone in your force who was given credit for knowing, that some of the officers were not on the station here, namely, that Admiral Kimmel was not on the island and could not be found on the morning of the 6th. Have you heard anything of that report?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

General McNARNEY. Chief, what is the status of the Police Department under military law?

Mr. GABRIELSON. We are under the shore patrol—I mean the military police, Provost Marshal.

General McNARNEY. You get your directives, then, from the Provost Marshal?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir. In other words, we carry on—his orders are that we carry on as we have been, but we work closer in traffic matters.

General McNARNEY. But you are subject to his direction [1303] if he sees fit to give you a directive?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And has that worked without hitch?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or without trouble?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir, absolutely without—you can't conceive the closeness with which we have always worked together, and still continue.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, military law has practically made no change in your operations of the Police Department?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, sir, not a bit; only gives us a little more problems, that's all.

General McNARNEY. What is your feeling as to the necessity or the advisability of relaxing certain of the provisions that have been put into effect, such as liquor, blackout, curfew?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Personally I would like to see it as it is. Liquor, I would like to see some regulation worked out where people get a certain amount of bottled goods and take it home, and make it a very stiff sentence if anyone was caught with an open bottle on the street or in their cars. If you or I or anyone wanted to get a bottle they could go down and get a bottle and take it home. But I should hate to see them open up the saloons again, and I would hate to see them allow them to have bottled goods outside of their house, because I am afraid that if you did that some of these young sailors and soldiers that haven't been over here very long—there would be a lot of trouble. They would see a Japanese walking down the street, and Bang!—or a Hawaiian. And I am afraid that there would be a great deal of trouble if that liquor was not tight.

We have over here a lot of these young roughnecks, and we used to have a lot of gang fights. Sometimes the soldiers and [1304] sailors were responsible, and sometimes the local boys were responsible. Unfortunately our judge has never been in a gang fight, and we would have to give him testimony of everybody that struck somebody, and that can't be done. I was in one of those gang fights, and I got hit with it felt like a sledge hammer. I couldn't see who hit me.

The CHAIRMAN. And the judge wouldn't hold anybody unless you could swear to that?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, unless I could swear that so and so hit me. But we would have a lot of trouble about it, and I think it is a good thing to keep people off the street during this emergency.

General McNARNEY. Do you think that if the emergency lasts for, say, two years, you should continue to enforce an early curfew?

Mr. GABRIELSON. I think it might be a thing that people could visit, visit homes, but not to let them congregate around on the streets; make them go to and from wherever they were going. It is rather hard now on a lot of people. They can't visit. Take my wife: she has got to stay home alone every night, and now there is just a sample of one individual, and it is rather hard to sit in a dark house every night all alone. If a person could get out, visit around, it would make a different feeling amongst the civilian population.

General McNARNEY. How about keeping the movie open until, say, 9:30 or 10 o'clock?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Well, there is a good argument on allowing that to be done, say, earlier than 9:30, 10; say not later than 8:30 to be let out, because you can figure that out: when they start, you see, they go for every two hours; if they started at 10 o'clock—10, 12, 2, 4, 6, 8—they would get out at 8.

General McNARNEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, if you did that you would have to [1305] let those of Japanese blood go, who of course are American citizens?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to let them go just as you would others, would you not?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Oh, absolutely.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you would to some extent lose control of the Japanese blood if you did it, would you not?

Mr. GABRIELSON. We would, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you are cognizant, I take it, of the fact that the Japanese had perfect information for their attack of December 7?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know whether you are cognizant of it. Are you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, they did.

The CHAIRMAN. You know that their information, their intelligence, was literally perfect?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It was.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know that that was the fact in spite of three agencies here doing all they could to break through, and not breaking through, not getting anything, really. Now, you had a large number of Japanese consular agents here, didn't you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And nothing was done to restrict their activities, was there, before December 7?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Not that I know of; none that I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. You yourself were cognizant that there was an unusually large number of people connected with the Japanese Consulate here?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, and I know that the consul here had the reputation of being the smartest man in the service.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you relaxed the military control [1306] of those of foreign blood who might wish to aid Japan you would immediately increase your problem of counterespionage, would you not?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I think—I gather from the atmosphere of this community—that those of Japanese blood are very much frightened at present, very very scared; is that right, according to your observation?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, they are, but if anybody landed they would be different. If they landed any parachutes or landed any troops here then you would have another problem, because a lot of them would go over to them.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no doubt of that, have you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Even those who are so-called American citizens? They still—

Mr. GABRIELSON. Put us in their place. If we were in Japan what would we do?

The CHAIRMAN. I quite understand, but there seems to be a feeling here that we ought to open up Hawaii now to business as usual and put it back on the plain civil basis that it was before December 7, and that no harm would come from any Japanese: he would be loyal, and he would be a good citizen. Now, what is your view, after your years of experience?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Keep it military.

The CHAIRMAN. What?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Keep it military as it is. If you want to have safety you had better do that.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General McNARNEY. How is the blackout being observed? In other words, do you have many complaints?

Mr. GABRIELSON. You come out some night with us.

General McNARNEY. I was out once.

Mr. GABRIELSON. You were? Well, did you find many?

[1307] General McNARNEY. No; I could find but one ray of light. I compared it to the blackouts in London and in Moscow, and it is better than in London and as good as in Moscow.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes. Well, there is a lot of complaints that we have, but it is just the least bit of light some place. You don't see any place lit up. Once in a while we get some stores down there where people have gone away, or we had a restaurant the other night: they went away and left the lights. It was 4:30, and it was light, and they forgot the lights. And there are a few stores every night or so that do that, but you don't see any houses lit up.

The CHAIRMAN. I can testify that the thing is perfect; I have been out.

Mr. GABRIELSON. If any of you other gentlemen would like to go out some night we would be glad to send you out.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think I would like to do that some night, Chief. I will get in touch with you.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Well, you get in touch with me, and I will be glad to.

General MCCOY. Haven't you been out any night?

Admiral STANDLEY. Oh, I have been out, but I have gone to and from prior.

Mr. GABRIELSON. I will tell you, you go out now between 7 and 9 and you will see how damn dark it is. •

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I have been on the street up on the hill.

Mr. GABRIELSON. The only lights you see are the lights down at Hickam and Pearl Harbor where they are working and along the docks. They work down there. And then where they have these people interned on Sand Island they have a little light; they are getting that fixed now. But for the citizens, they observe it very good. I'll tell you, the Japanese people are very law-abiding. They are far better than the white race in being law-abiding.

[1308] The CHAIRMAN. Orders are orders.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Orders are orders, and they obey their parents. It is a disgrace for a policeman to come to their house, and they are very law-abiding. The Chinese are next, and the haoles are next. The haoles are about three times worse than the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. Who are haoles?

Mr. GABRIELSON. You and I, white people. We have some terrible ones over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

Mr. GABRIELSON. Now let's see. You wanted to get that information of—

The CHAIRMAN. Of any reports of riotous parties on Saturday evening, December 6. Complaints of noise and riot.

Now, Chief, you have a long experience in this island. Have you any facts or any thoughts or any opinions to offer this Commission that will help it in forming its conclusions?

Mr. GABRIELSON. No, I don't think I have.

The CHAIRMAN. You think we have emptied you by our questions, do you?

Mr. GABRIELSON. As far as my information is concerned, the only thing I can say: there is too much red tape in doing everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a criticism of the Army and Navy?

Mr. GABRIELSON. It is a criticism of the United States Government. Say before they start I would like to make a suggestion or recommendation, and that is that the Navy enlist men for the shore patrol and let them serve their enlistment as shore patrol officers. In the first place, we would get much better service from the shore patrol than we do. It is the system under which they work. They will have a large shore party, and then they will send over so many men to act as shore patrol. They don't know anything about it. They [1309] don't know what to do, and they have to arrest their buddies, and they just don't do it. Now, the military police

have an organization in which they are in there for the duration of their enlistment.

The CHAIRMAN. And they are trained?

Mr. GABRIELSON. And they are trained, and they are far more efficient. Now, that is, it is the system that I am talking about, not the individual men.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GABRIELSON. But if they could—and I think the Navy is large enough, and I think the Navy over here should organize a shore patrol of men who do nothing but that work.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, what was your observation of General Short's efficiency so far as concerns integrating the civilian defense here and the military arm? Had he been busy on that?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, General Short—I might give you, if you care to, a little history of what we had been doing under General Herron.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. GABRIELSON. He asked if we could organize a group of guards to take over the guarding of all public utilities and all communication lines and bridges of the Army outside of reservations. I told him that we could. We then organized 2500 men. We had them semi-trained in theory. We had officers go out and lecture to them, we gave them first aid, we had them given instructions in the riot gun. Those men were organized so that they could be called out on a very short notice. General Short was in accord with that, and then this act of the Home Guard was put in, and these men were not used.

The CHAIRMAN. General Short was active in getting the M-Day Bill passed too, was he not?

Mr. GABRIELSON. Yes, I understand that he was.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions?

[1310] (There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. Our investigation, Chief, is such that we feel it necessary to ask you not to discuss outside with anyone what went in in this room.

Mr. GABRIELSON. I will observe that. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

[1311] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL BRIANT H. WELLS,
UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, General?

General WELLS. Major General United States Army, Retired, and Executive Vice President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you lived on Oahu, General?

General WELLS. I arrived here on 24 October, 1930, and with the exception of some short leaves—one of them as long as six months on the mainland—I have been here ever since.

General McNARNEY. In what capacity did you first come here?

General WELLS. I first came here in command of the Hawaiian Division, stationed at Schofield Barracks, and served there for 11 months, and then I succeeded to the command of the department at Fort Shafter. I held that command 4 years and 3 months.

The CHAIRMAN. And you retired from the service when you were commander of that department?

General WELLS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you continued to live here?

General WELLS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the work of General Short since he has been Department Commander here?

General WELLS. No, I cannot say I am familiar with his military work. I have met him on numerous occasions in connection with his cooperation with the civilian community. I have visited at his home and I had him at my home, but I have not discussed the defense plans or the military action with him except in the way of old friends talking about personalities, perhaps.

[1312] The CHAIRMAN. From your observation, was he active and interested in integrating the civilian defense with the Army defense?

General WELLS. I think very much so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You think he made some progress in that respect?

General WELLS. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the attack on Oahu on the morning of December 7 a surprise to you, General?

General WELLS. It was, indeed; yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it the opinion in the community here that there might be such a raid on the island or was that ruled out of the probabilities as you gathered the opinions here?

General WELLS. That is a hard question to answer. My own opinion from the time I was in command, and perhaps I have uttered it in the critiques, maneuvers, and so on, among the officers in my command that no nation would ever attack these islands for the purpose of capturing them unless they had possession of the sea and control of the sea lanes.

If they had that control they could bring as many men as they wanted, and they would never bring fewer than they wanted, and they probably knew how many we had here.

It would be a case of our being under a state of siege for a while, but that was my opinion with respect to an attack for the purpose of capturing it. We always emphasized the danger of a raid. That might come at any time. I have always had in mind that there might be one. I might say that I have given very little thought to that since the presence of the fleet here.

I have been asked numerous times by people who were a little anxious, about whether they should go back to the mainland and what were the prospects of an attack here, and I said that it was inconceivable to me that the Japanese or any other nation could pull off even a raid here while our whole American [1313] fleet is in these waters. That, of course, was on the presumption that they were not only in the waters but that they were on guard.

I think that was the general impression.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that it was inconceivable that such a raid would take place in Pearl Harbor here?

General WELLS. Yes, and that was the opinion of most informed people.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any knowledge of the habits of the soldiers and sailors on leave or liberty on Saturday nights when a

great number of leaves were granted? Did you have occasion to be in the city and to observe them?

General WELLS. Well, I was chairman of what you might call the Mayor's entertainment committee for the enlisted men of the services. That was a committee of five citizens, and we had a great many subcommittees. We had one committee on church work and Mr. Wilke of the YMCA, and he coordinated his work with the churches with respect to the men on leave.

We had another one for visiting the homes. Many people opened their homes; then we had another one on dancing. Mrs. Pflueger was in charge of arranging dances for the men, and there were a couple of other various committees that I will not mention, which covered the whole situation.

These committees preceded the activities of the U.S.O. which have taken them over and which have charge of them.

There was a great deal of activity and many people tried to be of some help to so many soldiers and sailors coming ashore on weekends and Wednesday afternoons and more or less, after they had once seen the city, there was very little for them to see, and we wanted to get them out around the island and had trips and have them visit the homes and be hospitable. This community is more or less very hospitable.

I used to attend some of the dances and look them over and [1314] I got the impression that the morale was high and that they were having a good time. They appreciated all that was being done for them. As an old Army man I thought a lot of it was a lot of fol-de-rol. They do not need so much petting as they are getting, and they had some books sent out to the camps and some of the National Guard people have established some libraries.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the behavior on Saturday night with respect to drunkenness?

General WELLS. Well, I can't say I was downtown very often late Saturday night, but I will say I have never seen a better behaved bunch of soldiers and sailors. They are a clean bunch of boys. That was noticeable.

That was remarked upon. The Chief of Police has told me that they are getting in very little trouble. During my administration here the behavior of the soldiers and sailors as far as I observed it was excellent.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard rumors that one reason for the severity of the losses of the United States on the morning of the 7th of December was that both officers and men had been drinking to such an extent the night before that they were not fit for full service on the morning in question? Have you heard such rumors?

General WELLS. No, I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

General WELLS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been such rumors which have come to us. Do you credit them from your knowledge of conditions here?

General WELLS. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you have to say as to the condition of the officers of the Army and Navy so far as they came under your observation with respect to night drinking parties around the island?

[1315] General WELLS. I guess I go to as many tea parties as anybody does, as the average citizen, and I would say I have never seen a naval officer drunk since the fleet has been here. I can say that with very rare exceptions I haven't seen a sailor on the street except once in a while you would see them wobble along under the supervision of the military police or the shore patrol who had been under tow and were taking them home, but nothing like I have seen in other times.

The CHAIRMAN. You would say that the conditions have been better here in recent times than they were in earlier days?

General WELLS. I think that considering the number of people here that they are far better than they were in my 44½ years of military service.

The CHAIRMAN. General, did you have any apprehensions of espionage or sabotage from those of Japanese blood on the island, whether alien or citizens, before December 7th?

General WELLS. Did I have any apprehension?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, of sabotage or espionage.

General WELLS. No. I would say in that connection that I have had occasion to talk to people of that ancestry, both people who are and who are not citizens, particularly the new Americans, and I have always had the attitude that we never would know concerning certain individuals.

We could not expect unanimity of loyalty. We do not find that anywhere, even among the Anglo-Saxon citizens. But to credit sabotage, I don't think so here. I did not have any credit as to the sabotage stories.

There have been dire predictions made for 40 years, and since I have been here, which is 11 years now, about what was going to happen in case we had war with Japan. You may be familiar with the old story of the naval woman who was supposed to have asked her maid about what was going to happen and what was she going to do in time of war, and her reply was, "I am going next door and kill the woman over there, and the maid [1316] over there will come over here and kill you." That is an old story. It has been repeated many times. We have been told about dire predictions that the docks would be burned and that the guns would be taken from the rear, and that many things would be destroyed, and the waterworks would be blown up, and all kinds of dire predictions that would happen.

Even before, when I was in command, there was a report that 50,000 Japanese were armed and they had their organization and would rise up overnight.

I never believed these things. I took the precaution to find out about them and none of these things ever happened. I have always said that in time of peace you may never know and we never are sure of anyone, but whenever it comes down to an emergency you can tell and it would not take more than a week to know where people stood.

I have always believed that when the Japanese are citizens of Japanese ancestry that it is not possible to wipe out citizenship. Our whole country is made up of people from all races and one citizen is just as good as another citizen as far as rights are concerned. By

rounding them up and putting them in a corner you can make them disloyal just as by pushing them in the face and showing that you suspect them.

That is not my idea.

Then, as an example, we have the commissioners who investigate this island with respect to statehood and they have about 25 congressmen sent over and they have hearings for a three weeks' period and they go around to the other islands and talk to a number of people, and some of them are outstanding citizens and some are crack-pots. They hear both sides; then they wind up by saying that you have a great population here, a great area, and this is a matter of concern, and then the question of education and that you are entitled to statehood but you have got a lot of people down here that we don't know about and therefore we are not prepared—or words [1317] to that effect—to recommend statehood at this time. That is what Hawaii has suffered under for years.

We never do know, and while I see that these predictions have been made, they have not happened so far, and maybe they won't. I do not say they won't happen, but it has not happened yet.

Then one of the cabinet officers came down here to report and when he was asked if there were any fifth columnists here he said that it was the greatest efficiency in that line that has come out of the war since Norway.

I think that is slanderous; it is not true.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you conscious of the fact that there was a vast corps of so-called Japanese consular agents at work here? That is, under the consulates prior to December 7?

General WELLS. Yes. I might say in that connection that for times back even into my command my G-2 officer said that there were these consular agents up and down in the islands, but I was never able to find to what extent they were consular agents.

I made an investigation and I concluded they were just Japanese desiring to keep in touch with their people and they would have communications with various people but I did not see any way to counter it than to find out about who they were, and on many occasions I found that they were working, reliable people.

They had a certain natural attachment, perhaps, for their own country and they would write letters to the consul once in a while and they were giving us information—some of them, and it was quite common that while we knew the consul when he came, he would come by and make a trip around the islands and get in touch with these people, but that they were agents in the sense of being spies I never have believed that they were.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any notion prior to December 7 [1318] that Japan had critical and accurate information of everything that there was on these islands and that was going on on these islands?

General WELLS. Well, if you had lived here as long as I have and seen the place fill up and the roads and other improvements made and were familiar with the type of workmen that we get coming through here, Japanese, Portuguese, and many others, and these trips and so forth, it is inconceivable that anybody who wants to know anything could not find it out without having a lot of spies. That has always been my view.

Then we have the prohibition against taking photographs of various installations, guns, ammunition, and storage. They take precautions, and I think they are necessary, but you have ships coming in and out all the time and the Japanese training ships coming in here and receiving the courtesies of the port and being turned loose, anywhere from 75 to 100 cadets in training, and they associate with their friends in town and get taxis, automobiles, and ride around. So, as far as information is concerned, I do not see how it can be helped, because when anybody wanted the information he could get it. Insofar as getting information is concerned, I do not think it could be helped.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was a wise thing to declare martial law when the emergency occurred on December 7?

General WELLS. I don't know. I don't know if my opinion is worth anything, particularly in answer to a question from a Justice of the Supreme Court, but I always did feel this way: than even when the people were talking about the so-called M-day that martial law would be required anyhow. That is, some kind of authority should be given to the commanding general, and they should work in connection with the civil government insofar as it is necessary for the execution of the plan of defense. I never had any idea that they should interfere with [1319] it. I do not believe in that. I certainly would not think that.

By that I mean there is a certain plan of defense here that the commanding general is responsible for and he is to be given sufficient from Washington to make that plan effective and Washington is responsible for giving him all the means to carry on his plan.

Now, if the commanding general wanted to say that the Kamehameha Road will be closed for traffic on that road between such and such a time and for such and such a day, that he should have the authority to do so, but without asking, say, the Mayor or anyone else.

Then if he wants to do certain work on a water system or take over the communications or the docks and the shipping and things of that kind, it should be necessary for him to do that without any difficulty in order to move his troops wherever he wants to. In other words, to carry out his plan he should have that authority, and I do not know anything short of martial law which will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the situation today requires that that still be the case?

General WELLS. Yes, I think the commanding general should have the authority in every particular to carry out his plan of defense, and I think that he should utilize the civilian setup.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

General WELLS. To utilize it to the limit, and I know people here are yearning to do it, and I do not think you could ever find a community that is more cooperative than they are here because they have lived with the Army and Navy here longer than any other community that I know of. They are a nationally-minded people. They want to help.

I think if I may be permitted without criticism to say that they feel sometimes as if they are not being used to the [1320] extent that they would like to be used, and they have been somewhat patient under the conflicting orders, which is more or less natural,

particularly in view of the fact that General Short comes in and gets these things started and then there is a new man coming in and there is still some confusion until it is worked out.

General McNARNEY. General, you were in command of the Hawaiian Department for a while. You said you had talked with General Short and you had met him. You must have formed your personal opinion as to his competency to hold his command here and to carry out the defense of this place. I would like to know what your personal opinion of General Short is.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, this is absolutely confidential. Nothing said goes out of this room.

General WELLS. Well, I have known General Short for a number of years. I have never served in the same outfit with him but have known his reputation and have seen him a good deal since he has been here.

I would say that General Short is as good as the average officer who would be assigned to this command.

Of course, it is an unfortunate thing when anything like this happens. I do not know that I should go any further in answering that, but I do not feel that when any disaster as great as the one which happened here comes, that it is the responsibility of the case that no man can be relieved of. Excuses do not excuse.

I feel that way toward the General. I would hate to have his career ended because there is a lot left in him for something else. If I were in command myself I would expect to be relieved under conditions of this kind. However, I would not expect to have my whole career blasted, but I would expect to have that under the circumstances. A captain losing a ship often goes down with it.

General McNARNEY. Do you know Admiral Kimmel at all intimately?

[1321] General WELLS. Only since he has been here. I have met him quite a number of times.

General McNARNEY. What opinion have you formed as to his capabilities?

General WELLS. I think he is a man of very high character. As to his efficiency I know nothing except what I have been told. He was rated as very high. I would not have any way of judging his efficiency.

General McNARNEY. So far as you know, was the civilian community satisfied with the two chief commanders?

General WELLS. I do not think the civilian community knew anything, very much about his ability. I think they were a little peeved at one time by the talk he made before the Chamber of Commerce where he criticized the place quite harshly for the lack of preparation in connection with the whole thing and that, I think, made them feel not so cordial toward him as toward General Short, but that is only the impression of the things that I have heard. I do not know that it is of any value, but I have heard that they did have that feeling that his criticism was not called for.

General McNARNEY. What is your feeling toward the relaxation of the liquor restrictions?

General WELLS. You mean my opinion about doing it now?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General WELLS. Well, I do not think it would hurt anything. I would relax them if I were in command. I do not know for what

time. I never thought of it before, but it might be for certain hours in the afternoon, maybe, or something of that kind.

I did not believe in prohibition. I think our people have taken the personal restrictions splendid and fine. I do not know that there is any discontent on the island, but if it is going to continue indefinitely, you will begin to see [1322] the usual bootleggers coming in, and I would hate to see that come about.

General McNARNEY. What is your feeling about the curfew?

General WELLS. Well, I think this: that if the time comes—and I hope it is here now—when patrolling and scouting are sufficiently efficient to give a reasonable time of alarm warning that then they could relax the blackout. Say up until nine o'clock or maybe ten. That would help the morale of the people. They could get an alarm system going so that they can quickly give the alarm for the blackout and have everybody in, but I do not approve of what has happened up to date.

I think the people would appreciate it very much if it could be relaxed a little in that respect because of this gloom most of the time and everybody cannot fix the blackout material that the people who are better fixed can do. However, I think the scheme of keeping the people off the streets during the blackout is good.

Admiral REEVES. General, it is obvious that the success of the raid on December 7 was partially and perhaps entirely due to the information in the hands of the Japanese. What steps do you think would be effective to prevent such information reaching Japan in the future?

General WELLS. You mean reaching them from now on?

Admiral REEVES. Yes, from now on.

General WELLS. Well, I certainly would censor everything. I suppose it is being done. I suppose I would see that no radiograms or cablegrams or anything of that kind were transmitted there. I suppose those steps have already been taken. If they are taken I do not know of anything or any way that the information about here can reach there.

The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we let the fishing fleet start out in full force again?

General WELLS. What is that?

[1323] The CHAIRMAN. Suppose we let the Japanese fishing fleet out again in full force.

General WELLS. I have always considered the Japanese fishing fleet as an asset.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is an asset in the sense that it is a great provider of food.

General WELLS. Well, there has been a great deal of talk and people would say, "Just think of all these sampans around here, not knowing who was loyal and so forth." For a great many people you never can tell.

I said, "What is to prevent us from taking the boats and using them for ourselves if the Government wanted to?"

They are a means of getting food. I certainly would see that they were out fishing under the supervision of the Navy or put our own crews on them or at least put a guard on the alien crews. I think they are a big asset. I certainly think they perform a considerable function in supplying and serving food to the people.

Admiral REEVES. Would you take any measures restricting the Japanese on the island other than censorship?

General WELLS. I do not know what steps have been taken, but I always had in mind that they would take the leaders in tow. I think they have been taken in tow. There may be some out, but it is my understanding that the F. B. I. got about 300 in the immigration station and conducted an investigation.

I may say that I have been rather intimate with Mr. Shivers who is in charge of the F. B. I. He has a large F. B. I. outfit here, and I have assisted him whenever I could.

There are 35 plantations throughout these islands in our Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association with which I am associated.

I have taken up with the managers of these 35 plantations the question of furnishing Mr. Shivers a list of the Japanese, aliens as well as citizens born, on these plantations.

I also wanted their estimate of the character of every- [1324] body and some indication of those that he thought might be disloyal in case of what happened now, and those he felt he could absolutely bank on in an alarming situation and those leaders that he could not.

I think Mr. Shivers has a lot of these reports but he was astounded about it, although it was not much of a surprise to me, about the very few people that these managers were willing to put down as being suspicious characters. However, from now on I see no reason why the situation should not be controlled through the F. B. I. and the Army and the Navy Intelligence agency. People have had very trying times, of course.

General McCox. Would you be in favor of rounding up all the Japanese on one island under a guard?

General WELLS. That is a fantastic idea which I discounted years ago. That was the idea that some people had when I first came over here and I think it is the most foolish situation that I could think of.

General McCox. You do not think it would be practical?

General WELLS. No, sir, I do not think it would be practical to start with. It may be advisable for a certain number when you investigate them as the federal agencies are and to have a concentration camp; I don't know, but they can't get a better place than they are now taking care of them and keeping them. If it is necessary to establish some other camp on one of these islands somewhere, there is no place to put them and it would only be a nuisance and a bother. Kahoolawe has nothing on it and Niihau might be a pleasant place. Very few people ever get a chance to see it.

General McCox. In the case of a future Japanese major attack on these islands—assuming that the fleet would be unable to prevent the Japanese attack—do you think that the people of Japanese blood would go in with the Japanese landing parties or undertake sabotage, the sabotage which has been [1325] envisaged by certain responsible officials from time to time?

General WELLS. I never have thought so. I think the recent experience has indicated that they would not. I cannot imagine a more favorable opportunity for sabotage than that which was here on December 7th and nothing happened. If there had been any concerted information going back and forth on that occasion, the people here looking for such a thing to happen, they certainly had every oppor-

tunity for it when it occurred and they could have done anything they wanted to because even the emergency guards were not out.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know that General Short had ordered his Alert No. 1 which was an alert against sabotage and therefore there was a doubled guard? Do you know that?

General WELLS. I did not see any on the streets. I have seen the alert on the bridges. I suppose No. 1 Alert, if that is sabotage, would be on all the time.

The CHAIRMAN. No, it has not been.

General WELLS. To answer your question, General McCoy, with respect to the people of Japanese blood, second generation and some third generation, and there are a number of them who don't even speak Japanese or understand it and they have graduated from our schools, and it has been the policy of the War Department to have the R. O. T. C. in these schools and they are eligible for commissions in the Reserve Corps, and when they started the draft they drafted them, and I think in the last draft there were 75% of the people of Japanese blood. They are being trained now at Schofield Barracks.

I must assume that they will be loyal. If a man is in the United States service he is under the orders of his officers, and if he is disloyal there is a way to take care of that and you and I know what it is and that is the best way to handle that thing. I do not think we should refuse to give a man a gun or let him handle a bayonet for fear that he will stick our [1326] own troops in the back.

As far as the alien population is concerned, we do not always expect that they will be loyal, but I think a great many of them would be. The story that they will get on the beaches when there is a force attacking here and they do not have anything but clubs and they might club our men and assisting the forces landing on the beach—that is just inconceivable to me. If some group started they would be promptly be taken care of if we have any efficiency.

General McCoy. This group you think would be loyal to the uniform of the United States?

General WELLS. Yes, the Hawaiian Division is.

General McCoy. I mean this 75% of those of Japanese blood?

General WELLS. Yes, I think there are indications that they would be.

General McCoy. Do you think they should be left here or taken to some other field of operations?

General WELLS. I think they should be treated like any other of our citizens until they commit some overt act which justifies handling them different.

I think that is the question with respect to loyalty just as we had in the other war. You and I remember the situation when we had people coming into the camp and some of them could not speak English and we had some trouble in training them but they turned out to be loyal Americans, and so far as I know we had very little difficulty with them.

Of course you could take the whole outfit under surveillance if you wanted to, but I think these suspicions have gone on long enough and have been disproved, it appears to me. I am willing to wait and see what if anything they will do.

If I were in command of the beach patrol and the beach defense, I would not hesitate to use the National Guard and to put those in it,

these drafted men, just like I would use the [1327] other troops. We have plenty of people observing what is going on and we could give them very good notice of what is going to happen before anything does happen as far as it concerns the island here. Our danger comes from not knowing what is going on overseas.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of your relations with the head of the F. B. I., Mr. Shivers?

General WELLS. Mr. Shivers, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And also as commanding general here for four years you must have had quite a lot of experience with the question of cooperation between G-2, the Naval Intelligence, and the F. B. I. What is your estimate of that cooperation or lack of cooperation and coordination?

General WELLS. In my time we did not have any F. B. I. to amount to anything. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned the cooperation was cordial and sufficient and I would say as perfect as it could be. We didn't have the agencies in town like now. They were out on the post, but my G-2 was all the time cooperating with the Naval Intelligence.

There was an F. B. I. man here for a while by the name of MacIntosh, I think. He was here all alone. He did not have anyone else with him. I used to see him once in a while. He used to investigate the various activities, violations against the federal law. Sometimes he would ask for your opinion about somebody who was going to be appointed a judge, or something like that.

Eventually it was ruled in Washington that there was not enough work for an F. B. I. man here and he was taken away. Then there was something that happened in connection with opium and he came back here again and then was gone again and was sent to Buffalo.

When President Roosevelt was here I was in command and I mentioned that to him. I said, "It is not my job particularly [1328] but I think this is a place that is sufficiently important to place here an F. B. I. agency and they should have someone here all the time and not have the case of someone here for a while and then being taken away when the Director of the Budget cuts the appropriation and then sends the man somewhere."

He told me to make a note of that among other things that he wanted, and I did, and then this resulted, and it has been growing ever since.

General McCoy. What was the reason for having the F. B. I. agency here in addition to your own G-2 or the O. N. I.?

General WELLS. You are asking for an opinion about peace times. The Army and the Navy officials are not supposed to be digging into the private affairs of other people. The Congress is very jealous of that and whenever they find out that our G-2 has done anything they are likely to cut the appropriation, because they said, "You military people are spying on the civilians."

It was not a case of spying on them and if you wanted to send a military intelligence man to a labor union meeting and they found it out, there was trouble.

We needed a federal agency here at all times to investigate these things, because the military is supposed to be subordinate to the

civilian life in time of peace, and the only way to get it was to have those people here who could get the information.

General McCoy. If you had found your G-2 prying into private business during peace times, you would have stopped it?

General WELLS. Not unless I thought somebody was going to catch me.

General McCoy. If we did not have martial law these same peacetime conditions would govern and the Army and Navy intelligence would not be able to do the job efficiently?

General WELLS. That is right.

[1329] There has been a lot of fine cooperation between them since Shivers came to establish this rather large agency here, because he has been able to get things done and he was always working in cooperation with the Army and the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such that we are compelled to ask the witnesses not to discuss their testimony, or to mention to anyone on the outside anything that has happened in this room.

General WELLS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. We will ask you to observe that.

General WELLS. I will be glad to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Judd.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY PRATT JUDD, PROFESSOR OF HAWAIIAN LANGUAGE AND HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your full name for us, please?

Mr. JUDD. Henry Pratt Judd.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your profession, sir?

Mr. JUDD. I am professor of the Hawaiian language and history at the University of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are also an ordained minister?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a church here as minister?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, I run a Hawaiian church.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe you have lived here all your life?

[1330] Mr. JUDD. Sixty-one and a half years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Rumors have come to us, Mr. Judd, to the effect that the morale of the Army and Navy officers and men on this island prior to December 7, 1941, was bad in connection with the amount of excessive drinking, and that the men were not, by reason of that fact, up to their duties on the morning of December 7th. Now, we would like to know what you know from your personal observations which would tend to confirm or to contradict those rumors.

Mr. JUDD. Yes, sir. My observation both on the streets of Honolulu as well as at Schofield Barracks where I go every summer because I am in the National Guard and have been for 20 years, is that the morale of the men was excellent. As I see them on the streets of

Honolulu the men seem well behaved and it would be an exception to see an intoxicated soldier or sailor. I would say that the morale of the men was excellent and the men were well behaved and a credit to the United States Government and to the representatives of the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. From your observations you would not expect that the Saturday night indulgences would result in any important diminution of the efficiency of the Army and the Navy on the morning of December 7th; is that right?

Mr. JUDD. Sir, I heard afterward that there was something, but so far as I know I saw nothing in the way of general intoxication or general letting down.

The CHAIRMAN. You say you heard afterward?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it you have heard the same rumors that we have, that officers were unfit for duty and many men were unfit for duty?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, I heard that the higher-ups were having a party in this hotel.

The CHAIRMAN. In this hotel?

[1331] Mr. JUDD. That is the rumor that has been going around.

The CHAIRMAN. What higher-ups? Army or Navy?

Mr. JUDD. Well, they said the admirals. I suppose that is the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Do you get around to social affairs?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you meet both Army and Navy officers?

Mr. JUDD. Mostly Army officers.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say about the decorum in the matter of intoxication and drinking at parties?

Mr. JUDD. Well, I would say it is comparable to the civilian life; no more drinking than among the civilian population, general speaking.

The CHAIRMAN. Honolulu is a very generous place in the matter of entertainment, isn't it?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. People are social-minded here?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And I suppose the Army and Navy personnel, the officers particularly, are invited to parties very frequently?

Mr. JUDD. Very much so, sir. I think the civilian population appreciates the Army and the Navy very much.

The CHAIRMAN. You have observed the work of the military law since it was put into effect on December 7th?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was a wise thing to put into effect after the attack?

Mr. JUDD. I do, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it is working well?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, sir, excellent.

[1332] The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in favor under the present state of affairs to relax it and to turn the thing over to the civilian authorities in toto?

Mr. JUDD. No, sir, not until the Japanese menace is cleaned out of the eastern part of the Pacific. We have got to get the submarines out of this section. Then it may be a time to relax it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view with respect to those of Japanese blood? Would you expect that in case of attack on this island that they would adhere to the United States?

Mr. JUDD. I would expect that a large majority of them, yes, a large proportion of them.

The CHAIRMAN. You are conscious that there is a minority that would probably not?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, just like probably on the mainland, where you have many people of German extraction.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you conscious of the fact that the Japanese espionage with respect to the affairs among the Army and Navy on this island was practically perfect?

Mr. JUDD. It must have been just about perfect.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the maintaining of the military law here will have some deterrent effect on the reduction of that in respect to any future attack here?

Mr. JUDD. Yes. If Japan knows that our men are scattered all over the island, I think there is little danger of any repeated attack or a second attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that if Japan were conscious of the fact that civilian authority was entirely restored and that persons of Japanese blood had the same liberty that they had in peacetime, that there might be another one?

Mr. JUDD. I think that as long as we have the splendid and efficient Army and Navy establishment here that I think that Japan would not try to go after us in spite of the fact [1333] that there may be 10% of the population who are potential saboteurs.

The CHAIRMAN. You would wish to retain the military control of things for the time being?

Mr. JUDD. Yes, as long as there is any menace at all, it should be retained.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, General?

General McNARNEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Judd, you have been here for 61 years?

Mr. JUDD. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. There have been many occasions when the fleet, not being based here, has visited here on problems, say, in 1925, I think in 1927, and 1932.

Do you have any knowledge of the entertainments having been given by the various Governors of the Islands to the officers of the fleet and there being large parties at this hotel or some other hotel involving practically all the higher officials of the fleet? Have you attended any of those parties?

Mr. JUDD. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. General McCoy, any questions?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such, Mr. Judd, that we will ask you not to discuss with anyone on the outside anything that has taken place in this room.

Mr. JUDD. That is the understanding.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.

We will adjourn at this time until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12:30 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1334]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The proceedings were resumed at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Wilke, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF WESLIE THEODORE WILKE, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, ARMY AND NAVY YMCA, HONOLULU, T. H.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir. Weslie Theodore Wilke. Not the man who ran for President.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on the island, Mr. Wilke?

Mr. WILKE. Since '32. 1932.

The CHAIRMAN. And in what capacity have you been here?

Mr. WILKE. I have been the executive secretary of the Army and Navy YMCA all during that period, coming here from Panama, where I was in a similar capacity.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had you served in the same capacity in Panama?

Mr. WILKE. Three years in Panama.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been in Army-Navy YMCA service anywhere else before that?

Mr. WILKE. Oh, yes. In California.

The CHAIRMAN. Where?

Mr. WILKE. Vallejo, opposite Mare Island.

The CHAIRMAN. Opposite Mare Island?

Mr. WILKE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where else?

Mr. WILKE. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WILKE. Well, I served with the YMCA during the war overseas, and then was out and came back in.

[1335] The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mr. Wilke, you have had a great deal of opportunity to observe these Army and Navy boys on leave, haven't you, on liberty?

Mr. WILKE. That's all I have been doing.

The CHAIRMAN. We have heard numerous rumors that on Saturday nights here in Honolulu there has been a great deal of drinking and bad conduct amongst the troops. Now, first of all, has there been much of that?

Mr. WILKE. There is a certain amount of drinking. My considered opinion is that it isn't as great as it would be among the same number of civilians.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you conscious of the attempts of the Army and Navy police and patrol to control that situation?

Mr. WILKE. Absolutely; work right with them all the time on that very thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they pretty efficient?

Mr. WILKE. They are very efficient.

The CHAIRMAN. And you are, of course, conscious that when a large fleet comes ashore and a great many men are turned loose in a city like Honolulu where liquor is obtainable it is impossible to prevent some drinking?

Mr. WILKE. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. WILKE. We take care of many intoxicated men in our place. By that I mean, if a man is intoxicated somewhat we put him to bed, send him back to his station when he is sober. That is simply a condition that results from a little too much liquor. But the great mass of the men certainly are not afflicted that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Wilke, I gathered that you thought conditions here were better than in other places where you had served; Panama, for example?

Mr. WILKE. No, I don't believe they are any better or any worse. Conditions are different in each place, and certain [1336] elements in the local conditions affect it.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Mr. WILKE. But I don't believe the men are any different here than they are in San Diego.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been rumors that there was so much drinking amongst the personnel on the night of Saturday, December 6, that a large proportion of of the force was unfit for duty that morning. What have you to say as to your personal observation on that evening?

Mr. WILKE. I wouldn't believe that to be true.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Saturday evening, December 6, any worse than any other Saturday evening, to your observation, where there is a similar crowd ashore?

Mr. WILKE. I don't think so. It probably was worse than it would be now with the saloons closed.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, I quite understand.

Mr. WILKE. But I think it was a normal Saturday evening.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have not much opportunity to observe the habit of the officers of either arm of the service with respect to liquor, would you?

Mr. WILKE. Well, not to a great extent. I know a great many officers, of course, but we cater largely to the enlisted personnel.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WILKE. Yes. And the officers, our contact with the officers, comes through the fact that most of them get their transportation back to the station from our place there, you see, the bus station.

The CHAIRMAN. The officers?

Mr. WILKE. Yes, officers.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen intoxicated officers going back and forth, to report?

Mr. WILKE. Occasionally.

The CHAIRMAN. Occasionally?

Mr. WILKE. Occasionally, yes, sir.

[1337] The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wilke, how in your judgment has the martial law operated here? Well?

Mr. WILKE. I think it has operated well. It is inconvenient, perhaps, but it is operating well.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose your stay on this island has acquainted you with the amount and character of those of Japanese blood, whether aliens or citizens, hasn't it?

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the continuance of martial law, if there is an emergency and a danger of possibly another attack from Japan, will have any effect in keeping that element of the population in line?

Mr. WILKE. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you abrogate it and go back to civil life now? Would you want that done, as a citizen here, if you thought the emergency were not over?

Mr. WILKE. As a citizen I would not do it.

General McCoy. I think I have one or two little points that I should like to have Mr. Wilke consider.

Since the draft act went into effect quite a large proportion of the soldiers drafted from the Hawaiian Islands would naturally be of Japanese blood, wouldn't they?

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you have a feeling that they would be loyal soldiers to the American flag?

Mr. WILKE. My feeling has always been that they would be loyal. So far, from what little observation I have had of them, because they have been stationed away from us to a considerable extent, I have no reason to change my mind.

General McCoy. Do the Japanese parents seem to resent the fact that their sons are serving under the American flag?

Mr. WILKE. I can't answer that question. I know no parents that I have talked with.

General McCoy. It would have been better for us to have [1338] asked that question of the general secretary.

Mr. WILKE. Yes. He has contact with the civilians. You understand, here our YMCA setup is quite different than elsewhere; the Army and Navy YMCA is totally and entirely separate from the civilian organization. We are part of a national organization that serves military and naval personnel. We do not, except that we work together in many ways, but we—

General McCoy. I am on your board.

Mr. WILKE. Yes.

General McCoy. Your national board.

Mr. WILKE. Yes, sir. I am glad to hear that, sir.

General McCoy. Do many of the soldiers and the sailors spend the night in the club?

Mr. WILKE. Before the blitz we had to set up cots in our place two or three times a week. Every bed would be occupied every night. We have 400 beds. We set up 375 cots, and we had the men sleeping on the floor in many of the public rooms. So that that partially answers your question. It was not possible to give all-night liberty to a great number of men who might want it because there were not suitable accommodations ashore to take care of them. Of course, that is all changed, because there is no all-night liberty now except to a very few.

General McCoy. Do you know what the regulations of the Army and Navy were about all-night liberty prior to the attack?

Mr. WILKE. As to which men secured all-night liberty? My feeling is that it was rather liberal, that a man whose record was good could get all-night liberty if he requested it.

General McCoy. Was there a large number of such liberty men on the night of December 6?

Mr. WILKE. Yes, there was. Of course I don't know that it was proportionately any greater than it would be any other Saturday night. I don't suppose it was, but our building was crowded that night, and we had—I can't tell you exactly, but we probably had 700 people sleeping in the place that night.

[1339] General McCoy. Did you have any disorder or trouble with them?

Mr. WILKE. No, sir.

General McCoy. What time did they go back to their stations? Do you know?

Mr. WILKE. They went back instantly when they heard the announcement. Our dining room was completely filled with men. Every table, every stool, every chair was filled, and when the radio announcement came that all men were to go back they dropped their knives and forks and left. In two minutes they were gone. That was their response to that. The reaction was instantaneous. Every man jack left for his post, even though hardly any of them believed at that moment that it was anything but an alert.

General McCoy. There were no officers there to herd them out?

Mr. WILKE. There were no officers.

General McCoy. All on their own initiative?

Mr. WILKE. Yes. The announcement was made by one of our staff over the loudspeaker, who got the announcement over the radio. The morale of the men was high, and I saw no one that morning, and I was right there, who was in the least under the influence of liquor. Not a man.

Admiral REEVES. The men who stayed overnight with you would have been the men most likely to have been under the influence of liquor, would they not?

Mr. WILKE. A great many of them would.

Admiral REEVES. The men who were sober went home during the night?

Mr. WILKE. Those—

Admiral REEVES. I mean, the probability is that any intoxicated man would have stayed ashore rather than gone back earlier in the night?

Mr. WILKE. Well, on Saturday night, Admiral, the men usually have a forty-eight, and they don't have to go back [1340] un-

til the next day, so most of those men are perfectly all right. Now, men who are intoxicated that we handle are usually men who get too much to drink in some place and they bring them up in taxicabs and unload them at our place. Now, there are some of those—that's bound to happen—but the percentage is so small that it really isn't worth remarking about.

General McCoy. How many would you say, just offhand, on a big night like Saturday night, would be turned in that way to you?

Mr. WILKE. Fifteen, perhaps. Twelve, fifteen, in there. And out of a thousand men you wouldn't consider that a proportion for a jam-boree such as Saturday night would naturally be when they go ashore.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked all the witnesses not to communicate what goes on in this room to anyone outside.

Mr. WILKE. That's right. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much indebted to you for your comment and giving us the benefit of your testimony.

Mr. WILKE. I think you recognize the fact that I am a strong adherent of the enlisted personnel of the Army and the Navy; nobody can tell me anything wrong about them.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Colonel BROWN. Governor Poindexter.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Governor?

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH B. POINDEXTER, GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Governor?

Governor POINDEXTER. Joseph B. Poindexter.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been governor of the Hawaiian Islands?

Governor POINDEXTER. Since the 1st of March, '34.

[1341] The CHAIRMAN. Have you heard anything that led you to believe that there might on or about December 7 be an air raid?

Governor POINDEXTER. Not a word. I was as much astonished as any person could possibly be over an unexpected happening.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to say that the general feeling here was one of security against such a thing, Governor?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, I believe that at that time it was. Of course, there has been a general feeling here that when anything did happen it would happen to Hawaii because we were here at the outfront, the outpost.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. But I am sure it was my feeling, and I think it was the feeling of most of the public here, that while this conference was going along in Washington, and while we feared the result of that conference wouldn't be what we hoped for, yet that under those circumstances there wasn't a possibility, I might say, or a probability of anything occurring like did happen on the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, was it at your initiation that martial law was declared in the emergency? At your request?

Governor POINDEXTER. No. It was at the request of the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. At the request of the Army?

Governor POINDEXTER. General Short.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think it was a good thing to do in that emergency?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, this was the way it was represented. Of course, being a civilian, I was not very keen about having martial law, you will understand, but a disturbance that we had here and the large Japanese population that we have in Hawaii was the reason that was advanced why that could be better handled through martial law than by civil authorities. In other words, there was an uncertainty of what attitude they would take.

[1342] The CHAIRMAN. And I suppose that uncertainty persists as to at least a minority of them today, does it not?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, I think that—

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you understand that this testimony is wholly confidential.

Governor POINDEXTER. What?

The CHAIRMAN. I mean this testimony is wholly confidential; this is not to be published.

Governor POINDEXTER. Oh, yes.

I feel this way about it, and perhaps I am more cautious than the average citizen: that there is some danger here yet in the situation with reference to some of these aliens. I am inclined to think, from the attitude taken by a great many of these young Japanese, that their desire is to be loyal, and of course many of them are in the public service, and many are draftees out at Schofield and in the Army, but that there are saboteurs here I am quite convinced.

There has not been much evidence of sabotage, but that may be due to two things: one, the fear of the effect of martial law, the fear that it puts in their hearts; and the other thing, most of these aliens are old people. I mean Japanese aliens; they are old people, and they are too old to be active themselves, and they have lived here so long that while they are Japanese at heart I feel that they just are not physically able to get out and do much.

There are some here—some priests in the Buddhist church and some of these language-school teachers—that in times past have been reported to me as being reserve officers in the Japanese Army. There has been no evidence of any attempt at sabotage on the part of any of those two classes, but undoubtedly somebody is doing spy work here, and they are the people that I have in mind that are responsible for this spy work.

The CHAIRMAN. It is perfectly evident from our investigation, Governor, that the Japanese were advised in the most [1343] meticulous detail as to all topographical facts respecting Pearl Harbor.

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And as to all the tactical dispositions they had evidently perfect information. That must have been obtained by some spy system on this island; isn't that your view?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, of course, topographical facts, they are here and open and have been always open.

The CHAIRMAN. Very difficult to conceal them.

Governor POINDEXTER. Their ships would come in here, and in the past we had reason to believe that—I am speaking of their training ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. —reason to believe that they left people here and took on others in place of them, so when they sailed they had a full crew.

The CHAIRMAN. But somebody had been left here?

Governor POINDEXTER. Somebody had been left and others had been taken on.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. And it is from them, of course, that—this is just my own surmise.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. It was from such class of people that they got the topographical situation. I know when they would come in town they would make trips around the island, be taken to this place and be taken to that place. So I feel that they have known the conditions in the island so far as the harbors and the ports and the forts and the public buildings and all that—they have known this for years.

Of course, as to what they knew as to the berthing of those ships out there or the condition that existed on Sunday, I don't know.

[1344] The CHAIRMAN. Were you conscious, Governor, that there were an inordinately large number of consular agents attached to the Japanese Consulate here for the past months?

Governor POINDEXTER. No, I didn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Or wouldn't that come to your attention?

Governor POINDEXTER. That wouldn't come to my attention, no. I didn't know that. We immediately took charge, of course, of the Japanese Consul.

The CHAIRMAN. I know that. I know it was seized the minute war was declared.

Governor POINDEXTER. And of course I presume it has been reported to you the amount of money we found on them, which we thought was unusually large.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I didn't know that.

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, we can get those figures for you, but it was—

The CHAIRMAN. Would Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. have them?

Governor POINDEXTER. Mr. Tree has them, and I think—yes, Shivers would have them. He has them, yes. It was somewhat over \$20,000. Some of that, however, was in the safe. Some was on their persons. But we felt it was an unusual amount of money to have around in a place like Honolulu where there are banks, you know, and we don't like—I don't like to carry money.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, I want to ask you a question.

Governor POINDEXTER. There was another thing, a point there on this possible notice that they might have had. We made a survey of our food here. We closed all stores one day and made them take an inventory of everything they had. We found the supply of rice was unusually short, very much below what it should have been, and naturally that aroused some suspicion as to why that should exist; and our investigation showed that these Japanese merchants, or some of

them, when customers would come in to buy a sack of rice, would tell them, [1345] "You better buy two sacks."

Now, that may have been due to either one of two reasons: one, of course, that they had advance notice of what was coming; the other was the rising price of rice. Rice of course has been going up, like all other articles, and it is their primary food. It is their bread.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. And it may be that they were being advised from an economic standpoint. But, anyhow, we know that the most of them did; they accepted that advice and instead of buying one they bought two, and I presume—we found one fellow with a whole truckload of rice. So that it aroused my suspicion, anyhow, that perhaps it was something more than just the economic side of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, what has been your observation as to the conduct of personnel of the forces when they are ashore here? Has there been anything out of the ordinary in the way of drinking and disorder?

Governor POINDEXTER. No, indeed. I have observed that the last few years rather closely, and I feel that there was nothing whatever that would subject them to criticism. Once in a while some fellow would get a little too much booze, of course, and maybe he would reel a little bit; but the conduct of the enlisted men—or of the officers, as far as that goes—I thought was very much improved in the last few years over what it used to be here when the boys would come ashore. They were a little bit rowdy. But not this time at all. It was unusual to me, the exemplary conduct that they exhibited. Quite pleased with it. I know we often spoke about it, what a high type class of young fellows they had in the Navy. I think there has been a great improvement in the enlisted men in the Navy, and in the Army too, over when I first came in contact with them. Young fellows, you know, that are high-school boys and some of them college boys, well behaved. We [1346] have had them in our home, groups of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Chosen at random? Groups chosen at random?

Governor POINDEXTER. Just say, "We will take so many today." You know, we did that for a while here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. We were trying to entertain them all.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. And perfectly behaved. Gentlemen. Just put it that way: they were perfect gentlemen.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. Governor, we had a statement made before us today that the Japs ran the Immigration Service here.

Governor POINDEXTER. Ran it?

General McNARNEY. Ran the Immigration Service, and that any Japanese who wanted to come in was always taken care of. Can you give us any light on that subject?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, I will say that is news to me, General. I never even have heard a rumor of it, and I would say, putting it very mildly, I doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. The story was, Governor, that an association called the Japanese Hotel Association had a great pull down at the Im-

migration Bureau, and they were always able to wangle through any Jap that they wanted to get in. That is about the story, isn't it, General?

General McNARNEY. That is about the story, yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, of course there is this Japanese Hotel Association, and most of the Japanese, at least when they want to leave, make all the arrangements through one of these hotel managers, but you are getting them in—well, I just say that is news to me. I really have no information on it at all.

General MCCOY. Under whom does that Immigration Service function? The Treasury?

[1347] Governor POINDEXTER. It is under the Department of Justice now, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. It was moved to the Department of Justice from the Department of Labor.

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes, it was. It was Labor, but about a year ago—was it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. In the recent past it was transferred to the Department of Justice, and of course the same personnel remained; but I have found Mr. Strench, so far as I have had any dealings with him, to be upright and straightforward, and I am really astonished that there is any such charge, I will be frank with you.

General MCCOY. Were you conscious of their being a large number of Japanese agents and spies, we will call them, here prior to the 7th?

Governor POINDEXTER. No; I would have no means of knowing.

General MCCOY. Was that brought to your attention?

Governor POINDEXTER. I would have no means except, as I have told you, that I suspicioned these priests and these school teachers. Of course, not so many of the school teachers; there haven't been so many of them brought in. But I am inclined to believe that a very good percentage of these Buddhist priests are actually reserve officers that are in the Army over there or that are sent in here for a purpose other than what it was presumed to have been.

General MCCOY. Was there any attempt ever made to prosecute them, so far as you know, by the federal authorities?

Governor POINDEXTER. No. You see, under the law they could come in as priests or teachers. The law permitted that, and I don't know under what act they would prosecute them, General.

Another time here years ago there was a very corrupt [1348] Immigration Service here, but that had peculiar reference to Chinese, and they were bringing back a great many Chinese in here that shouldn't be here. But that ended in the early 20's, 1920, '21. That thing was discovered, and some were prosecuted, and one or two killed themselves, and the whole thing was changed as far as personnel was concerned, but I really haven't heard any charges against the present personnel down there.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, how many of the young children of Japanese blood of school age go to these Japanese-language schools? Could you give us an idea of the proportion of them?

Governor POINDEXTER. No, I couldn't, but I could say this: that the number attending has been decreasing.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes. I would think probably practically all of the first generation from the immigrant attended Japanese schools, but as you get farther away from the immigrant they get further away from the Japanese culture and the attachment to the Japanese customs; and I think, as I think most of us think here, that in the course of time these schools will just pass out of existence for lack of support.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Governor POINDEXTER. Of course, it won't be in a few years, but it will eventually come. A great many of the younger people are complaining, you know, about this burden on them, sending their children to school; and when the old people die who are really the urge to educate them in Japanese, that influence is gone, and they just quit. That's all.

The CHAIRMAN. Governor, what has been your observation of the conduct and efficiency of General Short in connection with integrating civilian defense and military defense here?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, I had great confidence in General Short.

The CHAIRMAN. You had great confidence in him?

[1349] Governor POINDEXTER. Of course, I never knew General Short until he came here.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite so.

Governor POINDEXTER. But I will say this, I will say that General Short was constantly urging for a long time this preparedness on behalf of the civilian population, and he spoke in season, and once or twice I thought maybe out of season, on that. One time he delivered an address on food, and I felt rather alarmed at it because I thought he was alarming the people unnecessarily, don't you see? That was quite some time ago.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. When I say "out of season," that is what I had reference to. But I think, after all, his attitude in that respect was right. He seemed very much concerned about the situation here with reference to the civilian population, and he urged us constantly and I think was largely responsible for the original start of all of this organization. You see, we organized, and I doubt if there is any other community anywhere that was really better organized from the civilian standpoint than we were when this thing came. There was some confusion, of course. There was confusion everywhere, but they did a good job. The medical was particularly well organized. We had wardens appointed, and they had their various groups. It has probably been explained to you how they worked out, and on the whole I have only the highest words of commendation for the civilian population on that day.

The CHAIRMAN. How about your civilian evacuation committee? Is that functioning well now? Is it ready to move if it is called upon?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, yes. It functioned that day.

The CHAIRMAN. It did?

Governor POINDEXTER. Of course we had no refuges then. Since what they call J-Day, Jap Day, the President has allotted \$2,800,000 for the purpose of building shelters and places of [1350]

refuge, and under the instructions that was to be done in connection with the Army. Well, the engineers took that over. They have completed a camp out at Wahiawa, another at Kalili—that is up in this end of the town (indicating—and they are working now or should be working and I assume they started—I think they expect to start Sunday—on Palolo, which is just up here toward the mountains (indicating). Those would be the three which I think that the plan called for, the main evacuation camps. And then they have been constructing shelters around public places along the waterfront, and things of that kind. It is only quite recently we got the money, but I think the thing is in very good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. You ought to have sufficient money to do the job now?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes, I think so. I think we have.

General MCCOY. And that is being done through the District Engineers?

Governor POINDEXTER. He is doing the actual construction. You see, he had all the material in this town, building material.

The CHAIRMAN. They commandeered all that?

Governor POINDEXTER. They just commandeered it, and he has the labor and the organization, so we made an arrangement with him by which he was to go into this valley and construct this refuge, the buildings and whatever was necessary, furnish the material, furnish the labor, and as we directed the spot he went in and built it.

General MCCOY. Does he work with your evacuation committee?

Governor POINDEXTER. Oh, yes. Yes, yes, he is. That is, to that extent. He asked us to say where they shall go, and he wants some advice as to the type and the equipment that will go in, but he just goes ahead and from there on it is just like a contractor entering into a contract: he does the work, [1351] furnishes the material, and I think that is in as good shape as it could be expected.

General MCCOY. Does the evacuation committee also concern itself with the evacuating to the mainland?

General POINDEXTER. Well, take the Iwilei district, for instance. Of course, that is done under the Army orders. That is the industrial district out here where the tanks are, oil tanks and the storage. They evacuated everybody, men, women, and children.

Of course, now, you take these danger zones like around here. On account of this fort over here, Fort De Russy, they expect to evacuate the women and children in case of emergency. Of course the men, they are supposed to be having something to do; we don't want to put them out where they can't be of assistance. Those plans have been pretty well worked out, General, and I think that they will function all right. Here is the danger zone around Fort De Russy, say. They propose to do this: they will go to these people and warn them that they are in the danger zone and that they had better evacuate. Some of them of course will say, "No, I don't want to." Well, we are going to leave them there at their own risk except that, when the time comes that they are actually in danger, then they will be moved out. And the whole city has been plotted on that basis.

Admiral STANDLEY. I want to ask a question of the Governor. If it has been covered, tell me. Then he can answer it.

Governor, the belief has been expressed here that because we had no evidences of sabotage during this raid on the 7th that was an in-

dication that there are no plans for sabotage in the future. Is that your view?

Governor POINDEXTER. No. No, I wouldn't go that far, Admiral, at all, because we are taking precautions against possible sabotage.

[1352] Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, this raid the other day was just the conditions under which there would be no sabotage if they had the desire to come in later and take the place, capture it?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, they would be particular not to commit any acts of sabotage in this raid if they had any idea of coming here later and trying to capture the place; is that your view?

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, I don't know that I look at it exactly that way. As to sabotage, of course, I take it that the saboteurs would be in small groups. One man would go down here and probably try to plant a charge of dynamite under any public utility, for instance, or a public building, and I doubt if there are any widespread plans among the Japanese people to commit sabotage, but I don't doubt that there are individuals among them who would if they could get the opportunity and could do it without fear of the consequences.

Admiral STANDLEY. But the people's suspicions are not allayed or the belief that there may be sabotage is not allayed, then, by the fact that you didn't have any in the last raid? You are still on the lookout for it?

Governor POINDEXTER. Oh, yes. We are guarding all these what we consider vulnerable points, every one of them. Oh, no; I think that would be unfortunate if we took that view.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Governor POINDEXTER. You see, we have a great population of Japanese that have never been put to the test. We don't know how they are going to react. One man's opinion is just as good as another's as to what is going to happen so far as they are concerned. My opinion is that most of these young Japanese want to be loyal to the United States. I am not certain of all of them, and I am very certain that the old people still cling to Japan. And did you have figures on [1353] the population?

The CHAIRMAN. No, we did not, and if you have them we would like to have them.

Governor POINDEXTER. I put some down that I took from my annual report this year.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. That will be helpful.

Governor POINDEXTER. It shows the population by counties and cities and shows the total population broken down by races.

The CHAIRMAN. May we put that in our record?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes, indeed. That is why I brought it.

The CHAIRMAN. With the consent of the Commission we shall put this in our record as part of the Governor's testimony.

General MCCOY. Let us have the summary of it, will you, please?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will summarize it for us. You need not take it, Mr. Reporter.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

(The tabulation of population estimates referred to is as follows:)

[1354] *Population Estimates As Of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941*

Area	July 1, 1940	July 1, 1941
City of Honolulu.....	180,986	200,158
City and County of Honolulu (exclusive of Honolulu City).....	79,899	110,345
City of Hilo.....	24,341	22,667
County of Hawaii (exclusive of Hilo City).....	49,222	45,731
County of Kalawao.....	465	464
County of Kauai.....	35,956	33,479
County of Maui.....	55,785	52,495
Total.....	426,654	465,339

Race	July 1, 1940		July 1, 1941		
	Citizens	Noncitizens	Citizens	Noncitizens	Total ¹
Hawaiian.....	14,359		14,246		14,246
Part-Hawaiian.....	50,470		52,445		52,445
Puerto Rican.....	8,322		8,460		8,460
Caucasian.....	103,700	2,681	139,299	2,328	141,627
Chinese.....	24,245	4,589	24,886	4,351	29,237
Japanese.....	121,312	36,678	124,351	35,183	159,534
Korean.....	4,517	2,337	4,628	2,253	6,881
Filipino.....	17,109	35,498	18,050	34,010	52,060
All others.....	807	30	832	17	849
	344,841	81,813	387,197	78,142	465,339
Apr. 1, 1940, Census, T. of H.....					¹ 123,330

¹ Figures under "Total" and last entry (April 1, 1940 Census figure) appear in pencil on copy of tabulation submitted to the Commission.

[1355] The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions of the Governor?

Governor POINDEXTER. Returning to General Short, I want to impress, gentlemen, that my opinion is that General Short was very much responsible for what we did accomplish in the way of organization here. I think his whole heart was in the situation. Of course, it is connected with the military situation, undoubtedly.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Governor POINDEXTER. And I feel, in justice to him, that I ought to say that I do believe that without the push and the effort that he made the civilians wouldn't have realized what possible danger they were in. And they were well organized, and they functioned splendidly. I really am proud of the civilian population, the way they came through in this crisis.

The CHAIRMAN. I think their attitude now is excellent.

Governor POINDEXTER. There has never been any panic. Of course a great many of them are a little bit jittery, but there has never been any panic, and they have kept their heads well; and I feel that if we have to go through it again we will go through it of course even better. We learn from experience. They are accepting this blackout, which isn't very agreeable to any of us, in good spirits. Of course there is grumbling; of course they naturally have to let loose a little bit and grumble.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the privilege of an American citizen, to grumble.

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, as I said, I do not think any community could have done better. I feel that everybody has cooperated throughout.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if there are no other questions we shall thank you very much, Governor, for attending our session.

Governor POINDEXTER. Well, sir, I am glad. I hope [1356] if there is anything further you will call on me.

The CHAIRMAN. I shall ask you, as we have other witnesses, not to disclose anything that has occurred in here.

Governor POINDEXTER. Oh, no, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Our testimony is confidential.

Governor POINDEXTER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your coming to us, sir.

(Governor Poindexter, having been excused, was recalled, and testified further as follows:)

Governor POINDEXTER. The first part here (referring to document, Population Estimates) is broken down by counties, covers the whole islands; the second part, the racial groups. It is just the whole island, and it is not broken down before this.

The CHAIRMAN. By counties, but it is the entire islands?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It covers every island?

Governor POINDEXTER. Yes, and this figure in pencil is what it indicates, the Census of 1940 (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. 1940.

Governor POINDEXTER. It shows the increase.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Governor POINDEXTER. We had no way of breaking this down, or I hadn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that is sufficient for our purposes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, sir.

[1357] **TESTIMONY OF LESTER PETRIE, MAYOR OF THE CITY OF HONOLULU, T. H.**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, sir?

Mayor PETRIE. Lester Petrie.

The CHAIRMAN. You are Mayor of the City of Honolulu?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. For how long have you held that office?

Mayor PETRIE. Since the first of the year.

The CHAIRMAN. First of '41?

Mayor PETRIE. Of '41, I should say.

The CHAIRMAN. The City is now under military law, under martial law, is it not?

Mayor PETRIE. To a certain extent, I would say, yes, as I understand it.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that it was necessary at the outbreak of this emergency to put the city under special martial control?

Mayor PETRIE. Well, I didn't see any objection to it under the conditions that it was put under; I thought it was for the best for the city.

The CHAIRMAN. If there is an emergency and a danger of further aggression by the Japanese, do you think that the present status is a good one for the protection of the community, or would you lift the military control?

Mayor PETRIE. Well, you mean to lift military control and put it back into the city?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, wholly on a peace-time basis.

Mayor PETRIE. If we had further trouble?

The CHAIRMAN. If there is an emergency. If you thought there was a danger of another attack now within the near future, do you think it would be safe?

Mayor PETRIE. Would we be better off under civil [1358] government?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mayor PETRIE. I think we would be better off as we are.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Mayor PETRIE. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Was the attack on Pearl Harbor a complete surprise to you, sir?

Mayor PETRIE. It was, sir. I watched it for a half an hour from my house—I live up on the hill, and I have a perfect bird's eye view of the whole situation down there—and I couldn't believe it. It looked to me very much like a practice smoke screen. The smoke was right on the ground, going right over the entrance to the harbor, and I thought that was a perfect demonstration. I got my glasses out and saw the fire burning on the ground, didn't see any fire coming from the hangars, and they seemed to be intact, and I could see the shells exploding in the air, the clouds, black clouds that they make. And then I saw the detonation possibly of bombs which I thought at the time were mines that we might have been setting off outside the entrance.

Then I got a little suspicious, and then Mr. Walker rang up, and he says he just got word from one of the plantations that the harbor was being attacked. Well, I says, "It can't be, Tommy. I have been looking at it for a half an hour, and it looked like a pretty good demonstration of what might be a war."

"Well," he says, "I will go down and find out." And he went down, and in about five minutes he called me up. In the meantime along came a couple of projectiles right in front of me. I didn't see them, but I could hear them going by. And he says, "I think it's real."

No; I was really surprised, gentleman.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your observation, Mr. Mayor, as to the conduct of the personnel of the troops in the City of [1359] Honolulu on Saturday nights? Bad, good, indifferent, or what?

Mayor PETRIE. Of the citizenry?

The CHAIRMAN. No; of the troops, of the boys on leave, shore leave here.

Mayor PETRIE. I saw nothing that would cause me to have an opinion other than normal.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some talk—you may have heard it—to the effect that officers and men due to excessive drinking were not in shape to do their duty. Did you see anything of that?

Mayor PETRIE. No, I did not. No.

The CHAIRMAN. And has anything come to your attention, as an official of the City, that would lead you to believe that those rumors were true?

Mayor PETRIE. No, there has not.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the morale of the troops and their behavior when they were on leave been generally good?

Mayor PETRIE. They have, to my observation.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose men will get drunk when they are on leave, and you have had that experience?

Mayor PETRIE. I haven't seen much of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not?

Mayor PETRIE. To be honest about it. I have seen some of the boys, yes. We had them out entertaining them one night, and a few of them possibly got a little too much, and it was nothing out of the ordinary. Out of 50 there might have been a couple of the fellows——

The CHAIRMAN. Drank too much.

Mayor PETRIE. —in uniform, that had, because it was easy to get, and the citizens had them, as hosts, and were putting it in their hands.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

Mayor PETRIE. On the streets I think their condition [1360] has been unrepachable; no complaint at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything.

General MCCOY. I think that I would like to ask a few questions about the Hawaiian population. We are conscious, of course, of the problem you have of so many aliens and such a large population of Japanese blood. Have you been fearful of that Japanese population, as a responsible official here of the government?

Mayor PETRIE. I have never worried much about it myself. I have noticed every time I have been on the mainland the feeling that there seems to be, a little fearful of the Japanese down here, and I have been asked if we are not afraid of them. My answer has always been in the negative, that I did not fear, particularly when we had so many of our own troops here; I didn't think that there would be any opportunity for them to do anything if they did feel that way.

It has often been discussed about some of our younger generation coming up. I have no right to say that the American locally born men are antagonistic to our form of government. The question has been asked me, once, if I thought they would be loyal in time of trouble. Well, my answer was that I had no right to say otherwise. I have grown up with them here. I have been here for 62 years. I was born in San Francisco and brought here as a babe and am now going on to 64 years old. I was about 2 years old or a year and a half when I came here.

I have practically grown up with them.

I was on the railroad here, took up my first employment after leaving school and was there 46 years up to the time of my taking over a full-time government position; and during that time on the railroad we had nothing but Japanese section men, principally the older age, aliens, and I had a whole lot [1361] to do with them.

There were a few of them possibly that you might suspicion sometimes, but now those old fellows—they are all in the older age, and I don't think that they are interested. I think they are looking for peace. That is my personal opinion of these older fellows, and I know a great many of them. Some of them are still on the railroad.

Then the younger element comes along, and among the younger I think that they are pretty well Americanized, I would say, the ones that are just getting out of school and possibly have been out of school for four years.

Then you may have another group in there, I would say around about 40 or somewhere, that have grown up and possibly did not have the opportunities or see the conditions particularly, the—well, what would I use there? The national conditions exemplified here possibly through the military forces here. They have been increasing considerably lately.

Then you might think sometime if they did happen to get in here, a question might arise in your minds whether some of them wouldn't be up in the front line with them, the little older ones there.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not feel too sure?

Mayor PETRIE. I wouldn't swear to that.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not feel too sure?

Mayor PETRIE. Some of that particular group up along in there that have been educated, have a good education, you might be a little *kanalua*, as we would say. I wouldn't use the word "suspicious," but doubtful, you might say. Or it might be possible that you might find some of them, as I say, who would pick up with them and fall right in line with them. But as a whole I think the younger generation is not that way.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose they go to foreign-language school largely because the old ones insist that they shall?

Mayor PETRIE. That is it, I think, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. If they had their choice they probably [1362] wouldn't go to foreign-language school?

Mayor PETRIE. They wouldn't bother with it, no. They start right in as soon as they are old enough to walk, almost, and go to our schools and get into their schools.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does the Jap younger generation attend the movies to any extent?

Mayor PETRIE. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Does the younger generation go to the movies to any extent?

Mayor PETRIE. Oh, yes, quite a little.

Admiral STANDLEY. What kind of movies? Do they have Japanese films here, or do they go to see the American movies?

Mayor PETRIE. They have two theatres, I believe, that show Japanese films. I couldn't say really, now, how they are patronized. I have never been to them. They have two large theatres here. One is one of our local concerns and one a theatre of their own, just put up recently, opened up two or three months ago. I couldn't say what their reactions are, what pictures they do show. I have never been to one of them.

General McCoy. You think that most of these that have been interned on Sand Island should be kept interned?

Mayor PETRIE. Well, it would depend a whole lot on who they are—and what you know of them or whoever has them there knows of them. I don't know of any that's over there. In fact, I don't know of any Japanese that are over there, except I have heard offhand that some of these older financial men here are there.

General McCoy. Were you conscious of any large number of Japanese aliens coming into the islands or into the city prior to December 7 that you had a suspicion of?

Mayor PETRIE. No.

General McCoy. Or reported to you as being suspicious characters?

Mayor PETRIE. No. You mean coming in from away from [1363] away from the islands? No. I did not know of it. Never brought to my attention, and never heard it mentioned.

General McCoy. What would you think of the loyalty of these selectees that are now in the service?

Mayor PETRIE. They are the younger group. My honest opinion, as I say, is that I have no right to say that they could otherwise than loyal. There might be—

General McCoy. In other words, you think they should be treated as American citizens until there is some evidence of their disloyalty?

Mayor PETRIE. I don't know whether you could say that one of them would be maybe as loyal as my boy or your boy, but as a group that way I think you have no right to say that they are not, and perhaps nothing else other than that language school that they went to. Now, what they have had imbued into them there—

General McCoy. In case of a Japanese landing on this island in force do you think that they would remain loyal?

Mayor PETRIE. I think the younger ones would.

General McCoy. But you would watch the rest?

Mayor PETRIE. I think they are wise enough to know where their interests are, where their best interests are.

General McCoy. If the Japanese army landed on this island they might think their interests lay the other way?

Mayor PETRIE. Well, that would be hard to say. If they were possibly approached in a certain way, saw certain temptations or certain temptation were put before them, I don't know whether you could consider them on the same status as myself or any other American citizen. It might be a question there.

General McCoy. That would be another reason for continuing martial law, would it not?

Mayor PETRIE. I think that martial law right now is not too much of a hardship. It possibly has affected much [1364] business here. It no doubt has affected many of the Japanese businesses, I guess, and many more of our own, I think.

General McCoy. That would indirectly affect the American business, wouldn't it?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, it affects quite a little business here, and it may be you have heard expressions made that possibly it could be released a little bit and let normal conditions have a little more leeway as far as business is concerned.

General McCoy. Wouldn't that put the Japanese—that is, American citizens of Japanese blood—exactly in the same status as you and other Americans?

Mayor PETRIE. Well, they are right now, aren't they, under the present martial law, many of them?

General MCCOY. No.

Mayor PETRIE. These younger ones are.

General MCCOY. They are not.

Mayor PETRIE. Unless there are restrictions against them that I am not aware of, as a race.

General MCCOY. Restrictions can be put under martial law that could not be put under normal conditions?

Mayor PETRIE. Oh, yes. I think you could—at least, we should—have control of it. The military governor or our civilian governor should retain control.

General MCCOY. Under the martial law?

Mayor PETRIE. Under the martial law. But possibly business could be eased up a little bit, restrictions against business. There is quite a little alarm. It has caused quite a little unemployment now, although there are quite a few requests for labor.

[1365] The CHAIRMAN. You mean defense workers?

Mayor PETRIE. But there is still a lot of unemployment here that is not employable as labor. That is, requests, you see, around town among the business people.

General MCCOY. What has been your responsibility so far with respect to tying up the whole fishing fleet? Does it affect the community particularly?

Mayor PETRIE. Tying up the fishing fleet?

General MCCOY. Yes, the Japanese fishing fleet.

Mayor PETRIE. I have never given that very much thought. I do not see why we can't bring in the fish, but I think you would pay more for local fish than you would for imported fish. That is, if we had a period of time to bring the fish in.

General MCCOY. You would not expect any danger?

Mayor PETRIE. I think they suffer themselves. They are more of a fish eating nation, particularly the older ones. They are the principal sufferers.

With regard to myself it has not affected me at all.

General MCCOY. Have you been conscious of the danger from the Japanese having control of the fishing fleet?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, I think there is a danger here.

General MCCOY. What would you think if martial law were removed here?

Mayor PETRIE. If you would remove it altogether? I do not think it should be removed altogether. I would feel safer if you would still have charge of it. I do not think right now would be the best time to put us back to normalcy again.

General MCCOY. In this catastrophe of December 7, how did your local doctors come to the front and center? Are you conscious of their work?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, it was wonderful. We prepared ourselves a way back. I think it was along in—I just made a note of that (referring to a paper). It was back in April that we organized the Disaster Council and erected a major disaster [1366] council to prepare ourselves. That was back in April. We passed it on April

26 and had a major disaster council. That major disaster council was composed of our citizens here.

On June 16, we gave General Short authority to close all roads leading to or from places that he desired to close for military purposes.

Then on December 2nd we introduced this rent control bill and passed it on December 13. That is the official activity we took.

Then in the meantime we were organizing different divisions of this council. We organized medical units and the training of them and the hospital units and the transportation facilities were all pooled, ready to act. We organized all the information we had.

We had not started on the bomb shelters but we got the information on them from an engineering standpoint. We had our fire wardens. We had about 3,000 of them listed over the different districts set out in blocks.

We had all plantations organized. We set up facilities and trained 150 civilian police who were all prominent citizens around town.

The people responded 100% and I am very proud of the response of the people of this city on that occasion and the way they turned out on that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. That is fine.

Mayor PETRIE. We purchased between \$30,000 and \$40,000 of medical supplies and we had them all here, stored in the basement of the City Hall, and we had them distributed on that day between the Army and the Navy and our own groups.

We had ordered \$50,000 or \$60,000 worth of fire equipment. We received most of the hose but unfortunately the pump units we have not here yet. I believe they are in San Francisco. We have not gotten them here yet, but we had three units out at [1967] Hickam Field and two of them were damaged.

The CHAIRMAN. And you lost three firemen?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes, three firemen and several were injured from shrapnel and machine-gunning. I think the city has responded in a wonderful way. The citizens have responded wonderfully and we have great respect for our leaders on these disaster councils.

General Short's representative and a representative of the Navy sat in on all our meetings in an advisory capacity. Much of our information was gathered from them and we received their advice.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you had any union labor trouble here?

Mayor PETRIE. Nothing like what they had on the mainland. We have had some, but compared to the mainland we have had nothing like it.

Admiral STANDLEY. They cooperated fully with you in your efforts?

Mayor PETRIE. Yes. Oh, yes, they have.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for coming here. We will ask you not to discuss anything that has gone on in this room.

Colonel BROWN. Bishop Sweeney.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Bishop?

Bishop SWEENEY. Yes, sir.

[1368] **TESTIMONY OF THE RIGHT REVEREND JAMES JOSEPH SWEENEY, BISHOP, ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF HONOLULU**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, Bishop?

Bishop SWEENEY. James Joseph Sweeney.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the Catholic Bishop of Honolulu?

Bishop SWEENEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you held that office?

Bishop SWEENEY. I was appointed on the 20th of May, 1941. I took office here on the 10th of September, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been in Oahu before that time?

Bishop SWEENEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you had opportunity to observe the conduct and morale of the enlisted personnel of the Army and the Navy during their leave on shore, particularly on Saturday nights?

Bishop SWEENEY. No, I have not; not directly. I get that from the chaplains.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been rumors which have come to this Commission which we feel it our obligation to investigate, that there was a great deal of drinking and drunkenness on that Saturday night which may have affected the effectiveness of the personnel on the morning of Sunday, December 7? You may have heard such rumors?

Bishop SWEENEY. No, I have not. You see what happened—I was away at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. You were away?

Bishop SWEENEY. Yes, I was away. I left here on the 24th of October to report to Washington and did not get back until it had happened, and I was fortunate to get back.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had any reports from those under your charge?

[1369] Bishop SWEENEY. No, I have not, not in regard to that point at all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any views, sir, that you would care to state as to whether you think the martial law declared here has been a good thing in the emergency?

Bishop SWEENEY. I have some notes here regarding the present situation that I would like to present.

The CHAIRMAN. We would like to have them, sir.

Bishop SWEENEY. I do not mean anything to be in the way of a criticism or anything like that. I am merely stating some opinions that I have formed.

My first feeling was that we are living a very abnormal life here at the present time. I have felt that it was necessary to return to normal life as much as possible. I thought that the first thing was in connection with our schools. The children are around the streets and they are at the movies and playgrounds, but particularly on the streets, and I am afraid that we will have trouble with the children and especially those of high school age unless there is some sort of supervision.

I have thought that if they were under the protection of mature men and women teachers that they would be as safe in school and

perhaps safer than they would be on the streets. I thought that the engineering department of the United States Army could inspect every school building, both public and private, and make some provisions for possible air raid shelters so that the children could go down there, and the teachers would be drilled and then they could bring them immediately to that place.

I am merely commenting upon what I have seen and heard on the mainland before I left.

The second thought that has come to me was that after all that has happened here, these Hawaiian Islands have been developed [1370] by American enterprise and I have wondered whether it is wise in view of that fact to evacuate so many of our American men and women. Now, I do not think they are evacuating the men, but many of the women are going, and perhaps some men, and taking with them their families. I have had three or four instances in the past week.

I am afraid that if a great number of these do that you are going to have a predominantly Oriental population here. I am not saying anything against their people or the different races or the citizens here, even those who are patriotic, but this is America and if we have merely an Oriental population, the Islands go down, and there is going to be the moral problem so far as the personnel of the Army and Navy are concerned. We can't hope to keep the men away. They want the comforts of American life even though they are at war, and if there are no Americans here, it is going to be very bad.

We must also face the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of these Islands have what you might say is not a high mental development, and it is really necessary to increase the education of these people as to what should be done in case of emergency. The mere announcement on the radio or even in the newspapers is not sufficient. Many of them do not even read the papers and many of them do not listen to the radios.

We have got to get a more complete education to the people as to what should be done, and I might say almost a drilling in case of emergency and in air raids.

The fourth point that I would like to present is that because of the closeness of the buildings here and the fragile material of which the majority of them are made, I think it would be a good idea if we had fire wardens at almost every block particularly in the thickly populated sections of the city. You cannot depend on the home owner, particularly [1371] when you are dealing with the class of people in the closely congested regions, particularly the Oriental type. You cannot depend on them to act in an emergency. An incendiary bomb can do a great deal of damage.

The CHAIRMAN. Has the system of fire wardens been established here?

Bishop SWEENEY. I have not heard of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the authorities here have been working and organizing such a block distribution of wardens.

Bishop SWEENEY. The only thing I noticed here is that on occasions when I go out and I have a permit to go out when it is necessary, and I come back many times at night and I see lights showing. Of course we know it is a blackout, but it could be an incendiary bomb, and how long it would take to find out may be another matter.

Another point I have, and that is that I realize that it is perfectly natural for rumors to start up at a time like this and for such rumors to spread, but I think certain measures should be taken not only to scotch those rumors but possibly that the truth concerning the situations, which would not be useful to the enemy in any way, should be brought to the people's attention. That is particularly true in respect to communications which should be established particularly between the mainland and here.

I do not mean without censorship, but I mean to increase the censorship so that it can be done more quickly. Now, I think it is three weeks for air mail.

Many people on the mainland, when I left, had the impression that Hawaii just did not exist. Many of them told me, "Bishop, it is no use to go back; there is nothing to go back to."

They had the first reports which came out telling of the trouble and the losses here; then they suddenly stopped; then there was no word at all; then the rumors started. I mean, [1372] that they should be quieted in some way without aiding the enemy. I realize that many of these things are difficult to accomplish.

The CHAIRMAN. You are the third person who suggested opening up the communication lines more quickly between here and the mainland.

Bishop SWEENEY. Yes. And because of the abnormal life we will have to take greater measures to protect the health of our people.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, both for health and for morale.

Bishop SWEENEY. Because of the abnormal life it may go on for three or four weeks and then it is going to wear them down.

In connection with that, I think that the evacuation system is something which should be taken into consideration. I think it is going to have a bad effect on the natives here. I have gotten this from various sources. If people are going out, then they are saying that it is going to happen, and they are doomed.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a very interesting story.

Bishop SWEENEY. It has a bad effect on them. Of course, we know differently, but it is hard to get them to believe these things.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Bishop, we thank you very much for coming before us.

Colonel BROWN. Reverend Paul Waterhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

[1373] **TESTIMONY OF REVEREND PAUL B. WATERHOUSE,
PRESIDENT OF TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give us your full name?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Paul B. Waterhouse.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Waterhouse, you are president of the Temperance League of Hawaii?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you lived on the Island, sir?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. My parents were born here and I have been here ever since 1885 off and on, and for the last seven years I have been here continuously.

General McCoy. As a clergyman?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

General McCoy. With what church?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, it is the Congregational Church and the Hawaiian Board of Missions. I am superintendent of the Bible Training School.

General McCoy. It is supported by the American Board of Missions?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No. We help them rather than they help us. The Hawaiian people here have contributed to the American Board of Missions rather than their contributing to us. We are self-supporting.

The CHAIRMAN. Your organization has communicated with the Commission, and so far as we can observe the only question in which we both are interested in jointly is the question of how far the indulgence in liquor by the enlisted men or the officers might have contributed to the lack of morale when we were under attack on that Sunday morning. We would be glad if you would tell us what you have observed about the morale of the enlisted men in connection with this question of liquor when they are on liberty or leave in Honolulu.

[1374] Mr. WATERHOUSE. Anyone who lives in Honolulu cannot fail to see especially a few days after payday the great amount of looseness in the morale that there is here, and the 104 liquor places which are located in a central place between where they have to come into town from Fort Shafter or Schofield into this place and they have to go through that little bottleneck and it is just full.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you realize that the officers of the Army and the Navy have to deal with a situation and not a theory?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And when the men have worked on a hard post or when the men have returned from a long and arduous cruise, it is necessary to give them leave for recreation or else the men will wear out. The officers have to give the men leave where they are stationed. If liquor is sold it is inevitable that the men who want it will buy it when there is no violation of the law. You realize that?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the officers have taken the best steps that they can, under existing conditions, with the open-licensed saloons, to police their men?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I think there is a definite effort upon the part of the officers to try to keep their men out of trouble.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. And if you get drunk, we will have somebody to take care of you and get you back safely home. I think that has been the attitude, to try to keep them out of trouble and I think that is so.

That, to my mind, is aside from the question as to whether these men will be in the proper morale in case of attack if a person is drunk or partly drunk, and that is the question, it [1375] seems to me, that we are facing today.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you acquainted with the statistics of the cases of drunkenness in the civilian population here as against the

military population on Saturday nights over the last six or eight months?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the police records before us, and we have the records of the military police, who make a record of every man who is picked up or who is arrested. They are taken over by the military police or the shore patrol, and I presume that those are the most accurate statistics that we can get.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You would not know how the civilian behavior compares with the behavior of these boys on leave, would you, so far as drunkenness is concerned?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, sir, I have no accurate figures, but it goes without question that down there in that bottleneck district where the service men are at, it is from five to one.

The CHAIRMAN. As compared with the civilians?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, in that district.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather from your communication to us that your view was that in the emergency that liquor should be prohibited to sailors and soldiers and to all the personnel of the Army and the Navy?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. We do feel that the order that closed the liquor places at this time was the wisest thing that could possibly be done at this time under the attack, and it seems to me, as I sense the situation in Honolulu and on these Islands, particularly so here, that the wisdom in closing these saloons was right in line with the best strategy that could possibly be made, and I am sure that these people, the civilians of Honolulu, feel that way, and if anything was due to the lack of morale of [1376] the soldiers because of drunkenness and things of that sort, we feel that this strategy in closing up was the best thing at this time, when we do not know when the next attack will come.

It is strategy to keep up the morale of our men to the highest pitch. We do not allow aviators to drink if they are going to fly. Why should we let our men or individual civilians as well as anybody else do it? Let us shut them all off during this emergency.

Now, I am not talking about the question of people who like liquor. We recognize that. That is not what I am talking about. I am not fighting against it. I am thinking about the strategy at the present time. It seems to me that there should not be a letting down or the people will say that the military forces do not think it is so bad.

The CHAIRMAN. You believe that the present military regimen should be maintained?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, that is exactly what my thought was in coming here, that that should be maintained during this emergency.

I am not talking about the general thing as to whether you or I wish to drink, but in this emergency it is necessary to keep our civil morale up and the military morale up to the highest pitch in order to get the greatest efficiency.

We have a lot of defense workers here and there is a so-called hotel that used to be the boys' Kamehameha School, which has been turned into a defense workers' hotel. The morale there so far as

drunkenness is concerned is very low. Isn't it the thing for our defense workers to be at the highest pitch if we are at war and we do not know when the next attack will come? Isn't that the best strategy? Isn't it? We have to carry on until such time as the blackout is over and we have to carry on with these things and then go back.

[1377] The CHAIRMAN. What made you fear it would be changed? What made you fear the liquor regulations would be changed?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Well, there are two things that made me think so. First was the statement in the paper by Colonel Green with respect to the liquor business and the restrictions, and the meeting of the liquor dealers, retail as well as wholesale, and the night clubs and such, as to how liquor should be handled, but I do not care a bit about their ideas of how it should be handled. I think this is a case for the military to decide, as to how it is to be handled, rather than the liquor dealers.

General McCoy. Who are these liquor dealers?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. They are people in town, civilians, just like anywhere else.

General McCoy. Are they Americans?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I think Mr. Benny will have better figures on that than I. A large number of the liquor licenses are issued to aliens.

General McCoy. To aliens?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, aliens have liquor licenses.

General McCoy. What aliens are they?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Japanese, to a considerable extent.

General McCoy. Who are the big men, the wholesalers?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. They are American citizens.

General McCoy. Now, would they come under this heading that we have heard talked about here, known as the Big Five?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I do not think so. It is the Liquor Dealers' Association. The Big Five, of course, are interested in liquor to a certain extent like this hotel here which dispenses liquor, and that is under the Big Five, but not primarily so, not primarily so.

The CHAIRMAN. It is more scattered than that?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, it is more scattered than that.

[1378] General McCoy. Has it always been the case that it has been wide open here with respect to liquor?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Just like the rest of the country: about the same. Of course, it has been a great increase with the increase in personnel.

General McCoy. Was prohibition in effect here?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. We were just like any other part of the United States.

General McCoy. What happened at that time?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. During prohibition.

General McCoy. Yes.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Just about the same, whether you were in Indianapolis, San Francisco, Los Angeles, or New York. It was about the same. There was bootlegging and there is bootlegging now. It was just about the same. I do not think it was any different.

General McCoy. Have you made any protest against this softening of military rule to anyone?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

General McCoy. To the responsible military authority?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes, I have sent one communication to Colonel Green. We would like to present the question from this angle: in other words, to protect America. That is what I am talking about.

General McCoy. Have you had an interview with Colonel Green?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. No, that has not been granted. We are hoping to have it.

We are in close touch with the Liquor Commission and I think the Commission has done its best under almost impossible conditions. The liquor situation here is rather out of hand, and they have but 12 inspectors and they can hardly cover the whole thing.

[1379] It is very hard to control, and I think that the Liquor Commission has done its best, but the liquor men do not like them, and in the last Legislature they put through several bills, railroaded them through, weakening the control of the Liquor Commission.

But, gentlemen, our appeal is in the face of the emergency, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. We get your point, sir.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. That is it.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not pressing the general problem of prohibition?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Not at all. We are very urgent in insisting upon the consideration of keeping our strength at its highest pitch, and I do not believe in loosening up that military order which came right in time, and I do not believe it should be relaxed at this time until the danger is over, and I do not think it is. Therefore, we are urging that you gentlemen consider the thing from that angle. That is our position.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. Yes. I am referring to your letter of January 3rd, with respect to the time of the attack, in which you said, "It was based on the well known but grim and awful fact that we have only half a Navy, half an Army, on Saturday night and Sunday morning."

Is that a well known fact that we have only half an Army and Navy?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I think that is overstated, half a Navy and half an Army. Half the Navy is not here. Half the Navy is off during week-ends, perhaps, in and out, but you can't afford to let them all off.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any statistics to show that half of the men on liberty were drunk?

[1380] Mr. WATERHOUSE. No.

General McNARNEY. Then it is quite a bad overstatement, isn't it?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I think to say that half the men were drunk or intoxicated is an overstatement.

General McNARNEY. Do you think it is an overstatement to say that half of the personnel of the Army and Navy were in here Saturday night?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes. The fact is a civilian does not know how many men there are here.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the statistics.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. You know fully, but I do not pretend, but being a civilian, and when they are on the streets and it is a small town here

and the streets are narrow, and with this bottleneck filled with men, it looks like an awful lot of men. That is what gives us that impression.

General McNARNEY. May I ask if you think it is good for civilian morale in the Island of Oahu or for the Nation to put out that type of information which would tend to make the people believe that 50% of the Army and the Navy men were unfit for duty on Sunday mornings? Do you think this loose statement of yours in this letter is a good thing to put forward to the people?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I think it is not good to put it forward to the people in that statement, no, and we do not have any figures to put it that high, and I think it is not good, but at the same time I had the feeling that—not expecting an attack, and we did not expect to be attacked or we would not have been caught, but I have thought, anticipated, as it were, that 50% of our personnel were not on the up to the minute and they did not expect an attack.

General McNARNEY. Do you have any basis other than just your own opinion that 50% of the personnel were not fit and ready for duty?

[1381] Mr. WATERHOUSE. I can't argue on the 50%.

General McNARNEY. Can you argue on 20%?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Oh, yes, I think I could.

General McNARNEY. Can you show us any statistics?

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I cannot show you statistics. Statistics are hard to get unless you can go out and count them, and how are you going to count them?

However, Mr. Benny and Mr. Sanborne, Principal of Kalakaua Intermediate High School, and Mr. Castle, of Castle & Cooke, who went down into town on December 6—they went down about ten o'clock and on through until one o'clock, and made an investigation of what was going on in Honolulu on that Saturday night.

These three men, an educator, a businessman, and our secretary, can give you this information.

General McNARNEY. I would be glad to hear it.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. But when you come to the figures, it is hard to get them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. I appreciate your courtesy and the opportunity to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we have been glad to hear you, sir. I might say that the nature of our inquiry is such that we ask all witnesses not to discuss their testimony or what goes on in this room with anyone on the outside.

Mr. WATERHOUSE. Yes.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Benny.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

[1382] **TESTIMONY OF CHRIS J. BENNY, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. BENNY. Chris J. Benny.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your occupation, Mr. Benny?

Mr. BENNY. Executive Secretary of the Temperence League of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that a paid position?

Mr. BENNY. It is a paid position, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your only employment?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your only gainful employment?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, my full-time employment.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been such?

Mr. BENNY. A year and two months.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been on the Islands?

Mr. BENNY. Off and on for 35 years.

The CHAIRMAN. And continuously for how long back?

Mr. BENNY. For the last 10 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in the city of Honolulu on the evening of December 6, 1941?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What observation did you make as to the condition of the enlisted personnel of the Army and Navy in the city on the night?

Mr. BENNY. Myself and Mr. Paul Sanborne and Mr. Thomas Retogle decided that we would make a tour of the city. At nine o'clock we met at the Army and Navy YMCA. We walked down Hotel Street to River Street; up River Street to Beretania, and to Nuuanu, and down Nuuanu and back to Beretania to the [1383] Army and Navy YMCA where we stood for perhaps three-quarters of an hour.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the condition of the men as you observed them?

Mr. BENNY. There were a great many men in the city that night, both Army and Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose they were rather congregated in that particular neighborhood that you have referred to?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, in that neighborhood. They were crowding the streets as well as taverns and dispensaries, and of course doing some Christmas shopping.

We noticed a number of drunken Army and Navy men and a great many sitting at the tables in the taverns drinking beer and hard liquor. We loitered on the streets, standing outside some of these places, both the taverns and the liquor dispensary establishments, to observe whether the men were going up and down to the entrances to the houses of prostitution. Some of these places are located along Hotel Street, River Street, and Beretania.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell us approximately how many sailors or soldiers you saw in a condition where they were not able to take care of themselves?

Mr. BENNY. We made no count.

The CHAIRMAN. You made no count?

Mr. BENNY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the military police on hand?

Mr. BENNY. The military police, yes; and the shore patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any men in custody?

Mr. BENNY. I did not notice any instances, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you looked at the police records as to the number of civilians intoxicated and arrested on Saturday night?

[1384] Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On Saturday night, December 6?

Mr. BENNY. No, I am sorry; I have not.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, I suppose you would not have access to the military police records and the shore patrol records.

Mr. BENNY. No. We have not asked for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you observed the conditions on other Saturday nights when there were a great many soldiers and sailors on leave?

Mr. BENNY. I have made it a point to be on the streets on pay day nights and the nights following them, and I have made a general observation, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the conditions, to your observation, on Saturday night, December 6, worse than on those other nights?

Mr. BENNY. I believe there were more men in town.

The CHAIRMAN. More men?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there more drunkenness?

Mr. BENNY. I could not say more or less; I would not be able to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to say you saw 50 men intoxicated that night?

Mr. BENNY. I would say more than that.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be fair to say you saw a hundred men intoxicated?

Mr. BENNY. I have no count. I made no check. The greatest number of drunks were observed at the Army and Navy YMCA as they came back from their visit in the city and were making themselves ready to go back to the ships or the camp.

The CHAIRMAN. The busses leave from there to take the men back to the Navy Yard?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, and also Schofield Barracks.

[1385] The CHAIRMAN. So the men would congregate back there in order to get back to their posts?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Benny, of course the sale of liquor is authorized here and was on December 7 in the city of Honolulu?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it that you understand that after men have had a hard tour of duty in Army work or a hard cruise in Navy work that it is essential to grant them leave for recreation.

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And of course we necessarily meet the problem that liquor is sold where these men go. Now, do you think that the officers of the Army and Navy have attempted to police this thing, to do the best they can under the circumstances, or do you think the thing has been let to ride along?

Mr. BENNY. I am inclined to say that it has been let ride although I do think it was necessary to let down here for a period of recreation or rest, following a tour of duty.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BENNY. I think I do know the desires of the Army and Navy men, and have for practically all my life. I have been employed at the Army and Navy YMCA as a religious director in that organization, and I have engaged in conversations with a great many service men. I feel I know their needs and what they desire most when they come ashore.

Would it be all right if I make a general statement at this time?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Based on your experience?

Mr. BENNY. Yes. I believe that the average service man wants social contacts with the civilian population, that he desires that more than anything else. I believe that has been [1386] largely not available to him in the city, perhaps due to the great number of men here and the limited civilian population.

I would like to say that I feel that the city should share a measure of the blame. We discussed recreation for many months, and something has been done, but not on a scale large enough to occupy the interests of the service men. There is nothing here left for them to do except to wander the streets and to enter the first place that provides entertainment, where perhaps light and warmth and society can be found, and I believe that perhaps is back of the frequenting of those places.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so. Of course, the difficulty is that these men are strangers to most of the civilian population. There is some reluctance on the part of the civilian population to open their doors to men whom they do not know. There is a natural reluctance on the part of them to do that and it is a very difficult problem to integrate such a large group of men into the community. I think you recognize that fact?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is an Army and Navy YMCA and there is a Navy Recreation Center, but neither of these things, the things you are speaking of, can be supplied that way. They do not take the place of being in the homes or in the ordinary civilian life?

Mr. BENNY. Not to any considerable extent.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they are a poor substitute for them?

Mr. BENNY. Yes. The average service man, as I know him—and I am a civilian only—has been a lonely individual in the city. He does not like it and he wants to get back to the coast. I know from personal knowledge of the service men that many of them have written to their Congressmen and their [1387] commanding officers for a leave of absence in order to get back home for a while, and I would like to say that I feel that the pressure there has been very great. That goes for both the Army and the Navy.

The Army man is, of course, a little differently situated in that he has his quarters and they are fixed more or less at home, while the Navy man has no home.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions? General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. I am referring to the letter which was sent by your organization dated January 3rd, and speaking of the timing of the enemy attack, the letter states, "It was based on the well known

but grim and awful fact that we have only half a Navy, half an Army, on Saturday night and Sunday morning."

Do you consider that a correct statement?

Mr. BENNY. I would like to say that this letter was written by a member of the executive committee of the League, Mr. William C. Furer. Mr. Furer is the secretary of the Engineering Association and is an architect of the city and has been for a long time.

I had written a letter to be addressed to this Commission, but accepted that letter as written by Mr. Furer as a better one.

So, in signing that letter I gave it my approval.

General McNARNEY. Do you believe it to be a fact?

Mr. BENNY. The term "half an Army and half a Navy" might be an exaggeration.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you believe it is an exaggeration?

General McNARNEY. Do you think it bears any semblance to the truth?

Mr. BENNY. A great many Army and Navy men came to the city on Saturday nights.

I would like to quote a statement at this time. The night watchman at the Army and Navy Y said that 10,000 men were in the [1388] city on Saturday night.

General McNARNEY. And there were 5,000 of them drunk?

Mr. BENNY. No.

General McNARNEY. Well, I am quoting from your letter. We want to know the truth or falsity of it.

Mr. BENNY. I am not willing to say that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Well, you make allegations in an official document to the Commission. Are we to place credence in what you say or not?

Mr. BENNY. Not half that many, no. It is impossible to know.

General McNARNEY. Were there a thousand drunk?

Mr. BENNY. I could not say.

General McNARNEY. Were there a hundred drunk?

Mr. BENNY. I do not know.

General McNARNEY. You possess no personal knowledge to state that there were one hundred, which would be only 1% of 10,000?

Mr. BENNY. It is impossible to make any statement.

General McNARNEY. Then why is it necessary to make a statement like this? We are reasonable men. You do not have to make a statement like that in order to have us let you come before us for a hearing. What is the effect of things like that getting in the paper? What is the effect on the people, the civilians, on the morale of the fathers and mothers of everybody back home?

A statement like that here, to my mind, is so bad that it is worse than a thousand men getting drunk. That is my opinion.

Do you think that if my mother read that half of the men in the Army were drunk and not fit for duty that she would feel very good about it?

Mr. BENNY. No, of course not. No.

[1389] General McNARNEY. No. When you know it is false and not the truth, why do you put out statements like that?

Mr. BENNY. It would not be possible to make any statement, would it?

General McNARNEY. It is possible to make any truthful statement, yes, but not a false statement like that.

Mr. BENNY. It would be difficult to determine.

General McNARNEY. Well, you certainly know that it is not true?

Mr. BENNY. I could admit—I would be glad to—that it is an exaggeration so far as my personal observation goes, yes.

General McNARNEY. So far as any facts or any evidence is concerned which can be gathered from any agency on the Island of Oahu, it is false, isn't it?

Mr. BENNY. I would not be willing to say yes or no to that. I can't say yes or no. The service men are scattered over a wide area in this city; they are not all on Hotel Street or in the Y. They go to these places, the taverns out at Waikiki.

General McCoy. Do you know how many men spent the night in the Army and Navy YMCA?

Mr. BENNY. I do not know, sir, but that could be easily checked.

General McCoy. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Mr. Benny, in your opinion, are the streets of Honolulu not safe for women?

Mr. BENNY. Not safe?

General McNARNEY. Unsafe.

Mr. BENNY. Because of service men? No, they are not unsafe, no. I think a great many of the civilian population do not come downtown, but not through any fear of personal safety.

[1390] General McNARNEY. Do you have any reason to think, from your observation, that the success of the Japanese attack was in any way due to what you saw on the streets on Saturday night?

Mr. BENNY. I am not a strategist. That would be, again, out of my line. I can easily see that a man under the influence of liquor the night before and who has remained so until the next day would be unfit for military service.

General McNARNEY. You do not have any data which would lead you to believe that many men who did not return to the ship that night—and you know that the men have to be back at a certain time; you are conscious of that?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

General McCoy. I think it was twelve o'clock they said they had to be back, except those few outstanding men who were permitted to stay out overnight. I think there were some number reported in the Y that night.

Do you know how many were reported of those as having shown any signs of intoxication?

Mr. BENNY. No, sir, I am sorry; I do not.

General McNARNEY. Have you interviewed the director of the Army and Navy Y as to the state of the men the next morning?

Mr. BENNY. No, I have not.

General McNARNEY. I wish you would.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know him?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, I know him.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he a creditable and reliable person?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir; decidedly so.

General McNARNEY. Would you please get his views as to the condition of the men the next morning?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know how many sailors are located in this harbor?

[1391] Mr. BENNY. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you know how many there were on December 7?

Mr. BENNY. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have no idea?

Mr. BENNY. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would it surprise you if I told you that there were over 40,000 men based in this port that night?

(There was no answer.)

Admiral STANDLEY. You are interested in the security of the country, are you not?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, absolutely.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you are interested in the welfare of the men?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. The men who bear the brunt of that security?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then what do you think the effect was if 100 men were drunk or even if a thousand men were drunk—what do you think the effect of that statement is on the rest of the 39,000 or 39,900 men?

What effect do you think a statement like that will have when it goes home to their mothers?

What do you think the effect on the national defense is, and the effect on the men who have to bear the brunt of that defense?

Have you ever given a thought to that?

Mr. BENNY. I have taken the part of the service personnel for many years. I have a great sympathy for them and I think I have understood their problems.

Now, I believe it is something more than that. I believe that the taverns have become an excuse for the attitude of indifference on the part of the community in a big way. I think [1392] that they just have permitted the men to find their own entertainment, and the only entertainment open to them is the tavern.

Admiral STANDLEY. I suppose to wake up the community to its responsibility you are willing to make a slanderous statement about 39,900 men?

Mr. BENNY. I did not make a slanderous statement.

Admiral STANDLEY. Don't you consider that slanderous? That statement was not true. Don't you consider that slanderous about half a Navy and half an Army? Don't you consider that slanderous?

Mr. BENNY. I have not considered it such. I am sorry, gentlemen, if you think that. If you think it is slanderous, why, let me make the necessary apology.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I do think. You have made a slanderous statement. You have not made it public but you have made it to us, and it seems to me that a statement like that should be corrected, because that statement is being whispered around on the mainland. We have had word from people in Tennessee that this thing has happened.

Don't you think there is more than an apology due to make this correction?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, but how to make a suitable apology to correct the situation.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Mr. BENNY. That would be hard to do.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. When you start something like that it is hard to stop it.

Mr. BENNY. If that report is to be considered, it is a general statement. That is with my contact with the community.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, any organization like your organization is supposed to have as its mission the welfare of the whole country. When such an organization makes such a [1393] loose statement like that, how in God's name can you expect to do that when you make statements like that which are not the truth and when you know it is not the truth and if you do not know, you should have. It seems to me that there is need for a greater correction than just a hearing before this Commission in order to correct this. There is something more necessary to correct this than just a hearing before this Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions of Mr. Benny?

General McCoy. Yes. I would like to question Mr. Benny about his statement that nothing has been done for the soldiers in this community.

Is there any organization under the churches?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

General McCoy. Haven't a great many of the citizens thrown open their homes and received the soldiers and sailors?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir; that is correct.

General McCoy. And haven't there been clubs organized for their entertainment?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, that is also correct; yes.

General McCoy. And the Y is also a very successful organization?

Mr. BENNY. The Army and Navy Y has done a very fine job here.

General McCoy. I am a member of that national board and I was conscious of the fact that they had a very successful center here and that the Y work has been doing well for many years.

Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir; they have done a very fine job since the services have been increased. They have done a very creditable job, noticeably so.

General McCoy. Do you know of any organizations of women here who have tried to provide homes and dances where the men [1394] might meet nice girls?

Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir there have been such organizations started.

General McCoy. I take it that due to the very large number of sailors, about 40,000, and probably 50,000 in the Army—

General McNARNEY. Yes, about 50,000.

General McCoy. —that it is quite a problem in a town of this sort.

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

General McCoy. I take it that your organization is concerned with temperance and not with prohibition?

Mr. BENNY. We are concerned mostly with temperance, education, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Have you taken up with the civilian authority or with the military and naval authorities and presented any protest here or any suggestions that would help to solve this problem?

Mr. BENNY. As the opportunity presented itself, yes, occasionally we have.

General McCoy. These are Americans, are they not, who have these saloons and night clubs, and so forth?

Mr. BENNY. A percentage of them are, I think, Japanese. I don't know how many of those Japanese are aliens.

General McCoy. Are you conscious of any change since martial law was declared with respect to improvements with regard to the sale of liquor?

Mr. BENNY. Very much, very decidedly.

General McCoy. You think the conditions have been improved?

Mr. BENNY. Very much so, yes.

General McCoy. Would you be in favor of continuing that embargo during the duration of the emergency?

[1395] Mr. BENNY. Yes, sir, with certain qualifications, so long as other projects or enterprises are restricted and limited. I see no reason why we should especially select the liquor industry.

General McCoy. What qualifications do you mean? I am not clear on that.

Mr. BENNY. Well, I mean there are certain commercial enterprises which have been limited to a large extent in the natural operation of the commercial business during this present emergency and prior to the emergency.

General McCoy. Do I understand that you would like to see the embargo on liquor continued but certain changes made in it?

Mr. BENNY. No, but I would like to see all institutions, all commercial enterprises treated alike. I think to lift the embargo on liquor would be showing a little partiality.

General McCoy. Well, what reason do you have to think that it is going to be lifted?

Mr. BENNY. There was an announcement in the paper that the restriction would be modified.

General McCoy. Did it say what restrictions?

Mr. BENNY. The restriction on the liquor situation; that it would be modified for a time when a plan was devised.

General McCoy. It did not say when?

Mr. BENNY. It did not say when; no, sir.

General McCoy. Was that announcement made by any responsible authority?

Mr. BENNY. I believe so. It is in the paper today.

General McCoy. Who made it?

Mr. BENNY. Mr. Coll, president of the Liquor Commission. Then Colonel Thomas Green, advisor to the Military Governor also made a statement, according to the papers.

General McCoy. To the effect that the liquor restrictions [1396] would be modified?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Have you considered the discrimination against other businesses, if the liquor restrictions were lifted, due to the fact that there was no shortage in liquor?

Mr. BENNY. I beg your pardon?

General McNARNEY. Well, say automobiles and tires are restricted because there is a shortage of automobiles and tires. Would you consider that a discrimination between the two types of business?

Mr. BENNY. I believe it would be an unfair basis for a decision; yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Don't you think that the military control is based more on the amount of material available than anything else?

Mr. BENNY. Well, to illustrate, perhaps the building of houses may be one, home building, at the present time.

General McNARNEY. Well, there is a great shortage of lumber and building materials which are needed for defense work. It is necessary so far as house building is concerned to impose certain restrictions on it for the time being.

Mr. BENNY. Yes, and also possibly lumber.

General McNARNEY. That is in the same category.

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

General McCoy. Mr. Benny, you have been talking about enlisted men. Do you have any comment to make upon the conduct of the officers of the Army and Navy with respect to drinking?

Mr. BENNY. I have acquaintances with officers both in the Army and Navy and that comes about through my connection with the Army and Navy YMCA and particularly with the chaplains and others who come into the building, but I have no comment to make on that point.

[1397] General McCoy. Did you see any officer of the Army or Navy intoxicated that evening when you were downtown?

Mr. BENNY. No, I did not.

I think the point can be made that not all of the Army and Navy personnel were in uniform.

General McCoy. Was the military police of the Army and the naval patrol functioning properly that night, so far as you could see.

Mr. BENNY. Yes. They are always available and always have been available and patrolling the streets.

General McCoy. And so far as you know they take care of the soldiers and sailors?

Mr. BENNY. The military personnel are turned over to the military police.

General McCoy. Was that done that night, if you know?

Mr. BENNY. I would not know, but I presume that would be the case.

General McCoy. You do not know how many were arrested that night?

Mr. BENNY. No, but I would like to make a statement. I have somewhere in the office a copy of the duties of the shore patrol, and I recall that one of them, Rule No. 5 of the shore patrol, states that it is the requirement to take care of the men and see that they do not get into trouble, and I would like to express that as an opinion and have it inserted that unless there is a violation there is no arrest made for drunkenness but rather something in the nature of a commitment.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be surprised to know that on the night of December 6 between 6 p. m. and 6 a. m., the total number of soldiers taken into custody was 43, and 38 for being drunk and 4 for being away without leave, and that out of these 43, 42 were returned to their organizations and one man was [1398] confined for being drunk.

Now, would you have thought that that would be a normal record?

Mr. BENNY. I do not know that; I am sorry.

General McCoy. Mr. Benny, don't you think that that is a very small proportion, considering the fact that there were about 100,000 Army and Navy men here?

Mr. BENNY. The proportion is always small, but I think that is a fair statement. The condition in most intoxicated situations under any circumstances is that the proportion is small in the number of people drunk, and in fact the proportion of those who use liquor is small.

General McNARNEY. I agree with you.

General McCoy. Don't you think that that is a pretty good record, considering the fact that there were 100,000 soldiers and sailors on a Saturday night, the night after pay day? Isn't that a very small proportion of the men not able to go back to their places?

Mr. BENNY. Shall I answer that?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BENNY. There are many drunks who may not be observed or not taken into custody by the military police. The same would hold true among the civilians.

I assume that the percentage of men arrested for drunkenness does not represent the total number.

The CHAIRMAN. The recap sheet for the shore patrol indicates there were 38 arrests for serious offenses and 44 for minor offenses, which would include drunkenness, I suppose.

Does that seem to be the average?

Mr. BENNY. I do not know what the average is.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. You said you had quite a lot of YMCA service?

[1339-] Mr. BENNY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you had service other than in Honolulu?

Mr. BENNY. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has your experience with the Naval personnel been here?

Mr. BENNY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. At no other locations?

Mr. BENNY. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. At no other place where we have Navy bases?

Mr. BENNY. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions of Mr. Benny?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. The nature of our inquiry is such that we will ask you not to discuss your testimony with anyone or to disclose what went on in this room.

Gentlemen, we will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, at 4:35 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Tuesday, January 6, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m. at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.)

[1400]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1401] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

TUESDAY, JANUARY 6, 1942

SUITE 300, ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Honolulu, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired; Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission; Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Call Mr. Shivers.

**TESTIMONY OF ROBERT L. SHIVERS, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE
OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, TERRITORY OF
HAWAII**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name, Mr. Shivers?

[1402] Mr. SHIVERS. Robert L. Shivers.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, you are an attorney at law?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I am not.

The CHAIRMAN. You are and have been for some time the local agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. SHIVERS. I am the special agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. And how long have you held that position, sir?

Mr. SHIVERS. Since the office opened here in August, 1939; August 24th.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, was there at any time an arrangement or agreement made between you and the information or intelligence

services of the Army and Navy for a division of the work of those agencies and yourself?

Mr. SHIVERS. There was no such agreement made or entered into by us. There was an agreement that was entered into by the F. B. I. in Washington, O. N. I. in Washington, and G-2 in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. How did that divide up the work of counter-espionage?

Mr. SHIVERS. That originally divided it in this way: The Army Intelligence was to be responsible for all intelligence and all general intelligence investigations, including espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities, within the Army Establishment. The Naval Intelligence agency was to have exclusive jurisdiction over all naval installations and over all naval personnel. The F. B. I. was to have the civilian angle of it.

Now, that agreement was originally entered into in Washington. I received a notice of that, and the other agencies out here received such a notice. Subsequently that original [1403] agreement was modified to the extent that the Naval Intelligence would have jurisdiction over all espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities and general intelligence activities with respect to the Japanese populace.

The CHAIRMAN. The Naval Intelligence would?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Naval Intelligence, yes, sir. I understand that that was brought about by Mr. Hoover, the Director of the F. B. I., by Admiral Anderson, who was then in charge of O. N. I., and by General—no. Colonel. Who preceded General Miles at O. N. I.?

General McNARNEY. I can't think of his name right now.

Mr. SHIVERS. I know it as well as I know my own.

The CHAIRMAN. An Army colonel was in charge of general intelligence?

Mr. SHIVERS. An Army colonel was at that time in charge of general intelligence. It was my understanding that Mr. Hoover told the other agencies that the F. B. I. was not prepared to take over the general intelligence work pertaining to the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you mean by that the Japanese population?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Japanese population, both of Hawaii and on the Mainland United States, and that the Navy would carry on that work until the F. B. I. had gotten in a position where they could take it over. At the time we got into the general intelligence field we did not have any Japanese translators, we had not conducted any investigative activity into Japanese intelligence, and it was agreed between those three gentlemen that the Navy would continue—

Admiral REEVES. When was that, Mr. Shivers?

Mr. SHIVERS. That was early in 1940, sir. (Continuing:)—that the Navy would continue until such time as the F. B. I. was able to build up its sources of information, its translators, et cetera, and until such time as it was in a position to take [1404] over.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, up to December 7, 1941, had the F. B. I. had taken over that Japanese field?

Mr. SHIVERS. It had not; no, sir. The F. B. I. ever was working in collaboration with the Navy out here and with the Army Intelligence out here.

The CHAIRMAN. How large a staff did you have here up to December 7?

Mr. SHIVERS. On December 7 I had a staff of approximately 25, including clerical employees.

General McCoy. Were they all Americans?

Mr. SHIVERS. All Americans except one—all Americans, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you then been able to find a responsible person to do Japanese translating for you?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes, we have a Japanese translator.

The CHAIRMAN. You have one now?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes, and have had for several months.

General McCoy. When you speak of these as Americans, were any of them of Japanese ancestry?

Mr. SHIVERS. We had a Japanese translator of Japanese ancestry, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Only one?

Mr. SHIVERS. Only one.

General McCoy. The rest were all what you might call—

Mr. SHIVERS. All American.

General McCoy. Anglo-Saxon?

Mr. SHIVERS. Anglo-Saxon, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Not of alien blood?

Mr. SHIVERS. Not of alien blood.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, will you tell the Commission what your conception is of the difficulties of getting intelligence here as to Japanese activities on the Island and [1405] Japanese naval activities off the Island?

Mr. SHIVERS. I don't quite understand the question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I say, state, if you will, to the Commission what difficulties you saw here in getting this information as to Japanese activities. Were there difficulties?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, there were very extreme difficulties.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what were they, and why were they?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, I can explain that in this way: by saying that when I came out here to open the office of the F. B. I. on August 24, 1939, I found that the Army and Navy had been here with intelligence offices over a number of years. I therefore was under their influence for a period of, I would say, several months. I found that they had accumulated a store of information, or rather, the names of various and sundry individuals in Hawaii, Japanese agencies and people of Japanese blood who were considered to be suspicious, people who in their judgment should be interned in the event of hostilities involving the United States and Japan.

I made a tour of all of the Islands in Hawaii, asking the so-called haole populace—the businessmen, the plantation managers, the plantation owners—about the Japanese conditions and the Japanese situation. I got just about as many different answers as the number of people that I talked to. So far as I could learn the haole populace in Hawaii was not in a position to give any accurate information about the Japanese populace because there had been very little intercourse between the two. They could only give you surmises, they could only tell you what they thought would happen, but for factual information it didn't exist.

And that is one of the difficulties in conducting general intelligence investigations here, is that the Japanese community [1406] is

so closely woven together and there is such a circle within the Japanese community that it is very difficult for the haole mind to penetrate it. To a large extent the average haole does not know the Japanese psychology, he does not know the Japanese mind, and for that reason he did not know what was going on within the inner circles of the Japanese community.

General McCoy. What do you mean by "haole"?

Mr. SHIVERS. I mean, that is the Hawaiian term for white.

The CHAIRMAN. From such data as you could obtain you did get up a list of suspicious persons, or the Army and Navy had such a list?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Army and Navy had such a list. They had very little factual information to support such a list. We asked the Army and the Navy to turn over to us at that time a list of all of their suspects. We were trying to concern ourselves primarily with the internal security of the Island by learning the identity of those people who would be a menace to our security in the event of war. We therefore requested the Army and the Navy to turn over to us their lists of A and B suspects.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you mean by A and B?

Mr. SHIVERS. The A suspect was the individual who was to be interned in the event of hostilities with Japan. The B suspect was the individual kept under surveillance in the event of war with Japan.

The Army had some 700 individuals on their A list and some thousand on the B list. We then began to conduct investigations of those individuals to find out their background and their activities. We then saw that we did not have a sufficient background knowledge of the Japanese, so we then began what we call a Japanese survey of the entire Islands. That took into consideration all of the Japanese societies, the control of the Japanese consulate over the various societies, the control of [1407] the Japanese consulate over the alien Japanese.

We learned that there were some 234 Japanese consular agents who had been appointed by the Consul General of Japan here in Hawaii. Those men were scattered strategically throughout the Hawaiian Islands. We saw and the Army saw and the Navy saw that if used as an espionage ring they would be in a position to furnish the Japanese consulate with espionage information from every corner of the Hawaiian Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there is something in our record somewhere to the effect that there was a movement to arrest those people for failing to register.

Mr. SHIVERS. There was.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that?

Mr. SHIVERS. In April, 1940, I submitted a list of all of the consular agents in Hawaii to the F. B. I. in Washington and asked the F. B. I. in Washington to ascertain from the State Department if those individuals had registered in accordance with the Act requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals, also to ascertain whether or not they had been noticed to the State Department by the Japanese Government as diplomatic officials.

I received—I think I have that right here, if you don't mind my referring to it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, certainly not.

Mr. SHIVERS. On September 3, 1940, I advised the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington to this effect:

There has been transmitted herewith a list of Japanese acting as consular agents within the Territory of Hawaii for the local Japanese Consul. It is observed in the Act governing the registration of agents of foreign principals and of foreign governments that there are [1408] exempted from its provision—

Then I go ahead and quote that provision.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. Then I say:

It is requested that it be ascertained of the Department of State whether or not the names, status, and character of duties of the aforementioned consular agents are of record in the Department of State. If so, it is desired to know whether such consular agents can be considered to fall within the scope of the Act. If it is determined that these consular agents are not subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, as such, would their status be changed in any respect so that they would come within the purview of this Act, provided they are engaged in disseminating propaganda for the Japanese Consul or the Japanese Government?

It has been learned from a confident source that one of the consular agents telephoned to the Japanese consulate in Honolulu and asked a representative of the consulate if he should register under the terms of the Alien Registration Act. The member of the consulate staff advised the consular agent that he was not subject to the terms of this Act and should not register because he was a diplomatic officer under the jurisdiction of the Japanese Foreign Office.

These four hundred consular agents—I said four hundred. There are really only 234.

—are scattered throughout the Hawaiian Islands and the Bureau can readily see that they constitute a source of information over wide areas, which if used for espionage purposes would be in a position [1409] to furnish the consulate invaluable information on fleet movements, Army posts, and all general information that would be of value to the Japanese Government.

In the event it is determined that any or all of these consular agents are subject to the provisions of the Registration Act, this office desires to conduct an immediate investigation for the purposes of ascertaining their activities looking toward a prosecution of those consular agents who have violated the terms of the Registration Act by not having registered as prescribed.

While this office is not aware of the full extent of the duties of the consular agents, it is believed that they are required to look after the interests of the Japanese populace in their respective communities, to keep alive the Japanese spirit, and to do the bidding of the Japanese consulate. They are undoubtedly looked upon by the Japanese populace as representatives of the Japanese consulate and the Japanese Government and the Emperor of Japan, and for that reason wield considerable influence in determining the actions and molding the thought of the Japanese populace in Hawaii, especially among the alien element.

Then subsequently I received a letter from the Bureau in Washington that said:

For your information with regard to the progress being made in the possible prosecution of Japanese consular agents there is enclosed a photostatic copy of a letter dated July 25, 1941, addressed to the Attorney General by the Secretary of War, together with a photostatic copy of the enclosure contained therein.

[1410] The Department has previously advised that the State Department has entered no objection to the prosecution of these consular agents, but in view of the objection entered by the Secretary of War, the Criminal Division is not prepared at this time to authorize prosecution of these agents, but still has the matter under investigation.

Now, prior to that communication I informed the Bureau on June 23, 1941, that—I made reference to a telegram from the Bureau of June 2nd stating that the Attorney General's office of the Department had requested an opinion from the United States Attorney of Hono-

lulu regarding prosecution under the Registration Act of the 234 Japanese consular agents in Hawaii.

As stated in the aforementioned wire, Mr. Angus Taylor, Jr., acting United States Attorney here, wired the Department recommending immediate prosecution but advised at the same time that Lieutenant General Walter Short, Department Commander of the United States Army in Hawaii, was opposed to such action at this time on the grounds that it might react unfavorably on the Japanese community, although such action would not interfere with any plans of the Hawaiian Department for the defense of the Islands.

The United States Attorney is in receipt of a further communication from the Department requesting to be advised if there has been any change in the opinion of General Short concerning this matter and requesting to be advised of the practical effect of his opposition.

Acting United States Attorney Angus Taylor has informed me that he has communicated with General Short [1411] through Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Marston who is in charge of the Military Intelligence Office for the Hawaiian Department, and has been informed that the General has not changed his opinion in this matter and will actively oppose the prosecution of these individuals by recommending to the War Department, if necessary, that the matter be taken up with the Attorney General with a view of preventing the arrest and prosecution of the Japanese consular agents at this time.

As I understand it, the primary objection of General Short is that since the Registration Act has been in effect since September, 1939, he does not believe it would be considered fair play if the Government should at this time arrest the 234 Japanese consular agents who have been acting as such since the enactment of the law, and he feels that it would be regarded by the Japanese community as a hostile act designed to harass the Japanese aliens and American citizens of Japanese ancestry in the Hawaiian Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. Now can you give us a little background on that, Mr. Shivers?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, I can.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in touch with the War and Navy Departments on this question and with Mr. Taylor?

Mr. SHIVERS. You will recall that in one of those letters there I said that the United States Attorney had been requested to give an opinion as to whether or not these people should be prosecuted.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. The United States Attorney consulted me on that. At that time the United States Attorney had not been furnished with copies of the reports that had been submitted by [1412] our office for the simple reason that the Department of Justice itself, the Attorney General's office, decides the question of prosecution on violations of the Registration Act, bearing in mind that in prosecutions under that statute the venue lies in the District of Columbia. However, it was the thought of the Attorney General that these men would not have to be prosecuted under the amended act requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals but could be prosecuted under the original act, which requires notice to the State Department of all agents of any foreign power.

Mr. Taylor consulted me, and I then called a meeting of Captain Mayfield, who was the District intelligence officer, Naval District intelligence officer, Lieutenant Colonel M. W. Marston, who was then the G-2 officer, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell. I told them that I had received a request from the United States Attorney to furnish him with all of the information that had been developed on these consular agents and that he was going to report to the Attorney General his opinion as to whether or not they should

be prosecuted. I informed them that I thought that they should take the matter up themselves with their respective commands, who at that time were Admiral Bloch and General Short, and that since it was purely a criminal proceedings I did not suppose that they would have any objection to it, although I thought that they should be consulted on the matter.

The following day we met again, and Captain Mayfield, representing Admiral Bloch, stated that the Admiral was all for prosecuting these consular agents and that they should be, in his judgment, prosecuted. Colonel Marston, representing General Short, made substantially the same report that I have just read to you.

The CHAIRMAN. That the Army thought they ought not to be?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Army thought that they should not be.

[1413] Mr. Taylor, the United States Attorney, asked me what my opinion was. I told him that, as you know, this office cannot recommend to the United States Attorney either for or against prosecution in any criminal case. We merely submit the facts to you. I said, "I do feel, however, since the Army is responsible for the defense of these Islands, that we as an organization should not do anything that is going to embarrass the Army in the defense of these Islands, and that we should give consideration to General Short's position." Mr. Taylor thereafter did recommend to the Department of Justice that they should be prosecuted, and he quoted Admiral Bloch and General Short.

Then there came an opinion from the War Department. Thereafter there was an opinion from the War Department. Thereafter there was a request from the War Department which was transmitted to the Attorney General by the Secretary of War quoting a paraphrased telegram which had been sent to the War Department by General Short on July 22, 1941, which says:

We are at present engaged in a counter propaganda campaign whose object is to encourage loyalty of the Japanese population of Hawaii on promise of fair treatment. The present outlook of results of this campaign on entire population is very favorable. Success of the campaign would promote unity and greatly reduce proportions of our defense problem. Espionage Act of June 15, 1917 referred to in your radio of July 19, 1941, has been in effect here since August of 1939 with no attempt at local enforcement. As result of careful survey of situation, considering available facts and opinions F. B. I. and other federal agencies I believe not over ten percent of the unregistered consular agents in Hawaii are aware they have violated our laws. I believe further that prosecution at this [1414] time would unduly alarm entire population and jeopardize success our current campaign to secure loyalty Japanese population.

In my opinion fair play demands that warning be given to consular agents to register by a certain date on penalty of prosecution. I believe development of loyalty among Japanese population more important than punishment of a few individuals. It is impracticable to place total Japanese population of one hundred sixty thousand in concentration camps.

The CHAIRMAN. That is General Short's?

General McCoy. That letter is signed by the Secretary of War?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Personally signed by Mr. Stimson?

Mr. SHIVERS. Here is the Secretary of War's letter. Do you care for me to read that to you, sir?

General McCoy. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. "Washington,"—

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the letter he just read?

The CHAIRMAN. That is an excerpt from the Secretary of War's letter, isn't it?

Mr. SHIVERS. You will understand that when I read this letter here.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON

July 25, 1941

The Honorable, The ATTORNEY GENERAL.

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL:

Upon receipt of your letter of July 14, 1941, on the subject of the prosecution of certain unregistered Japanese consular agents in the Territory of Hawaii, I dispatched a secret radiogram to the Commanding General, [1415] Hawaiian Department, directing him to radio his recommendations stating clearly his reasons and objections if any to the proposed prosecution.

A paraphrased copy of his reply is attached hereto.

I concur in the statements and objections set forth by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and strongly recommend that a warning be issued to these unregistered Japanese consular agents, through their accredited Consul General in Honolulu, to register by a certain date, say within a period of thirty days after promulgation of the warning, under penalty of prosecution for violation of our laws.

I believe that such a warning will effect the desired registration and contribute materially toward the Commanding Generals campaign to secure the loyalty of the Japanese population of the Territory.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Shivers, was a warning issued then?

Mr. SHIVERS. There was no such warning issued.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? You don't know?

Mr. SHIVERS. That I don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that was intended to be a warning by the War Department? Or by the Attorney General's office?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think it was a suggestion by the War Department that the Attorney General's office——

The CHAIRMAN. The Attorney General's office.

Mr. SHIVERS. — should issue such a warning.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will find out from Mr. Taylor why [1416] it wasn't. He would know? At least, he would know whether he got any instructions?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, he would know that.

General McCoy. Do you know yourself?

Mr. SHIVERS. So far as I know, no warning was issued and no provisions for any warning were made.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't know why?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do know this: that subsequent to this I received instructions from the Bureau in Washington to conduct very thorough, complete investigations of all of the Japanese consular agents for the purpose of ascertaining in detail what their activity was, whether or not they had engaged in any subversive activities or in the dissemination of any propaganda, and that upon the completion of these investigations the matter would again be referred to the Department for an opinion.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we have gotten along to the middle of 1941, haven't we?

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of the——

The CHAIRMAN. We have passed midsummer.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, we have passed midsummer. July, 1941. July 25, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, did you start on the investigation?

Mr. SHIVERS. Immediately, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you discover?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, in the beginning we made about—we conducted investigations of about twenty of these consular agents back in April, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Mr. SHIVERS. And probably before April, 1940. And sent those in to Washington, and those reports were referred to the Attorney General. We did that in order to give the Department the facts with respect to the operations of these consular agents here, and at that time it was pointed out that the acts of one [1417] are undoubtedly common to the acts of all and that determination of a violation can undoubtedly be made from the facts that have been submitted in these reports.

Then, after receiving the further instructions after this adjudication had been made, we then assigned five men to conduct thorough immediate investigations of all the Japanese consular agents. We have quite a number on Hawaii, Kauai, Maui, and Honolulu, and those investigations have disclosed that they have been quite prominent in collecting comfort kits, moneys, and funds for transmittal to Japan and have been the leaders in the Japanese community, have filled out all of the papers necessary for the alien to fill out for transmission to the consulate. They also engage in filling out applications for deferment for military service, which they transmit to the Consul. They also handle expatriation matters, which they transmit to the Consul. And they also assist in the Japanese commercial census which is taken in Hawaii about every five years.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean taken under the Hawaiian Government?

Mr. SHIVERS. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Or taken under the Japanese Government?

Mr. SHIVERS. Taken under orders of the Japanese Government through either Consul. They also assist the dual citizen in filing his Army registration papers when he attains his majority. As you gentlemen know, all persons born in Hawaii of alien parents prior to 1924 are automatically dual citizens.

General McCoy. Dual citizens?

Mr. SHIVERS. Are automatically dual citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. They become citizens of the United States, but under the law of Japan they do not, unless they so elect, lose their Japanese citizenship?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is correct. In Japan they are Japanese citizens. In America they are American citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

[1418] Mr. SHIVERS. All those born subsequent to 1924 are not considered citizens of Japan unless they are registered with the Japanese Consul in Honolulu by their parents within fourteen days after birth.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Mr. Shivers, were a number of these consular agents American citizens, or were they all aliens?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say 99% of them were aliens.

The CHAIRMAN. Aliens?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is approximately correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Mostly aliens?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what has become of them now?

Mr. SHIVERS. They are in mass in the detention camp.

The CHAIRMAN. They have been interned?

Mr. SHIVERS. They were picked up on December 7.

General McCoy. All of them?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They never did register?

Mr. SHIVERS. They never did register.

The CHAIRMAN. And you only found them by ascertaining their status from their activities, I presume?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. Prior to 1941 the Nippu Jiji—Nippu Jiji is a local Japanese paper—prior to 1941 the Nippu Jiji published in its Japanese directory the names and addresses of all Japanese consular agents. We were able to learn their identity through that directory.

The CHAIRMAN. Directory.

Mr. SHIVERS. But beginning with the directory that was published in 1941 their names were omitted, and they were omitted at the request of the Japanese Consul, because he had learned that an investigation was being made of them.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course. It strikes me that that was a very large staff of consular agents for this Territory. How [1419] did you feel about that?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, it struck me this way: Of course, the United States would not have been permitted to have had such a setup in Japan or any other foreign country, and it struck me as constituting an espionage network which if we had had one like it, even in Hawaii, we would have known much more than we did know, because it was ideally set up.

If you have the time and are interested I can show you a chart here on the Japanese consulate setup here in Hawaii.

(The witness produced a chart.)

The CHAIRMAN. Nine on his staff. The advisory council noted here, is that of American citizens or Japanese?

Mr. SHIVERS. The advisory council, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Mori and others.

Mr. SHIVERS. The advisory council is composed of leading alien Japanese businessmen and professional men in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. I see they have got one Wade Warren Thayer here. He is probably an Anglo-Saxon, isn't he?

Mr. SHIVERS. Wade Warren Thayer is an Anglo-Saxon. He is the registered attorney for the Japanese Consul in Honolulu. He resigned December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, you have classified the agents by islands?

Mr. SHIVERS. According to islands, yes, sir.

General McCoy. And they number how many?

The CHAIRMAN. Two hundred and thirty-four, do they not?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think the final count was 219, sir; some had gone back to Japan.

General McCoy. And as far as you know they have all been interned since December 7?

Mr. SHIVERS. Every one of them, yes, sir.

General McCoy. None escaped?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. I think we—in fact I know we have all of them.

[1420] The CHAIRMAN. The heading, "Registered Agents of Foreign Principals," refers to actually registered agents of Japanese business concerns, I presume?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. Registered agents of the foreign principals, the foreign principals in that case being either Japan or some agency in Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. In Japan. Well, then there were some that did register? I see they are called "Registered Agents of Foreign Principals."

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes. That's another story. Now, Wade Warren Thayer is the registered agent, because he is the attorney for the Japanese consulate. Theo. H. Davies & Company is registered as agent of the British Government or some British agency. Bowman, Deute, Cummings, Inc., is registered as, I believe, advertising agencies—relation agencies of Japanese Tourists' Bureau, I think. Nippon Yusen Kaisya is the NYK steamship line office here in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, there is no violation of any law as respects those fellows?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, let me; may I see that a second?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. The gentlemen listed here as Daizo Sumida, Dr. Iga Mori, Seizo Yamamoto, they registered as agents of a foreign principal after we had developed an offense against them. There were four Japanese men here who back in early 1940 got together and agreed with the Consul to contribute a sum of \$2,500 to the Pan-Pacific Union here. That \$2,500 was to go to the Pan-Pacific Union to defray the expenses of an individual connected with the Pan-Pacific Union by the name of Frank A. Von Heiland, who was suspected of being a Japanese and German espionage agent here in Hawaii.

The Japanese Consul General went to these four men and asked them if they would act, as it were, as a front for him [1421] in turning this money over to the Pan-Pacific Union, ostensibly to create a department of Pacific affairs in the Pan-Pacific Union but in reality to be given to Frank A. Von Heiland by the Pan-Pacific Union through arrangements that they had previously made. Well, there were Daizo Sumida, Seizo Yamamoto, Matsura Soga, the publisher of the Nippu Jiji, and one other individual. Now, Daizo Sumida, Dr. Iga Mori, Seizo Yamamoto, and Matsura Soga, they are the four individuals who took the money from the Japanese Consul. The check was given by the Japanese Consul to Sumida. Sumida deposited the check for \$2,500 in his own account and then drew a check payable to the Pan-Pacific Union on his account in the sum of \$2,500.

Well, during the course of the investigation it developed that they were just simply fronting for the consulate, and the manner in which they got the money into the Pan-Pacific Union was a ruse—the purpose of it was a ruse, and the actual fact was that the money was to go to Frank A. Von Heiland, who was going to use that in publication of the Pan-Pacific Union magazine, and that matter was of course reported and referred to the State Department. The State Department held that they were in violation of the act requiring the registration of agents of foreign principals. They registered and withdrew

at the same time, and by registering thereby confessing that they should have registered before, but coincident with filing they—

The CHAIRMAN. Quit.

Mr. SHIVERS. —quit, and no prosecution was instituted.

General McCoy. What is the Pan-Pacific Union?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is an organization that at one time was quite prominent here and on the Mainland. It was originally headed by Mr. Wallace Hume Ford. Perhaps you gentlemen may know him.

General McCoy. That has no connection—

Mr. SHIVERS. Has no connection with the Institute of Pacific Relations. [1422]

The CHAIRMAN. What was the man's name?

Mr. SHIVERS. Wallace Hume Ford.

For the past year and a half it has not been active at all except insofar as it was able to entertain some of the Japanese celebrities who came by here, and other Pacific figures, before the commercial relations with Japan were halted.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, I take it you have found it impossible to get a Japanese agent or agents here under the Bureau that you could trust; is that right?

Mr. SHIVERS. I wouldn't say that, Mr. Justice. I would say this: that it is next to impossible to get one whom you can trust who would be in a position to know what is going on.

The CHAIRMAN. The alien Japanese or the ill-affected Japanese are clams, are they? It is a tight ring?

Mr. SHIVERS. It is a very tight ring. You must remember that we have 41,387 alien Japanese in Hawaii. Now, we have 24,000 alien males and about 16,000 alien females, and it is almost next to impossible to get one on whom you could rely who is sufficiently well informed or close enough to the alien enemy to actually be in a position to know what is going on.

General McCoy. A number of these local Japanese of American citizenship are graduates of the University of Hawaii?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And have gone through the R. O. T. C. and are therefore reserve officers of the United States?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And are now on active service, are they not?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would you have trust in them or any of them?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would, yes, sir.

[1423] General McCoy. They are now in the United States service?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In an article published in the Reader's Digest on "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst" there is this statement with reference to the Japanese of like background in the United States:

Of the loyalty to the United States of thousands of our West Coast Japanese, particularly the Nisei, or American-born, there is and can be no question. In fact they have supplied much of the information our government has.

Now, that is with reference to those on the West Coast. Would you state whether that would apply here?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say this, General, that the Nisei out here—that is, some of them—have supplied us with quite valuable information, and even since the outbreak of hostilities they have supplied us with names of alien Japanese who they say should be interned.

The CHAIRMAN. How are you conducting your investigation, Mr. Shivers, to determine which of these interned Japanese may be liberated? Are you making such investigation?

Mr. SHIVERS. We are not making such investigation, Mr. Justice. That is the responsibility of the hearing board.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is the hearing board?

Mr. SHIVERS. That was appointed by the Military Governor, consists of five individuals, I believe, who gives to each a proper hearing.

The CHAIRMAN. Are some of them being turned out, so far as you know?

Mr. SHIVERS. So far as I know none have been released by the board. Now, there were some released by the military authorities before they went before the board. The plan here, [1424] as you gentlemen may already know, was to apprehend every German and Italian alien in the Hawaiian Islands in the event of a declaration of war on the axis powers. That was done with the exception of the aged and infirm. Practically every German alien and every Italian alien in Hawaii was picked up on December 8, and some of those have since been released on the representations of some of the people here who were willing to vouch for them.

General McCoy. Without investigation on your part?

Mr. SHIVERS. At the direction of the Army authorities, yes, sir.

General McCoy. And without investigation on your part?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not pick up every alien Japanese? You couldn't?

Mr. SHIVERS. We could not do that.

The CHAIRMAN. You picked up those that were suspected?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you form any opinion as to where the center of Japanese espionage was here?

Mr. SHIVERS. Very definitely, sir. I am satisfied that it was centered in the Japanese consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you were not able to break into the communications of the Japanese consulate with Japan on account of legal bars, as I understand it.

Mr. SHIVERS. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Until war was declared?

Mr. SHIVERS. Until war was declared. We had attempted to get the cooperation of the commercial radio communication offices here in furnishing us with the information, but were unable to do so.

General McCoy. Do you know whether the Army and the Navy were able to do that?

[1425] Mr. SHIVERS. I know this, sir: I know that the Navy beginning about November 24 or 25 was able to effect an arrangement with one of the commercial communication companies here to obtain all of the traffic between Honolulu and the Japanese Government in Japan. I don't believe, however, that any of that material was gotten together for the Navy until after December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Some of it was, Mr. Shivers, we have learned. Amongst others that Kita dispatch was delivered either the 5th or 6th in a batch of stuff from that communication company, but no—

Mr. SHIVERS. No; that is the material that I obtained.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I know you got it too, but we rather get the impression that it was turned over—you got it when you got to the consulate?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir; I got it from the radio company myself.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, you did? Well, that was never translated until after the—

Mr. SHIVERS. Until after the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It couldn't be, could it?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Navy had its arrangement with one company here, and I think it went into effect about December 1st.

The CHAIRMAN. That is about right.

Mr. SHIVERS. But my impression is that if they got it they were not able to have it translated.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not.

Mr. SHIVERS. Until after December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not able to make it out.

Mr. SHIVERS. If we had had an arrangement with the other companies whereby we could have gotten that information, we [1426] would have known what was going to happen before it did.

General McCoy. Did you see Colonel Sarnoff when he was here, the president of the Radio Corporation?

Mr. SHIVERS. I did not, no, sir.

General McCoy. When was he here? Do you know?

Mr. SHIVERS. The latter part of November. I knew that some arrangements were going to try to be made with him, and for that reason I kept out of the picture entirely.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, are you acquainted with a thing, the association called the Japanese Hotel Association?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it your notion that that association was active in getting men through the immigration bureau that perhaps ought not to have gotten in here? Have you ever heard such rumors?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, I am quite satisfied of that, sir, in this way: The Japanese Hotel Association interested itself primarily in keeping records of all Japanese who came into the Hawaiian Islands for any purpose whatsoever, and they now probably have the records that are much more complete even than our own immigration. They have furnished evidence for the immigration authorities on which certificates of birth could be granted and on which re-entry permits could be given. That is to say, they will find the midwife or somebody who knows the midwife who was present when this particular Japanese was born.

I would say offhand that the language newspapers, the Hotel Association, the Japanese-language schools have been the three worst subversive elements in Hawaii. Definitely the language school has prevented the assimilation of the American way of life on the part of the Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view as to the Shinto priests here and the teachers in these Japanese-language schools?

[1427] Mr. SHIVERS. Fifty-one percent of the teachers in the Japanese-language schools are alien. Forty-nine percent are American. The Shinto priests are all very definitely dangerous. All of them, Shinto priests, are now in custodial detention. There are two sects, the church and state sects, of Shintoism.

The CHAIRMAN. The church and state sects?

Mr. SHIVERS. Church and state sects of Shintoism. All state Shinto priests some time ago, about a year ago, were raised by the Japanese Government to a position equal to military officers, and we felt that that of itself was sufficient justification for their internment in the event of hostilities. We tried to approach this—the Army and the Navy and I have tried to approach the situation out here by endeavoring to first find out what the possibilities were and make provisions for eliminating those. We know that the consular agents were definitely a source of potential danger. We know that the Shinto priests were. We know that the Japanese-language schoolteachers were. By eliminating those in the event of war we had other things then that we would have to deal with, and those would be out of the way, believing and feeling that the leadership would be taken if and when those individuals were interned.

General McCoy. Were you able to get all of them?

Mr. SHIVERS. Sir?

General McCoy. Were you able to get all of them?

Mr. SHIVERS. Not all of the Japanese-language school-teachers have yet been picked up.

General McCoy. Were you able to get all the priests?

Mr. SHIVERS. All of the Shinto priests, yes, sir. We also are daily getting a number of young people, both aliens and citizens, who have recently served in the Japanese Army and who have returned to Hawaii as late as June, 1941.

[1428] The CHAIRMAN. People who have actually served in the Japanese Army?

Mr. SHIVERS. People who have actually served in the Japanese Army.

The CHAIRMAN. They would be, of course, aliens?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes; some aliens and some citizens.

The CHAIRMAN. Some citizens?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

General McCoy. Army and Navy, I suppose?

Mr. SHIVERS. Army and Navy. We had some in the air corps, some in the infantry, some in the navy.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that a great source of danger here was the uncensored short-wave radio sets, Mr. Shivers?

Mr. SHIVERS. That certainly is a definite threat and is now being used—is still being used to—

The CHAIRMAN. You think it is still being used?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think it is undoubtedly still being used for dissemination of information to the army as to the territory.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, how much monitoring are you able to do, or are any of these agencies able to do, of these radio sets?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is the problem of the signal corps of the Army and the Navy and the F. C. C. We do not monitor those.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not monitor them?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have heard it said somewhere here that there are but four monitoring sets in use on the Island now. Do you know anything about that?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think, sir, the F. C. C. may have four monitoring sets; I mean by that, mobile.

The CHAIRMAN. Mobile sets?

[1249] Mr. SHIVERS. Mobile sets, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In order to pick up a station that is sending from the Island?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Get bearings on it?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And locate it?

Mr. SHIVERS. But I am satisfied that there are considerably more than four actually doing the monitoring.

The CHAIRMAN. Actually doing the monitoring?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. As a result of that do you have knowledge whether sets have been picked up?

Mr. SHIVERS. Sets have been picked up; whether as a result of that, I don't know. I rather doubt that it has been as a result of their location, but sets have been picked up in the general localities where the direction finder indicated.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course it is very easy to construct a small sending set, isn't it?

Mr. SHIVERS. Very simple to one who knows how.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Is there any Japanese-language propaganda being put out by the American authorities on Oahu now?

Mr. SHIVERS. There is not.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there much Japanese propaganda coming over short wave from Tokyo?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There is?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In Japanese?

Mr. SHIVERS. In Japanese and in English, which is having its effect on the Japanese populace here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, is there any way to reach that?

[1430] Mr. SHIVERS. There is no way to reach that, sir, except by counterpropaganda and trying to jam the stations.

The CHAIRMAN. Has there been any success in jamming them?

Mr. SHIVERS. Not wholly, no, sir. They have been jammed at times, and other times they could not be jammed. I think the most effective way to combat that would be to have our own counterpropaganda system, which I understand is now in the process of being set up.

The CHAIRMAN. It is in process of being set up?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, do you happen to know whether the Army and the Navy were cognizant of your radio communication with your home office in Washington?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, I know that the Army was.

The CHAIRMAN. You do know that the Army was?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir. And, oh, I know that the Navy was, too. Now, when I say Army and Navy I am referring to their intelligence agency. I know that Army intelligence knew that we did it, and I know that Navy intelligence knew that we did it.

The CHAIRMAN. You don't know whether the operating staffs knew about it?

Mr. SHIVERS. I don't know about that.

General McCoy. Have they ever used it?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

General McCoy. They could have used it, of course, if they had asked you?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know whether your radio was receiving satisfactorily on the morning of December 7?

Mr. SHIVERS. It was, yes, sir. We received several messages on the morning of December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. On that morning?

[1431] Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Around the time of the attack?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir; it was subsequent to the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Subsequent to the attack?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been deeply impressed with the fact that the Japanese had perfect intelligence as to everything on this Island—topography troop movements, vessel movements, and everything else—and that the United States had practically no intelligence as to Japanese movements. Do you think that it was possible to have overcome that defect in our own information, from your experience here?

Mr. SHIVERS. From my experience here I think it could have been overcome. I don't think it could have been overcome here. I think there were but very few people, if any, not over one, perhaps two, who knew exactly what the Japanese contemplated. I think it could have been offset in Japan or somewhere in the East.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know whether we have any espionage system in the East?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you don't happen to know whether we have any Army or Navy intelligence spies in Japan?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that would have been the only source, really, and not a source here on this Island?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, I don't see how we could have possibly gotten it here unless we would have had access to all of the diplomatic channels that exist here.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if you had had access to the messages that they were sending over the commercial radio you might very well have spelled out a warning of action against this Island from those?

[1432] Mr. SHIVERS. I think very definitely we would have known that, sir.

Do you gentlemen—I don't know whether you want me to volunteer anything or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly we do. We want to hear everything that is on your mind.

Mr. SHIVERS. You asked me a moment ago if I thought I knew where the center of the Japanese espionage system was. I said the Japanese consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. I have reason for saying that, if you want those reasons.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do we want to go into the reasons? I think your judgment is what we want on that.

Mr. SHIVERS. I mean I can more or less give you documentary proof of that.

General MCCOY. I think your statement is sufficient.

[1433] The CHAIRMAN. I think your statement is enough.

Do you have anything, General?

General MCNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question or two.

I am rather at a loss to understand your statement about the division of the duties. You said the Navy had been assigned to the Japanese General Intelligence, as I understood you; is that correct?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir.

Let me go over that again, sir. Originally the Army was responsible for their own personnel and installations; the Navy was responsible for their personnel and installations, and the F. B. I. was responsible for the civilian program. That was modified so that the Navy had jurisdiction over all this general intelligence pertaining to the Japanese by reason of the fact that the F. B. I. was not prepared to take over the investigating of the civilian Japanese in connection with the general intelligence because they did not have the language facilities and did not have the translators and, as I say, they did not know anything about it up to the time we took over back in 1939.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Navy was responsible for general intelligence relating to and concerning Japanese?

Mr. SHIVERS. That was their prime responsibility, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And when the question of these consulates came up, the Navy recommended that they be prosecuted?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Army recommended to the contrary?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Army opinion prevailed?

[1434] Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does that make sense to you? Here is the Navy, responsible for it and the Navy recommends that these people be prosecuted, and the Army opinion prevails. It does not make sense to me. Does it make sense to you?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, sir, that was the matter that was decided back in Washington. I have my own personal opinions about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you this question: We know that in this attack on the 7th of December, or at least we have been informed by the people here, that there have been no acts of sabotage, no acts whatever during this raid.

Mr. SHIVERS. That is correct, sir, so far as I know, and I think I would know if there had been any.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that, in your opinion, conclusive evidence that if another attack should take place that there would be no sabotage?

Mr. SHIVERS. Absolutely not.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does that convey to you the possibility that that was deliberate so as not to alarm the people about sabotage so that when the real test came that sabotage would be effective?

Mr. SHIVERS. It certainly could be so construed.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have heard the statement made here that because of the fact that there was none that there would not be any. Do you think that the people may be lulled into a false sense of security because of the lack of sabotage?

Mr. SHIVERS. I think undoubtedly there are some proponents here who would be lulled or want to be lulled into that train of thought and who would probably try to lull other people into that train of thought.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not think that opinion is generally accepted?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, I do not by any manner of means.

[1435] Admiral STANDLEY. In your efforts here to obtain information, you did not make an effort to go into the messages sent out by the private cable company, did you?

Mr. SHIVERS. I made an effort to try to get them.

Admiral STANDLEY. But it was not successful?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have the F. B. I.—and do not answer this if you do not want to—been successful in accomplishing that in other places?

Mr. SHIVERS. That, sir, I would not be able to say because I have not been on the mainland in about two years. I could only say this: that you are dealing with different individuals and you may be able to talk one man out of something and you may not be able to talk the other man out of it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were not able to talk any of these people out of it?

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, we all tried it.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Shivers, did you discover any cash funds in the consulate when you raided it?

Mr. SHIVERS. We did not raid it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, who did?

Mr. SHIVERS. I will tell you exactly what happened there. On the morning of December 7 before noon, about 10 or 11 o'clock, I found out that the Japanese Consulate was not guarded.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not guarded?

Mr. SHIVERS. It was not guarded. They still had telephone communications going in and out. I tried to find out who could properly take over that duty there and I could not find anybody who would do it, so I instructed the Chief of Police to place a guard around the consulate for the protection of the consul general and the members of his staff and the consular property. That was done about noon.

When they arrived, the consul was burning his documents, [1436] which he had been doing for several days previously. He

was just walking out to play a game of golf, and he had a document strapped to his leg which they found, but that document was of no importance.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a considerable amount of cash in the consulate?

Mr. SHIVERS. I understand there was around \$20,000 there.

The CHAIRMAN. In cash?

Mr. SHIVERS. In cash, yes, and that was taken by the consul to the bank. I understand it was deposited there under the freeze order regulations.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is the consul now?

Mr. SHIVERS. He is at the consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. He is in the consulate?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he telephoning much?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir. I think his lines have gone dead or something.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this question, Mr. Shivers: You have been here quite a number of years. I gather from what you said that you think there are a number of young Japanese who would be loyal to the United States of America?

Mr. SHIVERS. That is correct, sir. I think there are some Japanese citizens of Japanese blood who are loyal, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What would you think would be the attitude of a considerable number of Japanese if an apparent successful invasion of this island by Japan was in progress?

Mr. SHIVERS. You might modify that by saying this, that in my judgment the alien Japanese and on through some of the second-generation Japanese, that just as soon as Japan achieves some temporary decisive victory, the old spirit will begin to bubble forth, and at that time we are going to have some very serious trouble because of the cockiness of some of the alien Japanese, which is going to offend the white Americans, [1437] the Chinese, or the Filipinos.

Such clashes can, as you gentlemen know, probably and possibly lead to a general riot.

Now, if there should be an out-and-out attack on this island by the Japanese Navy, reinforced by their air arm, I think you could expect 95% of the alien Japanese to glory in that attack and to do anything they could to further the efforts of the Japanese forces.

You would find some second- and third-generation Japanese, who are American citizens but who hold dual citizenship, and you would find some of those who would join forces with the Japanese attackers for this and other reasons. Some of them may think they have suffered discrimination, economic, social, and otherwise, and there would probably be a few of them who would do it.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your judgment as to the necessity for the future for maintaining such a strict military control as now exists?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say my best judgment, sir, is that the longer martial law is in effect the better off we will be here, and the opportunities for that type of work will be kept to a minimum.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather from what has been said that the Japanese around here are pretty well cowed and afraid?

Mr. SHIVERS. They are well afraid, pretty well afraid by this show of military force. I think that according to the Japanese psychology we can expect them to be subservient as long as America is on top. When we begin to suffer defeats, which we probably will, and they achieve some temporary decisive victory they will bubble forth and they will not show such subservience as they do now. As long as we are on top they will, but some of them will probably do anything they can.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General McCoy. I would like to ask some questions.

Mr. SHIVERS. I would like to ask if you gentlemen are [1438] familiar with the signal system that was set up here on the island.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the message?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. Are you familiar with the other messages, the contents of the messages?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You mean those messages setting up the signal lights?

Mr. SHIVERS. Those that preceded; anything in regard to the movement of ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the Kita message?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not know whether I should volunteer any evidence.

General McCoy. Yes, decidedly so. Let us have it.

The CHAIRMAN. This is after you discovered the evidence?

Mr. SHIVERS. The Dr. Mori message.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have the Dr. Mori telephone message, yes.

Apparently the Army and the Navy were not able to interpret the meaning of that message as a warning of the attack?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

These are the messages. On December 6, 1941, from Tojo, Foreign Minister, to Consul, Honolulu:

Please inform us immediately of any rumors of movements of warships after 4th.

Tojo.

December 5, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo:

One, three battleships mentioned in your X239 of Friday morning, the 5th, entered port. They expect to depart port on the 8th. Two, on the same day LEXINGTON and five heavy cruisers departed. Three, the following warships were anchored on the afternoon of the 5th: eight battleships, three light cruisers, sixteen destroyers. Came in four cruisers of HONOLULU type and two destroyers.

December 4, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister:

[1439] On the afternoon of the 3rd British man-of-war entered Honolulu and departed early on the 4th; about 1100 tons; one stack and had four-inch guns fore and aft. Immediately after entering port, crew went ashore and were receiving mail at the British Consulate."

December 4, 1941, from Kita to Foreign Minister, Tokyo.

At 1300 on the 4th a light cruiser, HONOLULU class, hastily departed.

December 3, 1941, from Foreign Minister to Kita, Consul, Honolulu:

Strictly secret. Would like you to hold your list of code words (also those used in connection with radio broadcast) right up until last minute. When break comes burn immediately and wire us to that effect.

Are you familiar with the system of signals?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHIVERS. And who prepared them?

The CHAIRMAN. Who did prepare them?

Mr. SHIVERS. A man by the name of Otto Kuehn.

The CHAIRMAN. A German alien?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He prepared the offshore signals?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. He prepared the light on Lanakai that was to be prepared in the beach house, and the light in the Kalama house through the dormer window at his home.

He was also to furnish signals to be given by an automobile, and if you remember, one light meant 1, 2, 3, 4, and two lights meant 5, 6, 7, 8.

Of course, we do not have a full story out of Mr. Kuehn. He admits, however, that he has been more or less working with the Japanese Government since about 1935 or 1936. He does not exactly admit that, but from what he has told us we know that he has been.

He has received some \$40,000 from Japan.

[1440] In the latter part of October or the first part of November the vice consul and another employee of the consulate who came here in June, 1940, Mori Morea, and a boy who drove for the consulate, went over to Kuehn's home and at that time there was delivered to Kuehn the sum of \$14,000.

That Kuehn said he got from a Japanese whom he had never seen before and he can't explain why he got it.

He said he went to the consul around the latter part of November trying to get the consul to send some money to his son, who is in Goebbels' department in Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. In Goebbels' department?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. The consul agreed to send \$500 to the boy through Japanese channels.

He then thought he should return the favor and asked the consul if he could fix up a set of signal devices for Japanese submarines off the Oahu coast.

I have been working on that now and we will undoubtedly be able to clear up that situation soon.

The CHAIRMAN. Haven't there been some indications that there was a signal light burning on Maui on the night in question?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not think so, sir. We had an indication that there was a fire at Haleakela either Sunday or Monday night, and somebody went up there to the fire and when they got there two men scurried away.

Now, the point given for the system of lights in Maui is the home of Carl Bassele. He bought a home about three months ago there.

Carl Bassele claims to be of Swiss extraction, but I think he was trained in Germany. He is now a naturalized citizen but one of the most rabid and pro-Hitlerite individuals around here.

So, it is quite possible that this money that Kuehn got from the consul was used to help Bassele buy this place on [1441] Maui for that particular purpose, although he claims the signals were not given and he had no intention about giving them.

The CHAIRMAN. These messages that you have read to us between Kita and Tokyo were sent as commercial messages?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not able to get those since you were not able to have access to the files?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. That was over the Mackay system.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was not open to you before?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. Yes.

Do you have a recollection of a German, a member of the Foreign Office, by the name of von Trott, who came over here any time since the war began?

Mr. SHIVERS. Not that I know of, no, sir.

General McCoy. He is a member of the German Foreign Office and he was in the United States.

Mr. SHIVERS. You mean since 1939?

General McCoy. Yes. He attended the Institute of Pacific Relations in Virginia Beach.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes; yes, I do remember that definitely now. Yes, he did come through here.

General McCoy. He has quite a world-round background. He came to the United States ostensibly to represent Germany at that conference. He left in December or January. That was 1939 and 1940. He was coming here to Honolulu and to Japan. Does that recall him to your mind?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, very definitely.

General McCoy. He associated with Mr. Charles F. Loomis, secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations and other members of that organization.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you have occasion to follow him?

[1442] Mr. SHIVERS. He left, sir. He was here just one day; then he left for Japan. We didn't follow him since that time, although I think on the mainland he was checked up and investigated while he was on the mainland.

As a matter of fact, I received a wire from the mainland that he was coming here and would contact certain individuals. I thought that was interesting.

General McCoy. You do not know whether he has been in association or communication with people on the island since that time?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I do not.

General McCoy. He happens to be in Brazil just now. He is a friend of mine and I have had occasion to watch him through my associations and through the State Department, and I knew he was coming through here after the conference.

Mr. SHIVERS. I handled that personally, myself. I made that investigation here and my recollection now is that he came out on the boat and probably went out on the Clipper.

General McCoy. Have you read this article in the Reader's Digest on Japanese sabotage?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I have not read it.

General McCoy. It is titled, "Japanese Saboteurs in Our Midst," and is by Stanley High and is in the Reader's Digest for January 1942.

It is mostly in connection with Japanese subversive action on the mainland. However, I would like to ask certain questions about it.

It states:

Last winter two retired Japanese officers—one for the Army and one for the Navy—toured our West Coast states to stir Japan's agents to renewed activity. They carried with them a secret document entitled *The Triple Alliance and the Japanese-American War*. One copy got into American hands.

[1443] Do you know of any such document?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

General McCoy. It states also:

This textbook has much to say about Japan's "surprise fleet," with its "mine layers capable of carrying a heavy load of mines for distribution in American sea routes of merchantmen and battleships." "We can then," the booklet continues, "strike the enemy fleet at a most opportune time and cut off communication lines as well as merchantmen."

Have you had any information to that effect about such a surprise fleet?

Mr. SHIVERS. Nothing about such a surprise fleet. We have had information that there were probably submarines off the coast of Lanai and Molokai. That was long before the hostilities. I would say that was about several months ago.

General McCoy. Was that information given to the Navy?

Mr. SHIVERS. That information came from the Navy to us, direct to us.

General McCoy. Another document captured "is a map, likewise printed in Japan—an overall key to our Pacific naval defenses including Hawaii." Have you heard of any such map?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir.

General McCoy. Have you seen any map of that sort?

Mr. SHIVERS. Nothing except the map since the raid, sir.

General McCoy. That was taken from the Japanese submarine?

Mr. SHIVERS. I have seen that map, sir, and I have also seen maps apparently taken from some of the planes.

General McCoy. From the Japanese planes?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, from the aviators killed.

General McCoy. It also states that more than 60% of California's American-born Japanese hold dual citizenship. [1444] What percentage would you think would be the case here of those who hold dual citizenship?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would say it would be quite higher.

General McCoy. Higher?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. We have not been able to get any accurate information on that because for a period of years the Japanese Consulate has refused to divulge that information, although they did give it up until several years ago.

I would hazard a guess. I do not think over 15,000 expatriated citizens are in Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean not over 15,000 who have relinquished their Japanese citizenship?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

General McCoy. Are there any Japanese Buddhist temples in Hawaii?

Mr. SHIVERS. Oh, yes, yes, quite a number, sir.

General McCoy. Are there any Shinto shrines here?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, and if you gentlemen are interested I will leave this with you, because this gives the setup in Honolulu and also some

of the other sections, and it does give a graphic picture of the Japanese activities here. Would you like to have it?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General McCoy. May we have it for our files?

Mr. SHIVERS. I can give you a copy for your files, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be very valuable to us, sir. If you would like to have a photostatic copy made, you can do that.

Mr. SHIVERS. Well, there are also others, but I can leave this here. There are in these charts the Communists and Germans and Italians as well as Japanese.

The CHAIRMAN. It is perfectly proper for you to give us this information, I take it?

Mr. SHIVERS. I would consider that so, yes, sir.

[1445] General McCoy. There is also this statement:

Almost every Japanese family in the U. S. is a member of a "Ken", or clan. Headquarters for each Ken is Japan—in the prefecture from which the family originated. The Ken's aim is to maintain the family tie with Japan. There are 57 Kens in Los Angeles alone. They are linked in an association; its hidden control is in the hands of one of Japan's top-flight spies.

Does that correspond with your information here as to the organization?

Mr. SHIVERS. That exactly corresponds to the organization here, but where they have hundreds we have thousands.

General McCoy. It also states:

Most potent of all organizations among the Japanese is the Japanese Association. Wherever so much as a handful of Japanese are gathered, an association is forthwith formed. It serves the community in numerous worthy ways. Control of these Associations—according to the testimony of Japanese—is almost wholly in the hands of aliens. Behind the scenes the strings are pulled by the Japanese consul. The Associations enable the consuls to keep a record of comings and goings of every Japanese, to transmit messages, launch propaganda and, when pressure is required, put on the screws.

Would that be in accordance with your experience that there is such an organization here?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes. The leading Japanese organization is the United Japanese Society, and many hundreds of societies radiate from that, and the flow is from the bottom to the top and back and forth.

General McCoy. It also states:

Thus the Japanese community—more than any other in the United States—is a fertile field for the purposeful machinations of a foreign power. With the generous [1446] support of the government of the United States the field is being cultivated.

Is that correct?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, that is correct in theory. The possibility is there. They have a setup and they can use it if they want to.

General McCoy. And it is protected by the laws of the United States in peace time?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

General McCoy. But under martial law, it would not be?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, no, sir; it is not under martial law.

General McCoy. Reading further:

It is doubtful whether Japan's spies and saboteurs inside the United States were in need of any such sales talk. Driven by their own well-nurtured patriot-

ism and apparently unmolested by the government they are plotting against, their part in the anticipated triumph appears to be well prepared.

Would you say that is correct?

Mr. SHIVERS. No, I would be inclined to doubt that except that it may apply to individuals, but not to the group entirely.

General McCoy. You feel that the apparent freedom of the Japanese agents here has been due to the action of the War Department and its representative here, the Commanding General?

Mr. SHIVERS. I do not get that question, sir. Would you read it for me?

(The last question of General McCoy was read by the reporter.)

Mr. SHIVERS. No, sir, I do not.

General McCoy. Well, your evidence would show that the failure to prosecute and to stop this type of work here was due to the recommendation of General Short that it would interfere with the efforts to keep intact or to play up to the [1447] loyalty of the Japanese community?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, sir, but my statement there should be construed this way, that it was because of the position taken by General Short that the Japanese consular agents were not prosecuted criminally for having violated the provisions of the registration act, and in presenting the question of prosecution to the representatives of the Army and the Navy Intelligence, I felt that they should be consulted and they should give the opinions of their representative commands because I did not believe that the civil government should without their knowledge commit either the Army or the Navy to any lines of action that they would have to approve, or which would interfere with their actions and operations.

General McCoy. You would consider that an error of judgment on the part of the Commanding General here, in the light of the subsequent events?

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes, I would consider it so, yes.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Shivers. We are asking all witnesses not to discuss their testimony or to disclose outside what has gone on in this room.

Mr. SHIVERS. Yes.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Taylor.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF ANGUS M. TAYLOR, JR., UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, DISTRICT OF HAWAII

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter and official position?

Mr. TAYLOR. Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States Attorney, District of Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been District Attorney, Mr. Taylor?

[1448] Mr. TAYLOR. I have been District Attorney since November 16, 1940.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that what position did you hold?

Mr. TAYLOR. I was first Assistant United States Attorney in this district.

The CHAIRMAN. From what time?

Mr. TAYLOR. From January, 1940, up until that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you come to the island in January, 1940?

Mr. TAYLOR. I did, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Before that you were an agent of the F. B. I.?

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How long had you been an agent for the F. B. I.?

Mr. TAYLOR. Since 1934.

The CHAIRMAN. You had been working on the mainland?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Where have you been stationed, Mr. Taylor?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have been stationed in various places. Customarily we go to Washington for a period of training, and then I worked in San Francisco, Washington, D. C., Minneapolis, Minnesota, and in the South, Memphis, Tennessee, Nashville, and Knoxville, the Far West, and practically all over the United States except the New England States, where I never have been. That is the only part I did not cover.

The CHAIRMAN. We have some evidence, Mr. Taylor, that in 1940 or 1941 the question arose as to the prosecution of certain consular agents of Japan. Are you familiar with that situation?

Mr. TAYLOR. I am familiar with the whole situation, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When, according to your judgment, did the question of that prosecution first arise?

Mr. TAYLOR. During the early part of 1941. I think it [1449] was in March that it came to my attention officially.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you present at any conferences with respect to the proposed prosecution or suggested prosecution?

Mr. TAYLOR. I was, sir. Would you like me to qualify my statement?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, tell us your story as you have it.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would be glad to, and just so the members of the Commission will know the facts and to get the background, I will give it.

As United States Attorney it is my duty to decide whether or not certain criminal prosecutions are instituted within my district. For that reason I have close contact with all federal agencies and also the agents of the Army and the Navy who carry on investigative work.

During 1940 and the latter part of 1939 the F. B. I. came here. I had been an agent, and I came out here originally for the F. B. I. in 1935 for a short period. Getting back to the subconsular agents, they had been investigated by the F. B. I. and the reports were submitted directly to the Attorney General through their investigative units. For reasons of their own, certain facts would not come to the attention of the district attorney here until the thing had reached its maturity; and there was then the question whether the prosecution should be instituted.

During 1941, May, I think it was, I had a communication from the Attorney General of the United States in connection with the work which had been done by the F. B. I. I was familiar with that because I was familiar with the work that they were doing and with the agents, and had daily contact with them.

In that connection he asked me if I would give my opinion as to whether the prosecution should be instituted against these several sub-consular agents.

I having been here off and on since 1935 had a very definite attitude toward the Japanese, and at the request of [1450] the Attorney General I contacted General Short and Admiral Bloch and asked them to send their representative to my office for a conference, which they did. They were Captain Mayfield of the Navy O. N. I. and Colonel Marston, G-2, representing General Short. Mr. Shivers of the F. B. I. was also present.

We discussed the thing back and forth. It had been discussed for many years about what to do with the 130,000 alien Japanese here.

We had the discussion, and the conclusion was this: I recommended to the Attorney General that these men be prosecuted. That was as early as June of 1941. I stated in my letter to him—which I have no objection of producing for you gentlemen, although I did not bring it here—that I felt that if we were ever going to divorce the influence of Tokyo from the Japanese in the island we had better begin now, because force was the only thing that they understood.

In that same letter I outlined my opinions to the General, which was referred to his staff officer, Colonel Marston, and they turned thumbs down on it due to the fact that they had their propaganda program, which to my mind was an appeasement program, saying, "If you be nice, good boys, we won't bother you."

Captain Mayfield representing the ideas of Admiral Block recommended that we institute prosecution in the routine manner. My idea was to just proceed along, because we did not want to cause any flare, and my recommendations were forwarded, and that's all there was to it.

Now, Mr. Justice Roberts, would you like me to give you my opinion as to my attitude with respect to this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to make this statement and it is based on my experience from observations from time to time, and that is that the Intelligence officers of both the Army and the Navy and other agencies that I have become acquainted [1451] with are fine men but they are not trained in basic investigative work. They do not have the same kind of basic training that the civilian agencies do have.

As early as 1935 I was in close touch with both the Army and the Navy Intelligence officers. There were certain problems during that time that were referred to, and they worked with my assistance.

In 1939 Mr. Shivers came here with a small force and then it grew to a large force. Colonel Marston became closely associated with them. He had trained investigators working here, and at that time the Japanese problem specifically was being handled by the Navy Intelligence due to the fact that they had the interpreters, the translators, and certain facilities which the F. B. I. did not have. As time went on the F. B. I. assumed certain responsibilities, and I do want to say, in my opinion, due to the experience that the F. B. I. could exercise a good deal of influence over the Army Intelligence officers. Now, it has been the opinion that a majority of the Japanese will be loyal, absolutely loyal. I feel that that is an opinion which has been arrived at due to certain economic causes. The Japanese block here is a very

powerful one, and they have been careful enough in keeping it toned down.

If this territory were a state they would immediately step forward, and they could then control the local legislature or they could elect the governor, either a puppet or one of their own kind, or they could send to Congress Japanese or else men whom they could control.

Now, I think the statistics will show that they have held back on the suffrage in this territory.

Now, another point that affects the economic life of this territory is the tremendous control in that there is no room for a competitor, and they must conform or they will be ruined and have the whole thing smashed, and they could even establish their own insurance company. They own factor houses [1452] something like the Big Five, and they have the association, and they control many things; they control distribution. You see the problem of these 130,000 people influenced by their race and their economic life.

Well, those things would cause any person that Mr. Shivers would have contacted six months ago to say, "We have worked with these people, the Japanese, for days, day in and day out, and we consider them absolutely loyal."

I am not surprised that having this get into the investigative hands and into the chief and then up to the intelligence officers all the way to the top, to the General in the Army and to the Admiral. If they do not get the proper information they cannot work on it intelligently.

Now, even as late as November 11, 1941, we had a public statement made by Mr. Shivers in which he was quoted in the "Advertiser" in which he stated in substance that the Japanese have nothing to fear and that we are not going to jail them, but that only the people who violate the law will be jailed. Now, of course that is fundamental. We do not jail anybody unless he violates the law.

Well, now, during that time and prior to that time a speech like that made on the islands was in my opinion probably the biggest joke the Japanese have ever heard, to have anything like this coming from the investigative officers, but my opinion was formed on the Japanese prior to the 7th of December and it is based on information which I have received in this territory.

Now, it was my idea, as I told the Attorney General, that it was necessary to go ahead with this prosecution. I said the Japanese system, to a large extent, worked through the contact of these sub-consular agents and that when they took the census of the Japanese population that was for military purposes or for other purposes but that it was a technical violation of the law and was the only means by which we could get at them to dig [1453] into their espionage system.

Some people will tell you, and I think if you go into the files of the investigative agencies you will find, that we have little or nothing in our hands with respect to the Japanese espionage system. Some people will say that they knew all about it before the 7th, but I was very familiar with the work of their organization and I was generally familiar with the subject and worked with all their investigative agents, and I had no idea, but these things happened, and there is nothing to give us any information about it.

Well, I do not know how far you gentlemen want me to go. I do not want to go into too much of a detailed background, but this is a

thing that is directly affected by the economic problems and has affected the economic life of this territory for years, and it will affect it as long as the control is concentrated in the hands of a few men who have their own selfish interests and they are used to doing business as they want to do business and in no other way, and they will brook interference from no one.

I do not know how much you want me to say.

The CHAIRMAN. This is just following it up.

With regard to the Army's belief that it would be better not to have this and the advice received at that conference, what instructions did you receive from then on?

Mr. TAYLOR. After recommending that these prosecutions be instituted—I think it was June 21, 1941—and at the same time the General through his staff officer gave me his opinion on it and began working through the Secretary of War. Then my next communication was to the effect that whether I should proceed with the prosecution unless I could give some more reasons to the Secretary of War and there was a cablegram from General Short in which he stated that he had been advised by the F. B. I. men and many other investigative agencies—to the War Department—that such propaganda program would be successful and [1454] they had nothing to fear.

There were other communications and the thing was terminated, but I had already communicated with Washington, with the Department of Justice, as to whether I should come to Washington and lay the facts before them, and they were still considering whether I would be authorized to travel when this thing happened on that Sunday.

This has been going on for years. With respect to this particular problem they had a technical violation and that is just where it stood.

Then on that Sunday they picked these people up. They are now in custody but they could have prosecuted them before. That is the status of the subconsular agents at the present time. They are in custody, but they were known for years and nothing was done about it until hostilities began.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your attitude as to the Japanese here, should there be any Japanese victories or should there be a threat of a real invasion here by the Japanese, on this island?

Mr. TAYLOR. I think, Mr. Justice, that there is no doubt that a majority of the younger Japanese of the third generation or American citizens will immediately turn over to their own race. There is no question in my mind about that.

I appreciate the fact that many of them would like to lead a peaceful, normal life here, and maybe that is why they came here, and many would like to be loyal, but no matter whether they would like to live a peaceful life—and the Japanese as a rule are a law-abiding group—but it is the system they have. The head of the group is the martyr of the family, and his word is law. No one can question his opinion in any way. If he orders it they must do it. Then he is answerable to the district leader or the subconsular agents, in some instances, and that man is answerable to the consul himself or to the military agent and then right back to Tokyo.

[1455] Their Emperor is not just like our President; he is a god, and of course, as we all know, to defy him in any way would make the individual have to live a life of purgatory. So, in my opin-

ion, whether they would like to lead as peaceful a life as possible, there is no question about it, because if he receives his order from the higher-up, whether from his agent or someone in the district or from the consul or the military agent, it will be carried out, in my opinion, no matter whether he personally wants to do it or not.

The incident at Niihau should have convinced anyone if they needed convincing, because they went right over to help that aviator. Mr. Robinson said to me that he was quite sure that those Japanese there would have been loyal to us, but the minute that aviator landed they gave him assistance, and the one that probably doubted what he was doing killed himself, which is a custom of theirs.

Based on my experiences of the Japanese in this territory and on my information I think that if there were an invasion or something of that sort that they would go over to the other side.

Now, an interesting point on that is that prior to joining the Axis the Japanese we had in the country—and I checked on this and I have it from sources, an uncle who investigated it, and there was comment as to whether the Axis were right, whether the Germans were right or whether the British were right, but immediately upon joining the Axis there was no discussion about the war. They just stopped talking about it and they would not talk about it, and there was always the hope for peace between Japan and the United States and never any talk about war, and that was also in the local press. I could go on like this. Do you want me to?

The CHAIRMAN. I gather from what you say that you think it essential that the military control here should remain?

Mr. TAYLOR. That I do, most emphatically. I still have [1456] my civilian title, but I have acted as legal advisor to the executive officer of the Military Governor, Colonel Green, and I have been working with Colonel Green, but I still maintain my own office, but I do feel that you should know that I have studied this situation. I came in this territory with the Antitrust Division to look into these corporations and the structure of these corporations and so on and I learned the bad side of this territory, not both sides as you see here, as commissions do—of course there has never been a commission like this—but the usual commission sees only the beauty, and they make an investigation, and they are wined and dined and they see some hula-hula girls, and they go out and they see the Japanese children saluting our flag one time and do not see them thumbing it the next.

Now, I feel very strongly on this problem, and I have sent my reports back to Washington and they have been filed away, and I think it is important that you gentlemen realize the strength of this thing. You should realize the lobby that they maintain in Washington and the strength that they have. I can show you that by an example. The United States Government had ordered our office to file a suit for a certain piece of property, and this property was owned by the Hawaiian Dredging Company, which is a firm which is controlled and owned entirely by Walter Dillingham, a very powerful figure in this community.

[1457] As assistant I was instructed to file this condemnation suit. I did, included a certain area, and also in that area it included all of the main buildings there were, and where a pier was to be constructed they already had piers there. Well, he has numerous con-

tracts with the Army and Navy. Well, they were aghast when the Army had requested that we take over the facilities down there. I said, "Well, I am sorry. I have had instructions from the Attorney General, and the certificate of necessity was signed by the Secretary of War."

Of course, we went right ahead with it, condemned it. The title was vested in the United States, or rather, immediate possession, and we proceeded under 171 of Title 50 in that particular case and went right ahead.

Well, they could exert such power that about, oh, sometime afterwards their attorney, Mr. Rand, came to me—he represents some of the Dillingham interests—and said, "Mr. Taylor, you will receive a wire from the Attorney General in a few days instructing you to dismiss parcels 1 and 2," that area at which their facilities were located. And I did receive that wire, and we dismissed those parcels 1 and 2, at the suggestion of the Secretary of War, right on down the line, and that was contrary to the wish of the Commanding General of this area here now—if you can figure that one out.

And it is a stupid proposition from a business standpoint. Here we give back to them an area within a danger area which will be a government reservation, which we will have to give them some right of way to go over to get to their property there, which in itself is dangerous; and if we ever need that area now we will pay through the nose for it, a dollar or so a square foot. It is very valuable industrial property now.

But that is just one of the instances there, and it has always been an old Hawaiian custom. "Well, here is Taylor out here in 1935. He is digging into this anti-trust business." And it is off the subject, but it is on the subject, as far as [1458] concerns the powers that they could exert back there. Here we had an open and shut violation of the anti-trust laws. I followed my report in, and pretty soon all gone, nothing done. Nothing ever done. They did cancel those contracts, which were absurd, in violation of many laws, but no action was ever taken. And the next year, I found, now the same situation exists, and this sort of thing is rampant. Not only myself. I think you should ask other people that have had difficulties of that sort.

Here we commenced an action here by the normal means of communication, such as naval radio or commercial radio. What do they do? They are on the long distance telephone. They have the mattress all set to receive the bomb when it gets to Washington, and it hits lightly and is covered over, and that's all there is to it. And those things are not idle fancies of mine but all can be borne out by records. And that is a thing, that force and that selfish feeling, that has formed the opinions of these men which were transmitted to our officers here and on up to our higher officers up to the commanders which shaped the policy of this Territory in reference to the Japanese.

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Taylor, confining your answer to the martial law, do you think that, for instance, it should be modified in connection with the school children going to school? Do you think it should be modified to some extent there?

Mr. TAYLOR. May I say this: that right now, for instance, I think there should be certain relaxations and modifications when we get a

general alarm system in. We don't have one now. There is no way to put out a general alarm in this territory at the present time, and I personally advocate opening the schools, because I think it would help the morale of the people in general, when we had a general alarm system that would alarm every [1459] one and when we had adequate bomb shelters to take care of them in the event of a raid. Those two things. When you can answer those two questions, I would say yes. It helps out the mothers with crowded homes. They have the children hanging around there getting into trouble, stumbling over everybody. It would help morale of everybody to have the schools open. But right now it is a safety factor, and that alone, and I think that that is the idea of the Military Governor, and as soon as those two safety factors can be provided for he will relax that order in reference to the schools and any other type of public meeting that is necessary.

Admiral STANDLEY. I noticed in this morning's paper that there was a notice of a meeting of the liquor board on Friday to discuss the relaxation of the martial law in regard to liquor. What is your idea in regard to that?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I think that would come back—you see, under the present setup, going on my theory, and which a few people are coming over to now—I had very few in my camp up here until a few weeks ago, but I have a few more followers now. But it is an excellent thing from a law enforcement standpoint to have every citizen in his home. Then with the potential saboteurs that might be roaming around, if we caught any man on the street: "Why are you there?" he has got to explain why he was there, in no uncertain terms, or he is subject to prosecution.

Well, now, that can't go on forever, but we have problems here that don't exist, say, in places like England where they have almost a unified population and a general alarm system and numerous bomb shelters, and the saboteur is the exception there rather than the usual thing that you might run into.

The liquor is a problem. Now, I think if you will investigate other countries you will find that most of them have light wines and beers that can be sold, and that is the normal drink [1460] consumed by the average person, and they have allowed the pubs to be open until about nine p. m., from twelve to about nine p. m., and it is a means of recreation for the enlisted men and other personnel of that type and I think has a good effect.

But then, on the other hand, you have got to consider the problem of transportation. We have our bases located a good way from the city here, and there is the question of law enforcement with these men half swacked after being in these pubs here. Yet, on the other hand, it is really a need for fighting men to have some recreation and relaxation. But then you have got to consider, when you consider liquor, the safety angle, the curfew law that is now in existence, the transportation problem; and if you relax anything I think that a very limited relaxation as far as public places are concerned would be, after these other safety factors have been taken care of, all right, and I think I would advocate it. I don't think that for any extended period of time we can be as rigid as we are now, and it will have a direct effect on the morale of the fighting men and the citizens here.

But I think, as far as whiskey and hard liquors are concerned, they probably could be sold by the package to the individual, to be consumed in homes and not in public places. Then that would keep them at home, and it would keep down the general bellyaching that you might hear; and then with the combination of a later curfew, which you might establish at any hour you wanted—seven, nine, or ten—it would probably regulate the whole problem, help morale in general, and we would be able to operate from the standpoint of law enforcement. I have the personal belief right off the bat that no liquor, black-outs forever—this, that, and the other—that hurts morale in the long run. You can't go forever like this. The people have reacted splendidly, and with very few exceptions from the very morning of the invasion right on up they turned to, the high and the low, the man in the street and the boys shouldering arms. And they gave their houses, [1461] they gave their automobiles, everything. All blacked out. Only a mistake where it wasn't completely blacked out. And that can be worked out, I think, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is it your idea to make no changes about the relaxation until these safety measures are put into effect?

Mr. TAYLOR. Absolutely. And I think that for myself and for you gentlemen while in Honolulu, of course, we have to sacrifice something now on our setup, but it is worth it to our general safety; and I think, from the standpoint of any relaxation, there has been a little private indignation of the bar to try to further relaxation of the general orders suspending the activities of the general courts and circuit courts, the Territorial circuit courts here, because some of the lawyers were not making as much money as usual. Well, I think a lot of us are not going to make as much money as usual before this thing is over, and I think it is entirely selfish and would weaken the whole structure of martial law in this territory to relax in any way the court orders now in existence, because due to the weight of authority—there is very little authority as far as martial law is concerned and no situation exactly comparable to this. But I feel that if we should allow the civil courts to operate even in a limited manner without juries, without subpoenaing witnesses—that is, members of the Army and Navy personnel—we would so weaken our position on the other side that our military commission functioning here, its right to function in the jurisdiction, might be seriously impaired. But if in six months from now or one month from now things do clear up in such a way those things can be changed, but right now I think we should hold everything steadfast—if it is—and dig in, and then we can relax as we see fit later on. We can't do it at one time, or you can't satisfy everyone in this town, or any town, as to [1462] what they want. It is impossible.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have no further questions.

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. District Attorney.

Mr. TAYLOR. All right, sir. Nothing else?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. TAYLOR. Could I make a statement independent of questions, Mr. Justice Roberts?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. TAYLOR. I would like to make this one statement: I feel that there has been in existence prior to the invasion, and, as the evidence has come to me, since the invasion, a lack of coordination between the federal investigative agencies of this Territory. Now, I am referring specifically to the F. B. I., to the Office of Naval Intelligence, and to G-2. Those three. And I think it so important that it should be brought to your attention; and it is a thing that, due to the relation with these organizations, a statement of which I made to you in the first instance, I have a chance to closely observe.

Now, from an ideal standpoint one of those agencies should be designated as a clearing house, and any information that came to any of the three should be carefully cleared through the other two. It would eliminate the great deal of loss of time. They would be able to intelligently do the work of the offices.

Now, I know that it will be denied probably, and probably has been denied. You get the picture of a very rosy existence, friendship, arm in arm going together, but that is not the case, and I think it is time now for us to throw aside those little petty jealousies.

The F. B. I., of course, is a fine organization, an organization that I was attached to for a long time. I have great faith in their ability, but there are other good investigative agencies, too. The Army has a good man here, the Navy has [1463] a good man here, and they should get together, throw off their personal feelings, and all three work in harmony; and I think possibly if that had been done we might have scratched the Japanese espionage system, rather than each agency hoping to break the big spy case first. And that is not idle talk. I know that. I worked with those men. Naturally, from a personal standpoint each agency wants to break the first big spy case. It didn't make any difference to me; I would have prosecuted whether the Navy broke it, the Army broke it, or the F. B. I. broke it; and unless you have an intelligence clearing house and harmony among those organizations we won't get that information that is so vital to us now, we've got to have, and the officers in command of these units here, and it will directly affect tactical problems and internal problems and the whole picture.

Unless we have intelligent information no officer can operate his fleet or operate his army or any part of it or command his district intelligently, and that is one of the paramount difficulties as far as I see it, besides this other thing that has happened. I would like to see—and I think the men here probably can work that out, but it has not been worked out up to this time, and even after the invasion there was still evidence in existence—and that is the thing that should have ended all feeling—of personal feeling right here. Even if there had been any in the past, it should have been stopped right there.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask one question?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. About the Adjutant General here. General Smoot, is it?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes. General—Colonel Smoot.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does he command the Hawaiian troops that are drafted?

[1464] Mr. TAYLOR. Colonel Smoot was the officer in charge of the Hawaiian National Guard prior to the institution of the selec-

tive service system. At that time he was made director of the selective service system. Now, since the invasion there was some talk of his being in command of a home guard, but by order of the Commanding General the home guard was put under the Provost Marshal and is at the present time. I noticed in the press this morning there was some statement about his going to command some other outfit probably equivalent to a home guard, of men up from I believe 18 to 44 or 40. I don't remember the age limit, but anyway Smoot appears again this morning as being the officer in charge of some new home guard outfit, but I know definitely that he was first in charge of the home guard of Hawaii, and then that was transferred by the General's orders to the Provost Marshal and is now under the Provost Marshal.

Admiral STANDLEY. In your suspicion of the loyalty of the Hawaiians of Japanese blood, does that extend also to those who have been drafted into the service and are now being trained in the Army?

Mr. TAYLOR. I think so, sir. I think there is no limit; that is, as far as my statements go I think that one of the biggest mistakes we could ever make is to have men out there in a position where they could do harm to us, and you see these vital projects being guarded and you wonder whether we have been invaded when you look at them: it is strictly Japanese around the installations around here, guarding those posts. I personally am bitterly opposed to that, and would put them in a work battalion and put them out somewhere, out where they could do no damage, except dig a little bit if you want them to dig.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have no further questions.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to follow your statement [1465] there in regard to these various investigative agencies. I understand that these agencies have responsibilities which are independent of each other: the Navy, Pearl Harbor, the Army, the Army installations, the F. B. I., with the civilians. Is that your understanding?

Mr. TAYLOR. That is correct, sir. And prior—

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute.

Mr. TAYLOR. Oh. Pardon me.

Admiral STANDLEY. I want your answer to that. Now, then, there is necessarily, where these people are working as they are here, an overlapping of duties?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Functions. Well, now, with the setup as it is, that is, the state, the fact that there are separate agencies, they have separate responsibilities; they have overlapping responsibilities. Just how would you get that central agency? Put them all under one head?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, I think it would be very well theoretically to be under one head. They could be divided up. Prior to the invasion, for instance, if the F. B. I. had got a certain set of facts that led them to Pearl Harbor they couldn't go through and go on and call on them. That in my opinion is absurd. They should carry on through. They would turn them over to O. N. I. then, and probably they would give them all the information or possibly just say they have a possible suspect in the yard there and go and look and find out who he is, and then you lose the very basis of the investigation, and you can't carry it through.

I think at this time what should happen is that there would be a general clearing house there. The minute Capatin Mayfield would know about it Colonel Feilder would know about it or Shivers would know about it, and if necessary assign one man from each office, and there would be no feeling whatsoever; [1466] carry right on through, going into any district they wanted to go into. They would all be informed of what happened; while in the past what actually happened was: In certain cases there when they got outside of this plan, that jurisdictional plan which you just mentioned, well, they would very definitely refer it to the other one, and that was all there was to it. If they were able to break the case, fine.

And that is manifested in the Coquelle case. You are strangers here. That was the case there involving a civilian employee down at Midway. Mr. Shivers had the name first. He just turned it over, and they checked it, and you probably read about it in the press. This was a man who secreted certain maps of an area, Midway Island, and when they found out and he was apprehended by the Navy here the Navy carried through on the case entirely. Well, then when the case actually broke Shivers wanted to know from me what it was all about. I said, "See Captain Mayfield. He can tell you. I am not going to give you his confidential files."

"Oh, that's all right. We will just let it go."

Well, that is right on the line. That is no condition to exist as far as our work is concerned here. We will never get anywhere that way.

And these Japanese are the most difficult people to deal with in the world from the investigative standpoint. With any other race you would be able to deal through informers; Hell, you can buy them off for anything. But not Japanese. Money means nothing to them. You can't put the fear of God into them. They don't care about any threats of any sort of bodily harm that can be done to them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then I gather that your criticism is not of individuals but of a system; is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I think the system is bad, but I think the individuals that are carrying out the system in some [1467] instances must broaden their vision, must be able to take advice from not only their superiors but from men working under them, and I refer to Mr. Robert L. Shivers specifically, or he will never get anywhere, never be able to comprehend the situation.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your criticism, then, is of Mr. Shivers?

Mr. TAYLOR. On that line, on that one thing, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. As to the Army and Navy officials have you criticism of them in the same line?

Mr. TAYLOR. I think from that standpoint that each of the agencies have in the past held out things on the others, and when and if they petered out to nothing, sure, they gladly sent G-2 or O. N. I. or F. B. I. a complete report of what fizzled out.

We had a most amazing case here—I would like to tell you about it if you would like to hear about it—that brings out my one point on the one thing:

O. N. I. was dealing with the Mitosi case we refer to here, the phoney spy case. Someone from one of the other federal agencies

there, the tax unit, came in and said, "I have got a real man here that can turn over the spies to you." That was the thing we would all grab at. That was the best news anybody ever had.

Well, O. N. I. didn't say a word to anybody about it. "We have got a spy catcher here now, and we are going to keep him."

Well, what happened, he was a phoney. He was going out and he got cards, and he had these old alien Japanese filling them out: name, address, religion, and so forth. Where are you from? And then after they signed it he would put on there the oath of loyalty to the Japanese Government. It states, in substance, "I will protect any spy that comes into the Territory of Hawaii and assist him in any way that I can."

That was red hot. Then he had the old alien where he [1468] wanted him. So he would take that card in and come back to the victim and say, "The Naval Intelligence—" or the Army Intelligence—"has gotten that card out of my possession, but I have a Japanese clerk in that office, and if you will give me \$2,000 I can recover that card for you." And it was an excellent shakedown racket practiced over here, and here the Navy main informer was the shakedown artist, and at the same time he was giving this information to the Navy, when if they had checked with the F. B. I. they had a long record there. He had been in Kaneohe, the bughouse over here.

The police, to show how little they knew what they were doing, picked up the Navy's prize informer. Now, they took and incarcerated him, turned him over to the F. B. I., and the F. B. I. wouldn't even let the Navy see him. Figure that one out.

Admiral REEVES. I think somebody had better get busy on these things.

The CHAIRMAN. I think so too.

Mr. TAYLOR. And the case is pending in my court now, the whole record, the whole report. And then of course, certainly, there was a conference there. So the main informer of the Navy was picked up here, and the F. B. I. had him and they wouldn't let them see him, and they got together, and they were at loggerheads. The Navy still thought they had a good informer in this man because he was giving them very thorough information in reference to spies, and they had nothing but a big shakedown scheme. And still that was the whole mess there, and the one was holding the other. And there are other instances.

But there is no time now for a man's personal vanity to be satisfied. It is the old feeling that "I want to control everything." I have not said for a minute that the F. B. I. is not an outstanding investigative organization. Mr. Hoover is a fine man; he has got fine men under him. But when his men get too little to be able to cooperate a hundred percent with the [1469] other investigative agencies or to take advice, it is time for them to resign.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Very much obliged to you, sir. We have asked all the witnesses to observe the caution not to discuss anything that has occurred in the room.

Mr. TAYLOR. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you have some Army and Navy men out there. Mr. Taylor, I don't think Mr. Kimball could cover anything on this background that you haven't covered.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Could he?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, I know that you gentlemen are in a hurry, Mr. Justice Roberts, but I would suggest, sir, rather than take one man's opinion for this vicious setup that is in existence, that you hear from men born and raised here.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we have got ample evidence, I think, along the lines of your view about martial law here and about not relaxing the military control. There have been various citizens who have testified along that line, and I think that is the thing that he is particularly interested in.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, he is.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY—Recalled

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel, we have received your statement of the corrections and additions that you desire made to your evidence as given.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to include in the record your complete statement of your desire as to corrections; and then, in order that we shall have the story complete, for the use of the Commission we are going to have a retranscript of [1470] your evidence made with these insertions and corrections.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We feel that we ought not to alter the record as it was made the other day, but in order to have this a sensible running statement that we can follow, we are going to have the whole transcript, this part, revised with your corrections, so that our eye will catch the corrections and we shall have a running statement and a connected story instead of the broken story that the record shows.

(Statement of Admiral Kimmel as to recommendation for revision of transcript is as follows:)

HONOLULU, T. H., *January 5, 1942.*

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.

To: President's Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

Subject: Recommendation for Revision of the transcript of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29.

1. On page 530 of the transcript to the record there appears a statement "Admiral Kimmel read from a statement." It is requested that this statement be included in toto at this point, to face page 530. The statement that was read follows:

"In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received from Patrol Wing TWO and the Task Forces which were operating at sea. The Staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and [1471] directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full information and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be assembled.

"It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose as a result of the attack rather than to concentrate on the preparation of reports of what had occurred.

"The reports are still coming in from individual ships and I understand the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling these reports which will be submitted in due course and from them as much more effective reconstruction of events can be made."

On page 531 there appears a statement "Admiral Kimmel read from a report". It is requested that this should be amplified to include the statement that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941 number A16-3/(02088). The subject: "Report of the Action of 7 December 1941" Copy of this report appended marked "Kimmel exhibit number —".

On pages 533, 534, and 535, it is stated that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report entitled 'Narrative of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid, December 7, 1941', " The following additions should be made:

"This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941 is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, [1472] submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) to Kimmel exhibit number —."

On page 537, the statement appears that "Admiral Kimmel read from a report entitled 'Disposition of Task Forces on December 7.'" There should be added at this point the statement that this report was enclosure (D) to the report of the action of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088) and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel exhibit number —.

My written statement of 17 pages which I read at the hearing on 27 December, together with such interpolations as may have been made in the reading thereof has been omitted from the transcript. It is requested that this statement, together with all interpolations that may have been made be included, beginning on page 538 of the transcript. The insertion of this statement is considered absolutely essential for the completeness of my recorded testimony.

On page 546 and page 547 I request that it be made clear that the letter referred to was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and that all the quoted matter on these pages were a part of the same letter.

On page 548, 7th line from the bottom—the word "Investigation" should be changed to "recommendation."

On page 549—It is requested that the following be eliminated beginning with line 2, "In the letter of the Bureau of Ordnance which modified this, I particularly stated that I did not take it in, and [1473] after this the thing was thoroughly gone over. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir," and the following inserted in its place "I have some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir."

14th line from the bottom, add—This is my exhibit 15 and should be appended as part of the record as Kimmel exhibit number — and so referred to at this point.

On page 550, line 10 from the bottom—It is requested that this security order, my exhibit number 16, be appended to the record as Kimmel exhibit number — and that a note to that effect be made at this point.

On page 551—The order of October 14, 1941, "Kimmel exhibit number 2," should be inserted at this point in its entirety as Kimmel Exhibit. This is numbered Exhibit 16 in Admiral Kimmel's folder.

On page 552, line 1—The words "exhibit 18" should be deleted as they are not germane at this point.

On page 553, line 7—Delete the words "Exhibit 19" which are not germane at this point.

On page 556 it is noted that following paragraph 4 of the joint air agreement the authentication is omitted. This authentication is: "Approved 21 March 1941, signed C. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department."

[1474] On page 556-0, line 2 from the bottom—before the word "Pearl" insert the words "the defense of".

On page 558, line 1—there should be put a period after "practically" and the remainder of the sentence deleted.

On page 561, line 18—change to read "We had not sufficient air force to maintain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force left to go after the enemy when we found him".

On page 562 reference is made to Kimmel exhibit 3, to be included in the testimony. This has already been quoted in extenso in the transcript beginning on page 556 and extending to page 556-0 through pages 556-A-556-N, and concludes on page 556-0.

On page 567 at the bottom of the page add: "This is included as my exhibit number 9", which I request be appended as Kimmel exhibit number —, and be so referred to at this point.

On page 571, line 9—delete the words "I think" and substitute the word "for".

On page 571, lines 12 and 13—delete the words "which were" and the words "and they". On line 16 substitute "80%" for "99%" and in line 18 substitute "90%" for "99%". Line 21—change to read: "It appears that almost all the ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm". Line 11 from the bottom—change to read: "We had all guns fully manned, in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm". The remainder of the paragraph to stand as it is.

On page 572, line 18—change to read: "Some of them didn't even think about reporting the time they opened fire". "This is a special report in answer to a specific questionnaire".

[1475] On page 573, line 7—delete the words "no matter whether we had the same man or not". Line 12 adds: "Except that two .50 caliber guns were completely manned".

On page 575, line 7—change "Unav" to "Bunav".

On page 577, line 10 from the bottom—delete the words "they also made another". Line 9 from the bottom should read: "They were to make the daily search until further orders". Line 8 from the bottom—delete the words "and because we only had that one patrol squadron there". Begin a new sentence with "We".

On page 578, line 8—change the word "They" to "We".

On page 602, line 13 from the bottom—change to read: "It is the same subject", etc.

On page 604, line 14—change "landed" to "launched".

On page 607, line 8—change to read "To cover that circuit around Oahu continuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a surprise air attack". Line 14, change to read: "We would have to run a patrol", etc. Line 18—following "but" eliminate "to do anything but and substitute "doing anything other than what".

On page 611, line 5—change "decks" to "docks"; eliminate "the bridges" and substitute "board".

On page 612, line 1, add: "We delayed the sortie of heavy ships due to the report that mines had been dropped in the channel". Line 2—eliminate the word "them" and substitute "the cruisers". Line 3—change to read: "By that time the mine report was discounted and she went out".

On page 612, line 8—change to read: "Batdiv-1, consisting of three ships, came in on the third: Batdiv-2 [1476] and 4, consisting of five ships, came in some days before that".

On page 614, line 13 from the bottom—change the word "agreement" to "schedule". Line 11 from the bottom—change to read: "and they were due to come in, Task Force One on 28 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 December". Line 4 from the bottom—after the word "had" insert the words "more than".

On page 615, line 8—change to read "I think that Task Force Three was out in its entirety" and eliminate the words "I think the Task Force was out at Midway in its entirety". Line 16—Change to read: "Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, with the information service that we now know the Japanese had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our ships had been at sea the Japanese would have held off for another chance and tried another time".

On page 616, line 2—after the word "embarked" add "American passengers". Line 2 after the word "we" change the word "have" to "had". Line 3 after "believe" change "it" to "American passengers". Line 4 after the word "sea" put a period.

On page 618, line 2 from the bottom—change "have 4" to "had 12".

On page 619, line 10 from the bottom, add: "From Pearl Harbor".

One page 622, line 2—put a period after "this". Remainder of paragraph 1 to read "We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track

was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for this submarine to have [1477] passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have made was reported to me but I have not checked it".

On page 623, line 5 from the bottom—eliminate the words "it is in this report" and substitute therefor "there was an intelligence report some time ago, as I remember it", etc.

On page 624, line 4 from the bottom—place a period after "report" and substitute "then the air raid started" for "that an air raid started".

On page 625, line 3—eliminate the paragraph and substitute therefor: "No sir" "I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was reported to me was that a destroyer had depth bombed a submarine".

On page 626, line 11—eliminate the words "and of the board" and substitute therefor the words "that bore". Line 13—eliminate "twenty-ninth" and substitute "twenty-seventh".

On page 627, line 10 from the bottom—after "175" insert the word "patrol".

On page 628, line 7, eliminate the words "planes for defense" and substitute therefor the words "plans for advance".

On page 631, line 2 from the bottom—change "no" to "yes".

On page 633, line 6 from the bottom—eliminate the word "difficult" and substitute the word "duty".

On page 636, line 3 from the bottom—after the word "very" insert the word "good".

On page 639, line 10 from the bottom, add: "When I received the air raid warning at about 7:50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the Fleet in Pearl Harbor".

[1478] On page 664, in order to clarify the record it is suggested that the letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts, dated February 17, 1941, number OP-30 C 1-AJ (SC) N20-12 serial O10230 be inserted in the record at this point.

On page 665, line 17—eliminate the word "Whitehead" and substitute the word "wide".

On page 666, line 7—eliminate the words "there was one torpedo by the RALEIGH and I got that and examined it, but the one up here blew the head off and I do not think they recovered the head".

Reason. This statement does not make sense and is not essential testimony.

On page 672, line 5 from the bottom—eliminate the words "leave that out".

On page 692, line 2—eliminate the word "first". After "out" in the 3rd line delete "nothing whatever stayed at this end" and substitute therefore: "About every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out".

On page 692, line 15 from the bottom—eliminate the sentence "A whole lot of the stuff is we lack experience".

Also "General McCoy in questioning the Army Commander the other day Admiral Kimmel will you cut that out, that's all right, I don't—I'd rather not say."

In connection with the discussion which appears on page 694 I did not bring out a fact which was well known to me and that is that my headquarters furnished the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with a copy of our operating schedule which [1479] showed the ships which would be in port during any given period and also the ships which were at sea and the general areas in which these ships were operating.

On page 697, line 13—change the word "motored" to "motive". Line 12 from the bottom—change to read "over and above the extended overhaul period which occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months".

On page 700, line 4—change "battle" to "battleship". Line 11 from the bottom—change to read "only by having double crews for each plane and by having new planes coming in very rapidly".

On page 701, last line—change "personally" to "permanently".

On page 705, 6th line from the bottom—change to read "I think there were five battleship captains—I can get you a list of them for the record".

On page 707, line 4 from the bottom—change the word "deck" to "board".

On page 709, line 12 from the bottom—after the word "would" put in the word "not".

On page 710, line 10—after the word "that" put in the word "way".

On page 712, lines 9 and 10 from the bottom—change the word "Koonce" to "Coontz".

On page 713, line 11—eliminate the words "Chief of Staff" and substitute the words "Commander-in-Chief and his Staff".

On page 715, line 4 from the bottom—change second "director" to "chief".

On page 716, line 5—eliminate "that" and the comma following.

[1480] On page 718, line 8—eliminate the word "familiar" and substitute therefor "friendly".

On page 727, line 14 from the bottom—delete the word "and" before "catch".

On page 728, line 8—change the word "release" to "relief". Line 10 from the bottom—eliminate the words "of known weight" and substitute "and supplies".

On page 731, line 7—change "twenty-fourth" to "twenty-seventh".

On page 732—Admiral Theobald's answer at bottom of page—strike out entire answer and substitute therefor: "You asked for this paper this morning. It shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief".

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I would like to say that I have submitted to the Commission this letter of January 5 requesting that the transcript of my testimony which you permitted me to examine be revised.

I found on examining the transcript of testimony that many essential features of my testimony had not been recorded in the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I feel that unless these are included, in order in which I presented them to the Commission, that the testimony will not present an accurate picture of my position and my actions prior to and doing the attack.

In addition to this, the transcript contains a large number of clerical inaccuracies which either distorted or clouded the meaning or produced passages which were unintelligible. I spent the better part of two days, assisted by Rear Admiral Theobald and a stenographer, in my endeavor to reconstruct an accurate version of the testimony which I [1481] presented before this Commission. In view of the extensive change necessary in the transcript, I request that I be given another opportunity to examine the transcript after the corrections have been made.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be a pretty big job for us to get this re-write of the transcript, but I suspect we can arrange that to the Admiral's satisfaction. How about that?

General McCoy. I should think so.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, sir, I can be available to examine it as fast as they finish it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And I should be able to finish my examination as soon as they finish the culmination of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we will get in touch with you and advise you how we can arrange that.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That was just a suggestion, I mean.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we want to meet your views about that, and I think we can.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand that you wish to add to your testimony something that you omitted on page 694, and I want to see that we have this:

In connection with the discussion which appears on page 694 I did not bring out a fact which was well known to me, and that is that my headquarters furnished the headquarters of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with a copy of our operating schedule which showed the ships which would be in port during any given period and also the ships which were at sea, and the general areas in which these ships were operating.

[1482] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. And you wish that added to your testimony?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And in amplification I had written out practically the same thing in other words here. But, in addition to that, the Commanding General requested me to supply his headquarters with only one copy of such schedules, for security reasons. This practice of supplying the Commanding General with a copy of our operating schedules was initiated several months before the attack, and continued.

That was something that of course I knew perfectly well, but I can't recall everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Admiral KIMMEL. There is one additional thing sir, that I would like to call to the attention of the Commission. In my testimony I indicated that we believed we could not keep up a continuous search and patrol with the long-range planes available, except for a very short time. I wish to invite your attention to the joint air operating plan and estimate in effect at the time of the attack. This operating plan had been in effect for several months. You will note that this same conclusion was arrived at by the two senior air commanders in the Hawaiian area, Rear Admiral Bellinger, commanding Patrol Wing Two, and Major General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force. I cite this merely to demonstrate clearly that this matter had been thoroughly considered months prior to the attack.

Now, I haven't the papers here, but an examination of that joint air operating plan, which was gotten up by Major General Martin and Rear Admiral Bellinger and approved by General Short—

The CHAIRMAN. And Admiral Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. —and Admiral Bloch, contained that very [1483] statement.

The CHAIRMAN. We have the paper before us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I knew you did. I just want to call attention to that.

Admiral THEOBALD. It is in evidence in one of the other exhibits.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is in evidence, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I just want to call attention to that last thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, there is a matter that in your interest we would like to ask you about for a moment.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We find on examining the transcript that, while you state that you learned of the attack, it is not clear where you were on the morning of December 7 when you first learned of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in my quarters in the Navy Yard area. They telephoned to me the air raid warning, which came almost immediately after I got the word of the submarine attack, and I went out of my quarters, saw the attack, the first attack made by the planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. Got into the car and went directly to my headquarters, and I was in my headquarters—

The CHAIRMAN. And your headquarters are where with reference to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Submarine Base.

The CHAIRMAN. At the Submarine Base?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And from the Submarine Base you directed and issued your commands?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

[1484] The CHAIRMAN. To meet the emergency?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You remained on duty there throughout the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We wanted just to clear that up. I think that clears it up, doesn't it?

General McCoy. Not entirely.

Admiral KIMMEL. Off the record, sir. And I mean off the record, because they have put in a lot of these things here.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McCoy. I would like to get that on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I want it on the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. It happens that after I had reached my headquarters and was watching the attack out of the window a .50 caliber machine gun bullet struck me on the chest a glancing blow. I picked it up; I have the bullet now.

Admiral THEOBALD. Spent bullet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral THEOBALD. It was a spent bullet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. General, you have some questions?

General McCoy. Yes. I am just thinking a moment.

Have you presented in evidence in your first appearance before the Commission or in this corrected report a sequence of orders that you issued that morning during and after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was contained in the—wait just a moment. The substance of it was contained in the—

The CHAIRMAN. Report of December 21st? I don't think so.

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I was trying to get the thing the way I designated it. "The disposition of task forces."

The CHAIRMAN. Which is to go in here now?

[1485] Admiral KIMMEL. Which is a part of the record. In addition to that, we presented to the Commission, as I recall it, the dispatch orders that we sent out. That, I think, is a part of the enclosures which Mr. Howe has.

Mr. Howe. Yes, I have those right here, sir.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[1486] General McNARNEY. Admiral, were you cognizant of the incident which happened on the night of December 7 with regard to losing some of our carrier planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Did I know about it?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I did.

General McNARNEY. Did you direct any investigation to be made of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Have any corrective measures been taken?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. That is all I wanted to know.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say this, as long as this has been brought up, that about 10 o'clock in the morning Admiral Halsey asked me if the fields in here were available, whether Ford Island was available for his planes in case of necessity. I answered yes because they were.

I did not think any more about it. He notified us that six fighters were coming in. The Commandant of the District knew that six fighters were coming in and my headquarters knew the six fighters were coming in, and the Army knew the six fighters were coming in, and we informed all the ships in the fleet that the six fighters were coming in.

They came in with lights on.

The CHAIRMAN. Running lights?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, with running lights on. Unfortunately, instead of going right down and landing at Ford Island, the smoke from the burning oil overshadowed the whole place and they were blinded and tried to get in there and they came right up over the ships.

Now, you must remember that these people on the ships had undergone a terrific experience. One ship opened fire, and the trigger fingers were very itchy, and when that one ship opened fire the whole bunch opened in a fusillade.

[1487] The minute the first one opened fire I sent out the signal, "Cease fire. Cease fire." and the commandant of the District sent out the signal to cease fire.

You can well understand the feelings of these people on the ships when they saw those planes coming over them after having had their first baptism of fire. I cannot find it in my heart to be too harsh on the people who opened fire.

Much as I regret the incident, I know of nothing that we could have done other than what we did do that night to prevent it.

With the steps that have been taken, I feel certain that nothing like that will ever occur again, and if we have the warning that we had given them, it will not happen.

General McNARNEY. I had a report that our planes were fired on again on the morning of the 8th. Have you heard that?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the morning of the 8th?

General McNARNEY. Do you have any information on that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have not heard of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. Late on the evening of the 7th 18 BSP's came in from the ENTERPRISE and they were shot at.

General McNARNEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. If there is anything else that you wish to explain with respect to your testimony, do not hesitate to communicate with us, and we will give you the opportunity to do so.

Admiral KIMMEL. Thank you very much, sir. I have not anything.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, there may be something which may occur to you, and if it does call it to our attention.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. General, do you want the signals that we sent out on the morning of the 8th?

General McCox. I think I would like to have in the record [1488] the report that went out that day showing what action was taken by the Navy to meet the situation, beyond what is in the testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. General, you must realize that a great many of these orders were issued by telephone and no record whatsoever was kept of them. Things were happening fast and we were trying to get things done.

General MCCOY. Well, I just wanted to make sure that we covered the whole point of the aggressive action, so to speak, the comeback of the naval units.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn at this time until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning, in order that the Commission may visit certain of the defense installations on this island.

(Thereupon, at 12:50 o'clock p. m., the hearing was adjourned until Wednesday, January 7, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.)

[1489]

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[1490] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 7, 1942

SUITE 300, ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Honolulu, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, in answer to the Commission's call for all complaints and reports received by the Police Department of the City of Honolulu on the night of December 6, Mr. Gabrielson, the Chief of Police, has furnished a complete report which should be copied into the record at this point.

(The document above referred to is as follows:)

[1491]

DRUNKS TURNED OVER TO M- AND S-

To Military Police:

_____. Co. M. 19th Inf. Sch. Brks. Arrested at the Service Cafe at 9:30 P. M. 12-6-41 by Officer T. Sato for being drunk, staggering.

_____. Schofield Barracks. Arrested at Maunakea & Beretania Sts. at 12:35 a. m. 12-7-41 by Officer A. Lee for being drunk.

To Shore Patrol:

_____. S. S. Dobbin. Arrested at Nuuanu & Hotel Streets at 11:45 p. m. 12-6-41 by Officer A. Lee for being drunk.

_____. Pearl Harbor. Arrested at Aala Park by Officer J. C. Lee at 12:30 a. m. 12-7-41.

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL

1. _____ Lt., Naval Air Station PH was involved in a minor accident with _____ of 3450 Maunalei Ave. at about 8:30 p. m. 12-6-41 somewhere on Ala Wai Blvd. Both cars going straight ahead, no violation indicated.

2. _____ of 251st. C. A. Camp Malakole was involved in a minor accident with _____ of Hawaiian Village at 2:30 p. m. 12-6-41 on Kam Highway near new Pearl Harbor Gate. _____ had been drinking and was trying to overtake _____ car. _____ took off after accident and information broadcasted. No disposition available.

3. _____ of Co. D. 298th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was involved in a \$275. accident with _____ of House 834, Waipshu at 9:50 p. m. 12-6-41 on Kam [1492] Highway Honolulu side of Waipahu-Schofield junction and _____ was injured, receiving an abrasion to left ear, left elbow and back; taken to Waipahu Hospital and later discharged. _____ had been drinking, was trying to make a left turn and was on the wrong side of the road. Charged with Sec. 601 TC. Report No. B-44182.

4. _____ of Co. E 19th Inf. Scho. Bks. drove his car off the Kaukonahua Road cut off at Haleiwa at 12:00 noon 12-6-41. Damages \$15. and none injured. _____ had been drinking and was charged with Sec. 6281 SL '41. Report No. B-44001.

5. _____, Sgt. of Batt. C. 98th. C. A. Scho. Bks. drove off the road on Red Hill road about 4:30 a. m. 12-6-41 when his car skidded. \$125. damages, none injured. No disposition noted. No report number.

ARRESTS AND COMPLAINTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL DECEMBER 6, 1941

1. _____ Co. A. 27th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was arrested at 12:47 a. m. for tampering with vehicle belonging to _____ parked at 832 Hauoli St. Charged with Attempted Malicious Conversion and defendant turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43865.

2. _____ of USS Cassin reported being struck by _____ of Hon. Rapid Transit Co. at Alapai and King St. at 1:02 a. m. when he attempted to stop a fight between Mrs. _____ his companion and _____. Desired no prosecution. Report No. B-43867.

3. _____ of USS Rigel, PH was arrested at 9:40 p. m. at Kalakaua & Kuhio Ave. for trying to start auto belonging to Detective _____. Referred to Shore [1493] Patrol for disposition. Report No. B-43976.

4. _____ 18th Air Base, Hickam Field was found lying in the toilet in the rear of lobby of Army and Navy YMCA about 8:00 p. m. with cut on head. Treated by Dr. Raymond YAP for lacerated wound right post parietal scalp. Strong alcoholic breath. Subject did not know what happened to himself. Turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43986.

5. An unknown sailor was apprehended by the Emergency Hospital attendants for tampering with Emergency Hospital ambulance in front of Star Grill, 255 N. King St. 12-7-41 at 12:30 a. m. Turned over to Shore Patrol for disposition before arrival of police officer, therefore, name unavailable. Report No. B-43984.

6. _____ of Naval Air Base was treated at Emergency Hospital for two inch wound on right side of face. He claimed to have been injured 12-7-41 about 2:26 a. m. when glass from windshield of auto he was riding flew back and cut his face when car sideswiped a City and County street sweeper. Report B-44033.

7. _____ 21st Signal Co. Scho. Bks. claimed to have been short changed by taxi driver from the Shamrock Taxi, 12-7-41 at 1:45 a. m. Gave taxi driver \$5, and didn't receive any change. Instructed to swear out a warrant but failed to do so. Report No. B-44035.

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Kimball.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn.

[1494] TESTIMONY OF RICHARD K. KIMBALL, MANAGER OF HALEKULANI HOTEL, HONOLULU; HAWAII

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, Mr. Kimball?

Mr. KIMBALL. Richard K. Kimball, manager of Halekulani Hotel, owned by my family.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Kimball, you were born in Hawaii, were you not?

Mr. KIMBALL. I was, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And your family has been here for many years?

Mr. KIMBALL. My father came here in 1901 from Boston, and my grandmother was born in Tahiti and came here and was married on Kauai.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been manager of the Halekulani Hotel?

Mr. KIMBALL. Actively for three or four years. My father has been retired. He died a few months ago. I have been with him since 1933.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been a member of the Territorial Legislature, have you not?

Mr. KIMBALL. That is correct, a member of the House of Representatives.

The CHAIRMAN. For how many sessions?

Mr. KIMBALL. Two sessions, 1937 and 1939.

The CHAIRMAN. First of all we would like to know from your observation what has been the conduct of the officers of the Army and Navy who have been guests or visitors at the Halekulani Hotel, with respect to temperance and intemperance?

Mr. KIMBALL. I would say the guests who have been registered guests, that their conduct has been excellent. [1495] I would say the senior officers who had dinner parties, as Admiral Kimmel, who was there on that Saturday night as well as having been there for other parties—but the senior officers' conduct has been very fine indeed. Some of the junior officers of the Army and Navy have used our house without a key, the lanai, for cocktail parties, and that has been almost notorious and it is difficult in stopping those cocktail parties, but that is the way with the younger men and they are out for having a good time, but that was long before the war started.

The CHAIRMAN. Since the emergency started have you had occasion to observe both the junior and senior officers with respect to temperance?

Mr. KIMBALL. Not so much so the junior officers, no.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the conduct of the enlisted personnel if they are on leave in Honolulu, from your observation?

Mr. KIMBALL. I would say it is very good, very good as a whole.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course you understand that when officers of the fleet or Army give leave to a large number of men and liquor is sold lawfully, that you cannot keep these men out of the saloons.

Mr. KIMBALL. I understand that, and I am a special police reserve officer and I have been on active duty for the last four or five months with the police, and I would say it has been exceedingly good so far as the enlisted personnel are concerned.

The CHAIRMAN. Martial law was declared on December 7 and has been in effect since. I want to know your view as a citizen interested in the City of Honolulu as to whether you think that should be abrogated.

Mr. KIMBALL. No, not in the least, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Having that in mind, that the emergency [1496] exists and that another attack might well be planned on Hawaii, do you think that the martial law should be held firmly?

Mr. KIMBALL. Firmly, and also that no one should be allowed on the streets any more than they are now, without a real reason and without a proper pass to identify themselves. I have been on police duty night after night, and it is wonderful to see how the streets are, and that is as it should be.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view as to the possible disloyalty of Japanese aliens and first and second generation Japanese if there should be an attack on this Island or if the Japanese should make a threat here?

Mr. KIMBALL. I feel as in the case when the aviator landed on Niihau, and I brought this along (referring to a newspaper) but the two Japanese over there went with the aviator against the Hawaiians of the Island. Mr. Robinson, the man who owns that Island loved those two Japanese and felt they were very loyal and true and would never turn against him, but they did. They captured the Island of Niihau and had it as a Japanese prize for a short time.

That is an example of their loyalty to us when they have a chance to be loyal to their Emperor.

I would say that the vast majority of Japanese are—and I am going to be a candidate for election again in this Territory and the Japanese almost dominate the vote, but I have said it openly before and I will do it again—that the vast majority of Japanese would be loyal to us just so long as we were on top, but they would turn just as soon as the tide began to turn, and I think that very few of them would remain loyal long enough to go down fighting for the American flag—very few.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Taylor yesterday thought that there might be certain business interests in the community that would bring strong pressure to have the civilian rule restored so [1497] that business could function more freely, and he thought that to yield to that business motive would be a mistake under the present conditions. How do you feel about that?

Mr. KIMBALL. I agree with him absolutely. Shall I elaborate?

The CHAIRMAN. He fully went into his reasons. I simply was interested in know whether you concurred in his statement.

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General MCCOY. It just occurs to me in your mentioning of this incident on Niihau that we have not a record of that in our testimony, and it seems to me to be an outstanding incident that certain indications can be drawn from both as to the Japanese and the Hawaiians.

Do you happen to know whether this account in the newspaper is a full and accurate account?

Mr. KIMBALL. I do not say that it is a full account, but the facts have never been repudiated. I think that the gist of it is there.

General MCCOY. I wondered if that case had been investigated officially. Do you know?

Mr. KIMBALL. I could not say.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. In connection with Mr. Kimball's testimony he has filed a copy of the Honolulu "Advertiser" of Tuesday, December 16, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Kimball, you said you had been serving with the police as a reserve officer.

Mr. KIMBALL. That is right, without pay.

Admiral STANDLEY. Without pay. That has been for several months?

[1498] Mr. KIMBALL. We were trained and started back last summer. The chief asked for 150 young businessmen in town to volunteer for police training. It was a movement particularly to get the business people of Honolulu interested in his problem, and he went before the session of the Legislature and asked for 100 more men and tried to convince them, and he did convince us, and a group of us got together and went to the press to get favorable editorial comment and went to the Legislature, and we were able to get him the appropriation for 100 additional officers.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the nature of the training?

Mr. KIMBALL. We were trained first at night classes once a week for three hours, at the Central Grammar School Auditorium. That was just lecturing. And then demonstration in jiu-jitsu, but not real juijitsu classes for six weeks, but we saw how the police officers are trained.

Then we went out on prowler duty in the radio cars one night a week, and we are doing that now as a regular thing. We did that to see how they worked and learned the general technique.

The chief had in mind that if there was a major riot on the waterfront that he could put his real police officers down there and leave the reserve officers to patrol the rest of the community, and I wish to commend the chief of police on his whole conduct throughout this.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did this duty take you into the congested districts of the city?

Mr. KIMBALL. No, my area was out in the residential area, not in the slums, if that is what you mean.

Admiral STANDLEY. You did not get down in those areas?

Mr. KIMBALL. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know anything about the men on liberty there from the Army or Navy on Saturday nights?

[1499] Mr. KIMBALL. No, I would not know.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do not take this.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[1500] Admiral STANDLEY. I understand that there has been some effort toward providing rest centers for crews of vessels which have come back from long cruises, naval vessels. Have you any information in regard to such efforts?

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes, I have. I was asked by—this is off the record again. Shall I give the names of the officers who have contacted me on the subject?

Admiral STANDLEY. Put it on the record, yes; I want the story.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KIMBALL. Commander O'Leary asked me, as manager of the Halekulani Hotel, if we could provide for a group of 60 or so men coming in from sea duty a place where they could come and relax and get away from the Navy Yard for a few days. He got the idea, I believe, because we had just had a group of New Zealand and Australian troops at the Halekulani Hotel who were brought down

from the Coast, had been here for a week or so and then taken back again because they couldn't get them back to New Zealand. He had seen how nicely they fitted in there among the guests. It seemed to be a lift to their morale to be there, and he felt it would be fine if these men that he knew of, apparently, that were coming in could come in and do likewise, have a good bed and get away from the environment and get a little sunshine, as he put it. And he made arrangements for them, and the men did come, conducted themselves very nicely.

I sent Admiral Bloch a letter suggesting if he had any other groups of that sort coming that we would be glad to take care of them on a moderate basis. I didn't mention the price we would charge. Admiral Bloch called me on the phone shortly afterwards and asked me to quote him right over the telephone what we would charge for also food, not only give them a room. I said that we would not be interested in feeding them. It would be too much of a problem. Much of our staff were gone, [1501] taking waiters' jobs out in these camps and various places, so that our staff is materially reduced, having no more tourists coming in; and he asked me to let him know immediately what we would charge per man.

I wrote him a letter—and I will submit you a copy of that letter if you would like—stating that we would not be able to feed them but we could house them, and if necessary we would give them the cash each day for their food, so that they wouldn't be out of cash any day, and we would make them a price of say, \$2.50, and we would give them a bed a night for a dollar and give them a dollar and a half out of cash, which we would charge the Navy \$2.50 a man for. That is, they would be feeding themselves; that was a little too much of a job. He wanted us to take up to 200. I said we could only take 60, 75 at the most, at the present time, because at the present time we have about 50, 60 tourists at the hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the conduct of those men was exemplary?

Mr. KIMBALL. Oh, I should say so. Fine.

General McCoy. Are you through, Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General McCoy. Are you acquainted with the efforts of certain ladies of the community, headed by Mrs. Wayne Pflueger and Mrs. Edward Carpenter, to provide such environment for sailors and soldiers when they are ashore in Honolulu?

Mr. KIMBALL. Yes, through the papers I have seen about it. I haven't followed it very closely.

General McCoy. I understand they have taken over a club known as the Outrigger Club.

Mr. KIMBALL. In the Advertiser I notice an advertisement that hostesses would welcome fleet personnel; "service personnel," I believe it says, and states the prices for sandwiches and coffee and things.

General McCoy. And there has been an effort on the part [1502] of the community to meet the situation of soldiers and sailors in the city of Honolulu on liberty?

Mr. KIMBALL. You mean before the war started?

General McCoy. Yes.

Mr. KIMBALL. Or after? Before the war?

General McCoy. At any time.

Mr. KIMBALL. The whole time I would say that the community's interest in the welfare of the men has been most noticeable. I mean they were very anxious to help, and they have done a lot, and people have had them into their homes on numerous occasions. My wife has gone down and been a taxi-dance girl at the sailors' dances and things, and lots of girls here have done it. Anything to help the men have a good time for an evening. I would say it is very commendable the way the community has conducted itself in that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Kimball.

Mr. KIMBALL. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Please observe the caution: we have asked all witnesses not to discuss what has gone on in here.

Mr. KIMBALL. May I leave something with you here that I feel is of interest to the Commission?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. KIMBALL. We had recently a special session of the legislature, and previously a regular session. At that time there was a very, very bitter fight between the Dillingham interests and the Castle & Cooke interests which are the controlling interests of the Big Five, as it is known, over a Pier 15 for the harbor, which could make it possible to stop doing business with the Dillinghams, both their railroad and their wharves; and I went to great effort after I found out how [1503] unfair the Dillinghams were being taken in this thing by the Governor, the Board of Harbor Commissioners, the controlling group in the legislature, and the agents for the Matson Steamship Company. But I went to Mr. Dillingham. The whole story is too long for the record, but I got interested in his fight, on an honest and fair crusade, and made every effort I could to expose the scandal of the way he was being beaten.

I had pictures taken of the harbor front, which the press was saying was congested because of lack of wharf space. I showed empty wharves. At the time of the congestion Castle & Cooke purposely created a congestion on the harbor frontage here in order to make it seem to the public necessary to build a huge public wharf with public funds, which would give them the opportunity to have a complete monopoly here.

They talked the Governor into agreeing with them, and the Board of Harbor Commissioners, three of the members of which were bitterly opposed to Mr. Dillingham for previous personal reasons, and they wanted to destroy this old wharf and build a big new one there.

I contended that the old wharf was still handling cargo—ships at that date were there discharging cargo—and that the present time wasn't a time to destroy a wharf and build with new materials and lots of men at this time a new wharf.

And this is a matter of great importance in the Territory here, and it shows how far these groups, particularly the Castle & Cooke group, would go to use the press for propaganda purposes. They had every merchant in the Territory afraid to come out and help Mr. Dillingham, because the merchant has to get his cargo in here by Castle & Cooke, Matson, the public carrier. The ships were overbooked, and a merchant wouldn't be able to get his freight in if he opposed in any

way. A member of the senate who was interested in getting his merchandise in was able to get more than anyone else in his particular line of business all during this time, and he was a [1504] very vigorous crusader for the Castle & Cooke cause. The press criticized him at this time, criticized Castle & Cooke on that particular issue. But I bring this to your attention to show how far these interests, particularly the Castle & Cooke interests, will go to achieve their economic ends.

I have two wires, one sent by Governor Poindexter to Mr. Warner in Washington, and I want to leave these for your record, if I may, these two wires.

The CHAIRMAN. All right, sir.

Mr. KIMBALL. A man in the Maritime Commission, on receiving word from the Governor, went to Matson to find out the other side of the story, and if you read those wires they are very significant; the one from the Governor first. That is that one (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. What bearing, in your judgment, has this matter you just talked to us about, on the present situation?

Mr. KIMBALL. Well, I feel that the conduct of both the Army and the Navy here—their plans, whatever they have done—has been influenced by both the Dillingham interests and the other interests when what the Army or Navy planned to do in any way conflicted with the plans of either the Dillingham interests or the Big Five; and I contend that they are so influential in Washington that they are able to have their way one way or another, and I am convinced of that, and this is my personal experience with it. I have many, many instances I can cite.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the Army and the Navy ought to have their way in an emergency like this?

Mr. KIMBALL. I believe if we are going to be an outpost of national defense for this side of the hemisphere then the Army and Navy should at least be able to do it as they want to do it, and not have private interests here dictate what shall be done or what shall not be done. Difference of opinion of interests in the Territory. This wire (indicating) makes it [1505] questionable whether the Maritime Commission ought to take it up. Admiral Bloch, General Short, and Governor Poindexter recommend priorities for essential foodstuffs, recommend it unequivocally. I mean they were urging me. Admiral Bloch got after me and he just gave me the devil in no uncertain terms for not going harder after these things in Washington. In Washington somehow pressure is put on so that the people there say, "The interests in Hawaii are differing in their opinion. The sugar interests don't agree with the Admiral and the General and the Governor. Therefore we had better not do anything about it." That is just as definite as anything can be, and that has been the case here for many years, that no one has been able to rise up and question these interests here economically. They have been broken financially, and their prestige socially is broken. So that the individual who tries to question them either ends up by taking to liquor or leaving the Territory here.

Fortunately my family has a business that does not depend on the Big Five or Castle & Cooke or Matson or any other group for their existence. Tourists out here, men coming from the mainland with

their families, have had in the past to make fake bookings out of this hotel in order to get passage on a Matson steamship. After they arrive here they are cancelled, and they already have bookings with us. That is a matter of record; many many letters I have on file. I can get you reputable people in Philadelphia, New York, Boston, and anywhere that can substitute that, and the letters talk for themselves. But we have been able to get them anyhow, because they insisted on coming to our hotel. Therefore I have been able to be independent politically in our legislature. They have tried to discredit me in every way.

General McCox. Who is Mr. Warner?

Mr. KIMBALL. Mr. Warner is the head of the agriculture extension division at the University of Hawaii. The Governor [1506] appointed Mr. Warner and myself a committee of two to go into the food storage problem here. The Big Five did not want a big supply of food brought in here, and they have effectively blocked it up until war was declared, and I have a great deal of information, enough that I can substantiate that statement with. The food storage plan, which you may have heard about in Washington—three and a half million dollars that was turned down by the Budget Bureau about four months ago—was blocked, I am convinced, by people in Honolulu here who used their influence in Washington to discredit our proposal, the proposal of General Short, Admiral Bloch, the Governor, and his committee; and Admiral Bloch I think will testify the same way. Incidentally, I want to commend Admiral Bloch on his vigorous attitude towards the food problem; he has been very keen to see it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, General?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We are very much obliged to you, Mr. Kimball.

Mr. KIMBALL. All right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to leave these with us (indicating telegrams), or do you want to take them?

Mr. KIMBALL. I would like to leave them with you.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We would be glad to have them.

Mr. KIMBALL. I don't like to leave the impression that Governor Poindexter is dishonest. I believe that Governor Poindexter was misled in his judgment of this Pier 15, of the necessity for a Pier 15, and he is a very stubborn person, and he didn't like to change his stand. I believe he was just mistaken.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

[1507] **TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT GEORGE P. KIMBALL,
UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name and rank to the reporter?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. George P. Kimball, Lieutenant Junior Grade, United States Naval Reserve.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity are you serving in the Navy, now, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. In the District Intelligence Office.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your chief there?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Captain Mayfield.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been impressed, Lieutenant, by the fact that the intelligence services seem to have gotten very little in the way of espionage information on this island prior to December 7, I believe. How long were you in that service, sir, prior to December 7?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I reported for active duty on April 15, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had had a matter of eight months' service there?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What particular branch of intelligence work were you doing during this period?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I was doing office work, sir, evaluation and dissemination, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you be in a position to know whether there was cordial cooperation with your service by the services of the Army and the F. B. I.?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I would be in such a position, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What judgment did you form as to that, as to whether there was a central clearing of valuable information here?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Well, the chiefs of the three [1508] branches met weekly every Tuesday, Mr. Shivers and Colonel Bicknell of the Army contact office, and Captain Mayfield, and the personnel of the three offices would constantly visit back and forth getting information from the files of the other two offices. I know as far as we were concerned, because I had more or less charge of it, all pertinent information that we obtained, either from local sources or that we received from ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, we would send copies of to G-2 and to F. B. I.

The CHAIRMAN. And did they reciprocate by sending you anything they picked up?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. They would send us more or less their completed work.

The CHAIRMAN. Completed work?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Their reports as completed. We would try to send them as much as we could that was of general information, other than matters of purely naval interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you feel that at this time the system of three divisions of information or intelligence here locally on the island can be bettered?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I believe that the coordination can be improved. In other words, I believe there has been full cooperation but perhaps not full coordination.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your diagnosis of why it seems to be impossible to break into the Japanese community here and get what is going on in the way of espionage and subversive activities?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Well, one reason, we have all tried it. That is, the F. B. I. and our office, which have, as you may realize, under a tripartite agreement executed some time ago—the Office of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. have concurrent jurisdiction, as they refer to it—it is really responsibility—for the Japanese subversive activities; and we have both tried to develop informants and contacts

amongst the [1509] Japanese themselves, among the second-generation Japanese, but those young men are no closer, really, to the Japanese that we are really after than we are ourselves personally. And they have tried to help us as much as they could, but—

The CHAIRMAN. They don't know much?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. They don't know much, either.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does know? Who are the head devils in the Japanese intelligence here?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. The Japanese Consulate.

The CHAIRMAN. And alien Japanese aiding him?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Aliens.

General McCoy. Consular agents?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. The consulate heading it up and using perhaps some but by no means all of their consular agents. The consular agents are used mostly by the consulate for administrative purposes: that is, reporting deaths, births, marriages, and other such matters in the Japanese community.

General McCoy. Having to do with dual citizenship?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir. One of the phases.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, the fact is that you haven't been able to break into the ring very successfully, have you, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Not yet. We feel that we are getting a little bit of information now that may lead somewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. You do?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. That is, that in connecting it up with the consulate the difficult thing is to connect individuals with the consulate in other than purely legitimate activities. In other words, the heads of the two Japanese banks have had for a long time frequent intercourse with the consulate, which is easily explainable by them. The head of the local Japanese steamship line, the NYK, people like that; so it has been difficult to find people who haven't had an [1510] absolutely legitimate explanation for their intercourse with the consulate.

General McCoy. Who has succeeded the consul in the heading up of Japanese information since the 7th of December?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. We absolutely don't know, sir. We know it must be someone, because we believe that the consul felt for some time that he might be closed up any time after the Italian and German consulates were closed throughout the country; and there is no question that they made plans, had an alternative plan, and have one that they are operating under today, and we absolutely don't know where that is.

The CHAIRMAN. Has any other government taken over the consulate here for the duration, any neutral government?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Sweden was supposed to, but the Swedish consul here is a very busy American doctor of Swedish ancestry, Dr. Larsen, and I don't think he has been able to do anything in that direction, so I think everything is in status quo.

General McCoy. Has there been any continued suspicion of the former legal advisor of the Japanese Consulate, Mr. Thayer?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, no suspicion attaches to Mr. Thayer so far as I know.

General McCoy. How long had he been the legal counsel or counselor of the consulate?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. A number of years, General; oh, I would say 15 or 20 years, I believe.

General McCoy. Is he an American in good standing here otherwise?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Oh, yes. Yes, very much so. He is a member of the bar, has been for some 40 years, and has been head of the Boy Scouts here for many years, and all of my contacts with Mr. Thayer professionally as a lawyer before going on active duty led me to believe that he was a very loyal American.

[1511] The CHAIRMAN. Have you any questions, General?

General McNARNEY. Do you believe that information on the situation here is going out to Japan now?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. The only indication we have of that is their broadcasts from Tokyo. I haven't had much time to listen to them, but their overseas broadcasts probably do contain some information that is more than just guesswork and more than they were able to obtain in their one raid. That is probably going by short-wave.

The CHAIRMAN. You think there are some short-wave sets working here still?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I am not a technical man on radio.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. But that is my understanding, that is my belief, but I have no information at all, because all the licensed short-wave operators were put out of business immediately.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. It has to be a bootlegger if it is anybody?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Have you any personal knowledge of the activities which took place on the island of, I think, Niihau? A Japanese airplane landed there and took over the island.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No. There is a report. I have read a report by an Army officer who went over as soon as they got word on Kauai, and a second-hand report that the representative of the District Intelligence Office on Kauai wrote. He didn't go over to the island, but he interviewed and questioned people who had been over, and reconstructed it to the best of his ability; and then this Army officer—incidentally, a second-generation Japanese lieutenant; I can't remember his name—who went over with this expedition on the lighthouse tender, about a dozen men, and brought back the Hawaiian who actually killed the pilot, and his wife, and brought them back for [1512] hospitalization. And so those reports are available.

The CHAIRMAN. What do they indicate? Outline the incident as those reports indicate it.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. The incident is quite hazy; it is quite jumbled. The facts are not clear, but the plane came down, and these Hawaiians had no idea of what it was or why, because they have no radio at all over on the island, and the people didn't know the war had started. The pilot got out and was unarmed, and he started to attempt to dispose of his confidential papers and documents and codebooks, and so on, in his plane, and they became a little suspicious, and they wouldn't let him do that, and took him to the house of one of the natives and kept him there. And then they thought he was a pretty good sort, and

they allowed him a certain amount of leeway and latitude, and finally he got back to his plane and got his service pistol, I believe, and took control of the situation, and locked up the native who was his host, who was keeping him and then joined with this—first, before that happened, the two Japanese on the island, one Hawaiian-born and one alien, came into the picture while the Japanese pilot was still being kept as a prisoner, so to speak; and the citizen Japanese joined with him apparently quite willing. The alien was more reluctant, and the citizen got a shotgun. That is, acting in concert the pilot and the citizen Japanese did the holding up of the rest of the people, and then several of the natives became alarmed and walked to a distant part of the island where there was a whaleboat, in which they put out for the island of Kauai, and the Japanese knew that. Then he tried to destroy—then he finally got back and burned his plane, but the natives were holding his codebooks—codebook and charts and so on—and he couldn't get them, and that was what he really was after. And finally the shooting broke out, and the citizen committed suicide; and the Hawaiian—Kanahele I think his name was—who was shot at and wounded by the pilot, kind of grabbed [1513] him and killed him, with the aid of the Hawaiian's wife. In the meantime the pilot had set fire to his plane, and whether he got all of it, whether he destroyed all of his material or not I don't know, but at least his charts I think were recovered by the Army expedition that went over there. But the illuminating thing about it is the citizen who so readily joined with him when he thought the Japanese had the upper hand.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that your general impression?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. The general impression—the report by the officer, Army officer who went over there, probably gives the—I have just read it once hurriedly.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. And the newspapers have it but not in much detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant, is that your impression of the attitude that is likely to be taken by these citizen Japanese if Japan appears to be getting the upper hand?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Not all of them by any means, but by a great many who are today perfectly law-abiding citizens, if they felt—in other words, some would go down with us if it came to that point, and others wouldn't care to, but they want to appear to be with us today, and they are perfectly law-abiding and probably won't do anything as long as they—

The CHAIRMAN. Remain as they are.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. —remain as they are, under control.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

General McCoy. How would we be able to get a copy of that report? Would you be able to furnish us a copy of the Army officer's report, or would you prefer to have us get it through the Army?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I could have one of our stenographers copy it very easily, General, and send it out to you.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you do that?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, Mr. Justice.

[1514] General McCoy. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Five copies. You can just carbon it, can't you?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Five copies, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Lieutenant, where is your home?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. At the Halekulani Hotel, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you appointed to the Reserve Corps from Hawaii?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. This has been your home?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. It has always been my home, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Always been your home?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You lived here?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. In connection with your statement to the effect that information is still going out of Oahu, and in connection with the resignation of Mr. Thayer on the 8th of December after the attack, had it ever occurred to you that that might be the very logical way that Mr. Thayer would retain a continuous contact with the Japanese consul: get out immediately and give the impression that he was through, and then continue that contact in another way?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. It could be. It is possible, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I just wanted to suggest that to your mind.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Possible. I will bear that in mind, sir.

General McCoy. Has he been questioned at all by the Naval Intelligence, as far as you know?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, sir, he hasn't. He was hurt quite badly fighting a fire in his neighborhood and has been at home, and I think he has only just recently returned to his office downtown.

[1515] General McCoy. Have you, as a neighbor and possibly a friend, had any suspicion of him at any time as being involved in any Japanese subversive activities or cognizant of them?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, I haven't. I haven't, General. I haven't had any such suspicion. If Mr. Thayer were apprised of what little even we know of the espionage activities that the consulate, his former clients, have been engaged in, I think that he would probably be quite shocked. I mean he would probably have—he has no conception of what those people have been doing.

The CHAIRMAN. He has been representing them in their business affairs, I take it. The consul has, I suppose, a lot of business, legal business?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Giving them opinions on the application of local law to one situation or another, but there were various matters that we know they didn't consult him on: they consulted Japanese lawyers on.

The CHAIRMAN. There are Japanese lawyers on the island, are there?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Oh, yes, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. A number of them?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. There are about, oh, eight or nine, perhaps ten, here in Honolulu now.

General McCoy. Members of the bar?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Members of the bar, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were they by such membership obliged to be American citizens?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir, under the rules of the Supreme Court here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Lieutenant, in the espionage work upon which you are engaged secrecy is one of the great necessities or requirements, isn't it?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. In order to get information you can't [1516] let the world know what you are doing; isn't that true?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Surely.

Admiral STANDLEY. It has been suggested here that one of the faults of the system here—the three systems—is the fact that they don't immediately communicate these suspicions of something going on; or, if they feel that they have a source of information, that they should give it to the other two services at once. Wouldn't that rather jeopardize in many cases, or hasn't it been felt that that would jeopardize, the success of such an agency?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, that is one of the things that we are up against. It is desirable often to let the other two agencies know immediately, so that if they have any information that fits in with the information in the possession of the originator or the original recipient of the immediate report, it is advantageous. On the other hand, one or the other of the two other agencies might conceivably take some other action in the case that would be a tip-off. It is awfully hard to—you can't lay down any fixed rule of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a fact that the F. B. I. are not allowed to conduct investigation on Navy premises and that if they have a case they have got to run it as far as the Navy Yard and then turn it over to you?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Under what they call the—under this agreement all reports of subversive activities on naval reservation affecting Navy personnel or civilian employees or contractors' employees—Navy contractors' employees—are the responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence for investigation, but we have always tried to work in close cooperation with them, and they give us information, and they obtain as quickly as they can give it to us—for instance, they are investigating a certain individual in town and they find that he associates with some yard employees, and they give that to us immediately.

[1517] The CHAIRMAN. You run the yard end of it down?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. So you think the thing is working out pretty well, do you, this division of responsibility?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Not as well as it could, perhaps. There probably isn't as close coordination as there should be.

Admiral STANDLEY. Lieutenant, have you knowledge of any cases where the Navy Department had even gone so far as to enlist in the naval service F. B. I. representatives and taken them on board ship in order to help solve situations?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I have never heard of such a case, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I do know that is a fact.

The CHAIRMAN. Here, you mean?

Admiral STANDLEY. I don't know that it is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Somewhere.

Admiral STANDLEY. But I know that it has been done.

General McCoy. What is the representation on the part of Naval Intelligence as to responsibility on the part of Naval Intelligence for subversive activities among the natives?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Reservations, you say? You mean among the Japanese?

General McCoy. Yes.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Well, now, the Japanese field, the Japanese problem, under this agreement was left the joint responsibility of the Office of Naval Intelligence and F. B. I.; and we have fallen down in that in the past; prior to the outbreak of war our attempts at joint investigations there were not successful. Joint investigations of a particular Japanese or a Japanese commercial establishment or a hotel or barber shop or something like that, or an individual—group of individual Japanese, would be left to an agent from the F. B. I. and to an agent from the Office of Naval Intelligence, two agents to work on the same case. That wasn't successful. [1518] It was too much "Let George do it. After you." That sort of thing. That wasn't successful. It is a matter of who is in charge. Well, nobody is in charge. Well, all right, nobody is in charge, and the thing drifts. That was not successful.

General McCoy. Were you cognizant of the fact that there were, prior to December 7, several hundred consular agents here who were not registered under the law?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I was cognizant of that fact, General.

General McCoy. Do you know why they were not prosecuted or warned to register?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Only by hearsay.

General McCoy. Did you feel that that was a great danger yourself, to have them loose without any supervision?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I thought that they clearly came within the provisions of the Registration Act and should have been required to register, and, if they failed and refused, then prosecuted. That was merely my personal opinion.

[1519] General McCoy. How long has the Navy had a counter-espionage organization on the Islands?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Well, we have had the District intelligence for a number of years, but it was very small and very inadequate.

General McCoy. Inadequate?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Very inadequate in size and personnel up until the end of 1940, and then they began to gradually add to it.

General McCoy. What was the size of the counter-espionage organization as to the number of field operators you had on December 6?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. We had a dozen in the main office, over at Pearl Harbor, and in the individual branch offices. There was one man at the Kanehe Naval Air Station and a man at the Naval Munition Depot at Lualualei, and one on each of the main islands.

General McCoy. Is there any shortage of funds at this time for this purpose?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I am not familiar with that, General. I could not say. I have had nothing to do with the administrative end of the office and I could not tell you that.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your office cognizant of the fact that some of these islands had sheriffs and some peace officers who were Japanese?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes.

General McCoy. Were any of those agents whom you mentioned of Japanese blood?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, we had no agents in the office of Japanese blood. We have one Hawaiian and one Chinese-Hawaiian.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any translators of Japanese blood?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. We have a Japanese translator, yes.

[1520] Admiral STANDLEY. But so far as you know, there were no Japanese agents?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. We have undercover informants who volunteer. They are nonpaid informants. They are the people I mentioned before, citizens of Japanese ancestry. We placed a good deal of confidence in them, but I think they were as much in the dark, I am convinced, as some of the rest of us.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have any check on the Japanese translator?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. He had been in the office for quite a long time, Admiral; before I came on active duty. He did not have access to or work with the confidential files. His work has largely been translating newspapers up to the war, and of recordings of overseas broadcasts from Tokyo, and that sort of thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. You accepted them without question?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir. His work was always subject to check by his immediate superior, Lieutenant Carr, who is head of the translation section and who is a very gifted linguist.

Admiral STANDLEY. Does he speak Japanese?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, very well. He speaks that along with 26 other languages.

We have several other language officers.

Admiral REEVES. Am I correct in my understanding of what you say that the intelligence work among the Japanese populace is the joint responsibility of the Navy Intelligence and the F. B. I.?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, that is correct.

Admiral REEVES. I understood from the testimony of Mr. Shivers that it was the Naval Intelligence responsibility alone under this distribution of the work by the agreement that you had entered into.

[1521] The CHAIRMAN. I did not so understand his testimony. I understood his testimony was that the F. B. I. was originally to take it all but that it was not equipped to take it all and asked the Navy to come in until they could be so equipped, and since that time there has been a division of it.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. That is correct, Mr. Justice.

Admiral REEVES. Who has the responsibility now?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. It is still joint, Admiral; it is still a joint responsibility. We have no limit. We have no lines of demarcation or division.

Admiral REEVES. The F. B. I. has never taken that over entirely?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, they have not.

Admiral REEVES. But that was the original plan, that the F. B. I. would take that over when they were equipped to do so?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, and then they found particularly here and I believe on the West Coast also that the Navy had been working

along that line to such an extent that they had a lot of background information, and that was one of them, one of the observations that the Navy continue in the field of Japanese activities, Japanese espionage and propaganda.

Admiral REEVES. How has this joint responsibility of the Navy and the F. B. I. worked out with respect to the Japanese populace? How has it worked out?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. It has caused somewhat of a hiatus. It has caused a few holes in the fish net unfortunately, but through no one's fault in particular. That is the case when two organizations try to cover an entire field without any demarcation or delimitation, and you do not always know where the other fellow is going to put his neck and he does not know where you are going to put your neck.

Admiral REEVES. Then there is no clear understanding [1522] between the Navy and the F. B. I. as to the character of work that each shall undertake?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, it is case by case. We will not investigate a case they are actively investigating because of the duplication.

Admiral REEVES. Is it possible, then, that both the Navy and the F. B. I. may concentrate on subversive activities among the Japanese populace and both have overlooked the espionage activity?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I think there has been that tendency. The F. B. I. called that internal security, to go after people who have what they call definitely nationalistic tendencies. That is, they referred to to those who were strongly pro-Tokyo who perhaps would be dangerous in the event of war, and those are the people who are at present on Sand Island.

Of course, a good Japanese agent is not going to be actively pro-Japanese and offensively so. So, I think perhaps they may have overlooked some of the most important ones for those who have been most offensive by their statements.

General McCoy. I understand those now interned on Sand Island are being investigated by a board before which they can appear and state their case. Are you familiar with that board?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. That is the internment procedure. They were taken over originally for temporary custodial detention, and their cases are now being heard by two boards functioning in the same manner. They are two three-man boards.

The board or boards determine whether they should be interned for the duration of the war.

General McCoy. Are they civilian boards?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir, General.

General McCoy. Completely?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, on the boards are only civilians [1523] and they are advisory only.

General McCoy. They cannot turn a man loose just on his own statement?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No. That is subject to the approval of the Military Governor.

General McCoy. Are steps taken to investigate the background of these people before the military authorities act on them? Do you know whether they do that, or simply review the proceedings of the board?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. All the people on Sand Island were previously investigated, and they were put there as a result of the investigation which was completed prior to the outbreak of the war.

The CHAIRMAN. They were placed on a list after the investigation?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes, sir, Mr. Justice. The F. B. I. has got a list, of course, and some of them were names that our office had contributed—a great many—and others that they had discovered themselves, and others that the Army had contributed.

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be difficult for you to get us a copy of that working agreement between the three agencies? Is it in the form of a letter?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No.

General McCoy. I think if possible that it would be better for us to get that.

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Army Intelligence offered to give us a copy.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I can get it easily enough.

The CHAIRMAN. There would not be any difficulty on your part in producing it?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. No, I could go right to Captain Mayfield.

[1524] The CHAIRMAN. You can say to him that either he or Colonel Bicknell offered it to us and we passed it by. I would like to look at it.

Lieutenant KIMBALL. I can get five copies made of that agreement.

Admiral REEVES. Do you think that the intelligence work now conducted by these three agencies would be more efficient and conducted in a better manner if there were only one controlling head in charge of the three agencies?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. That would be possible, Admiral, only insofar as the work did not apply purely to one service or the other. The Office of Naval Intelligence should properly have the exclusive responsibility for the workmen at Pearl Harbor and to investigate the background of those of foreign ancestry or people working at the yard about whom there may be reports that they are acting suspiciously.

Admiral REEVES. Do you understand that my question is applied to the local situation?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Locally, as applied to the Japanese, I think it would be more advantageous to have it in one head, yes, without losing any of the advantages of having the different ideas coming from the Army on one hand, the Navy on the other, and the F. B. I. on the third. I think the power and the control should be in one person's hand as far as the Japanese are concerned.

Admiral REEVES. That is what I mean. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please observe the caution not to discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room?

Lieutenant KIMBALL. Yes.

[1525] **TESTIMONY OF YEE KAM YORK, FIELD EXAMINER AND AUDITOR, TERRITORIAL TAX OFFICE, HONOLULU, HAWAII**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Mr. YORK. Yee Kam York. This is my American passport (handing paper to the chairman).

I originally had this passport from the Philippines. Are you General McCoy?

General McCoy. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in Hawaii?

Mr. YORK. Well, I was born here and I left here at an early age—I think I was about ten—and returned the latter part of 1937 after the second attack by Japan on Shanghai.

The CHAIRMAN. You are employed here, are you not?

Mr. YORK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In what capacity?

Mr. YORK. I am employed as field examiner and auditor at the Territorial Tax Office, in the Bureau of Examiners.

The CHAIRMAN. You have had occasion, then, to talk to many Japanese who are also American citizens?

Mr. YORK. Yes, sir, and aliens.

The CHAIRMAN. And aliens too?

Mr. YORK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the Commission the benefit of your judgment as to the attitude of the Japanese population on these Islands in an emergency or in case of a Japanese threat or attack upon Hawaii?

Mr. YORK. My very mature judgment as very reluctantly given is that in case of the acid test that a good part of them cannot be depended upon.

The CHAIRMAN. That comes from observing their conduct [1526] and talking with them?

Mr. YORK. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And from knowing something about their psychology?

Mr. YORK. Yes, and I know their mental setup and I draw a parallel from my experience in China and throughout China and I knew the Japanese there.

I was for ten years the submanager of the Chungking Industrial Bank and I came in contact with Japanese bankers, financiers, merchant men, consular officials, and army and navy officers.

My bank used to finance the war materials and munitions before the war and I had personal contact with them.

General McCoy. I understand that you have also lived and had business affairs in Manila?

Mr. YORK. I lived in the Philippines for ten years. In fact I am an honor graduate of the Sebu High School, the Sebu Provincial High School.

I will show you evidence of that (handing a paper to General McCoy). This goes back to 1917, when I graduated from the Sebu Provincial High School.

General McCoy. You have always been an American citizen?

Mr. YORK. Yes, sir. I have a letter from the Consul General Goss. I believe he is now Minister to Australia.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General McNARNEY. Do you have any personal knowledge of any individual who was or is engaged in subversive activities in the Territory?

Mr. YORK. I know of one, but I think he has left here. I associated with him in my tax work, and he looked to me like he was a naval commander. He was down around Haleiwa.

General McNARNEY. Where?

Mr. YORK. That is on the other side of Oahu. This was [1527] back in August or September—I don't exactly remember the date—of 1940, and he was leaving evidently on the pretext that his father and mother were sick in Japan.

General McNARNEY. What action led you to believe that he was an agent?

Mr. YORK. My association with the Japanese Army and the navy officers is such that his manner, his conduct, is one hundred percent naval conduct.

He had a son in the University of Hawaii and he had a son in high school at the time, and he was leaving in a very broken up shape. He had two fishing boats, powerful-motored boats.

General McNARNEY. Did you ever get in any one of those boats?

Mr. YORK. No. I saw them right next to the place.

General McCoy. Is that near the Naval Station?

Mr. YORK. No, nothing. I believe the Army was just trying to fix up some kind of—they were just planning to build up in that Haleiwa district. That is near the Haleiwa hotel.

General McCoy. There is a flying field there now?

Mr. YORK. I think they knew what was coming before. Certain soldiers in this place were guarding that little bridge which crosses that place.

General McCoy. Were you familiar with the fact that a large number of Japanese consular agents were on the Islands prior to December 7?

Mr. YORK. Well, you see, my own observation is this and it is my judgment that was arrived at and I have no malice toward anyone, you see, but there was the parallel, and I could only draw a parallel, but they make the most efficient use of the organizations as an instrument of the Army and the Navy. [1528] As to the consulate, I have good reason to believe that the consulate, the churches, and even certain Japanese merchants, prominent ones, work very closely.

You may not believe it, but I have had occasion to call at the consulate. You ask about any Japanese and they go and open a book and know the name of that person and his wife's name and how many children, and the age and what the occupation is. They go to that extent, a very detailed extent.

General McCoy. That is, the dual citizens?

Mr. YORK. Japanese, yes, dual citizens. Yes, I think they have every Japanese of Japanese blood listed.

I was surprised myself because I did not expect them to have that system.

General McCoy. Would you have confidence in any Japanese?

Mr. YORK. I think there are some, but that "some" is the minority. That is, the Japanese. That is the biggest problem we have in Hawaii, how to segregate or how to maintain our security without making the few loyal ones suffer for any potential danger from the rest.

General McCoy. Have you been at any time in touch with the Army or Navy Intelligence here?

Mr. YORK. Here?

General McCoy. Yes.

Mr. YORK. In fact, I drafted a letter and I said to my wife several times, you see—as far back in July, 1941, I drafted a long letter but unfortunately I addressed it to Admiral Bloch and I failed to complete that letter, as I changed my mind at the last minute, because I was afraid how—you see I live out in the country and my family is surrounded by Japanese and I was afraid I would be identified and my family might be harmed, so I was afraid.

I leave home early in the morning and return after business hours and my family is there all alone. I have no [1529] public road of access except a trail. That is a footpath.

General McCoy. Where does your family live?

Mr. YORK. I own my home under a mortgage. After I returned here I bought the land and built the house with the mortgage, you see, in Kalihi Valley. That is near Fort Shafter.

In fact, just before eight o'clock on that Sunday morning I was still in bed, reading a magazine. I was late, as usual, on Sunday morning, and I heard a bomb explosion. My ear—having heard so many bomb explosions in China—caught it and I told my wife, I said, "I heard this funny explosion. Why don't you go out and see what it is?"

So I jumped out of bed. My wife said, "It is only some target practice."

So I got out of bed. I took my field glasses. I have a very powerful German glass. I looked toward Pearl Harbor and there I saw it was already burning, about eight o'clock. I could hardly believe my eyes for one hour until I looked at the place. I told my wife, I said, "These Americans, when they have maneuvers, they certainly make it realistic."

General McCoy. You could not believe your own eyes?

Mr. YORK. No, I could not believe my eyes.

I saw two or three planes flying high and there was anti-aircraft, and no plane shot down, and I said, "That confirms my belief. Nothing was shot down, so it must be a maneuver."

Along, I think, about half-past eight or nine, three flying fortresses came low, right almost over my house, and I think I could see the men inside in the flying fortress. There were four motors. The three of them circled low.

At that time I thought it was still a maneuver, until a hand grenade or either a small bomb exploded from about here (indicating) to about over to that tree (indicating).

As I was carrying my little boy, instinctively I jumped [1530] back and I told my wife, I said, "This looks too serious to be a maneuver." I ordered my family back in the house. I said it looked real because of the explosion and after, the three flying fortresses.

Subsequently I thought that the hand grenade, if it was a hand grenade, must have been dropped by the Japanese plane when flying over.

These three flying fortresses had no armor or at least they had no ammunition. They were flying low in order to protect themselves, to give themselves a chance for protection of the anti-aircraft that was firing around Fort Shafter.

Subsequently I thought these three flying fortresses came from the coast, although I had no information. I just state this to the General.

General McCox. Do your Chinese friends have any concerted association to protect themselves against the Japanese here?

Mr. YORK. Here? No. I think the Japanese are just—they just have not got that unity of action. The Chamber of Commerce is supposed to be their strongest organ, but I was surprised to see that they are very individualistic; they stand alone. They do not have organized effort, you see. They are very poor in that respect.

The Japanese are very strong in that respect. What the organ say, everybody follows.

The Hawaiian Islands is an economic—in fact absolutely under Japanese economic control.

If you allow me, I mention the incident of the fishing boat. They control all these fishing boats and construction work. In fact, if you don't use Japanese labor you can't hire anybody to go on the building. All construction work is by them, and the restaurants and all saloons and bars and dispensaries, flower shops, hogs—the pig industry.

[1531] General McCox. Do you consider that a great danger?

Mr. YORK. You see the Japanese always—I can only draw from the parallel—but these are sponsored by the Government. I left the Philippines in 1919 and at that time I was the only graduate or practically the only Oriental graduate in the Philippines Sebu Provincial High School; but in 1919 the Japanese began to come in by shiploads.

They always go, and again I am drawing from a parallel, from my experience in China. Here in the Hawaiian Islands, the American so-called democracy and freedom of religion and education, with all those practically assists them in this espionage. In China there is restriction against them, and still they find ways and means to establish schools and get a hold.

In French China in Siccawai they bring the Japanese boys in and make them go to school and make them travel extensively and intensively. They know every field and every section, and when the attack comes they know every corner of China, to the surprise of the Chinese, and then we found out that they had established their schools and they had their graduates and they made the honors and they made them travel, and they always bring a camera around to every place and picture things.

General McCox. Do you think it is wise to enlist the Japanese boys here in our Army?

Mr. YORK. I think as long as the Japanese secret organs still have contact, it is dangerous. I would not approve of them being in any vital thing; I would not approve of them in any vital service; maybe something that is not vital.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many planes do you estimate were in the air on that day?

Mr. YORK. From my observation?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Mr. YORK. I observed it through the attack.

[1532] Admiral STANDLEY. What was your estimate?

Mr. YORK. I think it was around 30 or 40 planes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is over Pearl Harbor?

Mr. YORK. Yes. Of course, I could not see the other sections. My place has a good view of Pearl Harbor. I am on a hill about 300 feet high.

General McCoy. You could tell from your house how many ships were in the harbor?

Mr. YORK. No, I could not tell that, because the trees are in the way.

Another impression I had was this, and I could not understand it, even to this day, and that is, why the American forces at Pearl Harbor allow the Japanese aliens and Japanese nonaliens to live all around that harbor. I cannot understand why the whole harbor should not be reserved for naval activity.

In fact, one Japanese doctor had one of the best residences in the best site and he could see all that was going on.

At different times the Navy prosecuted some Japanese who had some fishing boats around Pearl Harbor, and even one fishing boat was claimed to come from Hilo.

That is to me 100% agent activity and not ignorance. They claim they did not know anything about the naval regulations prohibiting any ship or fishing boat to come by or near Pearl Harbor.

Then the language schools and churches, especially the churches which tie up the so-called American-Japanese to the Japanese Mikado.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know what happened to these boats of this Japanese naval officer?

Mr. YORK. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did he take his boys back to Japan?

Mr. YORK. He left his family behind at the time. I thought you were referring to the fishing boats.

[1533] Admiral STANDLEY. No.

Mr. YORK. Oh, pardon me. He left his wife and his children behind.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know where these boats went?

Mr. YORK. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where they are now?

Mr. YORK. No, I don't know. I only knew at the time.

I questioned him, trying to establish indirectly some evidence, whether he was earning more than what he reported. So I questioned him, whether he had a fishing boat and he said—You know the answer. They try to tell you that they have nothing and they hesitate in the typical Japanese way, but I kid my patients a little and then question them two or three times, the same question in a different way, and then he said, "One." And then he said "Two," and then he tells you how much his catch is and how much he makes.

General McCoy. Do you speak Japanese?

Mr. YORK. No, I do not. Unfortunately, due to my duties, they did not allow me to learn it. I was so busy and I did not expect to make use of it.

General McCoy. You spoke to him in English?

Mr. YORK. Broken English, so-called pidgin or Japanese English.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. YORK. One statement I would like to make.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. YORK. I think the Army action succeeded in—I mean those in the Army or Navy or aircorps, but I feel the Army did something

through the alertness, taking certain positions in a certain way, that I think they succeeded in quelling any uprising that might have occurred if Japanese were able to land any forces.

To give you an illustration, there was the little Island [1534] of Niihau at which there are 180 Hawaiians and three or four Japanese and only one Japanese family.

You probably heard about that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we know about that.

Mr. YORK. And that one Japanese, who is an American citizen, turned right over to them.

The Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands are such that if there is no Japanese here or landing force, everything is all right, but once the hostile enemy force lands here, you can't depend on the local population.

That is the parallel with China. They came into China as merchants, businessmen, and they were all right, but as soon as the Japanese Army is five or ten miles away from the place, they just string arm bands across them, and even with sticks, and they are military in civilian attire.

When they come in they guide the Army and the Navy to each road and tell them where the prominent people are and corral them and then tell them where the police station and the Chinese barracks are located. They know everything.

I believe from the fact that they attacked all vital point sin Oahu shows that it is long planned. That is from my observation.

I mention only a specific case in August or September, 1940. For instance, if they want to live here, they must have tax clearance. That is why I can make contact with them, and I can question where they have been employed, but some of them say, "No, I have not worked." One I asked said he worked at Fort Armstrong, and I asked him how long, and he said, "No, I have not worked there."

I said, "That was only a minute ago. Now you say that you have not worked there. How can you change that statement?" I said, "What job were you doing?" He hesitated. Then he told me where he worked and I asked him how long he had been working, [1535] and so on. Then one man said he had not worked for six months because he was discharged, but I see all these people, Japanese nurses, carpenters, fishing men, merchants, clerks, and all types of Japanese.

One statement I would like to say. I hope it will not turn out to be a fact, but I think it is potential. Ever since this Pearl Harbor attack, a lot of Japanese are taking out tax clearance for taxi licenses, and they may be beginning to use them to spy on different things.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say taxi licenses?

Mr. YORK. Yes. Because they have to come to us to get the tax clearance before they can get a taxi license. I thing that should be checked into.

I have the official documents, but unfortunately they have never coordinated the activities in the District. The director of immigration—they think they have certain duties and that is all, with respect to immigration. But I have looked around at all these books and returns and you see how these prominent groups get in and they control things.

Here, though, there is no work in cooperation, no correlation of things. If they had correlation and coordination, Pearl Harbor would not have happened.

Another thing, they control the dispensaries on the Hawaiian Islands and all these saloons and dispensaries, and the people go in there, the defense workers, to have a good time and get talking, and anybody could hear what they say, and you could also see all the ships in Pearl Harbor.

Another point is this: on a certain day you have the sailors and soldiers off because of pay day and they know that. I wonder if the Army or Navy could not change their pay so that the whole force would not be paid on one day, so they do not have their leave of absence at that time and certain forces are always functioning.

[1536] Another thing, I have in my office, as my official duty, I go into Fort Kamehameha and I see Hickam Field and all those planes. They are just on the field like sardines, so close.

I think the Chinese are more efficient and give more efficient protection to their planes. They have fewer planes and therefore they are very valuable. They always put sand bags around and you can't bomb all of them at the same time and in the enemy attack they can't drop bombs at random.

Among other things I think about when I was called over to Fort Kamehameha on official duty, I look at these planes and they are a sure target.

Why should Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field be so close?

Another thing, why not put a tunnel through Kalihi? Then put some fighting planes and some bombs in there and have the space so that they can come through on both sides. There will be plenty of room there for the storage of planes and food. Why is that not done instead of having the planes out in the open? Now the Japanese could see those things. They practically know how many planes you have.

I am surprised myself at things. I am no military technical expert, but I have experience, and I guide myself by my experience. I lost everything in the second war. I was worth over a quarter of a million dollars and I lost everything by surprise. I came over here, and as President Roosevelt says in his speech, they could take it, and we took it, and I lived on something. I have a good position, so everybody says. I may earn very little, but I still go on.

I would like to contribute my services to the United States, the country of my adoption. I called on the different Government agencies and I am surprised. They say, "Well, you go see so-and-so." In fact, I saw the F. B. I. once. I went to Fort Shafter to see General Martin. I didn't see the [1537] General. The Captain said, "we are purely military agencies," and to see Colonel Bicknell. However, I have heard of Colonel Bicknell, and I was supposed to interview him. I tried to see someone in authority to tell them what I have, to give them the benefit of my experience, and I went and told the F. B. I. that I saw certain lights, blinkers, from places, and they told me, "You go and check it and then come back to us."

I felt, I was disappointed, and went back to my wife and said, "They expect me to be an active agent when I was not."

I asked them to make a certain time for an appointment and I would come and take them, but they would not. They said they were too busy.

Now, I am not here to run down anything, but that shows you the situation. Of course they are busy; I know that, but that is lack of coordination and correlation of the services here.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very, sir. Please do not discuss what has happened in this room.

Mr. YORK. There is one other thing: that is, the Admiral or the Commander-in-Chief and the Commander of the Air Force, and I know you have things to consider, but it is within my province to bring out the Chinese historical adage, to practice the principle of redemption through a life of service so you will not play into the hands of the enemy.

That is, the chief officers responsible here, like Admiral Kimmel and General Short and this Chief of the Air Force, I think they should be given a chance to serve the country, to serve the United States instead of being so crippled under a demotion or under a transfer that they would be unable to serve the United States.

The Chinese are historical and they always consider a [1538] certain merit of the case and they give them a chance to serve their country again.

I do not write Chinese, but I spoke to my wife, and asked her to make this Chinese adage, and I would like to offer this to you (handing a paper to the chairman).

Any Chinese scholar can give a book in those four characters.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY—Recalled

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN WALTER STANLEY DeLANY, UNITED STATES NAVY—Recalled

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain DeLany, the question was asked here yesterday as to the operation of a search after the attack on December 7 for the purpose of locating enemy transports or surface ships. By the plan as drawn up and agreed to by General Short and Admiral Bellinger, the duty of search in a surprise attack was on the air force. Do you have any records to show what searches were made after the attack?

Captain DeLANY. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you please present to the Commission any records which you have which will show that search?

Captain DeLANY. These are tracings from the reports that were submitted by the respective task force commanders.

The first tracing here indicates the search that was carried on by the Enterprise planes when they left their ship at 6:15 in the morning. That was before hostilities were declared, and the Enterprise was returning to Pearl Harbor after her trip to Wake.

General McCoy. Does the legend on the chart explain that?

[1539] Captain DeLANY. Yes.

The search was made from 0140 to 0150, a distance of 150 miles, and then the pilots were directed to return and land at Ewa, and they were caught coming in.

General McCoy. We would like to have these charts as a part of the record.

Captain DeLany. Yes.

This is a second tracing which indicates the track of the planes south of Oahu after the attack, and the tracks of the different planes are marked in different colors. The lines of search of planes of Patwing 14 are indicated by these red lines here (indicating).

In that connection this document here shows the prearranged searching plan which existed in the event that a contact was made, showing that planes VP-14 would cover this sector (indicating) and 11 here (indicating) and 12 here (indicating) and this would be VOS covered by VO-VSO-VJ and Army as available.

Admiral Standley. These are the sectors?

Captain DeLany. These are the sectors, yes.

General McCoy. Are they specifically named?

Captain DeLany. Yes, the directive to Compatwing 14 indicated that in the event of contact he would search sector here (indicating) and that Patwing 24 would search this sector (indicating) and the planes available would go into this sector (indicating) on their search in the event of contact. That accounts for the fact, as noted, that when contact was made the planes of VP-14 covered in this particular sector here (indicating).

The Chairman. How do you mean when contact was made?

Captain DeLany. I mean when a submarine contact was made, and when a contact developed, they searched in that sector, as was shown here before they went off in the morning.

General McCoy. In other words, it was automatic?

[1540] Captain DeLany. Yes, they went in to that particular sector (indicating).

General McCoy. What could you say about the northern search resulting in any contact?

Captain DeLany. As the planes became available after the contact, the different colored lines indicate the sectors of the planes as they went in the sectors. For instance, this area down in here (indicating) is covered to 200 miles by six VO-VS and they were organized in that sector to search in this area (indicating).

This sector to 200 miles was covered by nine SBD's which landed here (indicating), re-armed and went out.

The remainder of the search was instituted by the direction of the Commander-in-Chief to Patwing 2 as planes became available, and in this particular case nine SBD's were available and they were armed and went out from the ENTERPRISE.

Admiral Standley. When was that?

Captain DeLany. Around 11:50.

General McCoy. Was that while the attack was on?

Captain DeLany. No, that was after the attack, because they were armed at Ewa or wherever they could get armed and get gasoline.

Two VJ's were armed and sent out in these two sectors northward, and at that time there was the report that one of them was attacked by an enemy plane at 1310 at the end of his 300-mile search.

Admiral STANDLEY. When did you get that report?

Captain DELANY. Not until it was over.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the following day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not until he came back.

Captain DELANY. I do not know whether his radio was out or not.

General MCCOY. In other words, you had no information that day of any contact?

[1541] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Captain DELANY. This sector (indicating) is heavily covered on account of the fact that there were reports of a carrier to the southwest of Oahu. There were radio bearings which indicated that the carrier was down in this sector (indicating) and an afternoon search from the carrier reported, as also developed erroneously, that they had seen the carrier down in that sector (indicating).

As we had the information and the search was assigned and there were reports, erroneous reports from the pilots of the ENTERPRISE, that is why they are concentrated around here.

While that search was going on around Oahu, this represents the tracks of planes VP-21 that had been based at Midway and at the direction of the Commander-in-Chief had been directed to search the sector 070 to 190.

General MCCOY. Was there any contact?

Captain DELANY. No.

General MCCOY. When was Midway attacked?

Captain DELANY. I cannot answer that without referring to the record.

General MCCOY. Was it attacked that day or the following day?

Captain DELANY. My recollection is that it was the following day.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I think the testimony shows.

Captain DELANY. The planes were directed to search that sector (indicating) and land at Johnston before sunset the 8th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Was this search from Midway made on the 7th?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And ordered to be made after the attack?

Captain DELANY. Yes. As a matter of fact, those planes were in the air at the time of the attack, and then this additional search was made. We had a squadron of VP's at Midway. [1542] This was a normal search they conducted.

The CHAIRMAN. But this was an additional search ordered by the Commander-in-Chief on the 7th?

Captain DELANY. Yes, and in addition to that there was the direction of the Commander-in-Chief that the planes take off the next morning on another search and were directed to go to Johnston and cover that large area here and land at Johnston before sunset.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are the times indicated?

Captain DELANY. No, sir, I have no record of them. They will as they become available.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Why was the order given that the planes at Midway go back on the 8th?

Captain DELANY. They were brought back and landed at Johnston and then brought back to Oahu to strengthen the patrol of Oahu.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they were brought back to Pearl Harbor to strengthen the patrol here and told to cover this area in here.

Captain DELANY. These planes were sent originally to cover this area here (indicating) and to cover the two carriers that might have been in this general direction (indicating) as both carriers were reported to have been in that general west direction, so from Midway westward was covered by the search of the VP's.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Our directives to Patwing 2 were given by telephone and we made no record.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would Patwing 2 have the time of take-off and return?

Admiral KIMMEL. I doubt it very much.

Captain DELANY. This was drawn up after the people had a [1543] chance to sit down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Under the circumstances with the planes taking off they did not have much chance for paper work.

Admiral STANDLEY. Many of the pilots were in planes that they had never flown before?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

The next search conducted is one that was conducted by the ENTERPRISE fighter planes. This was in the afternoon.

General MCCOY. The afternoon of the 7th?

Captain DELANY. Yes.

This is predicated on the fact that radio bearings and also intelligence information indicated that there were carriers southwest of Barbers Point. There was the report that these pilots had sighted a carrier. Then after that report was made this (indicating chart) represents the tracking of the planes sent out with torpedoes and bombs to locate that carrier. Then these planes did not get back until after sunset and landed on the deck with their torpedoes and bombs.

This next search is the one conducted by surface ships, again based on the fact that the carrier was supposed to be southwest of Oahu, and the destroyers ran a search curve in an attempt to locate the carrier by task force 8, represented by these charts here, and also task force 12, and these circles represent the speed and the track of the enemy carrier and the tracks of the destroyers during the night and back there again the next morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Just to tie this up, I would like to ask Admiral Kimmel if these searches and these operations were made by his order that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were made by my general directive issued to the Commander Taskforce 8.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was Admiral Halsey?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, who was in the operation area, and the various forces to report to Admiral Halsey, and then we [1544] gave him the information and advice on which the order was issued.

The CHAIRMAN. That was my understanding of his testimony.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it would be well for me if I were permitted to read those messages which I sent.

The CHAIRMAN. Wouldn't it be a matter of accuracy if these were taken and copied into our record?

Admiral KIMMEL. It will only take about ten minutes, and my yeoman is now making six copies for the record of the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not see any reason to take them down stenographically and put them in the record.

Admiral KIMMEL. I just want to make sure that you know what I did. I do not insist on it.

Admiral STANDLEY. If you are going to read it straight through, then there is no necessity for doing that, but if you are going to read it and interpolate, then it is necessary to have it.

Admiral KIMMEL. In accordance with orders and doctrine issued in the Security Order of 14 October 1941, which provisions were in full effect on 7 December, it was not necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to issue numerous orders concerning the movements of the ships from the harbor to sea. Similarly the movements of the ships at sea were controlled by established doctrine. The orders which were issued on 7 December and which are set forth herein are, therefore, largely informatory and amplifying in character. Charts submitted in evidence before this Commission indicate the movements of surface and air forces, with their efforts to locate enemy vessels and bring them to action on December 7, 1941.

0800—

This is local time—

Admiral STANDLEY. When you are not quoting, I wish you would tell us.

[1545] Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

0800: From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations.

Air raid on Pearl Harbor. This is not a drill.

0816: From the Commander in Chief to all ships and stations.

Hostilities with Japan commenced with air raid on Pearl.

NOTE.—Transmitted to Commanding General.

0817: From CinC to Compawing 2.

Locate enemy force.

0832: From CinC to all ships present Pearl.

Japanese submarine in harbor.

0901: From CinC to Midway.

Pearl Harbor bombed. No indication direction attack.

Take off attempt to locate and sink Japanese force.

0902: From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12 and all ships Pacific Fleet exec

WPL 46 against Japan.

0903: From CinC to Wake.

Pearl bombed by Japanese. Be on alert.

0911: From CinC to all sector commanders Pearl.

Do not fire on our planes coming in.

0920: From CinC to Comtaskforce One.

Battleships remain in port until further orders.

Send all destroyers to sea. Destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by own cruisers to join Halsey.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you read that again?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

0920: From CinC to Comtaskforce One.

Battleships remain in port until further orders. Send all destroyers to sea. Destroy enemy submarines. Follow them by own cruisers to join Halsey.

[1546] Admiral STANDLEY. To join what?

Admiral KIMMEL. To join Halsey.

Follow them by own cruisers to join Halsey.

0921: From CinC to Pacific Fleet.

Reported that enemy ship has red dot on bottom of fuselage.

0950: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight:

Two enemy carriers reported thirty miles southwest Barbers Point.

1002: From CinCPac to all ships present.

Battleships remain in port probable channel mined.

1013: From Commander in Chief to signal tower.

Report the names of all ships which have left the harbor.

1015: From CinC to Comtaskforce One.

Do not send any more cruisers to sea.

From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Nine ComPatwing 2 to Patwing 21 search sector 000-030 Jap carrier.

The CHAIRMAN. What time was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. 1015. (Continuing reading:)

1018: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce 8, 12 and 3.

Search from Pearl very limited account maximum twelve VP searching from Pearl. Some indication enemy force northwest Oahu. Addressees operate as directed Comtaskforce Eight to intercept enemy. Composition enemy force unknown.

That was 1018.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

There was colloquy off the record.)

[1547] The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think that General McNarney wants a question in order to avoid reading all that the order relates and having you repeat it, and his question is to the effect: Why, Admiral, did you suggest there was a probability or a possibility of a carrier to the northward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Because I thought that was the most probable direction of an attack coming against this place.

The CHAIRMAN. But, as I understand it, you say you gave that direction to the commander of Task Force 8 not making it too strong—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. —so as to warn him to watch that area.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I think we have got that; is that right?

General McNARNEY. Yes. However, the charts submitted do not show that any search was made to the northward; is that correct?

Captain DELANY. No, sir. That is not correct.

General McNARNEY. I mean by the task force at sea.

Captain DELANY. By the task force at sea?

General McNARNEY. By the task force at sea.

Captain DELANY. No, sir; they were made from the island.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose, Captain, you would say in effect that the search made from Midway, the northern sector of that search, was to the northward of Oahu?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir; very definitely, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And to intercept any carrier to the northward?

Captain DELANY. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You see what I mean, General?

General McNARNEY. They were too early in the afternoon to intercept a carrier—

Captain DELANY. That is correct.

[1548] General McNARNEY. —making the attack at 8:55—at 7:55 in the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. At what?

Admiral KIMMEL. But, General, the search was made to the northward with planes from Oahu.

General McNARNEY. This is what I want to bring out. Take this off the record for a minute.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Let us get that on the record, then.

The CHAIRMAN. State your question again, General.

General McNARNEY. My understanding of your 1015 message is that you warned the task force at sea that there might be a carrier to the northward and directed him to undertake the necessary search. The charts submitted show that no such search was undertaken. Have you any explanation for this?

Admiral KIMMEL. The task force at sea, before they could organize a search to the northward, and from information which they had obtained, decided that the most profitable area to search was to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. Now resume your summary of your orders.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Can you tell me where I left off?

The CHAIRMAN. 1013, wasn't it? It is that long one.

General McNARNEY. 1018.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the last one.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is right. 1018.

1030: From CinC—

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). Before going to that, I should like to have these things straight on the record. Now, that order that you sent out for search was directed to three task forces; is that correct? Task Force 8, Task Force 3, Task Force 14?

Captain DELANY. Three, Eight, and Twelve.

Admiral STANDLEY. Three, Eight, and Twelve?

[1549] Admiral KIMMEL. That message there was sent to Com-taskforce 8, 12, and 3.

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute now.

Admiral KIMMEL. Is this on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, it is on the record. That answers my question. General McNarney referred to a task force. I would like to have it shown that that should read "task forces." Either of three task forces directed their search to the southward. That shows the whole picture.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not direct the task forces at sea to conduct any search. I directed the task forces at sea as follows:

Addressees operate as directed Comtaskforce 8 to intercept enemy.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is right. I wanted to get the three.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you gave them what information or suspicion you had and left final disposition of the forces on sea to Admiral Halsey, the commander of Task Force 8; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Go ahead. That clears it up.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I wanted to get.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

From CinC to Comtaskforce 3, 8, and 12.

General McNARNEY. At what time?
Admiral Kimmel. 1030.

- Submarine reported ten miles south Barbers Point.
- 1040: From Commander in Chief to Commander Mine Squadron Two.
Sweep south channel from West Loch to entrance for magnetic and moored mines.
- [1550] 1042: From CinC to Commandant Navy Yard.
CALIFORNIA is on fire inside probably two tugs with fire equipment could save her.
- 1046: From CinC to Comtaskforce Eight.
DF bearings indicate enemy carrier bearing 178 from Barbers Point.
- 1105: From CinCPac to all ships.
Enemy planes coming for Pearl Harbor from south.
- 1105: From CinCPac to all ships present info Comtaskforce Eight.
All ships departing Pearl organize as Task Force One undivided Comdesbatfor assume command report to Comtaskforce Eight.

And at 1046:

- From CinCPac to battleships present.
Send pilots to Ford Island.
- 1141: Verbal order.
From CinCPacific to Combatfor Batships.
Prepare available BB planes for search and report to subbase when ready and number. 2 CALIFORNIA planes on Ford Island probably ready.
- 1155: From CinCPac to all ships present.
All cruisers and destroyers depart Pearl as soon as practicable report to Comtaskforce One in DETROIT.

General McCoy. In what?
Admiral KIMMEL. DETROIT.
Captain DeLANY. DETROIT, the flagship of Rear Admiral Draemel.
Admiral KIMMEL. DETROIT is the flagship of the destroyers battle force of Rear Admiral Draemel.

- 11: From CinCPac to MINNEAPOLIS.
Use planes to search sectors 135 to 180 distance 150 miles from Pearl.

General McCoy. What direction would that be?

[1551] Admiral KIMMEL. That is the southward.

Admiral REEVES. Southeast.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

- 1158: From Commander in Chief to Comtaskforce 12, 3, 8.
Cancel Midway Marine flight.
- 1208: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight.
No confirmation position enemy carrier. Have searched arc two forty to three six zero but not thoroughly. Planes available Pearl can not conduct thorough search must depend on you. Nine ENTERPRISE planes landed four now being used search to northeast.
- 1232: From CinCPac to all ships present Hawaiian area.
Enemy transports reported four miles off Barbers Point attack.
- 1300: From CinCPac to MINNEAPOLIS.
What sector are your planes searching and to what distance.
- 1324: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight.
DETROIT PHOENIX ST. LOUIS NEW ORLEANS fourteen destroyers and four minelayers have sortied and are proceeding to join you also MINNEAPOLIS and four mine layers from operating areas send ships in to fuel as necessary.
- 1328: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight.
Your 2206 only nine arrived.
- 1329: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight.
No air attack here since about 0030.

Commander MARTIN. I do not know the particular sector that had been assigned to patrol wing 1 as of that date.

The CHAIRMAN. In what state were the others as respects readiness?

Commander MARTIN. I am not too familiar with the exact condition of the personnel at that time, but I believe that most of the crews were in their barracks or at their quarters in BOQ.

One other thing I might add: there was at that time the regular watch on the hangar, which consists of a ready-duty plane and a crew of about 30 men.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your field attacked by the Japanese?

Commander MARTIN. The station itself was, sir. The [1208] station consists of both the sea plane area and the field.

The CHAIRMAN. Were any of those planes anchored out?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir. Four planes were moored in Kaneohe Bay at about a thousand yards apart.

The CHAIRMAN. The rest were at the field or at the hangar or where?

Commander MARTIN. The remaining planes were parked on the ramp except for four which were in No. 1 hangar.

The CHAIRMAN. Now describe the attack and its effect, if you will.

Commander MARTIN. About 7:45 I was having a cup of coffee in my quarters, which are the most seaward quarters of the station, when—May I give this in the first person, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

Commander MARTIN. —when I heard a group of planes. I walked to the window and had the impression that a carrier group was about to land at our field. The first unusual thing that I noticed was that they were making a right-hand turn, which is contrary to the station flight rules. They were about 800 feet and approaching almost head on. At about that time they exposed their fuselage, and my young son invited my attention to the fact that they had red circles on them. It is rather hazy from then on, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do the best you can.

Commander MARTIN. I grabbed a pair of trousers and jumped in the car and drove to the administration building. I had just gotten in the car when the firing commenced. The planes by that time were very low but were momentarily hid from my view by the high hill, Hawaii Loa. While rounding the high hill I noticed one plane climbing toward our tower—they were right down off the rooftops—and shooting at the control tower. When I reached the administration building the firing had become quite heavy, and the first plane on the water had [1209] begun to burn. A message was telephoned to the Fourteenth Naval District duty officer, who informed me that they also were being attacked. I thought at first that it might have been an isolated raid here.

The first attack apparently consisted of 12 fighters who in appearance resembled the Army's P-36's. That attack lasted about eight minutes, during which time all exposed planes were set on fire. Fire apparatus and firefighting crews rushed to the burning planes, and along with the assistance of the contractors' civilian personnel attempt was made to drag the burning planes clear of the hangars. Salvage operations were well along, and it looked as if the hangar could be saved, when the second attack (about 25 minutes later) commenced.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the force that made the second attack?

Commander MARTIN. The second attack consisted of apparently 18 planes, half of which appeared to be bombers, dive bombers, although their attack could best be described as glide bombing. Preceding and during the actual bombing another strafing attack was made. About 18 bombs have been located, most of them falling on the southern side of the hangars and on the southeastern corner of No. 1 hangar. This attack destroyed the planes in the hangars. The fire engine ignited the hangar itself. In size the bombs apparently were between 150 pounds and 200-pound and from the fragments we have collected appear to have been armor-piercing shells, since the case was extremely heavy.

By the time the second attack had developed, anti-aircraft measures had been established and rifles and machine guns distributed to the personnel. During the second attack one fighter was obviously badly hit, apparently wounded, because he flew straight into the hill. Several other planes appeared to be giving off a vapor mixture which looked as it might be [1210] leaking gasoline. One other plane was reported from several sources to have crashed off Kailua Beach some distance at sea, but has not been found as yet.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your anti-aircraft artillery get into action on the occasion of the first attack?

Commander MARTIN. Our anti-aircraft consists merely of machine guns and rifles, but there was a great deal of fire before the end of the first attack, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no .50 calibers, then?

Commander MARTIN. The patrol wings manned all of the .50 calibers which were in the planes, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of the planes, however, were set afire, I understand.

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir, but in the initial attack, before, it looked like some of them were going to be saved. The burning started rather slowly. It was from incendiary bullets, and even while some of them were burning they—

The CHAIRMAN. They fired them?

Commander MARTIN. —they were firing the machine guns, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No plane escaped such damage as would render it for the time unusable?

Commander MARTIN. I have been informed that out of the—I didn't quite understand. Did you say that "no plane"?

The CHAIRMAN. I asked you whether any plane escaped attack so that it would be usable at the moment.

Commander MARTIN. The answer to that is No, sir. Nine of the planes have since—

The CHAIRMAN. Been restored?

Commander MARTIN. Been restored, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McCoy. Were you in touch with Bellows Field at that time?

[1211] Commander MARTIN. Many of the stories and information that has since been gained—we are unable to substantiate the evidence itself, but apparently one plane from the group that commenced the attack on Kaneohe dropped off and, flying real low, strafed Bellows Field. I have been informed that a civilian em-

ployee of the contractors phoned Bellows Field at the first attack, but they by that time were also being attacked.

General McCoy. So you feel that on the first attack they attacked you before they did Bellows Field?

Commander MARTIN. I think one of the group that came in over our station went over to Bellows Field afterwards, sir; yes, sir, that is the best information I have.

General McCoy. So it was practically simultaneous?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir. We are only about ten miles apart in air line distance.

General McCoy. Did you get any warning from outside your post at any time prior to the attack?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir. From all that I can learn I believe the firing commenced at Kaneohe first of all.

General McCoy. At what time?

The CHAIRMAN. At 7:45.

Commander MARTIN. It was sometime after 7:45, very—one or two minutes, I would guess.

General McCoy. Did you notice the direction from which these planes came?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir; they approached from slightly west of north.

General McCoy. Did you notice any torpedo planes?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir. To amplify that other question, sir, the second attack, which consisted of bombers, was noticed by Mrs. Martin as coming in directly from the seaward, which is slightly east of north. The view up there is absolutely wide open so that you can see.

[1212] General McCoy. You noticed nothing suspicious of any kind prior to the attack?

Commander MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Will you please observe the rule that nothing that has taken place in this room is to be discussed with anyone outside?

Commander MARTIN. Yes, sir.

[1213] Colonel BROWN. Colonel Weddington, Mr. Chairman.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL LEONARD D. WEDDINGTON,
COMMANDING OFFICER, BELLOWS FIELD, UNITED STATES
ARMY**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name, please?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Leonard D. Weddington.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a colonel in the United States Army?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Lieutenant Colonel.

The CHAIRMAN. Lieutenant Colonel?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your post and duty on the morning of December 7, 1941, Colonel?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Commanding officer, Bellows Field.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that field attacked on that morning?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. By what force?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. First there was a single airplane, and about an hour later about nine airplanes.

The CHAIRMAN. Nine?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you when the first, single plane came over?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. At my home about a mile from the post.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the post within view of your home?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. At that moment?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see the plane?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You got word that it had been attacked, did you?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes. My driver came from the post and told me it had been attacked. They had gotten word of the attack of the other post and that one man had been wounded in [1214] the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us the approximate hour of that single-plane attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. About 8:35, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of attack was it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. It was a fighter airplane with no bombs; machine gun only and strafing—no diving.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it disappear to? Where did it go?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Toward Kaneohe.

The CHAIRMAN. You were on the field when the second attack came, I take it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What type were the nine planes that made that attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were fighters.

The CHAIRMAN. No bombs?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. No dive bombers?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Machine gunning?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did they fly high or low?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Fairly high. I do not believe any of them were over 1500 feet high.

The CHAIRMAN. What damage did that attack do?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. About the material—they wounded one man and set afire a gasoline tank truck, and a few holes in the rooves and shot down one officer of the 44th Squadron who was getting into his airplane to take off, and shot down two that took off, and damaged one O-49 airplane, and one O-47 was hit, but the damage was so slight as to be disregarded.

The CHAIRMAN. What airplanes did you have at that time? What was your total number of planes there?

[1215] Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 86th Subdivision had two O-46's, and I believe five or six O-47's.

The 44th Squadron was there for gunnery practice, and I believe they had either 11 or 12 P-40's.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they were parked on the field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were parked on our field, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They had been left there on Saturday?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir. They had been there about three weeks, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes in the air from your field when the attack came on?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there any planes fit to take the air after the attack at your field occurred?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. After the first or second?

The CHAIRMAN. Either one.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, we got the P-40's ready between the first and second attacks, because we did not know whether they were coming back there, but we still knew the attack was going on over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any of your planes actually get in the air?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Two of them got in the air but were shot down immediately as they got off the runway.

The CHAIRMAN. None got off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. One O-47 took off after the attack was over and tried to track them but never caught them.

The CHAIRMAN. Never caught them?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In which direction did they go as they left your field?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Toward Kauai.

The CHAIRMAN. Toward Kauai?

[1216] Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were over Kaneohe going from our place.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be to sea east and north?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. West and north.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, that is correct, west and north.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. West of northwest.

General McNARNEY. How many P-40's were available after the first attack to take off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. After the first attack?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I am not positive, but I believe there were 11 or 12.

General McNARNEY. Where they in commission?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I am not sure.

General McNARNEY. Where did the pilots of the P-40's spend the night of December 6?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Part of them were back in Wheeler Field. Part of them were in their tents. They had tents separate from the tents occupied by the other officers in the post.

General McNARNEY. Do you know whether they were in a state of readiness on the night of December 6?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The only readiness that we had on was a No. 1 Alert, which was ground, sabotage only, and they being for aerial gunnery were only responsible for a close guard on their own airplanes and had nothing to do with the ground defense of the post.

General McNARNEY. How many of those P-40 pilots got off there prior to the second attack?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I haven't heard a report on it. I saw three or four before the second attack.

General McNARNEY. How many P-40's did they attempt to get off?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Attempt to get off?

[1217] General McNARNEY. Yes, that they attempted to get off.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Well, counting the one man that was shot getting in the airplane, that made three.

General McNARNEY. . There were only three pilots in the ships?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, because they didn't have ammunition and they weren't going out to them until the ammunition was loaded.

General McNARNEY. They were loading the ammunition?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, they had the airplanes loaded with .30 calibre, and as fast as they got the .50 they would try to get off.

General McNARNEY. When did you get the order to go on Alert No. 1?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I believe it was the latter part of November, I think it was. It was probably the 27th or 28th.

General McNARNEY. What steps did you take in connection with it?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 50 men were armed, who composed the ground defense unit, and were trained to take their positions and were assigned the positions and were issued what little ammunition we had, but the guard itself was depleted after about two days, I think, because the ground defense unit was turned into the post guard, and it was reorganized.

General McNARNEY. What positions were your airplanes in under this order?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. During this alert?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. They were all in one bunch.

General McNARNEY. Was it customary to keep them that way all the time or only when you were on Alert No. 1?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. All the time.

General McNARNEY. All the time?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, our space was very limited there. It was impossible at the time to keep the number of [1218] airplanes that we had there under cover—that is, more than possibly 25 to 50. So, for the convenience of the guard they were kept together in a place.

General McNARNEY. Did you have any ground anti-aircraft defense in the planes on December 7?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Any anti-aircraft defense?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Not when the first attack came.

General McNARNEY. Did you get any in the planes before the second attack came?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What did that consist of?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. The 298th Infantry, Hawaiian National Guard, got two .30 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns into position at the end of the runway in a hole they had there for it and we got all the machine guns we had issued, but they had no ammunition in

the belts, and as I told the ground defense officer when I arrived at the field—he asked me about setting the machine guns out, and I told him to get the machine guns into position and shoot at the Japanese, because I saw it was Japanese, and if we did secure the ammunition to get it to its position.

General McNARNEY. Where did you have to go to get the ammunition?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. We had to come to the crater, and all the ammunition we got that we got out of storage 86, that was already belted for the machine-gun fire, out of the 86th Squadron Reserve. The post had no ammunition; it wasn't authorized any ammunition.

General McNARNEY. Did your fire have any effect?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. I saw the effect of one man firing. I saw the gasoline coming from one of them during the attack. After this man had fired on him, I saw he was afire and he had a stream of gas coming from that tank.

The CHAIRMAN. These planes which attacked you you attacked [1219] only with machine guns?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. That is all: only with machine guns, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a hangar out there?

Colonel WEDDINGTON. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel. We will ask you to observe the caution and do not discuss what you have testified to here or what has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it with anyone outside.

Colonel WEDDINGTON. Yes, sir. Thank you.

Colonel BROWN. Ensign Beardall.

TESTIMONY OF ENSIGN JOHN REGINALD BEARDALL, JR., U. S. S. RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. What is your name, Ensign?

Ensign BEARDALL. John Reginald Beardall, Jr., sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are an ensign in the United States Navy?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you graduate from the Academy?

Ensign BEARDALL. 1941, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. With what ship were you connected on the 7th of December, 1941?

Ensign BEARDALL. The U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. A cruiser?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the night of December 6?

Ensign BEARDALL. I was in Honolulu, sir, on shore leave, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you get back to your command?

Ensign BEARDALL. At 1:15, approximately, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of shape were you in when you got back?

[1220] Ensign BEARDALL. Well, not the best shape, sir, but not the worst.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have some drinks?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, I had some drinks.

The CHAIRMAN. What was the first you knew about the attack on that morning?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, I was asleep in my room below, sir, and the torpedo struck us amidships, and the concussion woke me up.

I got out of bed and went to the quarterdeck, and the word was passed about that time that we were being attacked by Japanese planes.

I saw a plane which was already passing over us. I could see the rising sun on the wing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where did it disappear to?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, it went over and then banked around to the left.

The CHAIRMAN. Over where?

Ensign BEARDALL. It passed over the RALEIGH and banked around to the left, and it was coming out down the entrance.

The CHAIRMAN. Then did you see that plane return again?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, we lost the plane.

The CHAIRMAN. And what orders were passed on the RALEIGH?

Ensign BEARDALL. To man the AA battery, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What state of readiness was your particular battery in?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, we had ammunition at all 3-inch guns.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean it was there before you got there?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, it was in the ready boxes at the guns. The machine guns had a thousand rounds apiece, and the 1.1 machine guns had 1904 rounds in each of the clip rooms.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of your gun crew at your station were on hand?

Ensign BEARDALL. Well, it was a ship's order for one half [1221] of the AA battery to be on board at all times and one half in each liberty group.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your one half available?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How quickly did you get firing?

Ensign BEARDALL. In approximately five minutes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What proportion of the complement of the RALEIGH was on board ship when the attack took place?

Ensign BEARDALL. I should say two thirds.

The CHAIRMAN. And what proportion of the officer personnel was on board ship?

Ensign BEARDALL. I should say about two fifths.

The CHAIRMAN. Who is your commander?

Ensign BEARDALL. Captain R. B. Simons.

The CHAIRMAN. He was on board?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. He took command?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was your personnel in good shape at the work that morning?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, I think in exceptionally good shape.

The CHAIRMAN. What has been your general observation since you have been in Oahu as to the conduct of the officers and the men when on leave? Has there been a great amount of drinking going on when they have leaves?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, I do not believe there is any at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You think the morale has been good in that respect?

Ensign BEARDALL. I think the morale has been very good, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did the RALEIGH get in the way of hits?

Ensign BEARDALL. She had a bomb hit aft, which exploded after passing through the ship.

[1222] The CHAIRMAN. In the water?

Ensign BEARDALL. It passed through the ship and went out the side and exploded on the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. On the bottom?

Ensign BEARDALL. On the bottom of the bay.

The CHAIRMAN. In the harbor, you mean?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no attempt to get her under way or to move her?

Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, the engineering spaces were flooded, or at least half of them were.

The CHAIRMAN. When you got to your gun position, what kind of planes did you observe making the attack? You spoke of one torpedo plane. Did you see any others?

Ensign BEARDALL. I remember the torpedo plane in the vicinity, but there was no other attack on the RALEIGH at that time. In fact, there were no other attacks on that side of the island.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you see any dive bombers?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, I saw Ford Island bombed, and the RALEIGH was dive-bombed by 15 planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of which missed her?

Ensign BEARDALL. Most of them missed her, yes. They were close misses.

The CHAIRMAN. No high bombing?

Ensign BEARDALL. I saw some planes that were flying at a high altitude, sir, but I did not personally see them drop a bomb.

The CHAIRMAN. They may have been photographing?

Ensign BEARDALL. They may have been, or they may have been forming up.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Ensign, are you in the water integrity group of the RALEIGH?

[1223] Ensign BEARDALL. No, sir, in the gunnery department, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have a water-tight integrity group there?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Can you state, from your knowledge, the general condition as to procedure after the RALEIGH was bombed? What happened?

Ensign BEARDALL. Condition Zed was set right away, sir, and then we went ahead with counterflooding afterward. I learned that more

from the reports of what I heard other people say than from any observation I made myself.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether the RALEIGH was thought to be sinking?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was thought to be turning over?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, we stood by to abandon ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that condition corrected by watertight integrity control?

Ensign BEARDALL. Somewhat. We were sinking slowly, and a lighter came by after the attack started and they passed some wire cables around the hull, and about an hour and a half after we had some sort of outrigger affair on the port side due to this lighter being connected to us by wires.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that condition lasted through a period of two or three days?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, they stayed alongside the lighter until we went into the Navy Yard a week ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the RALEIGH is in dry dock now?

Ensign BEARDALL. Yes, sir, it is in dry dock this morning.

Admiral REEVES. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions, Admiral?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

[1224] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Ensign. Please observe the caution not to discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it on the outside.

Ensign BEARDALL. Aye, aye, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Seaman Berry.

TESTIMONY OF SEAMAN FRANK MAUTHE BERRY, SEAMAN FIRST CLASS, U. S. S. RALEIGH, U. S. NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name, sir.

Seaman BERRY. Frank Mauthe Berry.

The CHAIRMAN. What ship are you connected with?

Seaman BERRY. U. S. S. RALEIGH, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What type ship is that?

Seaman BERRY. A light cruiser, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where was she moored on the morning of December 7?

Seaman BERRY. The north side of Ford Island just forward of the UTAH.

The CHAIRMAN. On the north side?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, that is Berth Fox 13.

The CHAIRMAN. Next to the UTAH?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, just forward of her, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you been on liberty Saturday night, the 6th?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, I had duty; I had watch.

The CHAIRMAN. You had duty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In what part of the ship were you when the attack started?

Seaman BERRY. I was on the port side quarterdeck and this torpedo hit right underneath us.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the first thing you knew about the attack the torpedo that hit or did you see bombs and machine gunning before that?

[1225] Seaman BERRY. Well, the starboard side quarterdeck was painted, so the watch on the port side and I didn't notice any bombing of Ford Island, but we did notice a plane in the air flying very high, but I didn't think anything of it.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that might be practice?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. As a matter of fact, the officer of the deck thought it was practice, and he asked me if I thought we should call the AA battery for a practice drill.

The CHAIRMAN. The first thing that woke up the crew and the officers of the RALEIGH was when she was hit by a torpedo?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that on the other side from where the torpedo hit?

Seaman BERRY. I watched them drop.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I want to know. How did they drop the torpedo?

Seaman BERRY. How did they drop it?

The CHAIRMAN. Was it low?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, he came in quite low.

The CHAIRMAN. How far away from you did he launch the torpedo? That is a pretty wide stretch of water from you, isn't it?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. He dropped it a little beyond midstream.

The CHAIRMAN. Beyond midstream?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you realize he was torpedoing at the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Sir?

General McCoy. Did you realize that he was shooting at the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Well, at the time I saw it drop I did not know what it was. I really did not know what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. You really did not know they were dropping [1226] a torpedo at you, did you?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. I asked the officer of the deck what was dropping, and he said, "I don't know." He thought it was practice.

The CHAIRMAN. You even then did not know it was a torpedo plane?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, I did not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did that torpedo which hit you do much damage to the RALEIGH?

Seaman BERRY. Well, we didn't list a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Seaman BERRY. No, it was just a gradual listing. Of course, it vibrated the ship a lot.

The CHAIRMAN. It did vibrate the ship a lot?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, it did. There was water by our feet and there was water at the quarterdeck, and it got washing around a little.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that there was a general quarters call on?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. I ran to the opposite side of the quarter-deck where the alarm is and I pulled the alarm, but it did not go off.

The CHAIRMAN. It did not go off?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, the electricity went the first thing.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get the anti-aircraft guns into action on your ship?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, I think we were the first ones.

The CHAIRMAN. How about the crews? How were the guns manned at that time Sunday morning?

Seaman BERRY. They were manned at all times. You mean before the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Was the ammunition at the guns?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. The ready boxes were there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was the gun crew on board?

[1227] Seaman BERRY. Well, yes, sir. Of course, at the time they attacked, any man who is near the gun will man the gun. There was a crew, but anybody who is standing by and who can work it will go in.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a rule that a certain part of every gun crew is to be on board and a certain part on liberty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And they were on hand?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And anybody who could work the gun got to it?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. The guncrews were on.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get hit again?

Seaman BERRY. Well, about an hour later we were hit; a bomb struck aft.

The CHAIRMAN. Aft?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it do serious damage?

Seaman BERRY. No, sir, it wasn't severe; it just went through the ship and out through the bottom.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I have.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty were you performing?

Seaman BERRY. I had the quartermaster watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many planes do you estimate took part in the attack. How many planes were there? It has been indicated that there were possibly three waves. How many planes would you estimate took part in the attack?

The CHAIRMAN. That is altogether?

Seaman BERRY. I would be afraid to estimate it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, we do not suppose that you took time out to count them.

Seaman BERRY. No, sir. After that, I got on the gun myself and started to work on the gun. I was opening up the new cases that came up from the magazines and taking the caps off.

[1228] Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still on board ship?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, I am still on board.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose there were quite a number of men from the RALEIGH on liberty?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On shore leave?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They all came back about what time that night?

Seaman BERRY. Well, the biggest part of the liberty party came back about 1 o'clock, but we still had quite a few stayed all night.

The CHAIRMAN. The liberty party?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And petty officers?

Seaman BERRY. Yes. There is quite a few on special liberty.

The CHAIRMAN. Were those that came back in good condition for work?

Seaman BERRY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Or were some of them tight?

Seaman BERRY. Well, I only saw three or four of them, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. They seemed to have had a few drinks?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, but they got right to work. It didn't stop them any.

The CHAIRMAN. These fellows were working the next morning?

Seaman BERRY. Yes, sir, and they worked all that night; no one hardly got any sleep. They were pumping the flooded compartments.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Did the bomb or the torpedo destroy the power of your ship?

Seaman BERRY. The torpedo destroyed the power right at the beginning.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you had no electricity or force in [1229] the water mains? You had no pressure?

Seaman BERRY. No pressure, no, sir; none in the freshwater lines. We did not have anything.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss with anyone your testimony or what has been said here. Thank you very much.

Ensign BERRY. Aye, aye, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Lieutenant Commander Taylor.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR, U. S. NAVAL RESERVE

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. State your full name.

Commander TAYLOR. William E. G. Taylor.

The CHAIRMAN. Commander Taylor, you had something to do with the installation of the detector device on the island of Oahu, did you not?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that you had some contact with this device in England?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Army borrowed you to aid them in setting up the system here?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In what state of preparedness or readiness was the interceptor command here or the warning system or the warning net and the rest of the paraphernalia on or about December 7, 1941?

Commander TAYLOR. It was not ready by any means, sir, for air warning, for air interception, and we were still trying to pull the last threads of it together and to get the information center mounted. I think we had something in the neighborhood of two or three more weeks work before we could get them functioning.

[1230] The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, it would ultimately have in this information center a naval liaison officer?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it would have several liaison officers—to have a regular watch of naval liaison officers.

The CHAIRMAN. That wasn't instituted for the practice drills that had taken place?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We had asked for them.

The CHAIRMAN. You had asked for them?

Commander TAYLOR. They were forthcoming from the Commander-in-Chief and we expected to have them within a week. They were being withdrawn from the fleet pool. We were going to get the reserve ensigns and get them trained to do the job there, but it would have taken a week or ten days to train them to do the job properly.

The CHAIRMAN. But no such thing had been instituted on December 7?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you cognizant of the fact that when Alert No. 1 was ordered on November 27, General Short also ordered the interceptor command or the air warning system to be in operation from 4 a. m. to 7 a. m. each day?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any conference with General Short about the purpose of that order?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, I have not seen the General. I never have seen the General.

The CHAIRMAN. You never saw the General?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What was your understanding as to the reason why that was put into effect?

Commander TAYLOR. We had the place operated from 6 o'clock in the morning until 11:30, as the equipment was breaking down occasionally; the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and then I believe it was General Short's order that the [1231] operations should be from 4 to 7 o'clock in the morning. They didn't install the commercial power.

We were planning as soon as possible to get the full operations resumed and to go on a 24-hour basis. At the time, on December 7, and up until that time, the information center was functioning under two departments: under the Hawaiian Department and under the interceptor command; so we had a little bit of confusion as to which was going to operate it.

The CHAIRMAN. The interceptor command and the Signal Service were both busy with it?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McCox. There were no permanent stations operating at that time, though?

Commander TAYLOR. Detector stations?

General McCox. No. permanent stations.

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, there were no permanent stations here at all. We had mobile detector stations. We still have them on the island. They are the only ones we have.

As I understand it, the permanent radar systems that are to be put in will be practically the same equipment but will be housed instead of on truck.

General McCox. But with different power?

Commander TAYLOR. It would eventually be commercial power, yes, but it would be some time before it would be put in.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the warning net connecting the mobile stations at the different places with the information center that you have in now is a temporary affair?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And what are the lines? Are they just temporary lines?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir. Some of them are temporary, but they are all in cable.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in a cable?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, it is all in a cable, but the [1232] temporary is the best equipment that we could get and get it in a hurry. It is to be installed in bombproof.

General McCox. Has it been installed in bombproof yet?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir, the bombproof is not ready, and the telephone equipment has not arrived from the mainland. I think it will probably take two weeks or a month to get it installed in there when the equipment arrives.

General McCox. So it is still a very sketchy performance?

Commander TAYLOR. It works very well, but it is not bombproof. It is in a pretty vulnerable place, although it is fairly well guarded, but it is very easy to sabotage it if anybody wants to.

The CHAIRMAN. It is still subject to these local break-downs?

Commander TAYLOR. Occasionally, yes, sir. It is very crude equipment.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has the operation been satisfactory since December 7 considering the state of preparedness of the personnel?

Commander TAYLOR. In some respects, yes, sir, because we do think they are good for air warning. It is pretty good for interception, but we can't get height when they get back there from the land just off-shore. We can't make interception with it.

General McNARNEY. Do you believe there is need for a system of ground observers to supplement the radar?

Commander TAYLOR. We have ground observers, but unless we can get a very good observer system with trained people we find that they are more of a hindrance than a help because we get so many false reports coming in.

On the day of the raid we had the Coast Artillery—which we are using—and they sent in very queer reports.

General McNARNEY. Is there any attempt to filter those out?

[1233] Commander TAYLOR. Yes, we filter those out now, which means rechecking and rechecking, because they are not well trained observers.

General McNARNEY. But it could be better?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. As time goes on?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir, it is getting better, yes.

General McNARNEY. How long do you think it will be before you have an efficient service?

Commander TAYLOR. I think it is almost as efficient as can be made with the best equipment. I do not think there is any better equipment being made on the mainland.

General McNARNEY. So far as you know, there is no equipment being made which will give you altitude?

Commander TAYLOR. Nothing I know of that is in production, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. Do you know about the I. F. F. equipment?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Is any scheduled to come out?

Commander TAYLOR. The I. F. F. equipment I do not believe will work in this case because the I. F. F. will only show up on the detector station on the proper frequency. The I. F. F. and the detector station have to be on the same frequency. These stations are on the same frequency, but the carrier planes have a different frequency; so the I. F. F. may work on the carriers and won't work when it comes into port, and vice versa.

We improvised this after December 7. We made an improvised system for the planes, which was to keep track of every plane at sea and when they came in, and we used the approach procedure so that nothing could come in until we had a chance to look it over carefully before it got to port. When anything not identified came in against the approach procedure [1234] we deemed it hostile and sent fighters off to intercept them.

General McNARNEY. With the information you have, can you identify them for interception purposes?

Commander TAYLOR. Well, we can't depend on getting the fighters at the proper height. With the proper detector equipment you could send out one or two planes to intercept a raid because you could put them at the proper height; but with this thing you have to send out a couple of squadrons to find them.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean there is no equipment available in the United States which will obtain height for you?

Commander TAYLOR. Nothing. The only equipment I know which does obtain height is the equipment used aboard ships. We borrowed one of those sets and installed it here in our system, but unfortunately it won't work in these mountains.

The CHAIRMAN. It will not work?

Commander TAYLOR. No, sir. We are trying to find something to make it work now.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know why it will?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do know why?

Commander TAYLOR. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not very hopeful?

1332: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight information
Comtaskforce One and Three.

Radio bearing indicates AKAGI bearing 180 from Pearl and another unit bearing 167.

This is one on which there is no time:

From CinCPac to all ships present Hawaiian area.

[1552] Enemy radio has been heard on 6581 kilocycles and 458 kilocycles.

1430: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight:

Your 2345 and 2239 approved probably enemy submarines off entrance.

1435: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce Eight.

No definite information yet available but indications are that enemy carriers may be both north and south of Oahu.

1530: From CinCPac to Comtaskforce 15.1

War declared by Japan on Britain and United States Task Force 15.1 proceed direct San Francisco Task Force 15.5 proceed to Sydney.

1700: (Verbal) From CinCPac to Compatwing Two.

Direct Midway planes—

Commander DeLANY (interposing). That's the Midway planes.

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing reading):

—Midway planes search Sector 070-190 to maximum distance possible and still land Johnston by sunset. Objective Jap carrier.

1845: CinCPacific Compatwing Two information Taskforce 8 and 12.

LEXINGTON group Taskforce 12 proceeding to intercept enemy carrier on assumption it departed for Jaluit from point 200 miles south Pearl at 1200 local today at 27 knots. Desire guard against repetition today's raid. ENTERPRISE Taskforce 8 latitude 20-45 longitude 150-15. Daylight tomorrow conduct air searches as follows: 6 PBV median 220 to 700 miles to search outer limit 0900. Spacing 50 miles. Patron 21 transfer from Midway to Johnston searching maximum area enroute. Maintain PBV now Johnston in [1553] readiness to take over tracking. Direct VB planes join ENTERPRISE sunrise. Employ other aircraft Oahu including Army to search 360 degrees from Oahu distance 200 miles taking off 1 hour prior sunrise. Hold other aircraft as striking group.

From CinCPac to Comtaskforce One—

The CHAIRMAN. Any hour?

Admiral KIMMEL. 1902. I beg your pardon, sir. 1902.

The CHAIRMAN. 1902.

Admiral KIMMEL (continuing reading):

—Eight, Three and Twelve.

Recent radio intelligence indicated formation Japanese major units into two task groups. First group concentrated Indo China area. Second group plus three Kongos unaccounted for. OpNav opinion latter force or part attacked Pearl. Composition second group follows three or four CA two or four CV two desrons of two CL twenty eight DD one subron of nine dash twelve subs and fast transport force containing twenty odd AP's. First fleet less seaplane tenders and one desron may be in support according OpNav.

1917: From CinCPac to all ships present.

Reference paragraph G Pacific Fleet Letter 2CL-41 Condition Two effective. Use maximum dispersal planes being serviced during night.

2000: From CinCPac to Taskforce 8, 12, 3.

Do not attempt entrance heavy ships to Pearl during darkness.

2225: From CinCPac to Combasefor.

Place two battle rafts outboard of each drydock caisson one to be alongside and one about one hundred feet out. To be in place by 0530.

Charts were offered in evidence before this Commis- [1554] sion showing the air scouting operations instituted on 7 December in an attempt to locate enemy forces. These scouting operations were under the direct command of Commander Patrol Wing Two, Rear Admiral Bellinger. They were instituted by order of the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, some in accordance with prearranged doctrine and others in accordance with

orders telephoned from the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief to Commander Patrol Wing Two. Throughout the forenoon of 7 December information received by Commander Patrol Wing Two was telephoned to headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, and information received at the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief was promulgated to the Fleet and at the same time telephoned to Commander Patrol Wing Two. The telephonic exchanges between the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief and Commander Patrol Wing Two were numerous, but in the exigency which existed they were not recorded. The Air Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain A. C. Davis, states that he himself did most of the telephoning to Commander Patrol Wing Two and that all orders to that officer issued by telephone were in accordance with verbal instructions which Captain Davis received from the Commander-in-Chief.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, it will help the reporter if those sheets that you used can be turned over to him.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Note, Mr. Reporter, that the plats discussed by Admiral Kimmel and Captain DeLany are marked in the order that they were discussed: Exhibit A of this date. What is the date?

Captain DeLANY. 7th, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Exhibit B of this date, Exhibit C of this date, and Exhibit D of this date.

[1555] (Plats discussed by Admiral Kimmel and Captain Delany were marked Exhibits A, B, C, and D of January 7, 1942, for identification.)

The CHAIRMAN. I suspect none of these existed on the date of the crisis?

Captain DeLANY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Made from records?

Captain DeLANY. These were all made from reports.

Admiral KIMMEL. Do you want more copies of them?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think we shall keep them in our archives, and any member can examine them or we can discuss them together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, then we won't need to make them.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you will not need to make them.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel produces certain excerpts from the correspondence between himself and CNO beginning 13 January and ending 2 December, 1941.

In producing these excerpts Admiral Kimmel states that they are, of course, excerpts from longer letters, that they do not purport to be excerpts from all of the correspondence, that they have been hurriedly prepared from the total correspondence, and that he desires no inference to be drawn that he has either attempted to draw correspondence only favorable to himself or the reverse in selecting these excerpts. He submits them only for such assistance as they may be to the Commission, and with the statement that so far as he is concerned the Commission is at liberty to examine in Washington the complete file of correspondence between himself and CNO if it wishes further information as to the same.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, gentlemen, in Washington or right here now.

Admiral REEVES. Either here or in Washington.

The CHAIRMAN. And also states that the complete file of [1556] correspondence is in his possession and that if before the Commission

is in his possession and that if before the Commission leaves it desires further to examine it it will be at the disposition of the Commission.

That ought to state your position accurately, I think.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is ordered that the excerpts produced by Admiral Kimmel be copied in the record immediately following this statement.

(Extracts from correspondence between Admiral Kimmel and Chief of Naval Operations are as follows:)

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

SECRET

S-E-C-R-E-T

EXTRACTS FROM SECRET LETTERS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND
THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

13 January:

Chief of Naval Operations writes Admiral Kimmel concerning his appointment as Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet and presents his estimate of the international situation. He expresses the opinion that we are heading straight for war and he does not see how we can avoid it. It may be a matter of weeks or days. He is terribly impatient at the slowness with which things move in the Navy Department in preparing the Navy for war. He does not want to become involved in the Pacific if it is possible to avoid it but realizes that we may become involved in the Atlantic and the Pacific at the same time.

27 January:

Three days before taking command of the Fleet Admiral Kimmel writes the Chief of Naval Operations that he has made a hurried survey of the situation and is particularly impressed with the lack of Army equipment [1557] "as to defending this base". He thinks the supply of an adequate number of Army planes and guns for the defense of Pearl Harbor should be given the highest priority. A secure base is of paramount importance. He has given Commander McCrae complete notes on his ideas, with the request that McCrae present them to the Chief of Naval Operations on his arrival in Washington. The prospective Commander-in-Chief stresses the importance of filling all ships to capacity with personnel, not only because of the shortage of personnel but in order to train men for new construction. He mentions a Fleet Personnel Board now in session to make a study of the required complement to man the guns of each ship of the Fleet.

29 January:

Chief of Naval Operations informs Admiral Kimmel that he is still fighting for personnel. With the Army building up to 1½ millions he can not understand why he has to fight so hard for almost every additional man for the Navy. In this and in subsequent correspondence he infers that the President is averse to increasing the enlisted complement of the Navy.

10 February:

CNO informs Cincpac that he continues in every way possible to fight commitments or dispositions that would involve us on two fronts. He mentions a conference in the White House. He states that he continues to impress General Marshall to reinforce Oahu and elsewhere and that General Marshall is going to send out 81 fighters. He hopes also to get Marines to Midway, Johnston and Palmyra. He states that every time he gets in the White House which is rather frequently, he struggles for additional men. The President simply has his own ideas about men. He feels that he could go to Capitol Hill and get all the men he wanted if he could just get the green light from [1558] the White House.

18 February:

Cincpac protests the recent action of the Bureau of Navigation in taking from this Fleet 40 officers who have had post graduate ordnance instruction. Many of

these officers are occupying important positions in the Fleet and it seems unwise when war is imminent to send on shore our best officers. He reports that he landed a full complement of Marines at Midway. He states he will be ready to send a detachment of cruisers, destroyers, and a carrier to make a cruise to Manila or elsewhere as proposed but advances the opinion that we should be prepared for war when we make this move. He complains of the lack of local defense forces for the Fourteenth Naval District which can be defended only by draining small craft from the Fleet. He speaks of Admiral Halsey's futile attempts to obtain from the Bureau of Ordnance the number of bombs needed and recommends that bombs be forwarded even though the magazines to stow them are not ready. He states "I feel that a surprise attack (submarine, air or combined) on Pearl Harbor is a possibility. I feel that immediate practicable steps should be taken to minimize the danger of damage inflicted and to insure that the attacking force will pay. We need anti-submarine forces—destroyers and patrol craft. Patrol plane squadrons will help when they arrive." He mentions having sent a despatch outlining the minimum complements prescribed for ships by the Fleet Personnel Board for each type. He wants lockers and bunks built into ships to permit increasing the size of crews. He asked that drastic steps be taken to stop the continual turnover of personnel, particularly qualified personnel. He demands the supply of modern type planes throughout the Fleet and forwards a copy of his letter to the Bureau of Aeronautics. [1559] He states "I have gathered the distinct impression that the Bureau of Aeronautics is primarily concerned with the expansion program and that the supply of planes and personnel to man the Fleet takes a secondary place."

22 March:

CNO replies that he regrets he is forced to transfer from the Fleet so many officers with ordnance training but states that the procurement situation in the Bureau of Ordnance is critical. He adds: "You may expect a similar effort to get legally trained officers in legal jobs ashore." He states that: "Need for the destroyers in the Atlantic Fleet right now is such that we will not be able to help you with additional destroyers for some months, in fact we may have to take some away from you soon." He agrees that it is desirable to acquire the NEW JERSEY and the MANHATTAN sea train vessels but says the President cut out the MANHATTAN'S and funds had not been made available for the NEW JERSEY's. He states that the SecNav approved recommendations for three additional store ships but the President cut it to two, and the status of legislation appropriating money for these two is indeterminate at the present.

22 April:

Cincpac to CNO. He recommends the establishment of a nucleus of trained officers and trained men in each type in the Fleet. He asks that legislation be obtained to prevent the discharge of qualified men and to permit them to remain in their present billets.

4 April:

CNO writesCincpac that the Japanese situation looks a trifle easier but the Department cannot be sure what the Oriental plans really are. He believes that Nomura earnestly desires to avert a crisis with the United States. He considers the situation obviously critical [1560] in the Atlantic and is hopeless unless we take strong measures to save it.

19 April:

CNO quotes the President as saying that as soon as the Australian expedition returns he wants to send out more such expeditions. He wants our ships to keep popping up her and there just to keep the Japs guessing. "This of course is right down the State Department's alley". "To my mind a lot of the State Department action and recommendations are no less than child's play and I have practically said so in many words (sic) in the presence of all concerned. I acquiesced in the Australian cruise with far more grace the (sic) I would have otherwise." He speaks of the necessity to remove to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet 3 BB's, 1 CV, 4 CL's and 2 squadrons of Destroyers. This is to be the first echelon for the battle of the Atlantic. It was agreed to, authorized by, and directed in its detail by he Presiden.

5 May:

Cincpac protests to CNO on the loss of so many experienced men upon the expiration of their enlistment to take positions in civil life because of the

high wages prevailing. He asks congressional legislation to freeze enlistments. He asks the CNO to indicate to the material bureaus the shortage of shipping in order that they might go out of their way to meet our demands for cargo such as bombs and ammunition.

16 May:

Cincpac writes the CNO that he is greatly concerned about the ammunition situation. He is unable to get sufficient target practice ammunition to complete training. He complains of the shortage of machine gun ammunition, particularly .50 caliber, which places us in a [1561] serious position. He stresses the need for gunnery school target practice ammunition and states that the situation in regard to reserve service ammunition is entirely unsatisfactory.

15 May:

CNO writes Cincpac that the Navy Department is aware of the Fleet's difficulties in connection with the loss of experienced men. The proposal to automatically extend enlistments during war and national emergency was introduced in the Senate but has not been introduced in the House as Mr. Vinson is apparently opposed to it. He indicates that there are no additional patrol craft that can be furnished the Fourteenth Naval District. "I must confess that our preliminary survey in this matter does not appear to be promising. I am keenly aware of your desire to save wear and tear on your destroyers. We are bending every effort to be prepared for war when and if it comes."

27 July:

Cincpac writes CNO a long letter covering the needs of the Fleet. Among the items mentioned are:—

The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

What will be the U. S. attitude toward Russian intervention in the war? Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, etc.

Will England declare war on Japan if they attack Maritime Provinces and if the answer is in the affirmative will we actively assist as tentatively provided in the case of Singapore and N. E. I.

Are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual [1562] support, etc.?

If England declares war on Japan and we do not, what is the attitude in regard to Japanese shipping, commerce, raiders, etc.?

Need for transports and light destroyer transports.

Need for Marine equipment, particularly antiaircraft guns and .50 caliber machine guns.

The need for ammunition handling and stowage facilities ashore.

The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board.

Need for additional personnel.

Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of a new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District.

Need for acquiring and assembling advanced base material at Mare Island.

Urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges and listening gear.

Communications. The inability to obtain RADAR's and "IFF" equipment.

Aviation requirements and need for new torpedo planes.

Conversion of merchant vessels for carrier landing training.

Need for development of air fields authorized in the Islands.

25 July:

CNO states that Cincpac may be called upon to furnish [1563] a carrier for the purpose of transporting airplanes to an Asiatic Russian port. The President has told him to be prepared for it.

24 July:

CNO writes that the President has finally approved a figure of 553,000 enlisted men and 105,000 Marines but what a struggle it has been. If we could only have gone full speed ahead two years ago, but that is water over the dam.

30 July:

Cincpac protests supplying aircraft to the Russians when our own deficiencies are so great. He does not want to divert a carrier from its proper duties to act as an aircraft transport. He asks why these planes cannot be flown out by Alaska and Eastern Siberia fields. He states that a carrier sent on such a mission to the Westward of the Japan-Kurile line must be protected and that its minimum escort and protecting force should be the entire Pacific Fleet. To deliver aircraft to Asiatic Russian ports in one of our carriers is to invite war. "If we have decided upon war it would be far better to take direct offensive action. If for reasons of political interest it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method that will be more advantageous to ourselves".

31 July:

CNO states that the converted LONG ISLAND is promising for her size and better than he had hoped for. "We have six more converting which will be much longer than this and may be superior in every way. They will, in all probability go to the British. In fact, we are doing the work on Lend-Lease." He states:—"Policy seems to be something never fixed, always fluid and changing. There is no use kicking on what you can't get [1564] definite answers for." He thinks that the Jap reason for holding off in Siberia until the Russo-Japan situation clarifies is that one of the reasons is Indo-China and pressure on Thailand puts Japan in a better position for an all-out cleanup in China. "I believe the proportion of our population which feels we should enter the war is relatively small."

12 August:

Cincpac asks that highest priority be given the manufacture and supply and installation of RADAR. He again asks for patrol vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District. He stresses the need for ships of all types and states:—"This is a vast ocean". The Marines have been sent to Wake. Some of the defense battalions are shy in equipment. The anti-aircraft guns for Wake are not equipped with directors. The battalions are short in .30 and .50 caliber machine guns and ammunition. He begs that some attention be given to the permanency of detail of captains and executive officers of heavy ships and mentions having recommended to the Bureau of Navigation the detail of younger officers to command destroyers and asks that squadron commanders be detailed only from experienced destroyer officers. He stresses the need for 20,000 additional men in the Fleet as soon as possible.

21 August:

CNO replies on the personnel situation but states that the Atlantic is much more in need of men than is the Pacific Fleet.

26 August:

Cincpac protests the transfer of 222 rated and experienced men from the Pacific Fleet to fit out the U. S. S. HORNET air squadrons on the Atlantic Coast.

28 August:

CNO to Cincpac:—"With regard to the general [1565] situation in the Pacific about all I can say is that Japan seems to have arrived at another one of their indecisive periods. Some very strong messages have been sent to them but just what they are going to do I do not know."

19 August:

CNO in a long letter to Cincpac replies to Cincpac letter of 26 July on the needs of the Pacific Fleet. In this letter it is stated why the different Bureaus cannot provide the equipment demanded for the Pacific Fleet. Some is under experimental stage and others cannot be obtained.

12 September:

Cincpac writes to CNO. Notes that the Southeast Pacific Force has shooting orders for surface raiders east of 100° West. He asks what orders to shoot should be issued in various areas of the Pacific. He asks what to do about submarine contacts suspected to be Japanese, off Pearl Harbor and vicinity. Our present orders are not to bomb unless they are in the defensive sea area. He states "A strong Pacific Fleet is unquestionably a detriment to Japan. A weaker one may be an invitation." He complains of our shortage of carriers, cruisers

and destroyers. He asks that the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON be sent to reinforce the Pacific Fleet.

23 September:

CNO replies that at the present time the President has issued shooting orders only for the Atlantic and the Southeast Pacific area. If Japan should attack Siberia the policy of the United States and that of the United Kingdom has not yet been clarified. He quotes article 723 U. S. Navy Regulations on the subject of using force and the legality of using force against a foreign and friendly State. He adds:—"The existing orders not to bomb suspected submarines except in the defensive sea [1566] areas are appropriate". "If conclusive evidence is obtained that Japanese submarines are actually in or near U. S. territory then a strong warning and a threat of hostile action against such submarines would appear to be our next step". Also, "We have no intention of further reducing the Pacific Fleet except that prescribed in Rainbow FIVE; that is the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month after Japan and the United States are at war"! "The existing force in the Pacific is all that can be spared for the tasks assigned your Fleet".

22 October:

Cinpac informed CNO that on receipt of despatch concerning the change in the Japanese cabinet he made the following dispositions:

- Continued maintaining the patrol of two submarines at Midway;
- Despatched twelve patrol planes to Midway;
- Started two submarines for the patrol of Wake;
- Despatched the CASTOR and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional Marines and stores;
- The CURTISS arrived at Wake with gasoline, lubricating oil and bombs;
- Prepared six patrol planes at Midway for Wake, replacing these six by others from Pearl Harbor;
- Sent additional Marines to Palmyra;
- Placed on 12 hours notice the Task Force under Admiral Pye, then on the West Coast for a recreation cruise;
- Prepared six submarines to depart for Japanese waters;
- Placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor;
- Delayed the sailing of the WEST VIRGINIA for the West Coast until time when she was actually [1567] required at Puget Sound.

Informed CNO that every exercise plan finds us short of destroyers and stated that in order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships made effective we required at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Again asked that the NORTH CAROLINE and WASHINGTON or some other battleships be sent here to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Asked for all long range submarines that can be sent here. Asked for more cruisers to take care of the Japanese raider activities after the outbreak of war. Asked for another carrier. Asked for sea train vessels to transport aircraft. Asked for RADAR and states that the first ones received for the HONOLULU class are of practically no value, being of the wrong type.

29 October:

Having been informed by Mr. Hallet Abend that the British Consul had informed Australia and New Zealand that England would declare war on Japan if the latter attacked Russia, Cinpac asks in that event what the United States would do.

6 November:

Cinpac forwards to CNO his estimate of the Japanese bases and forces in the Mandates. He again calls attention to the anti-submarine effort that will be required in this area and at sea if our operations are to be carried on with a reasonable security. In this letter he lists all types which are lacking sound equipment and asks that something be done about it. There are in this area 29 ships which can be fitted with sound gear and which are not so fitted.

7 November:

CNO approves the dispositions made by Cinpac after change in the Japanese cabinet. He notes the desirability of many things for the Pacific Fleet, particularly [1568] destroyers and cruisers but states that he just has not any

to give us. He states that King in the Atlantic is really up against it for destroyers for escort. He states the NORTH CAROLINA and WASHINGTON will not be available before March and that he is assigning them to the Atlantic for training. "Due to the urgency for providing destroyers of the Atlantic Fleet with high speed anti-submarine searching equipment, 27 of the 29 Model 'QC' retractable domes and projectors have been diverted from Pacific Fleet craft and will be sent to the Atlantic". He mentions two sea train vessels recently acquired and undergoing conversion. One of these will be sent to the Atlantic and one to the Pacific, but "if we have to send planes to the Near East we may have to use these ships for that purpose". He speaks of merchant ships to be converted to aircraft carriers but states that right now these ships are engaged in important duties and cannot be converted. Conversion will take from 12 to 15 months. At the same time he states that things seem to be moving steadily toward a crisis in the Pacific. "Just when it will break no one can tell".

15 November:

Cincpac asks for an additional 19,000 men and complains that material and personnel are being diverted to the Atlantic. He states:—"If this Fleet is to reach and maintain a satisfactory degree of readiness for offensive action the foregoing requirements must be met; and it must not be considered a training fleet for support of the Atlantic Fleet and the shore establishment".

14 November:

CNO states that just what we will do in the Far East remains to be seen. He attaches an estimate submitted by General Marshall and himself to the President, Far [1569] Eastern situation. In this estimate the President is informed that the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Pacific. It discusses in detail the situation in the Far East and makes certain recommendations, one of which is that the despatch of United States' armed forces for intervention against Japan be disapproved.

In this same letter CNO states that the flight deck merchant ship LONG ISLAND is far from satisfactory so far as speed is concerned, and adds:—"Incidentally, five of these type are being converted in our yards for the British, under Lend-Lease". He encloses a study made by the General Board on the subject of the fortification of Guam.

25 November:

CNO to Cincpac. "It might interest you to know that King strongly recommended his taking the destroyers which we now have on our West Coast ports and the Secretary was sold on it". (From this statement it does not appear that the Secretary of the Navy expected hostilities to open in the Hawaiian Area). Again the task of the Atlantic and the need for ships and transports are stressed. CNO has at last succeeded in getting the President to authorize draftees for the Navy.

In an undated postscript to this letter the CNO states:—

"I held this up pending a meeting with the president and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today's meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles an [1570] attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people. You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

"I won't go into the pros or cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that's the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be 'anything'."

2 December:

Cincpac to CNO. This letter is almost entirely on the defenses of the outlying islands and the recommendations from Navy and War Departments in the past few days that soldiers be used to replace Marines. Cincpac quotes to CNO the statement of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Detachment that

Army pursuit planes cannot operate farther than 15 miles from land. He states that if this be the case Army pursuit planes will be of very little use in an outlying island. He calls the CNO's attention to the fact that he has issued orders to the Pacific Fleet to bomb all submarine contacts in the operating areas around Oahu.

—End—

[1571] Admiral KIMMEL. May I get that back when they are finished with it? I would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will have it sent back to you to complete your file.

Admiral KIMMEL. Will that be all, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. If there is anything that occurs to you, sir, let us know, and we shall be glad to have you appear before us.

Admiral KIMMEL. I will if it does, but just at present I have nothing further to say.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT H. H. HENDERSON, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name and rank to the reporter, please.

Lieutenant HENDERSON. H. H. Henderson, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been in the Army Intelligence in the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Since September, 1938.

The CHAIRMAN. During that time has the liaison between F. B. I., Army, and Navy, to your observation, been an intimate one?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you found any evidence of one or the other of those agencies attempting to investigate things and not advising the other until the investigation was complete?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir, I never noticed that.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you think it has been that the intelligence services have not been able to break through the Japanese ring of silence here?

[1572] Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well, I really don't know, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been detailed to do some work on the Japanese end?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir, I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, under the agreement you look after military matters, Army matters, exclusively?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereas the Navy and F. B. I. have Japanese matters under their particular care?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think that the espionage against the Japanese could be better conducted if there were a single agency through which everything cleared and which had direction of all activities?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well, it might possibly be, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any other questions?

General McCoy. Are you a Reserve Officer?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Are you a native of Hawaii?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir. I came over here from Fort Sam Houston, sir.

General McCoy. For what particular reason were you detailed for this duty? Do you know?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well, I was transferred into the Intelligence Service in 1927 after being on a probationary duty for a couple of years. I was in the Intelligence Police Corps, and I came up to this from that.

General McCoy. You had no special qualifications for intelligence service here in Hawaii?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir. I was just a replacement.

General McCoy. Due to special knowledge of languages or anything of that sort?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir.

General McCoy. What has been your particular assignment?

[1573] Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well, sir, now as an officer I am an administration officer for the contact office downtown.

General McCoy. Does the administrative work go smoothly and satisfactorily in connection with the liaison with the Navy and the F. B. I.?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir. Our cooperation is especially good with the F. B. I. Of course they are right on the same floor with us, practically in the same office, although we have had no difficulty with the Navy at all. They have been very cooperative. I think all three of the services are working very closely together. They have been so far as I can see.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. Have you any intelligence police under your control?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir. Not exactly under my control but within the office.

General McNARNEY. I mean in your organization.

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. Where are they stationed?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Right down in the Dillingham Building right in town.

General McNARNEY. Where do they usually do their business? Where do they operate?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well they are circulating around town and also on the various posts whenever there is a necessity for it.

General McNARNEY. Have they turned up any subversive action or acts of sabotage?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. So far they have—well, there's lots of subversive activity been turned up, but no concrete acts of sabotage have been uncovered; lots of reports of it, but it never developed into anything concrete.

[1574] General McNARNEY. You say there is lots of subversive action turned up?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. Well, it is more reports of subversive activities than there were actual cases.

General McNARNEY. Did you ever get any concrete evidence on any particular person?

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, we haven't developed anything where it could develop into a trial.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

Admiral REEVES. I have nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Do not discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

Lieutenant HENDERSON. No, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Lieutenant Meurlott.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Lieutenant?

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LIEUTENANT BYRON M. MEURLOTT, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name and rank to the reporter?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Byron M. Meurlott, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence.

The CHAIRMAN. How long have you been with the Military Intelligence on the island?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Sixteen years, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have been here all the whole 16 years?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And have been devoting yourself to intelligence work?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you a native of the islands?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has your intelligence department in the Army had any particular mission with respect to the Japanese [1575] civilian population here?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. To some extent, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have understood that that was the particular care of the F. B. I. and the Navy and that you confine yourselves more particularly to Army matters. How about that?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Well, until comparatively recent years neither the F. B. I. nor O. N. I. was active here, and we more or less—

The CHAIRMAN. You took it on?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you been able to discover any overt acts of sabotage on the island?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I suppose that if you had any information of espionage on the part of Japanese you turned it over to one of the other agencies for investigation, or did you run it out yourselves?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. In the earlier years, I say, before the O. N. I. and the F. B. I. entered the field, we referred, of course, any suspicions of espionage or sabotage directly to the War Department, and

our department has attempted in the past to carry out certain investigations.

The CHAIRMAN. Now what is your practice?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. At the present time and since the President issued his order of instructions concerning the delineation of duties—that was about 18 months ago, I believe.

The CHAIRMAN. Just a little louder.

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. That was about approximately 18 months ago. (Continuing:)—we have confined our activities to Army personnel and civilians under military jurisdiction.

The CHAIRMAN. And have referred questions of Japanese sabotage or espionage in the civil population to the other agencies?

[1576] Lieutenant MEURLOTT. To the F. B. I., yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you report that promptly to those agencies if anything comes to your notice?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you think the system has been working here, of three agencies? Have they cooperated?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I believe so, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do. And you think the work is pretty well coordinated?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I believe it is, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. How long have you been on active duty?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. As a Reserve Officer?

General McNARNEY. As a Reserve Officer.

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Since April 5, 1941.

General McNARNEY. What was your status prior to that time?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I was the senior corps of intelligence police member in the Army.

General McNARNEY. How many other police were there besides yourself?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I believe there were 15 throughout the Army at that time. That was before the expansion occurred.

General McNARNEY. What is your force here now?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. We have a present authorized strength of 35.

General McNARNEY. What is your actual strength?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Well, we got in eight new ones yesterday, plus the 19 we previously had, would make us 27 at the present time.

General McNARNEY. You have served here for 16 years, you say?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. What is your opinion, from your experience over here, as to the loyalty of the average Japanese?

[1577] Lieutenant MEURLOTT. It is just purely my opinion, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. Well, based on your experience, 16 years as a military policeman.

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I would say that there would be a very small percentage that would be loyal to the United States: less than ten.

General McNARNEY. How about the R. O. T. C. men at the University and the high school? Is there a higher percentage loyal?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Possible. I wouldn't answer or guess on that.

General McNARNEY. You wouldn't like to draft them, though?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Approximately how many names has the Army turned in of characters who should be interned in time of war?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I should estimate it at approximately a thousand.

General McNARNEY. Who determines the ones actually to be taken up and interned?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. That was more or less decided jointly between our office and the F. B. I.

General McNARNEY. In other words, a large number of names that were turned in were thrown out on further investigation?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. I believe that to be true, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you speak Japanese?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. No, sir.

General McCoy. Hawaiian?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Well, I can understand certain Hawaiian and also certain Japanese, but I have never made a study of it.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

[1578] Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute. I want to ask a question.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just what is the limitation of the Army's G-2 functions or intelligence functions? Is it by location or is it by races of people, or what? Just what are the Army responsible for now under the new setup?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Well, as a matter of fact, I'd like to have an answer to that myself, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the reason I asked the question.

General McCoy. Are you familiar with the agreement between the three services?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. In a general way, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

General McCoy. Who was your particular superior, your chief?

Lieutenant MEURLOTT. Colonel Bicknell is head of my particular department.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Lieutenant. Please don't discuss what has gone on in this room with anyone.

(Thereupon, at 12:35 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1579]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

Colonel BROWN. Mr. Settle.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Settle, will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF FRANK EDWARD SETTLE, DRAFTSMAN

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name and address to the reporter?

Mr. SETTLE. Frank Edward Settle. My present address or my home address on the mainland?

The **CHAIRMAN.** Your home address.

Mr. SETTLE. My home address on the mainland?

The **CHAIRMAN.** Your home address here.

Mr. SETTLE. Red Hill, Honolulu.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Where is your home on the mainland?

Mr. SETTLE. Salt Lake City, Utah.

The **Chairman.** You came out here and have been doing some work at Midway, have you not?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes.

The **CHAIRMAN.** What is your profession, sir?

Mr. SETTLE. Draftsman, civil engineering draftsman.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Were you employed by the government or by a contractor?

Mr. SETTLE. By the contractors.

The **CHAIRMAN.** When did you arrive at Midway?

Mr. SETTLE. On October 10.

The **CHAIRMAN.** When did you leave Midway?

Mr. SETTLE. On December 27.

The **CHAIRMAN.** I understand from our Recorder that you have some knowledge and information with respect to the attack on Midway and the situation there. Will you in your own way please tell us what you have?

[1580] **Mr. SETTLE.** Yes. I have a way of timing; I time things subconsciously.

I was in the harbor on the morning coming back to land at 11:30 when we were notified there was trouble.

The **CHAIRMAN.** When was that?

Mr. SETTLE. That was on Sunday, December 7.

Then that evening at supper Mr. Sheik, who was the contractor or superintendent at Midway, warned us in a very positive manner that we would be shelled or bombed that night.

The **CHAIRMAN.** That would be the night of the 7th?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes, at supper on the evening of the 7th, yes, and that we should hunt a ditch or hole and crawl in it and lay down and stay there. So naturally there was quite a bit of excitement around there and we were talking about it. My barracks is 18-B, which is the closest barracks to the high point of the island, and that is only 32 feet high on the high point.

I was sitting back on the steps talking, and about half past nine I went to my home, barracks. Of course, it was blacked out.

I was sitting on the edge of the bed taking off my shoes when the first shot came. I went to look and it was about 9:32.

The **CHAIRMAN.** Was that shot from a cruiser or a bomb from an airplane?

Mr. SETTLE. I didn't know at the time; so I took off across the 200 yards to the high point of the island from my barracks and I went to the high point to get out of the line of fire which would be on an angle, because I knew they would be after the hangar and the electric works.

So I stayed on the high point and viewed the entire proceeding. There were several shots fired before I reached the top; whether our batteries or the ships fired the shots I do not know.

[1581] I was trying to see my watch and to time the flashes and the explosion but I could not see.

I do not know just how long the bombing lasted, but about 17 minutes after the first shelling it ceased and the first plane started warming up. I am a fairly good judge of time and that was about when the first plane started warming up. That was about 10:15.

It took off at 10:35. That was the only plane that took off.

The CHAIRMAN. How many planes were there?

Mr. SETTLE. I believe there were 16 Navy planes and 2 Dutch planes. One Navy plane was in the hangar. That is what caused the fire and burned the roof of the hangar and also some valuable merchandise that was stored in there.

Of course they had a good water system, but no water. The water system was a failure because there was no water.

The Dutch ship was riddled with about 200 shrapnel holes, and the Pan-American crew came over to help.

There were several of us on this high point, and this plane just circled the island. I do not think it was out of our sight for 15 minutes for the next half hour.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the American plane?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes. Our Navy plane did take off. There were three or four men getting off the planes into the water. We figured about 35 knots as the speed, and that would be 160 miles off Midway at dusk. The plane that took off came in at 4 o'clock.

The CHAIRMAN. How many planes were there in the patrol?

Mr. SETTLE. Different planes at different times. Sometimes it was many and sometimes fewer. They were going and coming. We kept no count of them.

The CHAIRMAN. You kept no count?

Mr. SETTLE. No, we kept no count, but there were always from seven to twenty planes, Navy planes, on the apron.

[1582] The CHAIRMAN. You say this Dutch plane was riddled?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How many other planes were destroyed or damaged?

Mr. SETTLE. One Navy plane was burned completely.

The CHAIRMAN. In the hangar?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes. That is what set the merchandise afire, and the Dutch plane was riddled and the other Dutch plane and the five Navy planes were out on the apron.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not seriously damaged?

Mr. SETTLE. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how many bombs or shots the Japanese planes delivered?

Mr. SETTLE. No planes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they cruisers?

Mr. SETTLE. All shells, all shelling. They were two cruisers.

I saw the flashes and got out the next morning and laid a stick to compare it right at this point so I could locate the exact position as to the reef, because the reef on the west side is out away from the island. I laid this stick down so I could locate it the next morning to see where it was in regard to the reef, to estimate the distance from Midway.

The CHAIRMAN. What was that distance?

Mr. SETTLE. It was five and a half miles.

The CHAIRMAN. You could not make out what the Japanese ships were?

Mr. SETTLE. No, but they were shooting four- and eight-inch shells.

The CHAIRMAN. What is that?

Mr. SETTLE. Eight- and four-inch shells, because we had the butts of some shells.

The CHAIRMAN. Was Midway attacked again?

Mr. SETTLE. No.

[1583] The CHAIRMAN. That was the only one?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you say you got off?

Mr. SETTLE. On December 27.

On Monday night, just south of Midway, I was on guard, having had some military experience, and I was on guard duty, and I heard a faint boom just over the horizon. That is, I was on guard and I noticed the flashes south of Midway and I heard the faint boom just over the horizon.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know what that was?

Mr. SETTLE. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did any naval vessels of the United States land at Midway in the week before December 7?

Mr. SETTLE. The Coast Guard patrol.

The CHAIRMAN. Only?

Mr. SETTLE. Yes, only.

The CHAIRMAN. No carrier or large ship came in?

Mr. SETTLE. No. That channel is only 26 feet.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we know that, but they usually anchor offshore.

Mr. SETTLE. They might have done that at night, but I did not see them. I heard nothing about it, any reports to that effect.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know where the airplane crew was prior to the attack or what they were doing?

Mr. SETTLE. Not from personal knowledge, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please observe the caution not to discuss on the outside what has gone on in this room?

Mr. SETTLE. No fish ever got caught by keeping its mouth shut.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

[1584] Colonel BROWN. Colonel Pickett.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL HARRY K. PICKETT, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your name, sir, to the reporter, and your title?

Colonel PICKETT. Harry K. Pickett, Colonel, United States Marine Corps.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you in command of the Marine force that was dispatched to Midway?

Colonel PICKETT. I will explain that, sir. My duties before December 7 were that I was commanding officer of the Marine barracks, Navy Yard, and District Marine Officer of the 14th Naval District. As District Marine Officer it was my duty, as specified by the Commandant, to coordinate the activities of all Marine defense battalions assigned to this district. In that capacity I was in charge, under the supervision of the Commandant, of the Midway garrison as well as the other islands before and after the outbreak of war.

The CHAIRMAN. What force did you have on Midway prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel PICKETT. The Sixth Marine Defense Battalion.

The CHAIRMAN. Which consisted of what?

Colonel PICKETT. It consisted of 30 officers and 795 enlisted men of the Marine Corps, and three officers and sixteen men of the Medical Corps of the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of them were on Midway prior to December 7?

Colonel PICKETT. All of them.

The CHAIRMAN. All of them?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The force that you have just described was on Midway?

[1585] Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

General McCoy. Was there any naval personnel besides the medical unit?

Colonel PICKETT. The force I have just referred to was the entire defense force, which is apart from the Naval Station personnel, which comes under the station commander. I do not have the figures on that.

The CHAIRMAN. Were there naval personnel on Midway?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know how many there were?

Colonel PICKETT. No, I do not.

General McCoy. Who was in command of Midway?

Colonel PICKETT. Of the Naval Station was Station Commander Simard. I do not recall his first name, and of the Sixth Defense Battalion was Lieutenant Colonel H. D. Shannon.

The CHAIRMAN. Where is Colonel Shannon now?

Colonel PICKETT. He is at Midway.

General McCoy. There are two separate commands, then?

Colonel PICKETT. Not exactly separate. The Defense Force Commander is under the orders of the Station Commander, but there is more or less a separation, a recognized distinction between the purely Station personnel and the Defense Force.

General McCoy. There is one man on the island responsible for the defense, in the last analysis?

Colonel PICKETT. I think that is correct. That is the Station Commander.

The CHAIRMAN. What equipment in the way of anti-aircraft artillery or planes was at Midway just prior to December 7?

Colonel PICKETT. You said anti-aircraft?

The CHAIRMAN. Anti-aircraft, artillery, and planes.

Colonel PICKETT. There were three batteries of four guns each of the three-inch anti-aircraft mobile guns of the Army. There were thirty .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. There were thirty .30 caliber ground machine guns. There were six [1586] anti-aircraft searchlights, and 29 automatic rifles; and there were three batteries of two guns each of the five-inch .51 caliber guns, naval guns.

In the line of their equipment there were three radars of the type SCR268.

In addition to that there were four 7-inch, .45 caliber guns and four 3-inch, .50 caliber guns which had been shipped to Midway and were in the process of being mounted.

The CHAIRMAN. What about the airplanes?

Colonel PICKETT. I am not familiar with the situation with reference to aircraft there.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that under a command separate from yours?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes, entirely so.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be the Naval Commander?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the post commander?

Colonel Pickett. Under the post commander, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you know from the reports as to the attack on Midway? When did it occur and what was its nature and so forth?

Colonel PICKETT. I read Commander Simard's report but did not bring a copy with me. As I recall it, the attack came on the night of the 9th or 10th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. We have evidence here that it occurred on the night of the 7th. Is that wrong?

Colonel PICKETT. I am not sure, but it seems that thinking back over the circumstances at the time that I made a mental note that the force that attacked there might have been the same one that attacked here, and I am speaking of an aircraft raid, which, I think, came there on one of the nights.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be any impropriety in your letting us have either the report or a paraphrase of the report or reports?

[1587] Colonel PICKETT. My operations officer is on the phone now getting it. I am sorry about that. I would have prepared an answer to it if I had known.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any other questions?

General McCoy. There were two reports, one from the Station Commander and one from your command?

Colonel PICKETT. General, these things happened so fast that I cannot say as to the dates and how many reports I read of it, but I think it is well to wait until we get the report. That will speak for itself.

Colonel BROWN. Major Pefley is here.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Major PELEY. Yes.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR ALFRED R. PELEY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Pickett has suggested, sir, that he did not

bring the report of the action at Midway, Major. Do you have the benefit of that report?

Major PEFFLEY. I called on the telephone. It was at 2155, five minutes to 10 p. m. on December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the report indicate what the attacking force consisted of?

Major PEFFLEY. It consisted of a small cruiser and a heavy cruiser, so far as we could determine.

The CHAIRMAN. It was not an airplane attack?

Major PEFFLEY. No, sir, it was not.

The CHAIRMAN. And this firing was from a considerable distance offshore, I take it?

Major PEFFLEY. This firing was first about 10 miles offshore, as I recall it, and then they later came in closer. When they came in closer the searchlights from Midway picked them up and one of our batteries opened fire, at which time [1588] they turned away.

General McCoy. Is there any report of the damage done to them?

Major PEFFLEY. The people at Midway report that her ships made considerable smoke when they turned away and appeared to have suffered two hits.

The CHAIRMAN. The Japanese, so far as you know, have not returned to Midway?

Major PEFFLEY. They have not returned to Midway, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there any damage report on the station itself?

Major PEFFLEY. Yes, the roof of the hangar was set afire and some matériel in the hangar was damaged from dropping fire brands from the roof.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was caused by shellfire?

Major PEFFLEY. That was caused by shellfire.

Colonel PICKETT. May I answer that?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Colonel PICKETT. I have some information on that. As I recall, that first dispatch said there were 18 or 20 direct hits on the island at that time and described the damage just mentioned by the other witness; and stated that several hits were observed on the enemy ships and that they went away from shore, and the radars indicated that there was some movement on the boats in a small area, which might have indicated that they were engaged in some rescue work.

Just about a week ago the Japanese reported the killing of a general and a colonel in the attack on Midway; so it is quite well established that considerable damage was done to them.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you tell us what islands constitute the 14th Naval District? I mean what outlying islands. [1589] We know the Hawaiian group.

Colonel PICKETT. Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and while Wake, I believe, lies outside the geographical limits of the District, it was more or less so considered as being in the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. As being in the District?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes..

Admiral STANDLEY. Samoa is not in this District?

Colonel PICKETT. No.

General McCoy. I would like to have the reports furnished of the commanding officers. Will you please furnish copies of them?

Major PEFFLEY. Yes, we can give them to you.

Colonel PICKETT. That report was from the station commander.

The CHAIRMAN. And will you request the District Commander to furnish us such a report?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

General MCCOY. I think it might be well for us to have furnished reports for all these islands. We may not have use for them, and then again we may.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you speak to Admiral Bloch about it, as to the reports of anything from the other islands?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the reports of the attack or observations of hostile fleet or anything on these islands at that time, December 7, and the next few days. You have that in mind?

Major PEFFLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Just make that request.

Anything further?

General MCCOY. If they are making copies, they might make five copies for us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if it is convenient.

[1590] Major PEFFLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have anything in mind, Colonel, or you, Major, any other fact that might be pertinent to the subject of our investigation as to the circumstances of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel PICKETT. Nothing more than perhaps you might be interested in knowing that at the barracks and the Navy Yard we had 13 machine guns in action in about 20 minutes after the attack started, and we either shot down or took part in shooting down three raiding planes. I said "took part in" because one plane was claimed by about a dozen people.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question or two.

What was the status of your anti-aircraft guns at the time?

Colonel PICKETT. They were machine guns.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the status of those guns when the attack started?

Colonel PICKETT. They were in the gun shed.

Admiral STANDLEY. It took 20 minutes to get them out and get them in operation?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They were not out on location at the time of the attack?

Colonel PICKETT. They were not set up, no, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that a special disposition or was that the usual storage for the guns?

Colonel PICKETT. That was the usual storage for the guns.

Admiral STANDLEY. No unusual precautions were taken as a result of instructions received immediately preceding the attack?

Colonel PICKETT. No, sir, but I might say that in the War Plans or in the plans for defense of this area that we [1591] contribute what anti-aircraft troops we have available to the Army for tactical assignment. That is their mission, and we merely augment their forces by whatever we might have available. That is not our mission, but

we merely have that matériel and ammunition on hand and put that into action quickly without waiting for an assignment.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would that state of readiness be only as obtained in the Army forces or the fleet forces?

Colonel PICKETT. As regards the Army entirely.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Army entirely?

Colonel PICKETT. Because it was their mission to provide the anti-aircraft protection for the Pearl Harbor area.

The CHAIRMAN. You had a number of exercises and drills in simulation to repulse aircraft attack?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes, that is a part of the routine training.

The CHAIRMAN. When you had such problems or exercises, who was in command of your guns?

Colonel PICKETT. They belonged to the various defense battalions which I believe were stationed at Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Who had command of them? Who told you when to fire or had command over the disposition? The Navy or the Army?

Colonel PICKETT. The Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Who was the Commander from whom you got your instructions in such a drill? Were you under the command of the Army? Was it General Davidson or General Martin?

Colonel PICKETT. I have not made myself clear. The drills are routine training matters.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I know that.

Colonel PICKETT. The alerts and arming the battle stations would be an entirely different matter, and when the Marines went to the Army groupment, they were assigned to their tactical positions, but in the routine defenses the final [1592-1593] direction was under the anti-aircraft group commander.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the Army?

Colonel PICKETT. The Army, yes.

General McCoy. Did you get any orders from him that day?

Colonel PICKETT. We put out two anti-aircraft gun batteries and, to the best of my recollection, thirty-seven .50 caliber anti-aircraft machine guns and fifty-one .30 caliber machine guns without waiting for instructions from the anti-aircraft brigade commander.

As the situation developed we reported our dispositions and they were approved and were continued and we occupied thereafter them for a matter of several days before any readjustment was made.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that answers it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your anti-aircraft guns were a part of the Army fire group?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And to be controlled by the group commander of the fire group, the fire sector?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes, sir. The Army calls that a groupment of the anti-aircraft machine-gun group and the anti-aircraft gun group.

Admiral STANDLEY. You are a part of the group?

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As a result of the drills and exercises do you take up a fire sector without any instructions if there is something

in that sector, or is there an automatic designation in the sector without any instructions from the fire group control?

Colonel PICKETT. No. That is because the presence of the Marine anti-aircraft is merely an accident, and the Army would not make a disposition of the Marines in that particular. It is purely a supplementary proposition rather than an integral part.

[1594] The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Do not discuss with anyone what has gone on in this room.

Colonel PICKETT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Major, we will ask you to get us those reports.

Major PEFFLEY. Yes, I will do that.

The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn now until tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Thursday, January 8, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m.)

[1595] EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES APPEARING VOLUNTARILY IN RESPONSE TO INVITATION OF THE COMMISSION PUBLISHED JANUARY 5TH, 6TH, AND 7TH

On January 7, 1942, the following witnesses were all examined apart by the Recorder, assisted by the Secretary, in some cases.

During the morning the following witnesses appeared:

Mr. Frank Elbert Midkiff, Trustee of the Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Treasurer of the J. B. Atherton Estate; in charge of the work of the Juliet M. Atherton Trust; Chairman of Civilian Evacuation Committee.

Mr. Midkiff was sworn by the Recorder and made a statement which was recorded in condensed form and read to and approved by him. In connection with his statement Mr. Midkiff submitted certain reports which have been placed in the files of the Commission. Mr. Midkiff's statement is attached hereto.

Ray C. Flock

Not sworn.

Civil service draftsman at Pearl Harbor. Was at Navy Yard overlooking Hickam Field between 8:45 and 9:00 P. M. Sunday, December 7th. Saw the incident of firing on our own planes. He suggested equipping our planes with flood lights on lower side of wings, to be flashed in predetermined code for identification. Will submit plans to Commission through Recorder by evening of January 8th.

Yee Kam York

Appeared before the Commission.

Field examiner and auditor, Territorial tax office. An American citizen by birth; Chinese ancestry; exhibited American passport. Was sub-manager of British-owned bank in Shanghai, and exchange broker. Was at Shanghai during 1931-1932 and 1937 attacks by Japanese. Employment as tax collector has brought him in contact with Japanese in countryside. Seemed to have promise of availability for intelligence work.

[1596] *Bud K. Rich*

Not sworn.

Civil service laborer. Present at Pearl Harbor during attack; manned fire hose; knocked out by hose. Complained of negligent treatment at hospital and of general treatment of civilian employees.

Mrs. Youmans

Not sworn.

Housewife. Stated fleet left Pearl Harbor at night, ten days before attack, with all lights lit.

Mrs. Maude Irwin

Not sworn.

Teacher, Helemano School. Was not examined. Left statement tending to show time of arrival of Japanese planes and number thereof. The statement is in the files of the Commission.

Edward R. Dathe

Made sworn statement.

Civil service, Pearl Harbor; outside machinist first class. U. S. Navy 1914-1918; discharged machinist first class. Reported two other civil service employes by name as having Japanese wives, and spoke of others unnamed. Recommended organization and drill of civilian employes, especially fire drill.

Mrs. Janet Morgan

Not sworn.

Housewife. Husband works at Pearl Harbor. Was in Honolulu evening of December 6th; saw large crowds of sailors, some of them drunk. Was concerned at this, but is not member of any temperance society. Was reassured by small number of arrests that night and large number present for duty next morning. Inquired whether suspension of liquor sales would be modified, and expressed relief on being informed there would probably be no serious modification during the existence of danger.

[1597] *Mrs. Irene Ford*

Not sworn.

Two days after attack was insulted by a Japanese; next day was bitten by a dog. Complained to police, who took no action. Her son was arrested today by the police.

Alipio B. Yangson

Not sworn.

Carpenter employed at Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor. Philippine born. For some time after August 1941 worked at Officers' Club. Not there December 6. Had no first-hand knowledge.

John H. Midkiff

Not sworn.

Manager Waialua Company plantations. Outlined steadily increasing emplacement of guns in pill boxes throughout large area at his plantation throughout General Short's tenure; consolidation of several private railroads with North Shore Railroad; laying of communication cables, etc.

Frank E. Settle

Appeared before Commission.

Civil service draftsman employed by contractor in construction work at Midway Island.

Lt. Commdr. Paul M. Bates U. S. N.

Made sworn statement.

Was senior department watch officer October 21, 1941, to December 7, 1941. Reported having made criticism of facilities of communication system at the operations office, which was in charge of watch officers under him from 4.00 P. M. to 8.00 A. M. each night during that period. He left written statements and supporting documents. He recommended calling Lieutenant Commander Harold Kaiminski, on duty at the operations office on the morning of the attack, who reported attack on destroyer by submarine and attack on submarine by destroyer. Statement taken by Mr. Maxson.

Edwin Pereira

Not sworn.

Employed at Navy Yard power plant. Present during attack. Among his duties were care and repair of pipes and [1598] valves and maintenance of water control. First drove in truck to No. 1010 dock. Closed broken steam pipe below 1010 dock. Stood by telephone for orders. Attended fire at dry dock. Picked up part of Japanese uniform with name, and part of plane with characters, which he turned in to authorities at Governor's office.

During the afternoon the following witnesses appeared:

Mr. Heberly

Not sworn.

Acting Collector U. S. Customs, Honolulu. Left report of two inspectors, eye witnesses of attack. The report is in the files of the Commission.

L. M. Ezera

Not sworn.

Painter, Honolulu electric power plant. Had instructions from on high as far back as June, 1941. Explained international conflicts on theory of sex. Wishes personal interview with President of the United States.

Romania H. Woolley.

Not sworn.

Reported at second-hand statements made by Commander Dreller U. S. N. advising his family to take precautions against possible enemy attack, and of defending Germany against her criticisms.

Mrs. Ralph Fishbourne

Not sworn.

Made substantially the same report as Mrs. Woolley.

Mrs. Jenny H. Dorr

Not sworn.

Interpreted advertisements of Japanese store according to code she herself discovered.

Miss Mary Monte Cairies

Not sworn.

On morning of December 7 had premonition of something wrong; noticed large plane hovering slowly over important business houses in Honolulu 6:03 a. m. to 6:18 a. m. December [1599] 7th. Apparently saw some of the Japanese attacking planes arrive at 7:55.

Mr. James F. Donovan

Made sworn statement.

Miner employed by contractor at Red Hill. Felt danger exists in large concrete tunnel leading from fuel storage tanks underground at Red Hill. Reported loose methods in issuance and use of identification badges.

Mr. C. W. Cordin

Not sworn.

79-year old veteran of three wars. Had difficulties with his landlord and was evicted. Informed this beyond the scope of the Commission.

[1600] STATEMENT UNDER OATH, JANUARY 7, 1942, MADE TO THE
RECORDER, W. B. HOWE

Lieutenant Commander Paul M. Bates, U. S. N., stationed at Headquarters 14th Naval District, Senior District Watch Officer, October 21 to December 7, 1941

Among the duties of Commander Bates and his watch was to make decisions in emergency and to report to the chief of staff before action taken, if possible. At the time Commander Bates was senior watch officer the equipment of the operations room consisted of three teletype machines and one field telephone connecting with lookout posts and the Army G-2. This telephone was manned by a reserve blue-jacket on a four-hour watch from 4 p. m. until 8 o'clock a. m. each night. District watch not instructed how to operate the teletype machines. One voice radio connected with the inshore patrol and the Naval Air Station and various other posts listening in. The telephone was a regular dial telephone.

In case of emergency it was the duty of the watch officer to call at least ten persons over the dial telephone, and it was also necessary to watch the teletype machines and send out the warning over the voice telephone and over the field telephone.

On or about the 25th of October, 1941, the morning after his first watch, Commander Bates made recommendations for changes in the standing instructions. These recommendations were made to Lieutenant Commander Harrison, who was the assistant to Commander Momsen. Commander Bates desired that Commander Momsen should get the suggestions. These suggestions were made in the form of notes, which were on a separate piece of paper attached to the log book.

After repeated criticisms of the system, Commander Bates requested a conference of officers of his watch to receive a lecture from the officer in charge of communications. This lecture was held in order to inform the officers of the watch [1601] how to run the various machines and exactly whom they were connected up with.

On Thursday afternoon, either the 24th of November or the 4th of December, but probably November 24, in view of the many questions that were asked by the watch officers, Commander Bates requested Commander Harrison and Commander Momsen to sit in on the lecture, to listen and explain what they knew about the matters in question; and that is when Commander Momsen stated, in substance, "I don't consider that you have anything to worry about," and that in due course of time he would complete his communication installations and man them with the proper personnel.

Commander Bates recommends that Lieutenant Commander Harold Kaminski be called by the Commission. He was duty officer at the moment of the attack and reported the attack on one of our destroyers by a Japanese submarine and reported the attack of the destroyer on the submarine.

Commander Bates submitted as part of his testimony a written statement with enclosures, which is attached hereto. It is a statement of facts and of recommendations.

Commander Bates recommends that the district watch officer's log book and instruction file be called for.

[1602] STATEMENT UNDER OATH, JANUARY 7, 1942, MADE
TO THE RECORDER, W. B. HOWE

Mr. Edward R. Dathe

Mr. Dathe stated that he is a machinist, first class, at Pearl Harbor, that he started to work July 27, 1940, at Pearl Harbor, and that his badge number is 31893.

Mr. Dathe was in the United States Navy 1914-1918, and was honorably discharged "Excellent" as Machinist, first class. He served on the George Washington in 1917, and on destroyer Fairfax from January 1918 on. He is married, and lives at Kaneohe.

He reports that a chief quartermaster outside machinist named Hoosier is married to a Japanese wife. Hoosier has to do with installation of secret mechanical equipment, among other things, and has access to the blueprints and also to the scheduled dockings and completions. Mr. Dathe makes no charges of improper action against Mr. Hoosier, but emphasizes the danger of a man with that information being married to a Japanese. On inquiry he has learned that the Japanese wife is now about 35 or 40 years old, was formerly hostess at the Valencia Roof, a hangout for sailors, that in 1927 she married Mickey O'Connell of the United States Navy, and later Hoosier married her and adopted her child. It is not known whether she is of alien or American birth, but it is believed that her parents are not living on the Island.

Mr. Dathe also reports that Charles Gerlach, machinist, civil service, Pearl Harbor, is married to a Japanese wife. He does not know Gerlach well, and makes no charges against him. Mr. Dathe believes, however, that Gerlach is hostile to sailors. He knows nothing about his political opinions.

Mr. Dathe believes there are five other men in key positions who are also married to Japanese wives, but he has no particulars.

Mr. Dathe reported at the Navy Yard from home about five minutes past nine on the morning of the attack, and on his own initiative took part in fighting the fire aboard the U. S. S. Helena under the direction

of William Maher, a quartermen at the Yard, a World War veteran from the Navy. They continued until around eleven o'clock A. M. fighting the fire and removing the wounded and the dead, and suffered some strafing from the Japanese planes around eleven o'clock.

Some months ago Mr. Dathe recommended that a fire-fighting force amongst the experienced civilian employees be organized at the machine shop in the Yard. He points out that on the morning of the attack the reservation filled up with about six thousand civilian workmen, many of whom performed no services and were in the way. He recommends that hereafter all civilian workmen be instructed and to some extent drilled in their detail in case of emergency—if in the Yard at the time, what to do; if away from the Yard, who are to return to the Yard and who are not to return. So far as he knows no steps have been taken along these lines, except that day before yesterday they did in the machine shop post a notice concerning certain groups of men to take care of buckets of sand. Outside machinists, however, are not organized. There is a large number of them. He believes that especially ex-service men could perform valuable duties in an emergency, if previously assigned.

Mr. Dathe has listened attentively to the dictation of this statement, correcting it from time to time, and states that it is a brief fair statement of his knowledge and of his recommendations.

[1603] STATEMENT UNDER OATH, JANUARY 7, 1942, MADE
 TO THE RECORDER, W. B. HOWE

Mr. Frank Elbert Midkiff

Mr. Midkiff gave his occupation as trustee of the Bernice P. Bishop Estate, Treasurer of the J. B. Atherton Estate, and in charge of the work of the Juliet M. Atherton Trust.

Mr. Midkiff stated that he has lived in Honolulu since 1913. He presented excerpts from a talk given by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short at the Chamber of Commerce Army Day dinner on April 7, 1942; also an outline of plan for protective measures for civilian population of Oahu in case of bombardment, prepared at the direction of General Short by his staff and submitted March 25, 1941. It was submitted to a group of civilian defense personnel with whom he had been in conference on this same subject. Mr. Midkiff also submitted a memorandum of undertakings of General Short in cooperation with the Civilian Defense Committee of Hawaii. The excerpts, outline of plan, and memorandum are in the files of the Commission.

Mr. Midkiff stated that in all of the subjects General Short was the leader—he furnished the leadership. The matters, or series of matters, were taken up by General Short with the Defense Committee. Mr. Midkiff stated that in his opinion, if it had not been for the leadership of General Short and the fact that he made the specialists on his staff available to deal with civilians on the several topics—production and storage of food; organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded; organization of an auxiliary police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage; evacuation of women and children; air raid shelters; harmonious relations between the races in Hawaii; and the place of the civilian flier in national defense, or in the event of war—there would have been no considerable progress

made by the civilian defense committee—it would have slowed down and would not have gotten under way. This cooperation resulted very beneficially when the attack came. These organizations which he encouraged all did effective work. In the Waialua District, within an hour after news of the attack, the various people assigned to tasks there were at their posts and the utilities were being protected by armed citizens in accordance with prearranged plan.

Mr. Midkiff stated that he was aware that there was no extensive local sabotage, although there is ample opportunity for it amongst maids, house boys and servants, Japanese mechanics, etc. Mr. Midkiff further stated that so far as concerned the attitude of the intelligent population in general with respect to the policies of our Government with relation to the Japanese, he had heard that some people criticized us for arming Guam. They were persons connected with military and naval establishments. In general the attitude was that it was an unnecessary expense, and that worse than that, it would goad the Japanese to take note of it, and we had better go easy on all that. In other words, there was a lot of sympathy with the attitude of Congress in doing nothing about it.

[1604] STATEMENT UNDER OATH, JANUARY 7, 1942, MADE TO
THE RECORDER, W. B. HOWE

Mr. James F. Donovan

Mr. Donovan was sworn by the Recorder of the Commission at 3.20 P.M.

Mr. Donovan has worked at Red Hill as a hard-rock miner for the last nine months. He described the following physical condition there as a possible menace:

Work is now progressing on the erection of four underground fuel storage tanks, each 100 feet in diameter and 285 feet in height. It is his understanding that as soon as completed these tanks are to be filled with fuel. Whether it is oil, gasoline, or other type fuel, he does not know. The tank bottoms are approximately 100 feet above the surface of Pearl Harbor. Approximately 20 feet below the bottoms of the tanks is one end of a tunnel twelve feet in diameter leading from Red Hill to Pearl Harbor, and opening there at water level. The purpose of the tunnel is to hold pipes from Pearl Harbor to the place of storage to permit fuel to be pumped from a ship or tanker at Pearl Harbor up into the tanks, and also pipes from the tanks to Pearl Harbor for the flow of fuel to Pearl Harbor for use there. The tanks are connected with the Red Hill end of the tunnel by branch tanks of the same diameter as the main tunnel, and through these branch tunnels run the connecting pipes. Mr. Donovan points out that if the bottom or lower parts of one or more of these tanks were to be ruptured, fuel from the tank would run into the tunnel and thence through the tunnel to Pearl Harbor, 100 feet below, and thence necessarily spread over the surface of the harbor. The present project calls for the installation of a total of fifteen fuel storage tanks, the connecting pipes for which will all run through the same main tunnel and similar connecting tunnels. Once on the surface of Pearl Harbor the inflammable fuel would be a great fire hazard. He recalls the burning of crude oil flowing on the lake of Maracaibo in

Venezuela several years ago, resulting in the destruction of 2,000 lives among settlements built there on piles amid the surface of the lake. The floor of the tunnel now holds a railroad for the hauling of pipes and other materials. It is improbable that this service can be interrupted until the final installation is made, and therefore it would be impossible before that time to place bulkheads in the tunnel to stop any such flow of oil as would be possible after a break in the tanks. In addition there is another tunnel, previously constructed, leading from a point below the level of the bottom of the tanks, nearly horizontally, and opening into a ravine, the flow from which would drain into Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Donovan showed two identification passes for himself. They are in the form of circular metal objects each containing a photograph of himself, with a legend around the outer edge of the photograph, reading in one case "Contractors NOY 4173 Red Hill", and inside this printing Mr. Donovan's number 14162. The printing around the edge of the other badge is "Contractors NOY 3550—NOY 4173 (P. N. A. B.) Employee", with the same number 14162 in the middle. The type of the first mentioned badge was abandoned approximately four months ago and Mr. Donovan was required to have a new badge, which is the second above mentioned. When the use of the first mentioned badge was discontinued he was permitted to keep it and was not asked to surrender it. The photograph in both badges is covered by celluloid or some transparent material. No other mark of identification of Mr. Donovan appears on either object, nor is there any stamp or other sign of identification on either object which would authenticate it as one officially authorized. The photographic work for each object was done at the commissary at Red Hill by operators apparently under the authority of the contractor and apparently not under the authority of the Navy. Mr. Donovan expressed the opinion that no one should be allowed to have more than one badge at the same time, and that consequently when a badge is retired it should be surrendered. He suggests that if this subject is investigated it be ascertained how many badges have been surrendered and whether or not there are any regulations requiring such surrender. He also recommends that when one type of badge is called in it be succeeded by a recognizably different type of badge, for example, instead of a circle, a square or an octagon.

Mr. Donovan has visited in Honolulu a photographic establishment where in a circular frame large enough to admit the head and shoulders of a sitter for the photographer, the circle is surrounded in large lettering by the text similar to that on the objects above mentioned. This arrangement permits a sitter to show his head and shoulders through the circle inside the large lettering and be photographed, thus reproducing an unauthorized photograph sufficiently like the authorized photograph as to make detection difficult. Mr. Donovan was informed by some of his fellow workmen that they, having omitted to have their photographs taken for badges out at Red Hill, had them taken for the objects above mentioned in Honolulu at a photograph studio of the same people who made the photographs at Red Hill. He does not recollect the address of the establishment.

He has also heard on what he regards as reliable statements to him by fellow workmen at Red Hill, that they have successfully used their Red Hill badges to obtain admission to the Pearl Harbor reservation. He has also heard on what he regards as reliable authority that the wives of workmen in Pearl Harbor are permitted to use their husbands' badges to gain access to the commissary at Pearl Harbor.

The above statement was dictated in the presence of Mr. Donovan after he had first related the circumstances and after he had been sworn, and he consents that this statement shall be taken as the one made by him under oath. The Recorder administered the oath under authority given to him by resolution of the Commission January 6, 1942.

[1606]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1607] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1942

**SUITE 300, ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Honolulu, T. H.**

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reporter, will you note that Lieutenant Commander Layton, Intelligence Officer of the Pacific Fleet, has produced a memorandum of the procedure in obtaining intelligence of the Japanese Fleet and a summary of the times when information as to particular elements of the Japanese Fleet was lacking to the intelligence here in the United States Navy. That will be copied in at the beginning of today's proceedings.

(The above-mentioned document is as follows:)

[1608] **UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET**

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMISSION

In accordance with the Commission's verbal directive, the following Summary is respectfully submitted:

In summarizing the frequency of occurrence of the periods when information was lacking in regard to the location or activity of a group, type or unit of the

Japanese Fleet during the last six months of 1941, necessitates a general review of the procedures and methods followed:

1. Due to the distances involved, it is seldom possible to intercept the original direct transmissions from Japanese Fleet units at sea, consequently interception depends on those naval communications handled by the more powerful shore stations on broadcast schedules. Approximately 90% of the intercepted traffic is of this latter nature. A unit may be addressed by other units via direct communication or the ship-shore channels (rebroadcast) whether in port or at sea. During tactical exercises ORANGE utilizes medium and low frequencies which are inaudible here. During such periods it is necessary to rely on the intercept activities at Guam and Cavite to observe and report on these activities. When in port, a unit almost invariably shifts to the low-frequency, low-power, limited range, "harbor frequency" depriving all intercept stations of originated traffic. Thus occurs periods when little definite information is available relative to a unit's activities except that inferred from the traffic addressed to either by the routing or association with other units addressed or associations with the originator [1609]

2. Changes of call signs, addresses, use of alternate, secret, tactical, and special calls, greatly complicates the identification of units and the reconstruction of the naval organization afloat and ashore. The Japanese Navy shifted its call signs on 1 May, 1 November and 1 December, 1941. Shortly after the 1 November change the Japanese began using a "blanket broadcast" system in which no originator or addressee appeared, these being presumably buried in the cipher text.

3. It has been a general rule that when a unit was not heard originating traffic or using tactical circuits it was presumed to be in port or in a navy yard in a relatively inactive status.

4. It is to be noted that for the above reasons the simultaneous location of each Division of Battleships, cruisers, destroyers, carriers, or submarines is not possible. Therefore, the locations of Fleet Flagships and some subordinate units of the above types must be relied upon to establish the presumed locations or activity of the remainder of the related lower echelons.

5. During the past six months, Fleet Intelligence records show that the occasions when uncertainty existed as to the exact location of certain types were:

Type	Total days uncertain	Number of Periods	Range of Periods
Battleships.....	70.....	Seven.....	8-14 days.
Cruisers (1st Fleet).....	nearly all.....	Almost continual absence of positive indications.	
Cruisers (2nd Fleet, less CRDIV 7).....	113.....	Eight.....	10-20 days.
CRDIV 7 (very active on detached duty).....	63.....	Six.....	8-16 days.
Destroyers.....	very indefinite.....	Seven.....	9-33 days.
Carriers.....	84.....	Eight.....	8-22 days.
(If Cardiv 2, formerly very active on detached duty, be excepted from this analysis the following result is more typical).			
Carriers (less Cardiv 2).....	134.....	Twelve.....	9-22 days.

[1610] (In both cases the longest period, 22 days, was in July 1941)

Respectfully submitted.

(Signed) EDWIN THOMAS LAYTON,
Lieutenant Commander, U. S. Navy.
Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

5 JANUARY 1942.

[1611] The CHAIRMAN. In answer to a request made yesterday on the Naval Intelligence there are produced excerpts from certain letters forming a delimitation agreement of the work of Japanese espionage between the various intelligence services. This is ordered copied in the record at the head of the notes of today's proceedings.

(The excerpts from correspondence are as follows:)

EXCERPTS FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS LETTER, DATED MARCH 15, 1941, TO
COMMANDANTS OF ALL NAVAL DISTRICTS, GOVERNOR OF GUAM, GOVERNOR OF SAMOA

Confidential

Subject: Investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage and Subversive Activities.

1. The delimitation agreement of June 5, 1940, transmitted with reference (a), was modified at a conference on July 29, 1940, between the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department and the Office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department, so far as subject-named investigations are concerned.

2. The following is a transcript of the notes of the conference on the subject matter:

"Mr. Hoover opened a discussion concerning the handling and coverage of Japanese activities. He stated that the Office of Naval Intelligence has done far more in this field than has any other agency heretofore. Admiral Anderson stated that the Navy has made some check on Japanese activities and has gone into some things which could only be done upon their aggrandized interpretation of Naval interest. [1612] He stated that the Navy Department does not want the full responsibility for the checking of the Japanese because of a lack of personnel, etc. Admiral Anderson furnished the conference with the background of Commander McCollom and pointed out that the Commander had resided in Japan, knows the Japanese language and has excellent Japanese contacts. Admiral Anderson agreed to make Commander McCollom and the Far Eastern Division of the Navy Department available for consultation and advise to the FBI at any time it was necessary or desirable. It was agreed that the Navy would continue to check Japanese activities in the same manner as in the past and that the FBI would take all possible steps to assimilate information concerning Japanese activities and to expand its own operations in this field."

3. The investigations of Japanese by the Naval Intelligence Service will be coordinated with those undertaken by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

COORDINATION OF FBI, ONI AND MID

Confidential

5 JUNE 1940.

I. It is agreed that in conformity with the directive contained in the President's memorandum of June 26, 1939, as augmented by his directive of September 6, 1939, responsibility for investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, sabotage and subversive activities will be delimited as indicated hereafter. Responsibility assumed by one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide a pool of all information received in that field but it does not imply the responsible agency alone is interested in or will work alone in that field. Close cooperation between the three agencies in [1613] all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. FBI will assume responsibility for all investigations of cases in those categories involving civilians in the United States and in its territories with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, Guam, Samoa and the Philippine Islands.

FBI will keep MID and ONI informed of important developments such as—

- (a) Developments affecting plants engaged on Army or Navy contracts.
- (b) Developments affecting vital utilities.
- (c) Developments affecting critical points of transportation of communication systems.
- (d) Cases of actual or strongly presumptive espionage or sabotage, including the names of individuals definitely known to be connected with subversive activities.

FBI will act as the coordinating head of all civilian organizations furnishing information relating to subversive movements.

III. FBI will assume responsibility for investigation of all cases in these categories directed from foreign countries on those occasions and in those situations in which the State, War or Navy Departments specifically request investigation of a designated group or set of circumstances.

FBI to keep MID and ONI informed of important developments.

IV. MID will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Military Establishment, including civilians employed on Military reservations or under military control. It will also assume responsibility for the investigation of cases in these categories involving civilians in the Canal Zone, the Republic of Panama, and the Philippine Islands.

MID will inform FBI and ONI of important developments.

[1614] V. ONI will assume responsibility for investigation and disposal of all cases in these categories in the Naval Establishment, including civilians under naval employ or control and all civilians in Guam and American Samoa.

ONI to inform FBI and MID of important developments.

VI. FBI will assume responsibility for ascertaining the location, leadership, strength and organization of all civilian groups designed to combat "Fifth Column" activities (overt acts of all sorts in cooperation with the armed forces of an enemy). FBI will transmit to MID, ONI and the State Department information concerning these organizations and any information received concerning their possession of arms.

Confidential

DECEMBER 12, 1940.

COOPERATION AND COORDINATION BETWEEN FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OF THE ARMY, AND THE OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE OF THE NAVY

1. The Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of the Military Intelligence Division of the Army, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of Naval Intelligence, with a view to promoting the closest possible cooperation and coordination between the Field Services of these agencies, recommend as follows:

(a) Special Agents in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Divisional Offices, Corps Area Military Intelligence Officers, and Naval District Intelligence Officers will maintain close personal liaison between those offices and their representatives, including a meeting of representatives of the three agencies, preferably the officers in charge, at least once per week, for the purpose of discussing pending and contemplated investigative activities, and any other subjects necessary to insure that there is proper coordination of their [1615] investigative work.

(b) The close personal liaison to be maintained between representatives of the three agencies at all times should insure that there is no duplication of effort in any field, and that a proper coverage of the whole investigative field is maintained. Particular attention should be paid to avoiding any duplication in connection with the use of informers.

(c) A distinction should be recognized between the investigative interest of individual agencies and the coverage interest. It is believed that all three agencies should study, from time to time, the coverage of the investigative field in order to insure that all channels of interest and avenues of information are adequately covered by at least one of the participating agencies.

(d) Where there is doubt as to whether or not one of the other agencies is interested in information collected, it should be transmitted to the other agency.

(e) Consideration should be given to the fact that certain classes of information are of general interest to the Military and Naval Intelligence Services in connection with background and a knowledge of espionage and sabotage organizations, even though the Military and Naval Intelligence Services may have no apparent direct investigative interest.

(f) Should differences of opinion of a minor nature occur; the Directors of the three intelligence agencies feel that with proper personal liaison, such differences can be satisfactorily adjusted locally by the officials in charge of the various divisional organizations.

2. The above instructions should not in any way be construed as abrogating the delimitation agreement previously promulgated, but as amplifying and clarifying this agreement.

[1616] The CHAIRMAN. There are also produced certain reports with reference to the incident on the Island of Niihau. These will be

filed as part of the records at the disposal of the Commission but will not be copied in the record.

Mr. HOWE. Mr. Chairman, the witnesses were examined yesterday. I wish to make a statement for the record on that.

Yesterday, in response to the invitation published in the papers by the Commission, witnesses appeared and were examined by the Recorder, assisted by the Secretary, with the result that two of the witnesses who volunteered appeared before the Commission, sworn statements were taken from four of them, and sixteen were after examination excused without either appearing before the Commission or making a recorded statement; and the Recorder invites a decision as to whether or not the brief summary of what these witnesses had to say should or should not be part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me, subject to the judgment of the Commission, that statements taken from these witnesses who gave statements should be made a part of the record, and the fact of the examination, whether taking of a statement or the rejection of the witness' testimony for irrelevancy, should be noted, together with the names of the witnesses, in the journal of the Commission's proceedings as of yesterday.

I guess you have done that, haven't you? Listed them?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Oh, what I did, I made enough copies to go in each transcript of the record, giving a brief outline of the statements of those who were not sworn, and then I thought we would write out in full the statements of those who were sworn, such as Midkiff.

The CHAIRMAN. Five copies, and put them in the record.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Five copies. And I spoke to Mr. Harkins and Mr. Howe, and we thought perhaps it would just follow at the end of yesterday's transcript as a sort of an addendum or something of that sort.

[1617] The CHAIRMAN. Unless there is objection to that, that will be done. I think we want to make a record of the fact that they were examined, and so on, and the effects of their testimony where taken.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Mr. Howe and I discussed last night whether we should put it in extenso in the minutes, and we thought it would lengthen them too much.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. HOWE. What, then, is the decision on that, sir?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Make five copies of our notes and append them to the transcript.

The CHAIRMAN. Of yesterday.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Of yesterday's proceedings, as a sort of addendum.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now let us call in General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY—Recalled

The CHAIRMAN. General Short, in the consideration of the testimony that we have taken there are some questions that have arisen

in our minds that we should like to clear up, and we have asked you to come so that we could put some questions to you and see if they would clear the situation.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember a message that was not translated for you until after the attack?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You had better look at it (handing a document to the witness). It is a message that has to do with the putting out of certain offshore signals indicating the whereabouts of the fleet on, I think it is, the 4th, 5th, [1618] and 6th of December.

General SHORT. I don't remember that that ever did come to me, Mr. Justice. I don't think that I ever saw that particular one. It was probably handled by someone who is——

The CHAIRMAN. Well, of course it was only ascertained what its contents were a couple of days after the attack.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Just look at it. It starts there and goes over the page.

General SHORT. Oh, right here.

The CHAIRMAN. It is just that message.

General SHORT. I had never seen this message until now.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You will observe that it calls for certain code signals of the movements of the ships on these particular dates.

General SHORT. Yes, sir, I see that.

The CHAIRMAN. 4th, 5th, and 6th.

Now, if that message had come to your knowledge before the 7th, would it have changed the dispositions that you made or changed your attitude with respect to an airplane raid on Pearl Harbor?

General SHORT. Well, I think that I would have been very suspicious that a raid might take place, because it would undoubtedly indicate some intention on the part of Japanese that they were interested in the movement of the ships.

The CHAIRMAN. Either to guide a submarine force or an air force?

General SHORT. An air force; one of the two, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. General, we have been informed that there was some movement in the year 1941 to arrest certain consular agents of the Japanese Consulate here. Do you remember that instance?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. There were some over 300, as [1619] I remember. The question came up whether they should go out and arrest all agents who had not registered as agents. Mr. Shivers, the head of the F. B. I., and I talked it over very fully. We were both of the opinion, since this law had been on the statute books for I believe something like two years and there had been no attempt to enforce it, that as an element of fairness there should be an announcement made. We were afraid that it would have an adverse effect on people that were thoroughly loyal, if they just went out and grabbed them all, when they had paid no attention to the law before; and Mr. Shivers at the time told me that he thought probably 90% of them did not know that they were expected to register. And when the War Department asked me about it I wired recommending that if they were going to arrest them there should be some advance notice for registration.

and I thought it was more important to cultivate loyalty among the Japanese-American population than it was to punish a few people. We had a list; we knew who the people were.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, have you in mind the contents of General Marshall's message of the morning of December 7? You have in mind its content, have you?

General SHORT. You mean the one——

The CHAIRMAN. That never reached you.

General SHORT. ——that didn't come until 2:58; yes, sir. I know exactly what it was.

The CHAIRMAN. If that message had reached you, let us say, three hours before the attack, would that have changed your dispositions?

General SHORT. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either—to at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.

[1620] The CHAIRMAN. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up?

General SHORT. The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing: that they are going into an entirely new phase and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of three or four days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

General McCoy. Didn't you have on the night of the 6th a bit of information from your intelligence officer that they were burning the consular records?

General SHORT. No, sir, I did not know anything about that until probably the afternoon of the 7th, that they had. I think that he did get some information that they had burned something.

General McCoy. It was not given to you?

General SHORT. It was not given to me. As a matter of fact, I didn't know that they had really burned anything until the time that the F. B. I. arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn't cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day.

General McCoy. And you would consider that a serious slip on the part of your intelligence officer, then?

General SHORT. Well, that is a little questionable, General, because we burn every day. Any secret stuff that we are destroying we burn to be sure that there is no chance of it helping somebody break the code, and I wouldn't have been surprised if the Japanese Consul's office was burning every day. It wouldn't have surprised me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything in their wastebaskets every day. [1621] I don't know that I would have gotten terribly excited about just the burning of the stuff in the wastebasket; I would expect it.

General McCoy. But the fact is that that did not come to you?

General SHORT. That did not come to me, no, sir. I learned the next day that when they arrested the Consul and the assistant Consul they interrupted the burning of a file.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, are you aware that Navy secret measures require that replaced secret documents be destroyed by burning?

General SHORT. I think that I—I believe that, anyway. I don't know that they ever told me, but we did it, and I just assumed——

Admiral STANDLEY. You have that arrangement?

General SHORT. We have, yes, sir. We just normally do. And I would have expected the Japanese Consul to do the same thing, so I don't know that I would have thought that it had any special significance.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General Short, so far as I can ascertain, the only thing you added on November 27 or therabout to Alert No. 1, which you then ordered into effect, was the order to operate the radar stations from four to seven each morning?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. That was the only addition?

General SHORT. That was the only addition to Alert No. 1, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, I gather from your testimony that your motive in ordering that was double: that you wanted the training to go a little faster,——

General SHORT. Yes, sir. It was an entirely new service. We hadn't had it over five or six weeks.

[1622] The CHAIRMAN. You wanted the training to go faster, and you also thought that that dawn would be some measure of protection.

General SHORT. That was, I considered, the most serious time of the day.

General MCCOY. And, as I remember it, you had in mind, however, not any fear of an attack at that time, and that you were trying to get warning of that, but that you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the worst time, the most dangerous time?

General SHORT. Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about the training, rather than expecting something to happen at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. General? Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I have some questions, but I just want to find something here.

General SHORT. May I correct one statement that I made in here?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

General SHORT. I thought it was correct at that time. My G-3 report stated that when the bombers went out at 11:40 they had gone under naval control. I found with a later check that they did not go out under naval control until later in the afternoon. The statement about their being put in the air was correct, but they were under our own orders.

Admiral STANDLEY. In one of the affidavits made by your officers. the affidavit by Grover C. White, the Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps. he says:

On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the control officer to request authority to have all stations operate from four a. m. to seven a. m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. "This was agreed to by the control officer." [1623] Have you any information as to why that request was made that way on that Saturday?

General SHORT. I haven't any information, except I had ordered these stations to work only from four until seven, and then they were supposed to carry on routine training for the rest of the day. In agreement they had gotten together and decided that if they carried on until eleven o'clock in the morning as a body they would get more out of it than they would if they went on their own after seven o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they would carry on the training three teams at a time until eleven o'clock, and then from there on to four they would be on their own and making repairs and things of that kind. So that, since I had not ordered that and they were doing it by agreement, they apparently thought that they could eliminate it on Sunday by agreement. That's the only way I can account for it.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, they were not going to do the training after seven o'clock on Sunday?

General SHORT. On Sunday. They had agreed that just on Sunday alone, in place of working right straight through, they would stop at seven o'clock on Sunday.

Admiral STANDLEY. We have a great many coincidences in this incident here on the 7th.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And this is one of them. I was trying to see if there was any reason why that request was made on that Saturday not to work after seven o'clock in the morning on Sunday.

General SHORT. I think it was only because it was Sunday, and they were working every day practically from four o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon, making a good long training day, and then they decided that on Sunday they would chop off Sunday hours, the only way I can figure it. They [1624] were working twelve hours a day the other days.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, under the date of 5 November, 1941, you issued a Standing Operating Procedure. That was signed by Adjutant General Colonel Robert H. Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished the Navy.

General SHORT. I don't know whether I stated they were furnished the copy, but I think probably they were.

Admiral STANDLEY. It came out that the Navy were furnished with nine copies of it.

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And on page 7 of this you give details of the operations of the interceptor command.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you said that it will "Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps Antiaircraft Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:" and so forth.

Now, that was issued on 5 November as an accomplished procedure.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But as a matter of fact that interceptor command was not functioning on that day?

General SHORT. The interceptor command had been in the process of development for probably two months, and we were getting this out for future use, and we had made up our mind—General Davidson and two other officers had been sent on to a school. We had heard from him that they were going to use this kind of a command on the Mainland, and we had definitely made up our mind to put it into effect, so we wrote our Standing [1625] Operating Procedure in that way. The air corps had gone over it very carefully, and the antiaircraft, and it had been talked over with the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, this was an ideal plan and would go into effect and as a matter of fact it did go—

General SHORT (interposing). As soon as—

Admiral STANDLEY. —into effect—

General SHORT. When the interceptor command started to go—when the interceptor command went into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. This didn't go into effect, then, until 18 December?

General SHORT. It did for everything but the interceptor command, but the interceptor command did not go into effect until General Davidson returned from the Mainland.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then these plans were based on what you expected to have when those are in operation, and not what you had?

General SHORT. That is true of that particular phase, of that particular phase only, because we were waiting until General Davidson finished that school there before we put out the details of the interceptor command. We wanted to be in step with what they were starting on the Mainland, because they had brought out no orders in the War Department. We were guessing a great deal until he got back.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, you were anticipating?

General SHORT. We were anticipating.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that your plans would be ready when the equipment was available, instead of waiting for it and then making plans?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. We didn't want to have to rewrite our Standing Operating Procedure.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all I have.

[1626] General MCCOY. The order activating the interceptor command as outlined here I believe was not published until the 17th of December. There was a special order activating it.

General SHORT. We had been using it. We had been using it for some time. I don't know whether you are correct or not on the date, but we had actually been using it. We were using it all during this period from November 27 on.

General MCCOY. As far as it was installed and able to function?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, General, in your annexes here you have a number of orders, and so forth, but I notice you haven't—

General MCCOY. Pardon me. Are you going to another subject?

Admiral STANDLEY. No; I am just going to continue this same thing.

General MCCOY. Yes, because I have some more questions about the interceptor command.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, go ahead on that. Excuse me. Finish that, and then I will go ahead with this.

General McCoy. As I remember in your testimony or that of your staff officers the radar instruments—that is, the permanent installation sets and the mobile sets—actually arrived here sometime in June or July, did they not?

General SHORT. Not all of the parts. Some of the things did not come.

General McCoy. I just wanted you to tell me why, when it arrived say in June or July, it was not functioning until December.

General SHORT. Now, as I remember, enough of the mobile [1627] sets to make it function got in probably five or six weeks ahead of December 7. Most of the stuff did come along in June, but there were certain parts—the signal officer would know what they were; I do not know; and when it came to the fixed stations the difficulty was there, we were having to build roads up as high as 10,000 feet before we could install those. So that was the reason the fixed stations were not in place when the mobile were, but I do not know the exact parts that were missing. But we started—we were very anxious to put that into operation, and just the minute that we had enough mobile stations that we could make it work we started training with it.

General McCoy. And that long delay, then, was due to physical difficulties?

General SHORT. All parts not arriving. Things of that kind.

General McCoy. And the building of roads to mountain tops, and so forth?

General SHORT. And, well, a cable up at Mt. Kaala; we still can't go ahead with that station because we have to have a steel cable to pull the things up there, and we have been trying to get it for months.

General McCoy. I think that is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just to continue that, General: You just stated that this plan was in advance of operations.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your radar was not operating, but this plan was what would cover it when it operated.

General SHORT. At that time I think our mobile stations were—when that was put out our mobile stations were really training, were operating all the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. But your interceptor command was not working?

[1628] General SHORT. I hadn't definitely—we hadn't given it a definite organization. It was working, but we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson got back from the Mainland, so we would not have to revise that. We were working informally.

Admiral STANDLEY. But it was still working under the Signal Corps at that time?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right.

General SHORT. But they understood—the air corps and the anti-air people understood definitely that the whole thing was going in.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, now, did the Navy understand? How did you—

General SHORT. I am sure that we talked over where we state in there. We wouldn't have thought of putting that in our operating

procedure without talking it over with the Navy. I am quite sure that we talked it over with Naval Operations.

Admiral STANDLEY. At any rate, the officers who were working on this were perfectly familiar with the setup?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. This was gotten up with a dozen people working on details, don't you know. We had out a tentative order before and got the reactions of all the staff when they tried it out before we brought this out. We had been working on this since the first of June on this Standing Operating Procedure.

General McCoy. Do you know the naval officer who was mostly concerned with cooperation in the technical sense?

General SHORT. I do not know. It may have been Captain DeLany, but I think it was more likely the officer doing corresponding work under Admiral Bloch. Now, I do not know.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, General, in your statement you referred, as Exhibit E, to a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan [1629] which concerns the assignment of aircraft between the two services when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base officer, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is a part of the exhibit. But I notice you haven't this (indicating) as a part of your exhibit. Do you recognize that?

General SHORT. I did not put this in. I just took extracts to show the particular application.

Admiral STANDLEY. But you were familiar with that?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that record.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute. The Admiral refers to an "Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan."

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute. No. This is the operating.

The CHAIRMAN. It is Addendum I.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but wait a minute. The plan itself.

The CHAIRMAN. This will identify the paper which you read. It is March 31. That is it, isn't it? Addendum I, dated March 31, 1941.

General SHORT. May I add, Admiral, that from that time along in March we had been carrying out an average of about one exercise a week with the Navy under this plan where we had actually been turning our planes over to them. An average of about one a week. And then they had also turned their planes over to us to put on dive bomber attack against ground troops.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then there is an "Addendum II" to that same paper (indicating).

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[1630] Admiral STANDLEY. You would be familiar with that?

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. I mean you would know that that had been issued?

General SHORT. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that states, as paragraph 3, "Readiness Reports," that

A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

and one of the task groups was the task group under General Marshall, or General Martin?

General SHORT. General Martin.

Admiral STANDLEY. And then it says:

These reports shall state: (2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, this provides that automatically each service will know and will be informed each day—

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. —of the planes that will be available to the other service the next day or from that time on in the event of an air raid or an attack?

General SHORT. Now, I believe that was carried out for some time, and then that General Martin and Admiral Bellinger came to the conclusion that some other arrangement, in place of that daily report, was better. Now, the details of that I don't know. General Martin could probably—General Martin can probably give it to you.

Admiral STANDLEY. You would not recall whether that agreement was changing—the original order here on your exhibit—

General SHORT. It just changed—

Admiral STANDLEY. —and went to this or whether it went [1631] from this to that (indicating), would you?

General SHORT. No, I do not.

General McNARNEY. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General SHORT. Sometime along the line they changed the form of the reports that they were making, made them a little less elaborate. And I don't know; General Martin would probably be able to tell you. I would not. I remember the incident.

General McNARNEY. They were actually given—they were in the hands of the Army and the Navy on December 7?

Admiral STANDLEY. This exhibit was issued dated the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Admiral Bellinger testified that those reports were exchanged.

General SHORT. They were exchanged. It was just a question of changing the form. We always had the information, but they did sometime along there; they changed the form to make it a little less elaborate than it had been, and I don't know the details. They were called to my attention at the time, but I do not remember.

Admiral REEVES. Then this procedure of exchange reports of available planes was still in effect?

General SHORT. Oh, it was in effect, yes, sir, but it was just a question of the form, the way in which they were doing it.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, what we were trying to arrive at is: You stated that inasmuch as the Navy had not requested any planes to supplement their long-distance patrol you supposed of course that they were able to do it effectively?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the statement you made, isn't it?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, because the responsibility under the agreement was theirs.

[1632] Admiral STANDLEY. By this Addendum No. 1 were you aware of the fact that the decisions in here—or rather, the decision as a result of that estimate was that

This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures?

Then again, in paragraph IV. (e) this same estimate says,

None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred.

Is that your information in regard to those operations?

General SHORT. In view of the directions that they had had not to disclose their intent and to be sure that the Japanese took the first overt act, I think that that would be a logical statement in connection with it, when you consider those two things.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, then, the plans in effect were not to become operative, and the—

General SHORT. Well, they were, but not—they were operative as a training measure. Now, I may say that—I will say at least once a week, and the usual procedure that had been carried out, the Navy planes, if we were going to—if we were given a mission of locating certain ships out here and then attacking them, ordinarily the Navy patrol planes made the reconnaissance and determined the location and gave an order to our B-17's our flying fortresses, to go out and make the attack. We carried out a considerable number that way, out as much as three or four hundred—as three hundred miles probably, at sea, and we were really very successful in the combination, but the usual thing was that they had located the ships and we made the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then am I correct in assuming that both you and Admiral Bloch, the Naval Defense Force Commander, and [1633] Admiral Kimmel, were all cognizant of the fact that these plans, just as I drew out about the interceptor command, were plans that were to be operative automatically upon an attack being made or war being declared?

General SHORT. Well, I would go a little further than that on the reconnaissance: that I think that as far as any location went, if they had had any suspicion of Japanese planes operating in this water, they would have attempted to get definite information. They probably wouldn't have taken any action against those ships, maybe, but they would have gotten the information.

Admiral STANDLEY. But it wouldn't have gone into effect until you had something definite to indicate that either—

General SHORT. We would not have made an attack. We would have turned in the information, but we would not have made an attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, as a matter of fact, this shows that your search was not being made, and these orders indicate that they were not to be made in peacetime, and they were only to be made in case of initiation of a hostile attack.

General SHORT. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as that whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was their responsibility, and I do not know

when their task forces—as I say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their task forces had as to search. I assumed that whenever their task force went out if it located Japanese ships it would report them.

Admiral STANDLEY. But as for the search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to be an all-around search, did you know that that was not being carried out daily?

General SHORT. I didn't know just what the Navy were doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out, and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the task forces.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think I have just two more questions [1634] here.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if I get the method of air cooperation, General, it was this: that under the reports that were reciprocally rendered by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin each commander knew what was available for his task.

General SHORT. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he needed to make no request? The moment he needed your planes he simply ordered them off the ground?

General SHORT. Automatically, those under his control, the minute any emergency arose.

The CHAIRMAN. And the minute you needed Bellinger's planes for your mission, under this arrangement your man ordered them off the ground?

General SHORT. That is correct. It didn't require any—

The CHAIRMAN. Request.

General SHORT. —request at all.

Admiral REEVES. It seems to me, General, that the reconnaissance search and the radar search are absolutely parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was a longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there was no difference whatever.

General SHORT. Oh, there should be—they would be tied in.

Admiral REEVES. It seems to me that prior to any hostile or air—or declaration of war that neither of these procedures was being operated regularly day after day.

General SHORT. They were being operated as a training matter, Admiral, rather than as a real intelligence service just combing the ocean.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. Now, I say I do not know just exactly what the naval instructions were, but I know that was true from our point of view, that we were operating as a training proposition.

[1635] Admiral REEVES. Your failure to operate the radar after seven a. m., was that in any way dependent on the fact that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes were operating?

General SHORT. It frankly was that we didn't think—from all the information that we had we did not think the situation demanded it.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

General SHORT. We would have been working 24 hours a day if we had had anything to indicate that the situation demanded it.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have just one more question there, General, and that is this: Under this same order the task assigned to the air combat group, which was under the Commander Air Force of the

Hawaiian Department—Commander Air Force, Major General Martin—one of the tasks is, or the task for the air combat group was to intercept and destroy hostile aircraft, and then this task I particularly come to:

Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

I just wanted to ask you if there was any report made to you after December 7 of any results of the planes with that task.

General SHORT. They did not succeed. They went out.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did they make a search?

General SHORT. They made a search. Under General Martin's own orders, without Navy request, they made a search, I think starting—if I may refer to some notes. (The witness examined notes.) At 1127 they sent—first at 1140, at 1300, and at 1330, and then the first search they made under Navy control was at 1520, I think. Now, General Martin could probably give you more [1636] details as to the exact—I don't know the exact mission that those—

Admiral STANDLEY. I just wanted to know if he had made report to you.

General SHORT. But he did make—yes, sir, there was a report made that day, and it was in error by saying it was under Navy control in these morning searches, because later it developed that it was 1520 before they made the first search under naval control. The four searches sent out previous to that time were under General Martin's instructions, and I do not know the mission that he gave them.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the force?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or the exact force?

General SHORT. The exact force I do not know.

Admiral REEVES. Then they made searches, but they did not succeed in tracking the attacking aircraft?

General SHORT. They did not succeed in tracking them, no, sir.

General McCox. Did any information come to you that day from your own sources of information or from the Navy that indicated the carriers were to the north of Oahu?

General SHORT. The only thing that indicated that to me was the fact that they picked up this group of planes at 7:20 132 miles 3 degrees east of north. That would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that direction.

General McCox. But then that was not reported to you on the 7th?

General SHORT. I did not learn that until the next day. That was just one of the things there that was available to the officers working with it. If I—I could have had that information—I was putting more of my time, frankly, in being sure that my troops were all getting to their positions, getting the [1637] ammunition, and everything of that kind, and I did not inquire about that particular thing until the next day.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask one more question, Mr. Justice, to bring this out.

General, is the organization here between the Army and the Navy under the principle of cooperation?

General SHORT. It was at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. And it has been changed. And was that organization such that each commanding officer had in his organization all the information that the other organization had?

General SHORT. I think that he would have gotten all that the other organization considered important to him. Now, undoubtedly there was lots of little details of information that would not come to me. I am sure that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch would have given me anything that they thought was of importance.

Admiral STANDLEY. But as a result of the liaison between the two the information was such—

General SHORT. Now, our G-2's worked constantly together. Just where that the details of that information—where they stopped transmitting that, I frankly do not know.

Admiral STANDLEY. But it was your understanding that that situation existed?

General SHORT. Oh, I believe that anything that was of any importance that I would get right away, I would transmit it immediately—

Admiral STANDLEY. Immediately to Admiral Bloch?

General SHORT. Absolutely, anything that I had of importance. There was no difference in regard to things of that kind; we were cooperating fully.

General McNARNEY. In that connection, General, did you see any of the Navy's daily summaries of intelligence between, say, November 27 and December 6?

[1638] General SHORT. I probably did. I don't remember. There is no one thing that struck me so outstandingly that I remember it in detail.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember any routine practice whereby the Navy operations advised your staff of their views as to where the Japanese fleet was from time to time, or didn't they send you that?

General SHORT. I think my G-2 got that summary regularly and that he brought it to my attention whenever he thought there was anything specially of interest.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything important?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. And there were very few days went by that I didn't see Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch or someone.

The CHAIRMAN. You thing that either Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch, if there were a significant movement of Japanese vessels, would have freely told you so?

General SHORT. Oh, undoubtedly they would.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further?

General McCoy. I would like to ask a few questions.

In view of what happened, and looking back on it, are you satisfied with the adequateness of the system in operation?

General SHORT. I thing the system is all right. I think that we made a very serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all out attack. I think that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.

General McCoy. Do you think there would have been any change in your attitude possibly, or a more complete meeting of the situation, if there had been unity of command?

General SHORT. I don't believe it would have had any particular effect without the commander in that instance had decided that there was the danger of an air attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness under unity of command [1639] that you had under cooperation.

General MCCOY. Did you discuss, by chance, with the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy that subject at any time?

General SHORT. On the 28th of November and again on the 1st and 2nd we had a lot of discussion, because the question of the relief of the garrisons at Wake and Midway was up. The War Department had called upon me to submit recommendations for garrisons to relieve them, and the Navy had had instructions along similar lines. As a result of that we had long conferences, and at the conferences the danger in the relief at Wake from submarines was discussed at very great length, because Admiral Kimmel didn't want his—we had the question of sending Army planes in there in place of Navy planes, and he didn't want his carriers to go closer than 200 miles of Wake on account of the danger of submarines. He was willing to have them go in close, so that our land planes would have to be flown the 200 miles; but, as I remember, in the whole discussion the fear was submarines, because Wake is close to some of the Japanese bases, and not a question of air, although they would be close enough that land-based planes could have operated against them when they were executing the relief at Wake. I don't think that that was given very serious consideration. But there was a lot of discussion at that time owing to the fact that we were going so far out to make this relief, going practically into the Mandate Islands.

General MCCOY. And in view of your warning orders you did think there might be danger to Wake?

General SHORT. At Wake, yes.

General MCCOY. At Wake.

General SHORT. Because we were right in the—but I think the feeling was, on the part of the Navy, that it was more likely to be a submarine proposition even there, although they [1640] were in reach of land aviation as well as carriers. It was fully recognized that there was considerable danger in executing a relief at Wake, but that was some distance out.

General MCCOY. And that brought up the subject of unity of command, did it, due to a difference of opinion on your part from any—

General SHORT. No, sir. There was one thing that brought up the question of command during that period. If we replaced the Navy garrisons at Wake and Midway I felt that the question of command should be just the same as on the Island of Oahu. The Navy felt that they should take over the command of the Army garrisons at Wake and Midway owing to the fact that they were advanced. That was the only difference of opinion that there was. I transmitted to the War Department my opinion that the command should be by mutual cooperation, with exactly similar relations that we have here on the Island of Oahu, and Admiral Kimmel sent to the Navy Department that he felt that the Navy should definitely assume command of the Army forces, and that was the only difference of opinion in the whole discussion, and we still had that difference of opinion at the end, the same as we did before we discussed it, and we frankly sent it on to Washington just as we felt about it, and each one of us said that the other disagreed with that part of his recommendation.

General McCoy. Did the War Department at any time while you were in command here call upon you for an opinion as to the subject of unity of command?

General SHORT. It never did, no, sir. I gave one in that case without being called upon.

The CHAIRMAN. In that particular instance?

General McCoy. In that particular instance, yes sir.

General McCoy. The joint defense plans that we have had in question show the thing intended to become operative in the [1641] case of an emergency or in case of a declaration of war?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and operating for training purposes naturally, before, because we couldn't expect to fight that way without we trained that way.

General McCoy. You did anticipate that there might be hostilities begin without declaration of war, however?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, we had that in our plan. You will notice in our Standing Operating Procedure we have a provision there where if it starts without declaration of war certain things go into effect at once.

General McCoy. In view of what happened do you feel that the joint defense plan was adequate?

General SHORT. I think it was. If we are going to—if you are going to conduct your operations by mutual cooperation, I think our plans were pretty sufficient. We had been working on them for months and making minor changes as we found necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Subject, of course, to the fact that you were short of materiel to carry out all these missions that were assigned to the two of you?

General SHORT. Oh, yes. Yes, sir, but as far as plans go I think the plans were sound.

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?

General SHORT. I do not believe it would.

Admiral STANDLEY. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were necessary to make the effective offshore patrol were here in sufficient number, do you still think that no change would have been made in the plans?

General SHORT. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises the [1642] assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and called upon us to execute the bombing mission, because they considered that our B-17s were more effective as bombers than their own planes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

General SHORT. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be—

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not you, I mean, but the Navy.

General SHORT. But the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. The combined effort, yes.

General SHORT. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would; I think that they would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.

General McCox. I would like to read this statement to you and have you comment on it, General.

Admiral REEVES. Before you go to that, General, let me ask General Short this:

On the other hand, if you had had material and fully equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

General SHORT. I probably would have operated them just as I did.

Admiral REEVES. All right. That was all, General.

General McCox. I will read this to you, and I would like to have you comment on it as to its correctness:

October 16, 1941, the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese cabinet and of the high possibility of hostilities between Japan and Russia and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. Both commanders were warned to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Apparently both commanders felt that the existing procedure need not be altered in the circumstances. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in training operations and maneuvers which were deemed to be highly important to the training of the Fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive training, particularly of its air arm. To have undertaken intensive defensive measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would have necessitated curtailment of the training if not its virtual suspension, and the situation was not thought to require this.

Do you think that is correct?

General SHORT. I think that is a correct statement, yes, sir.

General McCox. Now, it follows:

The commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been apparently continued through October and November and were awaiting further developments.

November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army radioed the Commander of the Hawaiian Department that the pending negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their resumption; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily [1644] possible; that while the United States did not desire to commit the first overt act the Department Commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message directed the Commander to undertake reconnaissance and other measures thought necessary but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the Department Commander to the Admiral of the Fleet.

Now, on the same date, November 27, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message by radio to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, which was furnished you.

General SHORT. Yes.

General McCoy. And which you are familiar with.

(Reading:)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet communicated the purport of this message to the General Commanding the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

November 28, 1941, the Commander of the Hawaiian Department, as directed by the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, radioed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. On that day he received from the Adjutant General of the Army a radio message stating the critical situation and directing that immediate precautions be had against subversive activities which might threaten military establishments in Hawaii and their property and equipment, without unnecessarily [1645] alarming the civil population.

To this the Commander of the Hawaiian Department replied by radio on November 29 outlining at length and in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential industrial and public utility establishments. No reply to this message was sent by the War Department in Washington or received by the Commander here.

General SHORT. That is correct, sir.

General McCoy. You have no comment to make on that statement?

General SHORT. No, sir.

General McCoy. You consider it adequate?

General SHORT. The only comment that I would make was that I drew the inference that the War Department approved of the action I had taken, because they knew very definitely what the action was. I gave them great detail.

General McCoy. You have always considered, I take it, that Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian Command were in a particularly dangerous position as an advanced post of the United States?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, and a particularly important position.

General McCoy. And in general you felt confident that you could counter anything that was directed against this Territory?

General SHORT. Yes, sir, with certain limitations. We realized that our forces on the outlying islands were extremely small. The War Department plan didn't provide for anything, and I had of my own volition sent one regiment out so as to prevent any local disorder or sabotage. I had done that on my own initiative without any change in the plan of the War [1646] Department. Up to the time I came here there had never been any troops maintained on the outlying islands.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. I just have one.

[1647] Admiral STANDLEY. I just want to ask one question.

You spoke in your statement about the Joint Action of the Army and the Navy.

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You are familiar with this pamphlet (handing a document to General Short).

General SHORT. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In connection with the relief of the garrisons at Wake and Midway, is it not a principle enunciated in those plans that the Marines operate as an advance force, an expeditionary force, to go with the fleet wherever it may go, and after the Marines and the fleet seized a base and established it, that the Army will come in if the

fleet wants to move off with the Marine expeditionary force, and the Army takes over?

General SHORT. That is the generally accepted plan, but I do not remember that our Frontier Coastal Plan made any definite provision of that kind.

The outlying islands were considered to be entirely under the Navy Department. As I remember, Midway, Wake, Johnston, and Palmyra were under the 14th District, and Guam was under the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, and we had nothing to do with them until this matter was brought up about our stepping into the picture. I do not know that there was a provision for that in our plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. This phase was not discussed?

General SHORT. No. I do not believe it was discussed in the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any further questions?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Colonel BROWN. General Martin.

[1648] **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL FREDERICK L. MARTIN,
AIR FORCE, UNITED STATES ARMY—Recalled**

The CHAIRMAN. There are one or two things I want to clear up in my mind, General Martin.

General MARTIN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. First, up to December 7, as I read this record, there was no inshore patrol maintained by the Army Air Force, a daily inshore patrol?

General MARTIN. No, sir, not as such.

The CHAIRMAN. That is just the difficulty. What does "not as such" mean?

General MARTIN. Nothing more than missions going out for bombing and for gunnery, which is conducted in selected areas in the vicinity of these islands.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a state of war or emergency not having existed in your mind, you were training?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, and we were training furiously.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were not conducting an inshore patrol to detect a possible enemy?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what I wanted to get clear.

General McNarney, you have some questions?

General McNARNEY. General, will you describe the standing orders or procedure for the interior guard of the air force stations?

General MARTIN. May I have that question again?

General McNARNEY. Will you describe the system in effect for interior guarding of the air force stations?

General MARTIN. Here?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

General MARTIN. The men were selected from the Air Corps men at the station for this particular duty. Practically all of them had special training as infantry, and we were required [1649] to train two battalions of a thousand men at Hickam Field for that particular kind of duty, and 500 men at Wheeler Field.

These men were placed on guard in the usual manner and in the usual relief. They had established defenses for certain positions which had been approved as the inner defenses for these airdromes; that is, making for bands of fire for machine guns from certain established positions and certain strong points about the air field which they occupied when we were on the alert.

General McNARNEY. Were those men detailed only for guard duty, or did they have a dual mission?

General MARTIN. Or else what?

General McNARNEY. Or did they have a dual mission?

General MARTIN. Well, it was changed. At first Hickam Field was required to have 500 men available for the Provost Marshal for police duty in the City of Honolulu and 500 available for guard duty as defense at Hickam Field. Wheeler Field was to have 500, to be an anti-sabotage guard, in addition to the regular guard at Wheeler Field.

General McNARNEY. Those were the anti-sabotage guard for the utilities and things not connected with the air field itself?

General MARTIN. Yes, sir, but at Wheeler Field they were to perform the anti-sabotage guard for Wheeler Field and the Schofield area, and 500 from downtown at the request of the Provost Marshal. The other 500 were to perform anti-sabotage duty at the field only.

General McNARNEY. Those men performing the anti-sabotage duty, were they mechanics and people having duties in connection with airplanes?

General MARTIN. We tried at first to take those who had just received and gone through a course of training which we gave them, largely in the school of soldiery, but that could not last for any period of time as those men had to be sent [1650] through the school to give them the proper specialized training. So when the alerts came those men were taken from the specialized training, as they had been here for several months. This was causing some trouble, because when we had alerts, as these men would be called, they would be taken from supplies and technical positions.

General McNARNEY. That is, this anti-sabotage guard would interfere with the actual operation of the aircraft assignments.

General MARTIN. Yes, and it was so reported.

General McNARNEY. Did you make any objection about this to higher authority?

General MARTIN. Yes. A letter was prepared in the latter part of August and taken to the Department Commander. I took it in person. I tried to explain the difficulties I was having in the way of conforming to the orders with reference to providing these men for alert and anti-sabotage duty and also having them in their proper position for the primary mission to which they were assigned.

General McNARNEY. Was any relief given?

General MARTIN. No, sir. The fact of the matter was that when the surprise attack came on Sunday morning we had to take the additional men that we had before and prior to the time when the alert for sabotage was established and to take all the men at Hickam Field and in our tactical school—possibly between four and five hundred.

General McNARNEY. Who devised the system for parking the airplanes under Alert No. 1 for anti-sabotage purposes?

General MARTIN. It was no particular device; they were just instructed to have them in a particular area so they could be guarded easily and protected from sabotage.

General McNARNEY. Were those orders issued by you or by the individual field commanders?

[1651] General MARTIN. Yes, sir, by myself.

General McNARNEY. During the period from November 27 to December 6, which was more or less the period of the emergency, did you, as a matter of routine, keep a situation map or have such daily summaries of intelligence furnished to you which would give you an indication of the most probable enemy force?

General MARTIN. What is that?

The CHAIRMAN. Read that to him.

(The last question was read by the reporter.)

General MARTIN. I did not receive such information, no.

General McNARNEY. In other words, your headquarters was not really on a war basis between November 27 and December 6?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. You did not keep the normal intelligence and operations data at that time?

General MARTIN. I will explain there. The intelligence here, so far as local conditions were concerned, was selected and evaluated by G-2. The only intelligence that I was required to keep, as a matter of record, was pertaining to the operations of aircraft in this vicinity and in the area that we were capable of patrolling.

General McNARNEY. Did G-2 or the Department furnish to you that daily summary?

General MARTIN. I do not believe it was daily, but they furnished a summary of information, such information as he had obtained largely from the newspapers and an analysis of his estimate of the situation itself.

General McNARNEY. Did you ever see the daily summary of intelligence gotten up by the Navy?

General MARTIN. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. It was not furnished to you?

General MARTIN. No, it was not furnished to me. It might have been furnished to the Department, but it was not furnished to me.

[1652] General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have a few questions.

In connection with the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, the principle of mutual cooperation was the method of coordinating the efforts in this area?

General MARTIN. Yes. That was specifically defined as to what mutual cooperation meant, mutual coordination.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that applied to the efforts right down the line?

General MARTIN. Down the line?

Admiral STANDLEY. The infantry, artillery, air force, and so on.

General MARTIN. I cannot answer that, Admiral. I was only interested in it so far as it applied to the air force.

Admiral STANDLEY. What applied to your contact with the Navy air?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And your contact with Admiral Bellinger?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you remember this pamphlet here (handing a document to General Martin)?

General MARTIN. I do not remember that I have seen this.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that addendum one or two?

General MARTIN. This is March, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. The 31st?

General MARTIN. Yes.

I do not believe I have seen this, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you look at the signature?

General MARTIN. I see nothing here to indicate I have ever seen this before.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think you signed it, didn't you?

[1653] General MARTIN. Yes, sir. That is my signature. I don't know whether I signed this or not. It is made from my signature, but I will have to admit frankly that I do not remember the signature.

Admiral STANDLEY. Your operations and your plans arrived at as a result of the agreement between you and Admiral Bellinger amounted to this: that you had a certain task force and the Navy had another task group?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Look at that task group in there and see if I am correct.

You had command of the air group, the air combat group?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Hawaiian Air Force?

General MARTIN. Yes. It was developed this way: at such time as the Navy required the help of the bombardment division, those available at that time would be turned over to the Navy for the mission and would remain in their control until that commission was finished. The combat fighting units and such of the Marine and Navy as might be ashore were to go over to the control of the Army. That was the joint agreement.

Admiral STANDLEY. That joint agreement so provided that each day automatically the Navy made planes available to you and you made them available to the Navy?

General MARTIN. Those in a state of readiness.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they became available to you immediately without any further order?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And your planes became available to the Navy without further order?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then the duties assigned under this agreement for the air combat group were as follows:

Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify [1654] and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

Was there any search made by the forces under your command on the morning of the 7th?

General MARTIN. Not on the morning of the 7th, no, sir. Trailing was to be conducted by the Navy scouting VOS type, because our pursuits can't go very far from shore. There were no Navy planes available to us on the morning of the 7th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was this changed?

General MARTIN. No, it was not changed, no, sir.

The type of ship that was to go trailing the enemy carrier was the naval scouting plane as they had the range. We did not have the range in the pursuit planes to intercept them.

Admiral STANDLEY. On the morning of the 7th you made no effort to trail carrier type planes?

General MARTIN. No, we did not have the type for the range, no, sir. We tried to load the bombers as fast as we could. The bombers were the only ones we had available for that purpose.

The CHAIRMAN. You did send off some of the bombers during the morning?

General MARTIN. Yes, we sent some out at 11:27 and 11:52, as I remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many did you have available?

General MARTIN. We had six, as I remember, A-20's, and we had three of the B-17's, which is the long-range bomber, and three of the B-18's, which is the medium bomber.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were gotten ready and sent out?

General MARTIN. Yes. The A-20A's were the first ones ready, because they were not subjected to the attack; none of them were destroyed except those in the hangars and they were the first ones sent out, and they were the ones that [1655] were sent south of Barbers Point because of the report that there was a carrier some distance from the point.

General McCoy. Who gave you that information?

General MARTIN. That came from the interceptor command, control officer.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, do you have any reports of the cooperation with respect to that agreement between you and Admiral Bellinger that would give us what your understanding of that agreement was? Apparently this is what has been presented to us by the Commander-in-Chief or the Naval Base Defense Officer and it is apparently signed by you.

General MARTIN. That is absolutely correct. I do not dispute that, because Admiral Bellinger and I worked on the agreement most of the time that I have been here and we discussed all these phases. As regards the addendum, I might have signed such but I do not remember, but we have discussed all these things, but I do not remember whether that was placed as a part of our joint agreement.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you recall if you discussed the question whether the operations that would be necessary in war time or when an attack was initiated could not be carried on in peace time because of the lack of facilities and planes? Do you recall that?

General MARTIN. At all times in discussing these problems we raised the point that to properly search the area required more planes than we had, but we did ask for equipment, and our plans were based on the utilization of the equipment available to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you know that on the morning of the 7th and prior to that, that offshore reconnaissance by patrol planes was not being made by Patwing 2?

General MARTIN. No, sir, I did not know that.

Admiral STANDLEY. You know the area that should be covered was not being covered? [1656]

General MARTIN. Yes. It could not be covered.

Admiral STANDLEY. It could not be covered?

General MARTIN. No, sir, it could not be covered.

Admiral STANDLEY. As I understand this agreement, this was based on hostilities and the beginning of war?

General MARTIN. Yes. In other words, the plans were based on the theory that we would operate in peace time as we knew we would operate in time of war. In order to be familiar with this we had frequent drills, and in fact we were having drills once a week where they would report a carrier or some target represented by some of these ships within a certain sector. As we could not search the entire sector, the Navy would search the sector, thus locating it, and then we would give the instructions for the bombers to attack, and they would tow the target so that we could have the actual practice in bombing.

That was very beneficial because we got very splendid practice of going to sea, locate the target, and actually bomb it when it was moving, and the maneuvers were conducted in accordance with the information.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was strictly a training procedure?

General MARTIN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. But the actual operation of this agreement was to go into effect automatically at the beginning of hostilities in case of war?

General MARTIN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Admiral STANDLEY. No.

General McCoy. I would like to ask whether all stations under your command were bombed or attacked by the Japanese on the morning of the 7th?

General MARTIN. All permanent stations were attacked, yes, but the less important station at Bellows Field was only machine gunned; it was not bombed. Hickam and Wheeler were [1657] both machine gunned and bombed.

General McCoy. Is there any other field on the island that was occupied by your command?

General MARTIN. Yes, there is a little training station at Haleiwa where there were some airplanes, and there were a few of those which escaped and got into the air.

General McCoy. They were not attacked?

General MARTIN. No, they were not attacked. Those at Bellows Field on that day were attacked, and one of the men was killed as he was getting in his plane, and another one was destroyed as it left the runway.

General McCoy. That field north of the island was not attacked?

General MARTIN. No, sir. Haleiwa is northwest of here. That was not attacked.

General McCoy. As I remember, the pilots from there took off as quickly as they could?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. How many of them were there, do you remember?

General MARTIN. That I do not remember, but two of those who succeeded in getting six of the airplanes left from that field.

General McCoy. Do you know whether they were the only two who took off?

General MARTIN. Two? More than two took off, but I cannot recall the exact number of those who took off.

General McCoy. As I understand, under Alert No. 1 you concentrated your planes for better protection against sabotage?

General MARTIN. Yes. Unfortunately I did, yes.

General McCoy. Well, now, as I understand it, the Navy dispersed their planes. Were you conscious of that?

General MARTIN. I can't answer that, no, sir.

[1658] General McCoy. The testimony shows that whether the planes were concentrated, as you did, or whether dispersed, as the Navy did, that the same result obtained, the successful and effective result of the Japanese attack. Those planes that were anchored around in the water around the Navy Base and the planes that were more or less scattered on runways and ramps were just as effectively destroyed as those that were concentrated.

General MARTIN. I did not know that they dispersed them, but I know the losses were quite heavy.

General McCoy. In other words, the surprise was so complete and the protection against enemy aircraft was so lacking on all fields that the Japanese were able to take their time and to destroy the planes whether they were concentrated or dispersed.

General MARTIN. I will say this: it is my opinion that dispersion would have made it such that our losses would not be so great, or it would have taken them a longer time to destroy them.

General McCoy. With respect to these precautions on the field, the considerable number of troops at fixed stations, and so forth, that was entirely against sabotage?

General MARTIN. Yes.

General McCoy. There were no machine guns on any of these fields in position and ready to operate immediately?

General MARTIN. I can't answer that directly because it was some time before they went into action; it might have been 30 minutes or an hour. I can't answer that question because there was much firing around Hickam Field at the time. I cannot say when they went into action.

General McCoy. Your disposition for the protection of the field did not involve setting up a state of readiness to use machine guns?

General MARTIN. No, no, sir.

[1659] General McCoy. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

Admiral STANDLEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Colonel BROWN. General Davidson.

**TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HOWARD C. DAVIDSON,
UNITED STATES ARMY AIR CORPS—Recalled**

The CHAIRMAN. General Davidson, can you tell me whether on the morning of the 7th the interceptor command directed any Army planes to trace the attacking Japanese planes?

General DAVIDSON. No, they did not. I got them all together and asked them why they did not and nobody knew. They saw the planes out in the air but they did not make any effort to trace them.

The CHAIRMAN. Would the direction to trace them come from your interceptor command? As I understand it, your interceptor command was not fully activated at that time?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir. That scheme was we would probably have some Navy planes that were just for that purpose, but we did not have them assigned to us. They were on the carriers, and I do not believe that there was any scheme for the pursuit planes to do that kind of work.

The CHAIRMAN. The pursuit planes did not have a range long enough for that kind of work?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, they did not have much of a range, although you think they would have followed that out, but they did not do that.

The CHAIRMAN. Under whose command were those planes, even those of short range?

General DAVIDSON. They were under me.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you give orders to trace?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, I did not given any orders to trace.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been stated that there was no Navy [1660] liaison officer or naval officer detailed at the information center of the Aircraft Warning Service on the morning of December 7. Is it not a fact that negotiations had been had with the Navy to assign officers for that purpose but that the arrangements had not been completed by December 7?

General DAVIDSON. I believe that is true. The board was not fully in operation on December 7. The board was in a state of training at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General Davidson, you were familiar with the reciprocal arrangement for the use of Navy planes by you and for the use of Army planes by the Navy, depending upon the mission that was to be performed?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, it is not exactly that way, sir. The fighters, Marine and Navy fighters that were ashore, and this one squadron of long-range, single-engine tracking planes, bombers were supposed to go to the interceptor command and the bombers to go with Patrol Wing 2. There is no arrangement necessary, and then they report to the interceptor command.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, the plan was that if you needed Navy planes that were to be used for a certain purpose, they were always assigned to you under the defense plan, and you simply ordered them into the air?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, if we had them.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were advised by the Navy how many would be ready for your command, and you advised the Navy how many there were for their mission?

General DAVIDSON. It is not exactly that way. They reported how many they had each morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Each morning?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, and if they are ashore, they report in to us so many available for missions that morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you order those into the air without further reference to anybody?

General DAVIDSON. No further reference to anybody. We have a telephone line to that squadron and tell them, "Scramble." [1661] That is the order.

Admiral REEVES. Do you know each morning how many Navy planes are available to you?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And the Navy knows each morning how many planes are available to them?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

General MCCOY. That is since the interceptor command has been activated on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. No, no, sir. That was the agreement entered into in March.

The CHAIRMAN. March 31.

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

General MCCOY. It was in operation on December 7?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

General MCCOY. But it was not working?

General DAVIDSON. No, we did not have them there. The Navy has very few fighters and tracking bombers that are ashore.

The CHAIRMAN. Most of them go on the carriers?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. We do not have them very often with us, but when we do have them we have them change their frequency to our frequency, and they operate just exactly as if they were an Army squadron.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you conducted with the Navy joint drills?

General DAVIDSON. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Whereby these available Navy planes were under your command and whereby your available Army planes were under the naval command in the joint exercises?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, there were a number of those, and they were quite successful. The Navy planes seemed to have a much better radio than was on our planes, and we could control them much easier when they got in the air.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the purpose of this joint training was [1662] that upon the information of an enemy force being present that this thing would automatically jump into operation?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, and no further orders were necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. So that if there came word that there was a carrier 500 miles to the eastward, every man in your command and every man in the naval command would have known exactly how this system was to operate?

General DAVIDSON. Yes, we would not have to assign any further orders. All our orders would have been made with respect to the alerts.

General McCoy. How would you know which would give the definite order? You or the Navy man?

General DAVIDSON. The Navy does not give any orders to the fighters and we do not give any orders to the bombers. We have the fighters under our control and they have the bombers under them. They have the mission for the bombers.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McCoy. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have a few questions.

I just want to know if you are familiar with that estimate of the situation, addenda No. 1.

The CHAIRMAN. Dated March 31, 1941.

(Admiral Standley handed a document to the witness.)

General DAVIDSON. I do not think I have seen that, no, sir.

General McCoy. Are you sure you have not seen it?

Show him the signature.

General DAVIDSON. I do not remember ever having seen this. The decisions that are arrived at in there are familiar to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have given us a very clear picture of the interceptor command and its responsibilities under you. How did you know about that agreement between you and the Navy without having seen some agreement of that type?

[1663] General DAVIDSON. That came down from the Air Force. We got the instructions that that was the way the two forces would be organized.

The CHAIRMAN. And all that is written in here is quite in accordance with your understanding of your obligations?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I am familiar with that, but I do not think I have ever seen it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has there been any plot made of the search of Army planes made after the attack of December 7? Has there been any plot made tracking these planes in the search?

General DAVIDSON. I would not know. I do not know that because I have nothing but pursuits. The bombers on the patrol wing would know that.

Admiral STANDLEY. That would be under Patrol Wing 2?

General DAVIDSON. Yes. I have the fighters.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have no plot of any search by your planes?

General DAVIDSON. No, sir, nothing except the plot that was on the radar sheets.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further?

Admiral REEVES. No.

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Colonel Hoppough.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes.

[1664] **TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL CLAY I. HOPPOUGH, SIGNAL CORPS OFFICER, HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you state your name and rank?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Lieutenant Colonel Clay I. Hoppough, Signal Corps Officer, Hawaiian Air Force.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney.

General McNARNEY. It has been stated that in the transmission of airplane bearings to planes at sea, that the Army equipment is of use only for a distance of approximately ten miles. Is that correct?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. No, sir, that is not correct. I am a telephone radio operator myself, and I have heard bearings transmitted, I should say, at least 200 miles, or in that vicinity. That depends on the power of the station, and we have quite a lot of power.

General McNARNEY. There is a statement here also that between December 10 and December 30, 1941, that the Federal Communications Commission was requested on 18 or 19 occasions to advise planes at sea of their exact location.

Were you in the habit of using the Federal Communications equipment for this purpose?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes. The Federal Communications Commission was very helpful to us. Between that time we had tried to organize here out of what we could get together a small direction finder net. Do you know what I mean?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Colonel HOPPOUGH. My men were on the net. We had a meeting of all hands, the Navy representatives, the F. C. C., two or three Army officers, the military intelligence, two or three signal officers, and myself, and we decided that we would put this net in and everybody would help. So when this was put in, this would be very helpful for planes which would be lost. So when planes get lost and they can't make a station [1665] selection and they say, "Please help us," we made it so the F. C. C. could head this thing up; so, with as much assistance as we got, we had a line run from the new station, the direction finder station at Wahiawa, and then there was a station at Punch Bowl, where this station was, and a small station I put in at Barbers Point, and another station I put in at Kaena Point, and a third station at Aiea; so there were these stations all coming into one central point, and the F. C. C. were a little better off than we were; so they headed the thing up. Then you could ask them for bearings and get them.

General McCoy. Was this system in operation on December 7?

General HOPPOUGH. No, sir. The F. C. C. was, but we did not have the equipment on December 7.

General McNARNEY. I have a statement here also that "The Army Signal Corps advised the Federal Communications Commission that upon returning to their carriers, these planes followed a frequency of 1500 kilocycles which was transmitted to them from the Japanese carriers." Do you have any knowledge of that?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. That is the first time I ever heard of it.

General McNARNEY. Would you know about it if it actually happened?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Well, the chances are that I would know about it, but I would not like to say that I have known about it. If we have men watching this frequency, they might skip it, but that would be a strong affair. That would be a carrier frequency to the airplane. I do not believe that frequency was on myself. I would have to hear it to believe it.

General McNARNEY. There is a statement also here with reference to the Navy facilities for advising airplanes of that exact location and that the Navy equipment is also very [1666] limited insofar as its effective distances are concerned.

Do you know anything about that?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Well, I can only tell you what I know, and that is the Navy equipment which was loaned to me gave bearings of signals coming from Tokyo more than five times, and also at one time gave bearings of signals more than 200 miles away.

The Navy equipment is all right. It is good. They do not have much of it. It is excellent.

General McNARNEY. Will you describe the means of communication available for communications between the ground and airplanes, and airplanes and the ground?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes. In our bombers we have what is known as a liaison set. That is a 75-watt transmitter. It is good for thousands of miles at times and hundreds of miles at others, depending upon the vagaries of short-wave transmission, which we cannot control.

In addition to that the bombers have a radio compass set. That set has a loop on top of the airplane, and the loop ends on the radio receiver inside of the compass rose.

The operator hearing the signal can turn that compass until he gets nothing, which we call null, and determine the direction of the signal from the airplane. Also by hooking or fixing the loop solid by a connection we have, a screw, to a predetermined position of the airplane in reference to its field on the ground, as the south position on the ground, when it is on the ground, the pilot may see the needle move like this back and forth as the plane moves away from the station or toward it. For instance, if the Admiral is the station and Mr. Justice Roberts is the pilot, he could move this until he gets the needle straight and he could home on that.

General McNARNEY. That is the bilateral?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes, that is the bilateral. You may [1667] not be able to tell very much, but there is a certain sense. The operator has to be good at it.

Now, there is another set, which is the pilot's own set, called the command set. That is a voice transmitter which he controls when he wants to use it, and that is up in front of the pilot. These are the sets only in the bomber.

In the pursuit plane there is just one transmitter. On certain types of observation planes there is a compass and combination set which is liaison and command together in one transmitter; so the pilot may use it or the operator may use it as he sees fit.

General McNARNEY. Well, there is no reason why an airplane finding his radio 200 miles away from Oahu and picking up the information, it should be transmitted?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. I do not understand that question.

General McNARNEY. There is no reason why it should not be transmitted immediately?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Well, do you mean information as to where he was?

General McNARNEY. Where he was and where the enemy was so that anybody might pick it up. In other words, the actual facilities were present in the plane and those on the ground could then receive it?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes. The facilities are there, yes.

The reason I hesitate to make that statement is that there are so many frequencies in use at the present time around here. This is not a criticism.

I will explain that. If the operator is not a good operator he can get away off from the frequency and never get back into it.

To show you what we have done in other cases, our ferry planes going back and forth from San Francisco to the Far East—I was responsible for putting in the communications service in them. We put the receiver five kilocycles this side [1668] of the frequency. That is, the receiver this side of the frequency and put one in the middle. Then if this man opens up in the plane, we will hear him.

Now, in the airplane, it is on a different proposition. The operator in the airplane has not those facilities, although the airplane receiver is normally a good receiver. It is sensitive. However, the antenna is moving this way and that. That affects the quality of the signal. It affects the stability of the signal, and I could not state to you, as a 40- or 35-year operator, that I can take any airplane in the world today and start out of here and guarantee that I will hear any signal that comes from the mainland. So, I do not know that I can answer your question.

General McNARNEY. Is it the normal procedure in the Hawaiian Air Force that he has to be able to guard his frequency?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes, they do, and it is guarded also by the wing station according to the mission. I could not tell you that unless I know the mission the man is on.

General McNARNEY. So any signal transmitted from a plane should be received?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes, without a doubt, unless—I hate to say this, because it looks like hedging.

An airplane can get offshore and he might send until his heart broke and they might hear it in Tokyo and we might not hear it at all. That is what you have to deal with in this short-wave stuff.

The CHAIRMAN. That is due to atmospheric and electrical conditions?

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes. That is on account of the heavy side layer moving up and down, and as that happens, it hits this heavy side layer and that heavy side layer moves out of position there, and you can't ever determine just exactly where your signal is going.

[1669] General McNARNEY. Please tell us what channels of communication existed between the Hawaiian Air Force and Patwing 2 on the morning of December 7.

Colonel HOPPOUGH. A very good automatic telephone system at Hickam Field backed up by a manual system which the operator on the board guarded. I would like to make myself plain.

Of course, the automatic system you dial. Now, in order to forestall any block of the automatic system—that is, you and I may be talking and block it and they may not be able to get through. So, in order to forestall that 18th Wing built into their switchboard a manual system by which they could reach Patwing 2 through the Navy switchboard.

In addition to that—I am not sure because I was not there at the time, but it was reported to me; when the first attack occurred I called up my people, Signal Officer 18th Wing and Signal Officer 14th Wing and said, “What have you got?”

They said, “Everything is O. K.”

At that time if everything was O. K. there should have been a radio circuit across there between the two organizations. I am not certain about that radio circuit. I don’t know.

There also was a telegraphic print circuit that was O. K. It was O. K.; it worked, because I worked it myself 25 minutes after the first attack took place, and the operator told me it was in commission, and the telegraphic printer is a circuit which takes in quite a lot of naval stations, Army stations in the various headquarters, the 18th Bombardment Wing, the 14th Pursuit Wing, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, Naval Air Station, Ewa Marine Group, fighters, and one or two additional stations that I am not sure of. Whether it was placed in the headquarters building at Pearl Harbor or whether it was at that time at Kaheohe, I don’t know, but it was one of the places.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

[1670] The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Please observe the caution not to discuss anything that has gone on in this room. Do not discuss it with anyone.

Colonel HOPPOUGH. Yes, sir.

Colonel BROWN. Colonel Fielder.

**TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL KENDALL J. FIELDER,
GENERAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY—Recalled**

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney.

General McNARNEY. Colonel Fielder, at one time recommendations were made for the prosecution of Japanese consular agents for failing to register under the laws of the United States. Do you know whether recommendations were made by General Short recommending against this, and if so what reasons were assigned for this recommendation?

Colonel FIELDER. I am not familiar with that. That probably took place before I joined the Department staff. When was this?

The CHAIRMAN. This was in the summer of 1941.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes. That was before my time. I came about the 1st of August.

General McNARNEY. Does the Navy furnish you with a daily summary of combat, Naval Intelligence?

Colonel FIELDER. They do now, yes.

General McNARNEY. Did they prior to December 6?

Colonel FIELDER. No.

General McNARNEY. Did you know that they were getting one out?

Colonel FIELDER. That I did not know, no, sir. We were not.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you get any summary of information from the Navy from day to day or from week to week, as it developed, of the location of the Japanese Fleet in force?

[1671] Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. We never had anything from them prior to December 7.

General McNARNEY. At any time between November 27 and December 6 did General Short caution you to bring to his attention any information of the enemy or information of importance which might come to your attention?

Colonel FIELDER. Only insofar as the local situation was concerned. We had no means whatever of assembling information concerning the location of the Japanese forces.

General McNARNEY. Did you go down to visit the Naval Intelligence officers of the fleet and of the base?

Colonel FIELDER. Not of the fleet. I had no connection with them; with the base, yes, once a week.

General McNARNEY. Did you have contact with Commander Rochefort?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, my contact was with the Office of Naval Intelligence, the 14th Naval District.

[1672] General McNARNEY. Well, you at that time were not interested in combat intelligence, then?

Colonel FIELDER. I was interested, naturally interested, but I was not involved in it in any way, because there was combat intelligence to do it, as far as I know.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you from time to time get from Army Intelligence in Washington statements of the situation with respect to the Japanese moves?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And intentions?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not?

Colonel FIELDER. None whatever.

General McCoy. You were not furnished with the usual information sheets of the MID in Washington?

Colonel FIELDER. I got those, but they usually pertained to subversive activities and things of that nature, not to the location of the Japanese battle force.

The CHAIRMAN. Any information that might come on that subject would come in the nature of special telegrams?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On a particular occasion?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, it would.

The CHAIRMAN. There was no routine service?

Colonel FIELDER. No routine service at all. That would have come by secret radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to know whether the Navy had any telephone lines such as you had to Washington, to the headquarters in Washington?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I don't know.

General McCoy. Did you ever use that scrambled telephone set in talking to your Chief in Washington?

[1673] Colonel FIELDER. Not prior to December 7. I have used it since then.

General McCoy. Do you know whether it was used at all prior to December 7 by anybody?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't know positively. I know that conversations were had with Washington prior to that, but whether they used the scrambler I don't know. I presume they did.

General McNARNEY. Since December 7 are you concerned with combat intelligence?

Colonel FIELDER. Very much so.

General McNARNEY. Have you made any estimate of the enemy situation?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, I have.

General McNARNEY. How often do you bring that up to date?

Colonel FIELDER. That is brought up to date daily.

General McNARNEY. Is it presented to General Emmons daily?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes. Yes.

General McNARNEY. I have no further questions.

Colonel FIELDER. Not only that. We get the daily intelligence summary from the Navy, and of course we still have absolutely no means of obtaining enemy information except through the local Navy agencies, the War Department, or the Navy Department, and our information depends entirely on what we get from them, but we do get it daily.

General McNARNEY. Are you keeping a situation map now?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you before December 7?

Colonel FIELDER. Oh, yes; so far as the foreign wars were concerned; we keep the Russo-German front.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[1674] Colonel FIELDER. And the Thailand front and the China front. We keep all of those, have been doing that.

General McNARNEY. I have nothing further.

General McCoy. Wait a moment, please, Colonel.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were you conscious from the time you took over this responsibility of the fact that there were several hundred Japanese consular agents here that were not registered?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did they concern you at all prior to December 7?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, they concerned me. They did, but I had no authority to investigate them whatsoever. That was a function of other investigative agencies.

The CHAIRMAN. You are referring now to the agreement between the three investigating agencies?

Colonel FIELDER. There was an agreement, yes, sir. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Which relieved you of any Japanese civilian espionage?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, it forbid me to do it. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Is that the case now?

Colonel FIELDER. That is not the case now, no, sir. All investigative agencies are centered under my office now.

The CHAIRMAN. They are all centered under your office now?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So you are a clearing house now for the three agencies?

Colonel FIELDER. That is right, yes, sir. That is because of the military governorship, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you think that is a much better setup?

[1675] Colonel FIELDER. It is a much better setup, and we naturally get more done.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not so likely to have one agency hide a case until it gets a break on it?

Colonel FIELDER. That's right, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a natural tendency where you have two or three agencies, isn't it?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, it is. It is. But it is working very smoothly now; we are getting a lot of information.

The CHAIRMAN. Good. Glad to hear it.

General McCoy. Are you able to use with confidence Japanese of American citizenship in your work now?

Colonel FIELDER. We have a few that we trust implicitly.

The CHAIRMAN. They are in the nature of informers, I suppose?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, not—even more than that; we have commissioned officers that we use in our—

The CHAIRMAN. You have?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Graduates of the R. O. T. C., University of Hawaii?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. Some of our informers are graduates of Mainland universities as well.

The CHAIRMAN. You have every reason to believe that they are loyal to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In any intelligence work you have to use people often that you don't have full confidence in, or course?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. In that case their information has to be carefully evaluated, naturally.

General McCoy. Is there close cooperation between the G-2 here and that in General De Witt's command in San [1676] Francisco?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, there is a very close relationship.

General McCoy. Are you still keeping up service with the Philippines?

Colonel FIELDER. We are out of contact with them now. Up until they lost communications we were in contact with them, and all military information that they had came through here.

General McCoy. Is there any information from any other place in the Far East that comes to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. We got some from Thailand; we have gotten some from Java.

General McCoy. Is there an American setup of yours operating which has a G-2 in the Far East other than in the Philippines?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. It hasn't been set up yet?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Are you in any way in touch with the Coordinator of Information in Washington or any agents of his in any other parts of the world?

Colonel FIELDER. Only through the G-2 section of the War Department General Staff.

General McCoy. As far as you know he has no setup yet in the Far East?

Colonel FIELDER. That's right, sir.

General McCoy. Do you have any association or connection with the G-2 people in General Buckner's command, Alaska?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. I have had contacts with them.

General McCoy. Do you happen to know whether the Navy has intelligence liaison with the naval bases in Unalaska and Kodiak Island?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't know that, sir.

[1677] General McCoy. That is part of the outpost?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. I know where it is, but I don't know whether they have liaison with the intelligence agencies there.

General McCoy. Do you happen to know under whose command those Alaskan naval stations are?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you, Admiral? Are they under the Commander here?

Admiral STANDLEY. No, they are not here.

General McCoy. They go to San Francisco?

Admiral STANDLEY. Thirteenth District.

Colonel FIELDER. I presume that would be, yes, sir. It's Seattle, I presume.

Admiral STANDLEY. Seattle, Thirteenth District.

General McCoy. General De Witt's command, however, as I understand it, takes in the Alaska Army's Intelligence.

Colonel FIELDER. That's right. General Buckner has local command of that. Simon Bolivar Buckner.

General McCoy. What is your opinion of the loyalty of the large Japanese population here?

Colonel FIELDER. I believe that a great majority of them would be loyal to our country, but there is naturally an element that would swing toward Japan if it appeared that Japan was likely to win the war. I think undoubtedly even the aliens here would remain at least neutral until they determined in their own minds who would win.

General McCoy. There is an ultimate danger, then, that you would have to face here in case——

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, there is a very definite danger, because about a third of the population are of Japanese extraction. There is a very definite danger.

General McCoy. Are studies being made of how that will be [1678] handled in the future?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Does it involve segregation?

Colonel FIELDER. It involves segregation, and it involves a propaganda campaign, morale building campaign: resumption of the Japanese press, for instance, and many other angles being considered at all times, you might say.

General McCoy. Have you any officers on your staff that have served in Japan as language officers or on duty with Japanese commands?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. You do not?

Colonel FIELDER. I had one officer on the way over here, and he never arrived. He got marooned in Manila. He was on duty in Tokyo at the time of the outbreak. No. He had gotten as far as Manila, but he didn't get any farther.

General McCoy. There have been, as I understand, from '21 on, a large number of officers on duty with Japanese commands.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. Quite a few of those have passed through here recently enroute to Burma or Thailand or with the lend-lease mission down in the Dutch East Indies, and I have met and talked with several of them.

General McCoy. Do you know what has happened to our military and naval attaches in Tokyo?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, I do not.

General McCoy. Do you know what has happened to the American command that was captured on Wake Island?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. The only—Well, I don't know anything except what has appeared in the press. It appeared in the press that they had been taken to Japan.

General McCoy. What are the conditions on Wake Island now as far as you know?

[1679] Colonel FIELDER. It is occupied—that's the only thing we know—by Japanese.

General McCoy. Was an air mission of photography to Wake Island reported to you?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir. I have the pictures.

General McCoy. What does that show?

Colonel FIELDER. It showed activities, about all. Practically no damage to the habitable part, and mostly the military installations that were destroyed; you see a plane or two in the shallow water, and you see movements: automobiles, for instance. I have studied the pictures carefully. They were taken in sequence. There is an automobile approaching a bridge, for instance, and the next picture shows that it has crossed the bridge, so—

General McCoy. So it would indicate that they are occupied?

Colonel FIELDER. It indicates that they are occupied.

General McCoy. No ships?

Colonel FIELDER. No ships.

General McCoy. Or enemy planes?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. There is one large flying boat that is easily identified in the water, submerged. Whether it is ours or theirs I don't know.

General McCoy. Were any Japanese warships noted there that have been destroyed?

Colonel FIELDER. There are several small ships visible in the water there. I don't believe that the enemy destroyers which were sunk there are visible from these photographs.

General McCoy. Have you any responsibility for any of the other outposts such as Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and those?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir, none whatever.

General McCoy. Have no agents there of your own?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

[1680] General McCoy. Have you been in touch with the military attache in Australia at all?

Colonel FIELDER. Not with the attache, but we have been getting dispatches regularly. They are relayed through here to Washington. Any information they send to Washington is intercepted here and utilized.

General McCoy. Is there any Army personnel on any of these outlying islands now?

Colonel FIELDER. Not in the Hawaiian group.

General McCoy. Any on Johnston or——

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. What is there?

Colonel FIELDER. Canton, I believe.

General McCoy. What?

Colonel FIELDER. Canton Island, I believe, Christmas Island, some of the islands to the south.

General McCoy. Artillery or——

Colonel FIELDER. Engineers principally.

General McCoy. Having to do with construction work?

Colonel FIELDER. Construction, yes, sir.

General McCoy. Is that work going forward? Do you know?

Colonel FIELDER. Going forward very rapidly. I have no direct supervision of that, but I know the status of it.

General McCoy. The same way at Midway?

Colonel FIELDER. Well, we are not so much concerned with Midway now from the Army viewpoint.

General McCoy. Did we have any detachments there of the Army?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know anything of the attack on Midway on the night of December 7?

Colonel FIELDER. Nothing more than that it was supposed to have been shelled. I think there was no attempt to land.

[1681] General McCoy. Was there no Army formation on the island at that time?

Colonel FIELDER. I don't believe so. There was a clipper there, I think. I am not sure about that. There were no Army personnel there.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you a question or two.

Colonel, in General Short's testimony there is a message No. 472 of the 27th of November. Have you seen that message (handing a message to the witness)?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That message was signed "Marshall." Then again General Short has referred to a message, or has in his testimony a copy of a message No. 482 of the 28th of November signed "Adams." Are you familiar with that message (handing a document to the witness)?

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Adams message practically duplicates the Marshall message to a certain extent.

Colonel FIELDER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Can you tell me why the Adams message—from whom that came?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir; I don't know why that was duplicated unless one might have been sent, the original one, direct from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall. Usually nothing comes in signed "Marshall" unless he personally has dispatched that message. Now, anything coming from the War Department other than that is signed "Adams."

General MCCOY. He is the Adjutant General.

Colonel FIELDER. He is the Adjutant General.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Colonel FIELDER. I get many messages, for instance, from [1682] the G-2 in Washington; it will say, "For G-2 Hawaii," and it is signed—it is always signed "Adams," but it might be signed before that—at the end of the message it will be signed "Lee," for instance, and then under that "Adams." That indicates to me that Colonel Lee sent the—initiated the message; but so far as transmission, the Adjutant General dispatches it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would there be any significance, in your mind, in the fact that a message of the 28th, the Adams message, is more explicitly concerned with sabotage than the message of Marshall of the 27th?

Colonel FIELDER. No, sir. I thought they were both directed against sabotage.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would there be any significance in the fact that the Adams message states that no illegal messages—or let me see it a moment. "No illegal"—

Colonel FIELDER. "No illegal measures are authorized."

General MCCOY. Are authorized. Would that have any particular significance?

Colonel FIELDER. It had quite a significance to me. It meant that I couldn't go in the Embassy or I couldn't pick up a Japanese on the street and question him.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, the War Department directed you to limit your investigation—

Colonel FIELDER. To our agreement.

Admiral STANDLEY. —to legal measures?

Colonel FIELDER. That's right, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything further, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Colonel.

Our next witness is at two o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

[1683]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

Colonel BROWN. Captain Zacharias.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, Captain?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, COMMANDING
OFFICER U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Ellis M. Zacharias.

The CHAIRMAN. And your rank?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Captain, United States Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you give to the Commission a statement of your duties which have been in connection with intelligence work in the Navy in connection with working in the Japanese field? Give the duties and the time you were engaged in those duties.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I first became connected with Naval Intelligence in October, 1920, at which time I was sent to Japan for the purpose of acquiring a knowledge of the Japanese language and its people. I completed that course with the Japanese earthquake on the 1st of September, 1923, and remained there for two months rendering such assistance as I could, before returning home.

Is that what you want?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. After this return I went to general sea duty until June, 1926, at which time I was ordered to the Asiatic Fleet in connection with special work to be done in that area, but at the same time performing the usual sea duty in command of a destroyer and later on duty on the fleet flagship.

[1684] In July, 1928, I was ordered to return to Washington via Tokyo, at which time I spent six months there refreshing my knowledge, and part of the time taking over the duties as naval attache because of the severe illness of the accredited attache.

Upon returning from Tokyo in December, 1928, I went to the office of Naval Intelligence in charge of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence, of which I was the head until May, 1931, at which time I was detailed to escort Prince Takamatsu, a brother of the Japanese Emperor, on a tour of the United States which ended in San Francisco. In May, 1931, I completed that duty and went back to the command of a destroyer for two years.

In 1933 I went to the Navy War College for a senior course, and upon completion of that in 1934 I returned to the Office of Naval Intelligence, again in charge of the Far Eastern section.

During this tour there developed certain Japanese espionage cases into which I was drawn for active work. I assisted in the prosecution.

Upon completion of this tour, in May of 1936, I was again sent to sea duty as executive officer of a cruiser, which office I held until May, 1938. At that time I was ordered to the 11th Naval District.

Admiral STANDLEY. San Diego?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, San Diego, as District Intelligence Officer, which office I held until 8 November 1940.

It might be mentioned that during this period there were also espionage cases in which I took active part. Also during this period I had occasion to advise the Fisheries Committee of the California State Legislature regarding the Navy Department's attitude toward the prevalence of fishing boats off the coast of the United States.

On 8 November 1940 I departed for Honolulu to take my [1685] present command as commanding officer of the heavy cruiser SALT LAKE CITY.

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, it has developed here that the Japanese intelligence service was most efficient and most effective, and on the contrary that the Naval Intelligence of the United States in connection with Japanese affairs is most defective and most inefficient. Can you throw any light on that situation, based on your experience?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Off the record for a moment.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is not generally understood that both the Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence have worked under a tremendous handicap occasioned by the normal attitude of the American people toward such work. This attitude unfortunately has been carried into the military services themselves, which has made it difficult for those interested to develop this type of work and to make the headway which they desired to make and which they knew to be necessary.

I know, as a matter of fact, that in order to get appropriations for this work, it was necessary to give evidence of espionage before the congressional committee, but I must say that in those cases that committee has responded quite readily. However, that should not be necessary, because we should realize that in the world situation we are confronting highly trained intelligence organizations on whom great sums of money have been spent.

As an example, where our appropriations would run \$250,000 a year, the Japanese would use \$5,000,000 and the Germans \$20,000,000.

In addition to that Military Intelligence has been handicapped by Department orders. In the last two years in San Diego I endeavored to have the Military Intelligence implemented by providing the intelligence officer of the 9th Corps [1686] Area, Colonel Oldfield, with certain facts which he could send to Washington in order to get them to allow him to proceed with these activities.

General MCCOY. Were they in the nature of counterespionage?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, in order to implement that and to enable him to do the same things which we were doing. In other words, this was to give him help.

No results were accomplished. Why I do not know. I believe it was because of a general clamping down upon all intelligence services after the publication of a book by Mr. Yardley, "The American Black Chamber," which publication, of course, did infinite harm to the United States.

It is my belief that if the intelligence service had been properly implemented at that time the book would have been prohibited and the publication prevented before the harm was done.

The Naval Intelligence, for some reasons, has not been under these same handicaps. We have had modest appropriations and have been allowed to do a certain amount of work. However, these appropriations which were given to the Naval Intelligence were primarily for the purpose of obtaining information in foreign fields and were not to be applied locally in what we call domestic intelligence. Anything devoted to domestic intelligence had to be taken away from that in foreign fields.

However, we have made considerable progress; and particularly in the areas where the Japanese were most active we were able to keep track fairly well of those activities and to identify, to a considerable extent, their agents.

Of course, it must be realized that the objective of counterespionage is not the prosecution of cases; the objective is the location of enemy agents so that their efforts can be nullified at the proper moment. However, because of the attitude of not only the public but also of certain high [1687] ranking officers in the Army and the Navy, there were occasions on which we found that prosecution of certain cases must be done in order to bring home the realization that espionage on a large scale was going on in the United States.

The first of these cases was originated and developed under the direction of Admiral Reeves in 1935. However, at that time after I had taken charge, so to speak, we had great difficulty in persuading the Department of Justice to prosecute the case. It took several conferences and reselling to convince them of the necessity for the prosecution, which was finally done, and after they had requested certain further information from the Navy Department in order to go ahead with the prosecution.

Our intelligence services in the foreign fields, for the same reasons given above, have met with serious obstructions because of the naivete of the curiosity of our own people, and in one case, which I shall cite, the lack of knowledge, the lack of general knowledge of intelligence and counterespionage on the part of both the naval and military offices. Both of these bear directly on the recent occurrences.

I had undertaken myself to establish information services out of Japan. Such establishment is something that cannot be done in a day. Preferably it requires at least ten years. In the process of establishing these or attempting to establish them, we sent one man to China, ostensibly on leave. The curiosity of his friends and other officials was so great that they continually wrote back to Washington endeavoring to find out what this man was doing. Finally the ambassador told the naval attache that if he was not informed what this man was doing in China that he was going to ask the State Department to have him taken out immediately. We had to bring the man home without further ado. His usefulness was finished.

On another phase—and I am afraid that I will have to be a little critical in the process, because this is something [1688] which should go into the record so it would not occur again—we undertook in connection with this service which we sought to establish to use a lieutenant colonel in the Military Intelligence Reserve of the Army, a man whom I consider to be No. 1 in intelligence after General Van Deman.

This man came into the Army from the National Guard of Arizona in 1916, at which time he worked with General Funston in Mexico. He was very efficient. During the last war he was at Governor's Island as a captain in the Army and was very active in rounding up agents in that area. In 1920 he went to Japan as a language officer. In 1922 after having acquired an excellent knowledge of the Japanese language, he having been prevailed upon by one of the larger companies there, a company of importers and exporters, to come with them, as he had previous extensive experience as a civil engineer, he

resigned from the Army and went with that company—to my knowledge having in mind the completion of an espionage service in Japan. This necessarily was held from everyone except a very few people.

His ability along that line was demonstrated a year previously when the naval attache, Captain Watson, requested this man to draw up an outline for him, an outline of the espionage service in Japan, which he did, and very well, and copies of which now repose in the Navy Department and the Military Intelligence, they having been sent in by Colonel Burnett, who was then the military attache.

A year later the earthquake happened. The company with which this man was associated was destroyed and his contract was liquidated. He returned to the United States and then endeavored to go back to the Army. His case was taken as high as the President, but at that time there were so many officers endeavoring to get back into the Army that a single exception could not be made regardless of the merits.

This fact was given to me by General Pershing when we [1689] were down in Arica, Chile, in 1925. I asked him about this specific case. He remembered it, and he said it was impossible regardless of the merits to bring this man back into the Army.

Because of his ability he soon established himself in a very high position in the commercial field. He is now independently wealthy.

Because of our previous association in Japan we worked together continuously on intelligence problems. His interest and knowledge has been and still is of the highest order.

In pursuance of our efforts, in 1938 he made a trip to Japan at his own expense for the purpose of setting up, at his own expense, a business organization to further this project. In this he was successful.

After about six months he returned to the United States. Upon arrival in Hawaii he was met on the boat by one of the members of the Military Intelligence Division for the usual interviews, it being known that he was a lieutenant colonel in the Military Intelligence Reserve.

In his interview with this individual he could not, of course, impart any of the secret work on which he had been engaged, but he did try to impress him with the intense interest that he still held in intelligence, and the connections which he held in Japan in the highest places beginning with Prince Takamatsu and with the leading military and naval men in Japan and those in commercial activities. He knew who this man was because he was very familiar with the setup in Honolulu, but after he had gone, a report was sent to Washington that this man was very dangerous, and it proceeded to outline many of the things which he had said and many which were quoted incorrectly. At the close of this report it stated that great care must be taken to see that should he come to active duty in the Military Intelligence, that this report not come to his observation.

In that report my name was mentioned, to the effect that [1690] on his return to the West Coast he was going to contact Commander Zacharias; which he did.

As a result of my name being mentioned, a copy of the report was sent to me by the Office of Naval Intelligence.

I immediately took it up with Colonel Oldfield, the intelligence head of the 9th Corps Area, San Francisco. He checked my statements with Major Martin and Major Martin confirmed my thorough belief in this person. That information was sent to Washington.

Almost simultaneously I heard that this person had been disenrolled from the Military Intelligence because of the failure to submit either a change of address or the report of a physical examination. I forget which it was. However, it was obvious that this pretext was being used as a follow-up on this report.

In July, 1940, I was sent to Washington for temporary duty, and at that time I wrote out in detail all that had occurred and took the original, of which there was only one and which was to repose in the files of Naval Intelligence, over to General Miles, then recently arrived as Director of Military Intelligence. I advised General Miles to seek the reputation of this party from certain colonels to whom he was known. I added that I knew of three who would probably have something to say about him, but that because of the petty jealousies which I knew to exist, those three would damn him with faint praise. With that I left the matter rest, except that I did see glowing reports that came from other directions.

This party later took up the question with the Inspector General's office, endeavoring to get back on the military intelligence rolls. To this date nothing has been done except what I consider a grave injustice to a very able man who was endeavoring to serve his country.

Those are two instances of the difficulties that we have [1691] encountered in endeavoring to establish a competent intelligence organization. On the advice and encouragement of General Van Deman I have been able to keep heart because he said, "You are running into exactly the same thing that I have encountered at the beginning of the last war. Don't be discouraged. You will make some progress." That is the only thing that has kept me going.

Now, I am giving you these details because I hope that we can do something for the future. It can be done and it should be done and it must be done if we are going to survive. In this world we have to fight fire with fire regardless of our ideals. In my work over the 20 years because of the lack of authority I have had to risk my commission and my career many times. However, that is one of the fundamental requirements of an intelligence officer. It should not be so, but it has been so in the past.

What I am hoping for is a clearer conception of the necessity and the function of intelligence throughout the United States at least among the public if possible, so that we will not have to be engaged in a continuous selling job when we could be devoting our efforts to much more useful projects.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your experience can you say that we have any intelligence coming out of Japan except through the naval attache? If you do not want to answer that question, do not answer it.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I understand that, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Answer any way you see fit.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Of course, every individual going to Japan who we think has ability to observe, we endeavor to contact them before they go there and after they return for the purpose of getting as much

information as possible. That also includes the members of visiting ships, naval, and the merchant marine. But as for underground sources of information, I must admit that it is very limited.

[1692] Admiral STANDLEY. Does that apply also to China?

Captain ZACHARIAS. In China we are slightly better off, but of course, because of the fact that our efforts were nullified by the two cases which I cited, which upset all our plans.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you connected with the establishment of this network of detectors established here in Honolulu?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You worked in connection with that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have no other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. You are cognizant of the local situation in Hawaii?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And the large Japanese-blood population?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes, I am familiar with that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you know the Japanese character and type pretty well?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. With a well-organized system here during the last eight or ten years, ought it not to have been possible to find sources of information of Japan and either take them or tap them? Was that an insoluble problem?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is soluble.

The CHAIRMAN. It has not been solved, sir, to any extent worth mentioning.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I might state there the part that I played in the establishment of the present intelligence, Naval Intelligence organization here and the necessities for it.

In 1935 Captain Kilpatrick, United States Navy, then District Intelligence Officer, made a complete survey of the needs of the island for an effective intelligence service. It was a comprehensive and excellent report. It carried with it [1963] great demands. That went into the Navy Department.

As a result of that he was immediately provided with an Assistant Intelligence Officer, and they initiated the work which was to be carried on later on. Subsequently both officers were detached and another officer with no experience whatever was made District Intelligence Officer.

On my arrival here in November, 1940, I was sought by Captain Kilpatrick, who was then on sea duty afloat here, to assist him in a survey of the intelligence needs of the office for the purpose of making recommendations.

At that time our office here had two rooms, one yeoman, and one investigator, whom I had sent out from San Diego.

We immediately recommended tremendous expansion in the office space, personnel, and equipment. I consulted with Admiral Bloch and told him what great strides we had accomplished in the 11th Naval District, and asked him, because of the recent arrival of the fleet and the fact that Honolulu was now our most vital spot, if he desired help in the direction of intelligence.

He agreed fully with that, and I told him that the following day I was going back to the Coast and I would make arrangements to send

out some personnel from my former office in San Diego to accomplish the job in the shortest possible time. This was done.

Within six weeks this office was on a good working basis. The naval personnel were headed out from the Coast, some trained and some untrained. Under the direction of one of the few experienced men that we have in the intelligence organization, intensive training was instituted. As a result of that I consider that on the 1st of December, 1941, we had an excellent and efficient intelligence organization working in Hawaii. Unfortunately and for reasons unknown to me, the Army was not able to take the same steps that we have taken.

I have already mentioned that we realized the necessity for the Army to proceed with this work, and during the two [1694] years at San Diego I did my utmost to assist in bringing pressure on Washington to allow the Army to go ahead.

It is a fact that they could not ask an intelligence reserve officer to bring in a single bit of information. If he brought it in himself they could accept it, but they were prohibited from approaching an intelligence reserve officer to go out and get information for them. Fortunately, we were not so handicapped, and I have never been able to understand why the Army was so handicapped that way.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain Zacharias, apparently the net result of the combined efforts of the intelligences of the Army and the Navy and the F. B. I. here up to December 6, 1941, was the conviction that the conversations to Tokyo and the Japanese spy system were centered in the Japanese Consulate. It seems to me not a very difficult matter to detect that.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was detected, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And secondly that the consulate had a large number of consular aides here who had not registered under our law and whose activities were variously enumerated. You knew that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That was also because of certain things. With regard to the consulates we have been prohibited and the F. B. I. has been prohibited from taking any action whatever against the consular officers. We have had several cases in which we should have proceeded against them, but we were not allowed to do so.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that due to the attitude of the State Department?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

As far as the abilities of the M. I. D. and as far as the abilities of the F. B. I. are concerned, I know what they are capable of doing and what their experience has been because I have been so closely connected with them. I believe that I have cooperated to the greatest extent and put them in a posi- [1695] tion where they would have thorough information.

I might tell you that Mr. Hoover, the head of the F. B. I., referred to my district as an example of cooperation and coordination and experience in counterespionage matters. It is a fact that when the Federal Bureau of Investigation was on detail to assist the Army and the Navy in investigative work extending to counterespionage and countersabotage activities, we were in a position to turn over to them tremendous amounts of material that we had in our files, in order to make a start; otherwise it would not have been possible for them to get under way in any direction. We have continually done so, and

I think they will admit that the Naval Intelligence has given them the fullest cooperation and aid in every respect.

I know the M. I. D. started out from scratch, and when they were finally allowed to proceed in this work we gave them the same help and the benefit of our files.

Things have not gone just the way I would like to have them go because I feel that there should have been and should be now a coordinating head of all intelligence activities.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the military governor now established here, Colonel Fielder, M. I. D. senior officer, is the clearing house and directing head of the three agencies?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you favor that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. To do any counterespionage and countersabotage a coordinating head cannot be effective unless he has experience. Counterespionage is a profession in itself. In Europe counterespionage personnel attend four intensive years at school. They then concentrate on one country for another long period of time. After that they begin to know something about counterespionage and countersabotage.

I have always maintained that I do not care who runs the job as long as he can do it well and thoroughly. However, I do not think that we should have at the head of any organization [1696] as a coordinator a man without experience. That condition obtains at the present time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you attribute the absence of information with regard to messages that were going out from the Japanese Consul here to Tokyo, do you attribute this entirely to the restrictions put on you by departmental orders?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir; yes, and to be specific we should not be called upon to endanger ourselves through surreptitious wire tapping in serving the country. That is a condition that has existed.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all I have.

General McCoy. What is your duty now?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am in command of the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City.

The CHAIRMAN. I gather from your statement that in view of the orders that you would have been violating both the orders and the law if you had attempted to read the messages off the commercial radio?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Off the commercial radio?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Technically we would have been violating the law, yes. However, there are no orders, departmental orders prohibiting it.

The CHAIRMAN. It strikes me, however, that as the radio went through the air and could be read by anyone, the messages could be taken off and if the code could be broken, it could be known what the consul was sending to Tokyo.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is still a violation of the law, to intercept and read any message.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a violation of the Communications Act as our court has so construed it. I wrote the opinion myself. We may as well have a frank statement.

Captain ZACHARIAS. May I add one more observation about inexperience at the top. This also applies to a large extent— [1697] almost invariably—to the directors of Naval and Military Intelligence and among the intelligence officers in the field. I have endeavored for a long time to establish necessary training schools for intelligence work, but because of the lack of personnel, funds, et cetera, we have never been able to get it; but I hope that the present and past events will be sufficiently impressive to remove for all time the difficulties that we have encountered.

[1698] The CHAIRMAN. It has been the fact both in the Army and the Navy, hasn't it, Captain, that men might get to fairly high rank, having had other assignments or duties than intelligence, and then be moved into the Intelligence Department in a superior position?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask this question there, Captain: Have there been any Navy departmental orders or policy which interfered with officers of the Navy following any particular line of duty or investigation or bent?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir, there have not been any such orders.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have there been orders to the effect that officers should not repeat in the Navy Department unless there was an absolute demand, that no other officers could be obtained to take their place? Is that not true?

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did not that prevent officers coming back in those various offices where they would get the experience? Has that not prevented that?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It worked against it.

General MCCOY. Is there any Navy training in G-2 work at all?

Captain ZACHARIAS. What was that, General?

General MCCOY. Is there any Navy school or training specifically in G-2 work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Do you refer to negative intelligence or positive intelligence?

General MCCOY. No. In general training for intelligence work.

Captain ZACHARIAS. Oh, going—in referring—

General MCCOY. For instance, you have a school for air officers, aviators; you have a school, a War College; and you [1699] have training—naval officers go to the industrial college, and so forth. Is there any school for training intelligence officers?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir, but I feel there should be. We have been endeavoring to conduct our training through written lectures, courses—written lecture courses—and frequent meetings of intelligence reserve officers and regular officers.

General MCCOY. However, officers such as yourself who have specialized in intelligence work are usually kept on that job, are they not, in the Navy?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not necessarily. Because of the handicaps in promotion which might accrue to an officer who spends too much of his

time on that work, it is necessary for those who are interested in it to get in their proper amount of time as seagoing officers in order to be eligible for promotion. You are required to perform two years at sea in the grade in order to be eligible for promotion, but there are some who have indicated that if and when the necessity arises they are willing to sacrifice even those considerations to perform that work. I so indicated that to the Director of Naval Intelligence a year ago, and three months ago to Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations.

General McCoy. Do you know whether Colonel Fielder had had training in G-2 work prior to this assignment?

Captain ZACHARIAS. He has had some assignment to G-2, but their work has been of such a limited scope that I may safely say that I do not consider him a qualified counter-espionage officer.

General McCoy. Well, I was speaking in prior terms of intelligence. Is it not a fact that he took the general staff training in G-2 at staff college?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Oh, that is true, yes.

[1700] General McCoy. What do you know about Captain Mayfield's qualifications? Not in a personal sense, but has he had any training or experience, as far as you know, in intelligence work?

Captain ZACHARIAS. None whatever, but he is a very capable officer, forceful, intelligent, and a fighter, and I want to add that I do not want to be critical of Colonel Fielder. Any such education which he has not obtained is no fault of his. It is a fault of the system.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as I interpreted one of your statements here, Captain, the impression it made upon me was that if in the exigencies of the service you felt it necessary to intercept a message you might very well be exposed to a Congressional inquiry and might very well be broken as an officer for having violated the law in your supposed pursuit of your duty.

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions. Have you any, Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. Have you performed duty here at Honolulu in the past?

Captain ZACHARIAS. No, sir, I have not.

Admiral REEVES. You never have been stationed here?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Not stationed on shore.

Admiral REEVES. Or on shore?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I have had several duties aboard ship in Honolulu, at which time my interest in the Japanese intelligence activities have caused me to keep in constant touch with the District intelligence office not only here but at every port along the coast.

Admiral REEVES. You have, then, a general knowledge of intelligence work here at Honolulu, and you have a very extensive knowledge of Japanese and Japanese people in Japan. [1701] I wanted to ask your opinion about the loyalty of the Japanese populace of the Hawaiian Islands.

Captain ZACHARIAS. From our information we know that all first-generation Japanese—that is, alien Japanese now resident—either here or in the United States, are probable enemy agents. We have information which indicates that they are visited periodically by representatives from Japan to obtain information which they might have

and to give them orders, these orders extending to details of sabotage which they are or were to perform when they received the word.

Among the second-generation—that is, American citizens of Japanese extraction born of Japanese parents—there is one element called the Kibei, K-i-b-e-i, which means returned to United States, which comprises those American citizens of Japanese extraction who returned to Japan at an early age and have lived there over a considerable period of years. Those citizens have come in contact with the younger military elements in Japan who we know are the motivating forces behind the present occurrences. We know that the younger generation of the military and naval personnel in Japan are the ones upon whom the Nazis have been concentrating their efforts, and I firmly believe that the present situation was really precipitated by the younger element.

Now, my reason for this belief, and you can confirm it, is indicated by the action taken in 1932 when the younger element, feeling that the governmental policy was not going in the right direction, took things into their own hands and inaugurated the assassinations and general disorder which required the Emperor himself to put down before it could be successfully stopped. Those younger people are used to further the interests of the chauvinistic group, such as Black Dragon Society.

The CHAIRMAN. Are there any of them here?

[1702] Captain ZACHARIAS. Many of them, sir. That group is, I consider, even more dangerous than the first generation or the alien Japanese whom I have already described as having regular details as agents.

The third group, American citizens of Japanese extraction who have never been to Japan, are in a somewhat different category, but many of those through their associations with visiting dignitaries, naval officers, et cetera, have been subverted, and they comprise another dangerous group.

The remainder are an insignificant number who are on the fence and can be swayed one way or the other comparatively easily.

Now, as regards loyalty, as regards the loyalty of this last group whom we might consider as possibly receptive to being good loyal American citizens, during my last two years in San Diego, visualizing this approaching storm and having observed in their language papers, which are partially English and partially Japanese, that they expressed themselves as being concerned over the fact that in case of war between Japan and the United States all of them would be thrown into concentration camps until further disposition could be made, I decided to meet with some of those people and find out their attitudes, intentions, and other matters.

My last meeting with them about July—August, 1940, was an occasion when they were having all the officers of the Japanese-American Citizens League, their association, of Southern California, New Mexico, and Arizona, meeting just outside of Los Angeles. I arranged to have myself invited to talk to them, and I talked to them for about two hours and a half, covering every possible contingency.

My objective there was to find some informants. They took my talk in a very fine manner, and as I completed they gathered around

me and said, "You must come up to our national convention in Portland."

[1703] I said, "No. It's impossible for me to do that. I have given you all the answers now, and you must bring this forward and take the necessary steps if you are going to throw off the implications now clouding your loyalty as American citizens."

I emphasized in that talk that in order for them to be looked upon as good loyal American citizens they must do the things which good loyal American citizens do, which is: whenever they encounter any information regarding subversive activities or espionage activities prejudicial to the United States they should bring it immediately to the attention of proper authorities. I told them that I knew that they as American citizens were being subjected to pressure from the Japanese consulate, Japanese officials, their parents, to make them work for Japan. I gave them the name of one man that I knew as a result of such pressure was forced to go back to Japan and serve in the Army of Japan.

I said, "Why haven't you come forward as American citizens and made this known?" They didn't know why they hadn't. I said, "I'll tell you why. It's because as individuals you can't bring yourselves to do this, and none has taken the initiative to form a group to do it, and the reason is that you have not only been subjected to pressure but also threats from the narcotic and gambling rings which you know are working with the Japanese agents in this country, and you have just allowed it to ride. Now, if you are sincere in your desires you will change that situation."

I allowed a short period to elapse. Nothing was done. I then called three of those that looked most promising and told them again they're still doing nothing; they are still in danger as a result of that if trouble comes. But it was impossible for me to get any of them to come forward and go to work, after I had fully acquainted them with every situation.

General MCCOY. You haven't much faith in the loyalty of any of them?

[1704] Captain ZACHARIAS. Therefore I can say that we cannot— We have no reason whatever to count upon them for any active loyalty.

General McNARNEY. If that was true on the Mainland it would probably be even more true here in Hawaii, would it not?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It was going to give you that. Has that question just gone in?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Captain ZACHARIAS. If so, I will answer it. That is correct, because in Hawaii the Japanese have been subjected to a real racial discrimination, which is nonexistent on the Pacific Coast. I happen to know that the Japanese consulate, Japanese Consul here—Consul General endeavored to be admitted into one of the country clubs. He was blackballed. On the Coast they may belong to all the clubs; they may play golf. Therefore, that active discrimination to which they are so sensitive is more existent here than along the Coast, and it presents an even more dangerous situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, sir, in the light of this statement that you have just made, what is your cure for the situation that the ma-

majority of the draftees here are American citizens of Japanese extraction and that the home guard now guarding bridges, terminals, public works of various sorts, is almost entirely Japanese?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I consider that a most dangerous situation which should be corrected immediately. If they must be employed let's employ them in labor battalions but take away those what I understand are three thousand rifles and ammunition which they have in their hands.

The CHAIRMAN. Or if they must have rifles and ammunition, why not let them use them in other platoons and brigades of American troops on the Mainland?

Captain ZACHARIAS. It is possible that on the Mainland [1705] they would not be subjected to the same pressure.

The CHAIRMAN. As here?

Captain ZACHARIAS. As would obtain here. Therefore that might be feasible.

Admiral REEVES. But I take it you are not in favor of arming the Japanese citizens anywhere?

Captain ZACHARIAS. I am not, because of what I recognize as an indecision on their part which might throw them one way or the other with the slightest provocation.

Admiral REEVES. That they are subject and that they react to this pressure from Japan is indicated by the attitude of these Japanese citizens of the Pacific Coast that you addressed?

Captain ZACHARIAS. Would you read that to me again?

The CHAIRMAN. Will you please read the question, Mr. Reporter?

(The pending question, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)

Captain ZACHARIAS. That is correct. And the same situation obtains even more strongly here.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. You appealed to those Japanese citizens on the Pacific Coast and had no response whatever.

Captain ZACHARIAS. I did, sir. They are—I don't know whether this should go on the record or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Captain, we are deeply obliged to you, and to one of your experience I hardly need to say that we have cautioned every witness not to discuss outside anything that has been said or discussed in here, with anyone.

Captain ZACHARIAS. And of course my objective is the future.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Thank you very much.

[1706] (There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let General Tinker be called.

Will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL CLARENCE L. TINKER, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be seated and will you give the reporter your full name and rank?

General TINKER. Clarence L. Tinker, Brigadier General, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney, will you examine him? Perhaps you had better sit here; will you?

General McNARNEY. General, will you tell the Commission if there were any outstanding deficiencies in the Hawaiian Air Force when you took command, and if so what they were?

General TINKER. I will say outside of the lack of sufficient equipment which was caused by destruction of equipment there was a lack of sufficient dispersed bases from which to operate.

General McNARNEY. In your opinion the main outstanding deficiency not due to enemy action was the lack of dispersed bases?

General TINKER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What action has been taken since December 7 to correct this?

General TINKER. Upon my arrival the action had already been started to disperse to a certain extent. If I may refer to some things here (referring to documents), I started immediately to get greater dispersion. The dispersion of aircraft on the fields that they were using was not sufficient, and I readjusted units, shifted units from one place to another [1707] to get greater dispersion on what operating bases I had. Since that time I have brought into operation two additional landing fields for operation, and I have others that are coming in as fast as the engineers can get them prepared for us.

General McNARNEY. How many have you under construction now?

General TINKER. We have three or four where construction is actually in progress and others that are surveyed and construction will follow as fast as equipment can be made available.

General MCCOY. Are these all on Oahu?

General TINKER. Yes. There are other fields that are being constructed on other islands, that I am not counting, because they are not available to me at present on account of lack of sufficient ground protection for the operating of my aircraft from those islands.

General McNARNEY. Have you made any agreement with the Navy as to the emergency use of their fields?

General TINKER. I am using some of the Navy fields at present. I have been using the field at Ewa and using the field at Kaneohe and also plan to use their field on Maui when the Department Commander thinks we have sufficient ground force there to warrant putting our air troops in there.

General McNARNEY. Has a system of anti-aircraft defense been installed at all airdromes now?

General TINKER. You mean——?

General McNARNEY. Ground anti-aircraft defense.

General TINKER. You mean anti-aircraft artillery or just anti-aircraft defense?

General McNARNEY. Anti-aircraft artillery.

General TINKER. Anti-aircraft defense.

General McNARNEY. Automatic weapons, and so forth.

[1708] General TINKER. Anti-aircraft artillery has at the recommendation of the air command been more or less concentrated in the Pearl Harbor-Honolulu Harbor area in order to give us more freedom of action for our pursuit aviation over the rest of Oahu.

General McNARNEY. How about automatic-weapon defense?

General TINKER. Automatic-weapon defense is throughout all of the stations; we have that all over.

General McNARNEY. Is it manned for 24 hours a day?

General TINKER. It's manned for 24 hours a day.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it adequate in amount?

General TINKER. I don't feel qualified as yet to answer that; I haven't had a chance to get around to all these places and make detailed inspections.

General McNARNEY. Have there been any changes in the existing agreement between the Army and Navy for the operation of the fighters and the bombers since you arrived?

General TINKER. There has not as yet.

General McNARNEY. It is still operating under the same agreement that existed on December 6?

General TINKER. They are. There have been minor adjustments of that agreement between the Naval Air Commander and myself only, but no formal readjustment of that agreement.

General McNARNEY. Is there at present any lack of channels of communication between the Hawaiian Air Force and its subordinate units and the naval air command?

General TINKER. There is no lack of communication, but there is a danger of a lack of communication if lines are cut, where we depend on telephone lines, if those lines could be cut. We are constructing here in our own depots high-frequency radio to give positive communication with important points outlying from the islands, and there is a considerable amount of high-frequency radio enroute here which I had ordered before [1709] I left the United States, for that purpose.

General McNARNEY. How many B-17's have you got available now?

General TINKER. You mean actually in commission today or available to me?

General McNARNEY. Available to you.

General TINKER. Forty-two.

General McNARNEY. What percentage are you keeping in commission?

General TINKER. I had thirty available today for—in actual commission.

General McNARNEY. Are they used every day on the distance patrol?

General TINKER. No. Eighteen of those are held as a striking force. There was at one time a time when the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet ordered that striking force reduced for a day because he considered the patrol more important, but I have said and recommended that eighteen is the smallest number that I should ever hold as a striking force, and I have been able to. I hold that now.

General McNARNEY. In what state of readiness do you hold them?

General TINKER. I hold them in 30-minute readiness; I tested them yesterday.

General McNARNEY. Did they get off in 30 minutes?

General TINKER. They got off—part of them got off sooner. They would have been about 35 minutes getting off. I didn't let them off. I tested them to their positions and then checked the time it took them.

General McNARNEY. What bomb loads do they carry?

General TINKER. They each had four 600-pound bombs.

General McNARNEY. Would it be possible for you to support an operation against Wake with B-17's?

[1710] General TINKER. No.

General McNARNEY. Would it be possible to support an operation against Midway?

General TINKER. No.

General McCoy. Why not?

General TINKER. The reach is not enough. The B-17 aeroplane can be flown long distances if you take the bomb load out of it and put in the additional gasoline tanks; but if we are going to use it as a weapon you reduce its distance that it can cover, and you have to consider also if you are using it as a weapon that you may have to fly full-throttle operation for a portion of that time, which takes up considerably more gas. We have been figuring logistics ever since I have been here on every possible offensive action that we could take from any possible base that might be available to us, and we find that there is very little that we can do from here except operate against a carrier or against a landing made in these islands.

We had at one time a plan here, and we worked logistics on it, to operate from Wake against the Mandate Islands, against that naval base, seaplane base down there from which they were bombing Wake, but the Japanese got to Wake too soon for us to put into effect.

The CHAIRMAN. General, is the distance patrol being taken every morning now?

General TINKER. Yes, sir. That is every day.

The CHAIRMAN. To what distance?

General TINKER. It goes to 700 nautical miles.

The CHAIRMAN. How many of your bombers are being used for that?

General TINKER. Well, that varies in accordance with the number of patrol boats the Navy puts out and the number of—and the condition of the surrounding area. If they have naval [1711] task forces out in a certain area we don't cover that area that the task forces can cover.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you sufficient personnel and matériel now to keep that up indefinitely?

General TINKER. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Or are you going to wear out?

General TINKER. No. We will wear out. We must have a great many more of this type of airplane if we are going to continue to do this work with it.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it becoming a serious problem to keep it going day by day now?

General TINKER. It is getting more and more serious, and if we should lose certain spares that we are expecting in very shortly it would become critical very soon.

General McNARNEY. How much time are those pilots on your B-17's averaging?

General TINKER. I haven't checked their average, but they get around between 10 and 12 hours on a patrol, and they hit a patrol about once every third day, I think. Something like that. That's about the average.

General McCoy. That is, the human element would hold up better than the plane?

General TINKER. No. No, sir. My aeroplanes will wear out about three crews. The large aeroplane, the B-17 aeroplane, will keep about three combat crews busy.

General McNARNEY. Have you any excess crews over the airplanes?

General TINKER. Well, I have about practically two crews to my B-17's now, two available crews.

The CHAIRMAN. And to keep them going regularly you ought to have three at least?

General TINKER. Three crews, about what I figure on a four-engine bomber, and two crews on a two-engine bomber.

[1712] General McNARNEY. At the present rate your crews will then get about 120 hours a month. How many months do you feel that they could continue that?

General TINKER. I don't think to exceed four months, probably less. I haven't had any experience with our modern aviator and modern equipment and this particular type of—

The CHAIRMAN. —work.

General McNARNEY. Who is furnishing the interior guard and close-in protection of the airdromes at the moment?

General TINKER. Ground troops. There are some air corps troops still on guard duty, but I think it is unnecessary. I think the base commander hadn't gotten the proper idea of the guard, and I think that we will have all of our bases in the next three or four days completely guarded by ground troops.

General McNARNEY. And you have been furnished sufficient ground troops to undertake this mission?

General TINKER. Yes. The Department Commander is making definite and organized plans for the guarding of all those bases with ground troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had occasion to ascertain what available planes and personnel there were in the combined forces for the defense of the coastal area on December 6?

General TINKER. No, I haven't.

The CHAIRMAN. You haven't?

General TINKER. I haven't gone into that.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you are looking to the future rather than to the past.

General McNARNEY. I presume that in your headquarters you maintain a situation up to date at all times?

General TINKER. I do, yes.

General McNARNEY. Have you made an estimate of the situation recently?

General TINKER. Yes.

[1713] General McNARNEY. What is your considered opinion as to the possibility of further enemy action against Hawaii?

General TINKER. Well, my personal opinion is that the next action coming will not be against Hawaii, that it will be to cut our route between here and Australia. My G-2, a man who gets all this information and analyzes it and brings it to me so I can look it over, watches that and makes deductions on it, and there doesn't seem to be—of course you can never tell what they are going to do, but the logical thing seems to be, from the way they are operating now, that they are going to cut our route between here and Australia.

General McNARNEY. Is there anything that you can do with the forces under your control to obviate that situation?

General TINKER. No. I have been trying to figure out how I can bomb the bases they are using, and I can't quite reach them. I am fixing up a bomber now I can reach them with if it works, and they are flying it today, and I haven't received a report on it. I don't know whether I can reach it or not.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would their bases be for that purpose? In the Marshalls?

General TINKER. In the Gilbert Islands.

The CHAIRMAN. Gilberts.

General TINKER. And I can reach it from Canton. I can't reach it with my present gas load, but I am putting in some gas in a big bomber and seeing if the weight distribution is right, and everything, and if it is I think I can reach it from Canton, and the bombs are already in Canton, I think, or on their way there. We sent them some days ago.

General McNARNEY. How heavy are you going to load your B-17's?

General TINKER. You mean in weight?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

[1714] General TINKER. It will load it around fifty, fifty-three thousand some pounds gross.

General McNARNEY. Can you get them off any airdrome except Hickam?

General TINKER. Well, I got a 5,000-foot runway at Canton, and I think we will get them off.

The CHAIRMAN. That is finished, is it?

General TINKER. We can't do this thing tomorrow or next day until we have tested this airplane and see whether or not—how we can get it off and what we can do with it.

General McNARNEY. What are your existing relations with the Navy?

General TINKER. My existing relations are that they have a call for me on all my bomber aircraft for search and for attack. As I say, except for one occasion I have been able to hold my 18 heavy bombers for a striking force, and while certain orders indicate that they intend to order the stuff out I have definite orders to my men what to do on certain occasions, and I have planned that they will do that. I'll get them in the air, and then the orders will be given to them, and I presume that I'm going to have some influence in the orders when they are given.

General McNARNEY. Now, you say you presume you are going to have some influence. Well, what channels of communication or what liaison between yourself and the Navy has been set up so that you will have this influence that you expect to have?

General TINKER. Well, I have direct line to patwing 2, is the naval air commander, supposed to run that. The bomber command has a liaison officer in that office, and the navy air command have a liaison officer in the bomber command, and they have direct telephone communication.

General McNARNEY. Under this system of command the commander of patwing 2 designates the objective, does he not?

[1715] General TINKER. That is right.

General McNARNEY. And the force to attack the objective?

General TINKER. That is in accordance with the written joint agreement.

General McNARNEY. Is the commander of patwing 2 cognizant of the capabilities of the B-17?

General TINKER. I don't know how much he knows about it. I don't anticipate that the present commander of patwing 2 is going to interfere with my saying how the B-17's should be operated, unless that situation is forced on him by some higher authority, but another commander might. The written agreement states differently.

General McCoy. Wouldn't that be the case with any commander?

General TINKER. What?

General McCoy. Wouldn't that be the case with any commander that is over you, whether Army or Navy?

General TINKER. You mean whether or not he would interfere with it?

General McCoy. Yes, or whether he would understand the powers and limitations of your bombers.

General TINKER. Well, yes. He is not—I don't suppose they could be expected to understand our equipment like we understand it. Therefore, as I say, I have made representations to the higher authority already that that thing should be controlled by my headquarters because my personnel know more about its use.

General McNARNEY. Well, you don't anticipate that any orders that we will say are impossible or on the borderline of attainment will be given to you?

General TINKER. Well, I don't at the moment. So far I have—I had an understanding with the Admiral who commands patwing 2 about how these things are going to be operated, and [1716] I have issued my own orders about what happens in the case of a surprise attack, and so forth, to all this bombardment aviation.

General McCoy. Isn't it a fact that orders may be given you that may seem very outrageous to you, as an expert, in wartime when you don't know the larger problem? Isn't it your duty, even if your command can't do what you are ordered to do, to obey orders?

General TINKER. Yes, it is my duty to obey orders if I get them, but it is also my duty to keep myself informed of what the picture is.

General McCoy. Well, you are very apt to get some orders in wartime that you don't think you can carry out, from whoever may be in command of you, and you will not be the judge.

General TINKER. That is very true, and if I get those orders I will carry them out.

General McCoy. You understand what the unity of command is for, then, don't you?

General TINKER. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. You don't understand always what affects a naval commander, do you?

General TINKER. No.

General McCoy. No. And it happens that the naval commander is your commanding officer and your commanding general at present.

General TINKER. That is right, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. As far as the interceptor command goes, you still have tactical control over the Navy fighters ashore, do you not?

General TINKER. When they are ashore, that's right. It is usually

only a portion of them, because they come ashore for various work and stuff like that, and they report to us, the percentage of them that are available for use, and they come [1717] under the interceptor command control, those that are available for use.

General McNARNEY. They are under your complete control?

General TINKER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. They go into the air when you order them into the air.

General McNARNEY. And you would expect them to carry out your orders in the same way that the Admiral commanding patwing 2 expects bombers to carry out his?

General TINKER. When we send them out to sea for him, when we turn them over to him, why, he controls them.

General McNARNEY. That agreement is fully understood? There is no misunderstanding about it?

General TINKER. No, there is no misunderstanding about that, excepting that we don't count on that fighter aviation, that carrier-borne fighter aviation, to be of any particular value to us in a fight except just momentarily, because we suppose that in case of a fight the carrier is going to get in motion and it is going to want its airplanes back on it. In other words, I don't count any strength—I don't predicate any plans that I make on any strength that I would get out of that carrier-borne fighter aviation.

General McNARNEY. How is the aircraft warning system working at the moment?

General TINKER. It is working pretty good, not as good as it will when we get our personnel better trained, and everything. This was only put in here very recently. It isn't like the ones that have been established quite a while in the United States, but it is working surprising well for the time it has been in.

General McNARNEY. I notice in the evening that you have some patrols of pursuit up. Are they controlled by the interceptor command?

[1718] General TINKER. By the interceptor command.

General McNARNEY. Through the controller at the operations room?

General TINKER. Mostly those pursuit patrols that you see up at night, unless they are there for some special purpose, are there chacking lights or something like that, to see if there are lights in the wrong place or to see if certain lights will do certain things.

General McNARNEY. How is the communication between the controller and the people in the air? Is it O. K.?

General TINKER. Yes.

General McNARNEY. It is apparently working all right?

General TINKER. It is apparently working; I have no complaint from the interceptor command of the radio.

General McNARNEY. I believe I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you any questions?

Admiral REEVES. No, I don't think so.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, have you?

General MCCOY. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, it has been necessary—we have requested all witnesses before us not to converse about the testimony or

matters that have been discussed before this Commission. Will you please regard this request, and we thank you very much, General.

Colonel BROWN. Commander Bates.

Admiral STANDLEY. Commander Bates, will you take the oath? What is your name?

Commander BATES. Paul M., sir.

[1719] **TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER PAUL M.
BATES, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(The oath was administered in due form by Admiral Standley.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Commander, I understand that you have appeared before this Commission as a result of the notice you saw in the newspapers; is that correct?

Commander BATES. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duties were you performing on the night of December 6 and the morning of December 7?

Commander BATES. Well, I was not performing any duties at the Yard then, sir. My duty at the Yard is assistant materiel officer for aviation in connection with the Islands, but I was the senior watch officer, not on duty at the time. Do you understand, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. You had no duties at the time?

Commander BATES. No, sir, not at the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. What information do you wish to impart to the Commission that you think would be pertinent to the inquiry here?

Commander BATES. Well, as the senior watch officer of the District, which duties I was appointed to on the 21st of October, I thought that my instructions were not adequate for the proper performance of that duty, and I protested several times to the District operations officer, trying to get the duties explained more fully so that not only I but the rest of the watch officers would be able to take action in case of any emergency.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were those protests, or rather, was that communication in the form of a recommendation to improve the conditions?

Commander BATES. Yes, on several occasions I did recommend, but no one paid any attention to what I said. For [1720] instance, the instructions as given were not explicit as to what we were to do, and I tried to get more explicit instructions issued because some of the officers there were reserve officers standing this duty, and I noticed today that when I got these instructions back all of the instructions are not here. There is one in particular in regard to what you do in case of an attack, air raid, that is not in this book (indicating). I requested this today, but I got it just before I left, and so the thing that I wanted to show is not in there.

We were supposed to call up about ten different places on a dial telephone in case of an attack, and we had one assistant who was a territorial reserve down at the section base at a time. He stood watch on the field telephone. That's the only assistant we had, and I tried to get more assistants, so that in case of an attack we could communicate faster.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are you still on that duty?

Commander BATES. No, sir. That duty ceased at the morning of the 7th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then there is no necessity now for corrective measures for something that existed on the 7th?

Commander BATES. That is right, sir; no, the measures have been taken now that I was striving to get put into effect before the 7th.

General McNARNEY. Are there sufficient channels of communication now available so that everybody can be warned almost immediately?

Commander BATES. Yes. However, I think the location of the communication center is wrong in view of the fact that it is on the top deck instead of down below.

Admiral STANDLEY. In what way, if any, or in your opinion did the conditions as they existed at that time in any way have a bearing upon the effect of the attack on the morning of the 7th, or could they in any way have avoided the attack?

[1721] Commander BATES. No, sir.

General McNARNEY. Was there any information available in the operations office prior to the attack that might have given warning that some sort of an operation was in progress?

Commander BATES. No, sir. Now, I can't say that, because I wasn't on duty that morning. That's merely hearsay as far as I am concerned. I requested—I didn't particularly want to appear before this Commission, Admiral. I wanted the officer who was on watch that morning to appear before the Commission. He is here now.

Admiral STANDLEY. He is here, you say?

Commander BATES. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is his name?

Commander BATES. Kaminski. Lieutenant Commander Kaminski.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, then you have nothing further that you personally want to impart to the Commission?

Commander BATES. No, sir, I don't. I thought I explained that. Mr. Howe. Yes.

Commander BATES. That I recommended that this other officer be called because he was on duty at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you anything further, gentlemen?
(There was no response.)

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Commander, we thank you very much, and we have warned other witnesses who have appeared, requested that they not discuss the testimony given here nor the matter discussed before this Commission.

Commander BATES. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you please observe that?

Commander BATES. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Thank you.

Colonel BROWN. Lieutenant Commander Kaminski.

[1722] Colonel BROWN. Lieutenant Commander Kaminski.

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HAROLD KAMINSKI, UNITED STATES NAVAL RESERVE

(The oath was administered in due form by Admiral Standley.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Commander, will you give us a brief resume of your service in the Navy?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, sir. I went into the Navy in the World War when it first started, and I went through with the destroyer duty and sub-chaser duty, and then at the time of the Armistice I was at New London, Connecticut at the submarine hydrophone school; after that with the gunboats to Haiti and San Domingo. I then took inactive duty, and then about 1920 to 1921 I requested active duty on the OKLAHOMA and went to the combined fleet maneuvers.

Then I took an examination for a commission in the Navy and was tendered a commission, which I never accepted; I never took the oath of office.

I was active in the Naval Reserve, the Sixth District, until about two years ago. Then I got out and then volunteered my services to the Department, and I was called for active duty a little over a year ago. I have been out here a year. I came here and reported for duty the first week in January.

Admiral STANDLEY. I understand that you appear before this Commission at the behest of Commander Bates?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is your understanding?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What duty were you performing on the night of December 6 and the morning of December 7?

Commander KAMINSKI. I was District Watch Officer.

Admiral STANDLEY. From what time?

Commander KAMINSKI. I had the watch at 4 o'clock Saturday.

[1723] Admiral STANDLEY. Four p. m. Saturday?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. 1600?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, 1600 Saturday night. I stayed on continuously for three days after that.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your tour of duty?

Commander KAMINSKI. My duty at that time was that I was the officer in charge of net and boom defenses.

Admiral STANDLEY. I mean so far as your watch duty on that night was concerned. You went on watch at 1600?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. When would you be relieved, ordinarily?

Commander KAMINSKI. I would ordinarily be relieved at 1 o'clock the next morning, sir, Sunday morning.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you the only officer on watch at that time?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, I was the only officer on duty in the district. However, they had the yard watch and then the security watch, but at that time I was the only officer on watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. What were your duties as watch officer?

Commander KAMINSKI. Well, my duties as watch officer were to take care of anything that turned up pertaining to the district—any district activities.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had there been any calls made upon you as duty officer which could not be performed at any time prior to that time?

Commander KAMINSKI. I do not understand.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you been standing watch prior to December 6?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had any occasions ever arisen when any [1724] matters came up which could not be handled?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When you went on watch you relieved the officer who was on duty?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You understood what your duties were supposed to be?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have any idea that you could not perform them under any circumstances?

Commander KAMINSKI. I felt that the station could not function efficiently with just myself. I felt that before. I had complained about the man they had on the telephone watch, and they had Hawaiians there who were not able to speak plain English and they did not receive the proper instructions at the telephone. In fact, the man I had that morning was perfectly useless and had not been instructed, and they did not understand the teletype there, and I felt there was too much responsibility for one person, and I felt that the situation should be corrected and we should have more personnel and the teletype should be manned and not just one officer with one enlisted man.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did your instructions call for any increase of help in case of emergency?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, my instructions in case of emergency were to call the Commandant; to call his aide, as a matter of fact, and second, if I could—no, that is wrong.

My first instructions were to call the chief of staff and the Commandant's aide. Those were the first to call: the chief of staff and the Commandant's aide.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have other calls that you were required to make?

Commander KAMINSKI. Constantly we had various routine calls. For instance there might be a destroyer coming in or [1725] something with contagious diseases and there might be various inspections and dispatches coming in. It was a regular routine duty.

Admiral STANDLEY. You received a call that morning of the sinking of a submarine?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes. I have the original dispatch and I initialed it.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the time?

Commander KAMINSKI. The time I received it? I initialed it. I saved a copy of it and I have it in this file.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the time?

Commander KAMINSKI. 0712. (Reading:)

From: WARD.

To: COM 14.

We have attacked fired upon and dropped charges upon submarine operating in defensive sea area.

Admiral STANDLEY. What did you do when you received that message?

Commander KAMINSKI. When I received that message I endeavored to get in touch with the Commandant's aide. I could not reach him on

the telephone. I then got in touch with the Cincus's duty officer. I read the message to him. I then got in touch with the chief of staff.

I have it here in chronological order.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just tell us what you did. How long did it take you to get in touch with the chief of staff?

Commander KAMINSKI. It took me quite a while to get him. I have some other message in here.

These are the reconstructed notes the next morning. During the morning of December 7 at 0712 I received that dispatch from the WARD, which I just read. Upon receiving that dispatch, I immediately endeavored to raise the Commandant's aide and could not contact him. I called and contacted Cincpac Duty Officer and read him the dispatch.

[1726] Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have the time when that call was made?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, because it was practically the same time. I did not waste much time. It was right after I got it. I did that next.

General McCoy. It was all within a few minutes?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

I called and contacted the Cincpac Duty Officer and read him the dispatch. I sent the message to ready duty destroyer MAHAN.

I have in here the MAHAN, but it was the MONAGHAN and they got it.

It was, "Get under way immediately and contact U. S. S. WARD in defensive sea area."

Admiral STANDLEY. Just a minute. Did you send that message on your own responsibility?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you have instructions that that is what you are to do?

Commander KAMINSKI. I had instructions, yes, to use my own judgment. I knew it was a ready duty destroyer, so I sent that message out. It was by visual.

I had the MAHAN, but the MONAGHAN went out. They knew it was meant for the ready duty destroyer. I told them to get under way and contact the U. S. S. WARD in defensive sea area. That is the message I sent.

I instructed the communication office to send a copy of the last message to the U. S. S. WARD for information. I wanted to let the WARD know that I had that information.

I then called the chief of staff, Captain Earle, notifying him of the WARD'S message. All this occurred prior to calling the chief of staff.

He requested confirmation from the WARD, which I relayed to the WARD and never received an answer; but I [1727] received a second dispatch in the interim about the time which I will give to you. It was between 0712 and 0720 that I received this dispatch. That dispatch is:

We have intercepted a sampan. We are escorting this sampan into Honolulu. Please inform Coast Guard to send cutter for relieve us of sampan.

That should be "to relieve us of sampan" instead of "for relieve us of sampan." That is garbled.

Admiral STANDLEY. That came in from the WARD?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, the U. S. S. WARD.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then what happened?

Commander KAMINSKI. I got in touch with the Coast Guard and found that they had received a communication practically simultaneous with mine; they had picked it up, so I dropped it.

Then I called the War Plans Officer, Commander Momsen, because after I called Captain Earle, he was quite astounded and he said he could not believe it. He asked for this confirmation. He asked to send him that confirmation, and he made several remarks at that time that he was astounded and that it was unbelievable, and made various other remarks.

He asked me to notify the Commandant. I asked him if he would please notify the Commandant because I had other messages to put through. He said he would. I had other messages to put through and asked him if he would do it. He notified the Commandant.

He suggested about calling Commander Momsen. I called the War Plans Officer, Commander Momsen, and was ordered to call Ensign Logan. He arrived at approximately 0725. Of course, these times are approximate and were reconstructed, and they are accurate to the best of my ability.

I called Commander Momsen around 0720, sir. I called Ensign Logan immediately after, in about five minutes.

It was 0725 that I received the message from the WARD. That is the sampan message. All these things were almost [1728] simultaneous.

A minute after, I got the Coast Guard; could not contact an officer but was informed by communications officer of the 14th Naval District that Coast Guard had received WARD's second message simultaneously. Commander Momsen arrived in the operations office a few minutes after Ensign Logan.

I then called my own commanding officer. After that, with the assistance of the lady at the switchboard I started to call all the department heads, after arranging with the telephone office to keep the lines open.

Her name is Miss Jones, and she was wonderful. She was right there when they were strafing and she kept right on the switchboard, and I do not know what I would have done without her.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did your commanding officer come over?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then you had other duty officers? You had other duty officers on that same duty?

Commander KAMINSKI. I will come to that.

At approximately 0755, but not later, I heard the first plane.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that?

Commander KAMINSKI. At approximately 0755 I heard a plane approaching. That was 0755 but not later that I heard a plane approaching from the south. I saw it from southerly lanai of administration building. I could discern the Rising Sun of Japan under the wings. The plane was joined shortly by others with the same insignia on it. This plane was flying very low and hedge-hopping, just going over the roof.

Admiral STANDLEY. In what direction?

Commander KAMINSKI. He came from the southward going over to the battleship anchorage. He was flying directly for the powerhouse, and then I watched him and then he went down in [1729] the direction of the battleship anchorage.

This plane was joined shortly by others with the same insignia on it. They were the dive-bomber type. Bombs were dropped and the first attack was on.

I tried to reach the YNg 17 by telephone. That is the torpedo gate.

I was unable to get through. I continued calling YNg 17 without being able to make contact. I made a telephone contact with YNg 17 at approximately 0830 and ordered Ensign Eastman, the officer in charge at that time at the gate, to close the A/T and A/B immediately.

About this time there was a slight lull in the attack, followed by a much heavier and concentrated attack, and I believed that it was in this attack that the formation of torpedo planes came in over Pearl Harbor.

This goes to 0755. It was during this attack that our defensive firing was increasing perceptibly. The noise was deafening. This attack lasted much longer than the first.

Captain Earle, Chief of Staff, arrived during this second attack.

I endeavored to close Honolulu A/T and A/B. That is the gate. I had considerable difficulty in getting through. Finally, Lieutenant Ottley's home was called and was informed that he had departed for the Control Station of the Honolulu net and boom. I tried to reach him there without success. During this period the third attack began. Defensive firing was exceedingly heavy, bombing likewise.

The Commandant and his aide arrived during the third attack.

Fires from Hickam Field and 10-10 dock were raging. Everything was obscured by smoke. At first I thought it was Red Hill. Then I knew it was not.

It was impossible to use the phone during this time because of the noise. This attack appeared to be the heaviest [1730] and the longest. After the third attack subsided contact was made with the officer in charge, Honolulu net operating station, and he was ordered to close the Honolulu net and boom immediately.

I was later informed by Lieutenant Ottley that the mess hall at Sand Island had been bombed and one man injured, but that they were still able to operate.

In here it says that the man's name was Mr. Ottley, but it was Lieutenant Ottley.

Captain Finlay, Senior Coast Guard Officer, had assumed his duties as Captain of the Port, Honolulu, and was in direct administrative charge of the Honolulu net and boom.

The Commandant's aide for aviation arrived during the last attack.

Then there followed a lull, followed by what I considered a relatively light attack. Shortly thereafter the attacks ceased.

That is practically all.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the last time you have in your memorandum?

Commander KAMINSKI. I did not put that down. I think I have that in this log.

No, I find I have not. I thought I had that here. No, I did not put that down.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the last time you have in your margin?

Commander KAMINSKI. The last time I have in the margin is 0755, but I think the last attack ceased, if I remember correctly, about 12 o'clock. I think that lasted about four hours.

Admiral STANDLEY. What other duty officers stand the watch with you on this duty? Is there a regular watch list?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. How many are there?

Commander KAMINSKI. Paul Bates, Senior Watch Officer; [1731] then there was Rutledge, Commander Rutledge; Lieutenant Commander Waldron. I do not know whether Harrison was standing watch or not. Harrison may have been standing watch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that a 24-hour watch or a watch during the night only?

Commander KAMINSKI. That was a watch during the night only except on week-ends. Then ordinarily it was a watch during the night.

Admiral STANDLEY. It was just a watch when the yard was closed?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes. At 1600 we went on, and came off around 8 o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. And at 8 o'clock in the morning the routine began when you came off watch?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

On week-ends we started at 12 o'clock on Saturday and did not get off until 10 o'clock Sunday.

Admiral STANDLEY. In an emergency like you this you had other stations?

Commander KAMINSKI. What is that?

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you have other stations in an emergency?

Commander KAMINSKI. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did the other officers?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, we all had other duties, but we were all up in the administration building.

Admiral STANDLEY. But when the yard was on full force you had other duties to perform?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In an emergency, if the call came for general quarters, you then had other duties?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. This was an emergency watch?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

[1732] Admiral STANDLEY. When the yard was not operating?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In this period when you were performing these various duties required by your instructions, was there anything you omitted or failed to do?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, I did not give the airplane raid alarm as I think Commander Momsen gives that. I tried to get through, and I did not get it through; somebody got it through, but they were dropping bombs prior to that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were able to perform the duties laid down for you?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, and I kept trying to get through to the gates. That was my primary duty. The operation of these gates was important. I tried to get them closed.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any alarm of any kind prior to the bombing?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Except your report of this submarine?

Commander KAMINSKI. That is all.

I reported this thing—as you notice—to the signal watch officer, and there is quite a lapse of time when I was called up again by the Cincpac's watch officer for confirmation of this and asked for a repeat, and I gave the repeat.

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain Earle asked you to confirm it?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, and I showed him the confirmation and I said, "That is all the confirmation you have."

Admiral STANDLEY. When you received the communication from the WARD to the effect that she had picked up a sampan at sea, did that raise any confusion in your mind as to whether that first message might have been connected with the sampan?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was no question in your mind?

Commander KAMINSKI. No question in my mind when I got [1733] that message, and I knew definitely we were in it.

As a matter of fact, I have here a copy of it—

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that you are referring to?

Commander KAMINSKI. I have an order that I issued to my own forces somewhere about a month before this thing happened. I did not like the way things were going and I issued the order to the Net and Boom Defense.

No, there was no hesitancy. I knew we were in it immediately when I got that. I have been looking for it and I told my wife I was looking for it.

This is document No. 3:

NOVEMBER 10, 1941.

From: Officer in Charge, Net and Boom Defenses, Fourteenth Naval District.

To: Net and Boom Defense Fourteenth Naval District.

Subject: State of Readiness, Wednesday, November 12, 1941.

1. All officers and men of the Net and Boom Defenses will be in a state of readiness and on station not later than 0700, Wednesday, November 12, 1941.

H. KAMINSKI.

Copy to:

OinC N&B Defenses Honolulu
OinC N&B Defenses Pearl Harbor
CO Net Depot
CO Ash
CO Cinchona
OinC Floating Equipment, N&B defenses.

Certified to be a true copy.

H. KAMINSKI,
Lt. Comdr. USNR

Officer in Charge Net & Boom Defenses, Fourteenth ND.

So it did not get me by surprise, I put in the alert on November 12. No, sir, I did not like the looks of things.

Admiral STANDLEY. Commander, what is it you have in mind that might have been done to avert the air attack? What is it [1734] you have in mind that was not done?

Commander KAMINSKI. I have not anything in mind that could have averted the air attack except that I do think that we were caught without being on the alert; we were definitely not on the alert.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all. Any questions?

General McNARNEY. I understand from your testimony that the facilities for sending out calls in case of surprise attack were inadequate?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, sir, I did not say the facilities were inadequate, but I say that the facilities were present but that the personnel was inadequate. You do not have enough personnel to handle the station.

General McNARNEY. If it was necessary to give all that warning over a dial telephone, isn't that inadequate?

Commander KAMINSKI. No, because we have many machines but no one with the ability to operate them. They have the teletypes and we have a switchboard, but the operator did not know how to operate the switchboard.

General McNARNEY. Were the teletype printers available?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, the teletypes are there, and the switchboard, but the operator did not know how to operate the switchboard.

General McNARNEY. The facilities were available but the personnel to operate the facilities were not on watch on December 6?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

General McNARNEY. How about the air raid alarm? Is that the same?

Commander KAMINSKI. No. The air raid alarm was somewhat of a different thing. It was more of a simple thing. I think that was of minor importance, because when I was watching the plane hedge hopping over the administration building the alarm had already been given by the bombs dropping.

[1735] General McNARNEY. If an air raid alarm had come 30 minutes before the actual attack, how many seconds would it take to get this signal in operation?

Commander KAMINSKI. The air raid alarm could have been put into operation immediately.

General McNARNEY. What type of alarm was that?

Commander KAMINSKI. A whistle in the power house.

General McNARNEY. Was everyone familiar with the signal?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What was the signal to be given?

Commander KAMINSKI. It was one long blast and two short blasts.

General McNARNEY. That is all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Any other questions.

Admiral REEVES. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. We are asking all the witnesses not to discuss these matters on the outside.

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. We appreciate your coming here.

Commander KAMINSKI. I do not know whether this is out of place or not. This is not in a spirit of criticism, but we have all got a mission

to do to the best of our ability and I have felt that certain things may be corrected. I was under-age in the last war and I did not have to come into this one. I would like to take these up and I would feel much better about it. Of course, some of them may be in the process of correction; I do not know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What are your suggestions?

Commander KAMINSKI. I think the communications setup is exceedingly dangerous in the 14th Naval District. It is vulnerable to attack. These buildings are all too close to the battleships. As a matter of fact, one of the Japanese planes shot two holes in the roof. Only the cement stopped it from coming down to my floor. Another plane started to strafe it [1736] as it came over.

I think these communications are essential and they should be so constructed as to be bombproof or put in a bombproof. There is a building under construction there for supplies. I think it would be better to put it in that building, which is uncompleted, and camouflage it.

Another thing that worries me is having all these officers trained there in the operations on duty at one time. We have too great a need for trained personnel. We haven't the time for training. I think the officers, some of them, were relieved too soon. I think Captain Morris was relieved too soon. I think some of them should have been here longer. I do not think they have been here long enough.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, the turnover is too rapid?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, the overturn is too rapid, yes. We have not got the personnel out here, and I think it is a dangerous situation. Today these officers on duty——

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Commander KAMINSKI. I think that also holds good for the officers on watch on inshore patrol. I do not know about the other officers, but the watch officers are special trained officers, and I think they should not be there at one time. That is, some provision should be made for it. I think the inshore patrol should have a separate watch to be operated like the operations watch.

I am not trying to get out of a watch, Admiral. You understand that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. What we are trying to get is what you think should be done to correct this situation.

Commander KAMINSKI. I am not trying to get out of the watch. Most anybody can be replaced, but I have been trained to do a certain type of work, but there should be some provision for it.

[1737] Another thing is the lumber piles and the automobile storage, which to my mind is exceedingly dangerous. I do not think these automobiles, so inflammable, should be stored around that administration building. They can walk. There is the danger of fire. I do not think these lumber piles should be around that administration building. They should be moved to some other area.

Another thing is the housing area. It reminds you of Tokyo or Yokohama. I do not care to move into it. I am a little scared of it. I am fighting against moving into that thing.

That area is right above the oil tanks, and I do not think that officers of any importance, or anybody, as a matter of fact, should be in those houses.

Admiral STANDLEY. The trend of your recommendations is that the congestion is too great around Pearl Harbor?

Commander KAMINSKI. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. In every way?

Commander KAMINSKI. In every way.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you made the recommendations to your senior officer?

Commander KAMINSKI. I have made no recommendation to my senior officer except one. I made one recommendation that they take over this present hotel for the housing of the officers. That is the only recommendation I made in writing.

Admiral STANDLEY. You realize that to accomplish these things the quickest way to get that done is to make your recommendations to your commanding officer?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, and my commanding officer and I have talked about the lumber piles. I have also made the recommendation concerning housing the officer personnel in this present hotel that we are in now.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all you had in mind?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes, with respect to the communications.

[1738] Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, you gave us that.

Commander KAMINSKI. And about relieving certain people on watches who are trained.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, you gave us that.

Commander KAMINSKI. And too many officers there at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Is that all you have?

Commander KAMINSKI. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Thank you very much.

Colonel BROWN. Colonel Smoot.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL PERRY M. SMOOT, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF HAWAII, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by Admiral Standley.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you question him, General McCoy?

General MCCOY. What are your present duties, Colonel?

Colonel SMOOT. I have three duties at the present time. The first one is Adjutant General, Hawaii, appointed by the President some years ago; the second one is Director of the Selective Service for the Territory of Hawaii, and the third one is Commanding General Hawaiian Territorial Guard.

General MCCOY. You have been Adjutant General of the District for how many years?

Colonel SMOOT. Eighteen years.

General MCCOY. You have in that period of time had considerable experience with soldiers of Japanese blood?

Colonel SMOOT. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. The majority of your soldiers, I take it, are those of Japanese blood?

Colonel SMOOT. No, sir, not the majority. We keep down to from 2% to 10%.

General MCCOY. Are there any special investigations or examinations of such soldiers? I am speaking of the National Guard with re-

spect to your statement about keeping it down to [1739] a certain percent. Do you look into their background and investigate it to be sure of the persons?

Colonel Smoot. Yes, sir. In a community such as Hawaii where the people do not migrate and emigrate very much, everyone is more or less known. We take the younger Japanese when they are recommended by their school mates and playmates from the time that they were youngsters, and we get these recommendations from the other racial groups of guardsmen. Each one is taken on the recommendation of some other type of guardsman.

General McCoy. Does it seem to be a desirable service to the natives of Hawaii?

Colonel Smoot. The National Guard service?

General McCoy. Yes.

Colonel Smoot. Yes.

General McCoy. You have no trouble getting recruits for the National Guard?

Colonel Smoot. No trouble getting recruits, no, sir.

General McCoy. Your next duty is director of the Selective Service?

Colonel Smoot. Yes.

General McCoy. How has that worked out in regard to the personnel? What is your feeling of security about them?

Colonel Smoot. That is a dual question. First of all, 60% of those we have inducted, or 2,483, have been Japanese, while only 30% of our registrations are Japanese. So you see that we have inducted almost twice as many as the registration showed.

The reason for that is that the Japanese are more available for induction. Of course, you understand that the Selective Service allows many exemptions and deferments for key men in industry and those directly in the national defense, construction and operation, and so on.

So, ever since the Selective Service has been in operation in Hawaii, since October, 1940, there has been a tremendous amount of national defense projects, construction work, and so on. It goes down even to the small shops in town where subcontracts are allotted to those places, with the result that the key men in all them, all types of industry, are not Japanese. They are others, the Japanese not being used to any extent in national defense projects. So that leaves them available for induction because they do not have any reason to be deferred.

General McCoy. To what organization have most of them been assigned.

Colonel Smoot. To the Second National Guard regiment in the federal service.

General McCoy. They are no longer under your command?

Colonel Smoot. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do they form a part of a regular division?

Colonel Smoot. Yes.

General McCoy. Which one is that?

Colonel Smoot. One of them is the 24th Division and the other was called the 25th Division, but was recently released because it now garrisons all outlying islands.

General McCoy. Is there a considerable number of Japanese reserve officers in this area?

Colonel Smoot. Yes.

General McCoy. Would you say the majority of the officers are Japanese?

Colonel Smoot. No, sir. I would say perhaps 30 to 40%.

General McCoy. Have you talked to their commanding generals at any time about them?

Colonel Smoot. Yes, frequently.

General McCoy. Have you given any warnings to them or have they consulted you about the loyalty of those people?

Colonel Smoot. It comes up constantly, and they seem to think those they have are loyal.

[1741] General McCoy. Do you think so?

Colonel Smoot. Only as long as the United States is in the ascendancy.

General McCoy. What is the nature of your home guard?

Colonel Smoot. It is a mixture of all races here, formed on one day, you might say, on the 7th of December. Thirty-eight percent are Japanese. They are mostly youngsters from the schools, being from 18 to 21; those in the high schools and the university.

General McCoy. Are the officers mixed about the same proportion?

Colonel Smoot. No, sir, we have two Japanese officers out of 89.

General McCoy. Is the home guard on duty in connection with safeguarding utilities?

Colonel Smoot. Yes, that is their main objective. Their mission is anti-sabotage.

General McCoy. In other words, you would be using a considerable number of Japanese soldiers in action against sabotage by other Japanese?

Colonel Smoot. Yes, that is so, except that we never place any guard of Japanese—if it is six men we never have more than two Japanese at any installation.

General McCoy. Do most of these soldiers speak English?

Colonel Smoot. Yes, all of them. They are people raised here and are American citizens, and are well known among the other schoolmates.

General McCoy. That is all.

Admiral Reeves. No questions.

General McNarney. No questions.

Admiral Standley. We appreciate your coming before us. We are cautioning all witnesses not to discuss their testimony or to discuss anything that has happened before this Commission.

Colonel Smoot. Yes.

[1742] Admiral Standley. We will adjourn now until 9 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken until tomorrow, Friday, January 9, 1942, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.)

[1743]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1744] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

FRIDAY, JANUARY 9, 1942

SUITE 300, ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Honolulu, T. H.

The Commission reconvened at 10:40 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel is recalled.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED STATES NAVY—Recalled

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you have in mind the chief of staff's telegram of December 7 which did not reach you until a day or two after the action here?

Admiral KIMMEL. The afternoon of the action, as I recall it now, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The afternoon of the action. After.

Admiral KIMMEL. After.

The CHAIRMAN. Too late to be of any use?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[1745] The CHAIRMAN. Now, having in mind the contents of that message, which General Short was ordered to bring to your attention immediately, would the information contained in that message have made any difference in your dispositions to meet a possible air raid? It is a pretty hard question to answer, I know.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I can answer that very readily. I scarcely read the message. I don't recall what was in it.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, briefly, what was in it was this: that it was believed that the Japanese would give an ultimatum at 1 o'clock Washington time, which would have been somewhere around 6:30 your time, and that the Japanese Embassy was destroying its code machines. That is the effect of it, I think.

Would that have spelled a probable air raid on the same morning, to your mind, if you had read it, with the background and with everything else that you had here?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't know that it would spell an air raid on this place, but I am sure that we would have taken steps to do all we could if we had received such a message as that.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that there probably would have been an alert ordered?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I am going to ask you about—

Admiral KIMMEL. Well—

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead.

Admiral KIMMEL. I want to make clear that I have not studied the message.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. But I paid very little attention to it because it was of no use to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly.

[1746] Admiral KIMMEL. And your explanation of it is all that I remember of it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, the other question I want to ask you is: You have in mind this message that was sent by the Japanese Consul here on the 3d in which he advised the Japanese authorities in Japan that they were setting up a series of signals—offshore signals by lights, and what not—that would indicate which ships were in the harbor and out of the harbor on the 4th, 5th, and 6th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if that message had been brought to you the day it was sent, on the 3d, would that have spelled to you the necessity for a different disposition of your forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. Unquestionably.

The CHAIRMAN. Those are the questions I wanted to ask you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Unquestionably.

The CHAIRMAN. I am asking you after the fact what you would have mentally done if you had got those messages.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you see the reason for my inquiry.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You didn't get either of these messages.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that is the thing we are worried about.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. If I had known that the Japanese Consul out here was sending such messages, if I had known the contents of the code messages which we afterwards translated, I would have—well, I would have immediately reported it to Washington and considered it almost equivalent to a declaration of war.

The CHAIRMAN. This, by the way, is the Chief of Staff's message that was to have been brought to your attention in time and was not (handing a document to the witness).

[1747] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I think we would have acted on that. I think there is no question but what we would have acted on that.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all I wanted to ask you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because I thought it fair to you to get your reaction if you had got the warnings which were intended for you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Or which you might have gotten.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Has anyone any other questions?

(There was no response.)

The CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to clear up that point before we finished.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN JOHN BAYLISS EARLE, UNITED STATES NAVY, CHIEF OF STAFF 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT

(The oath was administred in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name and rank and duty to the reporter?

Captain EARLE. John Bayliss Earle, Captain U. S. N., Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you ask the questions, Admiral?

Admiral STANDLEY. What duties were you performing on the night of December 6 and the morning of December 7, Captain?

Captain EARLE. Chief of Staff 14th Naval District.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you receive a message concerning [1748] submarine activities off the entrance of Pearl Harbor on the morning of December 7? And if so, state what the message was and the circumstances attending it.

Captain EARLE. About seven-ten or -twelve approximately—I don't remember the definite time—I received a telephone message from the operations duty officer in the District Staff Headquarters that he had received a message from the U. S. S. WARD, which was on channel patrol, to the effect that he had fired on and attacked a submarine. I got the impression at the time that the submarine had fired at him. I immediately called up—I immediately—I told the duty officer to get in touch with the ready-duty destroyer and send her out at once and to get ahold of the operations officer, and then I called up Admiral Bloch and notified him of the circumstances.

Admiral STANDLEY. How long did it take you to get the message to Admiral Bloch?

Captain EARLE. Not more than three or four minutes; two or three minutes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any doubt in your mind as to the validity of this report?

Captain EARLE. Well, my first impression was that it was just another one of these false reports which had been coming in off and on for a period of some years—not—for a period of a year. We had been having many false reports of submarines in the outlying waters, but this seemed to be a little bit more serious. Apparently there had been an actual attack made. Up to this time our previous experience had been with submarines that eventually failed. In other words, I don't recall of ever having fired either depth charges or anything else at a submarine prior to this episode.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you informed of a message also from the WARD saying that she had picked up a sampan and was towing her in?

Captain EARLE. I was.

[1749] Admiral STANDLEY. Did that have any bearing on the other message?

Captain EARLE. Well, that cleared it up in my mind. In other words, I couldn't understand, if it had been a serious situation, why the WARD was proceeding now apparently to leave her post without any particular fear and escorting a sampan to Honolulu.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were you informed at the time of the—at the time you received this message were you told of the time of the attack?

Captain EARLE. I didn't quite get it.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the time you received this message were you also informed of the time of the attack? I understand the message was coded and had to be decoded. Were you informed at seven-ten or -twelve, when you received the message, that the attack had occurred at 6:30 or 6:33?

Captain EARLE. No, sir; I was just told the message: attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. That they had attacked a submarine. And that was received at 7:12?

Captain EARLE. About somewhere around that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. About 7:10 or 7:12.

Captain, as Chief of Staff of the 14th Naval District you would have been informed of any defects of facilities, and so forth, on the station, would you not?

Captain EARLE. Not necessarily.

Admiral STANDLEY. Communications. In the communications facilities, for example?

Captain EARLE. Very probably. I wouldn't be able to say definitely, but that would be the idea. If it were a major failure I certainly should get some information about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the communication duty officer who made this report to you the 14th District duty officer?

[1750] Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he would have been under your authority?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Under your command?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you received any reports from the officer in charge of that post of the lack of facilities to carry on the duties of that post?

Captain EARLE. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. As far as you know, there had been no complaint that the facilities there and the personnel were not effective or sufficient?

Captain EARLE. That's right. No report had been made.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was any action taken on this submarine report, as to alerting the station or alerting or giving the information to the proper authorities to alert the station and the area, prior to the dropping of the bombs by the planes?

Captain EARLE. Only that the duty officer was told, and he informed me that he had informed the duty officer and Commander-in-Chief Pacific staff of the circumstances and that my immediate superior had been informed. Outside of that, so far as I know—

Admiral STANDLEY (interposing). But no action was taken?

Captain EARLE. —there were no other steps taken except to send the—

Admiral STANDLEY. But no action was taken.

Captain EARLE. —to send the ready-duty destroyer out.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Anything further, gentlemen?

General MCCOY. What was the alarm signal at the Navy Yard for an airplane attack?

Captain EARLE. One long blast, about 25 seconds, I guess, and one short one of about five seconds.

[1751] General MCCOY. Who was to give that alarm?

Captain EARLE. Given through the duty officer in the Headquarters Staff to the power plant.

General MCCOY. Did he give the alarm?

Captain EARLE. I never heard it if that alarm was given.

General MCCOY. You never heard the alarm itself?

Captain EARLE. I never heard it.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was an air alarm, was it?

Captain EARLE. Air? No, it was the regular big whistle on the power plant.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that an alarm for air, or was it for submarine attack?

Captain EARLE. That was an alarm for air.

Admiral STANDLEY. Air.

Captain EARLE. There was no submarine alarm.

General MCCOY. You don't know whether that actually was given by the power plant?

Captain EARLE. I do not.

General MCCOY. Were you familiar with the setup in the duty officer's center as to giving quick notice to responsible officers?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

General MCCOY. What was it? Do you remember?

Captain EARLE. As I recall, they had a special switchboard there which could be reached—all the responsible officers. They had a man on telephone watch, and they had this officer on watch at the same time with an assistant.

General MCCOY. Do you know who was with him that morning?

Captain EARLE. I do not recall. Lieutenant Commander Kaminski was the duty officer, but I do not remember.

General McCoy. Was the enlisted man on duty there supposed to be a regular sailor of the Navy?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would it have been possible that it was [1752] a Hawaiian?

Captain EARLE. Well, we have Hawaiians in the Navy at this post. It might have been so; I couldn't say.

General McCoy. Do you know whether there were teletype machines there for the purpose of quick spreading of information?

Captain EARLE. There are teletype machines there.

General McCoy. What was the purpose of that, of the teletype?

Captain EARLE. To pass the word quickly to the Army and to the various—

General McCoy. To all concerned?

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know whether that was used?

Captain EARLE. I do not know.

General McCoy. Had it ever been used?

Captain EARLE. Been used? I am a little bit doubtful because there has so much taken place since this thing occurred that it's possible that my recollection may be colored by that, but my recollection is that they were available and had been used, and primarily for training purposes; in other words, to make sure that the operators were being trained on these things all the time. There was a considerable communication going on on these teletype machines all the time, to such an extent that we had even called attention at times to the fact that they were getting too conversational.

General McCoy. I have no further questions.

Admiral STANDLEY. Captain, during drills and exercises and during working hours, and so forth, was this station fully manned?

Captain EARLE. It was manned to the same extent, these two officers and the telephone operator at night, and during drills it was fully manned with all the officers available, including all the teletype operators.

[1753] Admiral STANDLEY. Then, the situation was a situation for at night when the station was ordinarily closed and the other duty officers were not there?

Captain EARLE. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. I haven't anything further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Captain. Please observe the caution not to discuss what has been testified here with anyone.

Captain EARLE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anybody else, Mr. Howe?

Mr. HOWE. I believe there is a Mr. Butler out there.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Bring in Mr. Butler.

Will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF BERNARD J. BUTLER

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Give your full name and address to the reporter, please.

Mr. BUTLER. Bernard J. Butler. I live at Paia, Maui.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you attended the Naval Academy, did you not, Mr. Butler?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. They found me physically deficient in my eyes, and I had to leave.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your business?

Mr. BUTLER. I am in the pineapple business on the island of Maui, and then my activity in the business is such that I put back and forth between Maui and Honolulu, and the mainland also. As a matter of fact, I should be in Washington now under normal course of events.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you on the island of Maui on the morning of December 7?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you describe what occurred there [1754] according to your observation?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, I was at home working in the garden and talking with my youngsters, and so on, and about 11 o'clock the phone rang and said it was an emergency call. I happen to be a member of what they call the Major Disaster Council on Maui, and there was an emergency call for a meeting at 11 o'clock in Wailuku, and I asked the man why, and he said, "Have you listened on the radio?"

And I said, "No, I haven't."

And he said, "Well, you better do it, because there is an attack on Pearl Harbor," which I immediately attributed to a—I thought we had simply put the whole thing to a major trial spin, so to speak.

I turned the radio on, and about a few minutes later the phone rang again, and my boy is a Boy Scout, and they were getting all the Boy Scouts together. I listened to the radio for a while and heard what they had to say, and went down to this Disaster Council, and then Colonel Lyman, who was the Army commander there, reported that this had gone on, and we heard the Governor's address, and it all became apparent that it was a fact that this attack had taken place.

Of course the Council or the whole situation attempted to swing into action. The provisional police was called out to take their duties and guard posts that had been planned for them, which they had never been on before, incidentally; it was the first shot.

The CHAIRMAN. What military force was there on Maui before?

Mr. BUTLER. There was a battalion of what was the National Guard, the 298th or '99th—I forget which—in addition to the—there is a fleet detachment base there with a squadron of—a service squadron, VJ-3, on duty there.

The CHAIRMAN. How many Japanese were there in that home guard? What is the proportion?

[1755] Mr. BUTLER. In the provincial police; oh, I don't know. There was no effort—

General McCoy. With reference to the military organization.

The CHAIRMAN. This 298.

Mr. BUTLER. Oh, yes. I see. I think between 25 and 30%. Many of these men in the 298th I think were made up from draftees that had been in here, and they built up the thing when they moved it back.

The rest of the men were regular residents of Maui. I mean they just came home, so to speak.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you inquire?

Admiral STANDLEY. Mr. Butler, how long have you been associated with the business in Maui?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, ever since I have lived there, for eight years.

Admiral STANDLEY. Eight years?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is your estimate and opinion of the loyalty of the Japanese? First let me ask you this: How many Japanese are there in the island of Maui?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, the island of Maui has 47,000 people, and I should say that 35 to 37% of those were of Japanese extraction.

Admiral Standley. How many Filipinos have you there? Less Japanese?

Mr. BUTLER. Japanese predominate.

Admiral Standley. Predominate on Maui?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. I wouldn't estimate the number of Filipinos. They are predominant in agriculture labor. There is very little Japanese agriculture labor there. There are some of these that are machinists and mechanics.

Admiral STANDLEY. They are not in the truck—

Mr. BUTLER (interposing). There are a great many of them, but they are not doing basic agriculture work. That is, the men that are cutting the cane and hauling the cane, and so on, [1756] are predominant. I don't suppose throughout the territory that you could muster up a gang of men—cane cutters or what not—of Japanese extraction, to save your life. They just don't do that any more. They are nearly all Filipinos. However, the men who operate the caneloaders and mechanical devices, and so on, are usually Japanese, not Filipinos.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, what is your estimate of the loyalty of the Japanese: that is, the potential loyalty or future loyalty of the Japanese on the island of Maui?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, I have often recorded this opinion, on many occasions. First let me preface my remark with the fact that I was born in San Francisco and in an atmosphere of great intolerance toward the Japanese, and when I came down here I had no faith in them whatsoever. I had nothing to do with them; I didn't want to have anything to do with them. But my work was of such a nature that I was thrown into intimate contact with them, and I found myself, without intending to or without knowing I was doing it, subconsciously differentiating between them as to individuals. I found myself no longer generalizing, and I have found now that there are Japanese that I know whom I have implicit and utmost faith in, and there are ones I wouldn't trust around the corner, just as there are white men that I have faith in and others that I wouldn't trust around the corner. But I mean it's come—I have been so close with them, working with them, and my work has been in operation of canning factories in which predominantly we have Japanese, both men and women, and obviously you get to know individuals and you commence to differentiate on an individual basis.

I believe that of the—and I speak now of the Hawaiian-born, that is the citizen, Japanese—I am of the opinion that you can depend

upon a very great majority of them. I think that I wouldn't hesitate at all in my own thinking and operation or discriminate against them because they are Japanese, [1757] from the standpoint of loyalty.

On the other hand, the older men, the aliens, those who couldn't become citizens in any case, and came here from Japan, I would be chary about. I would expect that they wouldn't be loyal. I mean I would go on that as a premise.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, these American Japanese that you speak of are the children, largely, of the older Japanese who are still attached to the mother country, aren't they?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes; that is correct; that is, generally speaking.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. BUTLER. Of course some of them, there has been a complete severance, but there is a great deal of that.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite. Now, what according to your understanding is the authority of the head of the family in the Japanese setup?

Mr. BUTLER. Fundamentally it is the parent. There is no question of the influence of the parent, both the mother and father, on the child. There is a filial loyalty that we don't understand and can't appreciate unless you see it operate. But I believe this: there is evidence, to my mind, that there has been a very steady buildup of conflict between the younger generation and the older generation Japanese here in the past ten years. You can—oh, you can see it in their social life; you can see it in the control of their various and sundry associations, the lack of participation on the part of the older people in younger people's—oh, social life, and so on, the resistance on the part of the younger or the American-born Japanese to sending their children to the language schools. Most of them don't want to send them to them, and they resist, but they permit the parents to force them to do it, and they are always resisting it more and more. Even 20 years ago that wasn't so true, but it is much more so now; there is a conflict.

[1758] Admiral STANDLEY. What if there was a landing on the island of Maui of Japanese in force? Do you think that these citizen Japanese could be depended upon to defend the island against the Japanese?

Mr. BUTLER. I think a great majority of them could be depended upon to take arms against—I think would take arms against them, if their statements to me, the many of them that have talked to me, are any criteria.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there any disturbance among the Japanese and Filipinos in Maui?

Mr. BUTLER. Not now. There potentially is from the Filipino standpoint, not the Japanese standpoint. The Filipinos?

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke a moment ago of the Japanese occupying the technical positions or positions above labor status. What is your estimate of the skill of the Japanese generally?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, there again I must differentiate on an individual basis. There are some—we have Japanese in our employ, machinists and so on, who are as highly skilled as any man you would find anywhere in the world: they have initiative; they have skill; they are inventors. And on the other hand we have some that are as dumb and thick-headed as anybody you would find in the world.

Admiral STANDLEY. I don't think I have any more questions.

The CHAIRMAN. General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. Nothing.

The CHAIRMAN. General?

General MCCOY. Have you any fear of invasion on the part of the Japanese?

Mr. BUTLER. I wouldn't use the word "fear," but I would use the word "apprehension." We have had two very cursory attacks from Japanese sources on Maui. Submarines have come [1759] in on two different occasions and without any resistance or retaliation have shelled the place; and obviously, with that occurring on two different occasions with no retaliation, why, it's quite natural that you would be somewhat apprehensive of the situation on account of lack of defense.

General MCCOY. What do you suppose they shelled Maui for?

Mr. BUTLER. It seemed their—in each case the objective seemed to have been ships tied up in Kahului Harbor. It so happened on the first attack—it was about sundown of December 15—they laid five shells into our factory, knocked the stack down, put a hole in the roof. We were able to plot those shells and able to get off a course of flight on them and get the approximate position of the submarine from the sights that were taken on it, and we were simply in the line of fire of a ship that was tied up in the harbor, which was just preparing to put to sea, and his last shot hit the pier right at the—I mean the beam of the ship and didn't hit it, and the submarine then left.

The other night—the other was on a moonlight night about 2 in the morning, and there were two ships tied up, and this time they were out further, and he had a better peg at the ships; I mean the other way the pier was in the way, and this way he was more shooting at them, but his shooting wasn't very accurate in either case.

General MCCOY. One attack was on the 15th, and the other when?

Mr. BUTLER. A week ago Tuesday, the 30th.

General MCCOY. How quickly did American ships arrive as a result of that?

Mr. BUTLER. None arrived that I know of. The next morning there were some.

General MCCOY. Any planes, bombing planes come over?

Mr. BUTLER. No.

[1760] General MCCOY. Did you give the alarm—

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

General MCCOY. —to the military and naval authorities here?

Mr. BUTLER. Well, the first night the alarm was sounded immediately. I mean the thing was observed quickly from all these various and sundry lookouts that were reported. Colonel Lyman, commanding officer of that district, was on his way to make an address to the populace of the island over the police radio. Well, that interrupted that, and he made an effort to communicate to Honolulu the fact that the attack was on. The only means he had was the police radio. I mean he broadcast it to the world, you might say, over the police radio; that was the only means of communicating. And it was immediately transmitted also to the air base at Puunene where this VJ-3 was, and unfortunately the commanding officer—nobody could be found. They

were up on the mountain about 20 miles away, and it almost required the services of a search party to find them. Of course by that time the submarine was gone, and it would have been gone anyhow.

General McCoy. Who were these officers?

Mr. BUTLER. A man named South was in command.

General McCoy. Of the Army?

Mr. BUTLER. Navy. The Army is the lieutenant colonel—Lieutenant Lyman.

General McCoy. What does the Navy base there consist of?

Mr. BUTLER. It's a service squadron of ships as far as I know; I am not familiar with it. It is attached to the fleet and—

General McCoy. Are they hydroplanes?

Mr. BUTLER. There were none there then. There were only observation and reconnaissance planes as far as I know. Subsequently and before the next attack took place bombers were based there and are based there now. I saw them as I left [1761] Maui. But in the second attack—in the case of the second attack they didn't get in the air, either.

Admiral REEVES. You mentioned that these planes were VJ planes?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That means service squadron?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. It was a service squadron, as I understand; not combat planes.

Admiral REEVES. That is what I wanted to ask.

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. These planes were not armed? They had no guns or bombs?

Mr. BUTLER. On the first occasion. On the second occasion they were armed; there were armed planes there.

Another thing of interest to note indicating somewhat of the confusion that is existing here: in the case of this second attack, in an effort to communicate the fact to headquarters here in Honolulu, Colonel Lyman had to use the inter-island telephone—he had no other means of communication at the time—and the censor cut him off.

The CHAIRMAN. That is a radio telephone?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes, a public telephone. I mean as soon as he started talking about ships and firing the censor cut him off. So there we were without means of communication, and he was obviously very much put off, and he was desirous of having some means of communication here that he could depend on and that he wouldn't be cut off on, but he couldn't—

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any notion why the planes didn't get into the air from Maui on the second attack?

Mr. BUTLER. Maybe they weren't warm, or I don't know, but the personnel was informed and there was an officer in charge. Whether he felt that he should take the initiative and do it or not I don't know. It was 2 o'clock in the morning. It was a full moonlight night. I don't know whether flying conditions would warrant it or not; I couldn't

Admiral STANDLEY. Whom did those bombers belong to? tell; I don't know. [1762] But I do know none got in the air.

Mr. BUTLER. Those, the Navy.

Admiral STANDLEY. Those were Navy bombers?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. They belonged to the Navy?

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. As far as I know, there is no Army aircraft over there at all. The field was being expanded for that and is now in course of construction.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you made a report of these circumstances to the authorities here in Pearl Harbor?

Mr. BUTLER. I did that two weeks ago, yes. As a matter of fact, I came over here—not two weeks ago. I came over here the 28th of December. The people on Maui were, as I say, apprehensive after this first attack and particularly after the landing of the LAHAINA survivors. Those were those men who were in that torpedoed ship. They came along the coast one night sending up Very lights and flares, and they were observed, and we had no means absolutely of investigating them, no craft, no boats or anything else, and they came up on the beach in the morning, and everybody was disturbed. So I came over here to see if some representations couldn't be made to build up the defense, realizing of course the stress and the circumstances and the difficulty of so doing. That's about all that has occurred so far as concerns military activities on that island, but another phase of it that is of interest—may I do this without being questioned?—is the degree of confusion that exists in all of our preparations and activities. It is confused there and has been for some time, and I came over here to sort of try to find out what might be done to straighten it out so we could get on a firm basis; but I found that condition over there is amateurish in comparison with the condition that is here. They are professionals here.

There doesn't seem to be any forthright, direct leadership [1763] in this whole thing somehow, and everyone there is fearsome of it and decrying it and hopeful that—and it doesn't apply—I mean that is civilian population as well as anybody else. I don't think there is any leadership at all. We are not getting it, and people are wanting to do things, and many people realize the seriousness of the situation; many don't, I don't believe. They don't appreciate it. But many do, and there seems to be no cooperation; there seems to be no getting together on the thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you please give an instance of what you have in mind of Honolulu? You spoke of it I believe this morning.

Mr. BUTLER. Oh, yes. For instance, the—yesterday? You have in mind something in connection with this labor?

Admiral STANDLEY. I have in mind the question of the laborers unloading those transports.

Mr. BUTLER. Yes. Well, there has been a great deal of effort on the part of the Army to get labor ready to handle various things here, and representations were made to have men in from plantations here to unload transports yesterday. A great many men came in. They loaded them into trucks and piled them in here, and they got here in the morning and they waited all day long. I happened to see them leave at 4 o'clock in the afternoon. No ships had come; nobody knew anything about it. There seemed to be a lack of information. The Army people said they would be there and they needed the men, and lo and behold no ships turned up at all.

Well, that is perhaps understandable. On the other hand, a movement of ships of that size, it would seem that information would be

available to make a little more definite planning and not have that waste of time, effort, and men's tempers, and so on.

There is another phase of it that perhaps has not occurred, but it indicates to the men that are being handled that way the [1764] amount of confusion that exists. And then we have every night coming from Tokyo a broadcaster who is throwing out a lot of lurid, wild propaganda; and his propaganda, fitting in with events like that, ties up and will take. There is going to be a shaking of confidence if one—one of two things has got to occur. The broadcast has got to be cut out. But better than that, we have got to get some plan and cooperation. It seems to me that many—and I am looking at it entirely from outside, but I have been running around here for a week trying to get something done—that there have been assigned men to work and to jobs that are round pegs in square holes. I mean here is a man and here is a job: put the two together, rather than saying, "Is this man qualified to fill this job? Can he do it?" It seems to me that maybe there is a lack of comprehension of the magnitude of the administrative job that is necessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do you mean that the Army men and the Navy men who are assigned to these jobs don't seem to know their jobs?

Mr. BUTLER. No, I don't say all of them, but too many of them don't. I mean rather than a man in an administrative job whose immediate detail before has been with combat troops—well, the type of administration, it strikes me, is a little bit different.

You find a man who—oh, maybe he is put in the job as a food administrator, and he is probably an old fussbudget that you can get nowhere with: he has no imagination, and he's all tied up in red tape. You have just got them. It takes a week to try to get anything done at all.

Just as an example, one of the problems I came over here on was this question of food and supply of food to the outlying islands, quite a vital thing. What I had to do was quite simple. I got over here last Sunday. I haven't got the answer yet, and I have been camping in that capitol ground pegging away at people all the time, and I still haven't got [1765] the answer. We still don't know what to expect or what we can do. I mean either do something—I mean it doesn't make any difference, if we can just know one way or the other, but we can't find out, and everybody says, "Well, somebody else knows, and somebody else knows," and pretty soon you are right around in a circle and have gotten nowhere, and personally I am alarmed about the situation. I think something drastic ought to be done somehow or some way.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Butler.

Mr. BUTLER. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't discuss outside what your testimony has been.

Mr. BUTLER. I won't.

Colonel BROWN. Admiral Pye will be here about 12:20. He is leaving the Navy Yard at 10 minutes to 12.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Thereupon there was a brief, informal recess, at the conclusion of which the proceedings were resumed as follows:)

[1766] **TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM SATTERLEE
PYE, UNITED STATES NAVY, COMMANDER BATTLE FORCE,
UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET—Recalled**

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, when you were before the Commission here last week we asked you some questions in regard to the expedition for the relief of Wake, and you gave us an answer stating that you had received a message from the Department saying that the relief of Wake was not necessary—I have forgotten just what terms we used—but that in addition to that telegram there were other instructions that actuated you in calling that expedition off.

The Commission would like to hear what those reasons were, if you feel you could disclose them.

Admiral PYE. I think the best thing to do would be to read my estimate that I made on that day. This was written immediately after I made the decision, in order to put on record the thoughts I had.

Admiral REEVES. Before you do that, Admiral, I wonder if you could just rehearse the substance of the dispatch from the Department in Washington.

Admiral PYE. I have quoted in here the various dispatches, but the one to which Admiral Standley refers is:

Wake is considered a liability.

There were other words in there.

Admiral STANDLEY. This is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral PYE (reading):

Discussion of decision to retire task forces 14 and 11.

Admiral REEVES. This is the estimate?

Admiral PYE. This I wrote within two hours after I gave the order in order to have my decision on record. Also, all [1767] these facts had been talked over with my Chief of Staff and also the members of my staff. The decision had to be hastily made because Wake that day had been landed upon and there was no possibility at that time to continue the relief of Wake. Therefore a decision was necessary.

(Continuing reading:)

General Situation:

Commanding General does not consider Hawaiian Islands safe from a major attack and consequently until it is adequately reinforced by the Army or by an increase in naval forces the maintenance of present naval strength in the form of task groups is of primary consideration.

At the time the operation against the Marshalls was projected the Army had expressed no concern for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands even in the absence of the Fleet. It was, however, natural to assume, before the loss of the battleships, that the Fleet would be operating in force to the Westward of these Islands and would afford adequate protection against operations in force by the enemy in this vicinity.

At the time the operation against the Marshalls was planned, of which I was the strongest advocate, the latest available information indicated the probability that the carriers which attacked Oahu were returning to the Japanese Mainland or rejoining the combined Fleet. Later information beginning about 16 December indicated one and possibly two carrier divisions were in the Marshalls or vicinity. Greatly augmented air activity and reinforcements were noted. The frequent bombing of Wake by heavy land-based bombers in-

licated a land base at Enewitok or Rongelap. The total absence of the facts of enemy [1768] developments in the Marshalls made it most difficult to correctly estimate the capacity of the enemy. It may be assumed that the bombers which have constantly bombed Wake can fly at least 900 miles if on an attack mission if they do not return. It is apparent from their past actions that the enemy will take such action if by so doing they could sink a carrier. An operation to bomb the Marshalls was one which the enemy would anticipate and prepare for, if possible. Radar intelligence and intercepted plain-language messages indicated such preparation. In view, therefore, of the improbability of surprise, I on 20 December reluctantly abandoned the proposed attack by Task Force Eleven on the Marshalls and ordered that task force to proceed to the northward to support Task Force 14. Certain restrictions in operating areas were placed upon the Task Forces 14 and 8 in order to prevent their interference with each other, as both were on radio silence.

The loss of battleship strength, the absence of bases and uncertainty of fueling at sea, has made operation far to the westward a most difficult undertaking. Ships at sea must not run low in fuel as at most any time the channel to Pearl Harbor may be permanently blocked. Because of this possibility it is essential that one tanker with adequate fuel be maintained at sea. This reduces the rate of transportation of fuel oil from the Coast.

It will be at least the 10th of February before seven battleships could be made available in the vicinity of Pearl and probably the first of April before the two new battleships on the West Coast [1769] can be made available to the Fleet if so ordered.

The fall of Wake will relieve enemy forces operating there for further activity against the islands of the southern route such as Canton, Samoa and Christmas Islands, or against Midway.

Midway will be harder to take than Wake because it is better supplied and armed, has a radar and bombing planes and is probably outside of the bombing range of shore-based planes even from Wake; is at least as far from any enemy base as it is from Pearl from which it can be supported by VP and Army bomber planes, and by Fleet task groups.

Samoa at present cannot be held against a major effort of the enemy but it is doubtful if such an effort can be made at present. The most probable action against Samoa appears to be a move via the Gilberts and Canton. Canton is only lightly held by a company of Army Engineers without AA guns of other artillery. From Canton, supposing it to be completed by the enemy as a landing field, Samoa can be bombed as was done at Wake. However, the operations of our task forces in this vicinity are on a basis of near equality in distance from a base, with that of the enemy task forces.

Restrictions were also imposed upon the carrier and cruisers of Task Force 8 after it was learned that Wake had been bombed by carrier planes.

I might explain here that that restriction was that they were not to proceed closer than 200 miles to Wake.

Upon the return from Wake of the VP plane sent there [1770] with information as to the attack at relief, the situation at Wake seemed to warrant taking a greater chance to effect its reinforcement even at the sacrifice of the Tangier and possible damage to some major ships of the Task Force 14. The restrictions on Task Force 14 operations were therefore removed and restrictions on operating areas of Task Forces 11 and 8 modified to permit closer support.

Early on the 22nd information was received of ships in the vicinity of Wake indicating probable landing operation. This was later confirmed. Troops ashore and outcome doubtful. This evidence of a planned expedition indicated strongly that the enemy had estimated closely the probable date of our proposed attempt at relief, and that in such an operation it seems probable that plans would be made to trap, if possible, any relief force which attempted to come to the relief of Wake.

It immediately raised the question: With present enemy activity, can Wake be relieved or evacuated? The answer was unquestionable—No. Assuming Task 14 about 500 miles away, could it conduct air attack on enemy forces in vicinity of Wake which could save it? The answer again was, No. One such attack might destroy enemy transports and light forces, but except for morale value would or could do little to support Wake. The Wake relief expedition was a desperate move to give reinforcements to the gallant defenders, and I was willing, if no enemy activity other than bombing was in progress, to sacrifice the Tangier and several destroyers in the attempt.

When, however, it was apparent that the appearance [1771] of carrier planes over Wake could not save it but would give the enemy the information that one of our carriers was in the vicinity, a different situation was presented.

The enemy expedition against Wake was a definitely planned expedition. Had we been planning a similar expedition, we unquestionably would have placed strong forces in position to locate and attack any relief expedition. It is reasonable to suppose that with available forces such dispositions had been made.

Navy Department's Attitude:

Although upon making the report of proposed activities to bomb the Marshalls and relieve Wake, the Navy Department stated that it heartily concurred, showing an approval of an offensive attitude, almost every idea expressed by the Department before and since has been purely defensive in character, namely:

1. Knox is not yet satisfied that Hawaiian Islands are safe from capture;
2. Seems questionable that Midway can be retained, but it is hoped that Johnston, Palmyra, and Samoa may be;
3. CNO considers it possible for Japanese carriers again to raid;
4. Japanese carrier strength such that you cannot guarantee that landings cannot be made on outlying islands;
5. Because of success of Japanese raid it is expected to be followed up promptly by additional raids;
6. Wake is a liability.

The question immediately arose: Should Task Force 14 be ordered to attack the enemy forces in the [1772] vicinity of Wake? If so, should other task forces be ordered to support, or should all task forces be withdrawn?

From the point of view of the local situation, everything pointed to the first chance to damage the enemy in naval action. Such action would comply with the spirit of the offensive and might conceivably result in considerable loss to the enemy. To fail to support the gallant defense of Wake seemed pusillanimous and could we spare the force that might conceivably be lost, it would have been.

From the broader point of view, the situation was different. To insure the defense of other points, even the Hawaiian Islands, it was necessary to conserve our forces. If there was a chance to surprise the enemy, quite a risk was justifiable provided it led to a reasonable hope of reinforcing Wake. Such reinforcement being impossible in view of the landing attack, the primary reason for the accepted risk had vanished.

There remained several factors favorable to an immediate attack: (1) It would show that there is some offensive spirit; (2) It might do considerable damage to the enemy in transports and light forces.

Against such attack there were the following factors:

1. The forces engaged in the attack on Wake were of types the loss of which would have little effect on the enemy's future operations;
2. The loss of ships of types constituting Task Force 14 would seriously decrease the effectiveness of our future operations;
3. If the damage done to each force resulted in the loss of a carrier it would be greatly to our [1773] disadvantage;
4. If Task Force 11 went to the support of Task Force 14, it might lead to a major action at nearly 2,000 miles from a single entrance base of limited industrial capacity.

While believing in the principle of the offensive and suffering with those at Wake, I could not but decide that the general situation overbalanced the special tactical situation, and that under the conditions the risk of even one task force to damage the enemy at Wake was unjustifiable. I therefore directed Task Forces 14 and 11 to retire and Task Force 8 to cover the Wright enroute to Midway.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the Department informed of that decision?

Admiral PYE. Not in such detail.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were they informed of the decision?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has there been any reaction from the Department to that?

Admiral PYE. There was a dispatch asking me to state the considerations that led me to make that decision.

Admiral STANDLEY. There has been no word from the Department?

Admiral PYE. I sent the dispatch, but there has been no word.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the dispatch did you give, in general, the reasons for your action?

Admiral PYE. Yes, in general. I stated that they landed on Wake, and I stated in substance this same attitude of the Department. I also stated the difficulties that we would have [1774] had the task force become involved in the loss of ships, and that the general situation, in my mind, overweighed the tactical situation at that time.

I would say that Admiral Draemel, whom I had appointed as Chief of Staff as soon as I became temporary Commander-in-Chief, was fully in accord with my decision.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had two staffs at that time, practically?

Admiral PYE. Well, we had to combine them, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was there any officer on that combined staff who opposed your decision?

Admiral PYE. I think Captain McMorris was in favor and I think Captain Smith. McMorris was War Plans Officer and Smith was the Operations Officer.

Admiral REEVES. Would you read that last answer?

(The last answer was read.)

Admiral REEVES. Were in favor of what?

Admiral PYE. Were in favor of directing Task Force 14 to attack the enemy forces near Wake.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were their opinions asked for and expressed at that time?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were given consideration by you in making your decision?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is all I have.

Admiral REEVES. Would you state the composition of the three task forces?

Admiral PYE. Task Force 11 was composed of the LEXINGTON, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.

To be perfectly certain I would have to check these, but I am stating them as best I recall.

Task Force 14 was composed of the SARATOGA, two heavy [1775] cruisers, the TANGIER, and seven destroyers.

Each of those task forces also had a tanker, but I do not recall their names.

Task Force 8 was composed of the ENTERPRISE, two heavy cruisers, and six destroyers, as I recall.

Admiral REEVES. Task Force 14 was the one sent direct to Wake?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. With respect to Task Force 8, where were they?

Admiral PYE. Task Force 8 had left here later than the others and was out in the direction of Midway. At the time that they might gone it, it would have been about 600 to 700 miles from Wake, and a little to the northward of the direct line.

Admiral REEVES. They were then 400 miles from the SARATOGA? That is, Task 14.

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. How far away was Task Force 11 at that time?

Admiral PYE. About the same distance but to the southward of Task Force 8.

Admiral REEVES. You said you had combat information on December 22nd of ships in the vicinity of Wake.

Admiral PYE. Yes. There was a dispatch sent from there earlier in the morning saying there were ships there.

Admiral REEVES. A dispatch from Wake?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Did they indicate the character of the ships?

Admiral PYE. No.

Admiral REEVES. Did you get any information regarding enemy ships in the vicinity of Wake from the radio intercepts?

[1776] Admiral PYE. No, sir, I do not recall, no, sir. The dispatch from Wake came in the morning when they said the enemy had landed and indicated that there were two destroyers aground, and I think one cruiser.

Admiral REEVES. Then from Wake you knew that two destroyers were aground and there were several transports attempting to land troops?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And one cruiser perhaps?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That was all that was within sight of Wake?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. You spoke of carrier planes at Wake. When did you get that information?

Admiral PYE. The carrier planes that bombed Wake the day before.

Admiral REEVES. They bombed Wake on the 21st of December?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Therefore you deducted that there was at least a carrier or perhaps two carriers within flying distance of Wake?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. You had no indication of other enemy ships? I mean direct information or indications.

Admiral PYE. Nothing other than since about the 16th of December there had been general radio intelligence that there were two carrier groups and three battleships and two cruiser divisions in that area. The exact locations were not given, but they were assumed to be in that general area, in the Mandate area.

Admiral REEVES. That was on December 16th?

Admiral PYE. With respect to the general intelligence, [1777] the first indication of that, as I recall it, was about the 16th that these carrier groups had not gone back to the Mainland but were in the Mandate area.

Admiral REEVES. The Mandate area is not Wake, is it?

Admiral PYE. No, sir, it is not Wake, but there was no other way to tell us where they were. We had no definite bearings on them.

Admiral REEVES. So you felt that you had information leading you to believe that there was this force somewhere in the Mandate Islands?

Admiral PYE. I felt the enemy was definitely aware that there was only one point where we could go to offer any relief, and that was Wake, and that if they had prepared an expedition to take Wake, they would also give it adequate support, and if our planes went in to attack Wake, when the ships visited at Wake, there would be our carrier without planes, and if it was located by the enemy carrier, we would probably suffer severely.

Admiral REEVES. As I understand the situation, you had fairly complete information indicating the presence at Wake or in its near vicinity of certain forces.

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. And those forces consisted of one or two carriers, two destroyers which had grounded, and transports landing troops, and a cruiser?

The CHAIRMAN. A battleship?

Admiral REEVES. No, a cruiser at Wake.

Admiral PYE. There was no positive evidence that there was a battleship at Wake.

Admiral REEVES. The list I have given is the list you had of the vessels that you felt justified in believing to be in the vicinity of Wake.

[1778] Admiral PYE. That is correct.

Admiral REEVES. And these battleships and other forces were somewhere in the Mandate but their location was not definitely known?

Admiral PYE. No, no information at all.

Admiral REEVES. You merely knew about the 16th of December that they were somewhere down in the Mandate Islands.

Admiral PYE. Yes, but we also had the radio intelligence that they had about the composition of the force that had been in the vicinity of Oahu area and that had been supported by battleships, and there were at least two cruiser groups; that is, heavy cruisers. Whether they were all together at this time, was unknown to me.

Admiral REEVES. This expedition was primarily for the relief of Wake. Did it occur to you to use this expedition in a surprise attack for the destruction of the enemy carriers that were known to be in the vicinity of Wake?

Admiral PYE. That was a possible use, but I felt that with the lack of intelligence that we had, there was an improbable chance of locating them.

Admiral REEVES. But you had definite information that a carrier was within flying distance of Wake on December 21st?

Admiral PYE. Yes, we had.

Admiral REEVES. Did you think that the carriers were still there, or that they had left there on the 22nd?

Admiral PYE. I believed they were in the vicinity some place, in the vicinity where they would be able to support the operations by the destroyers and the transports on Wake, and if the larger ships had left there it was probable that they would be able to get information of our carrier before we could get information on their carrier.

Admiral REEVES. They had no hint whatever of the presence [1779] of your carrier and the task force near Wake, had they?

Admiral PYE. But we can only assume their knowing that that was the only point in which we could hope to do anything, and that an attempt to reinforce Wake appeared to me to be a thing that the enemy would expect us to do.

Admiral REEVES. On the other hand you had fairly definite information that there were Japanese carriers in the vicinity of Wake?

Admiral PYE. Yes, within flying distance.

Admiral REEVES. Then do you think the element of surprise was in your favor or not?

Admiral PYE. No, personally, I do not think so, Admiral, because I think the enemy, as we discovered later, had anti-submarine vessels as far as 400 miles from Wake, and I believe that had I been in their place that I would have had submarines and destroyers at the same distance from Wake; but the probability of locating our carrier the next day would have been greater than the probability of our carrier locating them.

General McCoy. Had you any submarines in that vicinity at that time?

Admiral PYE. Yes. We had one.

General McCoy. Where was it?

Admiral PYE. It was to the northward; it was retiring to the southward.

Admiral REEVES. Did you not think that the destruction of the two enemy carriers would have been a very definite blow to the Japanese forces?

Admiral PYE. Unquestionably.

Admiral REEVES. You knew that in all probability there were two carriers there?

Admiral PYE. I did not know how many there were. I knew [1780] there was at least one carrier within flying range.

Admiral REEVES. Yes. But you felt that the risk of attack on this carrier under the circumstances was too great to take?

Admiral PYE. Because the intelligence that we had gave us the impression that there might be as many as four carriers. We were not certain of that.

Admiral REEVES. You said something in your estimate to the effect that the possible loss to the enemy would have been very trifling compared to the possible loss to our forces. Did you have in mind the carriers, or did you eliminate the possible danger to the carriers?

Admiral PYE. I think that is qualified by saying the attack on the vessels known to be in the vicinity of Wake.

Admiral REEVES. It would have been a trifling loss?

Admiral PYE. If we had got nothing except the ships that were in the immediate vicinity of Wake.

Admiral REEVES. If you had gotten the carriers that you had reason to believe were in the vicinity of Wake, don't you think that would have been useful?

Admiral PYE. Yes, sir; unquestionably. There is no question about that. But another thing I don't think you give any weight to is the fact that our carriers would have been within range of over 40 land bombers that we knew were available to them.

Admiral REEVES. Do you mean you think they had land bombers on Wake at that time?

Admiral PYE. No, but within flying range of where our carrier might have been.

Admiral REEVES. There would have been the problem of locating our carrier before they could bomb it.

Admiral PYE. That is perfectly true, and we would have the same problem in locating their carrier, except that if they got [1781] to us first, they would have 40 bombers.

Admiral REEVES. Did you direct the withdrawal of the expedition against Jaluit and the Gilbert Islands?

Admiral PYE. I did.

Admiral REEVES. I understand that was under the initiative of the Commander of Task Force 11?

Admiral PYE. No. He was allowed to initiate these orders which Admiral Kimmel gave him, but when this strengthening in the Mandates and the operations of the bombers, land-based bombers for six or seven hundred miles, became known, I felt that Admiral Fletcher, Task Force 14, could best be supported by having Admiral Brown in Task Force 11 move to the northward rather than to make an attack on the Southern Marshalls, and from there having to retire in a direction away from Task Force 14.

Admiral REEVES. Who was in command of Task Force 8?

Admiral PYE. Admiral Halsey.

Admiral REEVES. And Admiral Fletcher had command of Task Force 14?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. Were they to report directly to you, or were all ships and task forces at sea under Vice Admiral Halsey?

Admiral PYE. Each task force was acting under the general instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, and they were all on radio silence; so when the orders had to be modified—I had placed restrictions on their operating areas because I did not want them to use the radio to communicate with each other; so I limited the area.

Admiral REEVES. Then the three task forces might be said to be under your command?

Admiral PYE. As far as the general areas were concerned, yes, but they were authorized by this order in which I removed [1782] the restriction for task force 14, and I also informed each of the commanders that the restrictions placed upon them were only to avoid their running into each other without knowing it, and that if the situation required it they were at liberty to take any action they so desired; but naturally, in that case, they would have to inform the other by radio as to what they were doing. In other words, the limiting of the areas was to keep them from running into the other, and once the situation was such that they wanted to change it, in that case they would have to communicate with each other.

Admiral REEVES. Your information was that there were battleships and other enemy forces somewhere in the Mandate Islands. Did they give you any definite indication as to where in the Mandate Islands they were?

Admiral PYE. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. How far are the Mandate Islands from Wake?

Admiral PYE. Well, the nearest is about 600 miles, and then it goes to as far as 2,400 miles, I should say.

Admiral REEVES. Did you have any information indicating that there were battleships nearer to Wake than 600 miles?

Admiral PYE. Nothing except possibly the assumption that battleships and carriers which had previously been reported as having operated against Oahu were still within tactical support of each other and that one carrier, at least, was within flying radius of Wake.

Admiral REEVES. These three task forces are composed of vessels of high speed. Did you have any apprehension that these task forces were in danger from battleship attack?

Admiral PYE. Not unless the ship was damaged.

Admiral REEVES. Then, as I understand it, you were in control of their movements in general, and when they were within [1783] some hundreds of miles of Wake, you ordered the withdrawal of the entire expedition of three task forces?

Admiral PYE. I ordered the withdrawal of Task Forces 14 and 11, and Task Force 8 was ordered to cover the reinforcement of Midway, which was then in progress.

Admiral REEVES. To cover the reinforcement?

Admiral PYE. To cover the reinforcement. We had a small force going out to Midway.

Admiral REEVES. To midway?

Admiral PYE. Yes.

Admiral REEVES. That is all I have.

The CHAIRMAN. Any other questions?

General McNARNEY. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Admiral.

(The witness left the room.)

General McCoy. I would like to have this newspaper story marked "Heroic Story of Wake Told by Navy Department" included as a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be copied into the record.

(The above-mentioned article from The Honolulu Advertiser of Friday morning, January 9, 1942, is as follows:)

HEROIC STORY OF WAKE TOLD BY NAVY DEPARTMENT

DIARY OF OFFICERS AT ISLAND REVEALS U. S. FORCES SANK, DAMAGED SEVEN ENEMY WARSHIPS

WASHINGTON, Jan. 8 (UP)—The navy department announced tonight that seven Japanese warships were either sunk or severely damaged and presumably destroyed during the attack against a heroic handful of defenders on tiny Wake Island.

Listed as victims of American gunnery were a cruiser, four destroyers, a submarine and a gunboat.

[1784] This news was based on information sent by Maj. W. Bayler, one of the Marine commanders on Wake.

A night Navy communique also announced that a submarine belonging to the Asiatic Fleet sank an enemy transport and three Japanese cargo ships totaling 30,000 tons.

Text of the Navy communique, based on reports up to mid-day Thursday, was as follows:

"Far east: The commanding officer of a U. S. submarine of the Asiatic Fleet has reported the sinking of an enemy transport. In addition, this vessel succeeded in sinking three enemy cargo vessels, each estimated at 10,000 tons displacement.

Central Pacific: The defense of Wake Island has been cited by the President of the United States as follows:

White House, Washington, Jan. 5, 1942. Citation by the President of the United States of the Wake detachment of the First Defense Battalion, U. S. Marine Corps, commanded by James P. S. Devereaux, and Marine Fighting Squadron 211 of Marine Aircraft Group 21 under command of Major Paul Putnam, U. S. Marines.

The courageous conduct of the officers and men of these units who defended Wake against overwhelming superiority of enemy air, sea and land attacks from Dec. 8 to 22 has been noted with admiration by their fellow countrymen and the civilized world and will not be forgotten as long as gallantry and heroism are respected and honored.

These units are commended for their devotion to duty and their splendid conduct at battle stations [1785] under the most adverse conditions. With limited defense means against attacks in great force they manned their shore

installation and flew their aircraft so well that seven enemy warships were either sunk or severely damaged and many hostile planes shot down, and an unknown number of land troops destroyed.

An increase of two Japanese warships—a destroyer and gunboat—over the originally reported cruiser, submarine and three destroyers that the Japanese lost in the Wake attack was indicated in two reports to Marine Corps headquarters received from the Pacific area.

These reports were received from Wake by a patrol plane. One is written on Dec. 20 by Major Paul Putnam, commanding aviation at Wake. The other is a day-by-day account of Marine aviation participation in the battle of Wake up to the 20th, written by Major W. Bayler.

The day-by-day record of the battle, though not an official report, is Bayler's account of what Marine aviation and Devereux's men did.

Bayler's report has but little reference to the Marines on the Isle besides the aviation group, but one brief note: "Japanese closed in to 4,700 yards before five and three inchers opened at point-blank range," indicates cool courage on the part of Devereux's men that ranks with the classic "whites of their eyes" line at Bunker Hill in the opinion of ranking officers of Marine headquarters.

To two destroyers lost in the final phase of the battle on Dec. 22, new information received brings Japanese losses in taking Wake to a total of [1786] seven warships—one cruiser, four destroyers, one submarine and one gunboat.

Bayler was on temporary duty at Wake in connection with the establishment of a base of operations for the Marine Corps aviation unit. This unit was composed of 12 planes with pilot. Forty-nine ground personnel arrived shortly before the outbreak of hostilities.

Following is the copy of a penciled note Bayler made from records sent the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. He was at Wake until the 20th. Synopsis of events from Dec. 8th to 20th, Dec. 8th, 7 a. m., received word of the bombing of Oahu from general quarters station, 11:58 a. m. 24 Japanese bombers on a northern course in close column vision versus from 3,000 feet. Hundred pound fragmentation bombs and simultaneous strafing caused casualties of 25 dead and seven wounded. Seven airplanes were burned and destroyed.

Dec. 9th, 11:45 a. m., 27 Japanese bombed hospital camp No. 2. Enemy killed several patients. Three dead. Got one Jap plane.

Dec. 10th, 10:40 a. m., 27 Jap bombers, no casualties.

Dec. 11th, 5 a. m., landing attempt by 12 Japanese ships, including light cruisers, destroyers, gunboats and two troop or supply ships. Jap casualties; One light cruiser, two destroyers, one gunboat, two bombers. (Note: Japs closed in to 4,700 yards before five and three-inchers opened at point-blank range.)

Bayler's diary continued: Dec. 12th, 27 Jap planes bombed Peale and Wake from 22,000 feet. No casualties.

[1787] 13th, all quiet.

14th, 32 Jap airplanes hit the airdrome. Two killed and one plane shot down (destroyed by our bombs).

15th, 11 a. m., dawn raid by three four-engined planes and 27 Japs bombers. Shot down two.

16th, 5:45 a. m., 41 Jap bombers hit Camp No. 1, Peale island Diesel oil supply, mess hall and pumps and evaporators at Camp 1.

18th, 11:40 a. m., one Japanese high reconnaissance plane.

19th, 10:30 a. m., Jap bombers hit airport and camp.

26th, all quiet, first day. Bad weather. Total casualties, 28 dead, six wounded as of 20th.

Bayler diary continued:

Notes: Firstly, Jap bombers Dornier type, two-engine, twin-tail, 160 knots; secondly, attack formation always in form line vision versus close formation. Excellent discipline; thirdly, sure Jap bombers shot down, three. More possible. One four-engine P-boat, one CL, one 2-DD gunboat.

Putnam's report on operations to the commanding officer of Pearl Harbor goes into more detail regarding the efforts of the tiny aviation complement to keep the planes that were left after the attack in the air against each new attack.

Of the original aviation force of 12 officers and 40 enlisted men, 19 enlisted men and eight officers were still on duty Dec. 20th. Of these, four enlisted men and two officers who were wounded were still on duty. One officer and six enlisted men were in the hospital and "doing nicely." The remainder, three officers and 24 men, were dead.

[1788] The letter relates that four planes were in the air against the Japanese at the time of the first raid. The other eight were aground in a build-

ing being serviced between flights and of these seven were destroyed and one slightly damaged.

One plane in the air later taxied into debris on the field—the first raid's wreckage—and bent its propellers.

Marine fighters to the 20th contacted the enemy seven times and shot down five Japs in flames. Four more were claimed by pilots but were not verified and several were known damaged.

Of the four claimed, one was a four-engined seaplane.

Discussing the surface attack on the 11th., Putnam reported "four airplanes (marine planes) made a total of 10 attacks, operating in greatly overloaded condition and performing splendidly. We claim the sinking of one ship and serious damage to another."

Devereux's guns evidently accounted for the remainder of the ships destroyed. Bayler's synopsis in the attack on the 11th said one plane was lost "in a washout on the rocky beach."

After the attack on the 14th, which saw two Marine planes destroyed, one plane aground by enemy action and one crashed on take-off, Marine pilots, mechanics and ground crews evidently made an additional plane or even planes from the wreckage of the remainder.

Lauding the work of ground crews, Putnam wrote: "Since the first raids, parts and assemblies have been traded back and forth so that no airplane can be identified. Engines have been traded from plane to plane, junked, stripped and rebuilt and all but crated."

[1789] Continuing his praise of the men under him, Putnam wrote: "All hands behaved splendidly and held up in a manner of which the Marine Corps may well be proud. I have no report regarding any officer or man being outstanding in bravery and fortitude—they all acquitted themselves with equal distinction.

On the other hand, I particularly wish to comment on the indefatigable labor, ingenuity, skill and technical knowledge of Lieutenant Keinney and Technical Sergeant Hamilton. It was solely due to their efforts that the squadron was still operating."

Discussing living conditions at the airdrome as of the 20th, Putnam said: "The personnel is living in dugouts made by contractors' men and equipment. It is not comfortable but it is adequate against all but direct bomb hits. Feeding is from the contractors' galley truck, making the rounds with hot food twice daily. Sanitation is only fair but so far there has been only a mild flurry of diarrhea.

Fresh water is adequate for drinking but salt water is being used for all other purposes."

The tone of the entire report indicates no particular anxiety on the part of the air group at Wake. They had orders to do a job, and with a job to do they were doing the job and would have continued to do it until circumstances beyond their control forced them to discontinue the effort. And they kept those circumstances under control for almost a fortnight.

At no time during the siege were there more than four Marine planes in operation, Putnam reported, but the varied total these planes took of the Japanese was one ship, one submarine and five Japanese planes.

"There is nothing to report from other areas."

[1790] The CHAIRMAN. We will adjourn subject to the call of the Chairman.

(Whereupon, at 12:58 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken subject to the call of the Chairman.)

[1791]

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¹ Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.

[1792] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

MONDAY, JANUARY 19, 1942

**BOARD ROOM, 2905 NAVY BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.**

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m., pursuant to Adjournment on Friday, January 9, 1942, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman; Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired; Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired; Major General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army; Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission; Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission; Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

[1793]

PROCEEDINGS

Colonel BROWN. General Marshall is here.
The CHAIRMAN. Have the General come in.
Will you be sworn, sir?

**TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF,
UNITED STATES ARMY, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall, we are particularly interested in ascertaining the exact facts with respect to the message you forwarded to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department on the morning of December 7, 1941. You stated those informally to us when you were with us before, but we took down nothing about it at that time.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir. Mr. Justice, Colonel Howe handed me the other day a draft of a statement—

The CHAIRMAN. Of a finding, yes.

General MARSHALL. —of a finding regarding that particular matter, and asked me, as I understand it, to correct that in terms as I understood them.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

General MARSHALL. And I have done that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. Unfortunately, I have not been able to go over it personally with Admiral Stark, who was concerned with me in the matter; and we are in agreement, I understand, in our main exchanges of information, and he questioned my wording, I believe, but as he is going to appear here a little later he can take that up. So if it is agreeable to you I will read a redraft finding, in the terms as I understand them, as to fact.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be splendid.

General MARSHALL (reading):

At about 11:25 a. m., Eastern Standard Time, [1794] Sunday, December 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations learned—

Now put this in parentheses, if you will, please, because I want to refer to it later.

(Certain matter read by General Marshall is omitted from the transcript at the direction of the Chairman.)

General MARSHALL (continuing reading):

—that what amounted to an ultimatum would be delivered to the United States Government by the Japanese Ambassador at 1:00 p. m. in Washington that day and that diplomatic relations between the two nations would probably be severed.

The Chief of Staff communicated with the Chief of Naval Operations by telephone at once, expressed his apprehension of possible attack without warning in any area, and recommended sending an immediate additional warning message to the Commander of the Hawaiian Department (and to the Commanding Generals of the forces in the Philippines, Panama, and on the Pacific Coast). He personally drafted such a message, and at 11:45 a. m., Eastern Standard Time, the Chief of Naval Operations requested that the various Army Commanders to receive this message be instructed to communicate its contents to their naval opposites. The Chief of Staff added a sentence to that effect.

because the message had already been finished.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL (continuing reading):

This message, in the longhand of the Chief of Staff, was personally delivered at 11:50 a. m. by a General Staff officer, Colonel Bratton, to the Communications Officer stationed in the War Department [1795] Message Center for immediate transmission by the most rapid means. The message in longhand was then typed and entered in the War Department Message Center register at 12 noon. The Chief of Staff specifically inquired through a second General Staff officer (Colonel Bundy, now deceased), and also by Colonel Bratton, what would be the elapsed time necessary for the message to reach its destination. He was informed that it would require about thirty minutes for transmission and delivery.

The War Department Communications Officer was able to send the message to the other points of destination by Army radio. He discovered, however, and we find this to be the fact,—

That was your part of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL (continuing reading):

—that due to physical and aerial conditions he could not raise the Army radio station at Oahu. He therefore delivered the coded message to the Western Union Telegraph Company by which it was transmitted on a through circuit to San Francisco and then relayed by the Radio Corporation of America to its office in Honolulu where it was received at 7:33 a. m., Hawaiian Time, one hour and three minutes after it was filed in the War Department Message center.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was that time, General?

The CHAIRMAN. 7:33.

General MARSHALL. "7:33 a. m., Hawaiian Time, one hour and three minutes——"

The CHAIRMAN (interposing). One hour and three minutes after it was sent.

[1796] General MARSHALL. (continuing reading):

—after it was filed in the War Department Message Center. Thus the message which the Chief of Staff understood should arrive at Army Headquarters at about 7:00 a. m. actually arrived at the Radio Corporation of America's office in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m. The message was dispatched by the Radio Corporation of America by messenger to Army Headquarters. Before it was delivered the attack started.

Now, I referred to a—I established a parenthesis up there around a certain statement which I ask you gentlemen to regard as completely secret because we are still using that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Why don't we delete it, Mr. Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. I regretted that you specified the matter at all.

General MARSHALL. I had to put it in there because your message—your draft stated that this came to us from the Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was not correct, I find.

General MARSHALL. It was not correct. He had indicated his views in this matter a number of times, but this message was going to him at the same time it was coming to us.

I might clarify that a little bit by explaining that the—this ought to all be off the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Then take it off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. I would like to get one question on the record here: General, the message of November 27 contained the words to the effect that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department should institute such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. What did you visualize that reconnaissance might or should have been?

[1797] General MARSHALL. My understanding of that particular matter was that an accord which we had in a written report here between the Fleet Commander and the Hawaiian Army Commander arranged that the offshore—the overseas reconnaissance would be directed by the Navy, and the Army to support it, that is, to carry out the missions assigned; that the immediate defense was the Army mission, in which the Navy would cooperate to the best of their facilities.

General McNARNEY. Well, then you would have expected that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would have taken the question up with the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet as to whether or not reconnaissance should be instituted?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Distant. Distant reconnaissance.

General MARSHALL. Overwater reconnaissance, whatever it was.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. Overwater. The overwater reconnaissance had been made the mission in a written agreement between the Fleet Commander and General Short. That was a new agreement after they got out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we know that.

General MARSHALL. And we had gotten into a similar discussion regarding that in the Philippines, where General MacArthur and Admiral Hart were settling their accord by which the affair was to be handled out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, General, unless you are going to get to it later I should like to ask you right there: Are you going to get to the reply to that message sent to you by General Short?

General MARSHALL. Yes, I've got that right here.

The CHAIRMAN. Is this on the record?

General MARSHALL. Yes, this is on the record.

[1798] On November 28, a radiogram from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to the Chief of Staff:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy. Re rad four seven two the twenty-seventh.

In other words, he made his liaison with the Navy in connection with that.

General McNARNEY. And you understood by the words, "Liaison with the Navy," that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet were discussing this question or at least had gotten together on the message of the 27th?

General MARSHALL. That's our assumption. He made his liaison with the Navy, and they had their plans. They had the Rainbow Plan, and they also had their immediate agreement for reconnaissance, as to the basis on which that would be operated.

General McNARNEY. You assumed that the words, "Liaison with the Navy," meant that the two responsible commanders were actually in consultation as to what steps should be taken to beat the situation existing at the moment?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, General, were you satisfied, then, that Alert No. 1 for the Army was sufficient to meet any situation?

General MARSHALL. Alert No. 1 and alert—the alert of November 24 and the alert of November—

The CHAIRMAN. I think the Admiral is talking about something that you don't quite get.

General MARSHALL. He is talking about—

The CHAIRMAN. General Short had established three alerts in his Standing Operating Procedure.

[1799] General MARSHALL. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Which was no part of the Navy's business except as it was informed of it; and his Alert No. 1, which was an alert against sabotage only, as you may now know, he put into effect on receipt of your message. He did not put into effect Alerts Nos. 2 and 3, which were war alerts, so to speak.

General MARSHALL. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Alerts against hostile action.

General MARSHALL. I see.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, what I understood Admiral Standley to ask you was whether you understood from his reply whether he put 1, 2, or 3, or what he put into effect.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, do you know what the provisions of Alert No. 1 are for the Army down there?

General MARSHALL. I am not familiar with the details of it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, you understood from the reply that these two commanders had gotten together to determine what measures they ought to take in view of the warning you had sent them?

General MARSHALL. That was my assumption, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And Alert No. 1 meant nothing to you as far as this—

The CHAIRMAN. (interposing). He didn't say that.

General McNARNEY. Alert No. 1 wasn't sent.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't say Alert No. 1.

Admiral STANDLEY. Alert for safety.

The CHAIRMAN. He said alert for safety. Alerted against sabotage. He said, "Liaison with the Navy."

Admiral STANDLEY. That is the point he made.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. "Report Department alerted to prevent [1800] sabotage. Liaison with the Navy." With this other thing.

Admiral STANDLEY. To prevent sabotage.

General MARSHALL. You see, my assumption in that was, as the Navy had the overwater patrolling, which is the first protection against an assault, that that was handled on that basis. That is what that meant to me.

Admiral STANDLEY. It never occurred to you that the planes of the Army would be centralized and bunched up?

General MARSHALL. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. And put on a four-hour notice?

General MARSHALL. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. That never occurred to you?

General MARSHALL. I didn't know that.

Admiral STANDLEY. It didn't occur to you at all that that was the situation?

General MARSHALL. No. I knew that they had this agreement, which was acceptable to Admiral Stark and myself, but it was the first time they had gotten it on a very specific terminology.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. And that when he established his liaison with the Navy, and in relation to this particular message on the 27th, that that included the reconnaissance phase of the matter.

If that is all right, I will go ahead with this other thing I was going to give you.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. This is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. I would like to ask, on the record, if the message of November 28 referring to sabotage measures was in answer to the message from the Commanding General Hawaiian [1801] Department, relative to the measures he had undertaken in view of the message of the 27th of the Chief of Staff.

General MARSHALL. I couldn't answer that. General Miles drafted this thing, and I would have to get him to answer that particular question. I don't recall.

General McNARNEY. Well, you just stated—this is off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now on the record, if you please: General, as I understand it from your present statement, the only information you had as to the probable delivery of your last warning message of the 7th was that it would arrive at Honolulu about seven o'clock in the morning, their time.

General MARSHALL. About that, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your communications officer did not advise you that he could not raise Honolulu on the war radio?

General MARSHALL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Army radio?

General MARSHALL. He turned immediately to this other channel of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. He didn't advise you that he had turned to the other channel?

General MARSHALL. No; we didn't learn that until after the affair had started.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you familiar in your Department with the fact that the Navy had much more powerful radio to Honolulu which could break through when yours wouldn't?

General MARSHALL. I didn't know that detail, but I know—I knew they had a rapid means of communication.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But when we obtained this information I went into the inquiry of why they hadn't turned to the other, and my understanding from the other office concerned was that [1802] the Western Union had this connection straight through that would give almost immediate delivery, and that as the air was difficult this other was the most rapid means of meeting the situation; and also I understood that he thought a teletype was working in Honolulu from the Radio Corporation of America's office to the office of the Commanding General. It was not working that morning; hence the delivery by bicycle. All of that, however, came out afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Afterwards. Were you or your communications officer familiar with the fact that the F. B. I. had a radio to Honolulu?

General MARSHALL. I didn't know that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not know it?

General MARSHALL. He may have known it. I didn't know it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. In all of this, of course, he was moving—he only had minutes to turn this way and turn that, and he made his decision on the Western Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General MARSHALL. They assured him they had a trunk straight through.

The CHAIRMAN. To San Francisco?

General MARSHALL. To San Francisco, with an immediate relay through to the other station.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the information that you had been given as to probable delivery of the message, it did not occur to you, I suppose, to use the telephone?

General MARSHALL. It is very difficult to answer that, because you are indulging in a hindsight—

The CHAIRMAN. I know that.

General MARSHALL. —in the light of what has happened. As nearly as I could give an answer that would be based on what [1803] might have been in my mind at the moment, it would be this: In the first place, the point at which we had the greatest fear of an instant action was the Philippines. We knew that Japanese movements were going on around there. That was quite evident. And if anything happened they were going to get it; there wasn't any question about that. So, in point of priority, if we had turned to the telephone undoubtedly I think I would have telephoned the Philippines. However, in any transocean telephone it is quite a long time before you make your connection. You are able to talk once you get it, but you are quite a little while before you establish it, and a considerable period of time, if it is out as far as the Philippines.

Also, I think the probability is that I would have felt at the time that war had not been declared. We were trying to avoid war. Mr. Hull was trying to gain time. We didn't know that "one o'clock" necessarily meant war; it may have meant a termination of diplomatic intercourse, relations; and because of their actions in China and Indo-China and Thailand, and there being no secrecy in transocean telephone messages, that might have been a hazardous thing to do, and it would have greatly complicated the Secretary of State's negotiations.

But, as I say, it is very difficult to give a correct answer in the light of knowing what actually took place, but I certainly would have turned to the Philippines first.

The CHAIRMAN. That leads me to make another inquiry: Was the carrier attack on the Philippine Islands at the very moment of the breaking of relations a surprise to you?

Admiral STANDLEY. Philippines or Honolulu?

The CHAIRMAN. Hawaii. —Hawaii, a surprise to you?

General MARSHALL. Yes, that was a surprise to me.

The CHAIRMAN. It was a totally unexpected move so far as [1804] prognostications with G-2 and yourself were concerned?

General MARSHALL. Not totally, because we had evidences of gathering strength in the Mandate Islands, air and naval vessels. We knew that, that they had increased their dispositions in the Mandate Islands. That was one reason that we assumed that Guam would be wiped out of the picture right at the start. That they would carry the matter right up to Hawaii I didn't anticipate. I fully anticipated a terrific effort to cripple everything out there by sabotage. I think that was almost axiomatic, as a matter of fact: that was going to come, because we had struggled with that factor from the start. It was almost insoluble to set up a sufficient defense, and they had been allowed such complete liberty of their surveys over the various islands. We knew of the things they had done year in and year out, which we couldn't under the law prevent, that it was a constant concern as to what we could do to prevent, against that immediate means of hostile effort.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you anything more?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General, in connection with that, on the morning of the 7th at the time the attack took place the naval task forces were largely to the west and southwest and Midway, towards Wake, Johnston. Appropos of your statement of the assembly of forces in the Mandates, had you

discussed that, the question of the danger from that area, and the sending of those task forces out into that area, with Admiral Stark? Had your War Plans or you?

General MARSHALL. I had discussed it in the joint board with Admiral Stark and the other officers on the joint board. The exact naval dispositions we did not know.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

General MARSHALL. But we were very much concerned over [1805] this big flight of fortresses for the Philippines and had asked particularly that they make arrangements to cover that movement through Midway and Wake, because we felt that this gathering strength in the Mandates threatened that whole movement to the Philippines.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then the assembly of those task forces there to the southwest was in the nature of furthering the War Department and the Navy Department efforts to send planes to the Far East?

General MARSHALL. As far—I don't know the exact mission of those forces, but I do know that we were concerned that the Navy should endeavor to give some support to the movement through Midway and Wake.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let us have Admiral Stark. Will you be sworn, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL HAROLD R. STARK, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, UNITED STATES NAVY, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. General Marshall has just given us the details of the circumstances which led up to his sending the message of December 7 which did not reach the commanders until after the attack. Will you tell us what connection you had with that message, Admiral?

Admiral STARK. My connection with that message was that on that Sunday morning I had just seen the message when shortly after General Marshall called, or at about the same time, and asked me what I thought of sending it on out to Hawaii. My first reaction, which I gave him, was that we had sent them so much recently that it might be unnecessary.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you say that to him?

[1806] Admiral STARK. Yes. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Put that in: "However,"—

Admiral STARK. However, in perhaps less than a minute I called him back and told him that we ought not to take a chance, and I thought it would be better to send it and get it out there as soon as possible. He was still writing the message at that time.

The CHAIRMAN. And at your request did he include anything in the message?

Admiral STARK. Yes. I asked him to put in the message that our people be informed. We had almost come to make this routine. That is, if I sent a message I read it to him and asked him if he would like to have me tell our people to give it to Army opposites.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And this message was just the reverse. I might say, off the record —

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Were you informed at any time, Admiral, as to the probable time of receipt of the message in Hawaii, or did you leave that purely to the mechanics of the Army?

Admiral STARK. I left that to the mechanics, made a quick mental picture that it might get there just about in time.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean just about by one o'clock our time?

Admiral STARK. Yes, just—well, yes. Off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Did it occur to you to send a message over your Navy transmitter?

Admiral STARK. Duplication of messages had frequently occurred to us, but because of security we usually sent the one message over only one transmission system.

[1807] The CHAIRMAN. You were familiar with the phraseology of the earlier messages of November 24, 27, and 29 sent by the various high commands here, weren't you?

Admiral STARK. You say, sent by the various high commands here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. That is, either by Army or Navy on those dates.

Admiral STARK. Yes. Well, with the Navy, absolutely familiar—

The CHAIRMAN. You wrote it.

Admiral STARK. —to the last word.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. With the Army, in general.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. And frequently accurately.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Was it the purpose of those messages to put the two commanders in the joint command out there on the alert against any form of attack?

Admiral STARK. Yes, it was to put them on a war basis, and on the assumption that when they particularly got the message of the 27th, or the others, they would be completely on the alert.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you familiar with General Short's reply to the Army message of November 27, which I show you?

Admiral STARK. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You were not familiar with that?

Admiral STARK. No, sir. Did you ever see that (addressing Admiral Turner)?

I say no; maybe the answer would be: I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. You will notice that in that he says, "Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy." Would you understand from that that the two commanders were in conference over the measures to be taken in answer to your warnings?

[1808] Admiral STARK (reading). Department altered—

The CHAIRMAN. "Department alerted."

Admiral STARK. "Department alerted to prevent sabotage."

The CHAIRMAN. "Liaison with Navy."

Admiral STARK. I would take it to mean that he had close liaison with the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. In respect of the warning that had been sent him?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I say I don't recall that; I know I never saw it. I am sure.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt a copy of it was sent to your Department for information, but it wouldn't necessarily come to your personal attention, as it was merely a reply to indicate he had their warning.

Admiral STARK. Not necessarily. And, off the record, did a copy come over to us?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, we saw a copy of it, and there had been sent messages from time to time which had gone out from the intelligence organization—two intelligence organizations which were primarily concerned with that, so I say that I thought it was more or less—my reaction was, it was more or less some supplementary affair to the alertness of the guns, and so on.

The CHAIRMAN. To the alertness of what?

Admiral TURNER. To the alertness of the troops.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. In other words, that they were not only doing this, but that was my reaction.

General McNARNEY. Do you think we should swear the Admiral if he is going to give testimony?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me swear you.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

[1809] **TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER, UNITED STATES NAVY, DIRECTOR OF WAR PLANS DIVISION OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Your full name, Admiral?

Admiral TURNER. Richmond Kelly Turner, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have already got his answer to the question.

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you got his duty?

The CHAIRMAN. What is your duty at present, Admiral Turner?

Admiral TURNER. Director of the War Plans Division of the Office of Naval Operations.

The CHAIRMAN. And you were performing that duty on December 7 and theretofore?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, for about thirteen and a half months previous to that date.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know that I have any further questions. Have you, Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral TURNER, when plans are made in accordance with the principles of command in Hawaii, cooperation, are those plans referred to the War Plans Division of the Navy Department, operations?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. As far as the Navy is concerned, those plans are not put into effect until approved by War Plans; is that correct?

Admiral TURNER. No. They are put into effect as soon as the emergency occurs, if not already approved. The method of handling fleet plans and Naval District plans is not the same. The fleet plans come to the War Plans Division for checking. [1810] The Naval District plans go first to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet to see if they are satisfactory for matters under his cognizance. After that has been ironed out they come to the Department, are then referred to the Naval District Division, and by cooperation between the Naval District Division and the War Plans Division the examination is made and approval given.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you recall—just a minute.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. This is the joint plan entered into between Bellinger and Air.

The CHAIRMAN. And the Air.

Admiral STANDLEY. At Honolulu. It is a part of the basic plan. Do you recall having seen that (indicating a document)?

Admiral TURNER. I am looking for the date. Yes, sir, I saw that plan, considered a good plan.

The CHAIRMAN. Showing the witness. Just say what you have shown him. Showing the witness—

Admiral STANDLEY. Addendum I.

The CHAIRMAN. Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operations Plan No. A-1-41, dated March 31, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. In that plan the decision was reached giving certain task forces and the duties of those task forces, and the decision stated that this plan was to become effective, or rather the decision was that,

This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or Fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures;

and in this plan it was provided that the long-range reconnaissance was to be done by the Navy, but also of the decisions was that,

None of the [1811] above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred.

Do you recall that?

Admiral TURNER. I don't recall that particular phraseology, but the answer, I think, to that question is to be found in the Fleet Security Plan of—revised October—

Admiral STANDLEY. Thirteenth? Fourteenth? Where is it? Can't find it?

Admiral TURNER. October 14, 1941, and that was about the third revision, as I recall, of the—I have it here some place, Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Here is 2CL-41.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I have it right here: that the security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas was the guiding plan for the conditions which existed up to the moment of the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were aware, then, Admiral, that long-range reconnaissance was not being carried out as a regular procedure during this period?

Admiral TURNER. I did not know that. As a matter of fact, when we heard the attack occurred, I assumed that they had a long-range

reconnaissance—had long-range reconnaissance planes out, but that since they take off about daylight they had not yet reached by seven o'clock the positions of the carriers, and I made that remark to several people that same day.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it your belief that 360-degree search was being made each morning at that time?

Admiral TURNER. It was my belief that a long-range reconnaissance search was being made as best could be done with the planes at the disposal of the Commander-in-Chief.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, you knew that the plan was not being carried out in its full effect because of lack of equipment; is that true?

[1812] Admiral TURNER. I did not know that, no, sir. I did not know that there was not a 360-degree search.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you have any idea that there wasn't equipment enough to conduct such a search for a limited period?

Admiral TURNER. I knew that there were an insufficient number of planes there to conduct a long-range reconnaissance search 360 degrees extending over a considerable period of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, Admiral, is it your information now in War Plans that an effective search is being conducted to the full extent that we think is required or you think is required and covering the full 360 degrees?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, I do not believe they have the forces there at the present time to conduct an effective search and at the same time to have available the necessary striking forces against a strong attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral Stark, General Marshall has given us—take this off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. May I ask Admiral Stark a question or two on the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this goes on the record.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, on November 27 you sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet which stated, in effect, that "This is to be considered a war warning," and you directed the execution of defensive employment—defensive—

The CHAIRMAN. Deployment.

General McNARNEY. Deployment. In that message you did not require any report as to the measures taken.

Admiral STARK. That's right.

General McNARNEY. But you did expect the Commander-in-[1813] Chief to take some measures, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Yes.

General McNARNEY. What is the type of action that you expected the Commander-in-Chief to take?

Admiral STARK. Well, it would be in accordance with his plan, and my thought, without checking up, would be that he would take dispositions to avoid surprise, so far as he could with what he had.

General McNARNEY. You would expect that that would include some air patrol?

Admiral STARK. Yes. It was my understanding that he was doing air patrol at that time.

General McNARNEY. In view of the fact that the method of co-ordination in effect at that——

Admiral STARK (interposing). I may say that Admiral Turner thinks, because of his familiarity right down to the details of that plan, that he can give you those dispositions perhaps better than I could, in detail as to what the plan held. Do you think you could, Admiral Turner? My answer can stand all right.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, for General McNarney's purposes, all he wants to know is whether you expected him to carry out his part of the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, whatever it was.

Admiral STARK. Well, significant as to the state of readiness to be expected at Pearl Harbor were the steps that he took for other than the Pearl Harbor defense plan. What we expected him to do was to get more planes and personnel, and so on, out to Wake and Midway, if possible, and to send his task forces—some task forces to sea in readiness to catch any raiders, which he did. He did that. We knew it. We knew these task forces were at sea. He informed us that one was returning from having put people ashore at Wake, that certain planes had been sent to Midway [1814] and were expected to go on the 5th or 6th day down to Wake, and we knew the schedule of the ships that were in port, and at that particular time out of the three task forces there were two scheduled to be in port. Actually there was less than one and a half in port.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STARK. He kept the others at sea. And because he had taken those measures, which looked absolutely sound, it was a safe assumption that other measures had been taken of a similar nature.

General McNARNEY. Well, you would expect, then, that some uses would have been made of the facilities available in Patrol Wing 2?

Admiral STARK. Yes, I would.

General McNARNEY. Under the——

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute, Admiral Stark.

Admiral STARK. Well, the answer would be given: Decidedly, yes.

General McNARNEY. Under the system of coordination then in effect, which was mutual cooperation, you would have also expected the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to get in touch with and confer with the Commanding General Hawaiian Department, as to the steps which should be taken to meet the situation then existing?

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes. I just would have assumed that that message of the war warning, plus telling the Army opposites—and off the record, I have forgotten whether I put in there that Marshall concurred or not. Sometimes I did; sometimes I didn't. (Continuing:) —that they would have said. "Well, here: here's about the extreme in the message," and for their joint defense they would have made their dispositions as best they could with what they had.

Is that——?

[1815] General McNARNEY. Yes, that is an answer. In other words, you assumed that the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet would have some information, at least, as to what the Army dispositions to meet the situation were, and that the Army Commander would know what the Fleet was doing?

Admiral STARK. Oh, yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. And that they would get together and consider as to whether or not the dispositions they were making, either jointly or separately, were sufficient to meet the existing situation?

Admiral STARK. Yes. And off the record.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Put that on the record.

Admiral STARK. Joint action requires mutual assistance, one with the other, best to meet any situation which confronts them. I thought you read that joint action.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, do you get the copies of the messages that the War Department receive usually from the outlying stations, having to do with the Navy and in liaison with the Navy? Do you ever see those messages?

Admiral STARK. We see messages—we see some of their messages, yes, and I think this is a correct statement; if it isn't, will you please correct me, Admiral Turner: War Plans, in particular, Army and Navy, are in close touch on incoming messages.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, but a great many of the detail messages are not exchanged. Off the record, I may put it this way, Admiral: If Marshall gets something which—

The CHAIRMAN. —he thinks important.

Admiral STARK. —he thinks important, he makes sure that I see it; and I'll get one and assume that it will go over there as a normal course of events. Or I may see "Army" on it; I will make certain he gets it.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have here a message that was sent by [1816] General Short on the 27th of November to the Chief of Staff of the War Department, in which the last sentence says, "Liaison with the Navy." Did you see that (handing a document to Admiral Stark)?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral Turner, did you?

Admiral TURNER. I saw that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you see that message?

Admiral TURNER. That was the one referred to previously—

Admiral STARK. The same one.

Admiral TURNER. —where we thought it was—where my impression was that it was an M. I. D. dispatch concerning sabotage, because our O. N. I. had sent out various and sundry messages direct to their agents on that subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you then construe that statement, "Liaison with the Navy," to mean that that was only liaison with regard to sabotage, or would you consider that as meaning a total liaison with the Navy?

Admiral TURNER. I assumed it was total liaison with the Navy. May I enlarge on that answer?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. We had for some time previously—we had tried—set up joint command centers, joint harbor control posts, in the various coastal frontiers. The matter had been discussed of setting up a joint command post in Hawaii, in correspondence over a considerable period of time. Both the Commanding General Hawaiian Department and the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District had recommended, after considerable study, strongly against setting up these joint command

posts because—their statements were that the liaison was close and that their arrangements were satisfactory for war as they were, and putting a joint command post out there which would be suitable for both the Army and the Navy is unquestionably a difficult problem, because the commanders want to be in [1817] different places; and I can say reluctantly, because that didn't seem to be a good solution and also because at that time we did not have funds available, the issue of the joint command center there was not forced from here.

Admiral REEVES. We are interested in your understanding of that dispatch. This dispatch from the Commanding General Hawaiian Department is in reply to specific warnings sent out by the Army and by the Navy, which he had seen, and in reply to those warnings he states, "Have alerted the Army against sabotage; am in liaison with the Navy"; but, as I understand your statement, you assumed that his liaison with the Navy meant that he was in direct conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet upon this subject of war warning and mutual defense and security. Is that the way you understood the message?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, because that message had to be considered in connection with other concurrent events. For example, on November 28 the Commander-in-Chief forwarded a report of minor operations, drill, for exactly this kind of a situation, which had been held jointly, and those drills we knew had been carried out previously, and apparently they were reasonably satisfactory to the commanders there.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice, Admiral Stark, that in both your message of November 24 and your message of November 27, "This is a war warning," you stated that your addressee should advise the Army command.

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that go to strengthen your view that you expected them to get together and confer about joint defense measures?

Admiral STARK. Yes. And I might add that I took both of those messages up to obtain General Marshall's approval prior to sending them.

[1818] (There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask, Admiral Stark: You had been warned by the State Department that the situation was extremely tense and that Japan might strike anywhere any time?

Admiral STARK. We had been warned that the situation was extremely tense. I do not recall the State Department making any prediction of Japan striking at any time. That was our own thought.

The CHAIRMAN. In view of the past history of the Axis powers you had no illusions about their waiting for a declaration of war to launch an expedition, had you?

Admiral STARK. None. I may say, off the record——

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you this: As the responsible commander of the naval forces, did you expect an air raid on Hawaii at this time?

Admiral STARK. I knew it was a possibility and should be guarded against. Whether it would come or not I could not say.

Now may I say something completely off the record?

The CHAIRMAN. Do not take this.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take this: In Admiral Kimmel's order 2CL-41 of October 14—

Admiral STARK. That's right. That is what it is.

The CHAIRMAN. —he said that a declaration of war may be preceded by, 1, a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor; 2, a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area; 3, a combination of these two. That does not seem to me to say anything specific about an air raid, but I suppose it envisages air as well as surface raids.

Admiral STARK. Well, when I read that order that was our thought.

[1819] The CHAIRMAN. Our thought is that No. 1 means air (indicating).

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you think that is right, do you?

Admiral STARK. That was my interpretation, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, it means an air raid: No. 1.

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes. Yes, sir.

Admiral STARK. I mean, until you brought it up I never even questioned it.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, if you can find the letter in which Admiral Kimmel suggested that he had in mind No. 1, I should like to see it.

Admiral TURNER. That is in a personal letter to you, Admiral, and you got those back.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, if Admiral Turner could get it and bring it in to us later I should like to see it.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. There is a letter as a part of the record from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief concerning the establishment of anti-torpedo nets in the harbor of Honolulu, in which in the first letter it was stated that the conditions there were such that he didn't believe that it was practicable to carry out a torpedo attack in shallow water and in limited areas of that kind; then, a second letter in which you speak of Taranto in Italy and in which you state that you must be careful of an attack there: that is, must have in mind, as you said a moment ago, that attack; but still no nets were established in the harbor, and there are none there now except your torpedo rafts.

Admiral TURNER. I have two letters here.

Admiral STARK. That is true, and off the record, which can be put on the record—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, what is this, off or on?

[1820] Admiral STANDLEY. Well, wait a minute. Do you want to answer that, or do you want to state it off the record? If so, if you do, I will withdraw the question.

Admiral STARK. That is true. Now, it is the best, if you want to get anything further—will you leave this off your record? If you want to get something further on the record,—

Admiral TURNER. I have the papers right here.

Admiral STARK. They conferred out there and decided they didn't want nets. You know that, don't you? Short and Kimmel.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral STARK. I will say that is true. And if you will elaborate there from the record (addressing Admiral Turner).

Admiral STANDLEY. I think we have the first letter. Now, the second letter was the one I would like to have you read, the one that speaks of the attack.

Admiral STARK. You spoke of two of them, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Well, we have a copy of them on the record in the files already.

Admiral TURNER. I have three letters here on that subject, and there are others. One is a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commander-in-Chief of Pacific Fleet, dated February 15, 1941.

Admiral STANDLEY. February 15.

Admiral TURNER. Serial 09330. Have you that?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. February, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we have it in full.

Admiral TURNER. That was after a previous exchange of correspondence on that subject of providing anti-torpedo baffles in Pearl Harbor. On the 17th of February a letter was sent to the commandants of all naval districts on that subject. I have that, giving a policy, and it is in that letter that the statement was made that, "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully [1821] drop torpedoes from planes. About 200 yards of torpedo run is necessary before exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

Now, later experience—

Admiral STARK (interposing). Corrected.

Admiral TURNER. —led the Department to believe that that was incorrect, and there is another circular letter out, of June 13, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. We have that.

Admiral STARK. You have that one?

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is referred to; I don't know whether we have it copied.

Admiral TURNER (continuing). —which draws back from that statement and makes this statement:

While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored may arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water, ten fathoms or more, is much more likely.

But there is a previous—this is the one I thought I was quoting:

Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as 300 feet and in some cases make additional dives of considerably less than 75 feet and make excellent runs. Hence it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, have you a third letter embodying a decision not to install any nets at this time?

Admiral STARK. It is here.

Admiral TURNER. That is the one of February 15.

[1822] The CHAIRMAN. Not subsequent; it is previous.

Admiral STARK. It is their recommendation. It came from out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, in a second letter there was a further consideration, after your second letter, and no nets were installed.

Admiral TURNER. The thing was: as soon as they arrived at that decision in June they undertook a study here as to how that problem there could be solved.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that study completed at this time?

Admiral TURNER. They never got a satisfactory answer, largely because the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District stated that until we could develop a light anti-torpedo net which could be moved with some facility he felt that it was better not to have the anti-torpedo baffles.

The CHAIRMAN. He has already testified that the anti-torpedo baffles at Pearl Harbor might very seriously interfere with the runs of his amphibian planes.

Admiral TURNER. It is an extremely difficult problem, and I could say this: that all of us that were working on it were very anxious to get a better protection against torpedoes in Pearl Harbor, and we concurred with great regret in the decision not to put them in, because we could not find the answer, after a great deal of thought and study.

Admiral STARK. And that was because of interference, as you just mentioned, and also, if ships wanted to get under way in a hurry, because of the time consumed in moving the nets, and therefore we concurred with the people on the spot.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think we ought to put these two letters on our record. Mr. Secretary, will you say that the Chief of Naval Operations has produced a letter of January 24, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, and [1823] a reply of February 7, which are ordered to be copied in the record at this point.

Admiral STANDLEY. Those are secret.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, shall we keep them in our files and not copy them?

General McNARNEY. No; it is all over the dam now.

Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I think; they are over the dam, but they are marked, "Secret."

Admiral TURNER. They were referred to previously. I invited attention to them in my previous testimony, and it was my intention at that time that they should go in the record. There is nothing there that isn't—

General McNARNEY. We have a lot of secret things in the record.

Admiral STARK. Maybe not to remove their secret status in the files if they are going into the record; of course, this record is secret.

General McNARNEY. This record is secret itself.

Admiral STARK. Yes.

(Letters referred to, produced by Chief of Naval Operations, are as follows:)

Op-12B-9-McC
(SC)A7-2(2)/FF1
Serial 00112.

SECRET

JANUARY 24, 1941.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. [1824] If war

eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

- (1) Air bombing attack.
- (2) Air torpedo plane attack.
- (3) Sabotage.
- (4) Submarine attack.
- (5) Mining.
- (6) Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

[1825] The counter measures to be considered are:

- (a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
- (b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
- (c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
- (d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
- (e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an Anti-Air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26—3" fixed anti-aircraft guns (of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor), 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun [1826] bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

(1) That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

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(2) That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.

[1827] (3) That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

(4) That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

(5) That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementing of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Navy Department.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX.

The Honorable

The SECRETARY OF WAR.

Copies to: Cinc. U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Com14. Op-22. Op-30.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, February 7, 1941.

SECRET

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of [1828] this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes; nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I am arranging to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the [1829] question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured—forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective.

(Signed) HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, is there anything more from these gentlemen? You are going to let us have that precis shortly, are you?

Admiral TURNER. Yes. It is being typed, and it should be ready shortly, I think.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We should like to have several copies.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. We shall adjourn to one-thirty.

[1830] (Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m. an adjournment was taken until 1:30 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Commission reconvened at 1:30 o'clock p. m., upon the expiration of the recess.)

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM J. WHALING, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name to the reporter, Colonel?

Colonel WHALING. William J. Whaling, Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps.

General McNARNEY. Will you swear him, Mr. Justice?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. We might go through that formality.

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Where were you on the morning of December 7, Colonel?

Colonel WHALING. On the morning of December 7 I was in Colonel Jackson's quarters in Pearl Harbor. I can indicate on that map (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Where were Colonel Jackson's quarters?

Colonel WHALING. Located just north of the Marine Barracks, about in that position (indicating on map), this being the Marine Barracks, this Pearl Harbor (indicating), this the dry dock (indicating), and the locality of the Administration Building of the Navy was about in there (indicating). This is where I was (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Now, where is the submarine base on this plan?

Colonel WHALING. The submarine base, right here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. I can see it now. All right, take a seat; [1831] the reporter will hear you better if you are over here.

(Colonel Whaling resumed the witness chair.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you without my questioning you give us an account of the first thing you saw, about the hour that you saw it, and then continue on with an account of what you saw?

Colonel WHALING. Commencing from the first thing I saw?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What did you say? "Saw," or the first of the incident?

The CHAIRMAN. The first notice you had of an attack was at what hour?

Admiral STANDLEY. The incident of the attack.

Colonel WHALING. Oh, it was about eight o'clock. That time can be up or down about five minutes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel WHALING. But about eight o'clock I was awakened by what I thought was gunfire, anti-aircraft fire. I was asleep at the time that the first explosion took place, and of course that awakened me. I turned over, and it happened to be that a Major James Monaghan was sleeping with me in the same set of quarters, and I said, "Jerry, don't you think the Admiral is a little bit inconsiderate of guests?"

And Jerry woke up and said, "I'll go down and see about it." And with that I waited a little while, and the next salvo or volley took place, and then I noticed the windows rattling, and I thought to myself: I didn't notice any 5-inch pieces mounted as close to the quarters as this last night, so it must be a little something wrong with that. And some of the detonations actually sounded like the heavy guns.

So with that I got up and walked over to the window facing the Pearl Harbor entry, and I looked out, and then I noticed smoke rising from the Pearl Harbor area. I turned to Jerry then and said, "This thing is so real that I believe that's [1832] an oil tank burning right out in front there." And then we hurriedly dressed and went outside. Well, it would be just—if I step over here I can draw some action here.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

(Colonel Whaling stepped to a map.)

Colonel WHALING. We stepped across the parade grounds, which is directly in front of the little square that I marked in black, and after we got over in front of the Marine Barracks, which is this little square (indicating), I met Colonel Elmer Hall. I said, "Elmer, this is a mighty fine show you are putting on. I have never seen anything quite like it."

He said, "It's so fine and real that, look at those Japs," and they were diving at that time into the—down and releasing their bombs in the vicinity of our ships which were anchored roughly in here (indicating). And we talked for a few more minutes in front of the barracks. At this same time that these planes were diving over here that we could plainly see, we could hear detonations over in the Hickam Field area, which was just south of our barracks—I have indicated it here (indicating)—and a few fragments, bricks and one thing another; it might have been concrete or it might have been shell fragments whistling over occasionally.

So, being an observer and unattached, I decided on looking around that the best place for me to be would be on top of that building. It's about a three-story concrete building. We went up on top of that building, and it happened we both had field glasses. We observed enemy formations, I would say—when I say a group I mean all the way from nine to twelve planes—coming in from the south, some of them releasing their bombs on Hickam, some of them passing over and releasing their bombs in the vicinity of our ships in the harbor. I can state that I don't believe those bombs were released any higher than two hundred yards, equal five or six hundred feet from the objective, from their targets, very low altitude.

[1833] Admiral STANDLEY. Those were not glide bombs or dive bombs? They were just——

Colonel WHALING. No; they were diving down. They were coming at a slope, not as great a slope as our dive bombers do, but they were coming down at a slope, and we could plainly from here (indicating) see the bombs released; and at that time, of course, on arriving on the top of the building I could look over here and discover that the oil tank that I thought was an oil tank originall was the OKLAHOMA—or the ARIZONA.

The CHAIRMAN. Arizona.

Colonel WHALING. I could look directly across and see the ARIZONA, which was approximately in that position (indicating), so we discovered then that was the OKLAHOMA and not an oil tank.

The CHAIRMAN. The ARIZONA.

Colonel WHALING. The ARIZONA. That is right. I am getting the two mixed up. The ARIZONA was here (indicating), and the OKLAHOMA was forward.

So then, noticing that the planes were coming directly over the top of the barracks, I guess that barracks—well, that's about the right position (indicating). Hickam hangars were along about like that (indicating). Hickam Barracks was west of the hangars. From our position up here we saw several bombs light over in the Hickam area. We could see fragments, and we could see three huge holes left in barracks and hangars over there. Later on I discovered there were five hangars hit and three barracks with direct hits.

These planes, as I say, were coming in in formation from the south, some of them stopping, dropping their load here (indicating), others dropping in over here (indicating). Well, they would dive down and turn out. They must have been very close to the superstructure of some of the ships, they were that low, in my estimation. The smoke that was coming from [1834] the ARIZONA was drifting across in a south-westerly direction. They would come down, drop their bombs, and were making their turn and their bank to take off, and they were taking off in this direction (indicating) toward the east or over toward Honolulu, the City of Honolulu, and they were disappearing momentarily through that smoke and swinging in this direction coming out (indicating). I could watch them, and one formation I watched from the time it arrived until the time it went out and departed. As I said before, there were about nine to twelve ships, planes, in this formation. They would swing in this direction, of course being very low, swing over in this direction, and about the time they would arrive over Honolulu they were back in a V formation again. They would go down approximately down the road. I don't know whether they were doing any machine-gunning individually on the way to the city or not. Presumably they were. And I did notice two fires started in the city itself, from where I could see the town. I imagine it was about seven or eight miles from Pearl Harbor to Honolulu. I could see two very prominent large fires started over town.

So they went over that way, swung to the south after passing the city, then toward the southwest, later on toward the west; and then almost to the limit of my visibility, and I think it must have been well beyond ten miles, they swung to the northwest.

The CHAIRMAN. Northwest?

Colonel WHALING. Northwest.

The CHAIRMAN. No formation that you noticed came back the second time over Pearl Harbor?

Colonel WHALING. Now, I believe—I have divided it into two phases. The first phase from eight to nine-fifteen, the second phase from about ten—it might have been ten-fifteen—until about eleven-fifteen. There was a pause of about three [1835] quarters of an hour from nine-fifteen to ten or ten-fifteen that there was practically no bombing in this area (indicating). Then at ten-fifteen, well, they took up the bombing again. They concentrated on heavy bombings in both places.

The CHAIRMAN. Did the second attack come in from the southward?

Colonel WHALING. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Same as the first one?

Colonel WHALING. Yes. That is, I saw some more planes. Now I don't know; they were probably—might have been others coming in from other directions, but these particular formations were coming in, and I could plainly see them coming in, and I would say at an altitude of about three thousand feet.

Admiral STANDLEY. Right there, Colonel, may I ask about the time you give, nine, nine-fifteen, and ten, ten-fifteen; were those estimates or did you have anything accurate about it?

Colonel WHALING. Just estimates. I can't say positively because I only glanced at my watch probably three or four or five times during the morning, but it is the approximate time, must be ten or fifteen minutes from the time that was.

Admiral STANDLEY. The reason I ask that is that in the evidence here we have that the planes all disappeared from that area by ten a. m., and I was wondering.

Colonel WHALING. Oh, no. They turned—

Admiral STANLEY. Well, we have it in the testimony that all planes had withdrawn by ten a. m.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel WHALING. I think not.

The CHAIRMAN. That is wrong, is it?

Admiral STANLEY. That is the reason I asked that question.

Colonel WHALING. No, sir; there was bombing after that. I think it ran closer to eleven o'clock.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes. Well, that is all right; I just [1836] wanted to know. You go right ahead.

(Colonel Whaling went to the blackboard.)

Colonel WHALING. During the lull—in the lull, I mean, from about nine-fifteen, between nine and ten, someplace in there, we could look over and see the people at Hickman Field loading or attempting to load the bombs into their bombers. They were trying to get some bombers loaded, apparently, to take the air. About ten o'clock we could see destroyers going out through the channel, several of them. I don't know how many, but several went out through the channel along about that time.

Now, although they started loading apparently as soon as they could over there I believe it was about eleven-twenty or eleven-thirty when finally six bombers did get off the ground over there. It might have been a little later than that, but somewhere around eleven-thirty, and I was over there just about the time they were taking off, and I believe it was around eleven-thirty. They took off two at a time, and six

of them taking off swung around and went over southwest or west. I don't know just where they did go.

Well, that I think is the general picture up to the individual destruction that took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel, you think there were perhaps twelve planes in the first formation that you saw come over when they were dive bombing, or—

Colonel WHALING. Well, there might have been more than that. I estimated about a hundred planes.

The CHAIRMAN. That you counted, about a hundred planes all told?

Colonel WHALING. Oh, in the entire morning?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel WHALING. Well, let's see now. There were twenty, two formations of—must have been twenty in two formations that I saw: that is, after the lull. Before that there must have [1837] been twenty or thirty more, maybe. No. Maybe—I figured there must be at least a hundred planes attacking at the different fields and this place. I think probably I would say seventy-five planes in there.

The CHAIRMAN. And then all told you saw seventy-five planes at various times throughout the whole period?

Colonel WHALING. Throughout the whole morning, I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they of different types?

Colonel WHALING. The ones that were close to me and that were actually doing the bombing were all the same type.

The CHAIRMAN. Single-engine?

Colonel WHALING. Single engines, two-seaters: that is, a gunner in rear and pilot forward.

General McNARNEY. Did you see any torpedoes launched?

Colonel WHALING. The torpedo planes were coming in from a different angle apparently. I think they were coming in from the other direction and swinging in this way (indicating). I think most of them were swinging in this way.

The CHAIRMAN. Indicating coming around to the north and then swinging to the west.

Colonel WHALING. Came through the valley. I am not sure, but—I didn't see any of those actually coming in in formation. As I say, the ones that I saw coming in would come up to a point almost directly over the barracks and then peel off one at a time and dive down and drop their bombs. The other planes, and I know—I know there were other planes there—were coming in, and many of them came in this way (indicating), and I didn't get a good look at them. There was a lot of smoke. I believe many of the bombs—or torpedoes, rather, were released like this (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. We have got some testimony that a number of those torpedo planes came across here almost directly over [1838] the submarine base (indicating).

Colonel WHALING. That is the direction I would say. That is the direction I would say.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you remember, the young lieutenant told us that, that was in command of that little boat.

Admiral STANDLEY. Little boat, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Said they came right over the submarine base there.

Colonel WHALING. Later on I walked over there, and I saw one of the torpedoes that had been released and went on to the beach there. It was facing like that (indicating).

Admiral REEVES. To the west.

The CHAIRMAN. Facing to the west.

Colonel WHALING. To the west, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was near one of the dry docks?

Colonel WHALING. Yes, the dry docks were right here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Colonel WHALING. That was over here in front of the officers' club.

The CHAIRMAN. In front of the officers' club.

Admiral REEVES. The bombing after the lull, in the second attack, of those planes that came in at about three thousand feet altitude, was that level bombing or did they dive down?

Colonel WHALING. No. They came in at about three thousand, dropped down in not a horizontal—

Admiral REEVES. Shallow glide?

Colonel WHALING. In not a horizontal but a dive and released their bombs not higher than five or six hundred feet from their targets.

Admiral REEVES. Did you see any bombs released at eight or ten thousand feet altitude?

Colonel WHALING. No, sir, none. All the bombs I saw [1839] released were released right down close to their objectives, the targets.

General McNARNEY. At the time you saw six bombers take off from Hickman Field were there any Japanese planes in sight at that time?

Colonel WHALING. I didn't see any at that time, no, sir.

General McNARNEY. How long had they disappeared, in your estimation?

Colonel WHALING. Oh, maybe twenty minutes, might have been thirty minutes. Fifteen to thirty minutes, I would say, because I had time—there was a—between the bombing—after the last bombing, which I would say roughly might have been around eleven o'clock, I did see some other Jap planes over towards the city, in that direction (indicating), and there was quite a lot of firing going on, firing at those planes. Just about the time—not over this way, I mean, but they were passing here going in that direction (indicating). Now, as that firing sort of eased a little bit I noticed one of these planes coming across, and he came across in a direction like this at a long, long glide, and I thought he wanted to land here, but quite a number of our—

The CHAIRMAN. You thought he wanted to land at Hickam Field?

Colonel WHALING. I think he wanted to land at Hickam Field, the way he was coming in, low down and a long easy glide, but there was so many of our aircraft—anti-aircraft opened up on him that apparently he pulled off, and I think he went over and landed somewhere else. I know he didn't land here.

General McNARNEY. What type plane was that?

Colonel WHALING. It looked to me as though it may have been one of the new twin-engine bombers. I am not sure.

General McNARNEY. Four-engine?

[1840] Colonel WHALING. Were they?

General McNARNEY. Two- or four-engine?

Colonel WHALING. Two.

General McNARNEY. Two.

Colonel WHALING. It wasn't big enough for a fortress.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you say after that ceased then these planes took off from Hickam?

Colonel WHALING. Yes, sir. So it might have been around eleven-thirty. I made a note of it at the time; about eleven-thirty they took off.

The CHAIRMAN. The Army records show eleven twenty-seven, so you are very close.

Colonel WHALING. Oh, is that so?

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, that second wave, is that the one you are describing, the torpedo wave?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. The one where they dropped torpedoes?

Colonel WHALING. I think those torpedo planes came in in both waves. I think many of the torpedoes were dropped in the first phase. I know the ARIZONA and the OKLAHOMA were hit early in the—because, as I say, when I first looked out the window the ARIZONA was afire then. She was smoking then.

Admiral REEVES. You didn't see any torpedoes dropped yourself?

Colonel WHALING. Not torpedoes, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. I do not think of anything else.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just one thing, Colonel. In regard to that first wave that came over there, could you see whether there was any anti-aircraft gunfire at that time meeting that attack?

Colonel WHALING. Oh, yes, there was anti-aircraft gunfire. I don't know just what it consisted of, but there was some.

Admiral STANDLEY. You didn't know—couldn't tell whether [1841] it was on the ships or on shore, or what?

Colonel WHALING. No; I could just hear from—

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Colonel WHALING. I could hear the firing going on down from the ships, and the only guns I could see were those right around the Marine Barracks. We had .30 calibers and .50 calibers there only.

Admiral STANDLEY. As I understood you to say, the thing that awakened you was gunfire at the very beginning.

Colonel WHALING. That was my first thought, Admiral. I thought it was a practice run, and it wasn't until I arrived over in front of the barracks and saw the first planes—then did I realize that we were at war with Japan.

Admiral STANDLEY. But gunfire was going on?

Colonel WHALING. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was gunfire at that time?

Colonel WHALING. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Colonel BROWN. Did you make it clear what pattern those planes made when they went off, as to where the carrier might be?

I think Colonel Whaling failed to bring one thing out when he was telling the story, when I heard the story the first time: the definite pattern that those planes indicated where the carriers were. They

went out and assembled to the south, and then finally when they all disappeared they disappeared to the northwest.

The CHAIRMAN. He has told us that. He stated that.

Do not discuss your testimony here with anyone outside, Colonel, please.

Colonel WHALING. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Do not discuss your testimony here with anyone outside. [1842]

Colonel WHALING. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What goes on here is confidential.

Colonel WHALING. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Will you be sworn, Colonel?

TESTIMONY OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL EDWARD F. FRANCE, SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give you full name and rank and duty to the reporter?

Colonel FRANCE. Edward F. France, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, United States Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel France, we desire to interrogate you about the message of December 7, 1941. Your records show at what time you received that from the office of the Chief of Staff?

Colonel FRANCE. We haven't the exact time that we received that message. It was somewhere between eleven-thirty and twelve noon. I would say, after the discussion with Colonel Bratton and refreshing our memories, that it was somewhere around ten minutes to twelve: eleven-fifty.

The CHAIRMAN. How long did it take to encode that, approximately?

Colonel FRANCE. The time involved was about twelve minutes. I would like to correct that: about ten minutes, because we filed it at 12:01.

The CHAIRMAN. You filed it at 12:01?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And what do you mean by filing it?

Colonel FRANCE. We turned it over—called the Western Union at 12:01, and that was the time that we started to send that message to them, at 12:01. [1843]

The CHAIRMAN. How do you send it to Western Union?

Colonel FRANCE. On the teletype, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There is a teletype connected between your office and the Western Union office?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir, and that message was complete at 12:17. Here is the message, sir (handing a message to the Chairman).

The CHAIRMAN. That is, the Western Union had it complete at 12:17?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, I understand that you had an open wire from the Western Union office in Washington to San Francisco; is that right?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir. I left Colonel Bratton in my code room. The procedure being a little unusual, he came up there very much exercised and inquired to get into the code room immediately, so it alarmed me. I was sitting across from my office, and I went over immediately to open it, and Colonel Bratton told me the importance of this dispatch. I arranged for him to go inside immediately, and I put my code people to work, and then I left Colonel Bratton there and went directly to the operating room and checked my Honolulu circuit and found out that we had faded out, as we say. The signal strength diminished, and we were unable to work Honolulu direct. My next alternative was commercial wire. We had previously handled messages that way. I called the Western Union immediately and asked them to set up a wire direct to San Francisco. I was familiar with the fact that they had a tube running across the street to the R. C. A., and that was the quickest means at my disposal at that time. Had I accepted to send that message via the Postal Telegraph Company the message would have to go to New York. There facilities are [1844] not as—

The CHAIRMAN. Direct?

Colonel FRANCE. Well, their facilities are not as ample as the Western Union, and the message would have had to be relayed at New York and relayed through the mux machines or multiplex machines in Chicago and then to San Francisco, which would require a relay from there over to the—upstairs to the commercial cable, and it would have gone by cable. I cautioned my operators in setting this coded message up to be sure that there would be no errors in it. I told them that accuracy was the important thing and speed was the second, because I didn't want that message to get into Honolulu garbled, as we say. So I took the shortest route for me in relays, and that was via the Western Union.

The CHAIRMAN. Has it ever been your custom, when you were in a jam for sending, to ask the Navy radio to send?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, indeed, sir. At times we do that. I didn't believe at this particular time that was the right thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not?

Colonel FRANCE. For the reason that I had faded out of Honolulu, and I could lose no minutes, and that was the next thing at my disposal, would require me to call the Navy to find out as to whether or not they were getting through all right. We don't have an hourly report, or so, that I am abreast of their operation, but I assumed in my quick judgment that this was the proper thing to do.

The CHAIRMAN. To your knowledge is the sending station at San Francisco of R. C. A. a powerful station that would break through when you could not?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir. They have 40 kilowatts of power there, sir, and I have 10, 10 kilowatts of power, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, normally how would you get a report of the receipt of this message in Honolulu?

[1845] Colonel FRANCE. Normally, sir, we send a pilot message ahead of any message that is of—

The CHAIRMAN. Of importance.

Colonel FRANCE. Of importance, and that is what I did in this particular case. I asked them—told the Western Union. In the

setup they automatically made the routine—the routine would suggest it in itself in setting that circuit up, but nevertheless we also told them we wanted immediate report on the delivery of that message, and I was very much concerned and General Marshall was very much concerned that we were not getting the delivery on that, and we followed it up with a service message to see. We wanted to know whose hands that message got into, and it went on late until the night, and two o'clock in the morning we hadn't as yet received the reply, and I personally talked to the signal officer over there about it on the radio.

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Powell?

Colonel FRANCE. Colonel Powell's office, yes, sir. Colonel Powell had—

The CHAIRMAN. He was away?

Colonel FRANCE. He was out in the field. The operator—

The CHAIRMAN. March?

Colonel FRANCE. I don't recall who it was, but I talked to him on the wire there and told him it was imperative that I inform General Marshall as to who received that message; and finally we got a report the following day, sir. This is the work sheet here on that message, sir, that shows the verbiage that was used in it. Would you care to see that sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No; I think not.

Colonel FRANCE. We finally got this message back. It was signed by General Short (handing a document to the Chairman) stating that that message was received in Honolulu at 7:33 in the morning.

[1846] The CHAIRMAN. And delivered to him at about 11:45?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It was delivered to the signal officer?

Colonel FRANCE. To the Fort Shafter signal office, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The same as we have seen.

The CHAIRMAN. The same as we have seen.

Admiral STANDLEY. Colonel, where is the Western Union office? Do you have a Western Union office in the War Department?

Colonel FRANCE. I have a Western Union office—I am their agent, Admiral—in my office. I am their agent, and I have a machine connected right to their office in town in here, a teletype machine right in their office. In fact, I have six machines into their office, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Did you tell General Short the route the message was following?

Colonel FRANCE. No, sir. I didn't believe that concerned the General, Admiral. I thought he was going to be rather busy, tried not to disturb those people.

The CHAIRMAN. You said "General Short."

Admiral REEVES. I mean General Marshall. Did you tell General Marshall the route it was following?

Colonel FRANCE. No, sir, I did not. General Marshall was exceedingly busy that morning, and I tried not to disturb him any more than necessary.

Admiral STANDLEY. How much urgency did General Marshall appear to indicate when he gave you this message? What was his attitude?

Colonel FRANCE. I can only say that, Admiral, by the attitude of Colonel Bratton.

Admiral STANDLEY. You only saw Colonel Bratton?

Colonel FRANCE. I only saw Colonel Bratton, but he was very much exercised over it. I have never seen him more [1847] excited, and I have a great deal of contact with him, but he was very positive that this must get out immediately, and I personally took charge of it and left nothing undone to move that just as fast as I could move it. I personally came back in the office and took it when the message was encoded and took it out to the operator, and after that message was sent I personally called the Western Union and told them the importance of it.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't know that I understand what you mean by a "pilot message." You say you sent a pilot message ahead of this one?

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir. That is what you call a message that you tell—tell the next station that this message is coming, that there is an important message on its way, sir. That is the normal procedure in communications. I had a similar message going to Melbourne, Australia, last Sunday morning, and I sent a pilot message, so that in the relay stations the chief operator there is alert for that message, to see that it gets personal attention and sent on its way. That is what a pilot message does, sir. It clears the wires and puts everyone on their toes.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything else?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Don't discuss the testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel.

General McNARNEY. Do you want to give him a warning?

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, Colonel, don't discuss your testimony here with anyone outside.

Colonel FRANCE. Yes, sir. I have not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't do it.

I guess that is all we have got for today, Admiral.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. HOWE. We have General Gerow on standby warning. I don't know whether he will be necessary or not.

[1848] (There was colloquy off the record.)

Colonel BROWN. General Gerow.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn, sir?

TESTIMONY OF BRIGADIER GENERAL LEONARD T. GEROW, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR PLANS DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give the reporter your full name and rank and your assignment to duty?

General GEROW. Leonard T. Gerow, Brigadier General, Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division, Army.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you under the same assignment on December 7, 1941?

General GEROW. I was.

The CHAIRMAN. We are interested in the messages which went to General Short from the War Department on and after November 27, 1941. Who composed the message of November 27, if you know?

General GEROW. That message was prepared by Colonel Bundy and myself. It was presented, I think, on the morning of November 27 to a conference consisting of the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark. After a draft of the message was presented to that conference the Secretary of War called up Mr. Hull with regard to the first sentence of the draft message that we had prepared. After the conversation between the Secretary of War and Mr. Hull the first sentence of the message was revised as is shown here in this message (indicating). I don't think I have a copy of the original draft. That was burned.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the trend of the general provision?

General GEROW. Well, it was purely a question of wording, Admiral. I think we stated in our first draft of the message that the negotiations had terminated, and Mr. Hull didn't [1849] want to make it that strong, and he said,

To all intents and purposes it has been terminated with only a slight possibility of them being resumed.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any discussion at that conference, General, as to whether that message laid too much stress on sabotage and said too little about defensive measures?

General GEROW. Laid too much stress on sabotage?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GEROW. I don't think that message referred to sabotage at all, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quite right; it doesn't mention sabotage. I was wrong in my recollection.

General GEROW. I would like to supplement that statement: In the original draft that we prepared there was a statement, which I have here, included in the message which said needed measures for protection against subversive activities should be taken immediately. That sentence was taken out late that evening, at the conference with the Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Colonel Bundy and myself. We felt that the caution as to subversive activities should go in a separate message, that it shouldn't be combined in this message, and it was decided to send it to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department to notify the Commanding General, rather than confuse the two issues in one message.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, there was a reply to that message from General Short, which I show you. Are you familiar with that reply?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, I am, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you understand by the phrase, "Liaison with the Navy," in that message, or what did the staff understand by it, as you know the facts?

General GEROW. Well, I must confess that in reading that message I tied it in in my mind with a message that had been [1850] sent by G-2, and as a reply to their message and not a reply to this other message. It was not checked against the number, which should have been done either by myself or someone in my division.

The CHAIRMAN. You will see by the reply that it evidently was intended as a reply to the message we have just been talking about.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. On the same day that the message of November 27 was sent out another message was sent from G-2, General Miles, which mentioned subversive activities.

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was confusion here as to whether General Short's reply was to General Miles' message or to the long message which we discussed.

General GEROW. Well, the question wasn't raised when it came through my division. It wasn't noted, Mr. Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, then, on the next day General Miles caused to be forwarded through the Adjutant General a rather long message which did deal with sabotage, which I show you.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that the 28th?

The CHAIRMAN. It was forwarded from here on the 28th.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that prior to the short message from General Short in which it says, "Liaison with the Navy"? Was that prior to that or after that?

The CHAIRMAN. They are both on the same day.

Admiral STANDLEY. The same day.

The CHAIRMAN. Short wired on the 27th, and this went out on the 27th. Now, I don't know whether this went out subsequent to the receipt of Short's message or not. We could probably find that out.

Gq ahead, General.

General GEROW. I knew this message was being—my message [1851] was being prepared by G-2 to dispatch on this subject, but I did not see the message before it went out. It was dispatched by the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2. That is the best of my recollection.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GEROW. It may have passed through—I haven't refreshed—

Admiral STANDLEY. Was that message resulting from your conference of the previous day in which you took out the question of sabotage in the previous message, and this was the resulting message?

General GEROW. I think, sir, the short one on the 27th that G-2 sent out was the resulting message. I imagine this was an elaboration the next day which G-2 undertook to prepare.

The CHAIRMAN. It is possible, then, that General Short might have understood that all these messages when taken together were a warning particularly against sabotage, General?

General GEROW. Well, that is a hard question for me to answer, Mr. Justice. I felt that we made our telegram, the one that War Plans sent out on the 27th, pretty strong, and no one knows what he would have done had he been in that position and not having perhaps all the information we had here, but we intended it to be a warning against not only subversive elements but against hostile action, as we stated hostile action might occur at any moment.

Admiral REEVES. Did the message from War Plans on the 27th contain any reference to sabotage?

General GEROW. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then General Short couldn't have obtained from the War Plans message any idea that you were talking about sabotage?

General GEROW. I don't see how he could, sir, except this one sentence: it said,

Prior to hostile Japanese action you [1852] are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not repeat not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

Admiral REEVES. Then the words "other measures" are the only possible reference to sabotage that that message could have been interpreted as containing?

General GEROW. I should say yes to you.

General McNARNEY. I would like to ask, General Gerow, what you had in mind when you put the word in, "reconnaissance."

General GEROW. We put that in with the idea of preventing surprise. the identification of the reconnaissance measures. The term "and other measures" we put in—we did not put it in originally in the telegram to apply to the prevention of sabotage, because in our original draft we did have a sentence that applied to that, but we had in mind with the necessary alerts the necessary precautions that a commander should take under a situation that we pictured.

General McNARNEY. Did you consider that a directive or a direct order to undertake some sort of reconnaissance, or was it left up to the Commander himself as to whether he thought reconnaissance was necessary? In other words, would you consider that a direct order, or do you think that the Commander still had some discretion?

General GEROW. The extent of that was left to his judgment, but the message distinctly stated,

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General McNARNEY. Do you know what the unparaphrased actual message that went out said? Did it say that "You are directed to undertake reconnaissance"?

[1853] Have you a copy of the unparaphrased message that was sent out?

General GEROW. The unparaphrased message stated,

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General McNARNEY. Well, would the words, "as you deem necessary," in your opinion, allow the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to not undertake reconnaissance if he thought it was unnecessary?

General GEROW. That is a rather difficult question to answer. We say, "as you deem necessary." We indicated that we felt increased reconnaissance was necessary.

Admiral REEVES. Did you intend the words, "as you deem necessary," to apply to reconnaissance or to apply only to other measures?

General GEROW. It was my understanding it would apply—it was our intention that it would apply both to reconnaissance and other measures. We looked on reconnaissance as something we wanted to emphasize among the various measures. We had had reports of Japanese concentrations in the Mandate Islands, and we felt that every effort should be made to identify any Japanese movements in that direction. As a matter of fact, we sent out those two B-24 bombers with an idea of trying to confirm the information that we received from other sources.

Admiral REEVES. Then it was your intention that reconnaissance should be conducted, but the character and nature of the reconnaissance was to be as he deemed necessary?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. We felt that reconnaissance was being conducted, but we felt that perhaps it wasn't—that the seriousness of the situation hadn't been brought sufficiently to their attention to increase the reconnaissance to the extent necessary.

[1854] General McNARNEY. Although the Commander may have had some discretion in the matter, would you say that if no reconnaissance was being ordered as a consequence of that message that constituted a direct disobedience of your directive?

General GEROW. I would not consider it a direct disobedience of that directive.

General McNARNEY. What would you consider it?

General GEROW. What?

General McNARNEY. I say what would you consider it, sir?

General GEROW. Well, in his opinion he probably had some reconnaissance.

General McNARNEY. Well, the question was if there were no reconnaissance ordered, and I will add: if there were no reconnaissance in effect at the moment. In other words, if no reconnaissance at all were being done, do you consider that that is a disobedience of orders, not to institute some reconnaissance?

General GEROW. I would consider it a failure to obey orders.

The CHAIRMAN. General, in the message of November 27, which is the message we are talking about, you provided, "Report measures taken."

Now, there was one report by General Short which I have shown you.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "Alert against sabotage. Liaison with Navy."

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. After the receipt of yours of the 28th General Short sent you another long telegram under date of November 29 in which he purports to answer the message prepared by G-2 and signed "Adams." (Indicating).

General GEROW. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. In that he reports at great length, as I read it, the measures he has taken to prevent sabotage, [1855] counter-espionage, propaganda, and so forth; is that right?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To whom in the War Department would that telegram go?

General GEROW. I should say it would normally go for action to the Assistant Chief of Staff G-2.

The CHAIRMAN. General Miles?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know where it did go in fact?

General GEROW. I do not, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did it come under your eye?

General GEROW. I do not recall it, Mr. Justice. It may have come through my division in information copy.

The CHAIRMAN. There is nothing in that to report any action taken in the shape of reconnaissance or other measures to repel hostile attack that you can find, is there?

General GEROW. I haven't studied it quite carefully.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, read it carefully, will you?

(The document referred to was examined by General Gerow.)

General GEROW. That message applies only to anti-sabotage and subversive measures.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, did the Department prior to December 7 send General Short any further or other directive?

General GEROW. The only one that I know of, sir, is the one that was sent on December 7.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. You are familiar with the fact that several Navy messages were sent?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Those of November 24 and November 29 with directions to show them to the Commanding General?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were copies of those shown to your staff [1856] before they went out from the Navy Department?

General GEROW. The one of November 24 was, yes, sir. I don't recall the other two that you refer to.

The CHAIRMAN. 29th, General.

General GEROW. The 29th?

Admiral REEVES. That is the one quoting.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes.

General GEROW. I may have seen that message, but we didn't have a copy furnished us, as I recall. We had a number of conversations.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, that was a message from the Navy quoting an Army message for the information of naval commandants.

General GEROW. Yes, sir. We have a copy. We received a copy of that from the Navy, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You are quite right; that didn't say, "Inform Army commanders," because it was quoting a directive to Army commanders.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did your Department send any instructions to department commanders with respect to destruction of codes prior to the 7th?

General GEROW. No, sir, unless there were some messages that went out from G-2 which I didn't see.

The CHAIRMAN. I think there is nothing further. General, have you anything?

General McNARNEY. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Reeves?

Admiral REEVES. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I have a question.

General, we have discussed a message there from the War Department to General Short; it is a message which concerns [1857] only military instructions and not sabotage and subversive movements, and it contains the message, "Report action taken."

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. "Report measures taken."

Admiral STANDLEY. "Report measures taken." Now, what was the reason for putting that directive in there: "Report measures taken"?

General GEROW. Well, because we had been unable in the past to get information of exactly what was being done from the various overseas possessions in messages of this kind, and in some cases we did not know that it had even been acknowledged. In this instance we wanted to know what measures he had taken. In other words, had he changed his dispositions? Had he altered his whole command?

Admiral STANDLEY. Then who would have been interested in following up that message to see whether those instructions were obeyed or not?

General GEROW. The War Plans Division, sir, should have been—

Admiral STANDLEY. War Plans Division.

General GEROW. Should have been responsible for following it up, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was not done then?

General GEROW. No, sir, it was not.

Admiral STANDLEY. You considered the message about sabotage in which he said "Liaison with the Navy" as referring or as complying with your instructions?

General GEROW. No, sir. That message that went through, I assumed it to be the answer to the G-2 message in my reading of it, and not the answer to this message.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not the answer to the "Report action taken"?

General GEROW. No, sir.

[1858] Admiral STANDLEY. Then those instructions went by the board: nobody followed them up then?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir; that is, between the 27th and the 7th.

The CHAIRMAN. We asked you when you were here before whether you would prepare a little precis of the occurrences in the last month or so before the attack. Have you done so?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I started back a little further than that: the general scheme of war planning, and then I outlined the messages as I saw them.

The CHAIRMAN. We may have that, may we?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. Here it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Admiral STANDLEY. Just another question.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, certainly.

Admiral STANDLEY. General, doesn't that message from General Short, the short message, mention the reference?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General GEROW. It does mention the reference, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And that reference is the message we are discussing?

General GEROW. That was sent by War Plans Division, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. So that was the answer to the message that you sent?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It was not checked against the number of the message. We went on the assumption rather than a check of the number of the message.

The CHAIRMAN. General, was a copy of the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan of the Hawaiian Department and the Fourteenth Naval District filed with you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. We have a—you have a copy of it, haven't you, Colonel McKee?

The CHAIRMAN. Now, as we read that plan it was to become [1859] effective not in peacetime but in time of emergency or hostile attack; isn't that right? It was a war plan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How was the Commanding General to know from your message of the 27th that he ought to put that war plan into effect or that he and the Naval Commander jointly ought to put it into effect?

General GEROW. It wasn't intended that he should put it into effect, Mr. Justice. He was told in this message, "Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan."

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then did the Army, War Department, intend that he should sit on a peacetime basis until some attack developed against him?

General GEROW. No, sir. We pointed out in the message the possible danger of attack and directed reconnaissance and other necessary measures without fully carrying into effect the provisions of this plan, which would have required hostile action against Japan, and the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act.

The CHAIRMAN. This was a defense plan, wasn't it?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That wouldn't require any hostile action against Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir, that had missions in there requiring him to attack enemy vessels, and so forth, on approach, and he could have committed hostile overt acts under that if we put this plan into effect, and as you notice we did not put it into effect against Germany and Italy until subsequent to the attack by Japan, because we were not then at war with Germany and Italy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, then if I understand you, he was to put into effect so much of that plan as consisted of reconnaissances and other means of guarding against a surprise [1860] attack. That was your purpose in instructing him; is that right?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. He had certain alert plans over there, certain preparations to meet an emergency, prior to the actual execution of a war plan. I think in their joint plan that was drawn up between the Navy and the Army, I think I quoted in this paper here, they said that when they agreed that danger of attack was imminent they would do certain things.

The CHAIRMAN. And you intended that they should do all those things that tended to the security of the naval base?

General GEROW. Absolutely, and the message stated, sir, that with regard to the overt act,

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have nothing more. Have you?

Admiral REEVES. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

The hearing is adjourned subject to the call of the Chairman.

(Thereupon, at 3:05 o'clock p. m., an adjournment was taken subject to the call of the Chairman.)

[1861] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1942

BOARD ROOM, 2905 NAVY BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Commission reconvened at 9:30 o'clock a. m. pursuant to adjournment on yesterday, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court,
Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;

Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;

Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

Major General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;

Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;

Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal
Advisor to the Commission;

Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL RICHMOND KELLY TURNER,
UNITED STATES NAVY—Recalled**

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Turner, I understood you to say yesterday that Admiral Kimmel received from the Department copies of the correspondence between the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, of date January 24, and February 7, 1941. Copies of each letter you lodged with the Commission yesterday. Do I correctly understand you so to state?

[1862] Admiral TURNER. The records of the secret file room of the Chief of Naval Operations show that copies of both letters were forwarded both to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. If Admiral Kimmel did not take his command until after the first of these letters was written, I assume the letters would remain in the file of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, for his notice when he did take command.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, that is correct. I believe, however, from the time it usually takes for letters to go by ordinary mail from Wash-

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ington to Honolulu that this letter arrived after Admiral Kimmel took command.

I will check into this and furnish the exact dates of delivery.

The CHAIRMAN. I would appreciate that.

Admiral TURNER. I find that the letter of January 24, 1941, signed by the Secretary of the Navy, was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on February 5, 1941, and by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on the same date, February 5, 1941; and that the letter of February 7, 1941, signed by the Secretary of War, was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on February 26, 1941, and by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District on the same date, February 26, 1941.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

* * * * *

(Thereupon the Commission went into executive session.)

[S-A] **ANNEX TO TRANSCRIPT AND NOT A PART
 . THEREOF**

A COPY OF THE TRANSCRIBED TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL GIVEN BEFORE THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK ON THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII, AND REVISED BY AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSION IN COMPLIANCE WITH REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL'S REQUEST.

[S-A1] **UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET**
 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Cincpac File No.
A2-11/FF12/
A4-3/QL/(13)
Serial 01646

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., October 14, 1941.

Confidential

PACIFIC FLEET CONFIDENTIAL LETTER NO. 2CL-41 (Revised).

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
To: PACIFIC FLEET.
Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.
Reference:

- (a) Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41.
- (b) Cincpac conf. ltr. file A7-2(13) Serial 01221 of 8 August 1941.
- (c) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 1CM-41.
- (d) Pacific Fleet Conf. Memo. No. 2CM-41.
- (e) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 3L-40 (Revised).
- (f) U. S. Fleet Letter No. 19L-40.
- (g) Section 3, Chapter II, U. S. F. 10.
- (h) Chapter IV, U. S. F. 10.

Enclosure:

- (A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors
- (B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

1. Reference (a) is revised herewith. References (b), (c) and (d), are cancelled and superseded by this letter.

2. The security of the Fleet, operating and based in the Hawaiian Area, is predicated, at present, on two assumptions:

(a) That no responsible foreign power will provoke war, under present existing conditions, by attack on the Fleet or Base, but that irresponsible and misguided nationals of such powers may attempt;

- (1) sabotage, on ships based in Pearl Harbor, from small craft.
- (2) to block the entrance to Pearl Harbor by sinking an obstruction in the Channel.

(3) to lay magnetic or other mines in the approaches to Pearl Harbor.

(b) That a declaration of war may be preceded by:

- (1) a surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor,
- (2) a surprise submarine attack on ships in operating area,
- (3) a combination of these two.

3. The following security measures are prescribed herewith, effective in part in accordance with enclosure (B) or in their entirety as may later be directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, or the Senior Officer Present Afloat in the Hawaiian Area:

(A) *Continuous Patrols:*

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(1) Inshore Patrol (administered and furnished by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District).

(2) Boom Patrols.

(3) Harbor Patrols.

(B) *Intermittent Patrols:*

(1) Destroyer Offshore Patrol.

[S-42] (a) The limits of this patrol shall be the navigable portion to seaward of a circle ten miles in radius from Pearl Harbor entrance buoy number one which is not patrolled by the Inshore Patrol.

(b) Three destroyers to search twelve hours prior to the sortie or entry of the Fleet or of a Task Force containing heavy ships. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol and when a sortie and entry occur in succession the Commander entering shall furnish it.

(c) One destroyer (READY DUTY) to screen heavy ships departing or entering Pearl Harbor other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry. The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District will administer the Ready Duty Destroyer for this purpose and issue necessary orders when requested by forces afloat. Such Ready Duty destroyer shall be on one hour's notice.

(2) Air Patrols:

(a) Daily search of operating areas as directed, by Aircraft, Scouting Force.

(b) An air patrol to cover entry or sortie of a Fleet or Task Force. It will search that part of a circle of a radius of thirty miles from the entrance channel buoys which is south of latitude 21°-20' N. The Fleet or Task Force Commander concerned shall furnish this patrol, establishing it at least two hours prior to the sortie or entrance, and arranging for its discontinuance. When a sortie and entry occur in succession, the Commander entering shall supply this patrol.

(c) Air patrol during entry or departure of a heavy ship at times other than described in foregoing subparagraph. The ship concerned shall furnish the patrol mentioned therein.

(3) Daily sweep for magnetic and anchored mines by Fourteenth Naval District Forces. The swept channel for Fleet and Task Force sorties or entries is two thousand yards wide between Points "A" and "X" as defined in subparagraph (C) (3), below.

(C) *Sortie and Entry:*

(1) Reference (h) will not be in effect in the Pacific Fleet during the present emergency.

(2) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District controls the movements of ships within Pearl Harbor, the Entrance Channel, and the swept channel.

(3) Point "A" is midway between Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoys Nos. ONE and TWO; Point "A-1" is midchannel on a line drawn 270° true from Buoy No. EIGHTEEN; Point "X" unless otherwise prescribed is three thousand yards bearing 153° true from Point "A".

(4) Zero hour is the time first ship passes Point "A-1" abeam for sortie, or Point "A" for entry, and will be set by despatch. Interval between ships will be as prescribed by Fleet or Task Force Commanders.

(5) Fleet and Task Force Commanders shall, for their respective forces:

(a) Arrange with Commandant Fourteenth Naval District for times of entry and departure, berthing and services.

(b) Prepare and issue sortie and entrance plans.

(c) Clear the Defensive Sea Area promptly after sortie.

(d) When a sortie and entry occur in succession, keep entry force well clear of Defensive Sea Area until sortie force is clear.

(e) Furnish own patrols except as modified by (B) (1) (b) and (B) (2) (b), above.

(6) Units departing or entering Pearl Harbor at times other than during a Fleet or Task Force sortie or entry, request authority and services as required, direct from Commandant Fourteenth Naval District.

(7) Heavy ships (including 7,500 ton light cruisers) maintain a minimum speed of 15 knots when within a radius of 15 miles from the entrance buoys to Pearl Harbor. During approach and entry, individual units govern movements to provide for minimum time in waters adjacent to the entrance.

[S-43] (D) *Operating Areas:*

(1) The Naval Operating Areas in Hawaiian Waters (U.S.C. & G.S. Chart No. 4102) are considered submarine waters. Observe requirements of reference (g).

(2) Ships, except submarines, shall anchor only in protected anchorages. Pearl Harbor is a protected anchorage. Hilo and Kahului are considered as such if

boat patrols are maintained at the entrance and if ships are so moored as not to be subject to torpedo fire from outside the harbor.

(3) Submarines may anchor in the following places: in Pearl Harbor, off Lahaina, inside or outside Kahului, off Kauai, and at Hilo. No boat patrons need be maintained.

(4) Submarines shall not operate submerged in the vicinity of surface ships except in accordance with prearranged plans for tactical exercises, for gunnery exercises, or for services to other types.

(5) Submarine operations, except (4) above, shall be confined ordinarily to Areas C-5, C-7, U-1, M-20, M-21 and M-24. Under special circumstances submarine squadrons may request additional areas from the office responsible for assigning operating areas, who shall assign areas clear of the general area allocated to surface ships and shall notify all Fleet units in the Hawaiian area. While submarines are operating submerged in C-5 and C-7 they shall maintain a guard ship on the surface to warn approaching surface ships.

(6) Except as specifically directed for exercise purposes, all operations of submarines other than those covered in sub-paragraphs (4) and (5) above, shall be on the surface.

(7) Commander Submarines, Scouting Force, shall ensure that commanders of surface and air task forces are furnished with detailed submarine schedules and all changes thereto. The latter shall ensure that units concerned, including air patrols, operating under their command are properly notified thereof.

(8) Ships proceeding independently across the operating areas at night shall follow neutral zones and area boundaries where practicable. The Task Force Commander in the vicinity shall be informed of: (a) the route to be followed using point numbers on the Operating Chart, (b) time of starting route, (c) the speed of advance. The Task Force Commander shall notify vessels of his force that may be concerned.

(E) Ships at Sea:

(1) When ships operate at sea from Pearl Harbor they shall be organized as a Task Force to which will be assigned destroyers and aircraft as necessary for screening. Each task force shall be organized offensively and defensively. These organizations shall be promulgated prior to leaving port and shall provide for the following:

(a) A destroyer attack unit to locate and attack hostile submarines.

(b) Anti-submarine screens for heavy ships in accordance with the number of destroyers available, priority in assignments being governed by the following:

Priority 1—BBs

Priority 2—CVs

Priority 3—CAs

Priority 4—CLs

(c) A striking unit of cruisers, carrier (if operating) and destroyers, to cooperate with Patrol Wings and Army Air Units in destroying hostile carrier group.

(d) A concentration of own operating submarines preparatory to disposition as circumstances require.

(e) Inner air patrol for dispositions or formations, when in operating areas. Such screen shall be maintained by Task Groups, if the Task Force Commander so directs.

(f) Inner anti-submarine screens, insofar as practicable with assigned destroyers. Carriers operating alone utilize plane guards for screening when they are not employed in plane guarding.

(g) Maintenance of condition of readiness THREE on torpedo defense batteries and equivalent condition of readiness in destroyers. Supply ready ammunition and keep depth charges ready for use. Aircraft will not be armed unless especially directed.

[S-44] (h) Maintenance of material condition XRAY, or equivalent in all ships.

(i) Steaming darkened at night in defensive disposition either as a Task Force or by Task Groups as practicable.

(j) Restricting use of radio to minimum required for carrying out operations.

(k) Maintenance of horizon and surface battle lookouts.

(l) Energizing degaussing coils whenever there is any possibility of the presence of magnetic mines. Water of less than sixty fathoms shall be avoided if operations permit.

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(2) Ships towing targets in operating areas at night will show appropriate running and towing lights, except when engaged in exercises the nature of which requires them to be darkened.

(F) *Ships in Port:*

(1) Ships in port in the Hawaiian Area shall carry out applicable measures outlined in references (e) and (f).

(G) *Defense Against Air Attack:*

(1) The principal Army anti-aircraft gun defense of Pearl Harbor consists of several three-inch mobile batteries which are to be located on the circumference of a circle of an approximate radius of five thousand yards with center in the middle of Ford Island. The Army, assisted by such units of the Marine Defense Battallions as may be available, will man these stations. Machine guns are located both inside and outside the circle of three-inch gun positions.

(2) In the event of a hostile air attack, any part of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor plus all Fleet aviation shore-based on Oahu, will augment the local air defense.

(3) Enclosure (A) defines the air defense sectors in Pearl Harbor and is the basis for the distribution of ships within the harbor for anti-aircraft fire. Hostile planes attacking in a sector shall be considered as the primary targets for ships in that sector. However, ships in other sectors may augment fire of any other sector at the discretion of the Sector Commander.

(4) The Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) shall ensure that ships are disposed at berths so that they may develop the maximum anti-aircraft gunfire in each sector commensurate with the total number of ships of all types in port. He is authorized to depart from the normal berthing plan for this purpose. Battleships, carriers, and cruisers shall normally be moored singly insofar as available berths permit.

(5) The Senior Officer Present in each sector prescribed in sub-paragraph (G) (3) above, is the Sector Commander, and responsible for the fire in his own sector.

(6) The Commandant Fourteenth Naval District is the Naval Base Defense Officer (N. B. D. O.). As such he shall:

(a) Exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack.

(b) Arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced.

(c) Exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing TWO for coordination of the joint air effort between the Army and Navy.

(d) Coordinate Fleet anti-aircraft fire with the base defense by:

(1) Advising the Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor (exclusive of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet) what condition of readiness to maintain.

(2) Holding necessary drills.

(3) Giving alarms for: attack, blackout signal, all clear signal.

(4) Informing the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(5) Arranging communication plan.

(6) Notifying all naval agencies of the air alarm signal prescribed.

[S-45] (7) The following naval base defense conditions of readiness are prescribed:

Condition I—General Quarters in all ships. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition II—One-half of anti-aircraft battery of all ships in each sector manned and ready. Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

Condition III—Anti-aircraft battery (guns which bear in assigned sector) of at least one ship in each sector manned and ready. (Minimum of four guns required for each sector). Condition of aircraft as prescribed by Naval Base Defense Officer.

(8) Searchlights of ships shall not be used in event of a night attack.

(9) In event of an air attack, the following procedure shall be followed by the task forces:

(a) *Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor.*

(1) Execute an emergency sortie order which will accomplish (2), (8) and (4) below. (This order must be prepared and issued in advance).

(2) Direct destroyers to depart as soon as possible and report to operating task force commander.

(3) Prepare carrier with one division of plane guards for earliest practicable sortie.

(4) Prepare heavy ships and submarines for sortie.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Task Force Commander operating at sea, advised.

(b) *Task Force Commander operating at sea.*

(1) Despatch striking unit. (See (E) (1) (c), above.)

(2) Make appropriate defensive disposition of heavy ships and remaining surface forces at sea.

(3) Despatch destroyer attack unit if circumstances require. (May utilize unit of (E) (1) (a) for this if not needed for A/S purposes.)

(4) Direct commander of operating submarines to carry out action desired of him.

(5) Keep Commander-in-Chief, Naval Base Defense Officer and Senior Officer Embarked in Pearl Harbor informed and advised of any attacks or hostile planes sighted in the operating area.

(c) *Naval Base Defense Officer.*

(1) Give the alarm indicating attack is in progress or imminent. If not already blacked out, each unit shall execute blackout when the alarm is given.

(2) Inform the Task Force Commander at sea of the attack and the type of attacking aircraft.

(3) Launch air search for enemy ships.

(4) Arm and prepare all bombing units available.

(H) *Action to be taken if submarine attacks in operating area:*

(1) In the event of a submarine attack in the operating area, the following general procedure will be followed:

Ship Attacked.

(a) Proceed in accordance with Article 509, F.T.P. 188. Originate a plain language despatch, urgent precedence, containing essential details addressed for action to the Task Force Commander in the operating area and for information to Commander-in-Chief, Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor. If the ship attacked is damaged, it will clear the immediate submarine danger area, at best remaining speed, then proceed toward Pearl Harbor using zigzag appropriate for speed in use.

[S-A6] *Ships other than one attacked.*

(b) *Battleships.* Zigzag at maximum speed. Launch aircraft armed for inner air patrol. Do not approach scene of attack closer than 50 miles during remainder of daylight period. Give own screening unit information to enable them to join quickly.

(c) *Carriers.* Same as for battleships, except place all aircraft in Condition ONE, armed. (At least one squadron with depth charges when they become available.) Aircraft for initial inner air patrol may be launched unarmed. Launch planes other than those for inner air patrol as ordered by Task Force Commander or as circumstances warrant.

(d) *Cruisers.* Same as for battleships, except, use one-half available aircraft (armed) for own inner air patrol. Send the second half to scene of attack (armed), to attack enemy submarine and to provide patrol for damaged ship if damaged ship has been unable to provide its own inner air patrol.

(e) *Destroyers.* Attack unit proceed at maximum speed to scene of attack. Take determined offensive action. Screening units join heavy ship units to which assigned. Destroyers in Pearl Harbor make immediate preparations for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. Report to Task Force Commander when clear of Channel.

(f) *Submarines.* Surface if submerged. Remain in own assigned areas, zigzagging at best speed until directed otherwise.

(g) *Minecraft.* Augment screening units as directed by Task Force Commander.

(h) *Base Force.* If ship attacked is damaged, tugs in operating areas join her at best speed, prepared to tow, slipping targets as necessary. Report in code, positions of rafts abandoned. Tugs in Pearl Harbor prepare for departure. Sortie on order of Senior Officer Present Afloat. High speed towing vessels proceed at discretion, keeping 50 miles from scene of attack.

(i) *Patrol Wings.* Assume readiness for search and for offensive action. Carry out search as directed by Task Force Commander. Prepare to establish station patrol 220 mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.

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(j) *Shore-based Fleet Aircraft.* Prepare to relieve planes in the air over the attack area, unless Pearl Harbor is also attacked, in which case the instructions issued by Naval Base Defense Officer have priority.

(k) *Naval District.* Clear Pearl Harbor Channel at once for either sortie or entry. Prepare to receive damaged ship(s) for repair.

(l) *S.O.P.A., Pearl Harbor.* Prepare destroyers in Pearl Harbor for sortie and direct the departure of units as requested by the Task Force Commander of units at sea. Control of departing units will pass to the Task Force Commander at sea as units clear the Pearl Harbor entrance buoys.

(m) *Task Force Commander at Sea.* Coordinate offensive and defensive measures. When immediate defensive measures have been accomplished, prescribe rendezvous and issue necessary instructions for concentrating and forming the Task Force.

(2) It must be remembered that a single attack may or may not indicate the presence of more submarines waiting to attack.

(3) It must be remembered too, that a single submarine attack may indicate the presence of a considerable surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier. The Task Force Commander must therefore assemble his Task Groups as quickly as the situation and daylight conditions warrant in order to be prepared to pursue or meet enemy ships that may be located by air search or other means.

[S-47] 4. Subordinate Commanders shall issue the necessary orders to make these measures effective.

H. E. KIMMEL.

Distribution: (5CM-41)

List II, Case 1: A, X.

EN1, EN3, NA12, ND11AC, ND11-12-13-14, NY8-10,

(A1-Asiatic, A1-Atlantic).

P. C. CROSBY,

Flag Secretary.

[S-48] (At this point in the original transcript there appears a map reflecting the Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan. This map will be found reproduced as Item No. 38, EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS, Roberts Commission.)

[S-49] CONFIDENTIAL

MEASURES TO BE EFFECTIVE UNDER PARAGRAPH 3 OF BASIC LETTER UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS

(A) (1)

(A) (2)

Boom—administered by Commandant Fourteenth Naval District with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(A) (3)

Harbor—administered by Commander Base Force with services furnished by Commander Battle Force from all ships present.

(B) (1) (a) (b) (c)

Furnished by Destroyers, Battle Force; Minecraft, Battle Force; and Minecraft, Base Force, and coordinated by Commander Destroyers, Battle Force.

(B) (2) (a) (b) (c)

(B) (3)

(C) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (6) (7)

(D) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)

(E) (1) (a) (b) (c) (d)

Assignments only shall be made. The Task Force Commander will hold one drill during each operating period, if employment permits, in the establishment of units prescribed.

(E) (1) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l)

(E) (2)

(F)

The provisions of reference (e).

(G)

Entire article, except sub-paragraph 6 (b), which will be as arranged by Naval Base Defense Officer with Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Enclosure (B)

[S-A10] Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, having examined the transcript of his testimony given before this Commission on December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, and having on January 5, 1942, by letter to the Commission (See transcript page 1470 et seq.) recommended certain revisions of that transcript, the Commission approved each of those recommendations and incorporated each of them in the transcript by interleaving the text of each suggested revision on a page immediately following each page referred to in the said letter. The Commission directed that the transcript thus revised is the transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony on the dates above mentioned. Nevertheless, in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's further request, it directed that his testimony of December 27, 1941, and December 29, 1941, be copied with each of the revisions incorporated in the copied text to effect a clean copy without interleaved errata. That copy has been made in one volume, in duplicate, pages S-1 to S-226, inclusive, and on January 24, 1942, verified by the Recorder to the Commission as to the correctness of each revision, and it is annexed to each of the two sets of 16 volumes each of the transcript, to be deposited respectively in the secret archives of the Departments of War and Navy, but by direction of the Commission not made a part of said transcript. The said annexed volume accompanies the 16 volumes of the transcripts and is marked "Annex to transcript and not a part thereof: A copy of the transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel given before the Commission to Investigate the Attack on the Territory of Hawaii, and revised by authority of the Commission in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's request.

WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder to the Commission.

[S-1] COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 27, 1941

LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

The Commission met at 9 o'clock a. m., Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding, pursuant to adjournment on yesterday.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Good morning.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you be sworn?

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED
STATES NAVY

(The oath was administered in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral KIMMEL. Would it be possible for me to have Admiral Theobald with me to assist me?

[S-2] The CHAIRMAN. Certainly, sir. Let him come and sit there beside you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have a statement here.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be very glad to hear that in the first instance, Admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Shall I read it?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You might sit with me here (addressing Admiral Theobald).

In submitting the report of operations undertaken on 7 December it is pertinent to state that only incomplete and rather hurriedly made reports have been received from Patrol Wing TWO and the Task Forces which were operating at sea. The Staff of the Commander-in-Chief has been continuously engaged in planning for and directing operations which have been undertaken since the attack. If discrepancies exist, as they probably do, in these reports, it is due to a lack of full information and it will probably be some time before complete reports can be assembled.

It has been our endeavor to get ahead with the war operations and to attend to the multitudinous details of reorganization and reconstruction which arose as a result of the attack rather than to concentrate on the preparation of reports of what had occurred.

The reports are still coming in from individual ships and I understand the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief is devoting as much time as they can to compiling these reports which will be submitted in due course and from them a much more effective reconstruction of events can be made.

I think you have, gentlemen, a report of the action of 7 December which I signed on 21 December.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we do not have it yet, Admiral.

[S-3] General McCoy. No.

The CHAIRMAN. That is your report to the Secretary of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We would be glad to have a copy of it. We have not a copy of it as yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was informed that you had been given a copy of it.

General McCoy. We asked for a copy but have not received it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir; we have not received it, Mr. Recorder?

Mr. Howe. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought you had it.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir. We have not had it. General Short's report was in Washington before we left, and we obtained a copy of it, and also here we got a copy of it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, this report was made up on the 21st—I signed it on the 21st of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we haven't had it yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. And that was forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief, and I am sure that I was informed that you had a copy.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been some slip about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Forwarded to Washington from here, was it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Here is a report; it is a very short one.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. It gives a narrative of events which we have reconstructed from all sources.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, that would be helpful to us.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, we haven't got it.

[S-4] The CHAIRMAN. We haven't got it.

Admiral KIMMEL. You haven't seen that?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. My remembrance, Mr. Recorder, was that we asked on our arrival here for any reports that the Admiral had made to the Navy Department.

Mr. HOWE. Yes.

General McCoy. But we have not received them yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the report had not been made when you arrived?

The CHAIRMAN. When we got here, no.

Admiral KIMMEL. And we got it up very hurriedly, the best we had, and I thought you had the report.

Admiral THEOBALD. I have sent for additional copies.

Mr. HOWE. Will you look that up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Perhaps I had better read the report.

The CHAIRMAN. I think perhaps you had. I think that would be a good preliminary.

(Admiral Kimmel read from a report from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, number A16-3/(02088). The subject:—"Report of the Action of 7 December 1941." Copy of this report appended marked Kimmel Exhibit number —.)

Admiral KIMMEL. That is all the report proper, but in addition to that we have four enclosures. One is a partial narrative of events occurring during Japanese air raid on Pearl Harbor of 7 December, second is the damage to ships, and the third is a supplementary partial report of damage to ships and the last one is disposition of all known forces, sortie from harbor, and conduct of the search.

Now, this narrative of events occurring during the Japanese raid on 7 December has been reconstructed from dispatches received and from the reports received from individual ships, [S-5] and this narrative does not represent the information that I had at the time. This is reconstructed afterwards.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say that the first word I had personally of any untoward incident was about 7:30. I was telephoned at my quarters that an attack had been made on a submarine near Pearl Harbor. We have had many reports of submarines in this area. I was not at all certain that this was a real attack. I had issued orders about the 27th of November that all submarine sound contacts were to be considered hostile and they were to bomb them, and that was a distinct change from the policy we had been following before that time. We had prohibited ships from bombing hostile submarines except in the defensive sea area, which was about three miles from the shore line. That procedure was approved by the Navy Department. I reported last February that I would be delighted to give orders to bomb, to depth-charge any submerged submarine that we didn't know about, and I was told that the former policy was the one that should be followed. The Navy Department never changed that. I changed it on my own responsibility and informed the Navy Department of all I had done, and that was the reason that these ships promptly made the attack on the submarine when it was discovered in the operating area. However, as I say, there were a great many false contacts, and I was not convinced at that time that there was an actual attack. You will see that is pertinent as his investigation goes on.

At 6:18—Shall I read this?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will, sir. Yes, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is quite long.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, it will orient us, I think, in the whole situation. Don't you, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it will assist, yes, sir.

[S-6] The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel read from document entitled "Narratives of Events Occurring During Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941." This narrative of events occurring during Japanese Air Raid on December 7, 1941, is submitted as enclosure (A) to the report of the action of 7 December, 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel on December 24, 1941, letter number A16-3/(02088), and is appended to the record as enclosure (A) by Kimmel Exhibit number —.)

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Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

0745 Avocet. Moored at Berth F-1A, NAS Dock, Pearl Harbor. Bomb explosions and planes heard and sighted attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Admiral, that means that at 7:45 your information station or your headquarters received that message from the steamer Avocet; is that it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What does the "Avocet" mean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Avocet is a mine sweeper converted for use of the aircraft, as an aircraft tender.

The CHAIRMAN. Ship moored?

Admiral KIMMEL. Ship moored at Berth 1A. Naval Air Station Dock, Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. And at 7:45 there was a bomb explosion on her?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh.

Admiral KIMMEL. She heard a bomb explosion, and she heard the planes and sighted them attacking Ford Island hangars.

The CHAIRMAN. And she reported that at 7:45?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, no. No, sir. This report is taken from the report made by the Avocet.

[S-7] The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. After the fact.

Admiral KIMMEL. After the fact, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you have reconstructed it now?

Admiral KIMMEL. We are reconstructing here.

The CHAIRMAN. In order of time?

Admiral KIMMEL. In order of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what we are trying to do.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand it.

Admiral KIMMEL. These reports were not prepared by me, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I get it now.

Admiral KIMMEL. At this time they had no time to make reports.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

The Tucker was nested alongside the Whitney. 5-inch gun No. 3 could not be fired. All other guns and .50 caliber machine guns fired at attacking planes

during all attacks. No loss of personnel or material. It is believed this vessel shot down three or four enemy planes.

This is the Tucker's claim, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I understand.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is what the Tucker claims.

Admiral STANDLEY. She is a destroyer?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, she is a destroyer.

(Admiral Kimmel read further from said Exhibit 2.)

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Admiral KIMMEL. The Tracy is a destroyer, by the way.

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Now, I might interject here that, while these items are the best they can get, they were taken under stress.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

[S-8] Admiral KIMMEL. And you have got to evaluate that, but this is the best that we have.

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(Referring to item "0755, Raleigh," report p. 11:)

He has covered a considerable period there, and he did not do all that at 7:55.

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I might say that the Ramapo was loaded with five motor torpedo boats which were being sent out to the Asiatic station, and they were later on taken off.

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(Referring to item "0759, Jarvis," report p. 18:)

The CHAIRMAN. What are BB's, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Battleships.

The CHAIRMAN. And where is Merry Point? Off to the eastward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Kimmel read further from said Exhibit 2.)

The CHAIRMAN. Since you started, Admiral, your aides have handed us a copy of this chronological statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I think that what you have read is sufficient to indicate the onset of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, the balance of it is all here, and as I understand it each ship reports what it was doing at a given hour or a given minute.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And I do not believe it would pay us to put the Admiral to the burden of reading all that, when we have it here for ourselves if it becomes material. I leave that to the members of the Commission, though. How do you feel about it?

[S-9] Admiral STANDLEY. It seems to me we could dispense with that and go to the task force report. He has another report there of damage, which is a summation of this, and I think we can dispense with that and go to the task forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Does that seem a good idea? We shall have all this before us to read, anyway.

Admiral REEVES. If there is any special portion of the narrative that he would like to call attention to, we might have that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Admiral, if beyond what you have read there is any special portion of this narrative that you think it important to call to our attention, we should be glad to hear it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is no special portion of the narrative which I haven't—I have covered that in a separate way, and I would suggest that we take up the question now——

The CHAIRMAN. I think this chronological statement is very important for reference.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. But it really does not give us as good a synopsis as perhaps you can give us yourself.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I was coming to. I have now——

Admiral STANDLEY. He has a prepared statement.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you have a synopsis statement of your own, Admiral, which you are going to give us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether you have them or not, but at your convenience we would like to have five copies of this report.

Admiral KIMMEL. The whole thing?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Entire?

[S-10] Admiral THEOBALD. Five of the entire report.

Admiral KIMMEL. Including everything?

The CHAIRMAN. The narrative.

Admiral THEOBALD. Damage and everything?

Admiral KIMMEL. The narrative? I mean the report with all the enclosures?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, exactly. Then we can use it at leisure, you see.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We have one copy, here, Admiral, now.

Admiral THEOBALD. You want four more, then?

The CHAIRMAN. We want four more.

Mr. HOWE. Five more.

The CHAIRMAN. Five more, yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I call your attention to one part of this, sir. I would suggest you take that up next. I have a copy of it here.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask you, Admiral: Have you a prior running statement covering your communications with the Department in Washington, and so forth, leading up to the 7th?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but I was trying to give you a picture of what had occurred, first.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. I quite understand that.

Admiral KIMMEL. And the efforts just to——

The CHAIRMAN. To repel the attack.

Now, you were coming to the disposition of the attack forces on that morning.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Admiral Kimmel read from report entitled "Disposition of Task Forces on December 7". This report was enclosure (D) to the report

of the action [S-11] of 7 December 1941, submitted by Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy, dated December 21, 1941, letter number A16-3/02088) and it is appended to the record as enclosure (D) to Kimmel Exhibit number 3.)

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Admiral KIMMEL. Incidentally, I might add at this point that in accordance with the security measures we had in effect it provided that patwing 2 should start this search immediately without any orders from me, and he had already started to do what he could before he got this order.

(Reading further:)

In presenting this statement to the Board, I must emphasize that the picture presented is that of events and actions before the attack and must be considered in that light. It is a common tendency, emphasized in this case by the magnitude and effects of the later developments, to judge events in the past by the actualities of the future, thus discounting the assumptions upon which the past actions were based. I cannot overemphasize the point that this entire situation can only be reviewed fairly and intelligently, by divorcing from our minds, to the extent that this is possible, the facts as we now know them, and to concentrate upon the situation as it appeared to the Commander-in-Chief before the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December. In stating this, I would like it understood that I am not attempting to avoid any responsibility which is legitimately mine. I was the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and that Fleet was seriously damaged, with a resultant effect which far transcends the fate or fortune of any individual. However, in justice to myself, to the Navy as a whole, and for the future welfare of our Country, it is vital that [S-12] events be dispassionately reviewed in their proper perspective. The statements which follow are based upon this premise, and will present as complete a picture as possible of our efforts to get the Pacific Fleet ready for war, to insure its security at its base, and to evaluate and meet by appropriate action, each situation as it was presented at the time.

Underlying all my actions were these basic considerations:—

First. Constantly changing regular personnel, both officers and enlisted, and the induction of new personnel, including a substantial portion of recruits and reserves, made it a vital necessity to maintain an intensified training program. This necessitated, if maximum results were to be achieved, confinement of our operations to areas close to Pearl Harbor where target and training services were available.

Second. It was essential to push a material improvement program covering installation, as soon as available, of short range anti-aircraft guns, radar equipment, lookout equipment, additional personnel accommodations, splinter protection and many other incidental alterations.

Third. Maintenance of reasonable security of Fleet units, both at sea and at an exposed base, poorly equipped for its own defense, was vital. Even aside from its defense, the deficiencies of Pearl Harbor as an operating base, presented a difficult problem which had to be met.

Fourth. Under approved War Plans, it was essential to initiate, promptly, offensive action in the Mid-Pacific and beyond, in order to contribute to the defense of the position of the Associated Powers in the Far East and Malaya by relieving the pressure in that theater, [S-13] which by all agencies, was conceived to be the locale of initial enemy operations. The Navy Department's plan that an early initial offensive be undertaken in that area had a vital influence on my thoughts and actions in each new situation.

In order to clarify the situation existing in the Hawaiian Area at the time of the surprise attack on December 7, it should be stated that:—

(a) Pearl Harbor is a Fleet base for upkeep, repair and recreation.

(b) The defense of Pearl Harbor rests with the Army, in accordance with Joint Army and Navy action. (Chapter 1, Paragraph 5 (a) (2)).

(c) The Navy had definite plans and was ready.

(d) We had an extensive training program to maintain the efficiency of all Fleet units.

My conception of a Fleet base is a haven for refit, supply, and for rest and recreation of personnel after arduous duties and strenuous operations at sea. I knew, as responsible officers have long known, that Pearl Harbor, with its

single channel and its congested moorings and industrial facilities is vulnerable as a base for heavy ships, particularly vulnerable to surprise air attack. Air attack at dawn can be guarded against only by a 360 degree search before dark to a radius of 800 miles, and this would require eighty-four planes daily, and three times that number to maintain continued daily flights. We have never had more than one third the latter number of naval patrol planes in the Hawaiian Area. We must depend upon pre-daylight search, radar warnings, and a base defense so effective that a raid can be repelled with certainty. We have not an adequate base defense today.

[S-14] Before assuming command of the Pacific Fleet on 1 February 1941, I made a survey of the defenses of Pearl Harbor and of security measures in effect in the Fleet. I had been informed by the Chief of Naval Operations that hostilities in the Atlantic might begin at any time and that a war on two fronts was possible.

I was astounded at the existing weakness of the Pearl Harbor defenses, and, collaborated with my predecessor in the preparation of a letter dated 25 January 1941 to the Chief of Naval Operations. This letter pointed out:—

(a) The critical inadequacy of anti-aircraft guns available to defend Pearl Harbor, necessitating during war the constant manning of ships' anti-aircraft guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District—subchasers and patrol boats.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

We recommended that measures to correct these deficiencies take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain. Some remedial progress was made. The War Department provided fighting planes.

My next step, 15 February, was to organize security measures for ships at sea, to guard against surprise attack, submarine or air. The order promulgating these security measures was revised from time to time and reissued in latest form as Confidential Letter No. 2CL (revised) dated 14 October 1941. Measures pre-[S-15] scribed in this order were rehearsed frequently and regularly by forces both at sea and in port. In Pearl Harbor ships were so moored that areas of fire were allocated by berths, and assurance was made that dispersal of ships permitted best possible anti-aircraft fire in all directions.

All during the period of my command of the Pacific Fleet I had to balance the requirements of training, material upkeep and military alterations of the Fleet against the security measures to be kept in effect. The availability of ships and planes for active war operations was one of my constant concerns. Obviously the maximum security could not be obtained unless we very drastically sacrificed the necessary training to bring and maintain the ships of the Fleet to a satisfactory battle condition. Constant personnel changes, both of officers and men, made this training mandatory. This applied to all types of ships and aircraft. My files are filled with the efforts we made and the steps we took to overcome difficulties. Our training program was thorough and I believe produced rapid and effective results. In accomplishing this training we had to accept continually throughout the past ten months a somewhat reduced security against a surprise attack. Had we not accepted this risk, Fleet training would have ceased. Immediately upon taking command I took steps to coordinate as well as my powers permitted, the efforts of the Army and Navy air forces stationed in the Islands.

The Fleet was divided into three Task Forces and the schedule of operations required at least one Task Force at sea at all times, available to strike in the event of a surprise. Often two Task Forces were at sea at the same time but never three. Training operations [S-16] were intensive, but it is necessary always to provide time in port for overhaul of machinery, against the day when all forces might be called upon for action against the enemy.

We worked out a comprehensive plan to utilize all the forces in Hawaii to the maximum in the event of a surprise attack. Frequent drills were held, deficiencies corrected in so far as possible, and every effort made to perfect the organization by trial and error. Day by day, over several months I had considered when we should establish the maximum security measures and I realized at all times that this would be a difficult decision to make. The despatches and other information we received were carefully evaluated and I kept my principal subordinate Admirals and the Commanding General informed of the situation as

it developed. The action I took was dictated by my own best judgment after such consultations and I think these subordinates were in substantial agreement with the action that I took from time to time.

War was threatened many times during the past year and I had to consider at all times the physical effect on the personnel of the Fleet of long periods of watch standing in port during peacetime and the result that the demands might not destroy the very vigilance that we were seeking to promote. The security measures in effect in the ships of the Fleet while at sea were of the highest order. We considered a massed submarine attack on the ships at sea in the operating areas as a probability and effective measures were taken to combat this menace. We considered an air attack on Pearl Harbor as a remote possibility, but one to be guarded against, and training and plans were made for this contingency to the limit of [S-17] forces available. Just when to place in effect to a maximum these measures was our problem. From the actions of the Navy Department I believe they shared the opinion that an air attack on Pearl Harbor was a remote possibility. Our correspondence bears this out. At the time the attack took place conversations were still being conducted in Washington. For an attack to be launched on this place the forces had to leave Japan at least two weeks prior to the conclusion of the conversations. Our radio and other intelligence gave no indication of such a move.

From 1 February to the date of the raid, both by official and personal correspondence, I continuously demanded of the Navy Department ammunition, modern planes, more destroyers, patrol craft for the Fourteenth Naval District, sea train vessels for transporting aircraft from the Coast, radar for all ships, IFF for planes, sound detection devices for small craft. My replies from the Department almost invariably were to the effect that the major effort would be in the Atlantic. This statement may be verified from the files of the Commander-in-Chief. Many of the most powerful and modern units of the Pacific Fleet were transferred to the Atlantic. Flight deck merchant vessels under conversion and small craft such as subchasers were diverted to the United Kingdom. I asked for more men, and was told that the Atlantic Fleet needs were even more pressing than those in the Pacific, the Atlantic Fleet was under complement also. Although shooting orders had been issued in the Atlantic and in the South East Pacific East of Longitude 100° W., as late as 23 September 1941 I was directed by the Chief of Naval Operations not to bomb suspected [S-18] hostile submarines except in the restricted area close to Pearl Harbor channel, and was informed that in the event of hostilities with Japan there was no intention to further reduce the Pacific Fleet except for the withdrawal of four cruisers about one month "after Japan and the United States are at war."

Failure to obtain men and materials demanded for the Pacific Fleet is not a defense against having been taken by surprise. I submit, however, that repeated rebuffs of my recommendations and constant insistence of the Navy Department that the major emphasis was to be placed upon operations in the Atlantic strongly contributed to my estimate that an air attack of the nature and force of that delivered on 7 December was not to be expected. Without warning from Washington, I had no reason to consider December 7th as different from other times of diplomatic tension with Japan. Throughout my tenure of office as Commander-in-Chief I have kept my Task Force and Type Commanders informed of the existing situation as presented to me by the Department. I believe all of these officers held views similar to mine. It must be evident today to anyone who studies my correspondence with that agency, that the Navy Department up to December 7th did not believe that Japan would make an air attack on Pearl Harbor nor that hostilities were unduly imminent. My frame of mind was necessarily influenced by the action of the Department and the letters and despatches which I received therefrom.

If the President, the State Department, and the Navy Department at any time during the Washington negotiations with the Japanese emissaries gathered a more alarming viewpoint regarding possible Japanese military action against this Fleet, I was never so informed. The [S-19] absence of such a warning from Washington could not fail to affect most decisively every estimate of the situation which I made up to the time of the attack.

The Commander-in-Chief received but one war warning, dated 27 November. It read as follows:—

"OpNav to Cincpac and Cincaf. Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of the conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. This is a war warning. The

number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of Naval Task Forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Tai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo. Execute appropriate deployment preparatory to carrying out defense tasks only assigned in WPL 46. Similar warning being sent by War Department. Guam and Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage."

There was a warning sent to Commander Naval Coastal Frontiers info CinCPac on 29 November.

This despatch indicated confinement of original attack to Philippines, N. E. I., and Singapore. On 30 November the Chief of Naval Operations sent following despatch to Cincaf:—

"OpNav to Cincaf, info Cinpac. It is indicated that Japan is about to attack points on the Kra Isthmus by overseas expeditions. In order to ascertain the destination of this expedition and for security, Cincaf is directed to cover by air the range from Manila to Camranh Bay for three days. Instruct planes to observe only. They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked. If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur."

The Secretary of the Navy has stated that a special [S-20] warning was sent by the Department to Cincaf on the day preceding the surprise attack. The fact that such warning was not delivered to me indicates that the Administration did not expect an air attack on Oahu.

We did expect a surprise submarine attack upon our ships at sea. There have been several such suspected attacks in the past, but no real evidence that they were genuine. We have for ten months been fully prepared for submarine attack. On 28 November, without reference to the Department, I ordered all ships to depth bomb suspected submarine contacts in all of the Oahu operating areas and confined submerged operations of our own submarines to certain limited areas. This readiness to meet the submarine menace is evidenced by the fact that when a submarine was discovered near the entrance to Pearl Harbor early on 7 December, it was promptly attacked by the nearest destroyer. When during the aerial attack on Pearl Harbor a destroyer making emergency sortie sighted a submarine in the channel ahead, the destroyer passed over the submarine and destroyed it by prompt depth charge action.

In the light of what has happened it is easy to state that we should have placed in effect all security measures and should have utilized our patrol squadrons to the maximum of their capabilities. At the time of the attack we had one squadron of patrol planes based on Midway and five and one-half squadrons based on Oahu. Of these one squadron had just returned from seven weeks extensive operations based on Midway and four and one-half squadrons had recently been delivered by air from the factory at San Diego. While operable these four and one-half squadrons required considerable work to make them effective. Difficulties were being experienced with this new type [S-21] and the absence of spares made it highly desirable to economize on their operations in order to have them available in an emergency. The Army was having difficulties with their four-engine bombers and it had been reported within the week that they had only six in operating condition. A flight of Army bombers arrived during the raid, but they had come from the mainland without ammunition. About a month before the raid we had sent two squadrons of patrol planes to the Coast to be replaced. I accepted with reluctance this reduction of our patrol planes but took the risk in order to have the new patrol planes available before delays incident to expected bad winter weather. I cite this as one of the many decisions that had to be made.

At the time of the attack the anti-aircraft batteries of ships in harbor were partially manned and they opened fire promptly on the first attacking planes. Two torpedo planes of the first wave were shot down before they launched their torpedoes and a third plane immediately after launching torpedoes. Only the short range weapons could be used against the low flying enemy planes in the harbor crowded with our ships and this Fleet is woefully deficient in short range anti-aircraft weapons. The use of 5" guns on the low flying first attackers would have wrought great havoc on our ships and on the shops and residences of the Navy Yard and nearby settlements. Furthermore, the fuse settings cannot be set low enough to cause the shells to burst in front of these planes when they

came into view over the trees and houses almost right on our ships. In spite of that I think they used them.

The Japanese espionage and intelligence service in the Islands was and is excellent. We know now that the [S-22] Japanese Consul General at Honolulu cabled, over our cable, the daily movements of our ships during the days immediately preceding the attack. Charts taken from enemy planes and a submarine prove that the Japanese knew the berth number and names of every ship in the harbor. This intelligence service placed us under a terrific handicap, a handicap that has existed during all the time the Fleet has been based on Pearl Harbor. That Japan was maintaining an effective intelligence service in the Hawaiian Area difficult to apprehend with the peacetime methods has been well known to us throughout our stay in these waters.

On the other hand, the intelligence service available to me was ineffective and inaccurate. I had never been able to obtain from my Government a definite statement of the action it would take in certain eventualities. Correspondence in the Commander-in-Chief's files can be introduced in evidence to confirm this. Letters and despatches received from the Chief of Naval Operations in the days immediately preceding hostilities indicated a Japanese movement to the Southward. My radio intelligence was misleading as was that promulgated by the Navy Department. On December 1, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin stating that there were strong indications pointing to an early attack on Thailand and that "The major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers." We have evidence now that four or more carriers took part in the attack on Oahu.

The heaviest damage suffered by the Fleet was that delivered by torpedo attack. The Navy Department was convinced that aerial torpedoes would be ineffective in Pearl Harbor and we had discounted that menace. The [S-23] anti-torpedo baffle had been considered, both by the Commander-in-Chief and by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District. In his letter of 15 February 1941 the Chief of Naval Operations had stated: "A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. 150 feet is desired." The depth of water in and around available berths in Pearl Harbor does not exceed 45 feet.

We knew the international situation was serious, but it had been serious for much more than the 10 months I served in command of this Fleet. Messages which I received from the Navy Department and our radio intelligence gave no indication that anyone considered an air attack on Oahu more than a remote possibility.

I went over each day all despatches and intelligence reports received. My staff were untiring in their efforts. On the Saturday preceding the attack we carefully evaluated the situation. It was appreciated that the situation was growing increasingly critical. Although I did not expect the United States to become involved immediately, a written memorandum, by my direction, was kept available as to the course of action to be taken if hostilities should come. The last revision was made on December 6.

It was felt that the most serious hazard would be from submarine attacks and that the most important considerations were to minimize the danger from them and to start offensive action by movement against the Marshalls at the earliest possible moment. This movement involved the advancement of patrol planes to Wake and Johnston and an increase of the number at Midway.

A careful evaluation of the factors involved, the information from the Navy Department, and the concept [S-24] of the war by the Department as indicated by the Departmental War Plans led very strongly to the conclusion that utilization of patrol planes for searching the Hawaiian Area for a possible but improbable enemy was of much less value than being prepared to immediately advance those planes to our distant island bases. To aid in their protection and to cover effectively the advancement of mobile surface units for offensive operations in the Marshall Area and to support these operations when commenced.

My operating plans, based on the Department's concepts of the war—in which I was in general accord—and its orders had been approved by the Department. I was prepared to commence war operations, and felt keenly that vigorous offensive action should be initiated as promptly as possible after hostilities commenced.

By our operating plans no more than two squadrons of patrol planes were to be retained in Oahu.

The purpose of such planes was primarily to cover the sea lanes toward the Coast and toward the South Seas against enemy auxiliary cruisers, submarines, etc., that might raid our communication lines. It was thoroughly realized that they were far too few in numbers to maintain any effective search around Oahu against enemy carriers. All other patrol planes were to be used in connection with offensive operations.

The Department with much more complete information than we had clearly indicated that they discounted the probability of an attack on Oahu. The attitude of our government was evidenced by acceptance of our war plan; by priority given to Europe and the Atlantic Fleet in assignment of aircraft, anti-aircraft weapons and other security installations; by transfer of the greater part [S-25] of long range bombers from Oahu to the Philippines and by the proposal (which incidentally I did not accept) to transfer fifty pursuit planes from Oahu to Midway and Wake.

Subsequent developments show that all of Washington as well as the Fleet were somewhat prepared for a treacherous initiation of war, if Japan should decide on such a course, but we were all in error as to the date, the direction and the character of that treacherous attack.

I have constantly given serious consideration to the question of the availability of patrol planes when hostilities broke out. As I have previously stated we had 69 patrol planes on Oahu on December 7. Of these 61 planes were in flying condition. Had I started the continuous patrols on November 27, the day the war warning was received, it is probable that this number would have been somewhat less by December 7. Fifty-four of these planes were of the PBY-5 type which had recently arrived from the mainland. There was a practical absence of spare parts for these new planes. Some material difficulties were being experienced and all of these new planes were due to be fitted with armor and leakproof gas tanks, before being entirely suitable for war service.

Maintaining continuous search using all planes in flying condition beginning on 27 November and continuing indefinitely had to be balanced against the probability of attack on Oahu and the desirability of having all our patrol planes in operating condition when war came.

Excluding the PBY-5 type an effective search could not be made with what remained. I therefore determined that our best course was to bend every effort towards getting the patrol planes ready for unlimited war operations [S-26] than to expend their efforts in partial and ineffective peace-time searches. To insure against a surprise attack from fast carrier-based planes it is necessary to patrol the evening before to a distance of 800 miles in a 360 degree arc. This requires 84 planes on one flight of 16 hours. The pool for a protracted period of searches of this character would require 252 planes. In addition, a dawn patrol to a distance of 300 miles is a further necessity. One hundred patrol planes would be required for this dawn patrol. This would be required for assured security against an attack because any search of 800 miles radius is certain to encounter daily many areas of greatly reduced visibility. Needless to say, had I known of the imminence of an attack on Oahu on or about 7 December, I would have utilized all planes to the limit of their capability accepting the necessary risks of such operations with the new patrol squadrons.

I believe the Fleet was in as an effective state of readiness as it was humanly possible to place it under conditions that existed during the past ten months. I am sure that my files and the testimony of responsible officers in the Fleet will bear out the statement that I left no stone unturned and spared no effort to have this Fleet ready to fight.

I can at the present time present certain exhibits which we have here to show the steps taken in the fleet to obtain the state of readiness which, I think, may be germane to the investigation. Shall I go ahead with them, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 10, paragraphs 7 and 9. Even before I assumed the duties of Commander-in-Chief, I had collaborated with my predecessor, Admiral Richardson, in preparing [S-27] a letter to the Navy Department setting forth the inherent weakness of the fleet's base in Hawaiian waters. This letter went forward to the

Department over the signature of Admiral Richardson. As it is very important, I shall read the entire letter:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., *January 25, 1941.*

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.

To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOC.

References:

(a) Opanav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.

(b) Opanav memorandum for Secnav OP-12-GTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor enroute to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending [S-28] a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form—even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.

(g) Local sabotage is possible.

[S-29] 5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

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(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.

(d) Augment Army A. A. defenses with A. A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

[S-30] This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:

(a) Provide escort for important ships.

(b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.

(c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.

(d) Dispatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.

(e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.

(f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:

(a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.

(b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.

(c) Despatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.

(6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.

[S-31] (9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcements. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the local defense forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.

[S-32] (b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this city. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103 (a) (5) of W.P.L. 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its [S-33] later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON.

Exhibit 11. In view of the fact that by far the most important damage received by vessels of the Fleet in the attack of December 7, 1941, was inflicted by torpedo action, I desire to read into the record at this time a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, the subject of which was: "Anti-torpedo baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks, Pearl Harbor", dated February 15, 1941.

I will read this letter in part:

FEBRUARY 15, 1941.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations

To: The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor.

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you read that again?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. He did not get that. Read it again.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

1. Consideration has been given to the installation of A/T baffles within Pearl Harbor for protection against torpedo plane attacks. It is considered that the relatively shallow depth of water limits the need for anti-torpedo nets in Pearl Harbor. In addition the congestion [S-34] and the necessity for maneuvering room limit the practicability of the present type of baffles.

2. Certain limitations and considerations are advised to be borne in mind in planning the installation of anti-torpedo baffles within harbors, among which the following may be considered:

(a) A minimum depth of water of seventy-five feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. One hundred and fifty feet of water is desired. The maximum height planes at present experimentally drop torpedoes is 250 feet. Launching speeds are between 120 and 150 knots. Desirable height for dropping is sixty feet or less. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered.

That is about all there is to it. That is the crux of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

General MCCOY. Was that since the British attack on Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General MCCOY. Was that prior to the attack on the Italian ship in Taranto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not find it out.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think it is.

General MCCOY. What is the date of that letter?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 15th.

The CHAIRMAN. February 15, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. February 15, 1941.

I think this was, yes, sir.
[S-35] (Reading:)

As a matter of interest the successful attacks at Taranto were made at very low launching heights at reported ranges by the individual aviators of 400 to 1300 yards from the battleships, but the depths of water in which the torpedoes were launched were between 14 and 15 fathoms.

The CHAIRMAN. That is 90 feet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Continuing reading:)

The attacks were made in the face of intensive and apparently erratic anti-aircraft fire.

(The above letter was prepared in the Navy Department after the attack at Taranto and all the quoted matter was a part of the same letter.)

I have Exhibit 12 here, which is a chart of Pearl Harbor showing that 45 feet is the maximum depth in the harbor. That is something that you can verify.

The CHAIRMAN. We have it here on the board.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think everybody knows it anyhow.

I might say that the torpedo business was a complete surprise to me. Had it not been for the torpedoes I think the damage would have been enormously less.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, had there been any communications from the Chief of Naval Operations or from the Navy Department later than February 15 modifying the content of that letter about the depth of water?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir. I will search for it and make certain.

[S-36] Admiral STANDLEY. Before I left Washington I saw a copy of a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance under date of July in which they referred to this letter stating that they found they could fire torpedoes at a lesser depth. I wish you would see if you have any such information from any source.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I asked them to do that for me.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take a recess now for about five minutes.

(There was a brief recess. The following then occurred:)

Admiral KIMMEL. I recall a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance on that subject, but it did not greatly modify this letter.

Admiral STANDLEY. I did not see the original letter, but I saw the second letter.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Because I particularly asked about it, but I am not sure it modified that letter to any extent.

Admiral KIMMEL. As a result of these facts, under date of March 12, 1941, I wrote the Chief of Naval Operations a letter accepting the fact that torpedo baffles not be installed in Pearl Harbor until a light efficient torpedo net could be developed and supplied to the area. It is an unfortunate fact that by December 7, 1941, the light efficient net had not been made available to Pearl Harbor for the protection of the vessels moored therein, and the endorsement on the

recommendation made by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District:

In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area.

[S-37] That was on the basis of that.

I have some recollection of such a letter but its contents left me with the conviction that we were safe from torpedo plane attacks in Pearl Harbor. That was what remained in my mind. We will look it up, sir.

Under date of 20 March 1941, Rear Admiral Bloch, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, wrote a letter to the Department on the subject: "Anti-torpedo Baffles for Protection Against Torpedo Plane Attacks."

Paragraph 3 of that letter read as follows:

In view of the foregoing the Commandant does not recommend the use of baffles for Pearl Harbor or other harbors in the Fourteenth Naval District.

That is the essence of the letter.

From the day that I assumed command of the U. S. Fleet, February 1, 1941, the security of the Pacific Fleet in Hawaiian waters was a matter of earnest concern to me. I immediately initiated a study of this subject and under date of February 15, 1941, I issued an order to the Fleet entitled "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

(This order was submitted as Exhibit 15 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel Exhibit number 4.)

Admiral THEOBALD. I do not think you need to read "G", as it is in the next one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I put that in to show that we started on this immediately.

Exhibit 16. After eight months' experience as Commander-in-Chief, I decided on certain revisions and elaborations of my original order on this subject, and under date of October 14, 1941, I issued another order on the subject of security of the Fleet at base and in operating areas. This order covered [S-38] the subjects of Continuous Patrols, Intermittent Patrols, Sortie and Entry, Security in Operating Areas, Security of Ships at Sea, and Defense Against Air Attack. Further subjects covered were: "Action to be Taken if Submarine Attacks in Operating Area." That I was not unmindful of the possibility of a surprise attack upon the Fleet is evidenced by paragraph 2 (b) of both my security orders. In both these orders this paragraph 2 (b) read as follows:

That a declaration of war may be preceded by: (1) A surprise attack on ships in Pearl Harbor, (2) A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating areas, (3) A combination of these two.

I think it may be well for me to read this security order in toto. I will read the whole thing:

From Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas.

Reference: (a) to (h).

Enclosure:

(A) Pearl Harbor Mooring and Berthing Plan showing Air Defense Sectors.

(B) Measures to be effective until further orders.

General McCoy. What is the date of that, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is dated October 14 and this supersedes the order covering the same ground issued on February 15, 1941. We issued an order and after eight months we gathered together the evidence that was in the original order and made a revision.

The CHAIRMAN. That security order will be placed in the record.

(This order was submitted as Exhibit 16 by Admiral Kimmel and is appended as part of the record herein as Kimmel Exhibit number—.)

(Admiral Kimmel read from the security order paragraph (G) on page 4 of the order and paragraph (3) found on page—.)

[S-39] Admiral KIMMEL. There are various other provisions which I had, covering the actions to be taken by the various commanders at the time of the air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Unless the Commission desires otherwise, I suggest that Admiral Kimmel's report of December 21, 1941, be marked "Kimmel No. 1" and attached to each of the copies of the notes of this day so that it will be in the same copy as the Admiral's testimony.

It is also suggested that this order of October 14, 1941, be attached to each page of the notes of this day as "Kimmel No. 2", so that we will have it in the same testimony and under the same cover.

Is that all right, gentlemen?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

(The order of October 14, 1941, "Kimmel No. 2," follows Page "551 Corrected A" of the original transcript which see opposite.)

Admiral KIMMEL. The close cooperation required between the Army and the Navy in the Hawaiian Area has always been thoroughly recognized by both services. Coordination of effort between the two services throughout my tenure as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was obtained by cooperative effort between the Commanding General and myself. The weakness of this command setup was finally recognized by the authorities in Washington and this recognition led to the only thoroughly satisfactory type of command in the premises, namely: "Unity of Command." Under date of December 17, 1941, Naval Operations addressed the following despatch to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet. I quote herewith a paraphrase of that despatch: "Commanding General, Hawaiian Department informed OpNav and Chief of Staff that Army of Hawaiian Coastal Frontier is now under C-in-C in Pacific. Obtain an exact copy of the Chief of Staff's despatch to the Commanding General."

[S-40] General McCoy. What date is that?

The CHAIRMAN. December 17, 1941.

General McCoy. Did you make any recommendations as to the unity of command before the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I made no recommendations on the subject. I talked about it on various occasions. It was a subject that has long been before the two services. I think it was recognized by everyone that the unity of command is essential to any effective effort.

General McCoy. Had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

General McCoy. While in the Navy Department had you served on the joint board?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; I never served on the joint board.

General McCoy. Did you know that that subject was up before the joint board before?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had heard it was before the joint board on many occasions, and I had heard that in time of war they would probably appoint a man who would have absolute command of the forces in any one area, but I knew nothing had been done, and I knew that in time of peace the probability of getting any action was just about nil.

Throughout the time that I was acting as Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet the cooperation and coordination of the efforts of the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Area were guided by "Joint Action, Army and Navy." This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. The most vital consideration in all efforts of cooperation was the coordination of the actions and operations of the air forces of the Army and the Navy.

I shall read paragraph d(3) on page 14 of "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," which reads as follows:

[S-41] A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

That comes under the heading of, "The specific functions of the Army in coastal frontier defense," and in carrying out these functions the Army will provide and operate or maintain:

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

Then on page 32 of the "Joint Action of The Army and The Navy," paragraph z:

An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. Its purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

Through verbal agreement with the Commanding General, an agreement for joint air action by Army and Navy forces was drawn up under date of 20 March 1941, and signed by the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, who was designated as Naval Base Defense Officer in my Security Orders of 15 February 1941 and 14 October 1941.

I might add that before I took over command, I took steps [S-42] to talk to the Commanding General and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and to my own air people, and I told them that we must get some method of operating the Army and Navy in conjunction with the other, to get some coordinated effort.

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As a result of their efforts and a great many other people, Admiral Bloch and General Short ordered a board to consider this method of coordination and efforts with the Army air force, and under date of the 20th of March they got an agreement, and the agreement is laid down here:

20 MARCH 1941

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the [S-43] immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

Approved 21 March 1941, signed G. C. BLOCH, Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant 14th Naval District and W. C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding Hawaiian Department.

MAILGRAM

Mailed at:

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 12001 April 1941.

From: Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District)
Action to: Cincpac, Pacific Fleet Force Commander & Type Commanders Com-
patwing 2, Dist. Mar. Officer, Capt. Yard, C. O.'s Dist. Activities & Units as
per distribution list [S-44] of N. B. D. O. Operation Plan No. 1-41 with
annexes, A, B, C, D, & E.

Information:

Cincpac

Comdg., Gen. Hawaiian Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

In accordance with paragraph (X) of naval base defense officer operation plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941, Revision of annex baker (Naval base defense air force operation plan No. A-1-41 dated 9 April 1941) is issued in replacement of annex baker dated 28 February 1941 and the latter will be destroyed.

C. C. BLOCH,

Rear Admiral, U. S. N.

Commander Naval Base Defense Force
(Commandant Fourteenth Naval Dist.).

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5) /ND14(03048)

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
PEARL HARBOR, T. H., April 9, 1941.

Annex Baker to Commander Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan—No. 1-41
dated February 27, 1941.

NAVAL BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE OPERATION PLAN NO. A-1-41

TASK ORGANIZATION

- (a) *Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing Two)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol Squadron.
Shore-based VO-VS units.
Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
[S-45] Army bombardment squadrons.
Army reconnaissance squadrons.
Navy Utility squadrons.

- (b) *Air Combat Group (Senior VF Squadron Commander)*

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
One division of shore-based carrier type VS planes.

1. Information:

This plan is made in accordance with: The Joint Air Operations agreement approved and promulgated on 21 March 1941; Joint Estimate covering joint Army and Navy air action, addendum I to this plan; and Pacific fleet confidential letter No. 2CL-41 dated 15 February 1941. An air combat group under the direction of the Commander Hawaiian Air Force will: Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft; Identify and report type of attacking aircraft; Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group; and as a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

Assumptions: As in Addendum I of this plan. Antiaircraft gun control in the Pearl Harbor area will be coordinated with operations under this plan. Air traffic lanes and recognition signals will be prescribed as found necessary.

2. This force will locate and destroy hostile forces raiding against Oahu or fleet units in the operating areas.

3. (a) Search and Attack Group. (a) Locate, report, and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets; (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier [S-46] involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of our surface vessel interception.

(b) Air Combat Group. (b) Operate as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force.

(x) This plan is effective upon receipt. It is operative without signal in the event of a surprise attack on Oahu. It might be made operative by despatch. In the meanwhile conditions of readiness prescribed in Addendum II will be taken as directed by the Commanding General Hawaiian Department for Army units and by the Naval Base Defense Officer (Commandant Fourteenth Naval District) for Navy units. This plan supersedes and replaces Annex Baker of Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-41 of 27 February 1941. Units assigned to task groups of this plan shall make readiness reports in accordance with Addendum II of this plan.

4. The senior carrier commander based ashore at Fleet Air Detachment, Pearl Harbor, shall at all times see that one division of VS planes is detailed to the Air Combat Group. When all carrier planes are to embark the Group Commander shall so inform the Commander Second Marine Aircraft Group who will make the detail required by this paragraph.

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5. Communications in accordance with Annex Easy to Naval Base Defense Force Operation Plan No. 1-40 of 27 February 1941. Use zone plus ten and one half time. Operation orders for the search and attack group will be separately distributed.

Addendum I—Joint Estimate.

Addendum II—Aircraft Readiness.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force,
(Commander Patrol Wing Two.)

[S-47] Approved:

C. C. BLOCH,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Force.

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

MARCH 31, 1941.

C-A16-3/A4-3(5)/ND14(0348)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force, Commander Patrol Wing Two, Naval Air Station, Pearl Harbor, T. H.

Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Addendum I to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operation Plan No. A-1-41

Joint estimate covering Joint Army and Navy air action in the event of sudden hostile action against Oahu or Fleet Units in the Hawaiian area.

I. Summary of the Situation.

(a) Relations between the United States and Orange are strained, uncertain, and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile actions by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a long period.

(d) A strong part of our fleet is now constantly at sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offensive action against any surface or submarine force which initiates hostile action.

(4) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.

II. Survey of Opposing Strengths.

[S-48] (a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers, seven of which are reported to be capable of 25 knots or over and four of which are rated at 30 knots or better. Two of the carriers are converted capital ships, armored and armed with 10-8' guns each and reported to have heavy AA batteries. Two others are small (7000 treaty tons) and limited to 25 knots. Exact information on numbers and characteristics of the aircraft carried by these ships is not available. However, the best estimate at present available is that the small carriers can accommodate from 20 to 30 planes and the large ones about 60. Probably the best assumption is that carrier complements are normally about equally divided between fighter and bomber types. Lacking any information as to range and armament of planes we must assume that they are at least the equal of our similar types. There probably exist at least 12 eight inch gun and at least 12 six inch gun fast modern cruisers which would be suitable supports. Jane's Fighting Ships (1939) shows over forty submarines which are easily capable of projection into this area. An Orange surface raiding force would be far removed from their base and would almost surely be inferior in gun power to our surface forces operating at sea in the Hawaiian area.

(b) The most difficult situation for us to meet would be when several of the above elements were present and closely coordinated their actions. The

shore-based air force available to us is a constantly varying quantity which is being periodically augmented by reinforcements from the mainland and which also varies [S-49] as fleet units are shifted. Under existing conditions about one-half of the planes present can be maintained in a condition of material readiness for flight. The aircraft at present available in Hawaii are inadequate to maintain, for any extended period, from bases on Oahu, a patrol extensive enough to insure that an air attack from an Orange carrier cannot arrive over Oahu as a complete surprise. The projected outlying bases are not yet in condition to support sustained operations. Patrol planes are of particular value for long range scouting at sea and are the type now available in this area best suited for this work. If present planes are used to bomb well defended ship objectives, the number available for future use will probably be seriously depleted. In view of the continuing need for long range overseas scouting in this area the missions of those planes for operations as contemplated in this estimate should be scouting. Certain aircraft of the Utility Wing, although not designed for combatant work, can be used to advantage in augmenting the scouting of patrol planes. Other types of aircraft, in general, can perform functions that accord with their type.

III. Possible Enemy Action.

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably [S-50] approach inside of three hundred miles.

(c) A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust.

(d) Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier.

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using and that it might find us in a condition of readiness under which pursuit would be slow to start, also it might be successful as a diversion to draw attention away from a second attacking force. The major disadvantage would be that we could have all day to find and attack the carrier. A dusk attack would have the advantage that the carrier could use the night for escape and might not be located the next day near enough for us to make a successful air attack. The disadvantage would be that it would spend the day of the attack approaching the islands and might be observed. Under the existing conditions this might not be a serious disadvantage for until an overt act has been committed we probably will take no offensive action and the only thing that would be most would be complete surprise. Midday attacks have all the disadvantages and none of the advantages of the above. After hostilities have commenced, a night attack would offer certain advantages but as an initial crippling blow a dawn or dusk attack would probably be no more hazardous and would have a better chance for accomplishing a large success. Submarine attacks could be coordinated with any air attack.

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise. This would be desirable but can only be effectively maintained with present personnel and material for a very short period and as a practicable measure cannot, therefore, be undertaken unless other intelligence indicates that a surface raid is probable within rather narrow time limits.

(b) In the event of any form of surprise attack either on ships in the operating areas or on the islands;

1. Immediate search of all sea areas within reach to determine the location of hostile surface craft and whether or not more than one group is present.
2. Immediate arming and preparation of the maximum possible bombing force and its despatch for attack when information is available.

(c) In the event of an air attack on Oahu, in addition to (b) above:

1. The immediate despatch of all aircraft suitable for aerial combat to intercept the attackers.
2. The prompt identification of the attackers as either carrier or long range shore based aircraft.
3. The prompt dispatch of fast aircraft to follow carrier type raiders back to their carrier.

(d) In the event of a submarine attack on ships in the operating area in addition to (b) above:

1. Hold pursuit and fighter aircraft in condition of immediate readiness to counter a possible air raid until search proves that none is imminent.
2. Dispatch armed shore based fleet aircraft to relieve planes in the air over the attack area.
- [S-52] 3. Establish a station patrol by patrol planes two hundred twenty mile radius from scene of attack at one hour before daylight of next succeeding daylight period.
4. None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises. To provide most effectively for the necessary immediate action, the following joint task units will be required.
 1. Search Unit.
 2. Attack Unit.
 3. Air Combat Unit.

Carrier scouts, army reconnaissance and patrol planes can be employed with very widely varying effectiveness, either for search or attack. Under varying conditions some shifts of units between the search and attack groups may be desirable. Also, the accomplishment of these two tasks must be closely coordinated and therefore these two groups should be controlled by the same task group commander.

V. Decisions:

1. This force will locate and attack forces initiating hostile actions against Oahu or fleet units in order to prevent or minimize damage to our forces from a surprise attack and to obtain information upon which to base coordinated retaliatory measures.

2. Subsidiary decisions. In order to be in all [S-53] respects prepared to promptly execute the above decision:

(a) Establish a task organization as follows by the issue of a joint air operation plan:

1. Search and Attack Group (Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two))

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Patrol squadrons.
 Shore-based VO-VS units.
 Shore-based carrier VB and VT squadrons.
 Shore-based carrier VS planes not assigned to the air combat group.
 Shore-based Marine VS and VB squadrons.
 Army bombardment squadrons.
 Army reconnaissance squadrons.
 Navy Utility squadrons.

2. Air Combat Group (Commander Hawaiian Air Force)

The following units in accordance with current conditions of readiness:

Army pursuit squadrons.
 Shore-based carrier VF squadrons.
 Shore-based Marine VF squadrons.
 One division of shore-based carrier VS planes.
 (Primarily for trailing aircraft)

(b) Assign missions to the above groups as follows:

1. Search and Attack Group. Locate, report and track all hostile surface units in position to take or threaten hostile action. Destroy hostile ships by air attack. Priority of targets: (1) carriers (2) large supporting ships. If choice of location is presented priority should be given to: (1) carrier involved in attack (2) vessels beyond reach of surface vessel [S-54] interception.

2. Air Combat Group. Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report type of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type planes to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group. As a secondary mission support search and attack group upon request.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:

(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.

(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

(c) Information is received that an attack has been made on fleet units.

(d) Define conditions of readiness for use with this plan as follows:

Conditions of readiness shall be prescribed by a combination of a letter and number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft for each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

[S-55] Degree of Readiness:

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

5. All types—four hours.

The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the tasks assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed therein.

(e) Establish a procedure whereby the conditions of readiness to be maintained by each unit is at all times prescribed by the Senior Officers Present of the Army and Navy as a result of all information currently available to them. In using the above conditions it should be noted that: Condition A-1 requires a preparation period of reduced operations and can be maintained for only a short time as it is an all hands condition. Conditions B-1 and B-2 require watch and watch for all personnel and personnel fitness for air action will decrease rapidly if they are maintained too long. Any condition 1, 2, or 3 will curtail essential expansion training work. Conditions C, or D, 4 or 5 can be maintained without unduly curtailing normal training work.

(f) In order to perfect fundamental communications by use and to insure that prospective Task Group Commanders at all times know the forces immediately available to them for use, under the plan above, in case of a sudden emergency, provide, for daily dispatch readiness reports as of the end of normal daily flying from all [S-56] units to their prospective task force commander. These reports to state:

(a) Number of planes in the unit by functional types such as bomber, fighter, etc.

(b) Number of each type in commission for flight and their degree of readiness as defined above.

(g) After the joint air operations plan under subsidiary decision (a) above has been issued, the task group commander designated therein will prepare detailed contributory plans for their groups to cover the various probable situations requiring quick action in order that the desired immediate action in an emergency can be initiated with no further written orders. To assist in this work the following temporary details will be made:

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(a) By Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two): an officer experienced in VF and VS operations and planning to assist the Commander of Air Combat Group.

(b) By the Commander Hawaiian Air Force: an officer experienced in Army bombardment and reconnaissance operations and planning to assist the Commander of the Search and Attack Group.

F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Hawaiian Air Force.

P. N. L. BELLINGER,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force
(Commander Patrol Wing Two).

Authenticated:

J. W. BAYS,
Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

BASE DEFENSE AIR FORCE,
PATROL WING TWO,
FLEET AIR DETACHMENT,
NAVAL AIR STATION,
Pearl Harbor, T. H., April 9, 1941.

Addendum II to Naval Base Defense Air Force Operating Plan No. A-1-41.

Conditions of readiness and readiness reports:

1. Conditions of readiness will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number from the tables below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

Material Readiness:

A. All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.

B. One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

C. Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

D. Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.

E. All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

Degree of operational readiness:

All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and proceeding with the assigned task.

1. For pursuit and VF types—four minutes. Types other than fighters—fifteen minutes.

2. All types—30 minutes.

3. All types—one hour.

4. All types—two hours.

[S-58] 5. All types—four hours.

2. The armament and fuel load for each type under the above conditions of readiness are dependent upon the task assigned in contributory plans and orders and will be prescribed in these.

3. Readiness Reports:

(a) A despatch readiness report, as of 1500 each day shall be made by each unit assigned to a task group by this plan as follows:

(1) Units of "Search and Attack Group" to the Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force (Commander Patrol Wing Two.)

(2) Units of the "Air Combat Group" to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force via Commander Naval Base Defense Air Force.

(b) These reports shall state:

(1) The number of operating planes in the unit by functional types as bomber, fighter, etc.

(2) The number of each type in material readiness for flight and their degree of operational readiness as defined above.

(c) The officer detailing VS planes to the Air Combat Unit (paragraph 4 of N. B. D. A. F. plan No. A-1-41) shall inform the Commander Naval Base Defense

Air Force and Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force by despatch of the detail and any changes therein.

Now, based on that the air officer commanding Patrol Wing 2, Commander Bellinger, and General Martin, Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force, got out an operating plan which was effective on the date that the attack took place.

General McCoy. Admiral, these agreements between Admiral Bloch and General Short, signed by each one of them, were they [S-59] approved by you as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were approved by me as Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, yes, sir. Whether I signed them—I don't recall that I actually signed them, but I knew all about it and I did approve of it.

General McCoy. Admiral Bloch was the responsible officer for the defense of Pearl Harbor on that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch was not responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor; he was responsible for certain elements of the defense.

General McCoy. He was?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was.

General McCoy. He was responsible for the security of the Navy Yard. Doesn't that also include Pearl Harbor? How is that exercised where you were present?

Admiral KIMMEL. As you stated it, sir, you said Admiral Bloch was responsible for the defense of Pearl Harbor. Of course the defense of Pearl Harbor, by agreement and by joint action of the Army and the Navy, was the responsibility of the Army, and Admiral Bloch was responsible for the naval elements that could be made available for the defense of Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say that in the event of an air raid the responsibility on Admiral Bloch was to turn over whatever was available to the Hawaiian Air Force to be used in connection with its own forces?

Admiral KIMMEL. For destroying planes over Oahu, yes, sir.

General McCoy. The call to be made on you by him for the Army command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Subsequently, that is in the operating plan, but we ran into some difficulty in the practical operation as to making this available. We got that all ironed out by the time of the attack, or long before the attack took place. That is, the different elements were automatically available [S-60] in case of an air raid. That was, I think, well understood by all elements.

General McCoy. Well, for instance, when an attack was over Oahu, my understanding would be that the Navy forces would go to the Army automatically, and by request vice versa, if you wanted them for patrolling over the seas, and they would go to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is just the point. In the drills with them we found that it took entirely too long to get a communication through. That provision was subsequently taken care of in the operating plans, and those forces that were available became immediately available.

The CHAIRMAN. That is to say, Admiral Bloch would not wait for a telephone call from General Martin, since he knew what he had

available for the Army, for General Martin, and would put his command at the disposal of General Martin?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And vice versa?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. That was the way it worked out practically.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. But in a working agreement they had this right to hold it back, but practically—I am now giving you what I believe to be a fact, and you can determine that more thoroughly from Admiral Bellinger and Admiral Bloch here.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I have heard, and this is hearsay—I wish to make that clear—that orders were issued by Admiral Bellinger and how and where he wanted his bombers to go. He immediately asked which bombers would be available, and when he was told he told them where he wanted them to go.

Now, there is a discrepancy that never may be definitely [S-61] located—I don't know—in all the testimony that is given here as to the events of this particular day. You can realize that people were laboring under a terrific stress and surprise which was so great that this thing had occurred, and the damage done, which was quite substantial, and we are bound to run into discrepancies of this kind in the testimony.

I believe that everyone is trying his best to tell the truth.

The CHAIRMAN. I am sure of it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask a question there, if I may, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Following this policy or this understanding that you said had been arrived at between the two force commanders, that was the procedure that was to be effective in case of an attack or an emergency; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the event or prior to the emergency where, as you have previously stated, there was a lack of sufficient force of whatever kind or nature to perform the tasks assigned, do you know whether the Commander of Patrol Wing, Admiral Bellinger, had asked the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

I understand it is the Navy function to provide the offshore air patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And there were not sufficient patrol planes to accomplish that effectively with the forces at that time. Had Admiral Bellinger made any request on the Army to supplement his forces to take care of that situation? Do you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, he had not, but the only real effective patrol planes that the Army had [S-62] were big bombers, and these big bombers within a week—it was reported to me that only six of them were in operating condition, and they had some twelve available at that time. We had—and my figures may be

slightly in error—but we had approximately twelve of those bombers here, but all but twelve had been flown to Midway, Wake, and then by way of Australia to the Philippines.

We were daily expecting somewhere in the neighborhood of sixty additional long-range bombers to come through here, and they were scheduled to go on to the Philippines. Shortly after that there were to be a hundred, I think. The exact figures escape me, but it was a large number. The Department was much concerned about the situation of Wake Island, and I thought we would be able to get these bombers through from Wake all the way to the Philippines.

We had previously put the guns on Wake, and we sent two submarines out to assist the defense, and we had just sent out these twelve fighting planes at the time that the attack took place. We were attempting to secure Wake as well as we could.

The construction of these bases on the outlying islands has been under the most adverse conditions. We were faced with the necessity of building bases and of protecting them at the same time. We had a limited supply of water and water-making facilities, food, and refrigerator facilities, and the total number of men on each one of the islands could not be exceeded. You could take your choice as to whether they should be military personnel or construction personnel at all times.

When we sent guns and the Marines to Wake, we had to withdraw some of the working force. When the Department wanted to send out a much smaller number of guns than I did, I sent a despatch to the Department in which I suggested more guns be sent, and they approved of it. About two weeks later they told [S-63] me they did not want all those guns out there and they wanted to send considerably fewer. I told them it was too late, that the guns were already there, and that I could not very well get them back.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did all these preparations and plans interfere with the requests or with the planes carrying out patrolling between the Army and the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

Admiral STANDLEY. My question was concerned with the fact if Admiral Bellinger did not make any requests upon the Army to supplement his offshore patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. About the request of Admiral Bellinger on the Army or planes to carry on offshore patrol, that could have been made, but so far as I know, it was not made; but I desire to point out in that connection that we had maneuvers shortly before this in which all the ships of the fleet took part, and we wanted the Army to take part in that maneuver. We invited them to, but the Army could not do it because they were engaged in ferrying these planes to the Asiatics, and in getting their planes in a ferrying condition here. I realized that the chance of getting any assistance from the Army was very small inasmuch as they had only six of these bombers which could fight this week before. They had their problems too, you understand.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, if you had anticipated the emergency which developed, would you have had any hesitancy in asking the Army for its help?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not the slightest.

Admiral STANDLEY. The answer is that the emergency was not anticipated, and therefore the other work took precedence over the condition you did not anticipate?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir, but I would like [S-64] to point out one thing and that was that we really had more ships out than the operating plans called for, and we made some changes in it from what the operating plan originally called for. We had not sufficient air force to maintain this patrol and if the patrol had been sent out we had no air striking force left to go after the enemy when we found him.

General McNARNEY. At this point I would like to read into the record the following figures from the statement of General Short as to the planes in and out of commission on December 7, 1941:

Reconnaissance planes in commission.....	6
Reconnaissance planes out of commission.....	7
Bomber planes in commission.....	39
Bomber planes out of commission.....	33

Admiral REEVES. That agrees with the Admiral's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that General Martin and Admiral Bel-linger had worked out some cooperative plans pursuant to the mater plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is so. I will submit that as an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Submit it as "Kimmel 3" and we will include that with your testimony so that we will have it before us.

You could probably furnish us copies.

(The document referred to above is quoted in the original transcript on pages 556-A to 556-O inclusive; it is also quoted in this supplemental transcript on pages S-47 to S-58 inclusive.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Exhibit 19. This is a fortnightly summary of current national situations, a bulletin issued by the Director of Naval Intelligence under date of 1 December 1941. I will read from "The Japanese Naval Situation" on page 9 of the fortnightly summary of the Office of Naval Intelligence, [S-65] dated 1 December, 1941:

Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the Command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.

The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc.

Exhibit 22 contains communications between Tokyo and the Japanese Consul at Honolulu. The vital importance which Tokyo obviously attached to a knowledge of the ships in Pearl Harbor and the manner in which they guarded against the departure of [S-66] those ships without immediate warning of that departure appears conclusive evidence to the effect that Japan had no intention of attacking Pearl Harbor in the absence of a large number of our battleships and aircraft carriers. Elaborate arrangements were made to report to Japanese submarines and Japanese vessels at sea the departure of the aircraft carriers and battleships from Pearl Harbor by:

- (1) Broadcast advertisements over KGMB at 0945 daily.
- (2) A system of lights from a house on Lanakai and Kalama during the night and visual day signals at Lanakai from a star-boat during daylight.
- (3) Further visual warning of the absence of aircraft carriers and battleships was a bonfire to be shown on the Island of Mauri near the Kula Sanatorium.

The codes of the Japanese Consul were seized on 7 December and it was not until 9 December that by using these codes the messages were broken down and the translation available to me. Had the information contained in exhibit 22 been known to me on 6 December I would have ordered all units to sea, because the best dispositions against surprise air attack can be effected with the fleet at sea.

However, the initiative as to the time of attack prior to the declaration of war rested entirely with the Japanese and if the fleet did proceed to sea, it had eventually to return to port for fuel, provisions, minor repairs to machinery, etc. In that event, the Japanese would have awaited the time when a considerable portion of the fleet was again in Pearl Harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have knowledge of a message from the Consul here seized after the consular office was seized?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was seized when? On the 7th or 8th?

[S-67] Admiral KIMMEL. The 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. You had no information of these secret codes before that day?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, which I got on the 9th.

The CHAIRMAN. It wasn't broken down until sometime after?

Admiral KIMMEL. It took a couple of days to break it down, yes. I do not think it is necessary to read these messages.

The CHAIRMAN. This will be off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to read them now?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, but off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Why the fleet is in Hawaiian waters: All the senior officers of the Navy have recognized the increased possibility

of surprise attack against the fleet when that fleet is operating and based in the Hawaiian waters. These facts were forcibly brought to the attention of the authorities in Washington by my predecessor, Admiral Richardson. In answer to a letter of his, the Chief of Naval Operations, under date of 27 May 1940 wrote Admiral Richardson as follows:

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph _____.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies.

And further in the same letter:

I realize what you say about the advantage of returning to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation, but at this time that is out of the question. If you did return it might nullify the principal reason for your being in Hawaii.

Now, those same conditions obtained up to the time of the attack here on the 7th of December. I knew that the Navy Department and the Administration in Washington insisted on keeping the fleet out here. I knew of the vulnerability of the fleet here. I thought it was appreciated in the Navy Department as well as by me, but it was one of the things I felt was beyond my power to change. I had the choice of saying I would not stay and to get another commander-in-chief, or to remain. Naturally, I wish I had taken the other course at the present time, but I did not. I did the best I could with what I had and under the conditions existing.

I have here Exhibits 1 to 8 which may be of interest. These are the steps which we took in the Pacific fleet to improve the efficiency of the fleet and to further the training program and to render the fleet as secure as possible.

I will read to you the titles which I think perhaps will give you all that is necessary, and you can go into them more thoroughly if the question arises in your minds as to the efforts that we made to bring this fleet up to a proper fighting efficient order.

The first one is on the question of anti-submarine screens, which was submitted on the 16th day of September, 1941. You can realize that all these represent the latest revisions we made of the orders which had been in effect prior to this time. It speaks of inner, intermediate, and outer antisubmarine screens. It speaks of general maneuvers, patrol stations, and a number of other questions that are germane to the subject, together with a number of diagrams.

Exhibit 2 is the tentative radar doctrine. The last revision was dated September 7, 1941. This is annex E to Pacific fleet operation order No. 31-41.

We had taken vigorous steps to learn how to use the radar. We had had a great many exercises in the radar, and we had developed a reasonably good doctrine for its use. We got out on October 28th instructions for escort commanders and commanding officers of escort vessels. [S-69]

On 31 October we got out task force organizations and missions. These divided the fleet into three task forces, or rather I should say into a number of task forces, but three principal ones, and it was a revision of the organization previously issued, changing it in some respects and getting it more nearly on a war footing.

It provided for a support force, a covering force, a reconnaissance force, a force to train in landing operations. It divided and established the task force for the Fourteenth Naval District, for the submarines, patrol wings, and a number of other points. It is here in extenso.

Exhibit 5 is the aircraft depth bomb alert watch. We had depth bombs in the fleet, and it was necessary to maintain a watch to drop a depth bomb, and I had arrangements for a plane to stand by when the patrol was out and to launch it immediately, to send out a depth bomb into any suspected place.

Battle plan and submarine and patrol planes under bulletin revision U. S. F. 10, which is covering the tactical orders and doctrine in United States fleet, and that was in process of revision at the time of the attack, or rather I should say it had been revised and was in process of printing at the time of the attack. The provisions of that were in effect though.

When I went to Washington in June I presented to the Chief of Naval Operations this survey of conditions in the Pacific fleet, and I took a great many steps hoping to improve the condition of the fleet, and I think we did make some improvements.

(Survey referred to in preceding paragraph was submitted by Admiral Kimmel as his Exhibit number 9, and follows page "567 Corrected A" of the original transcript which see opposite—Kimmel Exhibit No. 6.)

[S-69a]

UNITED STATES FLEET

A16/(0828)

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

S-E-C-R-E-T

PEARL HARBOR, T. H.,
26 May 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet.

I. Personnel.

(a) *Stability.* A most important, perhaps the most important factor in the day by day readiness of the Pacific Fleet is the question of stabilizing personnel—both officers and men. The Fleet is doing all it can, and is making good progress, in absorbing new men and training new officers, but facts are facts and neither the Fleet nor the individual ships can be a coordinated war machine if the present rapid turnover of personnel is continued.

(b) *Permanency of Officer Personnel.* Regular and experienced officers have been detached at an alarming rate. Cooke, for example, who came to the PENNSYLVANIA the latter part of February, is fourth on the list of twelve battleship captains in time on present billet. Executive officers are going, if anything even more frequently. The situation is no better in cruisers. There appears to be a tendency to give priority in importance to shore duty over sea duty; witness, transfer of officers skilled in fire control and gunnery to production and inspection jobs ashore, and the all too frequent detachment of commanding and executive officers and heads of departments from ships of all types. Expansion of the Forces Afloat does call for sacrifice in permanency of assignment in the Fleet, but we cannot afford to replace our experienced officers with reserves, most of whom are untrained, if we are to be ready for serious business. It does seem that much can be done toward stabilizing the experienced personnel we now have. Ordering captains, executives and heads of departments of the various types, well knowing that they will be eligible for selection and promotion within six months is an example of a condition readily susceptible of correction.

(d) *Permanency of Enlisted Personnel.* The situation is well known to the Department, as indicated by a recent directive to take full advantage of the

law and retain men whose enlistments expire outside the continental limits of the United States. The drastic trend in reduction of reenlistments in the Navy as a whole in the month of April is of serious import to the Fleet. Even in the Pearl Harbor area the wages offered ashore are so attractive and the jobs are so many that skilled men whose enlistments expire are tempted not to reenlist. A recent survey of Battleship Division THREE indicates that of the men whose enlistments expire between 1 June and 31 August 1941, 68.9% *do not intend to reenlist*. This is in line with a recent report of the Bureau of Navigation showing a reduction in reenlistments for the month of April from 83.09% to 69.53%. The Commander-in-Chief has requested the Bureau of Navigation to initiate legislation to hold for the duration of the war all men now enlisted in the Navy. He [S-69] does not look with favor upon the directive mentioned in the first sentence of this subparagraph. It is discriminatory and does not apply equally to all Fleets or even to all ships of the Pacific Fleet, since some ships overhaul on the Coast while others overhaul at Pearl Harbor.

The Fleet must and gladly will train and provide men for new construction and outlying stations to the limit of its capabilities, but it should be unnecessary to assign to shore duty so many experienced petty officers as we now find ashore. There is an urgent necessity that a continuous supply of recruits be furnished for training. It should be pointed out that since September, with new men started coming in in large numbers all vessels have had to absorb recruits in a large proportion. In the Fleet as a whole, complements are now made up of over 25% of men with the maximum of a year's service, and in some ships the figure approaches 50%. In the case of newly acquired transports, cargo ships, tankers and the like, the complements are almost 100% reserve, with little previous training. Present conditions are worse rather than better when new ships in large numbers are added to the Navy. The situation will be extremely acute if we are then at war. It is obvious that there are limitations on the capacity of active ships for supplying the large numbers of officers and men required to man the Navy now building, unless the immediate fighting capacity of the ships is seriously crippled.

Long range planning, with reasonable foresight as to future needs, is an imperative necessity. It would appear that training activities ashore must be greatly expanded, as the physical capacities of the ships limits the number that can be trained in the Fleet. The possibility that we may have to provide and quarter, ashore, a pool of trained men for new construction should be carefully examined, and provision now made for it, if found necessary.

A problem of immediate importance is brought about by a recent letter from the Bureau of Navigation which states that between now and September some 3,080 men, more than half of whom are rated, will be taken from the Fleet for new construction and for this purpose allocations are made in the ratio of 72% Pacific Fleet to 28% Atlantic Fleet. Unless a readjustment is made in these figures to correspond to the recent readjustment in the relative strengths of these Fleets, the Pacific Fleet will be seriously stripped of experienced men and may be unable to furnish some of the ratings demanded.

(d) *Health and Morale*. The desirability, if international conditions permit, of health and recreation trips to the Coast by Task Forces, each of which shall be no more than one-fourth the strength of the Pacific Fleet as now constituted must be given serious consideration.

(e) *Assignment of Flag Officers*. It is particularly desired that Vice Admiral Pye be retained as Commander of the Battle Force. Admiral Pye is able, vigorous, and loyal; and is an officer whom I would select, above all others, as Commander Battle Force.

[S-69c] (f) *Uniform*. There is too much change and experimentation at this time. It is not important whether rank is shown on the sleeve or on the shoulder of a khaki uniform, nor is it important whether the eagle of the cap device faces to left or to right. As for the khaki working uniform the Commander-in-Chief is convinced that it lessens the dignity and military point of view of the wearer and has a tendency to let down the efficiency of personnel. Reports from the aircraft squadrons are to the effect that from any considerable altitude they are unable to detect the color of the uniform on ships at sea.

II. Aviation.

(a) *Aviation Training*. The following requirements for aviation have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:

(1) Newly graduated pilots for carriers, battleships and cruisers should first be ordered to San Diego for indoctrination in Fleet squadron work and familiarization with latest types of planes.

(2) Replacement carrier groups should be built up at San Diego, for indoctrination of new graduates and for rotation with groups already in carriers.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Radioman should be established.

The following requirements are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) The level of experience of pilots in the Fleet is very low and the total number is too low.

(2) The level of experience of aviation ratings in the Fleet is low and the allowances are not filled.

(3) The rating of Aircraft Bomber, though approved, has not yet been established.

(b) *Aviation Material.* The following items which apply to aviation are in process of correction but progress is too slow:

(1) Carrier torpedo planes are obsolescent and spare carrier torpedo planes are too few.

(2) Replacement of other carrier planes with more modern types is not yet completed and the replacement planes are not yet fully modernized.

(3) There are not yet enough spare carrier planes of the new types and the stock of spare parts and engines is too low.

(4) Deliveries of ordnance and radio equipment for new planes have been too slow.

(5) Cruiser planes are obsolescent and deliveries of replacements have been too slow.

(6) Modernized patrol planes are not yet available in quantity. There are none in the Hawaiian area and there is no early prospect for replacement of those of the older type now in the Hawaiian area.

(7) There have been no deliveries of special radio equipment for patrol planes, corresponds to RADAR [S-69d] for ships, which will enormously increase the potentialities of these planes.

(8) There is a serious shortage of aircraft machine gun ammunition.

(9) No armor-piercing bombs, antiaircraft bombs or aerial depth bombs are yet available.

(10) There is a very serious shortage of aircraft torpedoes, and of equipment for their maintenance and overhaul.

(11) Completions of new carriers and new patrol plane tenders are too slow.

(12) Provision for bombs and for refueling planes at outlying bases is sketchy.

(13) There has been serious delay in deliveries of equipment under the cognizance of other Bureaus than Yards and Docks in connection with the construction of new air stations and bases.

In addition to the afore-mentioned items the following have been urged but favorable action has not yet been taken:—

(1) Aircraft overhaul at N. A. S., Pearl Harbor, now limited to patrol planes, should be expanded to provide for all planes now based in this area. Transfer to and from West Coast for overhaul is impracticable.

(2) Additional barracks should be established at N. A. S. Pearl Harbor.

(d) *Separate Air Force.* This ever present question is again being brought to the fore, in view of Mr. Scrugham's recent utterances. It is vital that the Navy's air service remain as it is. Our naval aviation is generally recognized, throughout the world, as being the best equipped, best trained, and most advanced of any naval air service. This has been brought about by the mutual recognition of the intimate relationship between air and surface sea forces, particularly in far-flung operations distant from established bases. Effective cooperation, in naval operations, between air and surface craft requires the closest kind of coordination, predicated upon precise knowledge of each other's capabilities, limitations, and tactics. This can only be attained by day-by-day operations, association, and exchange of ideas as an integral part of one organization. It is vital that this relationship continue, even at the expense (though this feature is greatly exag-

gerated) of some duplication of effort between the Army and the Navy. Mr. Scrugham's chief complaint, which deals chiefly with duplication of facilities at coastal air stations and the proximity of those stations to each other, is not a valid one. The services perform separate functions; the Army in extending the range of coastal batteries and the Navy in extending the mobility and coverage of ships in off shore search. The proximity of the fields to each other is largely a matter of the vagaries of Congress and the availability of land. The United States, due to its physical separation from its most probable enemies, has less need for a concentrated, offensive, air-striking force than other nations. [S-69e] The present GHQ air force, however, amply supplies this need. It may be noted, in passing, that, in spite of the fact that the Air Corps is a part of the Army, the strong tendency within that Corps for separation, has prevented the development of effective cooperation between ground and air forces. A separate air corps would make the situation much worse—for the Navy it would mean the death of naval aviation.

The British have found it necessary to place their coastal air command under the direct control of the Navy. Aside from discoordination of operations, this command was suffering from lack of proper types.

III. Material, General.

(a) *Priorities.*—The Navy is at present suffering from a shortage of material and is experiencing difficulty in having this shortage corrected. The principal items, and those that directly affect our early readiness, are (1) small arms and machine gun ammunition for airplanes and the Fleet Marine Force; (2) airplanes, especially those equipped with modern armor and armament; (3) close-range anti-aircraft guns, especially a 1.1", Bofors, and Oerlikon; (4) ammunition in general, particularly adequate reserves, and bombs of all kinds. Our ability to correct these deficiencies is limited by two factors: (1) aid to Great Britain, and (2) rapid expansion of the Army. Both of these limiting factors are admittedly of great importance and are entitled to proper weight in any system of priorities, but, from the point of view of the Fleet, it appears that there is a tendency to overlook the *time* factor. A priority system based on relative quantities needed by the three competing agencies, Britain, Army and the Navy, will prove fatally defective, if the *time* of beginning active operations is overlooked. As the situation appears now, the Navy may be called on for active operations in contact with well equipped opposing forces, yet is prevented from obtaining vitally necessary needs by the magnitude of the needs of Britain and the Army. If we are going into action first, our needs must be filled ahead of the Army's, and those sine qua non needs such as small arms and machine gun ammunition, modern airplanes, and modern close-range anti-aircraft guns, must be filled ahead of Britain's. There is a minimum need for the Navy without which it can not fight at all. Irrespective of how small that need may be relative to the quantitative demands of others, it must be filled *first*.

It is important to bring out this point now, since it is understood that the Army is basing its procurement program on a 4,000,000 man Army. If allocation be based on relative quantities, under such a program, the Navy will get little consideration. The imminence of active operations should be the criterion. Of course, the Navy Department is in a better position to judge that than we are, but we've been led to believe we were pretty close to war on several occasions, but we still didn't get the items we need.

(b) *Radar equipment.* Such excellent results are being obtained from the few RADAR's furnished that we should install now the equipment which will work, and not wait for something better to be developed. Delivery of RADAR should be accelerated.

[S-69f] IV. Communications.

The need for establishment of confidential call sign is urgent. With the present system of calls the text of a message may sometimes be inferred from the radio calls used. The danger of the present system is that codes may be compromised, as well as information disclosed. The cryptographic aid section of OpNav should immediately get out confidential call signs and more cryptographic aids.

V. Operations.

(a) *Fleet Operations.* With the recent detachment of many of the most modern and effective units, the adequacy and suitability of the forces remaining to accomplish the tasks to which they may be assigned is very doubtful.

In the Pacific, our potential enemy is far away and hard to get at. He has no exposed vital interests within reach of Pearl Harbor, and has a system of defense in the Mandates, Marianas, and Bonins that requires landing operations, supported by sea forces, against organized land positions supported by land-based air. This is the hardest kind of opposition to overcome and requires detailed preparation and rehearsal. It also requires a preponderance of light force and carrier strength, in which we are woefully deficient in the Pacific. Our present strength is in battleships—which come into play only after we have reduced the intervening organized positions. They (battleships) will have to be used to “cover” the intervening operations and prevent interference therewith, but their real value cannot be realized until the intervening opposition has been overcome and a position obtained from which solid strength can be brought to bear.

The Japanese are not going to expose their main fleet until they are either forced to do so by our obtaining a position close enough to threaten their vital interests or it is advantageous for them to do so by our having “broken our backs”, so to speak, by going up against their land positions and attrition operations.

The foregoing discussion is brought out to emphasize that the role of light forces, and particularly carriers, in the Pacific, is far more important than a casual evaluation of relative strength would suggest. Under RAINBOW 5, the Pacific Fleet (perhaps justifiably, in view of the Atlantic situation) is so reduced in light force and carrier strength that its capabilities for offensive operations of a decisive nature are severely crippled. Quick results may only be hoped for—common sense dictates that it is largely hope, based principally upon the idea that Japan will make a fundamental mistake, and that bold action may be able to take advantage of it.

In the Pacific, with enemy vital interests so far away, and no bases of our own within striking distance, the logistic problem is acute. We have not, at present, sufficient ammunition, provisions, cargo ships or tankers to support active operations in the Western Pacific—where the real battleground will be. We are having difficulty, even now, supporting the construction and defense activities of our own outlying bases. More auxiliary vessels are needed, now, for that purpose, and future needs must be anticipated to allow for acquisition and conversion of the ships. Our past experience, in this regard, has not been a happy one—the lag between acquisition and entrance into service being six months to a year. Repair and maintenance facilities at advanced bases can not be created overnight, nor can the Fleet remain long without them.

[S-69g] (b) *Fourteenth Naval District.* The defense of the Fleet base at Pearl Harbor is a matter of considerable concern. We should continue to bring pressure to bear on the Army to get more antiaircraft guns, airplanes, and RADAR equipment in Hawaii and to insure priority for this over Continental and expanded Army needs.

The naval forces available to Commandant are meager to the point of non-existence. A Fleet base is a place of rest, recreation, and resuscitation and must afford protection of the Fleet at anchor and during entrance and egress independent of the units of the Fleet. If units of a fleet must be employed for its own defense, in its base, its freedom of action for offensive operations is seriously curtailed—possibly to the point where it is tied to the base by the necessities for defense of that base. The need for patrol boats and other small craft, especially those equipped with listening devices, is urgent. The Fleet must be relieved of those functions which properly belong to the District. The Fleet does not have the destroyers or other vessels to take over those duties. The situation has been brought to the Department's attention by letter. It is now much more serious as many destroyers have been detached from this Fleet.

(c) *Marine.* The necessity for closely coordinated training of Marines and the ships which will support their landing operations is readily apparent. Operations of this character require detailed training and realistic rehearsal. At present, the Marines and their training ground (San Clemente) are in one location and the ships in another, 2,000 miles away. We need a training ground for landing operations and a camp for a substantial portion of the Fleet Marine Force in the Hawaiian area. This need will be worse, if we get in war in the Pacific, because we will not only need a training ground and large camp site for Marines, but also must train and rehearse, as the campaign progresses, Army forces as well.

Kahoolawe is practically undeveloped and can be used as an Hawaiian San Clemente. A camp site for 5,000 Marines has been selected and recommended for acquisition. This program should be pushed.

The Sixth Defense Battalion should be brought to Hawaii now in order to relieve the Seventh Defense Battalion at Midway where the latter has been stationed for some months. Equipment for this battalion should be provided as soon as possible. Other defense battalions now in the Hawaiian area are being used for other outlying bases.

(d) *Logistic Support.* Ships to transport men and materials to and from the Coast and to supply the outlying islands is urgent.

There is similar urgency in the need for ships to transport aircraft. Aircraft carriers should not be used for this purpose in peacetime and cannot be so employed in war. Action has repeatedly been requested.

VI. National Policy.

(a) Although largely uninformed as to day-by-day developments, one cannot escape the conclusion that our national policies and diplomatic and military moves to implement them, are not fully coordinated. No policy, today, is any better than the force available to support it. While this is well recognized in principle, it is, apparently, lost sight of in practice. We have, for example, made strong expressions of our intention to retain an effective voice in the Far East, yet have, so far, refused to develop Guam or to provide adequate defense for the Philippines. We retained the Fleet in Hawaii, last summer, as [S-69h] a diplomatic gesture, but almost simultaneously detached heavy cruisers to the Atlantic and retained new destroyers there, and almost demobilized the Fleet by wholesale changes in personnel.

We should decide on what we are going to do about the Philippines, now, and provide for their defense, if retained. It is easily conceivable that 50,000 troops and 400 airplanes, on Luzon, might prove a sufficient deterrent to Japan to prevent direct action. We should develop Guam and provide for its defense commensurate with its state of development. It is foolish to develop it for some one else to use.

The military branches of the government should be told, by the diplomatic branch, what effect it is desired to produce and their judgment as to the means available and the manner of its accomplishment should be accorded predominant weight.

Our Hemispheric Defense policy must comprehend the fullest cooperation between participating nations and our commitments limited by our available force. A strong component of that force is bases. No Hemispheric Defense policy that does not provide for our free use and development of South American bases (and local military and logistic support) can be effective.

VII. Information.

(a) The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet is in a very difficult position. He is far removed from the seat of government, in a complex and rapidly changing situation. He is, as a rule, not informed as to the policy, or change of policy, reflected in current events and naval movements and, as a result, is unable to evaluate the possible effect upon his own situation. He is not even sure of what force will be available to him and has little voice in matters radically affecting his ability to carry out his assigned tasks. This lack of information is disturbing and tends to create uncertainty, a condition which directly contravenes that singleness of purpose and confidence in one's own course of action so necessary to the conduct of military operations.

It is realized that, on occasion, the rapid developments in the international picture, both diplomatic and military, and, perhaps, even the lack of knowledge of the military authorities themselves, may militate against the furnishing of timely information, but certainly the present situation is susceptible to marked improvement. Full and authoritative knowledge of current policies and objectives, even though necessarily late at times, would enable the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet to modify, adapt, or even re-orient his possible courses of action to conform to current concepts. This is particularly applicable to the current Pacific situation, where the necessities for intensive training of a partially trained Fleet must be carefully balanced against the desirability of interruption of this training by strategic dispositions, or otherwise, to meet [S-69i] impending eventualities. Moreover, due to this same factor of distance and time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more

necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. Public Opinion.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in lackadaisical and half-hearted prosecution.

/s/ H. E. KIMMEL.

[S-70] Those are the principal things there.

Now, there is another thing, and that is the question of radar information, and I think perhaps you heard something about that, but I think it is wise for me to give you what I think and what I know about it.

The Army in the Hawaiian Area have a radar network on the Island of Oahu. On December 7, 1941, no communication was received from the Army authorities by the Naval authorities informing the latter that the Army radar had unknown planes recorded on their receivers.

At about 10:45 Tuesday, December 9, 1941, Commander Kitts, Lieutenant Colonel Pfeiffer, USMC, two members of my Staff, and Commander Momsen on the Staff of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District were in conference with Army authorities regarding the placing of certain anti-aircraft batteries. At the conclusion of the conference on this subject, Brigadier General Davidson, USA, asked these three naval officers if they would be interested in examining a radar plot of the Japanese planes which was recorded at the Army radar reception center during the forenoon of December 7, 1941. These naval officers did examine this plot and discovered therefrom that the Army radar network had picked up many unknown planes at or about six a. m., December 7, 1941, about 132 miles north of the Island of Kauai and had tracked these planes to Oahu and back to the northward until they disappeared from the radar receiver about 1059 in the morning. When asked why this information was not transmitted to the Navy, these naval officers were informed that the Army radar network was manned solely for drill on the morning of December 7, 1941, and the officer in charge of the operations thought that the planes which were recorded on the receiver were Navy carrier planes and did not consider it necessary to investigate the subject further. It also developed in conversation that the officer conducting the drill on this Army [S-71] radar network had departed from the radar reception center at about seven o'clock in the morning and left the center in command of a non-commissioned officer. This was advanced as the probable reason that the information on that Army radar was not transmitted to naval authorities on the morning of 7 December 1941.

The Navy has made no serious effort since that time to investigate this matter. However, even if a non-commissioned officer was directing the radar from seven a. m. until after the attack on Oahu, between the hours of eight and nine a. m. on December 7, 1941, it must be apparent that when the Army alerted at the time of the attack, an experienced officer would take charge of the Army radar reception center. Thus, even if an inexperienced officer or non-commissioned officer on the morning of 7 December 1941 had been the cause of failure to report strange planes to naval authorities prior to eight a. m. required by Joint Action, Army and Navy, it is incomprehensible that immediately following the first attack the officer directing the Army radar reception should have failed to appreciate the importance of the information to the Navy. It should then have been realized that, while this information was too late to prevent surprise, the Navy still had vital interest in the further movements of the Japanese planes as the Navy surface units were proceeding to sea in the hope of intercepting and destroying Japanese forces.

It is an unfortunate fact that as a result of the failure of the Army radar network authorities to inform the Navy that the enemy planes after the attack had retired to the northward, the surface naval operation which ensued took a westerly direction with their aircraft scouting largely to the southwest. The available Navy planes first scouted in a sector between 280° and 300° true. A second plane scout was between 300° and 000° true to 300 miles. This late forenoon failure in [S-72] communications between the Army and the Navy contributed somewhat in the escape of the Japanese surface vessels without any damage whatever.

I wish to clarify the status of Lieutenant Commander Taylor, USNR. This officer reported to Commander Aircraft Battle Force to give the fleet the benefit of his experience which included one year in the Royal Navy and one year in the Royal Air Force. He had had considerable experience in radar operations. As a matter of courtesy he delivered a series of lectures to the Army on the subject of radar. The Army was so impressed with Lieutenant Commander Taylor's knowledge of the operational aspects of the radar system that on about November 17, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in behalf of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, requested the service of Lieutenant Commander Taylor as technical advisor to the Army Air Forces in the Hawaiian area in connection with organization of the Army radar system. Without written orders Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army for this duty. It will thus be seen that his status was entirely one of a technician and in no sense was he a liaison officer.

The Army was responsible for a communicating radar information to the Navy both before and after eight a. m. December 7, 1941, and this should have been recognized as a matter of paramount importance. With the Navy fully alerted by five minutes past eight on that day, several channels of communication—telephone circuits, messenger, etc., were open for this purpose. The Navy's lack of this knowledge of the retirement courses of the Japanese destroyed the last possibility that existed on the forenoon of December 7, 1941, that the attacking Japanese forces could be brought to decisive action.

Now, in order to show the condition of readiness of the various ships of the fleet at the time of this attack, we have reports from a large

number of them, and it indicates that [S-73] watertight integrity report was what we call considerably better than XRAY provides for closure of all watertight compartments except those in the living compartments and for opening storerooms and such places as that in order that they may get some stores from the storeroom. However, a higher degree is when they close everything below the second deck, and the highest degree is when everything is closed up tight.

By my order and with the forces at hand we had ready ammunition on deck and in ammunition boxes for the 5-inch and for the 3-inch 50's, and for 1.1, and for the .50 caliber machine guns. On the battleships two of the 5-inch guns had ammunition laid out and the crew near the guns. Two of the .50 caliber guns were completely manned and ready. In all cases—and this is laid down in some detail here and is available for the inspection of the board—there were considerably more than 50% of the officers and well over 80% of the crew on board at the time of the attack. I should say it would run to 70% of the officers and 90% of the men. All ships went immediately to general headquarters. Fire was opened, and from the inspection of the reports from the various ships it appears that almost all the ships were firing with one or more guns within two minutes of the first alarm.

We had all guns fully manned, in full operation and inflicting damage within five minutes of the first alarm, as we know it is pretty well substantiated that in the first flight of the torpedo planes that three of the first flight were shot down; two before they launched their torpedoes and one afterward.

The CHAIRMAN. That would be than a total of how many?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon?

The CHAIRMAN. Were there about a dozen in that first flight of torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, somewhere in that neighborhood.

[S-74] The CHAIRMAN. You got a report on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is difficult to say exactly what the number was. I think it is reasonable that it was somewhere between 12 and 20 in the first flight. I think we shot down three of them or maybe more.

All this is, as I say, in considerable detail in the report. I do not think you want to know where every ship was.

The CHAIRMAN. No. I see it is summarized in the appendix to your report to the Navy Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This merely assembles it for each ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. It carries it along.

The CHAIRMAN. And what each ship did?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you developed it in order?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but this is a little different from the other. The other is a report of the ship and the action. Some of them didn't even think about reporting the time they opened fire. This is a special report in answer to a specific questionnaire.

Admiral STANDLEY. What is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Some of them didn't even think about reporting this. They knew their guns were manned and shooting and they didn't even mention it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there a summary there?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir, but we can produce the summary, if the Commission would like to have it.

The CHAIRMAN. These percentages are rough approximations?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but it is laid out in considerable detail here as to organization, training at sea, training in port, security for sortie and entry, security for ships at sea, [S-75] security for ships in port, duties of task force commander, naval base, air combat guard, watertight integrity in port, condition of readiness, what station, and so on.

I might say at this point something which just occurred to me, and that is that the organization prescribed for all the ships in the fleet provided that for the anti-aircraft battery that there should be a complete crew for the anti-aircraft battery in each watch section on board. that they should be capable of manning a complete anti-aircraft battery.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that there were skeleton crews and ammunition at the anti-aircraft guns on these battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, except that two .50 caliber guns were completely manned.

The CHAIRMAN. That was according to orders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think they were. They could not have begun firing as quickly as they did, if that wasn't so.

General MCCOY. Is that all submitted in toto?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am perfectly willing to, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That will be very helpful to us if you do.

Admiral KIMMEL. You can ask Admiral Pye if you want to.

The CHAIRMAN. That is really a report to him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. The Commission would only be concerned with the matter that is pertinent to the happenings on the morning of the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Some of it is in regard to sea maneuvers?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Before we forget it for the moment, will you find out when the Navy Department ceased permitting families of officers to come to Hawaii?

Admiral KIMMEL. The exact day I cannot give, but it was after the attack was completed. That is correct, isn't it?

I can answer that but I would prefer to get the despatch [S-76] that was sent out when they stopped it.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I know it was subsequent to the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. Families come here in many instances where they have home yards, but the Department will not furnish them transportation unless their home yard is here, but families could come anyway on their own expense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I want to amend that, because I misunderstood at first. The Department permitted families to come here but they didn't furnish them transportation.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. They didn't furnish transportation except to families of officers with permanent stations here or whose home ports were here.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to recess now until two o'clock.

(Thereupon at 1 o'clock p. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

[S-77] The CHAIRMAN. Had you concluded your statement, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. There are one or two things, sir, that I would like to add to what I already stated.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite right.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have here a memorandum from the fleet personnel officer:

To the best of my knowledge Bunav has never prohibited dependents of personnel attached to vessels whose home port is Pearl from coming out here on Government transportation. Attached dispatch proves that such dependents were still being authorized on 3 December. Subject to Opnav 98 if home port not Pearl Government transportation is not authorized any time in accordance with regulations except possible special cases about which I do not know.

The only thing that stopped dependents from coming out here was the evacuation order which was issued on 15 December:

Evacuation Hawaii directed for dependents Navy and Marine Corps and Coast Guard personnel on the 15th of December.

And on the 15th of December, also, Opnav sent a message 13 12 11 15 Commander in Chief Pacific Incom 14:

In order to reduce number individuals entering Hawaiian Islands to minimum take appropriate action to permit passage only those definitely required that area in interest of national defense. Maritime Commission, State, War, and Treasury office informed and requested to operate.

Off the record, I was a little confused with that evacuation order and the stopping of dependents coming out here. So, strictly speaking, we have got no order to stop dependents there. We had an order to evacuate.

On 22 October we received the——

Admiral THEOBALD. We will find it later.

[S-78] Admiral KIMMEL. At the time of the fall of the Japanese Cabinet we received a message from the Chief of Naval Operations telling us to make appropriate dispositions, because he didn't know whether we would be attacked or not. That was the essence of the message. I haven't an exact copy of it here.

Admiral REEVES. What date was that, sir?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is November. This is October.

Admiral THEOBALD. October.

The CHAIRMAN. I wonder if that is the message of October 16.

Admiral KIMMEL. October 16. Was that the day, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. There is a message of October 16, I think, both to the Department Commander and to you, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I have——

The CHAIRMAN. One from each department.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have not that here with me, but the essence of the message was to be prepared for anything. And as a result of the message which we received to make appropriate dispositions, I informed the Department that we were continuing to maintain the patrol of two submarines at Midway. We dispatched 12 patrol planes to Midway. We started two submarines for the patrol of Wake. We dispatched the Castor and two destroyers to Johnston and Wake with additional Marines and stores. The Curtiss arrived at Wake with gasoline, lubricating oil, and bombs. We prepared six patrol planes at Midway for Wake, replacing these six by others from Pearl Harbor. We sent additional Marines to Palmyra. We placed on 12 hours' notice the task force under Admiral Pye, then on the West Coast for a recreation cruise. We prepared six submarines to depart for Japanese waters. We placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. We delayed the sailing of the West Virginia for the West Coast until time when she was actually required at Puget Sound. This [S-79] is back on the 22nd of October.

We informed CNO that every exercise plan finds us short of destroyers and stated that in order to get anything like the capabilities of the heavy ships made effective we required at least two more squadrons of destroyers. Again asked that the North Carolina and Washington or some other battleships be sent here to strengthen the Pacific Fleet. Asked for all long-range submarines that can be sent here. Asked for more cruisers to take care of the Japanese raider activities after the outbreak of war. We asked for another carrier, for sea train vessels to transport aircraft, and urged to hasten the supply of Radar and made some complaint about the ones that we had received for the Honolulu class being practically of no value, being of the wrong type.

We on 27 November—

Admiral THEOBALD. You have read that already, I think.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 27 November when we received the war warning, we sent one Patron, then at Midway, ordered to Wake and proceeded on 1 December, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route.

Patron at Midway replaced by Patron from Pearl. Left Pearl 30 November via Johnston, conducting reconnaissance sweep en route Johnston and en route Johnston to Midway. This squadron made daily search of a hundred-mile radius from Midway on three, four, five, and six December. They were to make the daily search until further orders. We sent the Enterprise to Wake with VMF squadron, departing Pearl on 28 November, landed planes at Wake on 3 December. Enterprise conducted daily reconnaissance flights with own planes. Patron at Wake then withdrawn, conducted reconnaissance sweep en route Wake to Midway and a similar sweep from Midway to Pearl Harbor.

Lexington proceeded to Midway with VMF squadron, departing Pearl 5 December. Conducted daily reconnaissance flights with [S-80] own planes en route. She was 400 miles southeast of Midway when the war broke.

Burrows despatched to Wake with additional supplies, including Radar and forces, but was short of Wake when war broke. Burrows departed Pearl 29 November. She returned, incidentally, having

landed a barge down at Johnston Island, and she got in safely but did not go to Wake.

We conducted daily reconnaissance flights of VP planes based on Pearl Harbor, to cover fleet operating areas and approaches thereto.

The CHAIRMAN. What kind of planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Patrol plane flights based on Pearl Harbor.

Each day, beginning the latter part of November, 30 November, we got up a memorandum to show what the initial steps would be when war would come, and the last one was made up on 5 December, gone over by me on the morning of 6 December, and this was ready when the war broke. These were steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war, and I read:

Send dispatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send dispatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). The submarine and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them.)

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled.

(c) Raiding and reconnaissance plan effective, modified as follows: Delay reconnaissance until Task Forces Two and Three are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous to be designated.

[S 81] (d) Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

(e) Lexington land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec) and proceed with ships now in Company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake.

(f) Comtaskfor Three proceed to join Lexington group. Return DMS to Pearl.

3 (a) Do not modify the movements of Regulus at Midway (departing 9th), nor ships bound to Christmas and Canton.

(b) Direct that William Ward Burrows continue to Wake but delay arrival until 10th. Direct that Lexington group send two destroyers to join Burrows prior to her arrival at Wake.

(c) Do not withdraw any civilian workmen from outlying islands.

(d) Provide two destroyers to escort Saratoga from longitude 150° west to Pearl Harbor.

(e) Do not change passage of shipping to and from Manila, nor send any added escorts, nor dispose any cruisers toward California or Samoa until further developments occur.

I merely cite that, not that there is any particular merit in what we had planned to do, but to show you that we were alive to the possibility of war. I must state again that I was by no means convinced that we were going to get into the war at this time and that we would become involved immediately. That was, of course, my mistake.

Now, I have here a number of messages which were received, and I don't think it is necessary to read them all, but they can be inspected to show that from 20 January on we periodically received messages which indicated a grave situation. We did [S-82] not have any one prefaced by the term "war warning," but they might very well have been.

I have also made some extracts from letters from the Chief of Naval Operations in which this state of tension was emphasized from time to time. I think it is hardly necessary to read all those, unless you want something more definite.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask a question there.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Standley wants to ask a question.

Admiral STANDLEY. While you are on the messages you have referred to a message from Naval Operations saying, "This is a war warning."

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message? Have you got that there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. What was the date of that message?

Admiral KIMMEL. That message was 27 November.

Admiral STANDLEY. 27th of November?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Wait a minute now.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.

Admiral THEOBALD. That is right. Here. I have got it right here

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. There is the original, I mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. Shall I read that for you, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. No. I have it. I just wanted to ask you: Is that estimate that you read there as brought up to the 6th of December, and the plans of things to do—is that in the light of this war warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, in the light of that war warning and general situation.

Admiral STANDLEY. The last of that message says, "Carry out the task. Inform District and Army authorities."

[S-83] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did you furnish the Army a copy of this message, or do you know?

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help you on that.

Admiral KIMMEL. My recollection is that I sent a copy of the message to be read by the Commanding General and furnished him with a paraphrase of the message.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can amplify: during the recess—

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, suppose I swear you now, and if you answer questions then you will be a witness.

(The oath was administered to Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald in due form by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. Will you give your full name?

Admiral THEOBALD. Rear Admiral Robert Alfred Theobald.

General MCCOY. I do not think that counsel ought to be asked questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not understand that you were here as counsel.

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that you were here to assist the Admiral with information.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. So it is understood you are not acting as counsel here?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, sir.

General MCCOY. The Admiral is not on trial, of course.

The CHAIRMAN. No, this is not a trial of the Admiral, in any sense.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can help a little in this matter.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Admiral THEOBALD. Because during the noon hour Admiral Kimmel sent out to get this message, and we have got his intelligence officer and

his ex-intelligence officer and ex-communication officer outside, but I just interviewed them, and we can bring in his intelligence officer who did deliver [S-84] this message personally to an Army officer but not to the commanding general, and he doesn't know the name of the Army officer, but he is absolutely certain in his own mind that that officer that delivered it, naval officer, is Lieutenant Layton. He is outside now.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, do we want to break—

General McCoy. I think we had better finish with the Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. I should think so. We will hold him in reserve for this message.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. He did not receive a receipt for it. He said they were not receiving receipts at that time. He delivered the dispatch personally and remembers it of his own knowledge, but did not receive a receipt. That's what he said.

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead, then, Admiral, with your statement.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I haven't anything further sir, I think.

Do you know of anything further?

Admiral THEOBALD. No, I don't.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any message from the Chief of Naval Operations on 7 December 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. 7 December?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, the day of the attack. If your file is complete there I guess it ought to show it.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think this is just a—I had better go out and ask Curt to bring up the December.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, we would like to have any telegraphic messages that the Department sent to Admiral Kimmel between October 14 and December 7. We would like to have the complete file.

Admiral THEOBALD. All right, sir. We have here the November file. We haven't got the October file, or the [S-85] first seven days.

Admiral KIMMEL. We have the November file here, yes; I was just looking up.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have the November file. Here is the original November file.

Admiral KIMMEL. On 7 December, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Apparently your file there ends with November; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; it runs to the 7th of December.

The CHAIRMAN. That file (indicating)?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Oh, I don't know about this one (indicating), but I have here a transcript of what we considered the messages that might be germane to this investigation, and I find no message from the Chief of Naval Operations dated 7 December.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the next one earlier than the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. And I find nothing on 6 December.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes? What next?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. What earlier than that? What earlier than the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. On 3d December we have, "OpNav informs"—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "informs CinC Asiatic, CincPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

And on 2 December:

"OpNav informs CinC Pacific, Asiatic, and Com-14 and Guam that landing field will not be constructed on [S-86] Guam because of impracticability of providing effective defense for Guam."

The CHAIRMAN. That was on 2 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I can produce my files, of course, sir, and you can examine them.

The CHAIRMAN. Quite all right for you to do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. If I made a mistake here or if it hasn't been put in I want it found.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, quite right.

General McCoy. May I ask the Admiral if he—

Admiral KIMMEL. Now may I interject? Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. May I ask if you received on the 7th or at any time thereafter a dispatch that was sent to General Short by the Chief of Staff of the Army informing him of the danger of outbreak on December 7 and which arrived, as we know, in Honolulu on the morning of the 7th but didn't get to General Short until after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. In the dispatch General Short was directed to furnish you a copy.

Admiral KIMMEL. General Short did furnish me a copy of that. I saw it. But the attack had already taken place, and it was of no use to me. I did not keep a copy of it. That was delivered immediately—some 24 hours after the enemy raid had ended. I think that's wrong. It is a little bit earlier than that, but he did not receive it until after the enemy raid had ended. He sent it to me—he immediately sent it to me, and of course I have no interest in it.

General McCoy. You had not received that directly from the Navy Department, that particular dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I had not. Now, I was informed by the Secretary when he was out here that a dispatch had been sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, the purport of which I judged from his conversations was a warning [S-87] that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed by his Government to deliver his answer exactly at 1 o'clock, I think it was, Washington time, and that indicated that the Japanese were going to make an attack at that time.

That dispatch was never received in my office, sir. We have no record of it, and I am sure that if it had been received I would have seen it. Immediately the Secretary told me that, of course I had a search made in an attempt to discover it. The Secretary asked me if we had intercepted a dispatch. Well, with the number of dispatches that we have to decode we just simply cannot decode everything that

goes through the air, and so far as I know the dispatch was never even intercepted.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the Navy routine would a copy of that dispatch have gone to you as Commander of the Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Under the Navy routine, no, sir, not unless it was addressed to me.

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. And generally when a dispatch such as that is sent there is a multiple address; it is addressed to the Commander-in-Chief of Asiatic, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific, and any other interested parties. We have two degrees. One is that a dispatch is addressed for action and to other people for information. The information dispatches for general guidance and the action dispatches require something to be done about it.

The CHAIRMAN. So, as far as you know, that dispatch would have been sent directly to the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and would not ordinarily have passed through your office at all?

General MCCOY. Asiatic Fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I mean the Asiatic Fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Department sent a great many dispatches and sends a great many dispatches direct to the various [S-88] commanders.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Even in this fleet the Department may send a dispatch to a subordinate of mine on which he should take action, particularly in matters of materiel and personnel that I have no particular interest in. As Commander-in-Chief I could not cope with all those things, not even with the staff that I have.

General MCCOY. Those were really administrative dispatches?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There are numbers of dispatches that are sent.

The CHAIRMAN. So that, as far as you know, this dispatch saying that negotiations would be broken off probably at 1 o'clock Washington time, December 7, never came to you at all?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General MCCOY. Until after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral KIMMEL. I have never received that at all.

General MCCOY. He got it from General Short after the attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, but I am talking about a Navy dispatch. I am not talking about an Army dispatch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, you were talking about the Navy dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Now, as I understand you, the Secretary said that such a dispatch was sent to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have never seen that dispatch yet, and all I know about it is what the Secretary told [S-89] me.

General MCCOY. Have you endeavored to find out through communications what happened to that dispatch?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I made no attempt to find out. It would be very difficult to trace it with the meager information that I've got.

The CHAIRMAN. Communication with the Pacific Fleet might be direct from Washington? It wouldn't be relayed from here, would it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. It might be relayed through this station and still never broken down here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in the light of that plan that you made on December 6 resulting from information that you had up to that time, and suppose you had received that message from the Department that you referred to, breaking off relations and delivery of the note at 1 o'clock; suppose you had received that at 7 o'clock in the morning of the 7th of December; would you have made any other dispositions than were then in existence?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, that is difficult to answer.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, I am just trying to get informally the—

Admiral KIMMEL. It would depend very much on the wording of a dispatch which I have never yet seen. I am unable to answer that I would have done had that dispatch been received. If I had considered that war with Japan was imminent, if I had believed that war with Japan was imminent, I would have taken every step possible, but what my reactions would have been to the dispatch—well, I hesitate to make a statement like that.

Admiral STANDLEY. I am trying to ascertain whether or [S-90] not the information which you had up to the 6th of December had fixed in your mind the dates which progressively meant decisive action or possible decisive action: dates and hours and times. Had that impression been made in your mind, that various dispatches, and so forth, mentioning dates, had certain significance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't believe I understand you.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, I understand from the Department that they had referred in their various messages to certain dates: 27th of December. Oh, one, I think—

The CHAIRMAN. November.

Admiral STANDLEY. November. I think there was one in October, and the 29th of November was another, and then at 1 p. m. on the morning of the 7th of December was another, and the message which you never got. Now, I am trying to find out if these messages created in your mind a progressive move towards a date on which Japan was going to take decisive action. In other words, the message which said 1 p. m. on December 7 meant 1 p. m.—as far as concerns them over at that side, meant that that had a certain significance, and I want to know if it would have conveyed the same significance to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think it probably would, sir.

Admiral REEVES. I think that is the only dispatch that mentioned any date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, they spoke about the 27th.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Admiral REEVES. No, in no previous dispatch have they mentioned the date.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, but Turner has told us that there were certain dates that had made impressions on them; I don't know whether that was a radiogram or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall any specific dates, sir.

Admiral REEVES. There were no dates. The only dispatch [S-91] which I recall which mentions a date is the one of the 7th of December.

Admiral STANDLEY. That mentioned hours, yes.

Admiral REEVES. That mentioned date and hour.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume, Admiral, you are familiar with what burning the codes and the papers in the consulates means?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, but burning the codes in the consulate—after all, the codes are burned from time to time, and in a time of tension like this we receive a great many scary reports. To be sure, they came from a great many sources. But again, the Department sent me a message that these codes were being burned, and I feel, while that was good information, that they might very well have enlarged somewhat on what they believed it meant. I didn't draw the proper answer, I admit that. I admit that I was wrong. Nobody can gainsay the fact that if I had drawn different conclusions from what I got we might have changed things. Nevertheless, such a dispatch as that, with no amplification, was not near as valuable as it would have been if they had amplified and drawn the conclusions.

General McCoy. Don't you think it was of considerable moment, having followed the one of November 27 which was given as a war warning, "This is a war warning"; then the next dispatch you got—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but—

General McCoy. — stating that the consulates in London and various other places were burning their codes, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And don't you suppose it was sent to you with that in view, that is, in part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. As an additional warning to the dispatch of the war warning?

[S-92] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. But again, in connection with the war warning, the war warning was sent with some intelligence in it which very definitely indicated that in the mind of the Department the attack was directed towards Kra Peninsula. Now don't mistake me, gentlemen; I am not trying to evade anything. I am merely trying to let you know what influenced me, what was in my mind.

General McCoy. Well, that is what we are trying to find out, because it is pertinent both to our interview with General Short and with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. We are not trying to put you on the spot at all. We are just trying to—

Admiral KIMMEL. No, but I don't want to be misunderstood if I can help it.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, you quoted from that order made up on December 5 which you say you saw and approved on December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. Will you turn to that order again?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That was not an order, sir, so much as a memorandum or a reminder.

The CHAIRMAN. Or a memorandum of action to be taken?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it was a reminder of action to be taken.

The CHAIRMAN. That's right. Now, is there anything in that memorandum that tightens up the defense against a possible air raid on Pearl Harbor? And if there is will you point it out to us?

Admiral REEVES. Let us have the Admiral read the whole memorandum; it isn't very long.

The CHAIRMAN. Didn't he read it, Mr. Stenographer?

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you might read it. You need not take it again, Mr. Stenographer. Read it again.

[S-93] Admiral REEVES. Make a note.

Admiral KIMMEL. Just one moment. I think I can answer you. I think the answer to your question is that in these particular reminders there isn't anything that specifically tightens up on the patrol in Pearl Harbor, but that was in my mind and would have been done automatically.

Admiral REEVES. How long is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Automatically.

Admiral REEVES. I would like to hear it again.

The CHAIRMAN. Without taking it again on the record, will you read it through again?

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

Send despatch to Pacific Fleet that hostilities have commenced.

Send despatch to task force commanders:

(a) WPL 46 effective. (Execute O-1A R5 except as indicated in (b) and (c) below). (The SS and VP plans will become effective without special reference to them).

Admiral REEVES. That is very definitely air action, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was wrong about that.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, I thought there was definite air action in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that—

Admiral REEVES. Your submarine and VP plans.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

—plans will become effective without special reference to them.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL (reading):

(b) Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations—

Is that all you want, sir?

Admiral REEVES. No. I would like to hear it. It isn't very long.

[S-94] Admiral KIMMEL. Commerce sweeping plan, including cruiser operations west of Nanpo Shoto, cancelled. That was because there wasn't any commerce.

Raiding and Reconnaissance Plan effective, modified as follows:

Admiral REEVES. Yes; that is another item.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral REEVES. Another item of air, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Radio and reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance.

Admiral REEVES. Raiding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Raiding and reconnaissance plan.

Delay reconnaissance until task forces 2 and 3 are joined; Batdiv One join Task Force One; Commander Base Force send two tankers with utmost despatch to rendezvous with Task Force Three to eastward of Wake at rendezvous to be designated.

Admiral REEVES. What was Task Force 3, again? That contained a carrier, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. So you were sending additional support to the carrier east of Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is right.

Comairbatfor and units in company with him (Taskfor 8) return to Pearl at high speed, fuel and depart with remainder of Taskfor Two, less BBs, to join Task Force Three.

Admiral REEVES. Task Force 2 had a carrier in it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned (p. m. 7 Dec.) and proceed with ships now in company (Taskfor 12) to vicinity of Wake."

[S-95] The LEXINGTON, you remember, was up there.

(Admiral Kimmel read the remainder of the memorandum of steps to be taken in case of war.)

Admiral REEVES. As I have checked it, there are seven specific items referring to the movement of air force in this memorandum.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was to be put into effect in the case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. That was the action you took on what date?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was approved by me on the morning of 6 December.

Admiral REEVES. That was the direct result of the warning of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral REEVES. You took these war preparation measures on that morning as a result of that warning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; as the result of that warning and the general situation I wanted to know—I was keeping a running record of what—

Admiral REEVES. Well, would you say that these measures that you have taken are anti-sabotage protection? Did you have anti-sabotage in your mind when you took these measures to despatch forces all along?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral REEVES. Then, you took the warning of November 27 to mean more than protect yourself against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Did you discuss that with the Army commander?

Admiral KIMMEL. What I was going to do here? I think I didn't show him this. I discussed a great many things with [S-96] the Army commander.

General McCoy. Do you remember on what dates immediately prior to the attack you had conferences with General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would be difficult for me to say that, sir, but I think I can look at some of these dispatches and approximate the—

General McCoy. Now may I help you? General Short made a statement to us that he had conferences with you on certain days.

Could you have that looked up, the dates? Would that be here or at the hotel?

Mr. SCHNEIDER. It is probably at the hotel, General.

Admiral KIMMEL. We had several conferences.

General McCoy. My remembrance is that he spoke of a prior conference with you.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

General McCoy. Immediately prior to the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

General McCoy. And we asked him to give us some idea of what you talked about,—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. —to see what effect these dispatches had on the two of you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Talking it over together.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And the dispatch that we had particularly in mind, I think, at the time, was this one that was the war warning on the 27th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Apparently General Short didn't remember that at all. He had received no copy of it. That is, he had the record looked up. He didn't remember it at all, but he said he felt that you must have mentioned it to him, although he couldn't remember it, and his records and his file over [S-97] there do not show that it was ever furnished him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, I not only sent that war warning to General Short, to the best of my knowledge and belief, but—

General McCoy. I understood from your records that you had sent him a paraphrase.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Would that paraphrase use the term "war warning," do you think?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, sir; we had a paraphrase, or he read it, because they were not the same in literal wording, but "war warning" was in both dispatches, the paraphrase and the original.

General McCoy. It made no impression, as I remember, on General Short, however.

Admiral REEVES. No, I don't think it did.

General McCoy. He said, however, that he felt you had shown everything you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was going to add, General, that I believe that in my own office I showed him these dispatches and discussed them with him.

General McCoy. Well, he was of that impression, but he didn't remember that particular one.

Admiral KIMMEL. I believe that with all my might. I mean I am convinced that I did, and in addition to it I am convinced that I sent him a paraphrase of this message.

General McCoy. You remember the nature of your discussions at those conferences as regards your anticipation of what the Japanese

would do in case war was suddenly declared or started without declaration?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think that my idea was—I know that my idea was, and I think that I must have expressed it to the General—that I thought the war was getting pretty close. [S-98] I thought that they were going to go to the Kra Peninsula, and I thought they were going to go into Thailand. I agreed with that, but I believed that we might not get into it for a little while, but we never could tell what was going to happen.

Admiral REEVES. It might help you, Admiral: Do you recall General Short showing you a dispatch of the 27th of November which he received from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, on this same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Could I see it, sir, perhaps?

Admiral REEVES. Yes. (Handing a paper to Admiral Kimmel.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I have seen that before. Yes, sir, I have seen this dispatch before.

Admiral REEVES. Yes, you apparently had a copy of it from General Short on the 27th of November, and of course if you did you must have discussed this dispatch and also the one which you had received.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Yes, I remember seeing—I have seen that dispatch.

General McCoy. Do you remember General Short at that particular conference asking you if you anticipated any attack by the Japanese from the air here in Hawaii at the outbreak of hostilities either by declaration of war or without declaration of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't recall that now, but we discussed a great many things. It's quite possible he did ask me such a question.

General McCoy. Was there an officer by the name of McMorris with you at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Was he your operations officer?

Admiral KIMMEL. He is the War Plans Officer, yes, sir.

General McCoy. "War Plans." Well, we can ask—

[S-99] Admiral STANDLEY. He was supposed to have answered the question.

General McCoy. Well, the Admiral, he said, turned to McMorris and—

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, I recall.

General McCoy. Do you remember—

Admiral KIMMEL. McMorris is here and available, sir, whenever you want him.

General McCoy. I mean, do you remember referring, or do you remember that when General Short asked such a question you turned to McMorris and asked his opinion?

Admiral KIMMEL. I very probably did, sir.

General McCoy. You don't remember it, however?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't remember that particular incident, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Had you really any apprehension between November 27 and December 7 that there would be an airplane raid on Hawaii, on Honolulu?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought it was highly improbable, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that, so far as you know, the opinion of the well-instructed officers in your command?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. They were all, as you were, surprised at the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir. I might state that as nearly as I can recollect the Saturday preceding the attack I went over this situation in the forenoon, and I think Admiral Pye was in the office. I know I went over it with DeLany and McMorris and Smith. We left the office about 1 o'clock, came here to these quarters, where we have our meals, and I think after lunch we sat there and talked for some time about the possibilities of this and that in connection with the situation, and along two or three o'clock in the afternoon I went to my quarters and remained there until about a quarter [S-100] of six when I went downtown for dinner at the Halekulani Hotel. I left there about 9:30 and came home, turned in about 10 o'clock, and that was the way I spent the day before the attack.

General McCoy. What evaluation of the situation did your staff officers give you at that conference? What was the estimate of the situation at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The evaluation that they gave me is pretty well summarized in this memorandum of action to be taken. We discussed taking additional security measures and balanced the probabilities against the additional action to be taken, and made the decisions. I had no advice from any one of them—I think I am fair in stating that—to take any measures other than the ones that we had laid down.

The CHAIRMAN. When, if at all, Admiral, had you alerted the command under you against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had been alerted for two years against sabotage, sir, continuously.

The CHAIRMAN. You took no special means or measures after the message of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. At all times, long before I became Commander-in-Chief, we were alerted against sabotage. We had patrols in the ships, and what I believe to be a very effective organization. I was in the cruisers of the battle force at the time that that was first started; I got a very comprehensive order which remained constantly in effect. I took no measures against sabotage at this particular time because we already had done everything that we could do.

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. Had there been any sabotage in that period?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can say that there had been no proved [S-101] cases of sabotage. We had had some things go wrong with some turbines and other gear in the ship, and each time such an incident occurred we made a very thorough investigation, and I don't recall a single instance where it was determined that there was sabotage or even that there was a strong probability of sabotage.

Do you recall any?

Admiral THEOBALD. No; when I was chief of staff of the fleet the nearest we came to it was the ARIZONA incident, the fire in the ARIZONA, but the F. B. I. could never give us enough evidence to make the then Commander-in-Chief want to take any further action.

That was Admiral Bloch's regime. So it just dropped. That is the nearest.

General McCoy. Do you remember being furnished with General Short's Alert No. 1 that he put into effect as a result of that dispatch and conference with you of November 27?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not have in your files his Standing Operating Procedure?

Admiral KIMMEL. I may, sir, but if I did—I may have seen this (indicating a document), but if I did I never went into it very thoroughly, because that was the Army's mission. I thought General Short was a very competent officer, and so far as I remember I haven't seen this. It's possible that I have, but I don't recall it.

The CHAIRMAN. You will notice that in that telegram from the War Department to General Short of November 27 there is reference to precautions against sabotage.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That is in the telegram to him.

[S-102] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he inform you what he had done or intended to do with respect to precautions against sabotage?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know he didn't.

General McNARNEY. I think you are mistaken, Mr. Justice. That was on the 28th, sabotage.

The CHAIRMAN. Was it? Maybe I am wrong.

General McCoy. With reference to this Alert No. 1 that was furnished the Navy, according to the Army records, as the New Deal, as it were, as the result of the dispatch of the 27th, in this Alert No. 1 there is provision made on the Army air fields for, instead of the dispersion of the planes which had been in force before, a concentration of the planes, which caused their destruction in the attack. Now, was that order of the Army for protection against sabotage of their airships in any way put into effect in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. As regards land planes of the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. They were dispersed on the——

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no knowledge of the concentration of Army planes.

General McCoy. Well, it is provided for in this Alert No. 1 which was furnished the Navy on the day it was put in effect, according to the Army records.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, it may have been furnished the Navy and I would never have seen it, and I doubt if any member of my staff had time to fully read the whole setup there, and I certainly——

General McCoy. Do you know whether the Navy planes were [S-103] concentrated for protection at that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; so far as I know the Navy planes were dispersed. I had invited attention to the necessity for keeping the planes dispersed, and I know that at Kaneohe, in particular, they had attempted to disperse the 77 planes to the extent of anchoring them out to get them away, so as they were widely separated, and after the attack I was informed that every single one of these that had been

anchored out in our attempt to disperse them had been completely destroyed, while those that were kept on the ramps and dispersed as well as they could there—that while some of them had been damaged, most of them they had been able to repair and to fly; and due to the fact that those that were dispersed—I am speaking now of patrol planes, which are our biggest problem—those that had been anchored out, they could'n't get at them to fight the fire, once it started, and they were destroyed and sunk at their moorings; while those that were on the beach, they had been able to get at them and fight the fires and had saved some of them, at least.

Now, the condition of the planes at Ewa, which is where the Marines had their planes, I know they had provision for dispersing their planes. Exactly what condition they were in on the morning of the attack I don't know. I haven't found it out. But there was no order given by any authority any higher than the commanding officer of the field to protect against sabotage. Issued no such order.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in that memorandum of things to be done I note you referred to something that was to happen, as I recall, on the 7th of December. I think it was the [S-104] landing of planes at Midway or Wake.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, Midway.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you refer to just that memorandum there for a minute?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I know what you mean: "LEXINGTON land Marine aircraft at Midway as planned afternoon of 7 December."

Admiral STANDLEY. That is, planned afternoon of 7 December?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, that memorandum, then, was prepared on the 6th of December?

The CHAIRMAN. No, it was prepared on the 5th and visaed by him on the 6th.

Admiral STANDLEY. You approved it on the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

Admiral STANDLEY. All right. Now, what would have happened to that memorandum on, we will say, the morning of the 8th if there hadn't been any untoward incident here? We would have revised it? You would have, would you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have revised the memorandum.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, that was a day-to-day—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was a day-to-day plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Keeping it up to date?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I would have revised it. I did revise it. This is the last one; this is not the first one.

[S-105] Admiral STANDLEY. That is what I want to bring out. It had to be done from day to day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You have another one underneath there.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I have another one underneath here. It is the same subject; a little bit different. Some days the situation wouldn't change any.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, you did not discuss with General Short what shape his dispositions were in to meet an air attack here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not. That was the Army's responsibility, and I presumed he would carry out his responsibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did not discuss the possible air attack with him?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, I think, sir, we discussed a possible air attack on many occasions. We held these drills. For a long time we held them weekly, and then there was some difficulty about getting all elements to take part in the air-raid drills, so we adopted the scheme of setting a date considerably ahead of time, so all of us, particularly the Army aircraft, could take part to the fullest extent, and that had been in effect for—the air-raid drills started, oh, I should say in March at the latest.

They were held as often as practicable thereafter, and we held these dress rehearsals, you might call them, along about once a week and then once every two weeks because we wanted to get the two elements into it without conflicting with the training and the various operations.

Now, about the possibility of an air raid, we did discuss [S-106] it from time to time. I freely confess and so state that I considered an air raid on this place as a possibility, but by no means a probability.

General McCoy. Do you know yet where the Japanese carriers were at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. From the captured documents and from the planes that we got, all indications point to the fact that they were northward of the island, that they launched their planes some 200 miles from the island, and that they turned and ran north at as high a speed as they could immediately after launching the planes; and that they launched them around six o'clock in the morning.

I must say that this air raid was a beautifully planned and beautifully executed military maneuver. They knew exactly where every air field in this place was and they knew exactly where every ship in the harbor was supposed to be. They made their attack so that the air fields were attacked shortly before the ships in the harbor, Pearl Harbor, were attacked to insure that they could immobilize the planes on the ground, and they attacked—let us see. There are about nine or ten objectives, I believe, and they must have had a very considerable air force there to do it. I estimate that they must have had in the neighborhood of 250 planes in the attacking group. Now, that is hardly something that I can prove, but I think to carry those 250 planes they had at least four carriers, or probably six. We have documents which reasonably well establish the fact that there were four carriers here; there may have been two more, sir. We have some indications that they were accompanied by two battleships, that these carriers were accompanied by two battleships. I think they were probably [S-107] back there as a supporting group, some distance away.

Well, that is about all.

General McCoy. Were there any patrols out on the morning of the 7th or the night before, in a northward direction?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir; not until after the attack. You mean before the attack?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is what I thought you meant.

General McCoy. You spoke of things happening automatically. Were your patrols automatic and mechanical? That is, did you have some patrols day after day in the same region?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not entirely so, sir. We were making patrol flights in that direction, but the patrol flights to Midway and to Wake were not normal patrols. We have a system of patrolling the operating areas daily to ascertain that there were no surface ships or submarines on the surface in the vicinity of the operating areas. That was the only patrol that was a day-by-day affair.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you call the operating area? Three miles offshore?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. The operating areas extend 150 to 200 miles to the south and southward.

The CHAIRMAN. To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And no patrol would normally go to the northward?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, suppose you were expecting a raiding force to come from the southward, what would you do?

Admiral KIMMEL. The air raid force on this place would [S-108] have a better chance, a much better chance to get in from the northward than they would from the southward, but no part could be disregarded.

There are two ways for an expedition to come to this vicinity. One is from the homeland by way of the northern route which would be much more direct and advantageous, to come in from the northward; and the other would be a much shorter route from the Marshall area where it is about 2,000 miles to the Marshall area as against 3,500 miles to the homeland.

Of course, coming up from the Marshall area that would be some 1,500 miles less, but again, coming from the Marshall area, they would have the difficulties of taking their supplies to the Marshall area and they would have to pass our outlying stations, which are Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and in that area. So, I should say that the probabilities of attacking from the north were probably more than those from the south.

We felt that and our first inclination was to send carriers and other forces that we had at sea to the northward, but we were diverted from that by the, I assume, false reports that we received indicating that they went to the southward.

The CHAIRMAN. You are speaking of after the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. When you made the chase?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. That would indicate when you knew the dangerous point was to the north that you didn't expect any air attack from that region?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir.

[S-109] General McCoy. Because you had no patrols out there. The normal patrols didn't cover the northward point.

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not expect any air attack, and the only justification for the action that I took is that we considered an air attack here improbable at this time, and that the patrols to the northward were not justified with the then state of the planes and the necessity for conserving them, that I thought existed.

General McCoy. I take it from your testimony that you had nowhere nearly enough planes to cover the whole circle around Oahu?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, not effective, not effective to cover the whole circuit around Oahu. To cover that circuit around Oahu continuously we had to have two or three hundred planes to insure against a surprise air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. You would have to go about five or eight hundred miles the evening before?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to be sure. We would have to run a patrol eight hundred miles the evening before, and it takes in an awful lot of planes.

Now, there are many different ways to run a patrol, but doing anything other than what might be called a direct patrolling method leaves a great many hollows, blank spaces on your search, and while some of them looked very attractive on paper, when you sit down and analyze them they are by no means 100% effective.

However, if I had considered the probability of an air attack as if an air attack were anywhere near probable, I would have used everything we had, everything.

The CHAIRMAN. Including what ships the Army could have spared you?

[S-110] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. You did not ask the Army to reinforce your patrols at that particular time?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I am a layman on these matters, and your description of where your task forces were working does not register very accurately with me. Now, put it into a layman's language.

How many evening patrols were off here the evening of the 4th, 5th, and the 6th?

Admiral KIMMEL. We did not send any evening patrols.

The CHAIRMAN. None?

Admiral KIMMEL. None.

The CHAIRMAN. Therefore, there was no sector of the entire circumference that was searched every evening?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that would be the daily procedure at the several points of the circumference to see if an air raid was in the offing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do you have radar on any of your ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Do they work?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar on the ships in port is not effective, due to the presence of large land masses, and the only radar we had to depend on was the Army radar, so far as Oahu was concerned.

General McCoy. Did you have task forces for radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[S-111] The CHAIRMAN. None of them picked up anything?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Didn't one of them?

Admiral KIMMEL. One of them was within 400 miles of Midway and then out of range of anything, and they could not have picked up anything.

The other one was a little over 200 miles to the westward of Oahu, and it is highly improbable that they would have picked up anything.

Their planes coming, came into the combat, made contact, and they shot down some of the Japanese planes. This was in the midst of the fight, and my recollection is that about four of the planes from the Enterprise were shot down there during the time they were coming in here after they attacked.

General McCoy. Do any of your airplanes have radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. We do not have any radar on any planes, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not used radar planes for patrolling? Is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, we have endeavored to get radar in the patrol planes, and I hope some day we will have them.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there any morning patrol on the morning of the 5th?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, the only morning patrol was over the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean up to 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, to Honolulu.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

[S-112] The CHAIRMAN. It would not cover the whole circumference of the island?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Where would they be? To the southward?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were to the southward, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing in the north?

Admiral KIMMEL. Nothing to the north, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had the slightest inkling previously of an air raid you could have been working that point to the north as well?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you might have gotten news by six o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is quite possible.

General McCoy. Were you conscious after the war warning of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General McCoy. Of a Sunday.

The CHAIRMAN. Of the special dangers of a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I did not think it was.

The CHAIRMAN. As you look at it now, the Japanese plans are perfect in that respect also, aren't they?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And Sunday morning was the best morning for them to come in here, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On account of the number of passes and leaves issued on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but so far as the Navy was concerned [S-113] that had very little effect, very little effect on it, because the ships had ample men on them and used everything that they had.

General McCoy. Were the commanding officers of the ships present?

Admiral KIMMEL. The commanding officers of a great many ships were ashore.

General McCoy. That would be due to it being a week-end? To it being Sunday, would it not? That would be due to it being a Sunday?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, no, sir; not entirely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I might say that two battleship captains were killed on the bridges.

Admiral KIMMEL. They may have been ashore on other days.

General McCoy. There are more absences both of officers and men on Sunday than on any other day?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, maybe so, but I don't think appreciably more, certainly not at that time of the morning.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean the officers?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is your opinion of that (referring to Admiral Theobald)?

Admiral THEOBALD. The attack started about 7:50, and most of them start back about twenty to eight in the morning, and I think if they attacked on Monday morning there would not have been probably a great many more officers on board. They would have been on the docks, but maybe not on board.

The CHAIRMAN. When your ships are in harbor, do the officers sleep ashore generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends.

The CHAIRMAN. It depends on what is being done to the boat, I suppose.

[S-114] Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on whether the families are here, and there were a great many officers here who had no families, and they slept on board.

The CHAIRMAN. On board?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, a great many of them, and some of them got in this morning and they were in their quarters available immediately, and a great many others were in the same fix.

I have made no survey but I think it is safe to say that 50 to 70% of the commanding officers were on board at the time the attack took place.

The CHAIRMAN. Under the conditions of such an attack the officers of capital ships would have attempted to get their vessels out of the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. We would have attempted to get them out, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You would?

Admiral KIMMEL. As soon as we were able to arrange an adequate submarine patrol we would have gone out from the harbor.

Admiral THEOBALD. In fact, the Nevada actually started.

Admiral KIMMEL. In fact, the order was given and the Nevada was on her way out, and we told her not to go out. We delayed it and then it was hit by a torpedo and it beached. We delayed the sortie

of heavy ships due to the report that mines had been dropped in the channel. One of the cruisers made a circle of the island, of Ford Island, and then by that time the mine report was discounted and she went out.

General McCoy. When did the two United States battleships [S-115] come into the harbor?

The CHAIRMAN. We heard it said they came in on the 3rd or 4th or 5th. I do not know whether that is so or not.

Admiral KIMMEL. Batdiv-1, consisting of three ships, came in on the third; Batdiv-2 and 4, consisting of five ships, came in some days before that. Wait a minute.

General McCoy. What caused them to come into the harbor?

Anything affecting this war warning or despatches you had from the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. They came in in accordance with the operating schedule which we had prepared and we hadn't seen fit to depart from that up to this time.

General McCoy. Is it customary to bring two divisions into Pearl Harbor at the same time?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had the fleet divided into three major task forces (referring to a document).

The fleet was divided into three main task forces:

Task Force 1 with Admiral Pye in command, which consisted of Batdws two and four, which was 6 battleships, one of which was in the Navy Yard for repairs, the Colorado, which is still there; Cardiv one less Lexington. 1 Cv; Crudiv nine, 5 Cl, Desflot one less Desron five, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 10 DD, Oglala, Mindiv one, 1CM, 4 DM.

Their primary mission was to organize, train, and continue development of doctrine and tactics for operations of, and in the vicinity of, the Main Body; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and current plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient covering force available for supporting operations [S-116] of other forces; or for engagement, with or without support, in fleet action.

Task Force Two, (commander aircraft, battle force):

Batdiv one, 3 BB, Cardiv two, 1 CV; Crudiv Five, 4 CA, Desflot two, 1 OCL, 2 DL, 16 DD, Mindiv two, 4 DM.

Primary mission: To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for reconnoitering and raiding, with air or surface units, enemy objectives, particularly those on land; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Reconnoitering and Raiding Force for testing the strength of enemy communication lines and positions and for making forays against the enemy, and for operations in conjunction with other forces.

Task Force Three, (commander scouting force):

Crudivs four, six, 8 CA; Lexington plus Marine Air Group 21, 1 CV; Desron five, 1 DL, 8 DD; Minron two, 13 DMS; Trainron four, 6 AP; 2nd Marine Division less Defense Battalions and Advance Detachment.

Primary Mission : To organize, train, and develop doctrine and tactics for capturing enemy land objectives, particularly fortified atolls; to keep up-to-date normal arrangements and plans for such operations; and to accumulate and maintain in readiness for war all essential material required by the task force in order to provide an efficient Amphibious Force for attack, with or without support of other forces, on outlying positions of the enemy.

Task Force Four, (commandant Fourteenth Naval District) :

That part of Fourteenth Naval District Activities which involve [S-117] the Island Bases.

Primary Mission : To organize, train, and develop the Island Bases in order to insure their own defense and provide efficient services to Fleet units engaged in advanced operations.

Task Force seven, (commander submarines, scouting force) :

Subron Four less Subdiv Forty-one, 1 SM, 8 SS, 1 AM, 1 ASR, 1 DD, Subron six, 12 SS, 1 AS; Subron eight, 6 SS, 1 AS, Subron ten, 4 SS, 1 AS.

Primary Missions: (1) To organize, train and, concurrently with execution of the expansion program, to continue development of doctrine and tactics in order to provide an efficient Submarine Observation and Attack Force for independent operations or operations coordinated with other forces. (2) To conduct patrols in areas and at times prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in order to improve security of fleet units and bases.

Now, of the three main task forces operating out of here, it was provided that one of them should be at sea at all times; but sometimes two of them were at sea at the same time.

We provided for tactics for as large a number of ships as there were in these two forces and then pitted one force against the other. At times there were two task forces that were in port, and this was one of the days and there was no reason at this particular time to change it.

Now, according to this schedule there may have been some change in it, but that was when they were supposed to come in, and they were due to come in, Task Force One on 28 November and Task Force Two on 5 December. Task Force Three was due to depart Pearl on 5 December and to return on 13 December.

[S-118] . Admiral THEOBALD. That task force was the one scheduled to be at sea at the time of the attack, I think.

General McCoy. There was only one task force outside at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I did change that to the extent that we had more than one task force out. That was Vice Admiral Brown's task force, and that was the Lexington, 400 miles southeast of Midway, or the Indianapolis with Admiral Brown, but there was another task force out which had gone to Wake Island and was on the way back from Wake.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, you had part of one task force out and part of it in?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You had your cruisers and aircraft carrier out of one task force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, and the battleships in, yes. I think that Task Force Three was out in its entirety.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had had any suspicion of an air raid on that Sunday morning your ships would have cleared the harbor before they could have gotten here, and you could have gotten them out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. We would have sent them to sea.

General McCoy. The fact that you had two in here together would indicate that you had no suspicion here of any air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, any immediate danger, yes. As I look back, with the information service that we now know the Japanese had, they would not have attacked until our ships came into port. If our ships had been at sea the Japanese would have held off for another chance and tried another time.

[S-119] General McCoy. It goes back, I take it, to the fact that the Japanese had perfect information and you had none?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right, sir.

General McCoy. It occurs to me that at that time or previous to that time and up to now that you were without any information about the Japanese; is that not so?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have less now than we had before.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you say that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, perhaps we know more now than we did before.

Well, there is another thing in connection with this raid, and that is the Tatua Maru which was sent out from Yokohama for Los Angeles and Panama to evacuate Americans from Japan and to pick up Japanese in Los Angeles and Panama.

I believe from what I have seen that this Tatua Maru embarked American passengers and that she sailed. We had been watching that also. I believe American passengers actually embarked and she sailed, but I don't know where it went after it went to sea. But they got out, and I doubt very much whether the captain of the Tatua Maru knew anything except the fact that he was going to carry out his mission.

General McCoy. Your information service has failed you then?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so, sir.

General McCoy. You knew though that this place was naturally full of Japanese spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Apparently neither the Army service nor the Navy service was able to get these spies?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

[S-120] General McCoy. Do you attribute that to the fact that it was a poor service here or to the fact that the Japanese were particularly good?

Admiral KIMMEL. I attribute it more to our laws, our freedom, than to any other factor.

I have been told that the F. B. I. and the Military Intelligence Department and the O. N. I. had their eyes on a considerable number of people here in Honolulu and around here who, when war broke, were promptly seized and they have crippled the Japanese intelligence service considerably.

I think there were a considerable number. I hesitate to make that statement as to the number, but you probably know more about it than I do. It is something that is very easily verified, but I heard the statement made that they had about 2,500 rounded up, I would say. Is that correct?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there are about 400 Japanese out at the immigration station, if that is what you mean. That is my understanding. I do not know that to be a fact.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think perhaps the proper agencies would know that. I understood it was in the neighborhood of 2,500, but that I do not know. I had no responsible person to tell me.

General McCoy. Did you have any espionage service or counter-espionage service with anyone in Japan to inform you as to what was happening in the Japanese naval bases or rendezvous?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would not know that, sir. That is under the Office of Naval Intelligence. I hope they have, but I have not anything definite about it.

General McCoy. You spoke of the O. N. I. Did your [S-121] O. N. I. here have any espionage agent in Japan?

Admiral KIMMEL. So far as I know, no, sir.

General McCoy. Did they have any representatives in the Mandate Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Isn't it a very dangerous thing for us to sit here with no one in the Japanese areas and with 120,000 Japanese at our gates here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And we will continue to be dangerous.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I think it is not as dangerous now as it was before, the time before the declaration of war. This is a thing that has been constantly in the minds of a great many naval officers here, a great many of us. Once war is declared and the intelligence service is smashed, we are much safer here than we were before war was declared.

General McCoy. I notice in your operations orders and in your statements that you were under orders to supply certain fortifications or certain detachments and certain defense measures to these outlying posts.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did you expect these outposts to defend themselves against Japanese attack in time of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. We hoped that they would be able to defend themselves against a small expedition which could be sent there. We knew that Wake was vulnerable. We knew that, that Wake gave a great deal of concern to every one of us, and the steps to be taken at Wake were the subject of considerable correspondence between my office and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Navy Department. We felt [S-122] that if we could keep Wake reasonably well defended—and I think it was reasonably well defended—it would serve as bait to catch detachments of Japanese, the Japanese fleet coming down there, and we hoped to be able to meet them out there in sufficient force to handle them.

We also wanted to keep the investment. We had quite an investment at Wake, and the Navy Department had ordered it under way and there were extensive improvements established, and there was a flying field which, incidentally, has been used by the Army in ferrying planes to the Far East, and as an observation post.

The wisdom of ever putting anything on Wake is open to very serious question; by "anything" I mean anything more than just

enough to handle the commercial planes that could go by there. However, that was something in which the final decision was not with me, and they decided to do these various things at Wake.

Then we had the decision—as I tried to indicate here a little while ago in answer to a question where I got off the track a little bit—that we had to make a decision as to how such defense we were going to put there, if any. Rightly or wrongly, we eventually had there about 350 marines and 6 5-inch guns and 12 3-inch guns and a number of machine guns, and we had 12 fighting planes there.

General McCoy. Was that expected to hold out against Japanese attack indefinitely?

Admiral KIMMEL. It did for some time, sir.

General McCoy. Was the Navy to play any part in its defense.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

[S-123] General McCoy. What happened to them?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy were to play a part in its defense, but after this affair here the picture changed considerably from what we anticipated.

On the question of profit and loss with respect to Wake, we lost about 350 marines. They sank one cruiser, two destroyers, and a gunboat in one attack. They beached two destroyers up there when they landed, and presumably they were well destroyed before they got away, if they ever did get off. They knocked down and destroyed at least ten bombers which came over them and which attacked them. On the first attack they destroyed eight of the twelve fighting planes that were there with the other four ones that we could replace parts of that could be used.

General McCoy. Didn't you have a task force in the vicinity of Wake at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there was not.

General McCoy. I thought you said there was a task force there.

Admiral KIMMEL. That task force was about 200 miles away from Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. Wasn't there one to the westward at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Returning to Pearl Harbor.

General McCoy. And there was no help sent to Wake from the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, that is something that was out of my hands.

The CHAIRMAN. How far was this from Wake Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was 200 miles from Pearl Harbor.

[S-124] Admiral REEVES. How far is it from Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. About 1,800 miles.

General McCoy. Wasn't that in your plan to relieve Wake, to attempt to relieve Wake?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the original plan, yes, sir.

General McCoy. I am just leading up to some of the questions that we hope to put to the responsible commander since you have been relieved.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I explain a little bit about this Wake business?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. One of the principal difficulties at Wake was that of loading and unloading ships there. There is no way to get

in the lagoon, and we were working against time, hoping to get things so that when we sent a ship out they could run it in and unload it. Depending upon the weather, it took anywhere from two days to two or three weeks to unload a ship there, which made it very difficult to supply. We also had on that island a number of workmen that the Navy wanted us to keep there. I personally thought they were entitled to some protection, some chance for the white alley.

Now, with respect to operations that have taken place since I was relieved as commander-in-chief, I would prefer not to talk about it.

General McCoy. Yes.

The Secretary of the Navy made a public statement on his return to the United States that the Army and the Navy services were not on the alert and that they were completely surprised. Is that a fact, from your point of view?

Admiral KIMMEL. In the first place, before you can [S-125] answer that question you have to define the term "alert." There are many different degrees of alerts. I feel that the Navy afloat was alert and that they were ready for attack and that they were as alert as it was practicable to be at the time. They opened fire in most cases within two minutes of the alarm, and in some cases considerably less than that, and I considered them to be alert, in a fair condition.

General McCoy. I think his statement was that they were completely surprised.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. How about the statement he made also that they were completely surprised?

Admiral KIMMEL. They were surprised, yes sir.

General McCoy. Did you investigate, Admiral, how the submarine got into your channel here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. How did it get in?

Admiral KIMMEL. The submarine that came in the channel is a boat about five feet in diameter and about seventy feet long. It is fitted with a propeller like a torpedo has. It is run by storage batteries and can travel not more than 200 miles when its charge is exhausted. It carries two torpedoes, which torpedoes, we estimate, cannot run more than a thousand yards, but they carried also from 800 to 1,000 pounds of explosives in each one of those torpedoes. These submarines, according to the blue prints which we have captured, taken from the submarine, can make up to 24 knots under water and that it is just like a torpedo. Of course they can make that only for a very short time. They can put themselves in the wake of a ship and come through with the ship when the gates open.

[S-126] The CHAIRMAN. Did any ship come in that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Now, wait a minute. I do not want to make a statement without knowing it. I am not sure whether they did or not, but ships were out that morning, and they began to go out. I think it is probable that this submarine went down, dove under the net, and came in that way.

Now, we had never anticipated any such submarine as this. We discovered a chart on one of these submarines. On this chart a track was laid down. This track, where it passed the net, was later investigated and under the net in wake of this track was sufficient water for

this submarine to have passed without disturbing the net. The statement I have made was reported to me but I have not checked it.

The CHAIRMAN. An ordinary submarine would have gone into the net?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, an ordinary submarine would have gone into the net. It would have indicated it was there.

The CHAIRMAN. You have not found any evidence of the gate being open to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not there?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, it is not there. The gates are kept closed at all times except when a ship was entering or leaving. That has been definitely established.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell us what officer was charged with the duty of seeing that that net was closed that morning. I am not assuming anything, but we want that officer.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we can get him.

[S-127] I understand that there were two of these submarines which came in, or am I wrong about that?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had one come in.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the one the Monaghan ran down?

Admiral KIMMEL. The first was. He put a hole through it.

The CHAIRMAN. She rammed it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Rammed it and depth-bombed it. There were some air bubbles there and I did not want to take any chances so they bombed it again and that finished it.

The other submarine that they got went aground over by Bellows Field on the north side. We got that submarine in time and brought it over here and captured the two men in it.

We all thought that there was another submarine in the harbor at the time, but that was never discovered and I do not think there was another submarine in there. I think that was the only one.

A couple of days later we heard of another submarine in the harbor, and just to be sure, they depth-bombed it, but finally they said there was no submarine there and there hadn't been any. My opinion is that only one submarine got inside. Do you think that is a fact?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, if your description of that submarine is correct, would she be launched by a plane, or could it be launched from a ship, in your judgment?

Admiral KIMMEL. It would have to be launched from a ship.

The CHAIRMAN. Then part of the Japanese fleet would have been within a hundred miles of Oahu that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily. I think it is possible. [S-128] that these small submarines could have been serviced by other submarines. I think it is also possible that they could come alongside other submarines and get charged.

I think they might well have been launched from around here, 50 or 200 miles, and they could have been serviced there, or they might even have been concealed in this neighborhood for some time.

We made searches. There was an intelligence report some time ago, as I remember it, that they had sunk a number of small submarines over on the coast of Molokai, and that they were servicing them and charging them over there. That was several months ago. We made reconnaissance with searching planes but were never able to discover any of them.

Of course there are dozens of reports of the most fantastic kind that come in during any war period. We have tried not to overlook any of them, but we had to use some sanity in our investigation. I think one of the two-man submarines must have put one torpedo into the Raleigh. I believe that is all the damage that was done by the two-man submarines. That is not positive. It is not positive that that is true.

The CHAIRMAN. You say that at 7:20 a submarine was bombed outside Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that is in the report.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that was the area within which you had determined that you would bomb Japanese submarines if you found one?

Admiral KIMMEL. I had determined that we would bomb Japanese submarines found anywhere in the operating area.

The CHAIRMAN. Within 200 miles?

Admiral KIMMEL. Within two or three hundred miles of [S-129] this place.

The CHAIRMAN. Then the operation was within sight of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I judge so, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That did not come into the situation of an air raid, is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not at that time, and although we had indicated in our order that an air raid might very well be coincidental with submarines, we had so many reports, false reports of submarines in the outlying area, I thought, well, I would wait for verification of the report. Then the air raid started. Admiral Bloch will also develop that and give his reaction, which, I believe, is very much the same as mine.

The CHAIRMAN. With respect to what was mentioned before, do you mean you only knew that the airplane had taken a shot at something?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I had no report that an airplane had attacked a submarine. All that was reported to me was that a destroyer had depth-bombed a submarine.

General McCoy. In the air attack you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

General McCoy. The air attack on the submarine you heard about later?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sometime later.

The CHAIRMAN. I misunderstood his statement. Apparently the attack was by a destroyer, not from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was from the air, but I did not know that, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was both.

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean it has only been put together, [S-130] everything that we now know. That is not what we knew at the time,

I am giving you everything as nearly as we can find out what happened, but not what I knew was happening at that time.

General MCCOY. Did they sink that submarine at this time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General MCCOY. It was a large submarine, not a small one?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I am not positive of. I think it was a small one. One, I think the Ward submarine, was a small submarine, according to the Ward report.

General MCCOY. According to the Ward report did they ram it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, shot at it and depth-charged it. I think we got a considerable number of submarines, sir. The Japanese admitted the loss of five in the radio broadcast.

The CHAIRMAN. In this action?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, five small ones, they said.

Admiral MCCOY. To get back to the despatches from Washington, the war warning despatches, and others, that came here successively from October 16, and with respect to a war warning, and General Short said he felt sure you must have shown it to him. Were those furnished to your separate commanders?

Admiral KIMMEL. Were they shown to the separate commanders?

General MCCOY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In general I showed to the commanders of task forces, the three vice admirals, everything that I received in the way of war warnings and of the letters from the Chief of Naval Operations that bore on the situation. I kept them as thoroughly informed as I could.

In regard to this war warning on the 27th of November I [S-131] am positive that Admiral Pye had seen it. I think Admiral Brown had seen it, but I am not sure; I would not be positive Halsey had not because he was at sea at the time it was received.

General MCCOY. There was no warning given him by despatch or radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, but he was fully prepared for anything when he left here—he was fully prepared for anything that might happen. All he needed was a declaration of war, and I do not believe they could have got Halsey asleep while he was at sea.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like to ask you one question. According to No. 2 CL, 1941, revised, with respect to the defense measures available to be taken against air attacks on Pearl Harbor, it states that the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as naval base defense officer, shall exercise with the Army joint supervisory control over the defense against air attack; arrange with the Army to have their anti-aircraft guns emplaced; exercise supervisory control over naval shore base aircraft, arranging through compatwing 2 for cooperation of the joint air effort between Army and Navy.

In other words, that provides that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was the officer who coordinated the air defenses and possibly other defenses with the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then, in General Short's statement he refers to the joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier,

Hawaiian Department, and the Fourteenth [S-132] Naval District, and directly under this it is signed by Walter C. Short and C. C. Bloch.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And paragraph 18 says:

Navy. The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for (1) distant reconnaissance.

Now, as I take it, for that purpose the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District is under you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. But there is no separate force for the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. There is not enough of any planes for the defense of Oahu and the use of the fleet in the Pacific. Eventually the plans provided for about 175 patrol planes at that time.

Admiral STANDLEY. They were not attached to the District?

Admiral KIMMEL. And it is my recollection that some 80 of them were turned over to the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. As a part of the coastal defense frontier force?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. To remain here permanently?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. This is what I mean: 185 is the number called for, for airplanes, patrol planes, in this area, and offshore patrol planes, 72. I am speaking from memory only, but I think some 80 of those are set for the use of the Commandant of the District.

Admiral STANDLEY. But in the plans they allowed a force that will remain with the District for distant reconnaissance?

[S-133] Admiral KIMMEL. Of a number of planes we had here in the area and with our plans for advance to the westward and the reconnaissance covering the fleet movements to the Marshalls we would have left, as I recall, only two patrol squadrons here. These were plans approved by the Navy Department and the tasks set up.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then there was provision for a force to remain here for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two patrol squadrons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Under the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then have you explained that there were not sufficient patrol planes to carry out an effective patrol at any time; is that correct? I mean, an effective patrol against air attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, we find in the Standing Operating Procedure under interceptor command that the interceptor command will coordinate the control and operations of the antiaircraft batteries and will coordinate and control the aircraft warning service.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which included the interceptor command and the radar?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. As it developed, which you probably do not know, that radar service was not in operation for service at that time. It was operating as a training service, and while it had certain hours for operation, it was not operating as an effective warning service. Did you have knowledge of that?

[S-134] Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that, sir, until I got news of this radar incident which I had told you about.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether Admiral Bloch knew that was the case?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commanding General did not have advice with regard to distant reconnaissance and of the approach of the large torpedo planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And he did not have the force to do that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was the Commanding General interested in that?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think he was, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You are not sure whether there was a discussion or any knowledge of the lack of effective information on the instrument on that board to carry out that part, or the lack of an effective warning service on his part?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Admiral, we have had several problems out here, and we had clearly indicated to the Army as a result of some of these searches that we had conducted, that we could not maintain a continuous patrol around these islands and over several months ago. At one time in the early stages of our training with the Army I was informed that they had the idea we wanted the patrol out all the time. I know that their minds were disabused of any such thing as that, and I am quite sure the reasons therefor were set forth by us, the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and comptwng 2, who are the men having to do with the air, and I do not see [S-135] how they could have failed to know the condition of the state of the affairs at the various exercises, the joint exercises we had with them.

The CHAIRMAN. In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you probably knew or should have known that the Army warning service was not in shape to give you a warning, or to give them a warning, of distant airplanes, so there just was not any machinery for warning here; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought that the operations of the radar, Army radar, which was reported to me in the maneuvers, that we had, that they had been able to pick up planes taking off from Maui and picking them up this side from Hawaii and following them all the way in, in these exercises that we had. They told me that they picked up planes from our ships coming in, and we had several attacks on Pearl Harbor where we had them carry out and had the carrier run in and make the attack and the carrier run the planes in.

I had been informed that they had picked them up and that they had followed them in, and I thought the radar warning was in very good shape.

I knew that some of the radar warning net was not what they wanted it to be, and we were pushing in every way we could to get that radar warning net perfected, and within a week before this attack took place

I knew that my staff had taken a very effective part in urging the District and the Army [S-136] to do certain things in connection with it, and particularly the District, and young Taylor, I gave, as I told you about today.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And he had come down and told us also and some other people from the District and from the Army, and we were working on the perfection of the warning net, to get quicker communication, but I was under the impression, a very strong impression, that the radar was in operating condition and that it was in very good shape.

My recollection is, and I give you this for what it is worth—I have not talked to anybody about this since the action—but my impression was that they had, I think, three stations around the island, and their big ones were the ones, according to which, I thought that we could have some dependence on.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, while I think your information is incorrect as to that, the fact is that in the week of December 7th and the days prior to that, and on the morning of December 7th, you were quite confident that you would get a definite warning of distant planes; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought we would get some warning of distant planes.

General McNARNEY. And as a responsible officer you did not assure yourself of that fact?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, except indirectly, but when we had two separate commanders and when you have a responsible officer in charge of the Army and responsible commanders in the Navy, it does not sit very well to be constantly checking up on them.

General McNARNEY. Let us examine into that. Under the situation you had the system of mutual cooperation?

[S-137] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McNARNEY. And in the method of mutual cooperation, is it necessary for one commander to know what the other commander is doing or what his plans are?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Was there an officer on your staff detailed to the radar warning service room to keep you informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. How did you expect to be informed?

Admiral KIMMEL. The radar warning service was the function of the Army and the naval base defense officer. I had a staff who were active and trying to do the best. It is a physical impossibility for them to do everything, and I thought that they had developed it and handled it.

If I had it to do again, of course I would check it a good deal more than I did.

The CHAIRMAN. You had the responsibility for the security of your fleet, at least here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And the radar warning service would have been of enormous protection to your fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had a warning that war might break out at any time?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you tell us that you thought the radar service was working; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. From my experience and from what I knew, I thought I knew the radar service was working.

The CHAIRMAN. And you had no liaison officer with that service at the radar? [S-138]

Admiral KIMMEL. I had no liaison officer from my staff with that service.

The CHAIRMAN. But you had loaned Lieutenant Taylor to help them set it up?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And to help them in training?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he did not report to you or to any member of your staff anything whatever, and that was in the first week of December; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't say he reported to any member of my staff; he did not report to me.

The CHAIRMAN. He knew what the conditions were; is that right?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I think he probably did.

The CHAIRMAN. And as the radar system is now running, there is a naval officer sitting there at the board to inform you of anything that goes on there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that that was the situation then?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you assume was the situation?

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time or prior to the time of the attack, we had very few officers out here who were competent. Our cry was for competent officers, and that cry was continued, and it seemed we didn't have a sufficient number of officers to divert them to these duties.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean that you had no officer who you felt was available and competent to sit and stay there at the telephone and to phone the information to the Navy? [S-139]

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right. I did not think it was necessary to have an officer there.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that that was the Army's job?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but since the attack we have had some officers on the duty of identification of ships, and we put a considerable number with the Army.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F.?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

The CHAIRMAN. You knew that your own planes had no I. F. F. interceptor on them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. You knew, therefore, that the radar detector and the control officer would have to have advice from the Navy as to where your patrol fleets were, or did you assume that such information was being given to the controller on the morning of December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. As to where our ships were?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I didn't assume any such thing as that.

The CHAIRMAN. And you did not know how the Army interceptor service would know whether they were attacking planes or whether they were enemy planes? You did not know how that was worked out?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. I understood you to say that was Admiral Bloch's responsibility to work that out for the Navy, under you.

[S-140] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And you assumed that he had done his duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. I thought he had done the best he could, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, that is his duty. I do not think you could expect an officer to do any better than that.

General McNARNEY. For the purpose of the record I would like to call attention and make reference to the "Tentative Manual of Interceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defence," 27 October, 1941. Paragraph 7 refers to the personnel supposed to be present in the control room and subparagraph (g) reads):

Navy liaison officer. This officer is on the platform and has contact with the naval headquarters in the region. He will be able to identify all naval aircraft flying in the area so as to distinguish them from the enemy. He is also charged with keeping the controller informed of the naval situation so as to aid him in getting a picture of the situation as a whole.

I would like to refer now to the report of General Short on page 22. It states in paragraph 4:

The Navy liaison officer's position within the information center was not manned when I reached the information center at about 8:30 a. m. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 p. m., when the position was taken over by naval officers. Further the deponent [S-141] sayeth not.

(Signed) GROVER C. WHITE, Jr.

2nd Lieutenant, Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

I just ask to have that go in to clear this up.

General McCoy. May I ask a question, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. To go back to your memorandum of December 6.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. It was your function on December 6 to put into effect on the outbreak of war certain specific things.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. When war broke out, did you put those things into effect?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

General McCoy. Why not?

Admiral KIMMEL. I could not on account of the losses sustained.

General McCoy. Was not the fleet complete with regard to all forces except battleships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but that was a very big outfit that was cut out.

General McCoy. Did you have any information of any kind about enemy battleships being in this vicinity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If you had known that no radar was working on December 5th, 6th, or 7th, would you have altered your distant patrols in any way?

[S-142] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I doubt it.

The CHAIRMAN. Then, if no radar was working on that morning, there was no method of warning of a raid on these islands; is that correct?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, that is correct. If I had known that no radar was working it would have been a factor to consider, but what I would have done under those conditions I do not like to state.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought it was working.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is short of it. I thought it was in working condition.

Admiral REEVES. Is it a fact that there was no radar working that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral, my impression is, gathered from the report which I gave here, and the report of Commander Curts and others that the radar was working on the morning of the attack, and I thought it was in material condition to work, and it has certainly worked since then. The manning of it, I do not know about, but the material condition of the radar was, I thought, in every good material condition here, in material condition to work, and I thought it was in material condition to work because they did work it.

General McCoy. We heard testimony that it was not only in condition to work but that it actually was working.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I did not think there was any question about it.

General McCoy. And that it was not working as a system, but it was brought out that there was no naval officer present but only a soldier who picked up something that morning after the station had closed down at seven o'clock, and that one of [S-143] the soldiers just happened to pass along and pick it up.

Admiral KIMMEL. However much I should have personally checked into this thing—and God knows now I wish I had—I had a great many other things to do, and whether the Navy liaison officer was present at the radar at the time was something that the officer responsible for the running of the radar should have, it seems to me, looked into.

General McCoy. The warning system wasn't working; it was just a drill and had been exercised through a couple of mobile sets. None of the permanent sets is working yet.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of the permanent sets is working yet?

The CHAIRMAN. No, sir.

Admiral KIMMEL. I did not know that.

General McCoy. There was a soldier there playing with it, but no responsible officer to see this map that you have heard of in time to follow the attack.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, there was no responsible Army or Navy officer who heard about it until the next day. Let us be fair about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to make one point clear. At no time do I wish to accuse any Army officer or anybody connected with the Army of having withheld information which we should have had. I merely cited the incident as it was related to me in order to show what

might have happened if they had given us the information which was obtained.

General McCoy. Obtained but not evaluated in time to follow the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I wish to disclaim any idea of putting anybody on the spot. I want now and always to give everyone all the information that I have to tell you in order [S-144] that you may properly evaluate it.

General McNARNEY. There is some indication in your report that there were indications of enemy action at 6:18, 6:33, and 7 o'clock. If both the Army and the Navy had been on a war footing, would that information have been communicated to the Army interceptor command?

Admiral KIMMEL. The information which was communicated, as available, to certain Navy units at that time, was reported as rapidly as we could, but that information did not reach the responsible command until some time after.

I tried to emphasize the fact that this has only been drawn up from the reports received after the thing was all over, in order to show the sequence of events, as well as we could, and as soon as we could.

It does not show the information that was available. It should not be taken to indicate that the information was available at that particular time nor even that they made reports at that particular time. When a man sees things, before he makes a report he attempts to verify it, but that information was not available. All we had was given to the Army, all we thought was of any interest to the Army, and we gave it to the Army as soon as it was available to us.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will have to adjourn pretty soon if we are to get back before dark.

General McNARNEY. I have just one or two questions and then I will be through.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

General McNARNEY. What was the condition of readiness perfected for the naval base defense on the night of December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better get that from [S-145] Admiral Bloch. He can give you the answer to that.

General McNARNEY. Can he tell me who was the senior officer embarked in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, he can tell you that.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can tell you that. It was Admiral Pye.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get this information about the enemy airplanes at 6:30 or thereabouts? Where did you get that information?

General McNARNEY. Enemy action.

Admiral REEVES. Where did you get it? Did anyone know there were any airplanes present at 6:30?

Admiral KIMMEL. I heard they were present.

Admiral REEVES. Why weren't they reported to the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Why wasn't it reported to the Army?

Admiral REEVES. Yes, and how did you get the information about enemy airplanes?

Admiral KIMMEL. I got no information, sir, about any airplanes being present at 6:30 in the morning.

General McNARNEY. Enemy action, it is.

Admiral KIMMEL. The only information I had in regard to enemy airplanes was on the morning of the 7th when I received the air raid warning at about 7:50 a. m. and immediately after saw the planes attacking the Fleet in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral REEVES. I am told that the question was "enemy action." I suppose if they were not airplanes, they may have been submarines. Then the question is not pertinent to what we are discussing.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we had better adjourn until Monday morning.

[S-146] Let me say to both you gentlemen that the nature of our discussion is such that we deem it advisable that you do not discuss with anyone anything that has taken place in this room. That is necessary because of the secrecy of these things.

Admiral KIMMEL. I appreciate that, and almost everything I have presented here is of a highly secret nature, but I have no hesitancy in presenting it.

The CHAIRMAN. You need have no hesitancy in presenting it because there will be nothing in our report until the Secretaries of War and Navy see that nothing in our report will be in any way detrimental to national defense. We have no such agreement, but we have an agreement between ourselves that we will protect the national defense in this, so you need not have any hesitancy in anything you say.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p. m. the hearing was adjourned until Monday, December 29, 1941, at 9 o'clock a. m. at Pearl Harbor.)

[S-147] **COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE
ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII**

MONDAY, DECEMBER 29, 1941

**LOUNGE OF THE WARDROOM,
SUBMARINE SQUADRON FOUR,
UNITED STATES SUBMARINE BASE,
*Pearl Harbor, T. H.***

The Commission reconvened at 9 o'clock a. m., pursuant to adjournment on Saturday, December 27, 1941, Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman, presiding.

PRESENT

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;

Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army;
Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder to the Commission;
Lieutenant Colonel Lee Brown, United States Marine Corps, Legal Advisor to the Commission;
Albert J. Schneider, Secretary to the Commission.

PROCEEDINGS

**TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, UNITED
STATES NAVY—Resumed**

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, as you probably have heard, Admiral Reeves is not well. He was taken to the Naval Hospital on Saturday evening, and he is under the charge of Commander Brunson. Commander Brunson states that Admiral Reeves cannot be here today and possibly not tomorrow. We have consulted [S-148] Admiral Reeves and he is entirely willing to have the testimony go on. We have made arrangements that he will be furnished a transcript of the testimony each day so that he can read it and familiarize himself with it if he wishes to call you or any other witness back for further questions. In that case we shall call you or any other witness back for further questions by Admiral Reeves when he gets back if there is anything that appears to him as important to be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. We feel that you are entitled to a hearing before the full Commission, and if you feel that it would be fair to you to wait until Admiral Reeves can be back here, while I should deplore

the delay, I would feel that that was your right, and there would be no prejudice or feeling of prejudice against you if you ask us to wait until Admiral Reeves can be here.

If you would like to consider that matter more, we will give you time to do that and to confer with the Admiral here until you come to a decision about it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think I need no time, sir. I am very sorry indeed that Admiral Reeves is ill and I know that you will miss him, and I know that I will, but I have every confidence in the judgment of this Commission, and I think that the arrangements that you have made will be satisfactory to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You quite understand that Admiral Reeves will have the opportunity to examine you further if, upon the inspection of the notes, there is something that he thinks should be developed.

Admiral KIMMEL. I expect to be constantly available to the Commission for any such procedure.

[S-149] The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much for that decision, and with that understanding we will proceed.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I go ahead now?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. During my first day's testimony there appeared to be some question as to whether or not the OpNav despatch of November 27th, the war warning despatch, was delivered by me to the Army.

I have carefully investigated the circumstances of that delivery which I have found were as follows:

I gave the despatch to Lieutenant Commander Layton for personal delivery to General Short. Lieutenant Commander Layton misunderstood his orders and gave the despatch to Lieutenant Burr, Navy liaison officer at General Short's headquarters, and left Lieutenant Burr with the orders to deliver the despatch to General Short. When Lieutenant Burr arrived at Army headquarters, General Short and his Chief of Staff were not present. Lieutenant Burr therefore delivered the despatch to G3. He states that the despatch was delivered to either Lieutenant Colonel Donegan or Major Lawton and that Major Horner was present at the time. He states further that he asked the Army officer to whom he delivered the despatch to make certain that General Short received the despatch and that officer said that he would do so. Lieutenant Burr is very sure that this occurred on November 27th 1941 because there was considerable activity at Army G3 in connection with an order for Alert ONE which the Army issued on that date. Lieutenant Commander Layton is very certain that the despatch which Lieutenant Burr carried to Army headquarters was the [S-150] war warning despatch because that was the only despatch which he gave to Lieutenant Burr. Lieutenant Burr did not read the despatch but states that he had only been required to carry one despatch from the Fleet headquarters to the Army headquarters.

I might enlarge on that a little. This despatch was received in my office late on the afternoon of November 27. I immediately took steps to have that delivered. This dispatch was received in my office late

on the afternoon of November 27. 'I immediately took steps to have that delivered to General Short, and I gave it to this officer with orders to deliver it to General Short personally.

I had also attempted to get hold of Admiral Bloch, but Admiral Bloch had gone to see his wife, who was in the hospital. I got hold of his chief of staff, Captain Earle, and Captain Earle brought to me the dispatch which the Army had just received, their warning. I read that and while I was in there, Layton brought in the paraphrase of the dispatch which he had received, on which was written at the top, "War Warning," and it was something that I thought could not be mistaken. I approved of it and told Layton to deliver it.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, to deliver it to General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. To deliver it to General Short, yes. As Earle went out of the office he said to Layton, "Give this to Burr. He is going back to Headquarters now, and he will deliver it." And like an idiot, Layton did that. I did not know these details until yesterday when I investigated it.

That is correct, isn't it?

Now, there was another question which came out on Saturday, and that was the torpedo plane baffles. When I started to get up the data for this I told the commanders and my [S-151] staff that I wanted everything on this subject about aerial torpedoes, and when I presented to you what I did the other day, I thought I had everything. However, Admiral Standley recalled to my mind a letter from the Bureau of Ordnance which was dated in July. I have been unable to locate that letter, but I have located this letter of June 13, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commandants of the various Naval Districts on the subject of anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks. A copy of that was sent to me. I will read that letter:

JUNE 13, 1941.

In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles—

Admiral STANDLEY. What is the date reference?

Admiral KIMMEL. CNO letter, 17 February.

Admiral STANDLEY. 17 February?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, 17 February.

(The letter above referred to follows page 664 of the original transcript.) (See opposite.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I read this, and when Admiral Standley recalled it I had some recollection of some such communication, but when I read this, knowing of the depth of the water in this harbor, the channel, that it is 40 feet, and that there are very few spots where it is more than 45 feet, and knowing that battleships cannot be maneuvered in less than 40 feet, then I thought that if the Department meant that the heavy ships were always subject to attack, then I do not know why they did not say so, because we cannot maneuver ships in less than 40 feet of water. I still assumed that we had a certain

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[S151-a]

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, June 13, 1941.

Op-30C1-AJ
(SC)N20-12
Serial 055730
Confidential

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.

To: The Commandant, First Naval District.

The Commandant, Third Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixth Naval District.

The Commandant, Seventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Eighth Naval District.

The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Eleventh Naval District.

The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District.

The Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.

The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District.

Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks.

Reference: (a) CNO conf. ltr. Op. 30C1 Serial 010230 of Feb. 17, 1941.

1. In reference (a) the Commandants were requested to consider the employment of and to make recommendations concerning anti-torpedo baffles especially for the protection of large and valuable units of the fleet in their respective harbors and especially at the major fleet bases. In paragraph 3 were itemized certain limitations to consider in the use of A/T baffles among which the following was stated:

"A minimum depth of water of 75 feet may be assumed necessary to successfully drop torpedoes from planes. About two hundred yards of torpedo run is necessary before the exploding device is armed, but this may be altered."

2. Recent developments have shown that United States and British torpedoes may be dropped from planes at heights of as much as three hundred feet, and in some cases make initial dives [S-151b] of considerably less than 75 feet, and make excellent runs. Hence, it may be stated that it cannot be assumed that any capital ship or other valuable vessel is safe when at anchor from this type of attack if surrounded by water at a sufficient distance to permit an attack to be developed and a sufficient run to arm the torpedo.

3. While no minimum depth of water in which naval vessels may be anchored can arbitrarily be assumed as providing safety from torpedo plane attack, it may be assumed that depth of water will be one of the factors considered by any attacking force, and an attack launched in relatively deep water (10 fathoms or more) is much more likely.

4. As a matter of information the torpedoes launched by the British at Taranto were, in general, in thirteen to fifteen fathoms of water, although several torpedoes may have been launched in eleven or twelve fathoms.

R. E. INGERSOLL.

Copy to CinCpac

CinClant

CinCaf

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Tiburon

C. O. Naval Net Depot, Newport

Comdt. NavSta, Guantanamo

Comdt. NavSta, Samoa

BuOrd

Op-12

Copy

[S-152] immunity from attack in this harbor. Of course, I was entirely wrong.

General McNARNEY. You did not by any chance recover any of the torpedoes which the Japanese had fired?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we recovered one of them.

General McNARNEY. Was there anything peculiar about them?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they had wide fins. I have not had time to go into this myself, but I have been informed that these torpedoes were Whitehead torpedoes. That is subject to confirmation. Understand that I do not know completely what I am talking about on this, but I understand they were Whitehead torpedoes, manufactured in 1931, these aerial torpedoes.

They had a large fin on the side of them, almost like a diving rudder on a submarine, and when the torpedoes hit, they just skim into the water. They do not go down far.

Admiral STANDLEY. Are there two or four of these fins?

Admiral KIMMEL. Two. One on each side.

Admiral THEOBALD. It is a shallow dive.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very ingenious thing. They were evidently built and fitted that way just for this purpose here.

General McNARNEY. Was there any change in the arming device or length of the run necessary?

Admiral KIMMEL. That I would not know. I think Admiral Bloch can give you considerable information on that subject.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not know the name of the torpedo officer who examined it, do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. Admiral Bloch would know that. However, I can find it out for you.

Admiral THEOBALD. The man doing most of this work was Thales Boyd. He did most of the work on the torpedoes.

[S-153] Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Bloch talked to me about the arming device, but I think he was talking about the submarine torpedo which we talked about before.

In our reply to the original letter of February 17 34 indicated that we still wanted these light torpedo nets and baffles put out. You recall that.

General McCoy. What are these out here? What are these nets or baffles in the harbor now?

Admiral KIMMEL. They are improvised and principally target rafts with some nets strung under them.

Admiral THEOBALD. He may be confused about the baffles at the entrance to the harbor.

The CHAIRMAN. When we were on the tower on Saturday, Admiral, we saw what appeared to be a lot of floats carrying nets. That was in the upper part of the harbor, just what I would call about west of the part near where the floating dry dock is. We thought they were nets that had been put down.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am not familiar with it.

Admiral THEOBALD. Admiral Bloch would know about that. They have nets, however, in the channel. They have target rafts there. They got these target rafts out after the attack and strung them across.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to touch on the question of the Army Radar network. I have looked through the files of the Commander-in-Chief and found two communications regarding that Army installation. I would like to bring this up with respect to the discussions that took place the other day. The first one is a letter from General Short to Admiral Bloch [S-154] thanking him for certain Radar training which fifteen key enlisted men had received

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from four vessels of the fleet. This was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch. I will read pertinent sections therefrom. (Reading:)

As you are doubtless aware, fifteen key enlisted men and one officer of the Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, have recently gone to sea on cruises on board the California, Chicago, Chester, and Pensacola. While at sea, these men received valuable instruction and experience in the operation of Radar equipment, preparing them for the operation of similar Army equipment. Upon their return, the personnel receiving instructions were unanimous in expressing their gratitude for the consideration accorded them on these cruises and for the opportunity to become associated with the fleet personnel.

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to the interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army equipment shortly after it has been placed in operation.

Will you transmit to Admiral Kimmel and to the other naval commanders concerned my appreciation for the instructions afforded these men. Both services should reap great benefit in the near future from the security which will be afforded them from the increased efficiency of the Aircraft Warning Service personnel.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT.

Lieutenant General U. S. Army, Commanding.

[S-155] That was forwarded to me by Admiral Bloch on the 19th of June for such action "as you may care to take."

We had sent some air officers up to inspect the Army Radar, and they did derive some benefit from it.

Under date of August 5 General Short sent me a letter on the subject, "Aircraft Warning Facilities for the Hawaiian Department," which I shall read. (Reading:)

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion. Small scale operations is expected in the immediate future. Subsequent to the original setup the AWS has been greatly augmented. The results of this augmentation, however, are not expected to materialize for some months.

The Department Air Warning Service Board, consisting of officers from all instrumentalities associated with the Air Defense, has been reactivated and is now constituted as a liaison and advisory council on AWS affairs. Inasmuch as the Navy has shown considerable interest in the AWS and has initiated plans for a similar system of their own. It seems greatly to the interest of both services to have a Naval officer as contact or liaison officer between Army and Navy AWS activities. I believe that in this manner our efforts along these lines will be highly cumulative and that the prospects for future joint Army-Navy cooperation greatly enhanced.

Accordingly, your assistance would be appreciated in effecting arrangements whereby an officer from your Headquarters be detailed to serve as liaison officer between your Headquarters and mine.

Under date of August 16 I sent the letter:

[S-156] In reply to the suggestion that an officer of the Fleet serve as liaison officer with your Headquarters, I am pleased to advise you that Commander Maurice E. Curtis, U. S. Navy, the Communication Officer on my Staff, has been assigned to that duty.

It will be noted in my reply that I appointed Commander Curtis of my staff to act as liaison officer between my headquarters and General Short's headquarters. This liaison duty should not be confused with the liaison duty referred to yesterday by one member of the Commission at the time that he read from a publication on the subject of Radar installation.

If it is possible, I should like to examine this publication which was read from on Saturday.

(General McNarney handed a document to Admiral Kimmel.)

The CHAIRMAN. Take your time to examine it.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

When this extract was read it took me completely by surprise, and I thank you very much for letting me see this. I had never seen this manual, and when I left the meeting I tried to find out what it was he was reading from.

I would like to point out one or two things about this. I note that it is dated October 27, 1941, and that it is tentative, entitled, "Tentative Manual of Interceptor Command, Organization, Procedure, and Operations for Air Defense."

This, so far as I know, is not over the signature of any ranking officer in the Hawaiian area. I would like to say that no copy of it was ever received at my headquarters, and so far as I have been able to determine, it has not gone to the people there. I do not know whether it was ever received by Admiral [S-157] Bloch, but you can ask him that question when he comes before you.

I noted on page 2 of section 3, paragraph 6:

Warning: the writer again wishes to warn the reader that the above is merely a "stab-in-the-dark" and that the organization to be prescribed will be the result of a careful study by a board of officers.

The quotation read at the last meeting by a member of the board was subparagraphs (g) and (h) on page 5 of section 4 of this publication. I had no knowledge that the Army had prior to December 7 requested a naval officer for liaison duty at the A. W. S. reception center. But Admiral Bloch is a witness; the Commission can of course ascertain whether the Fourteenth Naval District had a copy of the manual or was asked by the Army for liaison watch officers prior to December 7, 1941.

I would like again to add the following brief comment: Prior to the events of December 7 I knew the following facts:

The Joint Action Army and Navy required the Army to maintain an Air Warning Service.

The Army had a radar network on Oahu.

On or about 19 November, by my authority, Lieutenant Commander Taylor was loaned to the Army to advise them in the operations setup for their radar network.

In General Short's letter of 5 August, he stated: "The Army aircraft warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion."

After the attack of December 7 I ascertained the following facts. This, incidentally, I found out after I left here the other day:

[S-158] That the Army radar network was operating for drill purposes only and plotted Japanese planes 132 miles north of Kauai into Oahu and back to the northward until 1059. I had learned that before.

Since the day of the attack Army radar network has been constantly in use.

That upon the day of the attack six Army radar stations were functioning, as follows: one at Fort Shafter, one on Koko Head, one on Kaawa, one near Opana, one near Paucena Point, and one at Wainae.

In reverting to this subject and in presenting again in more detail to this Commission the foregoing facts, I hope that the position which I have tried to maintain from the beginning, namely, that I have no

desire whatever to evade the responsibilities which were mine at the time of the events of December 7, 1941, will be fully appreciated by the Commission. However, in fairness to all concerned and as an aid to the future war-making capabilities of our country I feel it incumbent upon me to assure that all factors which in any way contributed to the happenings of December 7 be clearly presented to this Commission. It is with this thought in mind that I have felt called upon to revert to the subject of the Army radar.

After the conclusion of the session on Saturday I thought that a portion of my testimony was not clear and also that there might be some misapprehension as to my underlying attitude. I think I stated in the discussion which took place at the last session that I was convinced there were at least three fixed stations, and by that I meant three stations with communications to the central plotting room and to the central place, by wire, and reasonably secure, and I thought there were [S-159] more. I find that there were six, and I underestimated. Now I have been informed that each one of these radar stations that was manned was the search type and that they are—what do you call them? Two seventy, wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBALD. I don't know.

Admiral KIMMEL. It was a search-type radar. And at the places where they are building permanent setups, they propose to put the same type radars that they had mounted in these stations to which I referred. I think they are going to make some slight changes in the antennae.

Admiral THEOBALD. They said that they had taken one out of our damaged ship that would give them altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I know.

Admiral THEOBALD. This is only search, and they have only one that gives altitude.

Admiral KIMMEL. We turned one over to them from one of our damaged ships. I know that. It was done at my order.

A member of my staff recalled to me after this session the other day that I had told him that General Short had informed me that he thought he could give us a 200-mile coverage with the radar installations at some time, I don't know exactly when, prior to this; but that was firmly in my mind.

Now, I didn't want to bring up this radar business at all. It is an Army responsibility, and I was trying to keep as clear of anything which appeared to be shoving off on the Army as I possibly could, but when we got into it I felt in justice to myself and to the Navy, which is of much more importance than I, that I should say what I believe to be the truth about it.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask a question, I think, while we are on this: Admiral, does that pamphlet say anything about or [S-160] refer to a Standing Operating Procedure in the title page? Does it say why that was in there?

Admiral KIMMEL. I don't—(turning pages of a document).

Admiral STANDLEY. No. The title page. Does the title page refer to any previous correspondence?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can't see it, sir (handing document to Admiral Standley). It may. I don't—

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, have you ever seen that pamphlet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Have you ever seen that pamphlet (indicating pamphlet, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November, 1941, "Subject: Standing Operating Procedure. To: Distribution 'B', 'L', and 'G' less 1, 2, 3 and 5," signed by Colonel Dunlop)?

(Admiral Kimmel examined the pamphlet referred to.)

The CHAIRMAN. I think he said he had no recollection of ever having seen it.

Admiral STANDLEY. No; that is another one.

Admiral KIMMEL. In answer to your question, sir, I have seen this since the 7th of December, since these proceedings started, and to the best of my recollection I never—I didn't see this before. It is quite possible, and that I can ascertain, that it was furnished to my headquarters; and if you ask me if I read all of it I can tell you I have not. I did not read all parts of it. I have not yet read it all.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, for the benefit of the Commission, will you state what your status as to authority and responsibility was in relation to the Commandant of the Fourteenth District and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

[S-161] Admiral KIMMEL. The Fourteenth District is a part of the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet could give directions and orders to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was charged with dealing with the Army in practically all matters of detail connected with the liaison betwixt the Army and the Navy. There were of course certain things that I dealt directly with General Short on, such as these war warnings and things like that, and there were discussions that we had, but in practically—oh, in practically all cases the Commanding General dealt through the Commandant of the District in coordinating the—dealt directly with the Commandant of the District in coordinating, and anything that required my action came through the Commandant of the District to me. The Commanding General had an entirely independent and separate command. Both offensive and defensive arrangements were by the principle of mutual cooperation in accordance with the Joint Action of the Army and Navy, and the Commanding General was in no sense subject to my orders nor to the orders of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the event of the absence of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, did the Commandant of the District succeed at any time to direct command of the forces here, or did that devolve upon the senior officer present afloat?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Commandant of the District assumed command in his regular order of seniority.

Admiral STANDLEY. Of seniority.

Admiral KIMMEL. I conceive him at all times to be a part of the fleet, and in my dealings with the Commandant I tried to [S-162] consider him just as one of the subdivisions of the fleet. Now, manifestly the senior officer present afloat has certain responsibilities, and those were not changed by the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Those were not changed by the letter, did you say?

Admiral KIMMEL. Those were not—I didn't mean anything I said to change that. I didn't write any letter, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you mean this, Admiral: that even though the Commandant of the Fourteenth District by virtue of seniority was in command here, even under those conditions the senior officer present afloat had certain responsibilities as to the ships afloat here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I might say that Admiral Bloch so far as I recall during this period of time—well, he may have been for a few days, but in a vast majority of times, almost always, there was at least one task force commander in port, who was a vice admiral and therefore senior to Admiral Bloch.

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Who is a rear admiral.

Admiral KIMMEL. Who is a rear admiral, yes, sir.

Does that answer?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, I think you misconceived some of the questions that I put near the close of the last session. What I was trying to do was not to fix any responsibility on you or anybody else in the premises, but what I was trying to do was to find the net situation with respect to information as between Army and Navy as to warning devices in operation at the date of the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I understood that, and I have [S-163] absolutely no complaint to make to you or anybody else about the way I have been treated.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all right, sir.

Now, to summarize it, without going into the question of whose fault it was, whether it was the fault of lack of equipment, lack of personnel, defective exchange of information, or whatnot, the fact was that on the morning of December 7 you knew that there was not any distant patrol?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You thought that there was a radar information service operating?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. More or less complete?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I thought so.

The CHAIRMAN. And that was the state of your information and belief on that morning?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Admiral STANDLEY. May I ask, before we leave this subject of the radar, a question premised on the fact that the radar on the fleet in harbor was not working due to the surrounding mountains; it wasn't expected to work while they were in harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. However, in addition to the drill that was going on that morning by the Army there were task forces at sea supplied with radar on the individual ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Did that apply to all ships at sea, all fighting ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, all ships are not equipped with radar. The Chicago—

[S-164] Admiral THEOBALD. The Lexington.

Admiral KIMMEL. The Enterprise. Lexington wasn't in this area. The Chicago, the Enterprise, and I think the Indianapolis are equipped with radar and—now wait a minute. The Indianapolis wasn't there. I'm wrong. I'm wrong. No, I'm wrong. Cut that out, please. I got two task forces mixed up in my mind. The Enterprise was equipped with radar, and she was about 200-odd miles to the westward, and I am sure her radar was working at the time.

Admiral STANDLEY. The question I was wanting to ask again, or ask in addition: Was there post facto information furnished you such as we and you got as to the Army radar report or chart showing enemy ships operating? Was there also anything developed on any of the ships' radar afterwards that showed that they had any contact with enemy ships of any kind?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, not that I have heard, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. They were all too far away.

Admiral KIMMEL. They were all too far away.

Admiral THEOBALD. Any one of them. The Enterprise.

Admiral KIMMEL. Enterprise was 200 miles to the westward, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they had no contact with any surface ship or—

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, none was ever reported to me, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Too far away, sir. The Lexington and Indianapolis had them, but they were miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, they were way down.

Admiral STANDLEY. What would be the radii of any such instruments on any of these surface ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. The surface ships, it depends on the [S-165] height of the radar installation on the ship and the size of the ship that they are searching for: the two principal factors.

Admiral STANDLEY. About what would be the normal distance?

Admiral KIMMEL. I am trying to tell you that, sir. Take the Enterprise, and against a battleship, and she could probably be reasonably certain of getting it at 40 to 50 thousand yards, which is 20 to 25 miles. Now, then, against a plane which is well up in the air that could run up to as high as 200 miles. Now, the higher you put the radar installation the more it increases your range for surface ships as well as for aircraft and—well, does that answer the question, sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, in the case of a destroyer, I might add, the radar installation in the Enterprise should be good for, oh, somewhere between 20 and 35 thousand yards, something of that kind.

Is that correct?

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes. The thing about it is that the radar projects the beam and it's rectilinear just like light: as soon as you hit the curvature of the earth the things below that, below the horizon—

The CHAIRMAN. —you don't get.

Admiral THEOBALD. That beam goes over, just like over a hill, and it's no good.

Admiral STANDLEY. Taking height out, is there any limit in power or effect?

Admiral THEOBALD. You had better get experts, sir. I think we have gotten reception on planes well over 100 or 150 miles, and this Army radar followed some planes out, it must have been, over 200

miles before they lost them on that morning, [S-166] but I am not an expert on that, but I think it's around—I think 200 miles is—

Admiral STANDLEY. —the limit of power.

Admiral THEOBOLD. Again, a plane is a simple problem. With a good radar instrument you could get a plane that far.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know how high this Opana installation was, but I suppose it was as high as the highest masts on some of your ships, and they apparently picked up planes 132 miles away.

Admiral KIMMEL. It depends on the height of your planes again, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, again, how high they were.

Admiral THEOBOLD. Our planes are now coming to a technique of flying very low when they go out now until they have to go up to see something. I mean our planes are following a principle of getting down close to the water until they get close to something to search for. They have been doing that for some time now, and that is what the Japs did too.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Evidently they flew low along the easterly side of the Island in coming down here.

Admiral STANDLEY. You spoke of reports, Admiral, which caused you to send out patrols to the west and southwest.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any of those reports based on radar information?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, so far as I know, so far as I remember.

Admiral STANDLEY. What type of reports were they which caused the patrols to the south and southwest rather than to the north? That is, after the attack.

[S-167] Admiral KIMMEL. They were false reports, as we found out, and of contacts, and were direction-finder reports.

The CHAIRMAN. There is some belief, is there not, that those were stalls by Japanese boats?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Fishing boats and whatnot?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. We have been told that there was a great deal of radio talking and a great deal of confusion in the signaling after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. They did as much as they could to confuse everybody.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. And you must hand it to them, leaving aside the unspeakable treachery of it, that once they were launched on it they did a fine job.

Off the record:

(There was colloquy off the record.)

General McNARNEY. Admiral, do you maintain an operations board here which shows or pictures the location of surface vessels?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McNARNEY. You do not happen to take a photograph of it, do you, day-by-day, so we could see the picture on December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. We have records, I think, which can be—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, on that very line Admiral Standley has just made the suggestion that it would be helpful to us if you could

have prepared a large chart, probably on a [S-168] small scale, which would show us the location of all your forces on the 6th.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that that—

The CHAIRMAN. Between the 6th and the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the very thing you had in mind, isn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think if you will call Captain DeLany before you he is prepared to do that now.

Admiral THEOBALD. Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris.

Admiral STANDLEY. We would like a large-scale chart.

Admiral THEOBALD. They have the large plotting sheets they kept there on a table longer than this (indicating), and they have it there all the time, which is right in the war plan section at headquarters.

Admiral STANDLEY. It shows the whole ocean?

Admiral THEOBALD. It shows the whole ocean.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might give a brief description of the scheme that we had.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We kept the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District informed of the movement of all combatant ships, and in his office there was prepared each day a location sheet for the combatant ships as well as for all the merchant ships which we knew anything about, and a copy of that was furnished to my office, an overlay, and they could put it right on the chart, and we had all the merchant ships, and of course we knew where our own ships were, and they had their own ships and they had added on our ships. Now, that was done each day.

The CHAIRMAN. If I understand you, you had a permanent chart. [S-169] Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And then you made a location sheet which you can lay right on top of that permanent chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Transparent paper.

The CHAIRMAN. Transparent paper, which would locate your vessels on the sea area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And those are permanent records?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. So that they could produce the big chart and then produce the location sheets of, say, the 5th, 6th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And that would be Captain DeLany or Captain McMorris?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, Captain DeLany and Captain McMorris would be the ones to present that, and I think that there should be no difficulty about it.

General McCoy. May I ask if such a sheet, such a chart, was kept as to the Japanese fleet and where it was?

Admiral KIMMEL. That included this, sir. That was included.

General McCoy. On the same chart?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not necessarily on the same chart, but there was an overlay for that purpose. There was so much on some of these charts that—

The CHAIRMAN. So much on some of these overlays, you mean.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, so much on some of these overlays that they sometimes split them up and had one at—my [S-170] recollection now is, we had one for the Japanese and one for our own ships.

Admiral THEOBOLD. I would like to say something about that if I may. It is recognized that the Intelligence is not good, but we did have a Radio Intelligence Service that Lieutenant Commander Layton can tell you about, with a main-intercept unit in Washington, one in Cavite, and one here, who did trace by doing nothing but intercepting Japanese traffic and assaying it. They got all the checks. He, I assume, can tell you that; I don't want to. But they went right along, and that's all they actually have as to where the Japanese are. That's the main detections. There is no spy system in Japan; I don't think you can develop it. Layton, on that, will tell you a lot, I mean, and what they have in the way of plots.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

Admiral STANDLEY. You have a plot room, an operations room, in which all of this plotting is done, haven't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would there be any reason why the Commission itself could not go there and look at that plot room?

Admiral THEOBOLD. No.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is there anything more secret about that than we get right here?

Admiral KIMMEL. There isn't anything more secret about it, sir, except that they are carrying on work there right now, and it is a very busy place.

Admiral STANDLEY. Well, we wouldn't want to interfere, [S-171] I mean, but we could go there and see it in operation.

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. I think we could see exactly what they are doing there, to give us a picture that we could not get otherwise.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you have to communicate with the Commander-in-Chief on that, sir.

Admiral THEOBOLD. The Fourteenth Naval District was doing the same thing, too, as far out as they—they have a large plot in their war plans section.

Admiral STANDLEY. A separate plot, too?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Oh, yes, sir, over at Fourteenth Naval District headquarters of the Navy Yard. This plot room that Admiral Kimmel is talking about is right down here in Commander-in-Chief's headquarters about two blocks from here (indicating).

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to call—

Admiral THEOBOLD. To call up and find out?

The CHAIRMAN. Would it be convenient for you to arrange that at 12 o'clock we may be taken—only the members of the Commission; I think no one else ought to go—to those two plot rooms and look over the plotting?

Admiral THEOBOLD. Yes, sir. I will get that right under way.

The CHAIRMAN. If you will make that available to us we will adjourn at 12 o'clock and go down and look at that.

General McCoy. Were any of those information sheets or relays—overlays—of the Navy furnished to the Army? Do you know? Or the substance of the information?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think you had better ask Admiral Bloch that, sir.

[S-172] General McNARNEY. This is not particularly germane to the subject, but just for my own information I would like to ask the Admiral.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

General McNARNEY. In laying out your battle fleet formation, what is the normal position of the carriers in the battle fleet formation, with the whole battle fleet steaming out? I have a sort of smattering of naval formations, but not very much.

Admiral KIMMEL. You have touched on one of the most controversial subjects in the whole field of naval tactics. We felt for some time that the carriers should be separated from the battle line, operating on the hit-and-run principle. I think the latest thought on the subject is that the best place for the carrier is right in the battle line, for the protection of the carrier itself and for the protection of the battleships against air attack. I think it is probable there would always be at least one carrier kept right with the battle line.

Now, then, as to your dispositions, any one expedition would depend entirely upon your mission and upon the number of carriers and surface vessels that you had available for the mission. In this war up to the present there has been no such thing as a fleet action, a fleet in the sense of a large number of ships, and they have been small detachments of ships, and the British I think are pretty firmly wedded to the idea that the carrier stays right with the heavy ships except when they are off on some particular mission. You can protect them with the suitable fast ships to accompany them; because as long as you keep the carriers with the battle line [S-173] you sacrifice the advantage of speed that the carriers have over the battleships; and if you put some heavy cruisers or even light cruisers with the carriers you give them a much greater mobility than they would have with the battleships.

Does that answer the question?

General McNARNEY. Yes. This is just mostly for my own information.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a very difficult question to answer, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was not the case on December 7? That is, the battleships were without the protection of the carrier on the 7th of December?

Admiral KIMMEL. The battleships that were here?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Without the protection of the carrier? Yes, sir, in the sense that the carrier was not in port, but there was one carrier within 200 miles of here at the time.

Admiral THEOBALD. When you are in a port you naturally would depend for your main escort on land-based aircraft anyway.

General McNARNEY. You cannot operate a carrier in port.

Admiral KIMMEL. A carrier in port is just nothing, and we have long held—had a practice here that when a carrier comes into port she flies off her aircraft and puts them at the base, and we provided at each one of these fields ammunition, bombs, and what not to arm the planes

of the carriers, so that in event of being caught in port those planes could be useful. They were all taken off the carrier the minute it came into port, because they would be vulnerable not only to attack and the destruction of the planes because they couldn't get them off in port, but their planes would be useless too, so we always removed them from the carrier when we came into port.

[S-174] Admiral STANDLEY. What field did you use here for them, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. We used three fields. The north island.

Admiral STANDLEY. What?

Admiral KIMMEL. I mean Ford Island.

Admiral STANDLEY. Ford Island.

Admiral KIMMEL. Ewa; that's the marine field. And the landing field-mat over here at Kaneohe Bay. I might add that one of the first things that I hammered on when I took command was to get an agreement with the Army whereby we could use all their fields, any or all of them, and whereby they could use any or all of ours, and I issued orders that all Navy planes should by squadrons visit and be serviced at each one of the Army fields, and that was carried out, and they were familiar with all the Army fields, and I am quite sure that the Army were quite familiar with all our fields.

General McCoy. You spoke of one field, Admiral, as—

Admiral KIMMEL (interposing). Now pardon me.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I just add one other thing: And when I spoke of the places that we put the carrier planes when they came in, we normally put them at our own naval fields.

Excuse me, sir.

General McCoy. You spoke of one of your fields as Tamarim Bay?

Admiral KIMMEL. Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Kaneohe.

Admiral KIMMEL. Naval air station, Kaneohe Bay.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the seaplane station over here [S-175] to the northward of the Island.

General McCoy. On this Island?

Admiral KIMMEL. On Oahu, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. You know where Bellows Field is.

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. It is just over there (indicating).

Admiral KIMMEL. We haven't got a map of Oahu? Have you got a map?

Admiral THEOBALD. This (indicating on a map) is Kaneohe Bay, and this is the naval air station in here (indicating).

General McCoy. Did you have any normal anchorage for the fleet in this archipelago outside of Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. When the fleet first came out here we spent a great deal of our time in Lahaina road, anchorage over there.

General McCoy. Where is that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is on the Island of Maui. There is a harbor down at Hilo which would take a couple of battleships and a number of smaller craft. Those are the two principal places that we used outside of this.

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kalului.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

Admiral THEOBALD. Destroyers can go inside Kalului.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, we haven't used them.

Admiral THEOBALD. We have in the past, destroyers.

Admiral KIMMEL. And at Kalului, too. But when the situation became more tense and we were afraid of submarines, we stopped the practice of anchoring in any of those open roadsteads or in the harbor at Hilo, which is only partially protected by breakwater and subject to submarine attack, and [S-176] we used Pearl Harbor exclusively as an anchorage for heavy ships. We did permit submarines to anchor and work around Lahaina, and certain of the other smaller craft would from time to time be permitted to go to these other ports, but broadly speaking from the time I took command we had only one anchorage, which was Pearl Harbor. Lahaina, of course, is absolutely open. Lahaina. The anchorage at Lahaina is absolutely open, and studies were made several years ago to mine Lahaina to the extent necessary to make it unsafe for submarines to come in there, and a great many plans were made along that line. There are very swift currents over there, and it was finally decided that if we put mines in the number necessary to protect that harbor there was an enormous area to mine and that we would destroy more of our own ships than we did of the enemy, due to mines breaking loose in those swift currents, certainly after a short time, and that project was entirely abandoned.

General McCoy. When I was here in Hawaii about ten years ago I talked to the admiral commanding the base, only just an informal visit, and he expressed at that time considerable apprehension of the battle fleet being caught in Pearl Harbor, in its very narrow channels, and so forth.

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right. That was an apprehension I shared with him, and it was my constant concern all the time I was here.

General McCoy. At that time, however, he was thinking only of submarines; he was not then concerned with the air. More recently I served with one of your officers who served here up until a few months ago, and in talking to him about it, over the more recent concern of the Navy for defense from the air, he said that when he was out here—I think probably most of [S-177] his service being before your time—the fleet kept under way and stayed outside of Pearl Harbor and only went into the harbor by division but kept the main fleet outside of Pearl Harbor, conscious of the new danger from the air.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, General, that's possible during the period of the fleet problem over a month or six weeks, perhaps, but over several months I can see no way by which we could do it.

General McCoy. I take it, then, since you have been in command with the security of the fleet constantly in your mind, that your problem was more concerned with the safety from submarines than from air attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I was constantly concerned with the question of submarines, and we took very effective steps, I think, to keep a submarine from getting any surface ships. At least they didn't get any.

General McCoy. At these times of successive warnings from the Department I take it, then, that the fleet was mostly in Pearl Harbor rather than outside?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. We kept them in the operating areas, and we tried to change them around a little bit, and we tried to be constantly on the alert against submarines, but we did not keep them in harbor during all this time. We kept them at sea as much as we thought was profitable for our training and for the preparation for war and maintaining what security we could. We had to accept a submarine menace in the operating areas over a long period of time. We had to accept it, because if you keep a fleet in port you might just as well disband them, quit: they are no good to you.

General McCoy. Could you furnish us with a statement as to the times since you have had command that the fleet has been [S-178] in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. How many—well, I can give you a very—

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, you can do it.

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you a general statement right now which I think will serve your purpose.

General McCoy. Well, that would be satisfactory.

Admiral KIMMEL. When I took over command of the fleet—

Admiral STANDLEY. What date?

Admiral KIMMEL. On February 1, 1941. (Continuing)—Admiral Richardson had placed in operation an operating schedule whereby one-half the fleet went to sea and the other half of the fleet remained in port, and the half that were in port would sortie, and then the other half would come in.

I continued that for something like a month after I took command. It was too strenuous an operating schedule, and we had no opportunity to have upkeep on our ships, to keep up—overhaul the engines and machinery and perform necessary work to keep them going. We had a situation where some of the type commanders would never see a unit of his command at all. I modified that and divided the fleet: instead of two task forces or two operating forces, I divided them into three task forces. At the same time that I divided them into the three task forces I prescribed a mission, a specialized mission for each one, in addition to the general mission of all naval units. I presented that, I think, the other day. We then had one task force at sea all the time, sometimes two, so I would say that they were at sea about 40% of the time and in port about 60% of the time.

The CHAIRMAN. That is, any one ship would be so?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

[S-179] Admiral THEOBALD. Except the light forces.

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, there were times when the light force were kept out 60% of the time and in port 40% of the time, but I had to take very drastic steps to relieve the pressure on the light forces in order to be sure that we could keep them going.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, that would mean, then, as I think you explained the other day, that sometimes but a third of the fleet would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And sometimes two-thirds would be in here?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

The CHAIRMAN. And this particular occasion happened to be a time when two-thirds were in?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right.

General McCoy. And that was on the normal operating schedule?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral THEOBALD. You can examine those. We have them all, from way back.

General McCoy. Well, I think the statement of the Admiral—

The CHAIRMAN. This is an approximately correct statement, isn't it, Admiral?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can give you the details, of course, but I don't think it would be profitable.

The CHAIRMAN. I don't think we need them.

General McCoy. This is sufficient, I think.

[S-180] Admiral THEOBALD. You can add this: that about every time the force went out for ten days, nine to ten days, and about every second time the ships went out they stayed at sea about five extra days and we had five days of combined tactics and minor strategy by the forces out. So that about every second time the force went out it got about a time and a half at sea and above its 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ % at sea.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Sort of staggered the thing.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection it might be well to state that during all the time I was in command I made it a practice to invite the Army to take part in the exercises which we were planning, and on a great many occasions they did take part, particularly the air. On other occasions the Army requested that we hold certain maneuvers for them and come in and do this and that, and we tried to meet their wishes to the best of our ability, and I want to say that I think the Army cooperated, and I certainly tried to cooperate, better than any other place that I have ever served. We did try to get together.

General McCoy. In questioning the Army commander the other day I asked him what special measures of security for the fleet he took when the fleet was in the harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes?

General McCoy. That is, his responsibility was primarily for the protection of the fleet when it was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. And it was brought out that he didn't know when the fleet was in the harbor and that on this occasion when two-thirds of the fleet were in the harbor he had taken [S-181] no special precautions for the protection of the fleet, even after the war warning.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say something off the record, sir? I don't want this to go in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

(Admiral Kimmel made a statement off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me put a question that I think you will answer: Any citizen of Hawaii who had a motor car could find out how much of the fleet was in harbor at any given moment, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. All he had to do was drive around the harbor on the road.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And he could count them, couldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And we objected to that very much. There was nothing we could do about it.

The CHAIRMAN. You couldn't do anything about it?

Admiral KIMMEL. There was nothing we could do about it; we knew that.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask, however, following, General (addressing General McCoy), that question: You have previously stated that the movements of the fleet were known to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And were furnished him, all movements of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were in his operating room?

[S-182] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you know whether or not that information was disseminated to the forces in this area, Army and Navy alike?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well,—

Admiral STANDLEY. The Commandant of the District would know that, wouldn't he?

Admiral KIMMEL. He would know that, sir. I couldn't—I don't know what—

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you know that there was a port control office or some such thing in which there was an Army liaison officer, don't you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That port control office had a record of every ship that came in or out of this harbor, didn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, as far as I know of.

The CHAIRMAN. Don't you remember there is a port control office down there? The artillery—

General McCoy. And the artillery commander was conscious of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, the artillery.

General McCoy. What I was trying to bring out is that there were no dispositions taken by the Army, change in their normal peacetime procedure, when the fleet was in the harbor or at any time after this war warning—

The CHAIRMAN. No.

General McCoy. —either by the Army or by the Navy.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I suppose that in peacetime it wasn't necessary to take any, and I don't know what you could have [S-183] any more if there were six ships in here or if there were fifteen; the procedure would be just the same to protect that target, I should think, no matter how many or how few boats were in there.

Admiral KIMMEL. I might say in that connection that one of our concerns—one of my concerns was a system of recognition signals that the Army would understand, and we find that—

Admiral STANDLEY. Air or ships? Air recognition or ships?

Admiral KIMMEL. Ship recognition. We never got anything—well, leave that aside. Ship recognition signal. And we finally got that, never entirely satisfactory, as it never will be, but fairly well ironed out.

Admiral STANDLEY. Let me ask you this, Admiral: I would like to have you expand a little bit on this. You have spoken of this question of overhaul periods. I would like to have you expand on that a little bit for the benefit of the Commission.

I know the story, but—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. I would like you to get that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. None of our ships can continue operating indefinitely without a chance to overhaul their machinery. Our object was to bring the fleet into the war in tiptop operating condition. We didn't want to have them run down at the beginning of the war. We had an extensive program of alterations. These alterations included the installation of anti-aircraft guns, the installation of radar, the installation of protection, shields around a gun. What do you call them?

[S-184] Admiral THEOBALD. Splinter protection.

Admiral KIMMEL. Splinter protection. I couldn't get the word. Splinter protection around the guns and can you think of anything else?

Admiral THEOBALD. Those were the main. We were in general incorporating lessons of the war that were being supplied us.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but those were specific items. I was trying to get specific items.

Admiral STANDLEY. How about the degaussing?

Admiral KIMMEL. Oh, yes. Degaussing. That was a big item. I knew there was something else. Degaussing. Now, each one of those items required considerable work on a ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Wait a minute.

(There was colloquy off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. Each one of these required work on a ship, and during the periods that they were in port we gave what we call restricted availability at the Navy Yard for as many ships as they could handle and for which material was available to install these items.

Now, the degaussing, incidentally, is a very big job. It is a protection against magnetic mines, and a great deal of that was done right here in this yard on a great many ships.

Oh, yes: there is a listening gear to be put into the smaller type ships, and there was the installation of Y guns which throw depth charges. I know there were a great many others items, and if I had time I could probably get a great many, but I think you have got the general idea now. And by making these ships available during a week or ten days in here we were able to accomplish a great deal in the installation—
[S-185] we wouldn't have had any radar in any of our ships if we had not done that. That was one of the big things. Most of it was installed right here in this yard, some of it on ships which were undergoing overhaul on the coast.

And not only did we prepare for installing the Radar which had been received and the guns which had been received, but we provided the structural work and the wires in the ships, ready to put the Radar or the new guns in the places as soon as they were received in the shortest possible time.

Does that answer your question?

Admiral STANDLEY. I want to develop this question. Was the ship's force engaged in this work in port?

Admiral KIMMEL. The ship's force was engaged in this work in port to the limit of their capacity. Tenders were engaged in this work in port, and the Navy Yard was engaged in this work in port, in addition to the machinery, the permanent installations on the ships, the main motive machinery, and the power, and all working parts for the guns.

One of these ships is a mass of machinery. It is a mass of machinery, and this machinery requires constant overhauling just to keep it in tip-top operating condition.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, over and above any new overhauling?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above any new alterations.

Admiral STANDLEY. And over and above your annual overhauling period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Over and above the extended overhaul period which occurs at intervals of between 20 and 24 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. You mean the Navy Yard overhaul?

[S-186] Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. An extensive overhaul?

Admiral KIMMEL. An extensive overhaul. This has been constantly in my mind to keep the ships available, to be able to do something when war came and to be sure that they did not run down.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you adopted a policy of preventing breakdowns rather than run the risk of breakdowns?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, to avoid having anything wrong with the battleship at sea, you attempted to discover it during the overhaul period?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCox. We had a conversation the other night with Admiral Reeves about the trip of the Oregon to Santiago in the Spanish-American War. You are familiar with that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCox. And he stated that the Oregon progressively became better as they got to Santiago. The machinery was in better operating condition when they got to Florida than when they started.

Now, why was that the case in the Oregon when our present ships seem to be so delicate and lack the long-range operations in wartime, when in 1898 the Oregon was able to proceed to Santiago and be in better condition than when it left, without any Navy Yard for repairs except for such repairs as they were able to make en route?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think the ships of today are much more reliable than the Oregon was. In the midst of all this we [S-187] were convoying, escorting merchant ships from here to Manila and back. We were escorting merchant ships directly across by way of Torres Strait. We had, so far as I can recall at the present time, no breakdowns among those cruisers that they had working, and there were a large number of them, a considerable number of them which made that round trip.

The Oregon trip took about two months, I believe, to get to the Battle of Santiago from the time she started until the Battle of Santiago.

General McCox. I do not think it was that long, was it?

Admiral STANDLEY. It may have been, yes.

Let me answer that question, if I may. The Oregon was a brand new ship, just put in commission, and when you put a new ship in commission, it is just like a new automobile. The bearings have to be worn down, the gear has to be tested out, and naturally when it got there it was in better shape than when it started.

Admiral THEOBALD. There is no ship in this fleet which cannot do today what the Oregon did, and we can send a ship from here to the East Coast, or to New York, and we will bring them back without any difficulty; that may go along for a year, but at the end of that time you are bound to get your breakdowns. You have to keep them up all the time because you do not know when war is coming.

General McCoy. Under war conditions you could take the fleet over to Singapore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And you could take it from here in case the Panama Canal were blockaded, around South America, and [S-188] deliver it in the Caribbean?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, as long as you had fuel. That is the only thing you would have to supply.

Admiral STANDLEY. You have repair crews right on the fleet, right along with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

May I point out at this point that the state of tension with Japan has continued since 1937. It certainly has been active for the past two years. I seem to recall in 1937 that we had quite a scare on the West Coast, particularly against submarines.

Admiral Hepburn was in command of the fleet at that time, and he established a patrol of patrol planes, and he ran it for about a month or six weeks.

Admiral STANDLEY. Here or on the Coast?

Admiral KIMMEL. On the Coast. At the end of that time his patrol planes were just about worn out, and he had to stop it because he could not keep it up.

That is my recollection now. I am not sure of all the details because I was not there at the time in the fleet, but that is what I have been told.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can testify to that because I was a battleship captain in the fleet. They started in November, and not having a prohibited area we took some of the sabotage measures that were mentioned. We had some small boats or ships around, and it started in November and lasted until February.

Admiral Hepburn had a patrol about two hundred miles of a search, searching mainly for submarines. He did not have [S-189] sufficient BP's to run long-range scouts, but scouted only against submarines, on about a 400-mile trip.

At the end of three months, with the losses in life and losses in planes and the breakdown in planes from the scouting operations, it was necessary to stop it sometime in February.

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this: The British have run their ships through force of necessity, and the ones which have arrived in our yards were badly run down, in a run-down condition, and that after less than two years of the war.

That is the situation in regard to these planes on the Coast.

Admiral STANDLEY. How would you expect to do that in war conditions, having out planes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Only by having double crews for each plane and by having new planes coming in very rapidly.

General McNARNEY. To get back to the carriers, Admiral, is it considered by the Navy that the carrier is primarily a defense weapon, or is it an offensive weapon?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

General McNARNEY. Is it primarily used for defense or offense?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would say it is for offense, sir. You said primarily?

General McNARNEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. We have got to use it for the defense of the battle line against air attack. You must have some fighter planes there, but I think the primary mission of the carrier should be offensive.

General McNARNEY. That is just the point I was trying to [S-190] establish.

General McCoy. You made a casual remark the other day in connection with these patrol planes, that they did not have the new type of gas tanks on them. Is that a fact now?

Admiral KIMMEL. That the airplanes do not have the new war type gas tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. You are speaking of the leakproof tanks?

General McCoy. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. When they fly here from the Coast they do not carry the armor and the leakproof gas tanks on account of the weight. It is a long trip, and this armor and the leakproof gas tanks have to be installed after they arrive here. It cuts down, of course, the radius of operation and action of the planes. That also has been a matter of concern, and it may be that we will finally find that we not have these leakproof gas tanks or the armor because we cannot get the radius when we have them.

General McCoy. How much would the armor and the new tank cut down the radius? Would it be as much as a third?

Admiral KIMMEL. It is considerable. I would say at least 15 or 20%, but that would vary with the different types of planes.

General McCoy. I understand that you are putting them in here now?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, we put them in some of the ships.

Admiral THEOBALD. I was on duty over at Kaneohe Bay and they are putting them in now.

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet permanently base in [S-191] Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. What is that?

Admiral STANDLEY. When did the fleet permanently base in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not understand you, sir. You mean, when did they first come to this area?

Admiral STANDLEY. No, but when did they begin to base here continuously?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, they began to base in Pearl Harbor continuously when they arrived in this area April a year ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. April a year ago?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. They based in Pearl Harbor. Now, they anchored out for exercise periods, and what not, up until about the first of last January, and about the first of last January they decided they could not anchor in the outlying ports any more.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has the basing of the fleet continually here added or caused or brought about an increase in the facilities of the overhaul and repair and docking of the fleet at this port?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is unquestionably true, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. You do not know the extent to which that has been carried on while you have been here? Do you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I think you could get that more accurately from Admiral Bloch, but roughly speaking they had about 1800 employees here in the Navy Yard when Admiral Bloch first arrived. He has something on the order of 8,000 now. I think that is an indication.

I know a great many repair facilities have been added [S-192] machine shops, sheet-metal shops, and they have practically added a new dock over here which will dock any ship in the Navy.

Is that what you wanted?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, that is what I wanted.

Admiral, you took command of the fleet in February, 1941?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, the first of February.

Admiral STANDLEY. What was your assignment prior to that time?

Admiral KIMMEL. I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which included new 10,000-ton light cruisers with three divisions; two of the new 10,000-ton light cruisers and one of the old 7,500 tons—one division of over 7,500 tons.

Admiral STANDLEY. Had you prior to being detailed to the command of Commander-in-Chief made any efforts to get command of the fleet or used any influence to get the command of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. None whatever, sir. I would say the only influence I used to become commander of the fleet was to do my job the best I could. I never wrote anybody in connection with it and I never asked anybody anything about it.

When I was informed that I was to be Commander-in-Chief, I had been out playing golf on a Sunday afternoon. I came back to the dock and the first officer from my staff met me and told me that I was to report to the fleet flagship, that they had a communication for me to see. Captain Delaney was with me. He was then my chief of staff.

I went to the flagship and they showed me the message. Captain Delaney at that time said to me that he had [S-193] seen me under trying conditions, many trying conditions, and he thought I was going to faint when I read that message.

Admiral STANDLEY. That was your first information of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the first information that I had that I was to be Commander-in-Chief. I would be less than honest if I did not say that I had knowledge that Admiral Richardson, then Commander-in-Chief, had indicated that he thought highly of me, and also the Chief of Naval Operations, with whom I had served, Admiral Stark, who also thought highly of me.

However, nobody had said anything about my being Commander-in-Chief except to say, "Someday you will be Commander-in-Chief," and that kind of talk from various people.

It came as a complete surprise to me, and I thought that if I ever became Commander-in-Chief it would be much later in time than when I did get it.

Admiral STANDLEY. As Commander-in-Chief, the effectiveness and the efficiency of your fleet depends, to a large extent, upon the morale of the personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Is that true?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you, as Commander-in-Chief, would be very much concerned with the morale of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would, sir; yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you would also be concerned with the conduct of your personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, every one.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were at a party on that Saturday [S-194] night before December 7?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. On December 6?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Where was that party?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it a large party?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Leary gave the party. There were about a dozen people there, as I recall it.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were there other parties there largely attended by Naval personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. At the Halekulani Hotel?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the only one I saw.

Admiral KIMMEL. You were in uniform?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Were any Naval officers in uniform?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. From your personal knowledge, what was the conduct of the officers and the men of the fleet here in Pearl Harbor generally?

Admiral KIMMEL. We had some unfortunate incidents, none of them very serious. I considered the conduct of the officers and the men in this area from the time I took command—and when I knew all about it—as of the highest order. I think they obtained and deserved respect and admiration of the people in Honolulu.

Admiral STANDLEY. In the overhaul work that was being done here, were the officers required to supervise and inspect [S-195] and oversee the work done?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not only by the Yard but by their own personnel?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. Were there any special orders to the personnel of the fleet as a result of the war warning as to the percentage that could be absent from duty, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. Do you know how many captains of ships were aboard the ships in command at the time of the attack?

Admiral KIMMEL. I testified to that, I think, previously.

General McCoy. You spoke about it in a general way, I believe.

Admiral THEOBALD. I can find out. I think there were five battleship captains—I can get you a list of them for the record.

General McCoy. How many were killed on duty of the commanding officers?

Admiral THEOBALD. Bennion was one.

General McCoy. There were two captains?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Bennion and Von Valkenburg.

General McCoy. Were any of the captains of the battleships wounded?

Admiral KIMMEL. Not that I know of.

General McCoy. I am conscious of the death of Vice Admiral Kidd. What was his command?

Admiral KIMMEL. He was in the Arizona, sir. He had Batdiv 1.

[S-196] General McCoy. He was on the ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

General McCoy. He was killed on duty?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I may say that Admiral Calhoun was aboard and Admiral Furlong was aboard.

General McCoy. I would like to have furnished for the record a list of the captains present for duty at the time of the attack and those absent, please.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. Did we ask you for the percentages of the personnel on board ship? Did we ask you that on Saturday?

Admiral KIMMEL. I gave that in my testimony, sir, and we had it in considerable detail. I am not sure whether the captains on board would be in that.

General McCoy. Has the Navy Department asked for it?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

General McCoy. I noticed in your report to the Navy Department—which was furnished us—that it was of recent date. What date was that, if you recall?

Admiral KIMMEL. 21 December, sir.

General McCoy. Was that the first report you made to the Navy Department?

Admiral KIMMEL. I made telegraphic reports in which I included the essential factors of it and I made damage reports and I made casualty reports.

When the Secretary was here I gave him everything we had on the subject, and he took it back to the Navy Department with him.

It will be some time before a complete report of this can [S 197] be drawn up. I was relieved as Commander-in-Chief on the 17th of December, and since then I have not run the office of Commander-in-Chief.

I did urge them to get some kind of report to submit to this Board. I signed that report in order to get it through. Technically, I suppose I had no business signing a report. It should have been signed by the Commander-in-Chief, but it was forwarded by him.

General McCoy. That is the report in question, which we have?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Will you state for the Commission, Admiral, the procedure in the Navy, on Naval ships, in regard to the granting of liberty to the men, the number required on board, and the condition and state of armament, and the personnel in connection with it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. There must be at all times in port on board at least 50% of the enlisted men and 25% of the officers. I gave an order which was issued that there must be on board a sufficient number of men and officers in each watch to man all anti-aircraft batteries, and they must be men who are trained for the job.

That was one of the first orders that I issued after I became Commander-in-Chief, to make sure that they would always have on board a sufficient number of trained personnel to handle the batteries.

In this port there always had to be on board a head of the department, a representative of each one of the departments [S-198] in the ship, required to be on board and ready to do whatever was necessary. They should have on board a sufficient number of men to get away, to go to sea, to fight the ship. They must reach a state of efficiency at sea, depending on the number of men they had.

In this particular port we grant liberty from the afternoon until before midnight, when they were all supposed to be back on the ship. I am talking about enlisted men now.

In general, the officers lived on board ship. I had only a few of them who lived ashore in this port, the ones who had their families here, and they were relatively few. Some of the senior officers had their families here, more so than the junior officers because they had more money.

I think I stated previously that we had on board at the time of the attack at least 80% of the men, and probably over 90, and 60 to 75% of the officers. Now, that was by virtue of the fact that we were here at this time in this area, but that was the way it was all the time.

Is that what you wanted?

General McCoy. What was your flagship?

Admiral KIMMEL. My flagship was the Pennsylvania.

General McCoy. Where was the Pennsylvania at the time?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Pennsylvania was in dry dock at the time.

General McCoy. And you were living in your quarters ashore?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, I was living in my quarters ashore.

General McCoy. You had your headquarters established ashore?

[S-199] Admiral KIMMEL. I had headquarters established ashore. I would like to tell you about that.

General McCoy. Was that normal when the fleet was in the harbor?

Admiral KIMMEL. I would like to explain that so that there will not be any misunderstanding about it.

When I knew I was to take command of the fleet, which I knew about three weeks before I was to take command, I immediately started out to find out many things that I did not know about, and among others the one that I was most keenly interested in was the

question of war plans or what you are going to do with the fleet, or what the plans of the high command were with respect to the fleet.

I found in the flagship at that time only one commander and one lieutenant who were concerning themselves primarily with war plans.

Admiral STANDLEY. There was no general staff, as we understand it, in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. Well, I am talking about the war plans section of the Commander-in-Chief's staff. Everybody on the staff has to contribute something to the war plans.

I said to Admiral Richardson, the then commander, that I had thought that his number of officers detailed for war plans was entirely inadequate and that I did not see how the work could be done. I did not see how the work required to be done in that particular section could be done by those two men. He agreed with me.

He said he had no more room on the ship to put the people. I said, "Suppose I put them in some other ship?" I thought [S-200] that would not be very satisfactory. I consulted with him on this for a considerable time, and he said, "Something has to be done."

I said, "How about getting quarters ashore at least for the war plans staff?" and he said, "If you stay on ship and they are ashore, you will find that you won't get along very well; you can't split up your staff. If you do, you do not get the work done."

Shortly after that I came to the conclusion that we had to have more people on the staff of the war plans, and I asked for two additional captains to be detailed. Those were Captains McMorris and McCormack.

I arranged to put them in a place over here ashore where they could spread out in their work and put their charts out and such on the day I took command and to have the equipment and the supplies over here.

I asked the Commandant to prepare the third floor of this place, which was unfinished at the time, and I got the officers' quarters also for the occupation of the staff. I said I did not know whether I was coming ashore or not, but I wanted to be able to do so.

I operated that way for about six weeks, and found that this division of the staff—and incidentally there were other people coming to the staff such as Naval Intelligence people, which we were unable to accommodate on the Pennsylvania—and from time to time when matters of secrecy would come up, I would have to come into port, and I therefore found that that interfered with the training on the Pennsylvania.

I finally decided that I could more efficiently run the [S-201] fleet by establishing an office ashore, more so that I could by remaining on the ship.

That was a drastic step. I knew I would be criticized by some people. I consulted various people on the subject as to the way to solve this problem. Be that as it may, the result was that after about six weeks of operations, I came ashore with my staff and established them here at the Submarine Base.

Of course, I informed the Navy Department of everything I was doing. I arranged it so that my operating staff and the operating

files could be put on board the Pennsylvania in a matter of a couple of hours and we could leave port.

I tried to go to sea for the tactical exercises that were held, the maneuvers, and I generally succeeded in getting to sea during these tactical exercises, maneuvers, because I did not want to get out of touch with the sea-going end of it. The Pennsylvania up to the time of the attack was available for me to go aboard at any time.

I found that I could accomplish my job very much better by having my staff ashore in quarters where they could work. I think that the progress we made in training the fleet was very largely due to the fact that my staff were ashore and available to the various forces, top commanders for consultation, and that they were there during all this period.

I think that among the senior officers who understood the situation out there, that there was a general approval of the action that I had taken when they saw the results that were produced by it.

Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. I beg your pardon.

[S-202] Admiral STANDLEY. You were in a dual capacity at that time? You were acting in a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. Weren't you Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and also—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I was Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And as such you were responsible for the plans which the United States Fleet would use in case of war?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I was not responsible for the plans that the United States Fleet would use in war; I was responsible for the plans the Pacific Fleet would use in war, but I was also responsible for the tactical doctrines and orders that all fleets would use in the organization and prosecution of the war. Perhaps I should say not the organization, but in the organization of the task forces.

You know what the doctrines and tactical orders are.

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes, of course, but I am just trying to get the information for the Commission.

You as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and as Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had a dual capacity?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And you had a dual responsibility with regard to each of these?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Now, I have one other question. Do [S-203] you recall at one time that we had an independent flagship that had the single purpose of being the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. What ship was that?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the old—

Admiral STANDLEY. That was the Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. A merchant ship.

Admiral STANDLEY. Not a combat ship. The Great Northern, wasn't it?

Admiral KIMMEL. It had another name. I think it was the Columbia.

Admiral THEOBALD. It was the Columbia and was changed to the Great Northern.

Admiral STANDLEY. Do you recall who the first Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet was who hoisted his flag on that ship?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Koontz.

Admiral STANDLEY. No, not Coontz. Coontz never had it. He went to the Seattle.

But it was the established policy because there was not enough space on board any combat ship to take care of the staff of the United States Fleet Commander, that they used that ship.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct, sir. I might say there, too, just for the record, that in studies before the war, with respect to a war in the Pacific, that there were a number of people who had come to the conclusion years ago [S-204] that the proper place for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific was here at Pearl Harbor. Of course, I knew all that. I might add further that the Navy Department was fully informed of what I had done. I announced it at the Secretary's council in Washington in June, and besides I might say that I mean that they all knew it, as I had made representations to the Navy Department for quarters, stating that the quarters in which my staff was housed out here were not adequate and suitable, and they have appropriated or allocated the money for the construction of proper headquarters for the Commander-in-Chief and his staff out here, and they have broken ground over there for that place.

General McCoy. For the purpose of the record I would like to have you state your age at the time you took command of the fleet.

Admiral KIMMEL. I was born February 26, 1882, and I was just under 59 years of age when I took command of the fleet.

General McCoy. Could you state offhand the number of officers in your command over whom you were jumped when you were made Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral KIMMEL. In my command?

General McCoy. Yes, in your command.

Admiral KIMMEL. I would have to think about it.

General McCoy. Well, off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

Admiral KIMMEL. I can get that for you.

The CHAIRMAN. You can get that from the Naval records.

General McCoy. I think it is pertinent to what might be done to this record to show the whole story.

[S-205] The CHAIRMAN. Get that information for us, if you will.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. In connection with the description of your staff and its functions ashore, do you know what liaison your staff had with the Army staff? I mean, not through the District but directly. That is, so far as your operations in the War Plans Staff are concerned, did they have direct liaison with the Army staff of General Short?

Admiral KIMMEL. In a great many matters we did consult with them freely about many things.

General McCoy. Was there a joint plan of your staff and the Army staff?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. There was between Admiral Bloch and the Army staff, was there not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. A joint defense plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, but my staff interested themselves in a great many matters and matters that were not directly my responsibility, but we were urging the people to do things.

I know that shortly before this attack took place Captain Delaney, the operations officer of my staff, was urging the District to perfect our Radar communications circuits. Whenever we found anything that could be remedied, we consulted freely with the Army and more particularly with the District about the steps which should be taken. A lot of that was verbal, and a great deal of it was very effective. There are no written records of these things.

General McCoy. Admiral, General Short in his testimony [S-206] before us stated that between the 27th of November and the 7th of December that there had been personal conferences between you and him.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And there was one of these conferences in which General Short, in answer to our question about this war warning dispatch and so forth, stated that he felt sure that you must have shown it to him, but he did not remember, but he stated that he had in a talk with you asked your opinion about the imminence or the probability of an air attack, and that you referred to a particular Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

General McCoy. And that McMorris had replied—Do you remember that?

The CHAIRMAN. "Admiral, there is no problem."

General McCoy. Do you remember that conversation?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not recall it, but I presume that it took place.

The CHAIRMAN. At any rate it evidenced your personal state of mind at that time that you thought there was no probability of an air raid?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I have stated that, sir.

General McNARNEY. Admiral, can you give us a resume of your service, staff, education, and so forth?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have been Commander-in-Chief since the first of last February, as you know. Prior to that I was in command of cruisers of the battle force, which job I held for about 18 months.

Admiral STANDLEY. Comprising what battle force?

[S-207] Admiral KIMMEL. Comprising three divisions: two of 10,000 tons and one division of 7,500 tons. Prior to that I was in command of a division of heavy cruisers, scouting force, which command I held for about a year. During that time I made a good-will cruise around South America, and I visited Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Buenos Aires, Santiago, and Calalo.

Prior to that time I was budget officer of the Navy Department for three years. Before that I was chief of staff for the Commander, Battleships Force; and then prior to that I was commanding officer of a battleship. Prior to that I was a director of ship movements in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The cruise before that I was in command of a squadron of destroyers of battle force. Before that I was on duty in the policy and liaison section of the office of the Chief of Naval Operations. Prior to that I took a year's course at the Naval War College.

General McNARNEY. What year was that, may I ask?

Admiral KIMMEL. 1925-1926.

Before I went to the War College, I commanded a division of destroyers, Asiatic Station. Before that time I was production officer at the Naval Gun Factory, Navy Yard, Washington, D. C. Before that I was executive officer of a battleship. Just prior to that I was on the staff of Admiral Rodman in the North Sea during the war.

Do you want me to go any further?

General McNARNEY. No.

General McCoy. I notice that you had no duty with the Air Forces.

[S-208] Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, I am not an air man, although I have taken a very keen interest in air missions.

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did you graduate from Annapolis?

Admiral KIMMEL. In 1904, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Since this attack on December 7, Admiral, I presume that you have heard gossip and reports to the effect that some of your personnel were not fit for duty due to drink.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard that, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. There have been such reports.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never heard of that.

The CHAIRMAN. What have you to say about that matter?

Admiral KIMMEL. If that is a fact, I would be very much surprised and disappointed.

The CHAIRMAN. You have no knowledge of it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no knowledge of any such thing. I saw none and I saw no one who was in any such condition as that.

Admiral THEOBALD. Let me say that no liquor is allowed on board ship, and if the attack occurred at 7:50 in the morning, very few people would have had any liquor in their system, and if they had been incapacitated for duty, they are normally excused on Sunday; so it is inconceivable that anybody on duty at the time of the attack was under the influence of liquor.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have something similar to the Provost Marshall which is in the Army?

Admiral KIMMEL. A shore patrol, yes.

[S-209] The CHAIRMAN. Is there any report from them as to the conditions on shore on that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have seen none, no, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And who is the officer who was responsible for that report?

Admiral KIMMEL. That is the senior patrol officer.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know who that would be?

Admiral KIMMEL. I can find out.

The CHAIRMAN. Let us know who he was. We may want to examine him on that point.

Admiral KIMMEL. It is a complete surprise to me.

The CHAIRMAN. There has been a great deal of gossip in the newspapers in the States to the effect that both the Army and the Navy had a lot of shore leave and a lot of drinking and that some in the high command were not fit for duty on the morning in question. You heard of no such thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. It would have come to your notice if there had been such a thing?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think so, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a man by the name of Wayne Fluger?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a party at his house the night before December 7, that you know of?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know a Japanese named Otani, a fish merchant?

[S-210] Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know about a party at his place in which Naval men were in attendance?

Admiral KIMMEL. No. I never heard of this second man.

Admiral THEOBALD. Admiral Fletcher is quite friendly with Wayne Fluger.

Admiral KIMMEL. Fletcher was at sea.

This is an amazing statement.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you might have heard about it, because the Commission has had communications from some organization in the States making such allegations.

Admiral STANDLEY. The same organization, wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBALD. It just staggers me to think of it. It is inconceivable.

Admiral KIMMEL. During the time I have been in Honolulu, which has been ever since the fleet first came out here, my observation leads me to the conclusion that there has been very little drunkenness among the officers and men of this fleet. We have dealt very seriously with the incidents which were reported by the patrol, and they have been isolated instances. I do not mean that the men have not taken a drink or that the officers have not taken a drink, but that drunkenness was something which we would not tolerate, and there was very little of it.

Admiral THEOBALD. May I say something along that line, because I think I can testify to something here?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I spent a great many Saturday nights in public places dancing, such as the Royal Hawaiian, and the [S-211] night before this attack I was dancing from 8 to 12 at the Pacific Club. A large number of Army and Navy officers frequent these places, and I recognized most of the Navy officers, and it would be my duty to send anyone back who was not in a proper condition. I have never seen any such instances where I have recognized the people. I have seen officers who had a drink. I take a drink myself. But I am stag-

gered at the thought that drinking was in any way a contributing factor to what happened on the morning of the 7th.

Admiral KIMMEL. This is the first information that I have had of any such thing, and I am astounded.

The CHAIRMAN. I presume that the patrol officer would know of how many cases of discipline there were that Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And also there would be a report of acts of officers which led to inquiry or court martial?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. On that same subject?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to get those reports.

I presume there were a great many sailors ashore that night, since you customarily grant leave on Saturday night?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that pay day in the Navy?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not think so.

Admiral THEOBALD. Yes, it was right after the 5th. It was right after the 5th, and the 5th is pay day.

The CHAIRMAN. And the men on leave spend more money [S-212] getting tight right after pay day, I understand?

Admiral THEOBALD. That would be on the 5th, which was pay day.

Admiral KIMMEL. In that connection, sir, I do not know, but it is a fact that since we put in commission this new recreation center for the Navy that the large number of men who formerly went to Honolulu do not get any farther than the Navy recreation center, where they see movies and bowl in the bowling alleys, and they sell beer there, nothing more intoxicating than beer, and they stay there and eat their lunches and drink a bottle of beer, and they have their entertainment there at that recreation center, which is just outside—

The CHAIRMAN. I know where it is.

General McCoy. Who operates that?

Admiral KIMMEL. What?

General McCoy. Who operates that center?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy, but there is also a commissioned officer on duty there during all the time there is anyone there.

General McCoy. Is there a hostess there also?

Admiral KIMMEL. No.

The CHAIRMAN. You think that that recreation center has helped the morale and the habits of the men?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, very definitely.

Admiral THEOBALD. I would like to say something else. I left my house at 10 minutes before 8 in the morning, and I was at the dock about a quarter to 9 when the thing was still going on. There were a large number of officers on the dock. I did not see one single officer on the dock who was not [S-213] carrying himself in a perfectly proper manner, and there was no evidence of any officer carrying a hangover from the night before, and I must have seen 150 officers there waiting to get to their ships.

Admiral KIMMEL. I saw many officers that day, and I did not see any officer that I had the slightest suspicion of.

The CHAIRMAN. That you had the slightest suspicion of that he was not capable of—

Admiral KIMMEL. That he was not fully capable of performing his duties.

Now, with respect to this report, there may be some difficulty, because it goes to the type commanders, and there were eight of them, so there may be some delay in getting it.

The CHAIRMAN. Off the record.

(There was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Does the patrol officer make a report?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, the patrol officer makes a report, but you get it quicker than from the people at sea. It may be a little hard to get it.

The CHAIRMAN. The patrol officer is under Admiral Bloch, I suppose?

Admiral KIMMEL. The patrol officer is under the fleet run by the Commander, Base Force, Admiral Calhoun.

The CHAIRMAN. We can find out what action was taken by the Fleet Commander in that report.

It may be better to have the facts, because I do not want to leave any holes open.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. As I understand it, the things you and [S-214] General Short discussed from November 27 to December 7 were principally the relief of the forces on the outlying islands of Midway and Wake, were they not?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And there was some thought then that the Army might relieve the Marines out there?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir; yes, sir, I think that is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. And, as I understand it, reference to this war warning was merely reference to it?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Because neither you nor General Short took it as a warning that there would be a raid on Pearl Harbor rather than an aggressive move in the neighborhood of the Philippines or in the Far East?

Admiral KIMMEL. That's right, sir. And the Department by their despatches evidenced considerable concern about the security of their outlying bases.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that, and I think anyone who reads those telegrams will see that the Naval Intelligence indicated aggressive movements many thousand miles from Pearl Harbor.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. That is correct, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If it is convenient to you, Admiral, I think we shall adjourn now, as we are going to go and look at these plots in a few minutes, and I think we shall adjourn until two o'clock, sir, if that is entirely convenient to you.

Admiral KIMMEL. You want me to be here again?

The CHAIRMAN. I think there may be a few supplementary [S-215] questions we shall want to ask you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I think this is maybe the time to suggest: you have already Captain DeLany; you are going to have him over here.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Captain McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. Now, I would suggest you call—of course Admiral Bloch will be before the Commission.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. We thought of calling him next.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. And then there is Admiral Pye.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes?

Admiral KIMMEL. Admiral Brown, Admiral Halsey, and Admiral Calhoun, and of course anybody else that you want.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral THEOBALD. I think, McMorris.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I want to call Captain McMorris.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. He is in that planning division?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. This just occurred to me, Admiral: I have learned that after the attack there were two Navy officers through the balance of the day up in the radar control room. Was that by your instruction? That is after the attack.

Admiral KIMMEL. I think they were sent up there by Admiral Bellinger, wasn't it?

Admiral THEOBALD. I think compatwing 2, Admiral Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, we want to call Admiral Bellinger.

[S-216] Admiral KIMMEL. I guess you want Admiral Bellinger. I forgot him. Admiral Bellinger.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. Well, I think we shall suspend until two o'clock, then, gentlemen.

Admiral KIMMEL. Sir?

The CHAIRMAN. I think we shall suspend; until two o'clock?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes. I might add one thing here, sir, that just occurs to me.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. In connection with the size of the staff. After the attack took place and Admiral Pye's flagship, the California, was untenable, he came ashore and reported to me with all of his staff; and since that attack his staff, which is a very large one—the commander battle force—and mine have been constantly occupied with the work of running the fleet. Now, to be sure, during this particular period there were an enormous number of things to be done. I think they have done a very fine job, but it indicates very clearly that our previous estimates of what we would require in the Commander-in-Chief's staff are very far short of what we really—

The CHAIRMAN. Of what you needed.

Admiral KIMMEL. Of what we do need.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, we shall recess until two o'clock, and it may be we shall have no questions or very few questions for you.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But we are always thinking of something else that we have to cover.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. Well, I am always available, sir.

[S-217] The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir. Well, we shall not hesitate to call you back if there is anything we think of, but you might report at two o'clock in any event.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

(Thereupon, at 11:50 o'clock a. m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

The Commission reconvened at 2 o'clock p. m., at the expiration of the recess.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, U. S.
NAVY—Resumed

Admiral STANDLEY. May we go ahead?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, please.

Admiral STANDLEY. Admiral, in connection with your position here and duties and responsibilities as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet, what plans, if any, did you have, and what was your responsibility, for the defense of Midway and Wake Islands?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was the direct administration in command of Midway and Wake under the Commandant 14th Naval District, and of course I was responsible for everything that he did. I was responsible for the defense of Wake and for the defense of Midway, and for putting Marines and guns and all other defensive weapons out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. Originally, as you know, or whether you know it or not, Wake and Midway were developed commercially.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And the Navy had nothing to do with [S-218] that?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. And they were developed during the existence of treaties which prohibited our putting any defenses on the islands in that area?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir.

Admiral STANDLEY. When was the policy to put armaments on them and make them into offensive and defensive posts and military posts: When was that change made, if you know?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was at the time of the Hepburn report, the Hepburn Board. Hepburn was the senior member of the Board in the Navy Department, and Marquart was a member of the Board.

Admiral STANDLEY. And Greenslade was on it?

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not know whether Greenslade was on it.

Admiral STANDLEY. At any rate, it was known as the Hepburn Board?

Admiral KIMMEL. That was about three years ago. No, it was longer than that, I guess.

General McCoy. When I retired in the autumn of 1938, it was just about the time the Hepburn report was submitted to Congress.

Admiral KIMMEL. When was that?

General McCoy. In the autumn of 1938 when I retired.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, about three years ago, I should say, that the Board recommended the development of Wake, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, and I think also Dutch Harbor, Kodiak, and Sitka.

[S-219] They started then to get together defense battalions of Marines out there, stationed on these islands for the defense of the islands.

When the situation became tense or became what we might call tense, these Marine battalions were brought out here. We had these Marine defense battalions here long before it was possible or advisable to put them on the islands because the minute you put Marines on the islands you have the supply problem on your hands, and we had to reduce the number of workmen there.

I cannot give you the exact dates—I can find them—but my recollection now is that there were no Marines on any of the islands when I took command; that we sent a few Marines to Midway, to Johnston, and to Palmyra before we sent them to Wake, and the Navy Department urged us to do that. We could not send as many as we wanted to send in the beginning on account of the lack of facilities for supplying them, particularly food and water.

Admiral STANDLEY. Then this was the policy and the plans which resulted in the development in the Department itself and not out here?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, it dates back to the Hepburn report. It dates back to the Hepburn report, and they began to prepare these defense battalions, oh, some time ago.

Admiral STANDLEY. Was it your belief that in case the fleet had to move or in case of hostilities that the Marines would be able to defend those islands without the help of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. It was felt that the Marines on those [S-220] islands would put up a very good defense, and that it would require a considerable effort on the part of Japan to capture the islands. We had hopes that Midway might do pretty well. In Wake there was a considerable difference of opinion about whether it was advisable to put guns and Marines on Wake, and I thought a long time about it and finally decided that I would recommend that we put guns and the Marines on Wake, because we felt that an expedition to Wake, to attack it, would force the Japanese to expose some of their fleet, which we hope we would be able to get there to catch. On the other hand, having Wake would permit a considerable coverage of the fleet as long as we held it in any advance to the westward that we found it expedient to make in any forays.

Admiral STANDLEY. In other words, Wake and Midway were part of a plan?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, Wake and Midway were part of a plan.

Admiral STANDLEY. Which involved the movement of the fleet?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Admiral STANDLEY. Has there been any——

Admiral KIMMEL. May I say this?

Admiral STANDLEY. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. The size of the fleet to be kept out here was a very vital factor in whether or not we should have Midway and Wake. As a matter of fact, the Hepburn Board did not contemplate war in two oceans. The policy in regard to the islands was very much the same even after we had withdrawn something like 25% of the force that we originally had [S-221] out there.

Admiral STANDLEY. At the time of your relief here after December 7, Admiral, was there may effort to relieve the garrison at Wake or Midway?

Admiral KIMMEL. I answered a question similar to that the other day with the request that you question my successor on the subject.

Admiral STANDLEY. After December 7 was my question.

Admiral KIMMEL. I do not want to answer that, but I will since you press me.

Admiral STANDLEY. Would you rather that this answer not go on the record?

Admiral KIMMEL. I will answer it, and then you can put it in the record or not as you please.

I approved a plan which sent a carrier, three heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers, accompanied by a tanker, TANGIER, a submarine tender from which I took all torpedoes and things of that kind and loaded with ammunition and supplies. We also put on the carrier some 15 fighting planes which we felt we could fly off and get onto Wake.

At the same time we sent a similar force down to the eastern Marshalls to create a diversion in the direction of the eastern Marshalls and get this force that was going to Wake within striking distance of Wake, and send in the supply ship with three destroyers to ward off submarine and be prepared either to relieve Wake and supply them with ammunition and other supplies which would enable them to last two or three months longer, or at least a month longer, or to evacuate Wake without landing any supplies, depending on the [S-222] conditions as we found them there.

The orders that we issued were to reinforce Wake and evacuate some 650-odd civilians.

Now, we still have a problem out here, or still had a problem at Wake to get a channel in there where you could run a ship into it, and we hoped against hope that we might be able to continue the work sufficiently to get the channel in there and make it easier to supply. In my mind the decision as to whether it should be evacuated or not was to be made when we found the conditions there. I reported the plan, that I had placed in execution, to the Navy Department and got back a message saying that it was heartily concurred in, or words to that effect.

Then I turned the command over. Perhaps you had better get the rest of the story later.

If you want that in the record, all right. I might add one thing more for the information of the Commission. I received—I think it was on the 16th—a message from the Navy Department saying that I was to be relieved very shortly and that Admiral Pye was to be my relief, and directed me to inform Pye.

When I received that message, Pye had been in the office with me and knew everything that was going on. He immediately came over when the attack occurred and became my personal advisor there, as I told you before.

So I decided that the best thing for me to do in view of this force that I was setting in motion was to permit my successor to handle his operations, because I did not want to be relieved right in the middle of it. I sent a message to the [S-223] Navy Depart-

ment in which I said that Admiral Pye was thoroughly familiar with the details and the operations under way and planned.

Of course, the Department did not know that, as I had not told them before, and stated, "In view of your message I recommend that I be detached immediately in order that my successor can make a decision in regard to these operations," and the next day I got orders detaching me. I went down and turned over the whole command to Admiral Pye.

As I say, I did not want to put that in the record, but since you insist, that is a fact. Those are the facts.

Admiral STANDLEY. I have nothing further.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, the same day that you received that message, "This is a war warning," to with, on the 27th of November—

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. (Continuing:) —General Short received a long telegram from the War Department.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Did he show it to you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, that was sent down to me.

The CHAIRMAN. You remember that telegram (handing document to Admiral Kimmel)?

Admiral KIMMEL. I remember that.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short discuss that telegram with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I should say yes, but I cannot swear to it, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did General Short tell you that he interpreted that telegram as meaning that he should take measures [S-224] against sabotage rather than take measures on what we call his Alerts 2 and 3, which would put his troops in war positions and alarm the civilian population? Was there any discussion on that between you?

Admiral KIMMEL. I have no recollection of his having told me what he proposed to do.

The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember his discussing that with you?

Admiral KIMMEL. Against sabotage? No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That he was going to put his troops on a war footing?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir. I do not remember that at all. I have no recollection of it.

I may say that on the afternoon of the 27th of November I received the so-called war warning, and when I tried to get hold of Admiral Bloch and instead got Captain Earle. He brought this dispatch and I read it. I received the same dispatch from the Navy Department a couple of days later saying that this warning had been transmitted to various places. So I had it twice, as a matter of fact, the same message, this message that the War Department had transmitted. Burr gave it to the Commandant of the District, and Burr was bringing it to me when I asked for Earle. My recollection is that Earle and Burr both came over to my office, but I never saw Burr. That is my recollection, but I did see the dispatch.

The CHAIRMAN. In that (indicating) General Short says that he had conferences with you on November 27, December 1, December 2,

and December 3, and all of them with reference to the relief of the Marine Garrisons at Midway and Wake and with [S-225] reference to his communications with his superior officers about that matter, the relief of the Marine garrisons.

Admiral KIMMEL. There was a great deal about that, and in addition to Midway and Wake, Canton and Christmas.

The CHAIRMAN. He says that on December 4 Major Fleming of his staff saw Colonel Pfeiffer, Fleet Marine Officer, about ordnance that was to be sent to Canton Island. That would be in accordance with your understanding?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, had the Navy Department any telephone service to your headquarters? Or was it that you had to depend only on the Navy radio?

Admiral KIMMEL. The Navy Department in Washington?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral KIMMEL. I never have used the telephone, but during the attack and afterward Admiral Bloch told me that he talked over the telephone to Admiral Stark.

The CHAIRMAN. Would that be a public telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir, I think so; I think so.

General MCCOY. You had no scrambler telephone?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think that is a scrambler.

General MCCOY. You had a secret scrambler phone here?

Admiral KIMMEL. No, sir, there is not, so far as I know. I have never heard of any Navy telephone between here and the Navy Department. I think the only telephone to the mainland is a commercial telephone set. You could get that information from Admiral Bloch, who would know better than I would.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I have no more questions. Do you, [S-226] General McNarney?

General McNARNEY. No.

Admiral THEOBALD. You asked for this paper this morning. It shows the Admirals at sea who were senior to Admiral Kimmel and who were jumped by him when he became Commander-in-Chief.

(The document above referred to appears following page 732 of the original transcript.)

Admiral THEOBALD. Most pay days are on the 5th. The men are paid between the 1st and 5th of each month, with the majority paid on the 5th; so that a vast majority of the crew was last paid on the 5th of December. Admiral Kimmel had issued an order staggering the pay days.

The CHAIRMAN. For some reason the Army had also contemplated a similar staggering of the pay days, which, I think, had just gone into effect then.

Admiral KIMMEL. Our orders had not gone into effect. They were due to go into effect in January.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything more from Admiral Kimmel at the moment?

General MCCOY. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I think we will excuse you for the time being.

General MCCOY. I think the Admiral should know that we may probably want to call him back after we have heard the subordinates.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes, sir. I will be here, sir.

[1] **MINUTES OF THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941.**

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

(1) The Chairman presented to the Commission the Executive Order signed by the President, appointing the Commission, and defining its duties. A copy of the Order is attached to these minutes.

(2) By resolution unanimously adopted the Commission appointed Walter Bruce Howe as professional assistant, to act as Recorder of the Commission; and the following form of oath was administered to Mr. Howe by the Chairman:

You do swear that you will act as Recorder of this Commission with all due fidelity, and that you will preserve its transactions as secret, except as otherwise instructed by the Commission; so help you God.

(3) By unanimous resolution the Commission appointed Albert J. Schneider, as professional assistant, to act as Clerk to the Commission; and the following form of oath was administered to Mr. Schneider by the Chairman:

You do swear that you will act as Clerk of this Commission with all due fidelity, and that you will preserve its transactions as secret, except as otherwise instructed by the Commission; so help you God.

(4) By unanimous resolution the Commission appointed Lee H. Brown, Lieutenant-Colonel, U. S. M. C., J. A. G., as professional assistant, to act as Law Officer and Disbursing Officer to the Commission; and the following [2] form of oath was administered to Lieutenant-Colonel Brown by the Chairman:

You do swear that you will act as Law Officer and Disbursing Officer to this Commission with all due fidelity, and that you will preserve its transactions as secret, except as otherwise instructed by the Commission; so help you God.

(5) Thereupon the Recorder administered the following form of oath to the Commissioners:

You and each of you do swear that you will act as a member of this Commission with all due fidelity, and that you will preserve its transactions as secret; so help you God.

(6) The Chairman reported that he had called upon Hon. Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and requested that Mr. Hull would respond to a letter from the Commission requesting him to advise that Commission what if any warning of probable Japanese attack upon the United States had been given by him to the Secretaries of War and Navy. The Chairman stated that Mr. Hull had professed his willingness to respond to any such inquiry of the Commission. The Commission approved the Chairman's action, and requested that a written inquiry in the sense above described be sent to Secretary Hull by the Chairman.

(7) The Chairman stated that those members of the Commission who were available yesterday (December 17) had had an interview with the Secretaries of War and Navy, jointly, and had been proffered the fullest [3] cooperation of their Departments in ascertaining the facts relevant to the Commission's function.

(8) It was unanimously resolved that the Commission should in the first instance hear the Chief of Staff of the Army and Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy. General Marshall and Admiral Stark appeared together before the Commission and furnished information, supplemented by documentary evidence, showing that the Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and the General of the Army commanding in Hawaii had been furnished information of the seriousness of the Japanese situation from time to time, and had been specifically warned of the likelihood of a probable outbreak of war in the immediate future, on October 16, November 24, and November 27, 1941. It was thought best not to take into the custody of the Commission originals or copies of the correspondence in question, and General Marshall and Admiral Stark agreed to have Admiral Turner and General Gerow, of their staffs, furnish a memorandum respecting this correspondence, for the use of the Commission.

(9) The Chairman called attention to the necessity for power in the Commission to summon witnesses, compel the production of papers and documents, and examine witnesses so summoned, under oath. Representatives of the Judge Advocates General of the Army and the Navy stated they were unable to find statutory authority to enable the Commission to pursue this course. A request [4] was therefore made of the Chairmen of the Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives that a statute or joint resolution be adopted giving the Commission these powers and providing for the punishment of persons refusing or neglecting to obey the process of the Commission. Later in the afternoon Hon. Hatton Sumners, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, submitted a draft of the proposed legislation to the Commission, which was approved.

(10) It was resolved, that in the event it appears unlikely that the proposed legislation can be adopted in time to serve the Commission's purpose, the Secretary of the Navy be requested by the Commission to appoint a Court of Inquiry consisting of the two Admirals who are members of the Commission, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, of the Staff of the Judge Advocate of the Navy, as Judge Advocate of the Court, so that in aid of the Commission's powers this Court of Inquiry may, at the Commission's request, summon witnesses in accordance with the statutes and regulations of the Navy applicable to Courts of Inquiry.

(11) Admiral R. K. Turner and General L. T. Gerow produced documentary material from the files of the Army and the Navy respecting the joint war plans and other relevant material respecting the proposed preparations for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu. After consideration of the material presented these [5] gentlemen were requested to hold themselves in readiness to appear before the Commission again for further interrogation, and agreed to do so.

(12) The Commission unanimously resolved to accept the proposal of Messrs. Hart & Dice to furnish reportorial and stenographic service

for the taking and transcription of the testimony before the Commission at later hearings. The Commission further resolved to employ Lloyd L. Harkins, Francis T. Owens, Stephen S. Maxson, Maurice R. O'Connor, and Robert W. Shepherd, the individuals offered by Hart & Dice, under the terms of the contract a copy of which is attached to the minutes of this meeting; and further resolved that each of such individuals shall receive an allowance of Fifteen dollars per day in lieu of subsistence and all other personal expenses except transportation.

(13) General Gerow produced General Short's report of the action at Pearl Harbor, and it was read. The Secretary of the Navy's report of his investigation at Pearl Harbor was also presented to the Commission.

(14) The Commission resolved to meet tomorrow, December 19, 1941, to hear representatives of the Army and Navy Intelligence Units; and to depart for Honolulu on Saturday, December 20th, with the purpose of holding further hearings there.

[6] At 5.25 o'clock P. M. the Commission adjourned.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[7]

EXECUTIVE ORDER

APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7 1941, ON HAWAII.

Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following:

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D. C., will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D. C., and submit its report direct to the President of the United States.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure, to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation, and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection

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with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War [8] Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 18, 1941.

[9]

HART & DICE

SHORTHAND REPORTERS

416 Fifth Street Northwest

Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 18, 1941.

HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman of Special Board.

DEAR MR. JUSTICE: Confirming conversation in my office this afternoon with Mr. Howe and Mr. Schneider in reference to stenographically reporting the proceedings of your Board in Hawaii when the following proposal was made:

1. For five men to go, being Lloyd L. Harkins who will act as supervisor of the stenographic reporting; Stephen S. Maxson and Francis T. Owens, shorthand reporters; M. R. O'Connor and Robert W. Shepherd, Dictaphone-typewriter operators.

2. The charge for reporting and furnishing transcript, on the usual 29-line page, will be 60¢ a folio of 100 words. This to cover up to and including 5 copies of transcript but the folio charge will be the same should you decide to have only 2 copies made.

3. A per diem of \$10 per week day per man from the day our corps leaves Washington until their return for all days on which testimony is not taken; the folio rate to be the only charge (other than expenses which we understand you will take care of) on days when testimony is taken.

4. We understand we cannot take office equipment on the trip, but that you will arrange to have furnished our corps 2 Dictaphone dictators, 2 Dictaphone transcribers, and 3 Royal typewriters.

5. We will provide the necessary typewriter paper and carbon paper for producing transcript, but must depend upon you to arrange transportation—about 3 suit-case-size packages.

6. Daily copy delivery of transcript not expected, but as prompt delivery as possible consistent with hours of hearings.

We are holding our corps in readiness to respond to your call, expect to give you first class service, and understand that all proceedings are confidential.

Respectfully,

HART & DICE,
by (Signed) GEO. L. HART
Geo. L. Hart.

[10]

DECEMBER 19, 1941.

The Commission convened at 2309 Munitions Building, Washington, D. C., at ten o'clock A. M.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder and Secretary were in attendance.

General Miles, Chief of the Military Intelligence, appeared before the Commissioners and was interrogated by them.

Captain Theodore S. Wilkinson, Chief, Office of Naval Intelligence, also appeared before the Commissioners and was interrogated by them.

There was a discussion by the Commission concerning financial arrangements for the trip to Hawaii.

Contracts for their respective services were signed by the Recorder, the Secretary, and the Law Officer to the Commission.

The Recorder was directed to write, and did write, a letter to J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, requesting him to direct the Hawaiian office of said Bureau to place its facilities at the disposal of the Commission, and to Colonel William J. Donovan, Coordinator of Information, requesting him to furnish the Commission, upon its return, with a memorandum of facts or circumstances that might be pertinent to the inquiry, and a résumé of press, editorial and other comment concerning the Commission.

[11] General C. D. Herron joined the meeting, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

Colonel Edwin F. French, in charge of communications for the War Department, was called to the meeting and interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 12:30 P. M. the Commission adjourned until Saturday, December 20, 1941, at ten o'clock A. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Secretary.

[12]

DECEMBER 20, 1941.

The Commission convened at 2309 Munitions Building, Washington, D. C., at ten o'clock A. M.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder and the Secretary were in attendance.

General McCoy suggested that the Commission, upon its return to Washington, find out from the Navy and Army how the two commanding officers came to be appointed, their professional background, etc., as might be shown by extracts from their service records.

The subject of insurance was discussed, and the Recorder was instructed to make further inquiries and to take necessary steps in the matter of insuring the five members of the reportorial staff and the Clerk to the Commission.

The Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, signed a contract dated December 20, 1941, between M. LeRoy Goff, representative of Lloyd's, Limited, and the Recorder of the Commission, for Five thousand dollars insurance each, for Albert J. Schneider, Lloyd L. Harkins, Francis T. Owens, Stephen S. Maxson, Maurice R. O'Connor, and Robert W. Shepherd, for one month from the date of the contract, against accidental death, excepting as war hazard, and including travel by air, for a premium of \$37.50 each, to a total of \$225.00.

[13] At eleven o'clock A. M. the meeting adjourned.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

DECEMBER 20, 1941.

At 4.17 o'clock P. M. on the above date, the Commission and its staff left Washington Airport for San Francisco, California.

DECEMBER 21, 1941.

At 6.00 o'clock A. M. on the above date, the Commission and its staff arrived at San Francisco, California, and took quarters at the St. Francis Hotel.

At 4.50 o'clock P. M. on the above date, the Commission and its staff departed on the "California Clipper" for Honolulu, T. H.

In the evening the Commission conferred concerning the course of procedure to be followed at Honolulu.

[14]

DECEMBER 22, 1941.

At 7.20 o'clock A. M. on the above date the Commission and its staff arrived at Honolulu and took quarters at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

At 10.15 o'clock A. M. the Commission and its staff proceeded to Fort Shafter.

At 10.45 o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Fort Shafter.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Secretary to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission called for the production of:

(1) The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier (short title, HCF 41, 11 April 1941).

(2) Field Order No. 1 (tentative) Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 28 November 1941.

(3) Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 5 November, 1941.

The foregoing were produced by William E. Donegan, Lieutenant Colonel, General Staff Corps, and William S. Lawton, Major, General Staff Corps, who were interrogated by the Commission, and who made statements concerning said Plan, Order and Procedure.

Thereupon Lieutenant Colonel Donegan and Major Lawton were excused by the Commissioners, who immediately thereafter entered into a general discussion and consideration of the several matters hereinabove enumerated. A brief summary thereof was dictated by General McNarney to [15] Mr. Owens, one of the official reporters for the Commission.

In addition, the Board called for the production of the following:

(1) Diagram of air field showing exact disposition of the airplanes at the time of the attack, and also the normal dispersion pens and bunkers which had been prepared but were not occupied at the time of the attack.

(2) Copies of such arrangements and new instructions or orders for security as the present responsible General has made since the attack, both in the form of recorded ones and informal or verbal ones, if a record has been kept of them.

(3) Copies of such arrangements and new instructions or orders for security as the present responsible Admiral has made since the attack, both in the form of recorded ones and informal or verbal ones, if a record has been kept of them.

(4) The diary or other record of the Army's operations from November 15, 1941, to the date of the attack.

(5) The Pearl Harbor Log of the 14th Naval District from November 15, 1941, to the date of the attack.

(6) Copies of the Army's field orders for maneuvers to carry out alerts ordered by War Department from February 1, 1941, to the date of the attack.

(7) A copy of the order sending Naval officer to the Information Center of the Aircraft Warning Service, a copy of his instructions, and the name of such officer at the time of the attack.

(8) Five copies of "Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941".

(9) The despatch of the Chief of Staff, dated November 27, 1941, to the Commander of the Hawaiian Department.

(10) The standing estimate of the situation based upon Rainbow No. I, in force December 6, 1941.

(11) Transcription and translation December 6, 1941, 6.00 P. M., of Transpacific telephone conversation by local alien to unknown party in Tokio December 5 (reference Par. C (3), "Summary of Situation as of 7 December 1941", dated 22 December 1941.

[16] (12) All communications or directions issued by the War Department during the present emergency which resulted in the establishment of any category of alert, and the dates during which such alerts were in effect.

(13) The communications of November 16, 1941, and November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Staff to Hawaiian Department, or transmitted to Headquarters 14th Naval District, or the Commander in Chief of the Fleet.

Calls for the production of the matters enumerated or indicated in the foregoing paragraphs numbered (1) to (13) inclusive were made in writing.

In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Law Officer to the Commission, was verbally requested to procure the following:

(1) Map of Oahu.

(2) Weather forecast.

(3) Information concerning sunrise hour on December 7, and estimate of visibility before sunrise.

(4) FM 100-5.

(5) General Short's report of December 12, 1941, to the War Department.

And Major Allen was orally requested to ask Commander Bays to furnish Admiral Kimmel's report to the Navy Department.

The Recorder was directed to submit to the Commission a formula whereby basic secret plans, local defense plans, and secret plans subsidiary to them, may be discreetly referred to in the process of comparing the obligatory dispositions called for by such plans with the orders actually given, and with the execution of such orders.

[17] At 1.10 o'clock P. M. the Commission took a recess until 2.10 o'clock P. M., when it reconvened for further study.

At 4.20 o'clock P. M. the Commission adjourned until Tuesday, December 23, 1941, at 9.00 o'clock A. M., when General Short was requested to be in attendance.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,

Chairman.

Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,

Clerk.

[18]

DECEMBER 23, 1941.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Fort Shafter.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Secretary to the Commission were in attendance.

Walter C. Short, Major General U. S. A., appeared before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman, proceeded to make a statement.

At 10.30 A. M. the Commission took a recess of five minutes, after which General Short resumed his statement and continued until 1.05 o'clock P. M., when the hearing was adjourned.

The Commission was reconvened at 2.05 P. M., at which time the statement by and examination of General Short was resumed.

At 3.40 General Short was excused and cautioned to the effect that because of the nature of the inquiry and investigation it is desired that the questions asked and the testimony given, and anything that transpired during his presence in the hearing room, should be kept confidential and not discussed with anyone.

At 3.45 P. M. the Commission called Howard C. Davidson, Brigadier General, Air Corps, who, after being duly sworn by the Chairman, was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 4.50 P. M. General Davidson was excused, and cautioned concerning the secrecy of the questions asked of [19] and the answers given by him, and of all matters that transpired in the hearing room during his presence therein.

Jacob H. Rudolph, Brigadier General, Commander, 18th Bombardment Wing, was then called by the Commission, and after having been duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 5.00 o'clock P. M. General Rudolph was excused and cautioned concerning the secrecy of his testimony and all other occurrences during his presence in the hearing room.

At 5.02 o'clock P. M. Brooke Empey Allen, Major, Air Corps, was called before the Commission, and after having been duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

Major Allen was excused at 5.17 o'clock P. M., and cautioned concerning the secrecy of his testimony and all other occurrences during his presence in the hearing room.

The Commission then adjourned, to reconvene at Fort Shafter on Wednesday, December 24, 1941, at nine o'clock A. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[20]

DECEMBER 24, 1941.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Fort Shafter.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

Lloyd L. Harkins, Francis T. Owens, Stephen S. Maxson, Maurice R. O'Connor, and Robert W. Shepherd, appeared before the Commission, and upon their oaths, administered by the Chairman, did declare that they and each of them would well and truly perform their reportorial duties, and would preserve secret and inviolate any and all matters of any and every nature, in any wise pertaining to the investigation being undertaken by the Commission, which had in the past and which might in the future come within their knowledge or cognizance, in any way, as a result of their employment by and services to the Commission.

At 9.10 o'clock A. M. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff, Chief of Staff, Department of Hawaii, appeared before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 10.25 o'clock A. M. Colonel Philipps was excused and cautioned.

At 10.30 o'clock A. M. Durward S. Wilson, Brigadier General, Commander of the 24th Division, was called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

[21] General Wilson delivered to the Commission six copies of the Standing Operating Procedure, Hq. 24 Inf. Div. November 27, 1941.

At 10.50 A. M. General Wilson was excused and cautioned.

At 10.51 o'clock A. M. Major General Maxwell Murray, Commander 25th Division, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was thereupon interrogated by the Commissioners.

General Murray delivered to the Commission six copies of SOP 25th Div. December 2, 1941.

At 11.10 o'clock A. M. General Murray was excused and cautioned.

At 11.12 o'clock A. M. Major General Henry T. Burgin, Coast Artillery Command, consisting of Coast Artillery and Coastal Anti-Aircraft, was called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

General Burgin delivered to the Commission six copies of SOP Coast Artillery Command, dated November 26, 1941.

At 11.30 o'clock A. M. the following radiogram was received from the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D. C.:

"House Joint Resolution 259 approved twenty three December."

At 11.45 o'clock A. M. General Burgin was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then took a recess until 11.50 o'clock A. M., at which time Colonel Walter C. Phillips reappeared before the Commission to answer questions which arose during [22] the course of his examination in chief.

At 11.59 o'clock A. M. Colonel Phillips was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, General Staff, Commander G-2, Hq. Hawaiian Department, was next called before the Commission, at twelve o'clock noon, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 12.23 P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Fielder was excused and cautioned.

At 12.27 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Melvin L. Craig, Department Provost Marshal, was called before the Commission, sworn by the Chairman, and interrogated.

At 12.40 P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Craig was excused and cautioned. Lieutenant Colonel Fielder then reappeared before the Commission, at 12.41 P. M., for the purpose of answering a question which arose during the course of his examination in chief. At 12.44 P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Fielder was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then took a recess until 1.55 o'clock P. M., at which time Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Department of Hawaii, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated.

At 2.05 P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell was excused and cautioned.

Major General F. L. Martin, late Commanding General, [23] Hawaiian Air Force, was then called before the Commission, at 2.05 o'clock P. M., was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated.

General Martin offered a study of the air defense of Hawaii, dated August 20, 1941, which was received and marked "Martin Exhibit No. 1".

At 3.15 o'clock P. M. Major General Martin was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant Colonel Carroll A. Powell, Signal Corps, Department Signal Officer since 1940, was then called before the Commission, at 3.15 P. M., and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated.

Lieutenant Colonel Powell was excused and cautioned at 3.40 P. M.

Colonel Robert H. Dunlop was then called before the Commission, at 3.41 P. M., and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated. Colonel Dunlop was excused and cautioned at 3.48 P. M.

At 3.50 o'clock P. M. First Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, was called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated. At 4.10 P. M. Lieutenant Tyler was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then took a recess until 4.21 o'clock P. M., at which time Major Kenneth P. Bergquist, Air Corps, Operations Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn, and was interrogated. At 4.45 P. M. Major Bergquist was excused and cautioned.

[24] At 4.45 o'clock P. M. Major Lorry Norris Tindal, Air Corps, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn, and was interrogated. At 4.50 P. M. Major Tindal was excused and cautioned.

The Commission thereupon adjourned for the purpose of proceeding to and inspecting the information center of the Interceptor Command, located at Fort Shafter.

The Commission arrived at the information center at 4.55 P. M. and left at 5.10 o'clock P. M., to meet at nine o'clock A. M., December 26, 1941, at Fort Shafter.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

DECEMBER 26, 1941.

[25] At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Fort Shafter.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

There was a general discussion concerning the advisability of obtaining further evidence as to personnel and equipment, which discussion eventuated in a written call upon the Army for the following:

A table showing:

- (1) The authorized strength of the Hawaiian Department.
- (2) Actual strength on December 7.
- (3) Reinforcements received since December 7.

The report to show major items of equipment, including coast artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, both guns and automatic weapons; artillery and automatic weapons in the hands of the troops in excess of that authorized by tables of organization.

Information concerning:

- (1) How many of each type of plane is called for in the Army defense plan of the Hawaiian Department.
- (2) How many planes of each type were present December 7.
- (3) Of these, how many were ready for immediate use.
- (4) How many of these were not ready for immediate use, and why.
- (5) After the raid, how many of each type were on hand.
- (6) Of these, how many were usable.
- (7) How many planes of each type took to the air December 7.

The same information re airplanes was requested from Naval Aviation.

[26] At 9.25 A. M. Lieutenant Colonel Carroll A. Powell reappeared before the Commission for the purpose of responding to inquiries that developed during the course of his examination in chief, concerning the "scrambling" telephone, aircraft warning systems, atmospheric conditions on December 7, etc.

A copy of the so called Burwell report, mentioned by General Martin during the course of his examination, was received from him, was marked "Martin Exhibit 2", and was directed to be placed in the evidence.

Lieutenant Colonel Powell was excused at 10.06 A. M.

The Commission then called Lieutenant Kenneth M. Taylor, pilot, 47th Pursuit Squadron, at 10.10 o'clock A. M. The Lieutenant was duly sworn by the Chairman, and after having been interrogated by the Commissioners, was excused and cautioned at 10.23 A. M.

Lieutenant George S. Welsh, Assistant Operations Officer, 47th Pursuit Squadron, on December 7, 1941, was then called before the Commission at 10.25 A. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 10.35 A. M.

Lieutenant Colonel Powell then briefly reappeared before the Commission to furnish information concerning the amount of telephone traffic on December 7, 1941, and atmospheric conditions on said date.

At 10.37 A. M. the Commission called Sergeant Mobley L. [27] Hall, who was duly sworn by the Chairman, interrogated by the Commissioners, and excused and cautioned at 10.52 A. M.

At 10.53 A. M. Captain Frank W. Ebey, Commander Battery B, 55th Coast Artillery, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and, after interrogation by the Commissioners, was excused and cautioned at 11.05 A. M.

Lientenant Colonel William J. McCarthy, Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 55th Coast Artillery, Fort Kamehameha, T. H., was called before the Commission at 11.06 A. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 11.27 A. M.

At 11.28 A. M. Private Creed Shortt, Fort Kamehameha, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 11.32 A. M.

Lieutenant Stephen G. Saltzman was called before the Commission at 11.33 A. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 11.48 A. M.

At 11.49 A. M. Staff Sergeant Lowell Vincent Klatt was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 11.56 A. M.

Lieutenant Colonel Jack W. Howard, QMC, Supply Quartermaster, Hawaiian Depot, Fort Armstrong, T. H., was called before the Commission at 11.57 A. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 12.03 P. M.

[28] At 12.04 P. M. First Lieutenant Howard Frederick Cooper, C. O. Headquarters Squadron, 17th Airbase Group, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 12.15 P. M.

At 12.16 P. M. Provost Marshal Craig reappeared and supplied comparative information re arrests of soldiers and civilians for intoxication and other misdemeanors on December 6 and dates prior thereto. At 12.20 P. M. Provost Marshal Craig was excused.

A report was received from Colonel Dunlop concerning the percentage of strength of the various commands in the Hawaiian Department who were present for duty at 8.00 A. M. December 7, 1941. The Chairman read the tabulation to the Commission, and thereafter directed that the report be inserted in the transcript of the record.

A similar report was received from General Davidson concerning the Interceptor Command, was read by the Chairman, and was directed to be copied into the record.

At 12.26 P. M. Lieutenant James K. Thomas, who on December 7, 1941 was Post Signal and Post Signal Property Officer at Hickam Field, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman and interrogated by the Commissioners, and was excused and cautioned at 12.30 P. M.

Master Sergeant Ralph Trauger Ullrich was called before the Commission at 12.31 P. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after being interrogated by the Commissioners was [29] excused and cautioned at 12.35 P. M.

At 12.36 P. M. Pvt. 1Cl. Raymond F. McBriarty, Air Corps, who on December 7 was with the 86th Observation Squadron at Bellows Field, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 12.47 P. M.

Captain Melbourne H. West, Coast Artillery Corps, who on December 7, 1941, was stationed at Camp Malakole, was called before the Commission at 12.48 P. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 12.54 P. M.

At 12.55 P. M. Lieutenant Willis Theodore Lyman, 251st Coast Artillery Anti-Aircraft, Battery E, who on December 7, 1941 was stationed at Camp Malakole, was called before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 1.03 P. M.

Sergeant June D. Dickeson, who on December 7, 1941 was sergeant of the guard at Camp Malakole, Anti-Aircraft, was called before the Commission at 1.04 P. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 1.10 P. M.

At 1.11 P. M. Captain Brown appeared before the Commission for the purpose of producing certain maps.

At 1.25 P. M. the Commission took a recess until 2.20 P. M., when Charles G. Utterback, a civil service employee of the Corps of Engineers, appeared before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation [30] by the Commissioners, was excused and cautioned at 2.36 P. M.

At 2.37 P. M. Edmund St. John Griffith, a civil service employee of the Corps of Engineers, appeared before the Commission, was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 2.45 P. M.

Albert Leach Brinkman, a civil service employee of the Corps of Engineers, was called before the Commission at 2.46 P. M., was sworn by the Chairman, and after interrogation by the Commissioners was excused and cautioned at 2.56 P. M.

The Commission then adjourned further hearing until Saturday, December 27, 1941, at 9.00 A. M., at Pearl Harbor.

After such adjournment the Chairman directed that a communication from Major General Maxwell Murray to Major General McCoy, under date of December 25, 1941, correcting in certain respects General Murray's testimony given before the Commission, should be made a part of the record.

At 3.08 P. M. December 26 the Commissioners, Recorder, Law Officer, and Clerk left Fort Shafter and arrived at the Ordnance Depot at 3.15 P. M.

After inspection of the Depot the party left at 3.30 P. M. and proceeded to Wheeler Field, arriving there at 3.50 P. M. An inspection of Wheeler Field and its vicinity occupied the time until 4.30 P. M., when the Commissioners and their staff left to return to Honolulu, arriving at 5.30 P. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[31]

DECEMBER 27, 1941.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

After a preliminary discussion concerning procedure the Commission called Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, who appeared at 9.15 A. M. and was duly sworn by the Chairman.

Admiral Kimmel requested and was granted permission to have Admiral R. A. Theobald in attendance.

Admiral Kimmel then proceeded to make a statement and to answer interrogatories by the Commissioners.

At 11.30 A. M. there was a recess for five minutes, following which the statement by and interrogation of Admiral Kimmel was continued until 1.00 o'clock P. M., at which time the Commission recessed.

During the ensuing recess the Commissioners visited the so called observation tower for the purpose of viewing Pearl Harbor and vicinity.

The Commission reconvened at 2.40 o'clock P. M., when the statement by and interrogation of Admiral Kimmel was resumed.

Admiral Theobald was duly sworn by the Chairman.

At 5.25 P. M. the Commission adjourned until Monday, December 29, 1941, at 9.00 o'clock A. M., at Pearl Harbor, [32] at which time and place Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Theobald are to reappear before the Commission. Upon being excused the witnesses were duly cautioned concerning the secrecy of their testimony and all other occurrences during their presence in the hearing room.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[33]

DECEMBER 29, 1941.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present, with the exception of Admiral Reeves, whose absence was due to illness.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Theobald reappeared before the Commission.

The interrogation of Admiral Kimmel was continued after he was fully advised concerning the absence of Admiral Reeves and the course of procedure proposed to be followed by the Commission in the absence of Admiral Reeves. The colloquy between the Chairman and Admiral Kimmel in this connection is fully set forth in the transcript of record.

At 11.50 A. M. the Commission took a recess until 2.20 P. M. During the interval indicated the Commission proceeded to view certain maps and charts.

At 2.20 P. M. the interrogation of Admiral Kimmel was resumed and was continued until 2.50 P. M., when Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Theobald were excused and cautioned.

Admiral Claude C. Bloch was then called before the Commission, and was duly sworn by the Chairman.

At the request of Admiral Bloch the Commission consented to the presence of Commander C. B. Momsen in the [34] hearing room so that he might assist Admiral Bloch in furnishing the Commission with such information as it might request concerning matters touched upon in the course of the Admiral's examination.

The interrogation of Admiral Bloch was then begun and continued until 4.10 P. M., when the Commission adjourned until Tuesday, December 30, 1941, at Pearl Harbor, at 9.30 A. M. Admiral Bloch was excused until that time, and cautioned concerning the secrecy of his testimony and all other matters that transpired during his presence in the hearing room.

Following adjournment the Commission proceeded to a view of Hickam Field, and then returned to its headquarters in Honolulu, arriving there at 5.50 P. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[35] DECEMBER 30, 1941.

At nine-thirty o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present, with the exception of Admiral Reeves, whose absence was due to illness.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

Admiral Bloch and Commander Momsen reappeared, and the interrogation of Admiral Bloch was resumed.

The Commission received a list of officers off and on various ships on the morning of December 7, 1941; also various patrol reports and logs.

At 11.35 A. M. Admiral Bloch was excused and cautioned.

At 11.36 A. M. Captain Walter S. DeLany, Assistant Chief of Staff and Operations Officer under Admiral Kimmel, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 12.30 P. M. the Commission took a recess until two o'clock P. M., until which time Captain DeLany was excused with a caution concerning the secrecy of his testimony and all other matters occurring during his presence in the hearing room.

At two o'clock P. M. the Commission reconvened, Captain DeLany reappeared, and his interrogation was resumed and continued until 2.15 P. M., when he was excused.

At 2.20 P. M. Charles Horatio McMorris, Captain U. S. [36] Navy, War Plans Officer, Staff Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, 1 February 1941 to this date, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 3.05 o'clock P. M. Captain McMorris was excused and cautioned.

At 3.15 o'clock P. M. William Satterlee Pye, Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commander Battle Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

Commander Covington was present in the hearing room during the interrogation of Admiral Pye, for the purpose of assisting him in furnishing the Commission with such information as it might request concerning matters touched upon in the course of the Admiral's examination.

At 5.05 P. M. Admiral Pye was excused and cautioned, and the Commission adjourned, to convene again on Wednesday, December 31, 1941, at 9.30 o'clock A. M., at Pearl Harbor.

Following adjournment the Commission and its staff returned immediately to their headquarters in Honolulu.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[37]

DECEMBER 31, 1941.

At nine-thirty o'clock A.M. the Commission convened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present, with the exception of Admiral Reeves, whose absence was due to illness.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

Commander Covington produced maps and charts found on Japanese submarine and airplane pilots, and was requested to have photostat copies made for the use of the Commission.

At 9.40 o'clock A.M. Rear Admiral Patrick Neison Lynch Bellinger was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commission.

At twelve o'clock noon Admiral Bellinger was excused and cautioned, and the Commission recessed until two o'clock P.M., at which time the Commission reconvened and the interrogation of Admiral Bellinger was resumed.

Admiral Bellinger submitted Joint Estimate March 1, 1941, signed by himself and General Martin, made part of operational order of April 9, approved by Admiral Bloch, and forwarded through channels to Navy Department.

Admiral Pye advised the Commission that air raid drill was held 12 November, and that an air raid drill was scheduled but [38] not held November 29, in view of a sortie, and that an air raid drill was scheduled to be held again on 13 December.

The Commission was also advised that the Secretary of the Navy arrived at 7.00 A.M. on 11 December and departed at 4.00 P.M. 12 December.

The Chairman requested Admiral Bellinger to furnish the Commission the dates of joint air raid operational drills for three months

preceding December 7, held on the Island; also six copies of agreement between Admiral Bellinger and General Martin.

At three o'clock P.M. Admiral Bellinger was excused.

Rear Admiral William Lowndes Calhoun, Commander Base Force, U. S. Pacific Fleet, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated.

By direction of General McNarney, Major Allen was instructed to obtain a copy of the Army construction program, including priorities.

At 3.35 o'clock P.M. Admiral Calhoun was excused and cautioned.

Admiral William Rea Furlong, Rear Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander Mine Craft, Battle Force, on December 7, 1941, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

[39] At 4.20 P.M. Admiral Furlong was excused and cautioned, and the Commission thereupon adjourned until Friday, January 2, 1942, at 9.30 A.M., at Pearl Harbor.

Immediately following adjournment the Commission returned to its headquarters at Honolulu.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[40] JANUARY 2, 1942.

At nine-thirty o'clock A. M. the Commission convened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

At 9.40 o'clock A. M. Admiral William Frederick Halsey was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

Commander Covington was asked to obtain a copy of the secret despatch of November 24, 1941, from OPNAV to CINCAF, CINPAC, Commandants 11, 12, 13, and 15 Naval Districts. Such copy was produced by Commander Covington, but returned to him with the request that he obtain a paraphrase of said despatch, and also a paraphrase of the despatch of November 27, 1941. Later in the day the Commander furnished such paraphrases.

There were received from Admiral Bellinger the dates of joint air raid operational drills for the three months preceding December 7th, 1941, and also six copies of the agreement between Admiral Bellinger and General Martin of 31 October 1941.

At 11.55 A. M. Admiral Halsey was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant Commander S. G. Fuqua, who on December 7, 1941, was Damage Control Officer of the "Arizona", was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, [41] and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 12.30 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Commander Fuqua was excused and cautioned.

Ensign N. E. Ball, U. S. N. R., Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron One, Commanding Officer PT 21, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners.

At 12.40 P. M. Ensign Ball was excused and cautioned; and the Commission thereupon took a recess until two o'clock P. M.

By direction of General McNarney the Navy was requested to furnish a copy of the war diary of each major unit in the Fleet and District, beginning with date December 7, 1941; and an equivalent request was made of the Army.

By the direction of the Chairman the 14th Naval District and the Fleet were requested to furnish a record of the receipt of the Navy Department's despatch of November 24, 1941.

Information was also requested, in the form of data from logs or other sources, showing whether and upon what dates prior to December 7, 1941, the sea areas to the north of the Hawaiian Islands have been used for exercises.

At two o'clock P. M. the Commission reconvened, and Captain Irving Hall Mayfield, District Intelligence Officer, [42] 14th Naval District, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At three o'clock P. M. Captain Mayfield was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant Commander Edwin Thomas Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer, Staff C. in C., U. S. Pacific Fleet, was then called before the Commission, and after having been duly sworn by the Chairman was questioned by the Commissioners.

At 4.10 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Commander Layton was excused and cautioned.

Commander Joseph John Rochefort, U. S. N., 14th Naval District Headquarters, Officer in Command of Combat Intelligence, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 5.50 P. M. Commander Rochefort was excused and cautioned; and the Commission then adjourned, to reconvene at Pearl Harbor on Saturday, January 3, 1942, at 9.30 A. M.

Immediately following adjournment the Commission returned to Honolulu.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS, *Chairman.*

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[43]

JANUARY 3, 1942.

At nine-thirty o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Pearl Harbor.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Chairman read to the Commission a letter received from Admiral Bloch concerning a correction of his testimony in connection with the torpedo net. It was directed that a copy of the letter be included in the transcript of record.

The Chairman also read to the Commission a memorandum received from Captain Mayfield, stating when the long coded message dealing with signals was received from the communications company, when it was delivered to Captain Rochefort, when it was decoded and translated, and when the translation was received by Captain Mayfield. It was directed that a copy of the memorandum be included in the transcript of record.

At 9.40 o'clock A. M. Ensign Nathan Frederick Asher, U. S. N., was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 10.10 o'clock A. M. Ensign Asher was excused and cautioned.

Charles Herbert Shaw, Chief Torpedo Officer, U. S. S. Blue, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 10.30 o'clock A. M. the witness was excused and cautioned.

[44] He was followed by Ensign John Louis Landreth, Anti-Aircraft Division, who was duly sworn by the Chairman and thereafter questioned by the Commissioners. At 10.50 o'clock A. M. Ensign Landreth was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant Colonel Claude A. Larkin was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was examined by the Commissioners. At 11.30 o'clock A. M. Colonel Larkin was excused and cautioned.

At 11.35 o'clock A. M. James Joseph Curley, Chief Carpenter's Mate, U. S. S. "Nevada", was called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 11.50 o'clock A. M. this witness was excused and cautioned.

He was followed by Freeland Allen Daubin, Captain U. S. N., Commander Submarine Squadron 4, who was duly sworn by the Chairman. Captain Daubin produced certain secret documents which were marked Daubin Exhibit 1 and Daubin Exhibit 2, respectively, copies of which are in the files of the Navy Department in Washington. Exhibit 1 is a bound volume titled "Description and Photographs of Japanese Midget Submarine No. 19", and Exhibit 2 consists of photostat copies of charts of Pearl Harbor found on Japanese Midget Submarine No. 19. The documents exhibited to the Commission were in the afternoon of this day returned to Captain Daubin.

Following his appearance the Commission called Adolph Marcus Bothne, Boatswain U. S. N., U. S. S. "Oklahoma", who was [45] duly sworn by the Chairman and then questioned by the Commissioners.

Following the examination of Boatswain Bothne he was excused and cautioned, and the Commission then called Walter Frederick Staff, Carpenter's Mate 2cl. U. S. N., U. S. S. "Oklahoma", who was duly sworn by the Chairman and interrogated by the Commissioners. At 12.20 P. M. Mate Staff was excused and cautioned, and the Commission then adjourned until 2.00 P. M.

Upon adjournment the Commission considered Daubin Exhibits 1 and 2, and also discussed the subject of witnesses to be called.

During the morning Admiral Furlong was permitted to read a copy of his testimony with a view to possible correction of the same, and

Admiral Kimmel requested that he be given the same privilege with respect to his testimony. Upon consideration of the request the Commissioners decided to grant it, upon the conditions that Admiral Kimmel, in reading the transcript, preserve the secrecy imposed upon his testimony, and that any corrections or additions thereto which he cares to submit shall be presented in the form of a letter to the Commission, to be included in the stenographic transcript, upon which the Commission may recall Admiral Kimmel, should it wish to inquire into the subjectmatter of such letter. The Recorder reported that this message had been communicated by him to Admiral Kimmel.

[46] At 2.10 o'clock P. M. the Commission reconvened, and Captain James Marshall Shoemaker, U. S. N., who on December 7, 1941, was commander of the Naval Air Station at Pearl Harbor, was called, sworn and interrogated. At 2.35 o'clock P. M. he was excused and cautioned.

Thereupon the Commission called Commander Harold Montgomery Martin, who was stationed at Kaneohe Bay on December 7, 1941. Commander Martin, after having been duly sworn by the Chairman, was questioned by the Commissioners, and was excused and cautioned at 3.00 o'clock P. M.

The Commission then called Lieutenant Colonel Leonard D. Weddington, commanding officer at Bellows Field on the morning of December 7, 1941, who was duly sworn by the Chairman and questioned by the Commissioners. At 3.15 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Weddington was excused and cautioned.

Ensign John R. Beardall, Jr., who on December 7, 1941, was aboard the cruiser "Raleigh", was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was examined by the Commissioners. At 3.25 o'clock P. M. Ensign Beardall was excused and cautioned.

Seaman Berry, of the light cruiser "Robinson", was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 3.35 o'clock P. M. Seaman Berry was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then called Lieutenant Commander William [47] E. Taylor, who was duly sworn by the Chairman, and then interrogated by the Commissioners. At 4.10 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Commander Taylor was excused and cautioned.

Thereupon the Commission called Admiral Wilson Brown, who appeared at 4.25 P. M., was duly sworn by the Chairman, and interrogated by the Commissioners. At 5.10 o'clock P. M. Admiral Brown was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then adjourned and returned to its headquarters at Honolulu.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[48]

JANUARY 5, 1942.

At 9.30 o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

At 9.35 o'clock A. M. Mr. George Shadford Waterhouse, President of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At ten o'clock A. M. Mr. Waterhouse was excused and cautioned.

Bishop Samuel H. Littell was then called before the Commission was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. Bishop Littell was excused and cautioned at 10.35 A. M.

The Commission then called Mr. Leslie Ernest Eichelberger, who was duly sworn by the Chairman and examined by the Commissioners.

At 10.55 o'clock A. M. Mr. Eichelberger was excused and cautioned. and the Commissioners then called before them William A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police of Honolulu, who was duly sworn by the Chairman and examined by the Commissioners.

Mr. Gabrielson was requested to furnish a record of warnings issued by local police with respect to "loud parties" on the night of December 6, 1941.

[49] Mr. Gabrielson recommended the institution of permanent personnel for Navy shore patrol duty.

At 11:25 o'clock A. M. Mr. Gabrielson was excused, and Briant H. Wells, Major General U. S. A., retired, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 12:20 o'clock P. M. General Wells was excused and cautioned.

Thereupon the Reverend Henry Pratt Judd was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 12:30 o'clock P. M. Mr. Judd was excused and cautioned; and the Commission then took a recess until two o'clock P. M.

At that time the Commission reconvened and called before it Mr. Weslie Theodore Wilke, Secretary of the Army and Navy Young Men's Christian Association. Mr. Wilke was duly sworn by the Chairman, was interrogated by the Commissioners, and at 2:15 o'clock P. M. was cautioned and excused.

The Commission then considered a communication from the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning a radio direction finder.

At 2:30 o'clock P. M. the Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, Governor of the Territory of Hawaii, appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners.

During the course of his examination the Governor read a tabulation concerning the population of Hawaii, a copy of [50] which was directed by the Chairman to be included in the stenographic transcript of this day's proceedings.

At 3:10 o'clock P. M. Governor Poindexter was excused and cautioned.

At 3:15 o'clock P. M. the Hon. Lester Petrie, Mayor of the City of Honolulu since January 1, 1941, appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 3:40 o'clock P. M. Mayor Petrie was excused and cautioned.

James Joseph Sweeney, Catholic Bishop of Honolulu, then appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 3:50 o'clock P. M. Bishop Sweeney was excused and cautioned.

The Rev. Paul B. Waterhouse, President of the Temperance League of Hawaii, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 4:10 o'clock P. M. Mr. Waterhouse was excused and cautioned.

Thereupon Mr. Chris, J. Benny, Executive Secretary of the Temperance League of Hawaii, was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was examined by the Commissioners. At 4:45 o'clock P. M. Mr. Benny was excused and cautioned, and the Commission thereupon adjourned, to reconvene on Tuesday January 6, 1942, at nine o'clock A. M., at Room 300 [51] of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

(Sgd.) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd.) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

JANUARY 6, 1942.

[52]

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Commission unanimously appointed its Recorder, Mr. Walter Bruce Howe, and its Clerk, Mr. Albert J. Schneider, to take the testimony under oath of witnesses from the community offering themselves tomorrow, Wednesday, January 7, 1942, in response to the following notice, published in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin on the afternoon of January 5th, and to be republished on the afternoon of January 6th, and in the Honolulu Advertiser on the morning of January 6th, and to be republished on the morning of January 7th, pursuant to the Commission's direction:

The commission appointed by the president of the United States to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, invites any persons who have personal knowledge of facts which relate to the objects of its inquiry, namely, "to provide bases of sound decisions whether any dereliction of duty or errors of judgment on the part of the United States army or navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy" to attend in person before the commission or such of its members or assistants as it may designate, to make statements under oath of such facts.

The commission will receive such statements on Wednesday, January 7, 1942, between 9:30 a. m. and 12:30 p. m., and between 2 and 4:30 p. m., at the Royal Hawaiian hotel, Honolulu, Room 300.

The Recorder presented a letter dated January 6, 1942, [53] from Admiral Kimmel, containing recommendations for certain itemized revisions of the transcript of his testimony before the Commission December 27 and 29, 1941. The Commission decided to include in the record Admiral Kimmel's complete statement of his desire as to corrections; that the Commission ought not to alter the transcript as it was made for December 27 and 29, but that in order to have a sensible statement that the Commissioners can follow, they are going to have the whole transcript revised with Admiral Kimmel's corrections, so that the eye may catch the corrections and the Commission shall have as nearly as possible a running statement and a connected story. Admiral Kimmel was informed of this decision when he appeared personally before the Commission at 12.05 P. M.

At 9.30 o'clock A. M. Mr. Robert L. Shivers, Special Agent in charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, appeared before the Commission and was duly sworn by the Chairman. Thereupon Mr. Shivers was interrogated by the Commissioners. During the course of his examination Mr. Shivers exhibited a chart showing Japanese consular set-up in Hawaii, and matters of cognate interest; and, at the suggestion of the Chairman, Mr. Shivers agreed to furnish the Commission with a copy of this chart for its files.

At 11.10 o'clock A. M. Mr. Shivers was excused and cautioned.

Mr. Angus M. Taylor, Jr., United States District Attorney [54] for the District of Hawaii, was then called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by the Chairman was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 12.00 o'clock noon Mr. Taylor was excused and cautioned.

At 12.05 o'clock P. M. Admiral Kimmel, accompanied by Admiral Theobald, was recalled.

At 12.20 o'clock P. M. certain witnesses who had been called for this day were excused until Wednesday morning January 7th, at nine o'clock A. M., to reappear at Room 300 Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

At 12.55 o'clock P. M. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Theobald were excused; and the Commission then adjourned until Wednesday, January 7, 1942, at nine o'clock A. M., to reconvene at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

Following adjournment the Commissioners made a tour of inspection which included visits to Fort Ruger, Diamond Head, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe Bay, and which occupied the time of the Commission from two o'clock until 5.30 o'clock P. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[55]

JANUARY 7, 1942.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Commission received from Chief of Police Gabrielson a complete report concerning complaints on December 6, 1941, and it was directed that the report should be copied in the record.

At 9.20 o'clock A. M. Mr. Richard K. Kimball, manager of the Halekulani Hotel, appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was examined by the Commissioners.

In connection with his testimony Mr. Kimball filed a copy of the Honolulu Advertiser of Tuesday, December 16, 1941, containing an account of the killing of an escaped Japanese pilot on the island of Niihau.

At 9.40 A. M. Mr. Kimball was excused and cautioned.

Lieutenant George Kimball, U. S. N. R., was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. Lieutenant Kimball was asked to furnish to the Commission with five copies of a report concerning the episode involving the killing of a Japanese aviator on the Island of Niihau, and requested also to furnish the Commission with five copies of the [56] delimitation agreement concerning intelligence work. At 10.30 o'clock A. M. Lieutenant Kimball was excused and cautioned.

Mr. Yee Kam York then appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 11.10 o'clock A. M. Mr. York was excused and cautioned.

Admiral Kimmel and Captain De Lany then reappeared before the Commission for the purpose of further elaboration of Admiral Kimmel's statement. They offered, and the Commission received, four charts or plats, which were marked Exhibits A, B, C and D, January 7, 1942.

After Admiral Kimmel and Captain De Lany were excused at 12.25 o'clock P. M., Lieutenant Henderson, of Army Intelligence, appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 12.35 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Henderson was excused and cautioned; and Lieutenant Murlott, of Army Intelligence, was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners.

At 12.45 P. M. Lieutenant Murlott was excused and cautioned; and the Commission took a recess until 2.15 o'clock P. M.

Mr. F. E. Settle, who was a civil engineer and draftsman at Midway Island between October 8 and December [57] 27, 1941, then appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. He described the attack on Midway Island and the general situation there.

At 2.30 o'clock P. M. Mr. Settle was excused and cautioned, and the Board recessed to await the arrival of Colonel Pickett, U. S. M. C., to testify concerning the attack upon and conditions at Midway Island.

At 3.45 o'clock P. M. Colonel H. K. Pickett, accompanied by Major Peflay, appeared, were sworn by the Chairman, and were questioned by the Commissioners. These witnesses gave statistics concerning the attack upon Midway Island. Colonel Pickett was requested to furnish a copy of a report of the attack of December 7 from all outlying islands of this District.

At 4.15 o'clock P. M. Colonel Pickett and Major Peflay were excused and cautioned; and the Commission thereupon adjourned until Thursday morning, January 8, 1942, at 9.00 o'clock A. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[58]

JANUARY 8, 1942.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Recorder submitted a statement concerning the examination of twenty-two witnesses who appeared in response to the published notice set forth in the minutes of January 6, 1942, and who were interviewed by the Recorder and the Clerk to the Commission. It was ordered that this statement be appended to the stenographic transcript of testimony taken by the Commission on January 7, 1942.

It was unanimously resolved that of the five copies of the stenographic transcript of testimony which have been typed for the use of the Commission, four should be taken by the Commissioners to Washington, D. C.; that the fifth copy should be taken by courier, traveling apart from the Commissioners, to Washington, D. C.; that after said copies have served the purposes of the Commissioners in connection with the formulation of their report, three of said copies should be destroyed, and of the remaining two copies one each should be lodged in the secret archives of the Army and Navy, respectively, at Washington, D. C.

[59] At 9.35 o'clock A. M. Major General Short reappeared before the Commissioners for further examination. General Short was excused at 10.30 o'clock A. M.

Major General F. L. Martin then reappeared before the Commissioners for further examination. General Martin was excused at eleven o'clock A. M.

He was followed by Brigadier General Howard C. Davidson, who reappeared before the Commissioners for further examination, and who was excused at 11.12 o'clock A. M.

The Commission then called Lieutenant Colonel Clay I. Hoppough, who was duly sworn by the Chairman, and then interrogated by the Commissioners. At 11.32 o'clock A. M. Colonel Hoppough was excused and cautioned.

Colonel Kendall J. Fielder then reappeared before the Commissioners for further examination, which was concluded at 11.56 o'clock A. M.

The Commission then took a recess until two o'clock P. M., at which time Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U. S. N. appeared, was duly sworn

by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 3.40 o'clock P. M. Captain Zacharias was excused and cautioned.

Clarence L. Tinker, Brigadier General, U. S. A., then came before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners.

At 4.05 o'clock P. M. Mr. Justice Roberts was called away from the meeting, and Admiral Standley assumed the chair.

[60] At 4.10 o'clock P. M. General Tinker was excused and cautioned.

Commander Paul M. Bates, U. S. N., was then called before the Commission, and after being duly sworn by Admiral Standley was questioned by the Commissioners. At 4.20 o'clock P. M. Commander Bates was excused and cautioned.

The Commission then called Lieutenant Commander H. Kaiminski, who was duly sworn by Admiral Standley, and then interrogated by the Commissioners. At 4.55 o'clock P. M. Commander Kaiminski was excused and cautioned.

Colonel Perry M. Smoot was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by Admiral Standley, and was questioned by the Commissioners. At 5.10 o'clock P. M. Colonel Smoot was excused and cautioned, and the Commission then adjourned, to reconvene on Friday, January 9, 1942, at nine o'clock A. M., at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[61]

JANUARY 9, 1942.

At nine o'clock A. M. the Commission reconvened at Room 300, Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu, T. H.

All of the members of the Commission were present.

Mr. Justice Roberts resumed the chair.

The Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

In response to the invitation of the Commission Admiral Nimitz and General Emmons appeared for conference. The reporter was excused.

At 10.30 o'clock A. M. General Emmons retired.

At 10.37 o'clock A. M. Admiral Nimitz retired, and General Emmons reentered the conference.

At 10.45 o'clock A. M. General Emmons retired.

Admiral Kimmel was then recalled for further questioning, after which he was excused at 10.50 o'clock A. M.

The Commission then called John Bayliss Earle, Captain U. S. N., Chief of Staff, 14th Naval District, who was duly sworn by the Chairman and then interrogated by the Commissioners. At 11.15 o'clock A. M. Captain Earle was excused and cautioned.

Mr. Bernard J. Butler was then called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commis-

sioners. At 11.45 o'clock A. M. [62] Mr. Butler was excused and cautioned, and the Commission recessed to await the reappearance of Admiral Pye.

At 12.05 o'clock P. M. Admiral Pye reappeared before the Commission for further questioning.

At 12.55 o'clock P. M. Admiral Pye was excused, and the Commission adjourned to meet at the call of the Chair.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[63] JANUARY 10, 1942.

On the above date the Commission departed from Honolulu, and proceeded by air to San Francisco.

JANUARY 11, 1942.

On this date the Commission arrived at San Francisco, and left by train for Washington, D. C., via Omaha and Chicago.

JANUARY 12, 1942.

En route to Washington, the Commission met at the call of the Chairman and considered and drafted findings of fact.

JANUARY 13, 1942.

En route to Washington, the Commission met at the call of the Chairman and considered and drafted findings of fact.

JANUARY 14, 1942.

En route to Washington, the Commission met at the call of the Chairman and considered and drafted findings of fact.

JANUARY 15, 1942.

The Commission arrived at Washington.

[64] JANUARY 16, 1942.

At the call of the Chairman, the Commission met at 9.30 o'clock A. M. in Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present; and the Recorder, Law Officer, and Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Commission received the copy of transcript of testimony which was forwarded from Honolulu to Washington by officer courier.

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The Commission went into an executive session, which lasted until 12.30 o'clock P. M., when the Commission adjourned, to reconvene on Saturday, January 17, 1942, at 9.30 o'clock A. M.

JANUARY 17, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9.30 o'clock A. M. at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present; and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Chairman announced that the War Department had referred to General McNarney, for the attention of the Commission, a letter addressed to the President under date of December 22, 1941, signed by various citizens of Honolulu, [65] relative to General Short's career there. It was directed that until otherwise ordered this letter should be placed in the Commission's files and should not be copied into the transcript of record.

The Chairman also announced the receipt from the Secretary of State of a letter in the sense heretofore reported by the Chairman to the Commission as the Secretary's statement. The letter was directed to be filed with the records of the Commission.

The Chairman submitted a draft of formal preface to the proposed report by the Commission to the President.

General McCoy read a summary of press notices, editorials, etc., concerning the appointment and aims of the Commission.

The Commission then proceeded to the work of drafting proposed findings of fact, and was so occupied until 5.30 o'clock P. M., when it adjourned to reconvene on Sunday, January 18, 1942, at ten o'clock A. M.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[66]

JANUARY 18, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at ten o'clock A. M., at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present; and the Recorder, Law Officer, and Clerk to the Commission were also in attendance.

The Commission proceeded with the work of drafting findings of fact, and was so engaged until 4.30 o'clock P. M., when it adjourned to reconvene on Monday, January 19, 1942, at 9.30 o'clock A. M.

JANUARY 19, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9.30 o'clock A. M., at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, with the exception of General McCoy, who had previously consented to the Commission meeting and proceeding with the examination of witnesses in his absence.

General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, United States Army, appeared before the Commission, and after having been duly sworn by the Chairman was questioned by the Commissioners. At 11.20 o'clock A. M. General Marshall was excused.

At 11.30 o'clock A. M. Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy, and with him, [67] Rear Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, appeared before the Commission, were duly sworn by the Chairman, and were questioned by the Commissioners.

Admiral Turner stated that he would furnish a precis of statements made by him, Admiral Stark, and Admiral Wilkinson, before the Commission prior to its departure from Washington for Honolulu. Later in the day this precis was received and copies thereof distributed to the Commissioners.

At 1.00 o'clock P. M. Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner were excused, and the Commission adjourned until 1.45 o'clock P. M.

At that time Lieutenant Colonel William J. Whaling USMC was called before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was interrogated by the Commissioners. At 2.10 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Whaling was excused and cautioned.

At 2.15 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. French, Signal Corps, U. S. A., was called before the Commission, sworn by the Chairman, and examined by the Commissioners. At 2.25 P. M. Lieutenant Colonel French was excused and cautioned.

At 2.30 o'clock P. M. Brigadier General L. T. Gerow appeared before the Commission, was duly sworn by the Chairman, and was questioned by the Commissioners.

[68] General Gerow filed with the Commission a precis of the statement that was made by him before the Commission prior to its departure for Honolulu.

At 3.02 o'clock P. M. General Gerow was excused.

The Commission then resumed the subject of proposed findings of fact, and engaged in that work until 5.30 o'clock P. M., when it adjourned to reconvene at 9.30 o'clock A. M. on Tuesday, January 20, 1942, at 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[69] JANUARY 20, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9.30 o'clock A. M. at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission went into an executive session which lasted until 12.45 P. M. At that time there was an adjournment until 1.30 o'clock P. M., when the executive session was resumed and continued until 6.30 o'clock P. M. The Commission then adjourned until January 21, 1942, at 9.30 o'clock A. M.

JANUARY 21, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9.30 o'clock A. M. at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission went into an executive session which continued until 1.10 o'clock P. M., when the Commission took a recess until 2.45 o'clock P. M. At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the executive session until 6.30 o'clock P. M., when there was an adjournment until Thursday, January 22, 1942, at 9.30 o'clock P. M.

At three o'clock P. M. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for safeguarding the national interest, in any of the state- [70] ments, except one in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased.

At 4.30 o'clock P. M. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose, stated to the Recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the Recorder so informed the Commission.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[71]

JANUARY 22, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at 9.30 o'clock A. M. at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk to the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission went into an executive session which continued until 1.00 o'clock P. M., when the Commission took a recess until 1.30 o'clock P. M. At that time the Commission reconvened and resumed the executive session which continued until 5.00 o'clock P. M., when the Commission recessed until 8.30 o'clock P. M. The Commission then reconvened and continued in executive session until midnight, when it adjourned until January 23, 1942, at ten o'clock A. M.

JANUARY 23, 1942.

The Commission reconvened at ten o'clock A. M. at Room 2905 Navy Building, Washington, D. C.

All of the members of the Commission were present, and the Recorder, the Law Officer, and the Clerk of the Commission were in attendance.

The Commission began an executive session which continued until 1.00 o'clock P. M., at which time the Commission recessed until 1.30 o'clock P. M., when the [72] executive session was resumed.

At 3.00 o'clock P. M. the Commission unanimously adopted the following resolutions:

Resolved, That the Commission having on January 8, 1942, decided on the final disposition of each of the five sets of the transcript made at its direction of all testimony given before the Commission on December 22, 1941, and thereafter, and the taking of testimony having now been closed, it is now ordered accordingly that as soon as may be upon the completion of its report to the President, one complete set of the said transcript shall be delivered sealed to the Secretary of War, together with the complete stenographic notes of the reporters made December 22, 1941, and subsequent days on which testimony was taken, and one complete set of said transcript shall be sealed and delivered to the Secretary of the Navy, to be deposited, if agreeable to them, in the secret archives of their respective departments, and that the remaining three sets shall be promptly and effectively destroyed; and it is further ordered that one copy of the transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, given before the Commission on December 27 and December 29, 1941, made from the transcript of his said testimony at the request of Admiral Kimmel, and authorized by the Commission, but embodying in the text certain corrections suggested by him and hitherto otherwise noted in the transcript of his said testimony, the said copy to be marked "Annex to transcript and not a part thereof: A copy of [73] the transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel given before the Commission to investigate the attack on the Territory of Hawaii, and revised by authority of the Commission in compliance with Rear Admiral Kimmel's Request", and also one completed copy of the minutes of the meetings of the Commission, shall be enclosed with each of the sets of the transcript to be delivered respectively to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy; and it is further ordered that all documents remaining in the possession of the Commission, received by it from Army officers or agencies shall be delivered in one or more sealed packages to the Secretary of War, to be deposited, if agreeable to him, with the transcript of testimony, and all documents remaining in the possession of the Commission received by it from Naval officers or agencies and from sources other than those above stated shall be delivered in one or more sealed packages to the Secretary of the Navy, to be deposited, if agreeable to him, with the transcript of testimony, and that each of these deliveries shall be accompanied by a list, to be prepared by the Secretary of the Commission, of all documents in both deposits, showing the disposition of each document; and it is further ordered, that the Law Officer to the Commission shall see to the execution of the above orders and report the result to the Chairman of the Commission.

Resolved, that the Chairman of the Commission having been present throughout all meetings of the Commission, is authorized and requested to examine the minutes of the meetings of the [74]

Commission prepared by the Recorder and the Secretary, in his discretion to make any and all amendments thereto, and to approve the said minutes by his signature. The Recorder and the Secretary will each sign the minutes. The Chairman is authorized and requested to retain the said minutes in his custody.

Resolved, that the Chairman is authorized to sign the following order to Lieutenant Colonel Brown:

Upon delivery to the Secretaries of War and Navy, each, of one complete set of the transcript of all testimony taken before the Commission, and accompanying documents, and your final settlement with the finance officer of the Army, you will stand relieved of further duties with the Commission and report to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to resume your duties in that office.

At 3.35 o'clock P. M. the Commissioners signed duplicate copies of its report. The Chairman will retain the third copy and will have four copies made from it, one for each of the other Commissioners.

At 5.00 o'clock P. M. the President directed the delivery of the report by Mr. Justice Roberts at 11.00 o'clock A. M. January 24, 1942.

The Commission having made its report to the President adjourned without day.

(Sgd) OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman.

(Sgd) WALTER BRUCE HOWE,
Recorder.

(Sgd) ALBERT J. SCHNEIDER,
Clerk.

[75] (Appended to these minutes are lists of documents delivered to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, for deposit in their secret archives.)

Commission appointed by Executive order of December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON JANUARY 24, 1942, RECEIVED BY IT FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN MILITARY OR NAVAL OFFICERS OR THEIR AGENCIES, AND TO BE DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

- No. 1. Two copies of letter dated December 10, 1941, from A. A. Buta, Chief Inspector of Customs, and John D. Williams, Inspector of Customs, to Collector of Customs, Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H., giving the writers' version of the airplane attack on Pearl Harbor
- No. 2. Letter dated Dec. 30, 1941, Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Commission, concerning warnings of attack conveyed by the Secretary to the Departments of War and Navy in the period between November 1 and Dec. 7, 1941
- No. 3. Letter dated Jan. 16, 1942, William L. Langer, Director of Research, Coordinator of Information, to General Frank McCoy, transmitting resume of public opinion about the Commission, together with the resume mentioned in said letter
- No. 4. Letter dated Jan. 3, 1942, Paul B. Waterhouse, President, and Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary, The Temperance League of Hawaii, to the Chairman of the Commission, charging lack of sobriety on the part of army and navy personnel, and urging that alcoholic liquor be barred from the services; also copy of letter dated Jan. 4, '42 by the Recorder to the Commission, inviting Mr. Waterhouse and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission
- No. 5. Certified copy of Executive Order appointing the Commission
- No. 6. Copy of Joint Resolution authorizing the Commission to compel attendance of witnesses and the production of books, papers, and documents
- No. 7. Memorandum dated Jan. 9, '42, R. L. Shivers, Special Agent in Charge, FBI, Honolulu, to Mr. Justice Roberts, conveying certain items of information pertinent to the Commission's investigation
- No. 8. Correspondence with and report by W. A. Gabrielson, Chief of Police, Honolulu, concerning complaints and reports received by his department on Dec. 6 '41, relative to Army and Navy personnel
- No. 9. Tabulation of population estimates of the Territory of Hawaii as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941
- No. 10. Copy of "The Honolulu Advertiser" of December 16, 1941, containing account of killing of Japanese pilot on Island of Niihau

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- No. 11. Outline of plan for protective measures for civilian population of Oahu in case of bombardment, dated March 25 1941**
- No. 12. Letter dated December 22, 1941, from Hawaiian business and social organizations to The President, commanding General Short**
- No. 13. Precis of testimony before the Commission prior to its departure for Honolulu, given by Admiral Stark, Rear Admiral Turner, and Captain Wilkinson**
- No. 14. Memorandum dated 1/5/42, Myron Gurnea, Inspector FBI to the Chairman, re available radio facilities for transmitting airplane bearings**
- No. 15. FBI graphs showing racial composition of Territory of Hawaii &c.**

Commission appointed by Executive order of December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON JANUARY 24, 1942, RECEIVED BY IT FROM NAVY OFFICERS OR AGENCIES, AND TO BE DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

- No. 1. Map of Oahu main military and naval establishments
- No. 2. Map of Hawaiian Islands
- No. 3. Copy of letter of 1/24/41, Sec. Nav. to Sec. War, re security of U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself
- No. 4. Summary of reports and messages sent to CNO since attack on Pearl Harbor (three copies)
- No. 5. Six copies Memorandum 2/17/41 CNO to sundry Commandants of Naval Districts—Subject anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks
- No. 6. Five copies Memorandum 12/19/41, P. N. L. Bellinger, Rear Admiral USN, Commander Patrol Wing Two, to Admiral H. E. Kimmel USN, re availability and disposition of patrol planes on morning of 7 December 1941
- No. 7. Six copies "Summary of Reports and Messages" 8 Dec. 0427 to 17 December 0928
- No. 8. Seven copies Messages and orders from Hq. C. in C. Pacific Fleet Dec. 7 1941
- No. 9. Copy of Survey of Conditions in Pacific Fleet, dated 5/26/41, from C. in C. U. S. Pacific Fleet to CNO
- No. 10. Four copies Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised) dated Pearl Harbor T. H. 10/14/41, from C. in C. U. S. Pacific Fleet to Pacific Fleet—Subject "Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas"
- No. 11. Memorandum, Edwin Thomas Layton, Lt. Commdr. U. S. Navy, Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet, to the Commission, dated 5 Jan. '42, summarizing frequency of occurrence of periods when information was lacking in regard to location or activity of a group, type or unit of Japanese Fleet during last six months of 1941
- No. 12. List of damage control officers of ships present 7 Dec. 1941
- No. 13. Memo. (copy) dated 12/26/41, Commander Scouting Force (Administration) to Commandant Navy Yard Pearl Harbor, subject Navy Yard Pearl Harbor Priority List
- No. 14. Memo. (copy) dated 12/26/41, Commandant 14 Nav. Dist. to Chief Bu. Yards and Docks, subject, Construction Program on Oahu—Prosecution of, under war conditions
- No. 15. Copy of Memo. dated 1/16/41 from Commdr. Patwing Two to CNO. subject Readiness of Patrol Wing Two

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- No. 16. Memorandum dated 1/1/42 by Admiral Halsey, subject, "Summary of Action 7 December 1941"—Planes available Enterprise Dawn Dec. 7, and losses
- No. 17. Memo. dated 2 Jan. 1942, Admiral Halsey to Admiral Standley, subject "Liberty—Hawaiian Area"
- No. 18. Memo. dated 1 Jan. 1942, P. N. L. Bellinger, Commdr. Patrol Wing Two to Senior Member, Board Investigating Activities of Dec. 7 1941, transmitting 6 copies of report of Army-Navy Board of 31 Oct. 1941, and specifying dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held between 24 April 1941 and 12 Nov. 1941
- No. 19. Typical operations program of Commander Task Force
- No. 20. Three copies Memo. of 12/22/41, W. E. G. Taylor Lt. Cdr. USNR to Aide to the Commandant 14th Nav. Dist., outlining the Commander's assignments and duties
- No. 21. Memo. dated 1/2/42, Captain Mayfield to the Commission, subject, long coded message regarding arrangements for display of signals at Lanikai, Kalawa and on island of Maui
- No. 22. Memo. (undated) P. C. Crosley, Flag Secty. to Lieut-Comdr. Covington, forwarding copies of operation orders for combined inter Task Force tactical exercised held during second quarter of fiscal year (Sept. 24 1941 to Nov. 25 1941), and specifying areas where exercises were held. Copies of the orders are attached to the memorandum
- No. 23. Memo. 7 Jan. 1942, Dist. Intelligence Officer to President's investigating Committee, enclosing 5 copies excerpts from letter from CNO dated 15 March 1941 to Commandants of all Naval Districts, the Governor of Guam and the Governor of Samoa, and 5 copies of report dated 16 Dec. 1941 on subject of enemy plane that crashed on Niihau. There is attached to this memorandum one copy of the Niihau report.
- No. 24. Memo. dated 5 Jan. 1942, E. T. Layton Lt. Comdr. U. S. N., Intelligence Officer U. S. Pac Fleet, for the Commission, re fuze settings used by vessels at Pearl Harbor 7 Dec. 1941; with appended photographs showing bomber formations and illustrating "shorts" and altitude of attack
- No. 25. Letter 1 Jan. 1942, Admiral Bloch to Walter Bruce Howe, Recorder of the Commission, suggesting revision of the Admiral's testimony concerning the opening of anti-torpedo net
- No. 26. Three copies of Memo. of 1 January 1942 concerning status of defense battalions, Fleet Marine Force, assigned to 14th Naval District
- No. 27. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Palmyra Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence
- No. 28. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Johnston Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence
- No. 29. Three copies of History of Action occurring at Wake Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 22, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence

- No. 30. Three copies of report on conditions at Wake Island, from C. O. NAS Wake to Commdt. 14th N. D., dated Dec. 20, '41
- No. 31. Three copies of report of action at Palmyra Island 24 Dec. 1941, from C. O. U. S. Naval Air Station, Palmyra Island, to C. O. 14 N. D. (undated)
- No. 32. Three copies of report dated Dec. 19 '41 concerning attack on Johnston Island; from C. O. U. S. Naval Station (Air), Johnston Island, to Commandant 14 Nav. District
- No. 33. Security orders, instructions and arrangements issued since Dec. 7 '41 by units of fleet and 14th Nov. Dist., pertaining to security of Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Fleet
- No. 34. Five copies of history of action occurring at Midway Island from Dec. 7 to Dec. 31, as compiled from official despatches and correspondence
- No. 35. Undated report of damage caused by action of 7 Dec. 1941 at Midway Island, from C. O. that Island to C. in C. US Pac. Fleet
- No. 36. Report dated 12/12/41, C. O. Defense Garrison at Midway Islands to Commdt. 14 Nav. Dist., concerning action on 7 Dec. 1941
- No. 37. Report dated 17 Dec. 1941 from resident officer in charge public works at Midway Island, containing "Miscellaneous comments covering period 1 December 1941 to 17 December 1941" concerning work progress and effects of attack thereon
- No. 38. Report of Army-Navy Board 31 October 1941
- No. 39. Report of Action of 7 December 1941, dated Dec 21 1941, from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel USN to Sec. Navy
- No. 40. Location of regularly assigned commanding officers of ships present during Japanese attack of 7 December 1941
- No. 41. Short Patrol reports 6, 7, 8 Dec. (enlisted personnel)
- No. 42. List of short patrol reports of offenses committed by commissioned officer personnel of the Fleet 1 April-18 December 1941
- No. 43. Copies of radar plots furnished by Admiral Bellinger
- No. 44. Photographs taken during attack at Kaneohe Bay and thereafter, indicating damage done at that field, etc.
- No. 45. Copy of Naval Base Defense Officer's Operation Plan dated 7 March 1941
- No. 46. Copy of memorandum concerning coordination of FBI, ONI and MID
- No. 47. 14th Naval District Control Post Watch Officer's Log War Diary Reg. No. 2
- No. 48. Chart of Pearl Harbor showing location of various units of the fleet
- No. 49. Copy of report by the Secretary of the Navy to the President
- No. 50. Copy of excerpts from CNO's letter dated March 15, 1941, to Commandants of all naval districts, Governor of Guam, and Governor of Samoa, re investigation of Japanese Espionage, Counter-Espionage, Sabotage, and Subversive Activities
- No. 51. Letter dated Jan. 5 '42 from Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy to the Commission, recommending revision of transcript of Rear Admiral Kimmel's testimony before the Commission on December 27 and 29

Commission appointed by Executive order of December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941.

DOCUMENTS IN THE POSSESSION OF THE COMMISSION ON JANUARY 24, 1942, RECEIVED BY IT FROM ARMY OFFICERS OR AGENCIES, AND TO BE DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

- No. 1. Memorandum of 12/23/41, Capt. C. A. Kengla, A. C., to Executive Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, concerning parking areas and bunkers at Wheeler, Haleiwa, and Bellows Fields, together with charts accompanying the memorandum (the latter being rolled together with the charts)
- No. 1-A. Secret "OPN Map Annex 1 to accompany FO 1 Fixed Installations", Island of Oahu
- No. 2. Secret Map "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941—Anti-Aircraft Dispositions"
- No. 3. Map showing military reservations on Island of Oahu
- No. 4. Special Military Map AA of Hawaiian Islands
- No. 5. Map and explanatory addenda showing ground defenses at Hickam Field
- No. 6. Chart of Hickam Field showing disposition of aircraft at time of attack
- No. 7. Statement by Major General Walter C. Short of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941
- No. 8. Letter of December 23, 1941, H. C. Davidson, Brigadier General, A. C., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, embodying diary and other records of all units from 0001 15 November 1941 (two copies)
- No. 9. Reports of E. L. Duggan, 2nd Lt. A. C., and Edward F. Kent, Capt. Inf., Ground Defense Officers, showing ground defense activities at Bellows Field March 15, 1941 to December 7, 1941
- No. 10. Letter, 23 Dec. 1941, Leonard D. Weddington, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Bellows Field, to C. G. Hawn. Dept., reporting records of operations by all units from 0001, 15 Nov. '41 to 0730, 7 Dec. '41, and Field Orders or Instructions for Alert Procedure
- No. 11. Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Jay P. Thomas, 1st Lt., 86th Obsn Sq (C & D), Operations Officer, to C. G. Hawn. Dept., through C. O. Bellows Field, giving records of operations of and instructions received by 86th Obsn Sq from 0001 15 Nov '41 to 0730 7 Dec. '41

- No. 12. Memo. 22 Dec. '41, C. K. Rich, Lt. Col. A. C., Executive, Bellows Field, to Major Landry, G-3 Hawn. Air Force, re position of planes and bunkers on said Field at time of attack, together with layout map or general plan of Bellows Field accompanying the memorandum
- No. 13. Statement dated 22 Dec. '41, Edw. F. Kent, Capt. Inf., Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, concerning ground defense activities at said Field on Dec. 7 '41 and thereafter
- No. 14. Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Leonard D. Weddington, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Bellows Field, to Major Landry, G-3, Hawn. Air Force, reporting action taken at said Field on orders given by the responsible commanders, for security since Dec. 7 '41
- No. 15. Memorandum, Leland C. Hurd, Lt. Col. A. C., Commanding Hickam Field, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force, under date 23 Dec. '41, containing information as to arrangements made, orders issued, and verbal action, since Dec. 7, for proper protection of Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field
- No. 16. Letter 22 Dec. '41, Wm. J. Flood, Colonel. A. C., Commanding Wheeler Field, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force; giving information concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security of Wheeler Field since attack of Dec. 7
- No. 17. Letter 23 Dec. '41, J. H. Rudolph, Brig. Genl. USA, Commanding 18th Bombardment Wing, Air Corps, to C. G. Hawn. Air Force, concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for security since Dec. 7
- No. 18. Memorandum 22 Dec. '41, C. L. Tinker, Brig. Genl, U. S. A., Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, disclosing orders or instructions for security and employment of Hawaiian Air Force, given by him since his arrival
- No. 19. Letter 23 Dec. '41, H. C. Davidson, Brig. Genl. A. C., Commanding Hawaiian Interceptor Command, to C. G. Hawaiian Air Force, outlining arrangements and new instructions or orders for security after raid of 7 Dec. 1941
- No. 20. Letter F. L. Martin, Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Hawn, Air Force, to C. G. Hawn. Dept., dated 20 Sept. 1941, concerning joint Army-Navy Air Force Exercise
- No. 21. Letter Cheney L. Bertholf, Lt. Col. AGD Adj. General Hawn. Air Force, to C. G. 18th Bombardment Wing—subject, Attack of Navy Cruising Disposition
- No. 22. Letter dated Feb. 7 '41, Henry L. Stimson, Secty. of War, to the Secretary of the Navy—subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (copy)
- No. 23. Memorandum dated 26 Dec. '41, Robert H. Dunlop, Col, AGD, Adjutant Genl. Hawn. Dept., to Major Brooke E. Allen, Air Corps, containing tabulation showing percentage of strength of all major echelons, post and district commanders present at 8 a. m. 7 Dec. 1941, except Kauai Dist.
- No. 24. Letter 12/25/41, Maxwell Murray, Major Genl. UCA, to Major General Frank McCoy, supplementing General Murray's testimony before the investigating commission
- No. 25. Memo. 26 Dec. '41, A. W. Meehan, Major A. C., A. C. of S., G-3, Hq. Hawn. Air Force, to Roberts Commission, showing

numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii, specified in Defense Plan; airplanes on hand 7 Dec. '41; airplanes ready for immediate use; planes on hand after raid and usable after raid; and airplanes that took to the air Dec. 7

- No. 26. Letter 25 Dec. '41 Robert H. Dunlop, Colonel A. G. D., Adjt. General, to "Distribution 'B' and 'F' less 5 and 6"—Subject, Priority of Construction Projects
- No. 27. Translation of Mori conversation
- No. 28. Standing Operating Procedure 25th Inf. Div. dated 12/2/41
- No. 29. Standing Operating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 27 Nov. '41
- No. 30. Standing Operating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 1 Dec. '41
- No. 31. Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. C. A. dated 26 Nov. 1941
- No. 32. Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. Dept. dated 5 Nov. 1941
- No. 33. Certain enclosures from General Short's report, copy of which is in War Department in Washington
- No. 34. Letter 11/17/41 •F. L. Martin Major Gen. USA, Commanding Air Officer to C. G. Hawn. Dept., forwarding special reports concerning provisions for security of installations at Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Hawaiian Air Depot
- No. 35. "A Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu", F. L. Martin Major Gen. USA Commanding Hawaiian Air Force, to CG Army Air Forces through CG Hawaiian Department
- No. 36. Statement by General Gerow

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44.P31:P31 pt. 24

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

S. Con. Res. 27


A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 24

PROCEEDINGS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





1275

PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
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• Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack



UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946

**JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL
HARBOR ATTACK**

ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, *Chairman*

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, *Vice Chairman*

WALTER F. GEORGE , Senator from Georgia	JOHN W. MURPHY , Representative from Pennsylvania
SCOTT W. LUCAS , Senator from Illinois	
OWEN BREWSTER , Senator from Maine	BERTRAND W. GEARHART , Representative from California
HOMER FERGUSON , Senator from Michigan	
J. BAYARD CLARK , Representative from North Carolina	FRANK B. KEEFE , Representative from Wisconsin

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LOGAN J. LANE, *Assistant Counsel*

HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1- 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
2	401- 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587- 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585-2063	4195- 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065-2492	5461- 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493-2920	6647- 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921-3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929-4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278-13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153-5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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Part No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
27 through 31	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse- ments.

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HEARING
PEARL HARBOR, EXHIBIT 143, VOL. 3

EXHIBITS OF ROBERTS COMMISSION**EXHIBIT No. 1 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION**

[1]

DECEMBER 10, 1941.

Outside Div.

COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS,

Federal Building, Honolulu, T. H.

SIR: On Saturday, December 6, 1941 at 12:05 p. m. the Chief Inspector of Customs was notified by the Office of the Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, that a vessel was expected to arrive at Pearl Harbor at 6:00 a.m. on December 7, 1941, which would require Customs formalities.

The Chief Inspector requested that the Office of the Captain of the Yard notify the Inspector's Office before 4:00 p. m. of the same day in the event of a change of arrival time.

As per this request Inspector Lynch, on duty in the Inspector's Office 12/6/41 from 12:00 noon to 4:00 p. m., was notified that the vessel was expected to dock at about 7:30 a. m., Sunday, Dec. 7, 1941. He in turn notified the Chief Inspector at his home at 3:55 p. m., and was instructed to inform Inspector Williams that the boarding detail (Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams) was to report for duty at 7:00 a. m., Sunday, December 7, 1941.

The two members of the boarding detail arrived at the Inspector's Office at 6:55 a. m., on the 7th, and proceeded immediately to Pearl Harbor, arriving at the Office of the Yard Duty Officer, second floor of the Administration Building at about 7:20 a. m., where they were informed that the USS ANTARES was outside the entrance of the harbor and was expected to dock at about 8:30 a. m.

At 7:55 a. m., while awaiting the arrival of the USS ANTARES, several loud explosions were heard. The Yard Duty Officer telephoned immediately to ascertain where the firing was taking place. After a very short conversation he reported to another party by phone, "This is no drill, Sir.", and after replying "Aye, Aye, Sir.", turned to the Customs Officers and informed that Pearl Harbor was undergoing an [2] Air Raid by Japanese planes. These planes could be plainly seen flying low over the channel from the windows of the Yard Duty Officer's office.

The first raid lasted for about forty or fifty minutes after which there was a ten or fifteen minutes lull. Two more raids followed lasting twenty-five to thirty minutes each with a slight lull following.

The planes apparently broke formation in the vicinity of Alea Heights and swept down over the Channel, the Naval Air Station and Hickam Field.

At the beginning of the attack very few antiaircraft guns were heard, although the number steadily increased until by 9:50 a. m., when the third wave came over the fire of antiaircraft guns, exploding bombs and the rattle of machine guns caused an almost incessant roar.

The Customs Officers remained at the Administration Building until the third lull, which occurred at about 10:15 a. m., at which time the Chief Inspector questioned the Captain of the Yard regarding the feasibility of leaving the Yard and returning to town as no customs duties could be performed under the circumstances.

Upon being advised that there was no reason for remaining inside the Yard, Chief Inspector Buta and Inspector Williams left for Honolulu arriving at the Federal Building at approximately 10:45 a. m.

Respectfully,

(S) Andrew A. Buta,
A. A. BUTA,
Chief Inspector of Customs.
(S) John D. Williams,
JOHN D. WILLIAMS,
Inspector of Customs.

HONOLULU, T. H., Jan. 7, 1942.
Presented for information.

(S) Warde C. Hiberly,
WARDE C. HIBERLY,
Acting Collector of Customs.

1286 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT No. 2 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[1]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 30, 1941.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS,
*Chairman, Commission to Investigate the Facts
and Circumstances connected with the
Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.*

MY DEAR MR. JUSTICE: In your letter dated December 19, you request that I write to you, as Chairman of the Commission to Investigate the Facts and Circumstances connected with the Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, stating whether I "conveyed to the Departments of War and Navy of the United States, in the period intervening between November 1 and December 7, 1941, warnings of the immediate danger of possible attack by the forces of the Japanese Empire". You add that for your purposes it will be sufficient if I "will state briefly approximately the times when such warnings were given and, in outline and summary only, the purport of the warnings."

I would say in reply that I have constantly kept myself as familiar as possible with all important developments and conditions arising in the relations of the United States with other countries. Recognizing the cooperative relationships which exist between the Department of State and the Departments of War and of the [2] Navy, especially in times of danger to this country, I had during the year many conferences with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy and at intervals conferences with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and officers of their staffs. Our conferences sought a full interchange of information and views relative to critical situations all over the world, including—of course—developments in the Pacific area.

These exchanges of information and views were in addition to those which took place at Cabinet meetings and at meetings during the fall of 1941 of the War Council, and in numerous other conversations. At these conferences I was given the benefit of the knowledge which representatives of the War and the Navy Departments possessed of military factors involved in the world situation and I in turn took up political factors in the world situation and other matters of which I had special knowledge.

In reply to your express inquiry, I recall that at the regular meeting of the Cabinet on November 7, 1941, I stated among other things that relations between Japan and the United States were extremely critical and that there was imminent possibility that Japan might at any time start a new military movement of conquest by force [3] in accordance with her many times announced purpose and policy. It thereupon became the consensus of opinion that some members of the Cabinet might well emphasize this critical situation in speeches in order that the country would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development. Accordingly, Secretary Knox, four days later on Armistice Day, delivered an address, in which he especially emphasized this imminent and dangerous situation. He expressed the following strong warning:

" * * * We are not only confronted with the necessity of extreme measures of self-defense in the Atlantic, but we are likewise faced with grim possibilities on the other side of the world—on the far side of the Pacific. Just what the morrow may hold for us in that quarter of the globe, no one may say with certainty. The only thing we can be sure of is that the Pacific, no less than the Atlantic, calls for instant readiness for defense. In the Pacific area, no less than in Europe, interests which are vital to our national security are seriously threatened."

On the same day Under Secretary of State Welles, carrying out this Cabinet suggestion in an address, used the following language of urgent warning:

" * * * today the United States finds itself in far greater peril than it did in 1917. The waves of world conquest are breaking high both in the East and in the West. They are threatening, more nearly each day that passes, to engulf our own shores."

" * * *
"In the Far East the same forces of conquest under a different guise are menacing the safety of all nations that border upon the Pacific. [4]
" * * * our people realize that at any moment war may be forced upon us, and if it is, the lives of all of us will have to be dedicated to preserving the freedom of the United States, and to safeguarding the independence of the American people, which are more dear to us than life itself."

It will thus be seen that knowledge of the gravity of the situation in the Pacific was not confined to me, but was shared by many high officers of the Government. I might add that throughout this period officials of the Departments of War and of the Navy manifested a spirit of wholehearted cooperation and indicated in statements made to me from time to time their keen concern regarding the seriousness and critical nature of the danger.

On November 25 and on November 28, at meetings of the War Council, at which the highest officers of the Army and the Navy of course were present, I emphasized the critical nature of the relations of this country with Japan: I stated to the conference that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan; that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest by force; and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. At the conclusion I with due deference expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that [5] the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination for purposes thereof.

Sincerely yours.

CORDELL HULL.

EXHIBIT NO. 3 (NAVY, PACKET NO. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION,
Washington, D. C., January 16, 1942.

GENERAL FRANK MCCOY,

Room 2905, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL MCCOY: I am transmitting to you herewith, a resume of public opinion about the Commission to Investigate the Attack on Pearl Harbor. As you will see this digest is based upon almost a thousand newspaper clippings from the American press, and also some material from the British and Canadian press and some short wave broadcasts from Germany and Italy.

I trust this is the type of report which Mr. Howe, the recorder of your commission, had in mind, and that it will prove useful for your purposes.

Very truly yours,

WILLIAM L. LANGER,
William L. Langer
Director of Research.

Enclosure.

RESUME OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, JANUARY 7, 1941

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION—BRITISH EMPIRE SECTION—SPECIAL
MEMORANDUM NO. 30

RESUME OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
OFFICE MEMORANDUM

JANUARY 16, 1942.

To: Mr. William L. Langer

From: British Empire Section

Subject: Public Opinion on the Commission to Investigate the Attack at Pearl Harbor

The attached resume was prepared in response to the request of W. B. Howe, Recorder of Mr. Justice Roberts' Commission, as set forth in his letter of December 19 to Colonel Donovan.

Since this resume is for an outside agency, no attempt has been made to classify or stamp it. It contains nothing of a confidential nature.

The material in this resume is based upon a careful survey of nearly a thousand clippings from the American press through December 28, 1941. Of these, only 236 dealt directly with the Investigating Commission. After December 28 the newspaper press seems to have lost interest in the matter, though some references to it continue to appear in the weekly periodicals.

We surveyed also the Canadian newspaper press and the British press, so far as it was available. What we found is gathered together in a separate section.

We surveyed also all available reports of shortwave broadcasting to America on the subject, particularly from Italy and Germany, and our findings are gathered together in a section by themselves.

Sig. Not LEGIBLE

SUMMARY

The opinion of the United States press, particularly as revealed in its editorial comment is generally favourable to the President's appointment of the commission to investigate the Pearl Harbor disaster. The promptness of the President's order as well as his choice of the personnel of the Commission is applauded, and there is evidence of a widespread feeling of relief that a Congressional investigation appears now to be unnecessary. The press devotes more thoughtful and varied comment to the duties and powers of the commission than to any other aspect of the matter. The prevalent opinion is that the commission should fix the responsibility for the disaster, though some editors are disposed to limit its duties to fact finding and some go so far as to ascribe to it the power of a court martial. There is some disposition to lay the blame for the disaster upon the unpreparedness of the government at Washington. Some papers insist that the American people should know the facts, but there is a preponderance of opinion that popular judgment should be suspended until the Commission has made its report. The removal of the commanding officers whose conduct is to be investigated is unanimously approved.

A partial survey of comment in the Canadian press reveals no direct comment on the Investigating commission. The London *Times* of December 18 comments favorably on the membership of the board. No other mention has been found in the English papers which are available, and reactions from other parts of the Empire are not obtainable. German, Japanese and Italian short wave broadcasts adopt a tone of ridicule, implying that the investigating Commission was appointed to cover mistakes of Washington officials.

[4]

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- [1] RESUMÉ OF PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT THE COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE
ATTACK AT PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941

UNITED STATES NEWSPAPERS

I. Personnel

The President's choice of personnel is much the most popular subject in editorial discussion of the investigating commission. 107 out of the 236 clippings, dated from December 16 to December 28, refer to the appointments. Of these, an overwhelming majority, 104, approve unconditionally.

Two of the three exceptions do not in fact disapprove. The first, an editorial in the *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941, feels that, even though Justice Roberts' appointment may be justified by the emergency, it violates the sanctity of the court. The second, an editorial in the *Daily News*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941, suggests additional members for the board. Only the *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyoming, December 27, 1941, expresses an openly derogatory opinion of associate Justice Roberts' appointment. These three editorials are quoted after typical examples from approving editorial comment.

[2] "There was general satisfaction with the composition of the board, not only in the War and Navy Departments, which helped select personnel, but in Congress."—Lyle C. Wilson, Staff correspondent *Times-Herald*, Wash., D. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The personnel of the board appointed by the President to investigate what happened at Pearl Harbor could not be improved upon. At its head is a justice of the Supreme Court. Its other members include only such men who, trained in the profession of arms, are equipped to understand the military problems posed by the treacherous surprise attack. This understanding has seemed to us a vitally important feature of any inquiry into the 'setback', both for the sake of the public's perspective and for that of the morale of our fighting forces" Editorial, *Herald Tribune*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"Headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, the Board has won unanimous approval in diplomatic, congressional, and service circles, which sees its membership as assurance against any perfunctory 'white wash' ".—Joseph C. Harrison, Staff correspondent, *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 17, 1941.

[3] "The President owes it to the country to see that the promised investigation is of the most thorough going sort, and the personnel of the board named practically insures this."—Editorial, *Recorder and Democrat*, Amsterdam, N. Y., Dec. 17, 1941.

"President Roosevelt's designation of a non-military man to be chairman of the investigating group was believed part of an intention to get all the facts from a civilian as well as a military point of view."—News item, *Herald Tribune*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"A Philadelphia lawyer, who as a Republican helped to jail the thieves who stole America's oil from the Elk Hills naval reserve in California during the administration of Warren Harding, is going to Hawaii in a few days to find why it was that the United States Navy took the worst naval beating of the war on December 7th.

"The man is Owen Josephus Roberts, now an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He wears a derby, carries a cane, looks tough, and defers to his wife, a Connecticut Yankee.

[4] "He was chosen to head the board of inquiry which is to examine the reasons why the United States army and navy failed at Hawaii in order to illustrate the political solidarity of the United States to the world and to the American people.

"Never before has any President ever chosen any Supreme Court justice for any such assignment."—Richard Rendell, Staff correspondent, *Times*, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The five-man board appointed by President Roosevelt to find out why the Army and Navy at Hawaii were not on the alert against the surprise attack can be depended upon to consider the question calmly, carefully, expertly and with a sense of responsibility to the country and the future efficiency of the armed services. Justice Roberts, who has familiarity with the Pearl Harbor defenses, enters the inquiry with obvious impartiality except to the national interest, and the military and naval men, three of them retired, who will serve with him are of a caliber which insures that no mistaken sense of loyalty to their branches of the service will affect their judgment and their decision. So the verdict, in all circumstances, can be awaited with confidence."—Editorial, *Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Ky., Dec. 18, 1941.

[5] "Appointment of Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, of the United States Supreme Court, as head of the board is especially noteworthy from the public viewpoint. If this important inquiry showed signs of paralysis because of emphasis on military detail or because of military rivalries and prejudices, Justice Roberts, by virtue of his judicial training and his demonstrated appreciation of the public welfare, would be equipped to revitalize it and furnish impetus for a constructive conclusion."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, who has been granted special leave from the Supreme Court to head the board, is a man who combines a prosecutor's ability with a judicial temperament. His presence at the head of the board assures a thorough and painstaking investigation of the disaster—neither a 'white wash' nor a persecution."—Editorial, *Enquirer*, Cincinnati, O., Dec. 18, 1941.

"From the viewpoint of public confidence, the appointment of Justice Roberts to head the board of inquiry into the Pearl Harbor debacle is perfect. The board contains otherwise technical [6] men of the army and navy. They will be useful and important as judges from their points of view. The disinterested judgment on which the nation will depend will be that of Justice Roberts. His appointment ends any suspicion that a whitewash may be contemplated."—Editorial, *News*, Miami, Fla., Dec. 19, 1941.

"Of one thing we may be sure, and that is that the inquiry which is to be conducted by Justice Roberts will be both penetrating and fair. Its judicial nature is assured by its presiding officer. The presence on it of experienced officers, guarantees that neither the technical aspects nor the interest of the armed forces will be slighted."—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

"The board of inquiry set up by President Roosevelt to look into the lack of alertness at Hawaii would in peace times be called brilliant. Since the task assigned it is grim and unpleasant, we prefer to call it completely competent. The nation may have perfect confidence that the judgment it renders will be just, without whitewash.

"It is headed by Justice Roberts of the Supreme Court, [7] the only civilian member, who is best remembered for his extraordinary work in investigating Teapot Dome. Justice Roberts, a Republican, was appointed by President Hoover. He owes nothing to the present administration.

"Senior among the military members is General McCoy, whose skill as a soldier and a diplomat probably has given him a standing unequalled in our time by any military man. He is familiar with the Pacific, was General Wood's aide, then President Theodore Roosevelt's, then President Taft's. Not only his own service, but his attachment to those three men familiarized him with Pacific and Far East problems.

"The navy is represented by Admirals Standley and Reeves, men with high records of service, and each retired prior to the succession of Mr. Knox to the navy secretaryship. The only active officer on the board is Brig. Gen. McNarney of the Air Corps, called on to provide the board the technical background of air tactics."—Editorial, *Star*, Rockford, Ill., December 20, 1941.

Variations from Pattern:

"There is this criticism to be made of the board we think: It contains only one air fighting man, Gen. McNarney, [8] Gen. McCoy and Admirals Standley and Reeves are old time land and sea fighters respectively—fine fighters in their time, but times have changed."

"Doesn't this board need heavier representation from the air fighting element of the armed services? We think it does."—Editorial, *News*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941.

"The appointment of Justice Roberts of the United States Supreme Court as chairman of the board investigating the surprise of the army and navy by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor was certain to meet criticism on the ground that the sanctity of the court is violated when any of its members are called upon to perform other duties than those of the court itself. * * * But if there are to be any exceptions, the present emergency seems to offer justification."—Editorial, *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., December 23, 1941.

"President Roosevelt indulged in unconscious irony when he named Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts as head of the board to investigate army-navy delinquency at Pearl Harbor.

[9] "Sixteen years ago, as special prosecutor for the government in the Teapot Dome and Elk Hills cases, Mr. Roberts tried to send the late Edward L. Doheny to jail. Doheny put up the defense that he had built oil tanks and reservoirs at Pearl Harbor at the request of the Navy, which had persuaded the sentimental oil man that the United States was about to be attacked by Japan at any moment. Doheny's case, in short, was the 'yellow peril'. In fact, he summoned numerous naval officers to testify that then (1926) the United States was expecting an assault from Japan almost any day.

"Justice Roberts ridiculed the 'yellow peril' defense in the courtroom. He laughed at suggestions that Japan would ever dare to attack Hawaii, let alone the mainland. Mr. Roberts scoffed at the Doheny argument, which was based on the assumption that someday there would be a major war between Japan and the United States. Today Mr. Roberts is learning, perhaps, that he was all wrong 16 years ago, and that in this instance, the oil promoter was right."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., December 27, 1941.

[10] II. Duties and Powers of the Commission

The most original and varied comments on the investigation are those addressed to the subject of duties and powers. Editorial opinion falls into three groups, (a) outlining the purpose of the commission, (b) outlining the area of the investigation, and (c) suggesting a method of procedure for the commission.

The 37 clippings which refer to the purpose of the commission see it (1) as a fact finding board (10 clippings); (2) as an agency for fixing responsibility for the disaster (17 clippings); or (3) as an instrument of punishment in the trial of the commanders who were at Hawaii on December 7th (7 clippings).

17 of the 25 clippings which discuss the area of the investigation, are concerned with specific details of the attack at Pearl Harbor. The other 8 imply that the board's investigation should also be turned on higher authorities in Washington who were indirectly responsible for the lack of alertness.

Only 3 clippings discuss the method of procedure which the board should follow. One suggests that what happened after the attack as well as what happened before it should be examined. The second advises that the board be given all the powers of a court martial in admitting oaths, etc. The third warns the investigators [11] against interfering with the progress of the war.

The total number of clippings concerned with duties and powers is 67—considerably fewer than the number which discussed personnel.

A. *Purpose*.—37 clippings discuss the purpose of the committee's investigations. These divide into three main subsections: (1) those that see the committee solely as a *factfinding agency*, (2) those that see it as an agency for fixing the responsibility, and (3) those that see it as an agency for collecting evidence leading to the punishment of those judged guilty of laxity.

(1) *Board as factfinding agency*.—10 clippings.

"The legitimate purpose of this inquiry cannot be vindictive. The general public is not in a sadistic mood toward responsible military officials because of the Pearl Harbor defeat. Thoughtful citizens regard this inquiry board as an instrument for prevention of mistakes in the future like those apparently made in the Pearl Harbor defense system. This, of course, means that any appearance of 'whitewashing' would cause the public to lose confidence in the board and possibly in our military establishment."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., December 18, 1941.

[12] "This board will understand, and the people will agree with them, that the most important thing now is not to 'break' some high officer in the army or navy, though this may be one result of the probe, but the important thing is to find out exactly what happened, and why, to the end that it shall not happen again.

"Not primarily revenge, though those who were negligent should be made to pay for their negligence, is the objective of the presidential board but to discover ways to make sure that whatever the weakness was it shall be immediately cured."—Editorial, *Post*, Houston, Texas, December 18, 1941.

"Finding should be determined judicially, dispassionately, expertly with all the facts at hand. They should have a value in outlining further military strategy; be a defense aid of the future."—Editorial, *Herald*, Miami, Fla., December 18, 1941.

"Mr. Justice Roberts and his associates are not going to Hawaii to hold a court-martial; they are seeking facts."—Editorial, *Times*, Chattanooga, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

[13] "Courts of investigation or inquiry are regularly held by the Navy Department after each disaster, such as the loss of a submarine or the grounding of a ship in peacetime. Some courts are in no sense court-martials but are rather like grand juries. They merely study and present the facts brought out by the testimony. Of course, the data they uncover may later be used for court-martial, but unless specifically ordered they do not make recommendations."—Editorial, *Journal*, Dayton, Ohio, December 22, 1941.

(2) *Board as responsibility fixing agency.*—18 clippings.

"The board of inquiry, which has no punitive powers, can be likened to an investigating grand jury. It could exonerate all officers concerned in the Pearl Harbor attacks from negligence charges, or it could turn in a report recommending official reprimands or court-martial trials for certain officers."—Headley Donovan, Staff Writer, *Post*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

"The public wants no scapegoats. It does expect that blame will be fixed, if any exists, no matter how high in scale of leadership and direction it runs. The purpose is not vindictiveness, but to eliminate incompetence from the service and replace it with competence for the future."—Editorial, *Pioneer Press*, St. Paul, Minn., December 18, 1941.

[14] "The Presidential Board of Inquiry will weigh those facts and others to determine full responsibility for the near-calamity of December 7 * * *.

"This board is a blame-fixing board. Something happened which ought not to have happened, and responsibility for it is to be placed, if possible, upon certain individuals who failed, by reason of character, capacity or what-not, to meet the demands of the situation, before or after the fact."—Editorial, *Ledger*, Phila. Pa., December 18, 1941.

"The job that remains for the investigating committee is to lay the blame where it belongs and to remove suspicion from those who do not deserve it."—Editorial, *Call*, Allentown, Pa., December 18, 1941.

"The primary objective of the five-man board created by President Roosevelt to investigate why United States armed forces were not on the alert at Pearl Harbor should be the discovery of possible inefficiency among those in charge of defenses at the Hawaiian army and naval base.

"There should be no persecution or 'witch hunts'."—Editorial, *Register*, Mobile, Ala., December 18, 1941.

[15] "This is far from saying that a full investigation of the incident, with a direct indication of where the responsibility rests for the damage wrought, is not essential. Secretary Knox has said that 'the United States services were not on the alert against the surprise attack on Hawaii.' Though the American public to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, equally deceived by the diplomatic gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, it is imperative that they know who was asleep at the switch and why. For, whatever our national naivete respecting codes of honor in warfare, those in charge of our defense should have been prepared even for this abysmal display of trickery."—Editorial, *Dispatch-Herald*, Erie, Pa., December 18, 1941.

"The subject is being thoroughly explored by the joint board of inquiry, headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, which has been assigned the task of ascertaining the blame for the Pearl Harbor tragedy."—Editorial, *Times Herald*, Washington, D. C., December 19, 1941.

"It should be kept in mind that this investigation of the surprise at Pearl Harbor, with a view to 'fixing responsibility,' has its major importance not from the standpoint of punishing anybody but rather from the standpoint of finding out where all the faults appeared, so that lessons of them all may be learned and so that those or others like them will not occur again."—Editorial, *Register*, Des Moines, Iowa, December 19, 1941.

"We believe we may look to this board of inquiry to provide an unprejudiced, a complete and a politically fearless account of the Pearl Harbor disaster and that we may accept the verdict as to responsibility for history."—Editorial, *Star*, Rockford, Ill. December 20, 1941.

(3) *Board as an instrument of punishment.* 7 clippings.

"The investigation ordered by the President is called for and if grievous misjudgment is proved, it should be penalized."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn., December 16, 1941.

"The country, sorrowing for its dead, will look to the President's investigating board to place the responsibility for these derelictions, and to take proper disciplinary measures."—Editorial, *Vindicator*, Youngstown, Ohio. December 16, 1941.

[17] "The investigation which has been ordered shall place definite responsibility for that laxity. There should be no glossing over of weaknesses and errors. American morale will be aided and our fighting forces made more effective if the unpleasant truths are bared and stern punitive action taken, regardless of the rank affected."—Editorial, *Post*, Butte, Mont. December 16, 1941.

"It is to be presumed that the man or men found to be responsible for our fatal lack of alertness will be removed from command and that punishment will fit the crime—and inattentiveness, inefficiency and incompetence become crimes in time of war.

"The demand for swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness. The compulsion for discovering any guilty leaders springs largely from the principle of self-preservation, which requires that competent men be elevated and incompetent men be removed as the elemental condition of victory."—Editorial, *Star-Times*, St. Louis, Mo. December 17, 1941.

"The investigation mentioned by the Secretary is in progress. It is customary following any Navy or Army disaster. What it may reveal cannot be predicted. If there was carelessness, inattention to duty, culpable neglect, we may rest assured that it will be dis- [18] covered and properly exposed and punished."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Tampa, Fla. December 17, 1941.

"It appears that somebody was asleep at the switch in Hawaii. That is a military crime. In some more militaristic countries than ours, high officers have been shot for less * * *

"We doubt that anybody will be shot for negligence at Pearl Harbor. But anybody who may be found guilty should be given no second chance. He or they should be retired immediately from the armed services, and without public sympathy or any kind words in extenuation."—Editorial, *News*, N. Y. C. December 18, 1941.

"The only investigation of Pearl Harbor that will do the slightest bit of good now is to expose pitilessly the elements of failure in such a way that those same elements will never again contribute to another failure. Scapegoats for past defeats win no future victories."—Editorial, *News*, Beloit, Wisc. December 20, 1941.

[19] "The board of inquiry headed by Justice Roberts will, it is hoped, unearth the full story of Pearl Harbor so that adequate measures may be taken to place the blame and punishment, no matter how high the ramifications may reach. Anything less will not satisfy the people."—Editorial, *News-Tribune*, Rome, Ga., December 21, 1941.

B. Area of Investigation.—The 25 clippings which discuss the actual area of investigation fall into two classes: 1) 17 suggest what specific aspects of the disaster should be examined at Pearl Harbor and 2) 8 imply that the investigation should include also the higher authorities in Washington.

1. *The aspects of the disaster to be examined at Pearl Harbor*—"The President is appointing a special investigating board, and it will seek the harsh truth to these vital questions:

(a) Was there dereliction of duty prior to the attack?

(b) Was there error of military judgment which contributed to the surprise?

(c) Why was the Japanese 'fifth-column' espionage so successful in Hawaii, as Secretary Knox reports?"—Joseph G. Harrison, Staff correspondent, *Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 16, 1941.

[20] "The investigation will disclose facts which are not set out in Secretary Knox's report. Just what was the nature of the deadly fifth-column activities? Why was the dawn patrol ineffective? How are we to account for the absence of a night patrol? By what wily means were the Japanese able to get their

submarines and aircraft carriers to the scene? Why the disparity between the dead and the injured, the former totaling 2729 and the latter 656, a sharp reversal of the usual experience?"—Editorial, *Herald*, Boston, Mass. December 16, 1941.

"Among the matters which the board is expected to investigate is whether warships were manned at the time of the attack and Army aviators were near their stations, whether mechanical devices capable of detecting approaching airplanes were in operation, how many anti-aircraft guns went into action when the Japanese planes appeared and whether naval vessels were equipped with anti-aircraft sighting devices.—News item, *N. Y. Times*, N. Y. C. December 17, 1941.

"In addition to its task of fixing direct responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, the board may be expected to follow through on the implications of two other statements by Secretary Knox: [21] First, that the attack came from several Japanese aircraft carriers, and second, that it was facilitated by fifth column work on a scale comparable to that in Norway. Why, the board must ask, and the American people will want to know, were these carriers not spotted by the regular naval aircraft patrol? And how was it possible for the Japanese to know every detail of the disposition of the ships at Pearl Harbor by the aid of fifth columnists in the islands? One would think that somewhere in the vast ramification of fifth column activity which must have preceded the attack, some inkling would have been discovered by the Army and Navy intelligence services or the civil and military authorities of the islands."—Editorial, *News*, Buffalo, N. Y. December 17, 1941.

"Yet something was wrong somewhere, and it is the government's purpose now to ascertain what precautions were lacking, to what extent fifth columnist activity contributed to Japanese timing and accuracy, and wherein the episode displayed basic weaknesses of defense."—Editorial, *Gazette*, Worcester, Mass. December 17, 1941.

[22] "The board must determine how far into American life the fifth column might have bored and also whether some of our high officers are capable of discharging their duties."—Editorial, *Plain Dealer*, Cleveland, Ohio. December 18, 1941.

"The task of the board of inquiry will be to determine whether there was any negligence on the part of Army, Navy or Air Corps officers that contributed to undue loss of life or damage of property."—Editorial, *Union*, Manchester, N. H. December 18, 1941.

"The inquiry should disclose wherein military laxity permitted a surprise attack and whether that situation involved any derelictions of duty. It should determine whether satisfactory measures have been taken to guard against a new attack. Finally, it should delve into reports of extensive fifth column activity in Hawaii and if the potentialities of that activity require special measures for the protection of mainland defense establishments."—Editorial, *Citizen*, Asheville, N. C. December 18, 1941.

"The presidential commission may be relied upon to discover whether or not the failure of the forces to be on the alert was the [23] result of misjudgment, of dereliction, or conceivably, of a diplomatic policy of avoiding offense to Japan until every possibility of a peaceful settlement had been exhausted."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn. December 18, 1941.

"The board of inquiry appointed by President Roosevelt will determine whether the Pearl Harbor attack was made possible by general incompetency of the commanding officers, a temporary relaxation of vigilance, or a chain of circumstances beyond the control of the officials in charge."—Editorial, *Gazette*, Reno, Nevada. December 18, 1941.

"It should be remembered that the inquiry must determine not only whether these commanders were fulfilling their duty, but whether they had equipment necessary to fulfill that duty."—Editorial, *Times*, Shreveport, La. December 19, 1941.

"The Presidential board that is now investigating the tragedy must attempt to determine how and why Japanese forces were able to make a surprise attack upon the fortress island of Oahu after apparently penetrating far-flung naval scouting lines and close-in reconnaissance by Army planes.

[24] "Certainly, the great loss of ships, planes and lives was largely due not to the fact that the surprise attack was accomplished but that we were not prepared for the attack at all. The following mistakes seem to have been made:

1. Our fighting services, particularly the Navy, definitely under-estimated Japan and were over-confident to the point of complacency, an attitude that was only a

reflection of the national psychology. In manoeuvres and war studies we had frequently reckoned with the possibility of a Japanese attack upon Midway and had deemed as quite practical carrier-based air attacks upon Japan—similar to the one launched by the Japanese upon Pearl Harbor. We had always contemplated the possibility, indeed the probability, that war with Japan would start by a surprise attack without benefit of a declaration, and we had Port Arthur, in the Russo-Japanese war, as a foreboding precedent. Yet we apparently felt so secure behind the barriers of distance that such an attack on Oahu was scarcely considered.

2. There was no unity of command in Hawaii. The admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet had headquarters both afloat and ashore, but his responsibility was the fleet. The admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District (Hawaii) had headquarters at Pearl Harbor, but his responsibility was Pearl Harbor and naval installations ashore in the Hawaiian Islands. The Army's air fields and fortifications were under command of the general commanding the Hawaiian Department. The board investigating the Pearl [25] Harbor tragedy will undoubtedly endeavor to ascertain whether there was adequate coordination or liaison between the commanders.

3. The Navy concentrated too many ships at Pearl Harbor at a time of tension.

4. Apparently the ships in port were not protected by torpedo nets.

5. Apparently much of our gasoline and oil storage in the islands was not underground, or at least was not sufficiently protected.

6. Our Army and Navy planes on Oahu were jammed together in small areas—the Army's principally at Hickam and Wheeler fields; the Navy's principally at Ford Island in the middle of Pearl Harbor.

"The full study of these and many other factors will undoubtedly be made by the competent investigating board."—Hanson W. Baldwin, Columnist, *N. Y. Times*, N. Y. C., December 21, 1941.

2. *Implications that the investigation should include the higher authorities in Washington*—"Our forces would have defended themselves more effectively had they been expecting an attack. But behind their lack of such knowledge was a native State Department totally and blindly unaware of Japan's true intentions."—Editorial, *Advertiser*, Montgomery, Ala., December 16, 1941.

[26] "It ought to be readily established whether or not the responsible Army and Navy officers in Hawaii were adequately informed, by Washington, of the imminence of danger of attack. If they had been given such information as to point to the imperative need for being on guard, then culpable negligence would be indicated. Were they less accurately advised by Washington, their responsibility would be less direct."—Editorial, *Sun*, Williamsport, Pa., December 17, 1941.

"Whether the apparent laxity was entirely confined to Pearl Harbor or whether it reflects defective policy on the part of the high command in Washington is a matter that ought to be settled conclusively by this formal inquiry."—Editorial, *Tribune*, South Bend, Ind., December 18, 1941.

"The President's inquiry . . . will show whether the disaster at Pearl Harbor can be blamed upon unpreparedness at Hawaii or whether Washington ought to assume some of the responsibility."—Editorial, *Sun*, N. Y. C., December 18, 1941.

"In one respect the board appointed by the President is [27] inadequate for the job the nation expects. It can investigate in Hawaii but not in Washington. It can hardly be expected that a board appointed by the executive can investigate the departments of the executive government, particularly when a majority of its members are under the orders of these departments. Only the legislative branch of the government can do that with either propriety or success."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Chicago, Ill., December 18, 1941.

"The people at home demand a complete investigation, without making a 'goat' of any officer, or the 'whitewashing' of any man whose negligence or incompetency contributed to the loss of American lives, ships and planes. If the lack of alertness extended to the 'higher ups' in War and Navy Departments let the heads fall where found."—Editorial *Capital*, Topeka, Kansas, December 19, 1941.

"The responsibility is really pervasive; it involves our Navy department, our War department, our whole 'administration', indeed our whole nation. Bad as it now seems, we, including our experts, just didn't think the Japanese would attack without warning (though we should have), and in particular we didn't

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think they would attack with such aggressive boldness as Hawaii, so far away. The real blame must be diffused."—Editorial, *Register*, Des Moines, Iowa, December 19, 1941.

[28] "The investigation committee named by President Roosevelt probably will look beyond the conduct of the officers who were upon the scene. Certainly this should be the case."—Editorial, *Times*, Gadsden, Ala., December 21, 1941.

"Possibly the Board of Inquiry . . . will lay the blame, or some of it, a good deal nearer than Honolulu. . . . A government engaged in negotiations with a country governed by a group of semi-civilized magnates should not neglect to warn its officers at an island outpost to be on the alert."—Editorial, *Times*, Louisville, Ky., December 22, 1941.

C. Method of Procedure.—

Only 3 clippings had suggestions for the actual procedure which the board should follow; all were brief.

"The board of inquiry will have to proceed under fire, so to speak, and its findings examined against the background of what happened after as well as before the surprise attack."—Editorial, *Herald*, Durham, N. C., December 17, 1941.

"The board will have full powers, we trust, to admit oaths and to require the attendance of witnesses, precisely as a naval board of inquiry or a naval court-martial would."—Editorial, *News-Leader*, Richmond, Va., December 17, 1941.

[29] "It is essential that any probe of what happened at Pearl Harbor be conducted in such a way as not to interfere with the conduct of the war, or effect the morale of other army and navy officials."—Editorial, *Enquirer*, Cincinnati, Ohio, December 18, 1941.

[30] III. Probable Findings of the Commission

There is little speculation on the probable findings of the investigating board. Of the 236 clippings which refer to the investigation, only six voice any ideas as to its results, and these suggest a wide range of possibilities.

"Perhaps an official investigation is in order to determine why the armed services were not on the alert against the surprise air attack. Perhaps such an investigation isn't in order. If one is made, then also there should be an investigation as to why the Japanese were able to establish such an effective fifth column in Hawaii. The activities of the subversives which made up that column are likely more responsible for the ability of the Japanese to launch this unexpected attack than any other thing."—Editorial, *Arizona Republic*, Phoenix, Ariz., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Aside from any laxity involved, there is also a question whether the report may not show that there were insufficient numbers of ships, planes, listening devices, scouting or patrol vessels, etc., and that these deficiencies were the result of shipment of large numbers of planes, particularly, and other defensive weapons, to other nations under lease-lend. That, of [31] course, is always a possibility. The probability seems to be, however, that the facilities at hand were simply not manned at the time of the attack."—Editorial, *Day*, New London, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Probably that investigation will blast the naval careers of not a few of our officers, perhaps some in high places."—Editorial, *Herald*, Grand Rapids, Mich., Dec. 18, 1941.

"While members of Congress have no desire to anticipate the findings and conclusions of the board named to investigate Japan's original attack on Hawaii, they are convinced that the basic answer will be 'too few planes'."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., Dec. 23, 1941.

"A correspondent thinks that 'our danger lies within' and that the conservative military mind is more dangerous than fifth columnists."—Editorial, *Post*, Milwaukee, Wisc., Dec. 24, 1941.

"Washington advises report that the Roberts' board of inquiry left Washington with a distinct prejudice against the [32] Hawaiian air, land and naval commanders, who were not alert when the Japs attacked on December 7th. The investigators' perusal of confidential reports convinced them that our Pearl Harbor defenders should be court-martialed."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Cheyenne, Wyo., Dec. 27, 1941.

[33] IV. Request that American Public Suspend Judgment

34 editorials, dated December 16th to December 25th, warn the public against making judgments on the Pearl Harbor disaster until the investigating committee has had a chance to report. These warnings are very brief and almost identical in wording. For that reason, only a few typical statements have been quoted.

"Pending results of the investigation, speculation on the subject does no good and perhaps is injurious."—Editorial, *Press Telegram*, Long Beach, Calif., Dec. 16, 1941.

"The American people should not be prematurely harsh in their opinion, and we do not believe many of them have been. . . . If some cherished the delusion that peace was possible longer than others, the fact remains that all are awake now and facing a task so hard and terribly urgent that it leaves no time for blaming one another . . . But the assurance now exists that exact justice will be meted out, and this assurance gives no room for self-righteous recriminations based on hindsight."—Editorial, *Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Ky., Dec. 18, 1941.

[34] "Both the President and Secretary Knox chose to await the results of a reliable inquiry board before attempting to allocate responsibility. The public cannot with justice do less."—Editorial, *Union*, Manchester, N. H., Dec. 18, 1941.

"It remains to be seen what the findings of the board will be, and until they are made public it would be well to suspend judgment of the individuals who have been relieved of their command." Editorial, *Evening Star*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Until its (the board's) findings are made known, it is well, we think, to suspend any personal judgment and to avoid sweeping allegations of any kind going beyond Secretary Knox's declaration."—Editorial, *Age-Herald*, Birmingham, Ala., Dec. 19, 1941.

"Until all the facts are known it is the duty of every one to withhold judgment, confident that the commission the President has appointed will delve deeply, fearlessly and fairly, not alone to fix the blame but to make certain that whatever blunders cost us so dearly at Pearl Harbor will not be repeated."—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., Dec. 19, 1941.

[35] "Let the rest of us spend our energies fighting the war, not denouncing those actively at the front. Such denunciations are meat for the Axis propaganda sausage machines."—Editorial, *Journal-Transcript*, Peoria, Ill., Dec. 22, 1941.

[36] V. The Commission as an Alternative to a Congressional Investigation

Editorial opinion is unanimous in expressing relief that a congressional investigation has been called off, with the exception of one clipping from the Chicago Tribune, dated December 18, 1941. (See page 27.) The reasons given by the 25 clippings which deal with the subject are as follows:

(a) A congressional investigation would waste time and money since the President has already appointed a highly competent investigating commission.

(b) It would make secrecy in handling evidence impossible.

(c) It might be monopolized by publicity-seeking congressmen.

(d) It concerns a matter which, by rights, should be handled by the President.

"Congress, though impatient as we all are to know the truth, would do well to refrain from investigating on its own hook until the board set up by the President has had time to finish its labors and report. No good and but much confusion will result from having two simultaneous and independent investigations of the same matter. Moreover, ample experience proves that it is all but impossible for a Congressional committee to keep a secret—numbers make for leaks—and it is therefore certain that there are many details which responsible officers could reveal to a military court that they would be unwilling to confide to less sternly disciplined ears. For the present, at least, the conduct of the

[37] war is an executive function which can best be exercised by the Executive Department. Legislative inquiries may later become advisable, but right now it would be better for everybody to keep out from under the feet of those who must do the main job and do it in a hurry."—Editorial, *Sun*, New York City, Dec. 17, 1941.

"The Senate seems determined to investigate in parallel manner the Pearl Harbor affair, along with the investigation by the President.

"The investigation should be left with the President at this time, we believe.

"This is no hour for an airing of opposite views.

"It is a waste of time. . . .

"Senator Johnson of Colorado aptly said, when the matter of the investigation came up, that it should be left wholly to the President.

"In this we cannot help but agree. The country has confidence in the leadership of the President. He is our wartime chieftain.

"The investigation, carried on by the Senate, may well be of comfort to our enemies. No such hint of disunity should be allowed to exist."—Editorial, *Post*, Boston, Mass., Dec. 17, 1941.

[38] "What is not needed?

"The House Committee on Naval Affairs is reported to have under consideration an investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack to parallel the investigation to be made by President Roosevelt. In the Senate, Senator Vandenberg has already proposed broader action in the form of a suggestion for establishment of a committee similar to the 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' which functioned during the Civil War.

"The sort of thing is definitely not needed. Congress has important functions to perform and Congressional investigations of executive actions play an important part in the performance of these functions. But investigation of executive actions after the event is one thing and attempted Congressional supervision of executive action during the event is entirely a different thing.

"The 'Committee on the Conduct of the War' during the Civil War reflected no credit on Congress during that time. Nothing of that kind is wanted or needed now. Discipline of those responsible for admitted inefficiency at Pearl Harbor is clearly an executive function. Congressional investigation in anticipation of that action could only muddy the waters.

"This war cannot be operated successfully from the floors of the House and the Senate. Any efforts on the part of any members [39] of Congress to attempt anything of that sort should be nipped in the bud. We are not only fighting a war in which we need unity behind leadership at home. Also we are fighting it in a world in which dictators are waiting and listening for just such division and bickering in democratic government as that which this Vandenberg proposal would inevitably create.

"There will be little support in the country for this proposal in Congress. Indeed, it seems safe to predict that there will be little support for it in Congress itself."—Editorial, *News & Observer*, Raleigh, N. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"In Congress where there had been a minor and quickly squelched movement for an independent investigation, the purpose now is to delay any congressional inquiry at least until after the executive inquiry is completed."—U. P., *News*, Washington, D. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Since the board is composed of able and distinguished men, this prompt move toward inquiry will postpone Congressional investigation and perhaps sidetrack it altogether. The latter would probably take months, and feature a lot of extraneous debate, [40] and arrive at no more satisfactory conclusion than the President's board can reach in a fortnight."—Editorial, *Telegraph Herald*, Dubuque, Iowa, Dec. 18, 1941.

"It may not, of course, be the only investigation; for a disturbed Congress wants to get its investigatory grip on this issue and it may do so yet. But at least the character and qualifications of the President's board pushes aside any questions that the lack of alertness in Hawaii will be whitewashed or, on the other hand, that it will become now the subject of a political fishing expedition by Congressmen on the make."—Editorial, *Virginia-Pilot*, Norfolk, Virginia, Dec. 18, 1941.

"One can be doubly thankful that the inquiry was not entrusted to the tender mercies of a congressional committee. There are men on Capitol Hill who are only too eager to launch investigations on the familiar witch-hunting pattern. But this is not a time for promoting partisan politics or personal publicity. The public interest will be far better served by the type of inquiry which the President has instituted."—Editorial, *News*, Wilmington, Del., Dec. 18, 1941.

[41] "Congress has abandoned plans for separate legislative investigations in lieu of this official inquiry. This move is to be commended. Many revelations of the Pearl Harbor attack may produce military details valuable to the enemy. A board of experts is much better equipped to ferret out the real truth, assign the blame and maintain the necessary discipline regarding confidential disclosures. This task calls for experienced hands unhampered by partisan or political considerations."—Editorial, *Citizen*, Asheville, N. C., Dec. 18, 1941.

"In large measure the speed may be for the purpose of side-tracking a full-dress congressional inquiry into the situation. But if that is the case, the effect still can be gratifying. It can give the Congress reason to believe that it will not have to threaten an investigation every time it looks as if serious lapses have occurred, that it can depend on the high command to take stern action and take it quickly."—Editorial, *Register*, New Haven, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"In view of the character and intentions of the presidential board it seems hardly necessary for the House of Representatives to interfere with an investigation of its own. Such an [42] investigation would only make the job

of the executive more difficult and would result in more people knowing the details of the Pearl Harbor attack than is advisable for the security of the nation and its Pacific defenses. And generally speaking, the less interference by Congress in army and navy affairs, the better will the two forces be able to perform their jobs."—Editorial, *Register*, Mobile, Ala., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Here is a clear signal to Congress that for the time being at least it should keep its hands off. One notes that in each chamber certain elements, distinguished by their isolationist members, are itching to launch simultaneous inquiries of their own to serve as sounding boards for critics whose indignation over the setback at Hawaii is only matched by their previous obstruction of the whole defense effort. Happily the Senate leaders seem agreed that the President's investigation should forestall any similar action in their chamber. In the House, meanwhile, the pressure to set up a parallel investigation is still a threat. May we say to our Representatives that the less they attempt to run this war the closer will come victory?"—Editorial, *Herald Tribune*, N. Y. C. Dec. 17, 1941.

The same printed as an editorial in the *Dispatch-Herald*, Erie, Pennsylvania, December 18, 1941.

[43] "The worst thing that could happen, apart from the incident itself, would be to have it bandied about in a congressional investigation where speeches and smears would inevitably rear their heads and the quest for the truth would eventually be bogged down in a mass of oratory that completely obscured the issue."—Editorial, *Sun-Democrat*, Paducah, Ky., Dec. 19, 1941.

[44] VI. Need for Speed

Twenty-eight clippings mention the need for speed in dealing with the Pearl Harbor episode. In some cases comment is confined to an approving statement that "the President acted swiftly". Others go into more lengthily discourses on the need for conducting the investigation with dispatch in order not to minimize the value of the lesson to be learned. Interest in this subject ranged from the 16th to the 20th after which it was dropped completely.

"Acting with commendable promptness the government announces that a joint army-navy board will investigate the surprise 'stab-in-the-back' delivered by the Japanese against Pearl Harbor . . .

"Already both President Roosevelt and Secretary Knox have set an example for the investigation board in the swiftness with which they have acted. They realize that a long-drawn-out or delayed inquiry will minimize the value of the lesson to be learned."—Editorial, *Journal*, Dayton, Ohio, Dec. 17, 1941.

"There is reason for quick action, too, in determination of the whole truth. We have a very tough chore ahead and [45] every delay only makes it tougher."—Editorial, *Monitor*, Concord, N. H., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The whole proceedings were given further quickening by the investigation order of President Roosevelt, whose determination to get to the bottom of it and let the chips fall where they may, was enthusiastically received by the people."—Editorial, *Tribune*, LaCrosse, Wis., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The president has acted quickly on the report of Secretary of Navy Knox and the board of inquiry must make quick and full investigation . . .

"We want no whitewashing, no procrastination."—Editorial, *Journal-Times*, Racine, Wis., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The demand for swift investigation does not arise from vindictiveness . . .

"There is also the fact that, so long as it is suspected that the navy harbors incompetent admirals, the entire top group of officers is under a cloud of opprobrium and distrust. For this reason, it is probably a matter of utmost urgency to able [46] officers themselves that responsibility for Pearl Harbor be fixed as speedily as possible."—Editorial, *Star-Times*, St. Louis, Mo., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The President has acted with commendable promptness in appointing a five-man board to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor on Sunday, December 7th. Anything less than an immediate, thorough-going inquiry would have laid the Chief Executive, as well as the Naval and Military authorities in Hawaii, open to the severest criticism."—Editorial, *Record*, Troy, N. Y., Dec. 18, 1941.

"There is a healthy appearance here of some fast action . . .

"At any rate the evidence to date of speedy and impartial inquiry into the facts and of remedial action no doubt will react well on the population as a whole."—Editorial, *Register*, New Haven, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"The investigators, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, will have the confidence of the country and it is to be hoped that there will be no unnecessary

delay in performing [47] the task and making a full report to the country."—Editorial, *Journal*, Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

"A board of inquiry, headed by Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, is on its way to the islands where all the facts will be developed as rapidly as justice and fairness will permit."—Editorial, *Telegraph*, Macon, Ga., Dec. 20, 1941.

[48] VII. *Demotion of Commanders*

Editorial opinion is unanimous in approving the demotion of the commanders. Interest in this subject appears only on the 18th and 19th when 49 clippings discuss it.

In some cases, these statements do not bear directly upon the investigation, but they do indicate the extent to which the two are related in the minds of the public.

In general, the clippings fall into the following classes:

(A) 25 accept Secretary Stimson's statement that it was necessary to relieve the commanders of their responsibilities while they were involved in an investigation.

(B) 12 feel that it was wise to remove the commanders, guilty or not, in order to restore the public's confidence, and to show that both our government and our armed forces are ready for decisive action.

(C) 11 feel that Knox's report gives sufficient evidence to prove the commanders guilty, and to justify their immediate demotion.

(D) 1 feels that the demotion of the commanders was unavoidable but regrets the humiliation involved.

A. Acceptance of Secretary Stimson's Reasons for Removing the Commanders.—"As the inquiry starts, the Army and Navy have relieved of their posts the high military and naval officers in command of Hawaiian defenses at the time of the attack. Regardless of whether these men were guilty of negligence or are wholly innocent, this was the wisest thing to do. It would have been poor policy to leave [49] the responsibilities of command to officers facing the rigors and distractions of a formal investigation."—Editorial, *News*, Wilmington, Del., December 18, 1941.

"By relieving the responsible officers of duty before the investigation starts, furthermore, the administration has made certain that facts, not personalities, will be most important."—Editorial, *Repository*, Canton, Ohio, December 18, 1941.

"Obviously, they (the commanders) could not continue to execute their duties and at the same time remain available for the investigating commission. Without responsibility for the defense of Hawaii in the immediate future, these officers who were in command when the first attack was made, will be able to cooperate more fully with the investigators, and, if necessary, to prepare their own defense."—Editorial, *Times*, N. Y. C., December 19, 1941.

"They were the officers responsible for the sea, land and air defenses of the islands and the conduct of those defenses is now the concern of a presidential board of investigation. It would not have been fair to them, to the men under their command or to the nation to retain them in their posts while their administrations [50] were under critical examination."—Editorial, *Courant*, Hartford, Conn., December 19, 1941.

B. Approval of the demotion as a move to restore public confidence in the government and armed forces.—"The promptness of the decision in Washington to make these drastic moves is a good omen for the conduct of the war, now and in the future. It must prove heartening to the entire country, and its effect upon the entire armed establishment will be invigorating."—Editorial, *Telegram*, Worcester, Mass., December 18, 1941.

"The forthright action of the War and Navy departments in completely revamping the Hawaiian command and that of the Pacific fleet, following immediately upon the President's appointment of a formal board of inquiry, serves to dissipate completely any lingering fear on the part of the American people that the Pearl Harbor affair would be 'whitewashed' or any incompetents retained in posts of command in any of the branches of the armed service."—Editorial, *Herald-Dispatch*, Huntington, West Virginia, December 18, 1941.

"The sudden shift of ranking officers in Hawaii should be beneficial to the armed forces and the American public. It re- [51] flects a determination to eliminate from posts of greatest responsibility those who may lack the capacity for such commands."—Editorial, *Star*, Muncie, Indiana, December 19, 1941.

"Removal of the three men in a way makes the penalty lighter than if just one had been singled out, and that perhaps is fair. But the nation as a whole could not have complete confidence without changes in responsible leadership in the Pacific."—Editorial, *Globe*, Joplin, Missouri. December 19, 1941.

"Without waiting for a report from the president's board of investigation, the administration has removed officers in command when Pearl Harbor was attacked and appointed their successors. To what extent they were responsible for what happened will not be known until the board of investigators finishes its work. But neither the administration nor the people felt that confidence could be sustained or stimulated by their retention."—Editorial, *Independent*, Massillon, Ohio. December 19, 1941.

"Secretary of War Stimson's statement on the changes in the fleet and Hawaiian commands—the most extensive statement made on this subject—cites as reasons 1) the 'unpreparedness' of December 7, [52] which the War Department as well as the Navy Department now officially admits; 2) the necessary 'reorganization of air defenses in the islands; and 3) the avoidance of the situation that would result if the officers were still responsible for the security of the islands at a time when they were 'under searching investigation.'

"All these reasons add up to the hard fact that officers in charge at a time of disaster rarely retain their posts. This is an old doctrine, held to generally by all governments and all nations and extending far back into military and naval history. It may involve injustice. But sometimes injustice can be corrected. The immediate need is the restoration of confidence, among officers and men and in the country itself; and this restoration of confidence begins nearly always from the installation of new commanders."—Editorial, *Virginian-Pilot*, Norfolk, Va. December 19, 1941.

C. *Approval of the demotion of the commanders on the evidence of Secretary Knox's report.*—"We know from Secretary Knox's statement that there was negligence. That is sufficient reason why both the commander of the fleet and the commander of the shore forces should have been relieved of their commands."—Editorial, *Times*, Watertown, N. Y. December 18, 1941.

[53] "The removal of the admiral, a lieutenant general, and a major general who were in command at Hawaii a week ago Sunday was to be expected. It is a military maxim that there is no excuse for surprise. The service regulations of both the army and navy require every officer to take adequate precautions for the security of his own force, regardless of orders or lack of orders from his superiors. The officers who have been removed evidently failed to obey this first military commandment."—Editorial, *Tribune*, Chicago, Ill., December 18, 1941.

"It may turn out that Admiral Kimmel and Generals Short and Martin had given the proper orders that should have insured alertness at Pearl Harbor. But even so they are responsible for the obvious lack of preparation. An officer's duty won't stop with giving orders. Even more important, his duty is to see they are carried out.

"It would be disquieting, indeed, to think that our main fleet and our most important outpost were to be continued in the hands of men responsible for the calamity of December 7."—Editorial, *Record*, Phila., Penna., December 19, 1941.

D. *Approval of the commanders' demotion with regret for the humiliation involved.*

[54] "We say the apparent necessity for such action will be regretted because any of us can understand and sympathize with the kind of humiliation such action entails for the officers concerned and for the services as well. Because despite the fact many of their fellow citizens will be constrained to withhold final judgment until after the President's investigating committee has made a full report, so far as the public generally is concerned, the high command in charge on that fateful Sunday of the Japanese attack is already damned for having been 'asleep at the switch'.

"There will be no disputing the position of the administration, however, that whatever the facts may have been, it would be inadvisable not to remove those men from their commands pending the inquiry scheduled."—Editorial, *Journal*, Knoxville, Tenn., December 19, 1941.

[55] VIII. Publication of Evidence

14 clippings suggest the desirability of publishing the results of the investigation. Of these, 10 emphasize the American public's right to know the facts, while four recognize the possibility that it might be better to withhold them at least until some future date. Interest in this subject ranged from the 16th to the 19th after which there is no further mention of it.

A. Public's right to know.—"The findings should be given to the people. They are entitled to know the whole truth. And when the worst is known it will arouse the people of this nation to give of their energy, their wealth and all their resources, to the end that Japan and her Axis partners may pay in full for the crimes they are committing in their effort to destroy freedom and liberty throughout the world."—Editorial, *Herald*, Spartanburg, S. C., Dec. 16, 1941.

"Let us not confuse the immediate issues of the war by recriminations now, but let us bear in mind that Congress and the people have a right to know all the facts."—Editorial, *News*, Buffalo, N. Y., Dec. 17, 1941.

"The blame for the lack of necessary precaution should be determined because the American people are entitled to know [56] the facts.

"The secretary himself is involved, but whether open to any criticism will be, if such is the case, revealed by the testimony which should be available.

"The nation has a right to know what might have been done to soften the unexpected blow."—Editorial, *Journal-Times*, Racine, Wis., Dec. 17, 1941.

"Though the American public to the last citizen was equally taken unawares, equally deceived by the diplomatic gestures of Japan's envoys in Washington, it is imperative that they know who was asleep at the switch and why. For, whatever our national naivete respecting codes of honor in warfare, those in charge of our defense should have been prepared even for this abysmal display of trickery."—Editorial, *Herald-Tribune*, N. Y. C., Dec. 17, 1941.

"But whoever was to blame for it all, no matter how high their positions, that fact should be made known to the people of the U. S. who, after all, have seen vast destruction to their Navy and their planes, great loss of life of their sons and a sizable hole punched in the defenses of their liberties [57] and the independence of their country."—Editorial, *Grand Rapids*, Mich., Dec. 18, 1941.

B. Recognition of need for secrecy.—In commenting on Secretary Knox's statement that we are all entitled to know the facts, a Jackson, Miss., paper says:

"By 'all' we presume he means that the people also are entitled to this knowledge, and we believe that in due time it will be given to them."—Editorial, *Clarion-Ledger*, Jackson, Miss., Dec. 17, 1941.

"How much of the information gathered will be released to the public is a question of course; it may be that the inquiry will develop certain fundamental weaknesses in our defensive system that ought not to become public property."—Editorial, *Day*, New London, Conn., Dec. 18, 1941.

"Unless military necessity commands complete silence, it might be helpful for the people to know just how it was that fifth column activities made themselves manifest in Hawaii. Secretary Knox has revealed that the seditionists were active and effective, but he has not told the country just what it was [58] that those traitors did. Perhaps there are grave and sufficient reasons why this information should be withheld. If it would disserve the national interest for this information to be supplied, nothing more should ever be said about it. No American has any right to seek information whose disclosure might imperil the country."—Editorial, *Oklahoman*, Oklahoma City, Okla., Dec. 18, 1941.

"It is to be assumed that the investigation will be held behind closed doors and that the reasons for secret proceedings may also cause parts of the board's final report to the President as commander-in-chief to be held confidential. But on the broad issue of lack of alertness and responsibility for it, the public expects the board to be plain spoken—and it probably will be."—Editorial, *Republican*, Springfield, Mass., Dec. 18, 1941.

[59]

UNITED STATES MAGAZINES

A survey of popular news magazines of varied editorial policy reveals little deviation from newspaper opinion. The *Nation* for December 20, 1941, expresses approval of the President's appointments, and hopes the commission will not pull its punches. The *Nation* for the following week and the *New Republic* for both December 22, and December 29, 1941, state that though definite blame cannot be laid as yet, it is possible that "Munich-minded" Washington officials are primarily responsible for the disaster. The Henry Luce publications, *Time* and *Life* both for December 29, 1941, make no statement of opinion except to praise Justice Owen J. Robert's chairman of the commission, and give a brief summary of his career.

The *National Week*, Washington, D. C., December 28, 1941, announces the appointment of the commission, adding that its scope of inquiry is broad enough to have a real bearing on future policies. By implication, the article goes on to suggest that the commission may disclose lack of co-ordination between jealous army and navy rivals as the real cause of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

[60] The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*, December 25, 1941 makes no reference to the investigating commission, but gives the President a slightly two-edged compliment on his action in the Pearl Harbor affair. "The President apparently has not hesitated to deal vigorously with military dereliction or incompetence. On the contrary, he seems to have acted with dispatch, and so far as can be judged, with good sense. He should act with similar strength on other fronts."

The *New Masses*, December 30, 1941, approves the President's prompt action in appointing an investigating commission in the following terms: "The fact that our Commander-in-Chief has acted with such decision and speed will bolster popular morale and discipline. It will serve as a rebuke to those congressmen who were itching to make political capital out of the nation's defeat at Pearl Harbor."

Monthlies dated through January, 1942 including *Harpers*, *Fortune*, *Atlantio Monthly*, etc., went to press before the event so contained no comment. This is likewise true of those magazines such as the *Saturday Evening Post*, *Liberty*, and *Collier's* which are not concerned primarily with last minute news reports. No mention of the attack appeared in the *Financial Age*, December 22, 1941, or the *Financial World* of the same date.

[61]

OFFICIAL UNITED STATES DISPATCHES

An examination of cable dispatches received at the State Department since the Pearl Harbor disaster reveals no pertinent data. No attempt has been made to explore the war or Navy Department data as it is assumed that it will be examined directly by Justice Roberts' Commission.

CANADIAN PRESS

A partial survey of the Canadian press reveals only one reference to the investigating commission which appears in the *Toronto Daily Star*, December 18, 1941 as follows:

"The United States has removed its three principal officers in the sea, land and air forces at Hawaii so that they may face an investigating tribunal. These men, if they offended at all offended by a sin of omission * * * the British should remember that a disaster to Britain not less in seriousness than the disaster to the U. S. at Hawaii occurred off the coast of Malaya because of the deliberate, premeditated action of someone who terribly underrated air power."

"The American press thinks that the shake-up in the U. S. High Command indicates an intention to use air power freely to rectify the adverse situation in the Far East."

[62] No discussion of the subject has taken place in the Canadian Parliament which last met November 5, 1941.

BRITISH PRESS

This survey has been much limited by the fact that only the very few British newspapers which we received by air mail have been available for examination.

The only reference to the investigating commission found thus far appeared in the *London Times*, December 18, 1941, as follows:

"The membership of the board which will inquire into the Japanese attack on Hawaii is such as to deserve the fullest public confidence. Justice Owen J. Roberts of the Supreme Court, its chairman, is a man of keen and powerful mind; Major-General Frank McCoy will be remembered for his work in the Far East at the time of the Lytton Commission; Rear-Admiral William Standley has been Chief of Naval Operations; Rear-Admiral Joseph Reeves is a former Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Battle Fleet, and Brigadier-General McNarney is still on duty with the Army Air Force."

Official Reports of the latest House of Commons and House of Lords debates include no discussion of the Pearl Harbor attack nor of the President's appointment of the investigating commission.

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[63]

AUSTRALIAN PRESS

No Australian newspapers are available as yet. We have, however, established contact with Mr. Alan S. Watt, Secretary of the Australian Legation who has been good enough to check through the cabled dispatches to the Legation from Australia. He reports that he finds no reflection of Australian opinion about the Pearl Harbor investigating commission to date.

OTHER PARTS OF THE EMPIRE

Newspapers are not available, and no reflections of opinion have come in from other parts of the Empire as yet.

FOREIGN SHORTWAVE BROADCASTS

The shortwave broadcasts from Germany, Italy and Japan refer to the appointment of the investigating commission with their usual exaggerated ridicule.

The German radio asserts that the President, not the Army and Navy ought to be investigated, and adds that the impression made on the English was far from favorable. Broadcasts from Rome assert that the United States is receiving just reward for their ridicule of Japan. The investigation, according to the Italians, is simply an admission of incompetence and confusion.

[64] Japanese propaganda quotes German commentators as saying that through the investigation commission, Admiral Kimmel and General Martin are being punished for mistakes made by the Washington administration. "In other words, they are being sacrificed so that President Roosevelt and Colonel Knox will be able to escape from their responsibility for the Hawaiian disaster."

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL SUMMARY

This survey was made from the 400 United States newspapers, which are reviewed daily by the Press Intelligence Division of the Office of Government Reports. 834 clippings discussed the Pearl Harbor disaster. Of these 236 refer to the investigating commission. 16 United States magazines and 6 Canadian newspapers have also been checked. The only foreign publications available were the *London Times*, the *Manchester Guardian*, and the Official Reports of the Debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords. Foreign broadcasts were taken from transcripts made by the Federal Communications Commission, December 19-22, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 4 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

THE TEMPERANCE LEAGUE OF HAWAII

25 Dillingham Building Annex, Telephone 3183

HONOLULU, HAWAII

Rev. PAUL B. WATERHOUSE
President
PAUL B. SANBORN
Vice-President

CHRIS J. BENNY
Executive Secretary

HAROLD C. SMITH
Secretary
WILLIAM C. FURR
Treasurer

HONOLULU HAWAII, Jan. 3, 1942.

Hon. OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Chairman and Members of the Special Investigating Committee,
Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: The Temperance forces of America. Throughout the years, have consistently advocated sobriety both in industry and in the military and naval services. Failure to be guided in industry by rules of sobriety undeniably results in economic losses, but failure by the armed forces of the United States to observe a condition of strict alertness and sobriety at a time of unprecedented emergency might easily at such a time spell the humiliation of a Nation.

The timing of the enemy's treacherous blow for 7:55 on the first Sunday morning following pay day was no mere accident. It was based on the well known but grim and awful fact that we have only half a navy, half an army, on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

Literally thousands of our men of the services, both enlisted and commissioned, augmented by like thousands of defense workers were joined in a saturday night whirlwind which, with ever increasing tempo, was bent upon making the approaching Christmas Holy Season, the worst and wettest ever seen in Hawaii. In the tragic act which befell us, the prophet of old might have visioned the hand of a wrathful God stretched forth to stay the impending desecration.

The American people everywhere are seriously asking for the truth about December seventh. The Temperance League of Hawaii is not asking that your Commission apply censure or criticism. Regret and grief already exist. But we earnestly beseech you to use the opportunity to impress upon the American public the seriousness of the present situation; to awaken them from a state of self-complacency and delusion into which they have been lulled by the press, by the movie and by the politician and above all to bring about a realization of the unpleasant yet inevitable fact that every ounce of material and every unit of energy must be devoted to the gigantic challenge of winning the war. This task cannot be accomplished when millions in money and men will continue to be used for a purpose other than the great challenge,—for a purpose which, in fact, will hinder and hamper the efforts of industry and the efficiency and alertness of our military and naval services.

In view of the gravity of the situation we believe it to be within the sphere of your duty and responsibility to urge that alcoholic liquor be immediately barred from both navy and army, and from all vital industries.

This request is prayerfully submitted for your serious consideration.

PAUL B. WATERHOUSE,
President.

CHRIS J. BENNY,
Executive Secretary.

ROYAL HAWAIIAN HOTEL,
Sunday, January 4, 1942.

Rev. PAUL B. WATERHOUSE,
*President, The Temperance League of Hawaii,
25 Dillingham Building Annex, Honolulu, Hawaii.*

DEAR MR. WATERHOUSE: Mr. Justice Roberts, Chairman of the Investigation Committee appointed by the President, and now in Honolulu, has directed me to acknowledge your courteous letter to him of January 3rd, also signed by Mr. Chris J. Benny, Executive Secretary.

The Commission will hold hearings tomorrow, Monday, January 5th, in Room 300, in the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The Chairman, on behalf of the Commission, has asked me to invite you and Mr. Benny to appear before the Commission tomorrow afternoon between two o'clock and four-thirty, in order that the Commission may have the benefit of your testimony about the statements of facts in your letter, and perhaps in somewhat more detail. At the same time there could be an opportunity to discuss your recommendations.

The exact time during the afternoon for your suggested appearance is for the moment somewhat in doubt, as the Commission will not learn until tomorrow morning what time Governor Poindexter will appear in answer to the Commission's invitation. I suggest, therefore, that you telephone me tomorrow morning at about eleven o'clock, so that a definite hour may be fixed.

I am assuming that you will be willing to accept this invitation. Should your engagements tomorrow afternoon interfere it can probably be made possible to receive you on the following day, although the Commission's time in Honolulu is necessarily limited.

I am enclosing a copy of this letter to Mr. Benny for his information.

Sincerely yours,

*Recorder of the Commission to Investigate the Circumstances of the
Attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.*

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EXHIBIT No. 5 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

No. 3772

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That hereto annexed is a true copy of the document described below, which is in the official custody of the Archivist of the United States and is on file in The National Archives, to wit:

Executive order No. 89-3, dated December 18, 1941.

In testimony whereof, I, Solon J. Buck, Archivist of the United States, have hereunto caused the Seal of The National Archives to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Administrative Secretary of The National Archives, in the District of Columbia, this 24th day of December 1941.

[SEAL]

SOLON J. BUCK
Archivist of the United States
BY THAD PAGE
Administrative Secretary.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

APPOINTING A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE THE JAPANESE ATTACK OF DECEMBER 7, 1941, ON HAWAII

Pursuant to the authority in me vested by the Constitution of the United States, I hereby appoint as a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, the following:

Associate Justice Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Chairman;
Admiral William H. Standley, United States Navy, Retired;
Rear Admiral Joseph M. Reeves, United States Navy, Retired;
Major General Frank R. McCoy, United States Army, Retired;
Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney, United States Army.

The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor.

The Commission will convene at the call of its Chairman at Washington, D. C., will thereafter proceed with its professional and clerical assistants to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and any other places it may deem necessary to visit for the completion of its inquiry. It will then return to Washington, D. C., and submit its report direct to the President of the United States.

The Commission is empowered to prescribe its own procedure, [2] to employ such professional and clerical assistants as it may deem necessary, to fix the compensation and allowances of such assistants, to incur all necessary expenses for services and supplies, and to direct such travel of members and employees at public expense as it may deem necessary in the accomplishment of its mission. Each of the members of the Commission and each of its professional assistants, including civilian advisers and any Army, Navy, and Marine Corps officers so employed, detailed or assigned shall receive payment of his actual and necessary expenses for transportation, and in addition and in lieu of all other allowances for expenses while absent from the place of his residence or station in connection with the business of the Commission, a per diem allowance of twenty-five dollars. All of the expenses of the Commission shall be paid by Army disbursing officers from allocations to be made to the War Department for that purpose from the Emergency Fund for the President.

All executive officers and agencies of the United States are directed to furnish the Commission such facilities, services, and cooperation as it may request of them from time to time.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE, December 18, 1941.

EXHIBIT No. 6 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

ND V PM NR 131 23 DEC 41 :: Z TALK 232036 TORY PP GH 14 BT
FROM: JAG WASH D. C.
TO: COM 14
STANLEY FOR LT COL BROWN X HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 259
APPROVED TWENTY THREE DECEMBER

H. J. Res. 259

SEVENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; AT THE FIRST
SESSION; BEGUN AND HELD AT THE CITY OF WASHINGTON ON FRIDAY, THE THIRD
DAY OF JANUARY, ONE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED AND FORTY-ONE

JOINT RESOLUTION TO AUTHORIZE THE COMMISSION APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT TO
CONDUCT AN INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATTACK ON HAWAII, TO
COMPEL THE ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES AND THE PRODUCTION OF BOOKS, PAPERS, AND
DOCUMENTS

Whereas on December 18, 1941, the President by Executive order appointed Owen J. Roberts, William H. Standley, Joseph M. Reeves, Frank R. McCoy, and Joseph T. McNarney a commission to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) the commission appointed by the President by Executive order, dated December 18, 1941, to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by the Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941 (in this Act called the "commission"), may, or by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may designate may, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions at any place within the United States or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States. The commission or any member of the commission when so authorized by the commission shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under investigation by the commission. The commission or any member of the commission or any agent or agency designated by the commission for such purpose may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the production of such evidence may be required from any place within the United States or any place subject to the civil or military jurisdiction of the United States at any designated place of hearing.

(b) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person under subsection (a), any district court of the United States or the United States courts of any Territory or possession, or the District Court of the United States for the District of Columbia, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business, upon application by the commission shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear before the commission, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

(c) Process and papers of the commission, its members, agent, or agency, may be served either upon the witness in person or by registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the residence or principal office or place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same, setting forth the manner of such service, shall be proof of the same, and the return post-office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when registered and mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the commission, its members, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.

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(d) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except that that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.

(e) All process of any court to which application may be made under this Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the person required to be served resides or may be found.

(f) The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the President, shall furnish the commission, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the commission.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate.

EXHIBIT No. 7 (NAVY, PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
206 Dillingham Bldg.

HONOLULU, T. H., January 9, 1942.

Personal and Confidential

Memorandum to

Mr. Justice Roberts:

Mr. Hoover wishes me to inform you he has received information from a source heretofore reliable that during the time Admiral Richardson was in charge of the Navy at Pearl Harbor he refused to permit the fleet to anchor in Pearl Harbor on the ground that the Harbor was unsafe because it was not defensible if the fleet should be attacked there.

Admiral Richardson is reported to have required the fleet always to anchor in Lahaina Roads outside Pearl Harbor and to have advised the Navy Department that he would resist efforts to have him anchor the fleet in Pearl Harbor "at the risk of losing his command."

For your personal and confidential information, the following radiogram was sent to the Japanese Ambassador at Washington and the Foreign Minister at Tokyo, December 6, 1941, by Kita, Japanese Consul General at Honolulu:

"On the evening of the fifth the BB Wyoming and one sweeper entered port.

"Ships moored on the sixth are as follows:

BB-9

CL-3

DD-17

AM-3

"Ships in dock:

CL-4

DD-2

(CA and CB all gone)

"P. S. CB cannot be found in the fleet."

*Memorandum to
Mr. Justice Roberts*

JANUARY 9, 1942.

Again for your confidential information, the letter symbols in the above message is the official naval code for their ships:

BB—battleships
CL—light cruisers
DD—destroyers
AM—minesweepers
CA—heavy cruisers
CB—aircraft carriers

According to my information, the above information is correct and that these ships were actually docked or moored at Pearl Harbor on the sixth.

This office now has information from a Japanese taxi driver that he drove a member of the Japanese Consulate to Pearl Harbor Peninsula on December 6 to look at the fleet in Pearl Harbor, and the foregoing information was undoubtedly obtained by the Consulate member at that time. It is also now known that the same Consulate member, who came here March 27, 1941, has been engaged in espionage and reporting fleet movements to the Japanese Government since that time.

Again for your confidential information I am quoting a radiogram that was sent by Kita, the Japanese Consulate General at Honolulu, to the Foreign Minister at Tokyo. The date of this message is not known.

"1. The Army ordered several hundred balloons for training at Camp Davis, N. C., on the American mainland. They considered (at that time) the practicability of their employment in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Investigation of the vicinity of Pearl Harbor reveals no locations selected for their use or any preparations for constructing moorings. No evidence of training or personnel preparations were seen. It is concluded that their installation would be difficult. Even if they were actually provided they would interfere with operations at nearby Hickam Field, Ewa Field and Ford Island. The whole matter seems to have been dropped.

"2. Am continuing in detail the investigation of the non-use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships and will report further."

Any investigation under Clause 2 of the use of nets for torpedo defense of battleships would have necessarily had to be made in Pearl Harbor proper as no information could have been secured by visual observations from outside of the Harbor as the nets would not have been visible.

This leads me to the conclusion that from this and the accuracy of fleet movements previously reported the Japanese Government through its Consul General here has someone right inside Pearl Harbor who is furnishing this information and that visual verification of the information reported from the inside is made by Japanese Consular Agents from vantage points around Pearl Harbor merely as a check on the information furnished by their informant or informants on the inside.

I would appreciate an opportunity to discuss with you personally some phases of the situation out here, particularly some of the activities of the FBI in Japanese espionage matters, as well as the practical effects of the delimitation agreement.

Very sincerely,

R. L. SHIVERS,
R. L. Shivers,
Special Agent in Charge.

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EXHIBIT No. 8 (NAVY PACKET No. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

DRUNKS TURNED OVER TO MP & SP

To: *Military Police*

——— : Co. M 19th Inf. Sch. Brks.

Arrested at the Service Cafe at 9:30 PM 12-6-41 by Officer T Sato for being drunk, staggering

——— : Schofield Barracks

Arrested at Maunakea & Beretania Sts. at 12:35 AM 12-7-41 by Officer A Lee for being drunk

To: *Shore Patrol*

——— : S S Dobbin

Arrested at Nuuanu & Hotel Sts. at 11:45 PM 12-6-41 by Officer A Lee for being drunk

——— : Pearl Harbor

Arrested at Aala Park by Officer J C Lee at 12:30 AM 12-7-41

ACCIDENTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL

1. ——— Lt., Naval Air Station PH was involved in a minor accident with ——— of 3450 Maunalei Ave. at about 8:30 PM 12-6-41 somewhere on Ala Wai Blvd. Both cars were going straight ahead, no violation indicated.

2. ——— of 251st. C. A. Camp Malakole was involved in a minor accident with ——— of Hawaiian Village at 2:30 PM 12-6-41 on Kam Highway near new Pearl Harbor Gate. ——— had been drinking and was trying to overtake ———'s car. ——— took off after accident and information broadcasted. No disposition available.

3. ——— of Co. D 298th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was involved in a \$275. accident with ——— of House 834 Waipahu at 9:50 PM, 12-6-41 on Kam Highway Honolulu side of Waipahu-Schofield junction and ——— was injured, receiving an abrasion to left ear, left elbow and back; taken to Waipahu Hospital and later discharged. ——— had been drinking, was trying to make a left turn and was on the wrong side of the road. Charged with Sec. 6.01 TC Report No. B-44182

4. ——— of Co. E, 19th. Inf. Scho. Bks. drove his car off the Kaukonahua Road cut-off at Haleiwa at 12:00 noon 12-6-41. Damages \$15. and none injured. ——— had been drinking and was charged with Sec. 6281 SL '41. Report No. B-44001

5. ———, Sgt. of Batt. C. 98th. C. A., Scho. Bks. drove off the road on Red Hill road about 4:30 AM 12-6-41 when his car skidded. \$125 damages, none injured. No disposition noted. No report number.

ARRESTS AND COMPLAINTS INVOLVING SERVICE PERSONNEL DECEMBER 6, 1941

1. ———, Co. A, 27th. Inf. Scho. Bks. was arrested at 12:47 AM for tampering with vehicle belonging to ——— parked at 832 Hauoli St. Charged with Attempted Malicious Conversion and defendant turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43865.

2. ——— of USS Cassin reported being struck by ——— of Hon. Rapid Transit Co. at Alapal and King St. at 1.02 AM when he attempted to stop a fight between Mrs. ———, his companion and ———. Desired no prosecution. Report No. B-43867.

3. ——— of USS Rigel, PH was arrested at 9:40 PM at Kalakaua & Kuhio Ave. for trying to start auto belonging to Detective ———. Referred to Shore Patrol for disposition. Report No. B-43976.

4. ——— 18th. Air Base, Hickam Field was found lying in the toilet in the rear of lobby of Army and Navy YMCA about 8:00 PM with cut on head. Treated by Dr. ——— for lacerated wound right post parietal scalp. Strong alcoholic breath. Subject did not know what happened to himself. Turned over to Military Police for disposition. Report No. B-43986.

5. An unknown sailor was apprehended by the Emergency Hospital attendants for tampering with Emergency Hospital ambulance in front of Star Grill, 255

N. King St. 12-7-41 at 12:30 AM. Turned over to Shore Patrol for disposition before arrival of police officer, therefore, name unavailable. Report No. B-43984.

6. ——— of Naval Air Base was treated at Emergency Hospital for two inch wound on right side of face. He claimed to have been injured 12-7-41 about 2:26 AM when glass from windshield of auto he was riding flew back and cut his face when car sideswiped a City and County street sweeper. Report B-44033.

7. ——— 21st. Signal Co. Scho. Bks. claimed to have been short changed by taxi driver from the Shamrock Taxi, 12-7-41 at 1:45 AM. Gave taxi driver \$5. and didn't receive any change. Instructed to swear out a warrant but failed to do so. Report No. B-44035.

POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU
Honolulu, Hawaii

JANUARY 7, 1942.

HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS,
Associate Justice, U. S. Supreme Court,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR SIR: The attached is a report showing complaints and reports received by this Department on December 6, 1941, relative to Army and Navy personnel.

If there is anything further that we can do to assist you in any matter, kindly be assured that this Department is at your command.

Very truly yours,

W. A. GABRIELSON,
W. A. Gabrielson,
Chief of Police.

WAG:DL
Encl

JANUARY 9, 1942.

MR. W. A. GABRIELSON,
Chief of Police, City and County of Honolulu,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

MY DEAR MR. GABRIELSON: Mr. Justice Roberts has asked me to acknowledge with his thanks your letter of January 7, 1942, enclosing a report showing complaints and reports received by your Department on December 6, 1941, relative to Army and Navy personnel.

Yours sincerely,

Secretary, Commission to Investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor.

EXHIBIT NO. 9 (NAVY, PACKET NO. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION
Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941

Area	July 1, 1940	July 1, 1941
City of Honolulu.....	180,986	200,158
City and County of Honolulu (Exclusive of Honolulu City).....	79,899	110,345
City of Hilo.....	24,341	22,667
County of Hawaii (Exclusive of Hilo City).....	49,222	45,731
County of Kalawao.....	465	464
County of Kauai.....	35,956	33,479
County of Maui.....	55,785	52,496
Total.....	426,654	465,339

1312 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Population estimates as of July 1, 1940 and July 1, 1941—Continued

Race	July 1, 1940		July 1, 1941	
	Citizens	Noncitizens	Citizens	Noncitizens
Hawaiian.....	14,359	-----	14,246	----- = 14,246
Part Hawaiian.....	50,470	-----	52,445	----- = 52,445
Puerto Rican.....	8,322	-----	8,460	----- = 8,460
Caucasian.....	103,700	2,681	139,299	2,328 = 141,627
Chinese.....	24,245	4,589	24,886	4,351 = 29,237
Japanese.....	121,312	36,678	124,351	35,183 = 159,534
Korean.....	4,517	2,337	4,628	2,253 = 6,881
Filipino.....	17,109	35,498	18,050	34,010 = 52,060
All others.....	807	30	832	17 = 849
	344,841	81,813	387,197	78,142 = 465,339

Apr. 1, 1940, Census, T. of H., 423,330.

EXHIBIT NO. 10 (NAVY, PACKET NO. 1) ROBERTS COMMISSION

[The Honolulu Advertiser, Honolulu, Hawaii, December 16, 1941]

ESCAPED ENEMY PILOT KILLED BY HAWAIIAN PAIR ON NIIHAU

JAPANESE FLIER THREATENED TO KILL ISLANDERS

A desperate Japanese pilot, forced down on the small, peaceful island of Niihau, off Kauai, held the village at bay with machinegun and side arms before he was captured and killed by a six-foot Hawaiian and his wife who "got mad" when the enemy pilot shot the Hawaiian three times, according to a radio story broadcast by station KTOH, Kauai, last night.

Relating on of the most thrilling stories of the Pacific war, the narrator told how Benjamin Kanahale, powerful Niihau native, and his wife finally brought to bay the brutal invader who had threatened to kill everyone in sight.

GIVEN LIBERTY OF ISLAND

It was reported that the plane had been forced down on Niihau following the Sunday, Dec. 7, raid on Pearl Harbor. Natives took the pilot's machinegun and side-arms from him and then gave him the liberty of the island. The pilot is said to have immediately contacted two Japanese residing on Niihau, Harada and Shintani, who on the Friday following the landing persuaded the natives to hand over the fire-arms including the machinegun. The three Japanese, it was reported, thereupon established an armed camp, each standing an eight hour watch to prevent anyone escaping to bring help from Kauai.

In spite of this a Hawaiian, named Hauila, stole away and with a group of cowboys rode 18 miles across the island through a hail of machinegun fire and managed to take off for Kauai in a whaleboat. They reached Waimea 10 hours later (Saturday morning) after rowing steadily through heavy seas.

ARMY SQUAD DISPATCHED

Hauila's party contacted army authorities on Kauai and Lt. Jack Mizuba and a squad from the 299th Infantry returned in the whaleboat to Niihau.

In the meantime, it was learned, the enemy pilot had sent Shintani out to look for Hauila. Failing to locate his quarry, Shintani disappeared into the woods. The flier then asked Kanahale to aid him and the remaining Japanese, Harada, Kanahale, pretending to agree, set out with them in search of those who were missing. During the search, according to Kanahale, Harada became nervous and, obtaining a shotgun from the pilot, placed it against his stomach and fired. It missed and he fired again, the blast taking effect and killing him instantly.